globalization, guerrillas y paras: the case of colombia

8/6/2019 Globalization, Guerrillas y Paras: the Case of Colombia

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Globalization, Guerrillas y Paras : the Case of Colombia

Jorge E. Arboleda

Introduction.

This paper addresses three main points. First, it argues that global policies such as the

US-led War on Drugs, and free trade policies such as the Andean Trade Preference Act

(ATPA), the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), and the

current US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (FTA), have contributed to the

strengthening of the two main illegal warring factions in Colombia, the ultra-right

paramilitary (Paramilitares or Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia , AUC), and the leftist

FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). Second, these policies have helped

the ultra-right paramilitary groups on a much greater scale than the leftist guerrillas.

Third, both free trade and anti-drugs policies have contributed to maintainColombias

traditional system of land mal-distribution in place because theParamilitares , after

benefiting from these policies, have become an emerging class of narco-landowners whohave forced poor farmers off their land, causing the displacement of 2 million

Colombians.1

In Colombia, globalization and its policies have contributed to making the warring

factions more effective, efficient, and sophisticated than in previous decades.Colombias

warring factions have become active players in international criminal networks2 as a

result of the counterproductive effects of global anti-crime and economic policies, and

1 U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, December, 31, 2003. Cited in Bouvier, Virginia M. 2005. Evaluating U.S. Policy in Colombia: A Policy Report from the IRC Americas Program. InternationalRelations Center, Americas Program. An online version is available at: http://americas.irc-online.org/reports/2005/0505colombia.html2 Naim, Moiss:The Five Wars of Globalization . In Foreign Policy magazine, January-February, 2003: 29-30


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the interconnectedness of both legal and illegal markets. These factions have been

transformed into more competitive players in the national and international market of

illegal drugs and weapons trafficking while maintaining or increasing their influence inColombias political conflict. Through accessto global markets Colom bias warring

factions have become less dependent on gaining turf in their local civil conflicts, and

have significantly increased their resilience and chances for longer-term sustainability.3

The growth of these narco-networks has thus decreased the possibilities of a future

peaceful settlement to civil conflict in Colombia.

1. How Global Anti-Crime and Economic Policies Have Strengthened Warring

Factions in Colombia?

The increasing globalization of anti-crime and economic policies, namely free trade

agreements, and the opening of national economies to free market policies,is

correlated with the strengthening of warring factions. Anti-crime policies, such as the

war on drugs, have contributed to the increasing cultivation of illegal narcotics inColombia. By developing successful eradication campaigns in countries such as Peru and

Bolivia, the US led War on Drugs caused the moving of illegal crops from the southern

nations to Colombia. As successful eradication campaigns camped in Bolivia and Peru,

crops bloomed in Colombia under relaxed police control and the protection of illegal

armed groups.4

3 Williams, Phil,Transnational Criminal Networks . In John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds.). 2001.Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy. RAND-National Defense ResearchInstitute: 61-79. P. 80.4 Felbab-Brown, Vanda, 2005.The Coca Connection: Conflict and Drugs in Colombia and Peru. TheJournal of Conflict Studies,volume XXV, issue 2, Winter 2005. p. 11
http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/


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In the late 1990s the guerrilla, the paramilitary, and their narcotrafficking activities

seemed out of control. The Colombian government of president Pastrana and the Clinton

administration released the multinational anti-narcotics program, Plan Colombia, in 2000.Under this plan both administrations sought to destroy the narcotrafficking network that

was already operating between Colombia, the US and the countries of the European

Union (EU). Although eradication of crops was to be the main focus of the Plan, it also

included a social component that was to be likened to a Marshall Plan () to bring

about a lasting peace by addressing the growing violence and illicit crop cultivation as

symptoms of deeper issues of poverty, exclusion, and social and economic inequities.5

Plan Colombia modernized Colombias anti-narcotics forces and in empowered the

governments military to deal with the countrys insurgency. Despite being initially

designed as an anti-drug program, by 2002 the US Congress approved a legislation (P.L.

107-206) that allowed the Colombian government to use Plan Colombias resources to

combat insurgent organizations involved in narcotrafficking.6

This move strengthened theColombian government in its fight against the two main leftist guerrilla organizations, the

FARC and the ELN. Under this new plan, US aid to Colombia was increased from initial

$50 million in 2000 to $3.9 billion in 2005. Despite the early interest of both

governments in pursuing a social approach to the development of the plan, the Bush

administration, in agreement with the Pastrana administration and the incoming Uribe

Administration, decided that most of the aid needed to be invested in modernizing the

Colombian army as a way to defeat the forces securing narcotics production. As it ended

up, 80% of the US aid ($3.14 billion) was directed to the military to be used for training,5Bouvier, 2005: 16 Bouvier, 2005: 2


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counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics operations, and for the protection of

Colombias oil pipeline.7

Plan Colombia did not produced the counter-effects of the eradication programs inPeru and Bolivia. Instead of the crops moving to a neighbor country, cultivation

increased after Plan Colombias fifthyear. Results showed that if Colombia had supplied

80% of the cocaine consumed in the US in 2000, by 2005 it was supplying 90%. Supplies

of heroine went from 10% to 50% in the same period.8

Why did production of narcotics increase in Colombia during this period? One of the

answers posed by this paper is that part of the anti-drugs aid to the Colombian armed

forces ended up strengthening factions connected to the military, who have been involved

directly in narcotrafficking, namely the ultra right paramilitary Autodefensas AUC.9

Colombian armed forces and the American forces accepted paramilitary cooperation

although the paramilitary was listed as a terrorist organization by the US Department of

State, and has been found responsible of 70% of Colombias human rights violations andmost massacres.10 The widespread evidence that found most paramilitary operations as

widely backed by the Colombian armed forces, seemed not to have unduly influenced US

7 Bouvier, 2005: 28 Bouvier, 2005:29 See: Forero, Juan: Report Criticizes Colombia on Militias . The New York Times, November 9, 2002.Available online at:http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D06E3DF1431F93AA35752C1A9649C8B63Also, In March, 2000, paramilitary warlord, Carlos Castano, recognized in an interview that 70% of theAUC came from narcotrafficking while the other 30% was made out of contributions mainly from cattleranchers and land owners. See:Colombia Paramilitary Chief Says Businesses Back Him . The New YorkTimes, September 7, 2000. Online at:http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9906E4D61439F934A3575AC0A9669C8B6310 U.S. Department of State.2003.Colombia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Released by theBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. February 25, 2004. Available online at:http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27891.htmAlso in Spencer, David. 2001.Colombias Paramilitares: Criminals or Political force?The StrategicStudies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. P. 17. Available online at:http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub19.pdf
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D06E3DF1431F93AA35752C1A9649C8B63http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27891.htmhttp://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27891.htmhttp://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D06E3DF1431F93AA35752C1A9649C8B63


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policy.11 Evidence abounds linking paramilitary and armed forces use of resources

destined for anti-drugs campaign, while committing human rights violations, such as this

case of a paramilitary operation directed to the killing of civilians in the Putumayoregion:

There is already evidence of collusion between the new U.S.-trained

counternarcotics brigade and right-wing paramilitary death squads that are also on

the State Department's terrorist list (). In one recent incident a few miles

upriver from Puerto Asis--now known in Colombia as Muerto Asis (Death Asis)--

this reporter watched as an army patrol consisting of soldiers from the U.S.-

trained counternarcotics brigade allowed four paramilitaries armed with AK-47's

and walkie-talkies to pass unhindered and then watched the right-wing gunmen

openly brandish their weapons as they prepared to board canoes on the Putumayo

River. That same night, a paramilitary death squad killed three unarmed civilians

in Puerto Asis. Two were shot in the head, while the third was hacked open fromthe neck to the belly button with a machete.12

Colombias leftist guerrillas, mainly the FARC, also havefound an important ally in the

anti-drugs eradication campaigns. Experts reportthat the poor landless farmers see the

guerrilla movement as staunch supporters against an eradication program that destroys

the source of their income.13 The armys arrival in a peasant zone means the spraying of

11 Amnesty International reports: The vast majority of non-combat politically-motivated killings,"disappearances", and cases of torture have been carried out by army- backed paramilitaries. Availableonline at:http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engamr230192005.

