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Strategic Trends Programme

Global Strategic Trends - Out to 2045

Fifth Edition


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iiiGlobal Strategic Trends Global Strategic Trends

The Development, Concepts and DoctrineCentres Strategic Trends Programme is acontinuous programme of research thatseeks to provide policy-makers with acontext for long-term decision-making. This, the fth edition of Global Strategic Trends, builds on previous editions and arespected body of work that benets fromcontinual engagement with a wide rangeof contributors from academia, businessand government both domestically andinternationally. The extent of across UKGovernment engagement together withincreased levels of international consultationand peer review are particular strengths ofthis edition.

The challenge of looking 30 years aheadcannot be overstated. Importantly, GlobalStrategic Trends does not seek to predict thefuture, instead it describes plausible outcomeson the basis of rigorous trends analysis. Itis a truism that in an increasingly complex,competitive and connected world, thechallenge