12 Leech, Garry:Plan Colombia Killing Fields . In Colombia Journal. Available online at:http://www.colombiajournal.org/colombia130.htm13 Felbab-Brown, 2005: 4
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engamr230192005http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engamr230192005


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illegal crops with herbicides that destroy not only the coca and poppy plantations but all

other crops around. The leftist guerrillas are useful to the poor landless farmers as they

use their weapons against the spraying airplanes.14

The guerrillas have also won support from the peasants because coca and poppy

farmers see them as providers of authority and order in territories where the presence of

the state is almost non-existent.15 Besides providing police and customary justice to

alleviate disputes among the population, the guerrillas also provide logistics and

infrastructure to facilitate and regulate the transport of illegal crops to the market place.16

The guerrillas have established control posts along the roads17 and main navigable rivers

in Colombias Eastern Plains and the Amazon, and have transformed some trails into

unpaved roads to make the access of vehicles possible.18 In sum, the guerrillas have won

the peasants support because they provide them with services that the government would

be providing under normal circumstances.

How both factions have benefited from global-economic policies? The implementation of global free trade policies and anti-drugs policies in

Colombia set off a chain of effects and counter-effects that roughly worked as follows.

14 Forero Juan:Private U.S. Operatives on Risky Missions in Colombia . The New York Times. February14, 2004. Available online at:http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9907E3DE1F3AF937A25751C0A9629C8B6315 Thoumi, Francisco. 2002. Illegal Drugs in Colombia: From Illegal Economic Boom to Social Crisis . TheAnnals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 2002; 582: 102-116. P. 10616

Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, former United States drug policy coordinator, said about a FARC-controlledarea: ''it has been turned into an armed bastion of the FARC ().They're building roads, airfields. They'reprocessing cocaine.'' In Forero, Juan. Rebel Control Of Large Zone In Colombia Is Extended . The NewYork Times. December 7, 2000. Available online at:http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E06E0D7103CF934A35751C1A9669C8B6317 Forero, Juan.Key Roads Taken From Rebels, Colombia Says . The New York Times. November 14,2000. Available online at:http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0DEEDA1E38F937A25752C1A9669C8B6318 Revista Semana:De Qu se Re Piedad Crdoba? . Semana Magazine, November 11, 2007. Availableonline at: http://www.semana.com/wf_InfoArticulo.aspx?IdArt=107698


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First, the collapse of the international Coffee Agreement in 1989 caused the

unemployment of hundreds of thousands of coffee growers.19 Second, the implementation

of free trade policies in 1992 contributed to the increase of the rural unemploymentinitially generated by the collapse of the coffee agreement. Third, the unemployed

farmers joined the ranks of traffickers and armed factions involved in planting coca, after

successful eradication campaigns in Peru and Bolivia caused the movement of crops to

Colombia. Fourth, the farmers joined the forces of the armed groups controlling the areas

where the crops grow.

Global economic policies implemented in Colombia present three important

strikes from which Colombians suffered drastic consequences. The first strike was the

dismantling of the International Coffee Agreement in 1989 which caused high

unemployment therefore easing farmers shift from legal agriculture to illegal crop

cultivation. The second strike was marked by the opening of the economy in 1992 and the

consequent flood of food imports in Colombia which increased the rural unemploymentperpetuated by the collapse of the Coffee Agreement. The third strike was the elimination

of agricultural subsidies in Colombia.

The Collapse of the Coffee Agreement.

The dismantling of the Coffee Agreement in 1989 was a global policy strike that

pushed Colombian farmers into the ranks of illegal armed groups involved in

narcotrafficking in large numbers. Since the early 20th Century coffee has been

Colombias main export and strongest agricultural commodity. The shift from the19 Avils, William. 2006. Global Capitalism and Civil-Military Relations in Colombia. Albany: SUNYPress. P.90


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Agreements prices to market prices represented a decline of 40%.20 By 1992 annual

crop production fell 12.6%, and the overall agricultural product (including livestock)

1%.21

Colombia suffered its worst agricultural year three years after agreementscollapse.22 The country side lost of 200,000 jobs in the first three years after the fall of

the Agreement.23 The crisis affected 28 % of the Colombian population living in the

countryside at the time, roughly, 8-9 million people.24 The fact that coffee cultivation was

not an agribusinesses but carried out by thousands of country-wide-spread small family

enterprises made the effects more generalized among the population.25 Besides this, the

inability of Colombias agro-industry to absorb the unemployed26 meant that former

coffee growers had to develop their own strategies for their survival.

The move from coffee cultivation to coca growing was not difficult. Coffee

farmers and pickers knew cultivation well, and both were used to relocating during

harvest season. Coffee and coca planting in Colombia present similarities that help

explain why the unemployed peasantry migrated into Colombias jungles to plant illicitcrops. First, most of Colombian coffee growers knew how to plant and harvest other

produce that required the similar delicate care required by coffee. Second, coffee

20 Nestor Osorio, from the International Coffee Organization (ICO) writes: ICO data shows that in theperiod 1980/81 to 1988/99, prices paid to growers averaged US 67.92 cents/lb, with annual average highsof 97.6 cents in 1985, and lows of 59.7 cents in 1982/83. In the period from 1990 to 2004, the average haddropped to 63.9 cents/lb. in Osorio, Nestor:The World Coffee Market: Lessons from the Crisis and FutureScenarios. Available online at: http://www.ico.org/news/Brazile.pdf 21 Berry, 2004:2022

Berry, 2004: 2023 Aviles, 2006: 9024 Population data from: Food and Agriculture Oorganization (FAO). 2001. Perfiles Nutricionales porPaises: Colombia. Roma: FAO P: 6. Available online at:http://www.rlc.fao.org/prior/segalim/accalim/colombia/colmap.pdf 25 Most agribusinesses in Colombia are developed in the latifundia and agrarian Capitalism areas of thecountry, usually in the lowland valleys. Coffee is a mid-high altitude crop cultivated in areas of minifundiaor peasant economy areas. For information Colombias land classification, see Zamosc, Len.1986.TheAgrarian Question and the Peasant Movement in Colombia. London: Cambridge University Press.26 Berry, 2004: 20


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harvesting was seasonal. Coffee harvesters migrated along the Andean area of Colombia

(33% of the countrys area) as European harvesters of grapes do during thevendemia

season. Coffee harvesters change regions every year following the tracts of the harvestwhile being paid by the number of pounds they collect each day. Third, it is usual for

younger coffee harvesters to travel the country during several cosechas (harvests)

working to save money to later buy a small plot to start their own coffee farms.

These three factors are very similar to coca cultivation. First, coffee planters can

plant coca without needing much training. Second, coca cultivation, like coffee, requires t

planters to migrate to isolated areas where coca is planted and processed. Third, as with

coffee, it is also usual for raspachines (coca harvesters) to migrate during several

seasons while expecting to save cash to buy later a piece of land to grow coffee or raise

cattle. However, there is a fourth element in coca that has marked a difference and that

allowed coca to spread very quickly within Colombia -- there was no government

control, nor an official calendar of cosechas, -- coca was cultivated and harvested inevery single month of the year. This created an all-year round season for pickers and

planters. Thus, as the prices of coffee fell and consequently unemployment rose, the

response from landless farmers was to switch to coca cultivation. Since planting was one

thing the poor landless farmers knew very well, and migrating was just part of their

regular life, the transition was quite smooth.27

The Opening of the Economy and the Flood of Food Imports.

27 For information on the relationship between coffee and coca see: Jaramillo, Jaime, Leonidas Mora, andFernndo Cubides. 1986. Colo niza ci n, Coc a y Gue rril la . B ogo t: Uni vers ida d N aci ona ld eColombia.


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The second global strike that pushedColombias landless farmerstowards armed

groups came through the fast opening of the economy and the consequent flood of food

imports in the early 1990s. Once imported foods appeared in the market, prices of locallyproduced food declined causing economic loses to producer families. Poor farmers then

saw illegal crop cultivation as way to maintain their survival. In 1990, the year after the

fall of the Coffee agreement, the government eliminated the existing restrictions on food

imports. Taxes on imports decreased from average 35% to 12%. Importers introduced

foods obtained at lower prices in other countries. Imports of grains increased by 29%

between 1996 and 1998, vegetables 4%, and beans increased 3%. As a consequence,

Colombian farmers shifted from providing 46% of the agricultural product in the 1970s,

to produce only 26% by the end of the 1980s. Seasonal crops cultivated within Colombia

decreased 30% between 1992 and 1996. By 1998, 30% of Colombians diet was

produced in other countries. Legal cultivation of land decreased by 700.000 hectares.

Agricultural imports increased 24% between 1990 and 1996. The cost of food importsincreased from $175 million in 1990 to $833 million in 1996, an increased annual

average of 30%.28 As a consequence, a decline of the economy went so drastic that by

1992 Colombias economic growth dropped to an unheard of -2%. It was the first time

that the three sub-sectors of agriculture (coffee, cattle, and others) decreased all

together.29 Thus, as the landless farmers saw the coming of unemployment from the

28 Data in this paragraph from: Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO. 2001. Perfiles Nutricionales porPaises: Colombia. Roma: FAO. P. 7. Available online at: ftp://ftp.fao.org/es/esn/nutrition/ncp/col.pdf 29 Perry, 2000: 11


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Coffee crisis, they also saw their other produce replaced by imported foods. The only

solution then was to turn into illegal crops production.30

For unemployed peasants, while coca cultivation represented a solution to theireconomic crisis, it also meant the beginning of their connection to the armed groups who

controlled the coca business. By the late 1980s the territories of illegal crops cultivation

were controlled by the Medellin cartel, their allied paramilitary, and the guerrillas who

taxed the drug cartels in the areas where paramilitary control was not effective.31

Landless farmers migrating from Colombias agricultural areas to the jungles were coca

was planted and processed had to accept this reality by joining the armed factions. For

few of them this solution was a way to obtain jobs in the agricultural industry they knew

well, forothers, it marked their initiation into Colombias war as active members of

either the paramilitary or guerrillas. Their adherence to armed factions was rarely marked

by ideological commitment, and in most cases it represented a strategy for survival and a

way out of their condition of raspachines . Landless farmers joined either theparamilitary or the guerrillas depending on which faction was controlling the area where

narcotics were being produced.

The Elimination of Agricultural Subsidies.

30 Ahumada, Consuelo, and Christina Andrews:The Impact o Globalization on Latin American States .Administrative Theory and Praxis, Vol. 20, No. 4. December, 1998. P. 462.31 The guerrillas of the FARC moved to tax narcotrafficking activities after holding the internal conferencein the town of Cubaral, state of Meta, in May 4-14, 1989. The purpose of the conference was thephilosophical and ethical analysis of the use of drugs as a war weapon. The conclusions gave FARCethical, and practical reasons to tax the a coca market which they understood as a contradiction of thepolitical reality, and one that would give them the possibility of building a competitive army against thegovernments forces. The focus, after Cubaral, was the creation of a 28.000-men army distributed in thecountry in 48 fronts. See: Marks, Thomas. 2002:Colombias ArmyAdaptation to FARC Insurgency. TheStrategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. P. 4-6 Available online at:http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=18


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A third strike that pushed landless farmers into the ranks of armed factions was

the elimination of subsidies to the agricultural sector in Colombia. Such elimination was

promoted and pressured by international institutions, particularly the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF), on the Colombian government in exchange for granting the

government credit services of the IMF and the World Bank. Subsidies existed at the time

in Colombia, mainly to provide low interest rates to landless farmers either to buy land or

to plantcrops. To buy land, governments subsidies were mainly distributed through the

Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria , INCORA. To plant crops they were

disseminated in the form of credit through the Agrarian Bank,Caja Agraria . There were

also subsidies that secured minimum prices for harvests such as those secured by a buyer

institution, the Instituto Colombiano de Mercadeo Agropecuario (IDEMA). Besides these

subsidies, the government subsidized the building, maintenance, and extension of

agricultural infrastructure. These were usually done by the Instituto Colombiano

Agropecuario (ICA) that build public works, such as irrigation systems, and promotedtechnological change and research for the use of landless farmers to develop experimental

farms throughout the country. After 1990 theReformas Estructurales a la Agricultura

eliminated the subsidies that secured stable prices for landless farmers harvests32 thus

closing IDEMA and freeing the prices to float on the international market. Later on, the

same principle was extended to the supplying of low cost credit by the closing of the

Agrarian Bank orCaja Agraria . This meant that credit had to be acquired with

commercial interest rates. In terms of agricultural infrastructure, the government closed

32 Perry, Santiago. 2000. El Impacto de las Reformas Estructurales a la Agricultura Colombiana. Santiagode Chile: U.N.-CEPAL-ECLAC, P.11. Available online at:http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/0/5750/LCL1449P.pdf


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ICA and threw the existing irrigation projects and experimental farms into the hands of

private users associations.33 In terms of access to land, the government decided to

restructure INCORA under recommendations from the World Bank, thus taking away itspurchasing function while keeping its land titling task as INCORAs priority.34 Thus,

once the fall of coffee prices and the flood of food imports had pushed the rural poor out

of the labor market, the elimination of subsidies dealt that last blow that pushed

Colombians living from agriculture into the hands of the organized mafias and

guerrillas.35

Economists, usually friendly of free-trade policies, recognize that the shift from

the so-called protectionist model prior to 1989, to the modernized one of the 1990s meant

a shift around who would get the benefits of the overall economy. This shift meant that

benefits previously received by the rural population -under the protectionist model, were

transferred to beneficiaries living in the urban and semi-urban areas (intermediate cities)

where most Colombians lived in the 1990s.36

Colombian economists saw thephenomenon as a lesser evil. One that benefited more populated areas while also

benefiting the agro-industrialists interested in the lessening of seasonal crops and the

strengthening the permanent-agro-industrialized ones.37 The new model hurt the interests

of the rural poor by transferring the resources produced in the countryside to the fast

33Garces Restrepo, Carlos. 2001. Irrigation Management Devolution in Colombia . FAO-InternationalEmail Conference on Irrigation Management Transfer, June-October, 2001. P. 7. Available online at:

http://www.fao.org/AG/aGL/AGLW/waterinstitutions/docs/CSColombia.pdf 34 The World Bank. 1996.Review of Colombias Agricultural and Rural Strategy: A World Bank CountryStudy. Washington : The World Bank. P 45. Available online at: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1996/05/01/000009265_3961214180428/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf 35 Berry, 2004: 2736 Kalmanovitz, 2001: 3937 Kalmanovitz, 2001: 19, 26-27.


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growing urban centers where most of the agribusinesses had their headquarters. As a

result, the landless farmers had little choice but to join either narco-guerrillas or narco-

paramilitaries, causing a wave of violence not seen in Colombia since the 1950s. Aseconomists and politicians described the period: the economy was doing well but the

country was doing bad.38

2. Global Policies Contributed More to the Strengthening of the Paramilitary than

to the Guerrillas.

It took 40 years (1964-2004) for the FARC to reach the size of a 20.000 member

guerrilla organization. It took only one decade (1990-2000) for the paramilitary to reach

the size of an 11.000 man army.39 What made the ultra right paramilitary to grow at a

much faster rate than the leftist FARC? Although some analysts have argued that the

rapid growth of the paramilitary is due to their success in getting support from the

population who feel victimized by the guerrillas,40 this paper argues that what caused the

rapid growth of the paramilitary in Colombia was the support obtained from the mainbeneficiaries of global trade policies, namely agribusinesses, the landed gentry, and

multinational corporations doing businesses in the country. The association and

coincidence of interests, between the paramilitary and Colombias agro-industrial

establishment gave the paramilitary a climate of cooperation from the legal order and the

government that was not granted to the leftist guerrillas. Such support was given to the

paramilitary in order to strengthen the position of Colombias agro-industrial sector in

38 The expression la economa va bien, pero el pas va mal is attributed to President Virgilio Barco(1986-1990)39 U.S. Department of State. 2003. Patterns of Global Terrorism. Available online at:http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/31946.pdf 40 See Spencer, David. 2001: 11


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battling activists of labor and land rights. The support from legal-established agri-

business firms can be reviewed by analyzing the existing information on links between

agribusiness, multinational corporations operating in Colombia, and politicians with theAUC. Although the lines between agribusiness, politicians, and, sometimes, MNCs is a

blurred one, this paper attempts keep each one of these entities separate in their

connection to the paramilitary

The Paramilitarys Connection to Transnational Business and Local Politics.

Colombias paramilitary are benefited from free trade agreements because of their

connection to Colombias agro-industrialists, rich landowners, and multinational

corporations (MNCs) operating in the country. Colombian agribusinesses and MNCs

benefit from global policies as these policies make it easier for Colombian businesses to

compete abroad. Paradoxically, the advantage of free trade agreements for Colombian

exporters are provided under a protective measure created as a result of the anti-drug

cooperation between the US and Colombian governments. The 1992 Andean Tariff Preferences Act (ATPA/APTDEA), and the currently discussed Free Trade Agreement

with Colombia (FTA),41 offers low tariffs to Colombian agribusiness to enter the

American market. Similar agreements were signed with countries of the European Union

(EU).42 ATPA/APTDEA, FTAC and the trade agreements with the EU, were designed as

a policy tool whose effects would contribute to job creation in Colombia. However, new

jobs created during the first five years after the signing of the agreements turned out to be

41 See: Editorial: Getting to a Colombia Trade Deal . The New York Times, May 29, 2007. Availableonline at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/opinion/29tue2.html42 Proexport, 2005:Colombia: Foreign Trade 2005 . Available online at:http://www.proexport.com.co/VBeContent/library/documents/DocNewsNo5392DocumentNo4950.PDF


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insignificant for Colombias rural poor. By 1998-99, unemployment in Colombia rose to

20% in both the rural and urban country, while the whole economy contracted 4%.43

Three years after the signing of ATPA, in1995, the trade deficit had already eaten 4% of the GDP. Levels of poverty in 1999 were no different from those of the 1980s: 79% for

rural population and 55% for urban.44 Trade agreements benefited mostly the Colombian

agro-industrialists and their international partners.45 After all, there was a direct

connection between those exporting Colombias permanent crops (bananas, sugar cane,

flowers, fruits, etc), and those importing the foods that soon flooded the market of

imported foods: they were the same, and belonged to the same agro-industrial and

commercial syndicates. They benefited from the low tariffs overseas, bought cheaper

foods somewhere else (mainly in South East Asia), and introduced them in Colombia,

also benefiting from the low tariffs imposed after the signing of the free trade

agreements.

Paramilitaries, Mafiosi , and Politicians .The ultra-right paramilitary got initial strength from connections to narco-

trafficker who already had the support of some Colombian politicians. The connections

of the paramilitary to the moneyed class of Colombia (particularly in the state of

Antioquia) was orchestrated by former Medellin Cartelmafiosi and politicians connected

43 Inter American Development Bank, Office of Evaluation and Oversight, OVE. 2003. Country ProgramEvaluation (CPE): Colombia (1990-2002). P 2. Available online at:http://www.iadb.org/ove/Documents/uploads/cache/320624.pdf

44 Kalmanovitz, Salomn, 2001. La Agricultura en Colombia entre 1950 y 2000 . Bogot: Banco de laRepblica. P. 36-38. Available online at: http://www.banrep.gov.co/docum/ftp/borra255.pdf 45 Kalmanovitz, 2001: 19, 26-27.


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One of the fiercest defenders of CONVIVIR was current Colombian President,

lvaro Uribe, who at the time of CONVIVIRs legalization was the acting governor of

Antioquia. President Uribe, as a member of a cattle ranching family with suspected ties tothe Medellin Cartel, particularly to the Ochoa Vasquez crime-family and to Escobar

himself,49 had enough reasons to support the project and to avoid not only the inquiries

abouthis familys connections but also to protect the interests of his supporters from the

agro-industrial banana syndicates of Antioquia, the cattle ranchers association (Fedegan),

and the agribusinesses syndicateSociedad de Agricultores de Colombia (SAC).50 As

other scholars argue, the paramilitary, as a criminal organization, reached a degree of

sophistication that allowed them not only to launder their criminal proceeds into the

legitimate system, but also to acquire information and protection for money from the

political class and the government.51

Paramilitaries and Agribusinesses.

The connection between paramilitaries and agribusinesses strengthened the ultraright force because the rich owners of agribusinesses opened many doors for the

paramilitary to gain support from legal businesses. This connection was usually mediated

by the political class in power in the early 1990s. This political class, under the leadership

of current president Alvaro Uribe, pushed the agro-industrialists, their allied paramilitary,

49 Links between President Uribe and Pablo Escobar are mentioned in current media. A recent article inColombias main paper, El Tiempo, states that Colombias anti-corruption czar has left his post afterlearning of President Uribes connections to late Pablo Escobar.El Tiempo: 'Zar' Anticorrupcin Renuncitras Artculo que Vincula a Padre del Presidente con Pablo Escobar . Published: December 12, 2007Available online at: http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/2007-12-12/ARTICULO-WEB-NOTA_INTERIOR-3855844.htmlAlso, Romero, Simon:Colombian Leader Disputes Claim of Tie to Cocaine Kingpin . The New YorkTimes, October 3, 2007. online at:http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/03/world/americas/03colombia.html

50 Avils, 2006:13551 Williams, 2001:79
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/03/world/americas/03colombia.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/03/world/americas/03colombia.html


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and narcotraffickers to express publicly their desire of legal recognition from the

government in 1994. Thus the pressures from this alliance between politicians, agro-

industrialists, and narcotraffickers to the national government to approve the creation of private security organizations produced its results in 1994 with the official creation of

CONVIVIR52. In 1995, the year after the CONVIVIR decree was enacted, President

Samper, appointed Hernn Arias Gaviria as superintendent of the CONVIVIR. Mr. Arias

Gaviria happened to be the son of the long-time president of Unibn (a banana producers

syndicate in Urab), Jos Manuel Arias Carrisoza, and a strong supporter of the

paramilitary.53 Urab is a region of Antioquia with one of the highest rates of violence,

human rights, and labor rights violations, and numbers of displaced people in Colombia.

By 1997, the CONVIVIR represented a force of 10.000 armedmen mainly in Antioquias

Urab and in the states of Cesar, Bolvar and Santanders mid-Magdalena valley. All

regions where narco-traffickers,and Antioquiasagri-business class owned properties

and did business.54

After many reports of human rights violations and after the United Nations

intervened in favor of human rights organizations, the CONVIVIR were suspended and

finally barred in 1999.55 Once the CONVIVIR were eliminated their formerly organized

members continued operating with the acquiescence of the police and armed forces, and

then under the name of Autodefensas Unidas de Cordoba y Urab (AUCC). They passed

52 BBC News:Uribe Inaugura Red de Informantes . BBC News En Espaol, August 8, 2002. Availableonline at : http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_2181000/2181939.stm53 Aviles, 2006: 118 54 Semana Magazine reports statistics quoting that out of the main 57 paramilitary warlords, 40 wereoriginally from the state of Antioquia. Semana Magazine, February 28, 2007. available online at:http://www.semana.com/wf_InfoSeccion.aspx?IdSec=155 Aviles, 2006: 118-19
http://www.semana.com/wf_InfoSeccion.aspx?IdSec=1http://www.semana.com/wf_InfoSeccion.aspx?IdSec=1


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intelligence to the armed forces and did their own military operations to protect the lands

of hacendados , and agribusiness, and to terrorize labor, and human right activists.

Paramilitary operations from the 1990s to present are reported as responsible for theworst massacres in Colombias history being the responsible 80% of all human rights

violations in the country.56. They are also responsible for the killings of the majority of

union leaders killed in Colombia, 75% of the worlds total.57

Paramilitaries International Link.

The Connection to multinational agribusinesses has strengthened the role of the

paramilitary in Colombias conflict. Local and international agribusiness involvement

with the paramilitary continues today, and many of agribusinesses partners of the

paramilitary have been indicted in the international courts accused of supporting

financially and militarily the re-born version of CONVIVIR and ACCU: the

Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). Current investigations involve Unibn and

Augura ( Asociacin de Bananeros de Colombia ), the banana planters syndicates, andtheir international partner, the US-based Corporation Chiquita Brands, for the

disappearance, torturing and murder of thousands of citizens of Antioquias Urab

region. Chiquita has acknowledged that its former subsidiary, Banadex, had paid $1.7

million to the A.U.C. from 1997 to 2004. The company has also admitted that the

payments were illegal; it pleaded guilty this year to violating counterterrorism laws and

56 Human Rights Watch:Oral Intervention at the 57th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights: Item 11 - Civil and political rights: Colombia and Indonesia . Online at:http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/04/04/colomb266.htm57 Bouvier, 2005: 9


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agreed to pay a $25 million fine.58 Besides the payments, which Chiquita agrees were

made in order to obtain security services from the AUC, Chiquitas associate, Banadex, a

Unibn member, was reported to have carried out logistical operations with knowledgefrom Chiquita executives in Colombia. Such operations include the buying, transporting

and illegal importing of 3.400 AK47 rifles, and 4 million pieces of ammunition for the

troops of Fidel Castano, a paramilitary warlord from the AUC.59

In the mining business, the multinational Drummond, an Alabama-based

corporation, has been accused of using the services of the paramilitary to execute three

union leaders who were working for Drummond, and had a labor dispute with

Drummond at the time of their assassination:

Last March, when the mine was in a bitter dispute with its union, the

union's president, Valmore Lacarno Rodrguez, and its vice president,

Vctor HugoOrcasita Amaya, were assassinated. () The recentlawsuit

() contends that several paramilitary gunmen stopped a company buscarrying miners back to their villages and ordered Mr. Lacarno and Mr.

Orcasita off. () 'Several witnesses heard the paramilitar ies say that they

were there to settle a dispute that Lacarno and Orcasita had with

Drummond,' the lawsuit said. () Last October, seven months after the

two officials were killed, Gustavo Soler Mora, the new president of the

58 The Associated Press:Victims of Colombian Conflict Sue Chiquita Brands . The New York Times,November, 15, 2007. online at:http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/15/business/worldbusiness/15chiquita.html59 Semana: Banana Para - Republic. Semana Magazine, March, 17, 2007. Online at:http://www.semana.com/wf_InfoArticulo.aspx?IdArt=101602


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union at Drummond's mine, was ordered off a bus by gunmen. Farmers

later found his body. He had been shot twice in the head.60

Another experience linking a coal mining MNC to the ultra-right paramilitary isthat of Glencore-Xtrata, Anglo American, and BHP Billiton, a group of international

corporations that exploit mines in areas of paramilitary control in the north of Colombia.

These corporations have been linked to the Colombian armed forces and the paramilitary

in operations dealing with the harassment and killing of union leaders. Accusations state

that the multinationals have cooperated with the paramilitary in the killings of 330 people

from the south of Bolivar state, the torturing of 88 persons and the disappearance of 80.

Some of these companies have also benefited from massacres executed by the

paramilitary in the region of Quincha (State of Risaralda), and Segovia (State of

Antioquia) where some of them exploit gold.61

Paramilitaries Current Politics.

The paramilitary is currently being strengthened by the support of theconservative politicians who are currently in power in Colombia. Such support has

allowed the paramilitary to enjoy a climate of cooperation form a government currently

ruled by conservative sectors of the old Liberal party, and members of the traditional

Partido Conservador . Lobbying from President Uribe and his political allies in Congress

resulted in the passing of legislation Ley de Justicia y Paz on June 2005 allowing for the

paramilitary to demobilize, confess their crimes, and to legalize their profits from their

60 Greenhouse, Steven: Alabama Coal Giant Is Sued Over 3 Killings in Colombia . The New York Times,March 22, 2002. Available online at:http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C05E3DA1E38F931A15750C0A9649C8B6361 Permanent Peoples Tribunal:Session on Transnational Enterprises and the Rights of Peoples inColombia: Second Hearing . Medelln, Colombia, November 10 and 11, 2006. Available online at:http://www.wrm.org.uy/countries/Colombia/mining.pdf


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criminal activities. In exchange for their confession, the law protected the paramilitary

commanders from extradition on drug charges while allowing them to negotiate low

sentences in Colombian courts. The Ley de Justicia y Paz saved the paramilitary fromextradition as it categorized "paramilitarism" as a political crime, not a penal one.62

Despite the governments intentions to save the paramilitary bosses from justice,

the paramilitary has suffered a setback. Judges ruled for the incarceration of 17 of their

supporter-congressmen, including a former speaker of the senate(Presidente del Senado) ,

on charges of paramilitarism. The Attorney General (Fiscal) requested incarceration of

the politicians under international pressures from the US Congress members, the United

Nations (UN), and numerous human rights organizations. Included among congressmen

indicted on paramilitarism is Senator Mario Uribe, a cousin and close allied of President

Uribe, who is being accused of attending covert meetings with paramilitary warlord,

Salvatore Mancuso.63 Mr. Mancuso is known not only for his role as a paramilitary

spokesman but also for owning a cattle ranch next to President Uribes ranch. Mr.Mancusos ranch is infamous for having been the place where one of Colombias worst

massacres, El Salado , was planned.64

The passing of the law allowing the paramilitary to return to civil life without

being punished for their crimes was a landmark in the relationship between the

government and the paramilitary. It meant the paramilitary were finally recognized, at

62 Forero, Juan:Colombia Law Grants concessions to Paramilitaries . The New York Times, June 23,2005.online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/23/international/americas/23colombia.html63 Semana:Un Trago Amargo . Semana Magazine, December 8, 2007. Available online at:http://www.semana.com/wf_InfoArticulo.aspx?IdArt=10823464 El Tiempo:200 'paras' participaron en masacre en El Salado (Bolvar) revel jefe paramilitar 'El Tigre' .El Tiempo, December 13 2007. Online at: http://www.eltiempo.com/nacion/caribe/2007-12-13/ARTICULO-WEB-NOTA_INTERIOR-3857589.html


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least in Colombia, as a political organization whose rights were echoed in Colombias

congress. For others, the law meant a measurement of how powerful drugs and guns have

become in Colombian politics. As Salvatore Mancuso declared in 2004, his organizationwas in direct control of 30% of the 263-member Colombian Congress.65

The demobilization of the paramilitary has not been easy. Many times

paramilitary fighters, after being told of their possible sentences, go back to their

previous activities after signing the demobilization act. This reluctance to return to civil

life has caused the division of the paramilitary into smaller groups who have already

become a security problem in the same regions where they operated before the signing of

the law. In 2004, The United Nations Human Rights Commissioner concluded that the

main paramilitary groups did not honor, in most regions of the country, the commitment

given to the government to cease hostilities. Infractions, including massacres, homicides

and displacements continue to be registered.66

The support from the three sectors, Colombian agro-industrialists, multinationalcorporations, and politicians-government has allowed the paramilitary successes not only

in the forced or voluntary recruiting of Colombian citizens but also in two main gains

against leftist guerrillas. First, both the paramilitary and Colombias Armed Forces have

gained control of important corridors/highways67 connecting the countrys main cities,

and main agro-industrialized areas (30% of the nations territory). A second aspect that

both the government and the paramilitary claim as their success against the guerrillas is

65 Forero, Juan: Rightist Militias Are a Force in Colombia's Congress . The New York Times, November10, 2004. Online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/10/international/americas/10colombia.html66 Quoted in Aviles, 2006: 138.67 Marks, Thomas. 2002: 15


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the decline in the number of kidnappings: from 3706 in 2000 to 1441 in 2004. One

problem found in interpreting the decline in kidnappings is that governments data does

not include kidnappings committed by the paramilitary and common criminals.68

The Guerrillas Share from Policies Counter -effects.

As this paper has shown above,the FARC, Colombias main guerrilla

organization, has benefited from the counter-effects of anti-drug policies carried both in

Colombia and overseas. The counter-effects of such policies, namely the moving of

illegal crops planting into Colombian jungles, have made possible for the FARC to

recruit large numbers of landless farmers who moved into those jungles to plant illicit

crops. Recruiting was easier after the 1990s because at this time Colombias jungles were

already under control of the guerrillas. The counter-effects of free trade policies also

benefited the guerrillas after the 1990s as these policies caused heavy ruralunemployment and the displacement of poor farmers to the jungles thus making it easier

for the FARC to recruit.

Also serving the interests of the FARC was the fact that the unemployed peasants

saw the guerrillas as allies in their struggle against the government that caused their

unemployment and displacement. For last 40 years the FARC has take the side of the

landless in the fight against the government for agrarian reform, and in recent times, the

peasantry witnessed FARCs opposition to the liberal restructuring of the economy.69

68 Bouvier, 2005: 669 Richani, Nazih:The Political Economy of Violence: The War-System in Colombia. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 2. (Summer, 1997), pp. 37-81. P. 70


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This coincidence of interests created a natural bond between poor farmers and guerrillas.

That bond did not exist between the landless and the paramilitary, neither between the

poor peasants and the politicians/government. After all, as shown above, the ultra-rightforce was openly created to defend the lands of the landowners and agri-businesses and to

attack those who dared to question existing labor and property rights. This polarization

between peasants and ultra-right forces gave advantages to the guerrillas.

The Guerrillas Transnational Ring.

In terms of logistics and military operations, the FARC has been strengthened by the

unexpected mobility of European guerrilla fighters in and out of Europes borders.

Resilient European fighters have contacted the FARC in a search for new ways of

continuing their guerrilla war not only within the borders of their countries but

overseas.70 Recent reports showed that after the Good Friday Agreement in Northern

Ireland, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) advanced a networking campaign in order to

establish contacts with other guerrilla organizations around the world. The IRA,according to intelligence reports, is responsible in the creation of a network that includes

guerrilla organizations from Afghanistan; Bosnia-Herzegovina; Chile; Colombia; Iran;

Iraq; Lebanon; Libya; Mexico; North Korea; Pakistan; Peru; Russia; South Africa;

Sudan; Syria; and Turkey.71 IRA members had been recently captured in Bogot and

charged with establishing terrorist training camps in the Colombias jungles controlled by

the FARC. According to reports IRA fighters came to Colombia to train the FARC in the

70 Resilience is treated here as in Williams, 2001: 80-81: the mor e options there are to compensate for[policy] and law enforcement successes whether in finding new ways of moving illicit commodities to themarket or alternative routes and methods repatriating profits. () The diversity of different connectionsallows the network to function even if some connections are broken.71 Center for Defense Information (CDI): Globalizing Terrorism:The FARC-IRA Connection . Published:June 5, 2002. Online at: http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/farc-ira.cfm


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use of explosives, mortar use, and the production of car bombs.72 In exchange, reports

argue, the IRA obtained drugs from the FARC. These drugs had been commercialized via

Belgium and the Netherlands, and their profits invested in the acquisition of weaponsfrom the former Yugoslavia and other countries of Eastern Europe. In an ongoing cycle,

these weapons are exchanged for drugs with the FARC and other guerrilla organizations

dealing with drug trafficking.73 By 2002, British intelligence reports estimated that during

the period 1998-2002 fifteen IRA experts traveled back and forth between Western

Europe and Colombia. The same source said FARC paid the IRA $2 million in exchange

for training using offshore bank accounts during the same period.74 The FARCs camps

have also served for the training of members of the Basque separatist Fatherland and

Liberty organization (ETA) from Spain.75

The FARC-IRA connection allowed both organizations to participate in ring

operations that have allowed them a sophisticated exchange of their assets and resources.

The FARC acquired training from what is considered one of the most effective guerrillaorganizations, while the IRA acquired the drugs that allowed them to much-needed

weapons as a result of the Good Friday Agreement decommissioning. The tab paid by

the FARC was a piece ($2 million) of the value of the FARCs drug trade, estimated at $1

billion.76 ETA has also taken advantage of the experience gained by IRA in its

connection to the FARC. Both the FARC and ETA are reported to have participated in a

72 McDermott, Jeremy: IRA Tr aining Haunts Colombias Guerrilla War . The Telegraph, March 8, 2007.Available online at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/08/03/wcolomb103.xml73 Curtis, Glenn E. and Tara Karacan. 2002.The Nexus Among Terrorists, NarcoticsTraffickers, Weapons Proliferators, and Organized Crime Networks In Western Europe . Washington:Library of Congress, Federal Research Division. P. 1, 24. Available online at:http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/WestEurope_NEXUS.pdf 74 Curtis and Karacan, 2002: 675 Curtis and Karacan, 2002: 676 Curtis and Karacan, 2002: 7


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ring model similar to that with IRA, and, in some cases, the three organizations are

reported to be part of one single network in an exchange chain: training-drugs-weapons

and training-drugs.77

3. Globalization Has Co ntributed to Keeping Colombias Traditional Land Mal -

Distribution.

Global free trade policies inaugurated in Colombia in the late 1980s have contributed in

two ways to land mal-distribution in Colombia. First, by benefiting agribusinesses and

the paramilitary in Colombia, global free-trade policies have contributed to maintaining

Colombias land mal-distribution. Both beneficiaries of these policies forced poor

peasants off of their land thus causing the displacement of 2 million Colombians from the

rural areas. Second, anti-agrarian reform policies pressured by international institutions in

Colombia in the early 1990s forced the government to stop the agrarian reform program

that began during the Belisario Betancur administration in 1982, as a response to

demands from leftist armed groups and peasant organizations.Economic Policies Contribute to Land Mal-distribution.

From the late 1980s to present, international trade policies and global counter-agrarian

reform policies have favored Colombias agribusiness, the traditional landowning class,

and their associated narco-paramilitary, against the interests of the landless. This

contention has caused the increase in levels of violence in Colombia. During these years

the number of yearly homicides rose to 30.000 and continued at the same level into the

early 2000s.78 As narco-paramilitaries have gained economic and political power in the

77 Curtis and Karacan, 2002: 1078 See: Brauer, Jurgen, an Alejandro Gomez-Sorzano: A Structural Model of Political Murder in Colombia1950-1999 . University Library of Munich, Germany, SeriesMPRA Paper,No. 1144.
http://ideas.repec.org/s/pra/mprapa.htmlhttp://ideas.repec.org/s/pra/mprapa.html


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country they have affected the land tenure structure by becoming the new landowners by

force. The narco-paramilitary replaced the old landowning class; they became the most

radical opponents of land reform policies, labor rights activists and guerrillaorganizations.79

Colombias land ownership pattern is one of the most concentrated in the world,

and this has led to contention between the traditional landowning class of the country and

the landless. Almost seventy years after the enactment of the first Colombian land and

agrarian reform (Law 200 of 1936) land concentration has not decreased.. In 1998 a

million small farming units held only 5.2 percent of Colombias farmed area. The size of

each unit was not even three acres, and most of them were located in eroded, hilly, and

mostly unproductive land. On the other hand, 40 percent of the land used for agriculture

and cattle ranchingwas owned by 1.7 percent of Colombias landowners.80

The conflict between landless and landowners has persisted despite the immense

cash flow that comes with narcotrafficking.81

Violence continues mainly becauselandowners join the narco-paramilitary in using capital, political connections, and

weapons to gain control over lands. Land thus serves as double-purpose tool: it allows the

narco-paramilitary to launder money while giving them control over large tracts of land

to produce, and sometimes to ship, agro-industrialized crops and illicit drugs.

79 Colombian scholar Alejandro Reyes explains that the buying of lands by narcotraffickers has increasedthe concentration of property in few hands, and, as a result, it has caused displacement of peasants tocolonization areas and into the cities. Reyes Posada, Alejandro. 1995.La Compra de Tierras por

Narcotraficantes en Colombia. In Machado, Absaln. 1998. La Cuestin Agraria en Colombia a Fines delMilenio. Bogot: El ncora Editores. P. 89 (Translation by author)80 Safford, Frank and Marco Palacios. 2002. Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society. London:Oxford University Press. P. 30981 Mauricio Reina writes that by 1994 narcotraffickers in Colombia had accumulated a total wealth of between U.S. $39 and U.S. $66 billion. Reina, Mauricio. 2001. Drug Trafficking and the National

Economy . In Charles Bergquist, Ricardo Pearanda, and Gonzlo Sanchez (Eds.). Violence in Colombia,1990-2000. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources. P. 81


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Agribusinesses strong support of narco-paramilitarism in the 1990s fueled the

contention between the countrys landowners and the landless peasants. Wealthy narco-

paramilitary financed then their own personal armies to force traditional landowners tosell/leave their estates, and to force peasants out of their small landholdings.82 This way

the narco-paramilitary gained control of the most productive lands of the country.83 By

the mid 1980s this new class of landowners was already using 4-6 million hectares for

cattle grazing, out of Colombias 40 million hectares.84 The contention between narco-

paramilitaries and the peasants gave strength to the FARC because the peasants saw the

guerrilla organization as their armed protector against the narco- paramilitarys intentions

of taking their lands.

As Colombian scholar, Alejandro Reyes Posada argues, the control of land by the

narco-paramilitary associated to agribusinesses has changed the characteristics of the

agrarian problem because of four main reasons: First, it has elevated the levels of

concentration of property in few hands, and, as a result, it has caused peasants migrationto zones of colonization (areas adjacent to jungles) and to the cities. Second, it has

overvalued lands, and de-stimulated the investment of resources from agriculture and

cattle enterprises into the market. Third, it has contributed to private financing of 82 Ale jandro Reyes Posada writes on the changes in the composition of Colombias landowning class: Thechange [in the landowning class] highlights a change from the lords of the land to the lords of the warbecause themafiosos , in the regions where they possess great territories, have formed death squads toprotect their interests and to administer private justice. In 126 municipalities where the narcotraffickershave bought land, there have been social protests. In three of the main regions of rural protest and guerrillaconflict, Urab-Cordoba-Bajo Cauca, the Middle Magdalena, and the Ariari-Guayabero-Guaviare region,the armed mafias enjoyed the benefits of an implicit alliance with the government armed forces in theirstruggle against the guerrillas. Thus, the creation of the self-defense groups (AUC) by the armed forces,and the death squads by the mafias, constitute a single process developed since 1981.Reyes Posada,Alejandro, 1994.Territorios de la Violencia en Colombia. In Ministerio de Agricultura (Eds.). El Agro y laCuestin Social. Bogot. Tercer Mundo Editores. P. 66 (Translation by author)83 Reyes Posada, 1994: 64-6584 Richani, Nazih. 1997.The Political Economy of Violence: The War System in Colombia. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Summer, 1997). P. 64


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counterinsurgency in search of safety made by force, while fighting the guerrillas,

terrorizing the rural population, and increasing levels of violence. Fourth, it has

reinforced the inefficient traditional behavior of dedicating the countrys best lands tocattle breeding while damaging agriculture and destroying the forests. In many areas of

the country the narco-paramilitary has replaced the old landowners, and in doing so, they

have deteriorated the already scarce social leadership within the affected regions.85

International Institutions Pressures for Anti-Agrarian Reform Policies.

During most of the 1990s International institutions pressured the Colombian

government to stop the agrarian reform programs that that had been initiated in the 1980s

in response to demands from leftist groups and peasant organizations. Giving in to this

pressure, the conservative side of the Colombian government (during the 1990-1994

administration) shifted to support agribusinesses and the land owning class of Colombia

by creating mechanisms to commercialize the available agricultural land while denying

the government the ability to redistribute lands to the landless by decree, as occurred pastColombian agrarian reforms. This change in the policy allowed the agribusinesses and

the narco-paramilitary to buy lands at a price fixed by the market. It hurt the peasantry

because poor farmers capital could not compete with the capital of the rich

agribusinesses and narco-paramilitary.

In the early 1980s, as a part of a peace agreement between the government and the

leftist guerrillas of FARC and M-19, the government addressed guerrillas demands

through the enactment of Law 35 of 1982, this law secured provisions of previous

Agrarian Reform Law No. 135 of 1961 in granting land titles to landless colonizers85 Reyes Posada, Alejandro. 1995.La compra de Tierras por Narcotraficantes en Colombia. InMachado, 1998: 89.


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(colonos ) and former guerrillas. During the government of Cesar Gaviria (1990-94) the

IMF and World Bank requested the restructuring of agrarian reform law of 1982 by

cutting the benefits given by this law to landless farmers.86

The introduction of Law 160of 1994stopped the giving for free land policy of 1982 and the Betancurs peace plan.

Law 160 commercialized all lands, included the state owned lands, thus enabling the

buying and selling in an open deregulated market at prices fixed by supply and demand.

The state ended its policy of granting plots of the statesland, or private land to peasants,

and committed itself only to minimally subsidize the purchase of lands through credit and

low interest loans.

After 1998, President Samper attempted to win domestic support by addressing

the demands of rebels and peasant organizations, thus attempting to lessen the effects of

Law 160. The President and the peasant organizations agreed to keep some of the

benefits of the old law of 1982 by facilitating access to land through disguised

operations in which the government subsidized land- buying by naming the landlessorganizations as the owners of communal areas named Peasant Reserve Zones ( Zonas de

Reserva Campesina ). Law 160 of 1994 helped to stabilize communities of small

producers who had acquired granted lands under the 1982 law by freezing the sales of

their lands thus avoiding possible buying of granted lands by narco-landowners. Despite

the efforts made by the Liberal government of Samper, by 2001 one-third of the

Colombians displaced from the countryside had lost their lands at the hands of narco-

paramilitaries who appropriated their farms as war-booty, and annexed them to their

86 Berry, 2004: 19


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haciendas.87 Sampers attempts to favor the interests of the peasantry despite

Washingtons pressure were finally reversedin 2000 once President Pastrana was

inaugurated and, again, pressured to continue the opening of the economy and theacceptance of the free trade agreements (ATPA/ATPDEA) and FTAC as a counter-

payment for the benefits of the coming Plan Colombia.

4. Conclusion.

This paper has found that Globalization policies of the 1990s, especially those of

free trade, and the War on Drugs, have strengthened the power of armed factions fighting

for controlling the nations lands. By strengthening Colombias warring factions,

globalization policies have contributed to create a more militaristic88 and volatile society.

In one decade (1990-2000) the size of only one faction, the paramilitary, increased from a

few fighters to more than 11,000 armed men, while the leftist FARC grew to 20,000.

Resources from the anti-drugs plan transformed the US embassy in Colombia into the

largest American diplomatic mission after that of Iraq, and Colombia became the third

largest recipient of US military aid after Israel and Egypt. Colombia has thus, after the

implementation of free trade policies and the US-led War on Drugs, become a more

complicated battlefield. In this modern battlefield the Colombian State does not need to

only fight its traditional leftist guerrillas, now it has to deal with two well-equipped

87 Reyes Posada, Alejandro. Paramilitares in Colombia: Contexto, Aliados y Consecuencias. Cited inAviles, 2006: 10988 Data from theColombias 2008national budget states that the military spending for the coming year isequivalent to 6.32 of the GDP. Also, 8.12 of the newly hired public servants will be occupied in securityand defense services. 65 percent of the countrys public investment will be assigned to military equipment,and 58.4% of the public sectors salaries will go to the Ministry of Defense.See: Isaza D., Jos Fernando,and Digenes Campos: Modelos Dinmicos de Guerra: el Conflicto Colombiano . Revista de la AcademiaColombiana de ciencias. Vol. XXIX, No. 110, March, 2005. online at:http://www.accefyn.org.co/PubliAcad/Periodicas/Volumen29/110/10_133_148.pdf


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factions, guerrillas and paramilitary, both fueled by a global demand on drugs from

Colombia. Contributing to this scenario of conflict there is the power of multinational

corporations whose association with the influential agro-industrial class of Colombia andtheir supported paramilitary opens a door for international powers to play a role in the

running of the Colombian state. The current state is succumbing to thee forces of the

narco-the paramilitary, multinational agribusinesses, and the attacks of the guerrillas.

Second, this paper has argued that globalization has favored the strengthening of

the ultra-right paramilitary groups on a larger scale than it has helped leftist guerrillas.

The globalizing forces in Colombia have created an environment that facilitates

cooperation of agro-industrialist, ranchers, MNCs, and government officers with the ultra

right force. The effects of such open cooperation with an illegal armed faction have led

the Colombian state to slip into the hands of the traditional moneyed class of Colombia

and into the hands of its associate narco-paramilitary. As a result, those who are currently

in power in the new Colombian state are those with one leg in the old traditional

landowning-political class, and the other in ruthless paramilitarism and global businesses.

As this new empowered global class advances its interests today, the demands of

Colombias landless and poor are left unresolvedthus keeping alive a conflict that started

in the early 20th Century.

Third, by supporting the rise of the narco-paramilitary, globalization policies have

contributed to maintaining a system of mal-distribution of Colombias most valuable

resource: land.89 These land distribution patterns have had negative consequences on the

89 .4% of landholders account for 61.2% of all landholdings, while 97 percent share ony 24.4 percent lands.In Aviles, 2006: 24.


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levels of inequality.90 Since the reforms to the economy were announced in 1990, the

population has grown 10 million91, and land resources have been kept in the hands of the

same few families that always possessed them, or transferred by force to the new class of narco-paramilitary-agribusiness. while the landless have continued to live from less and

less land and under the expectations of the never-coming agro-industrial employment, or

thrown into the illegal world that serves the drugs market and the armed conflict.

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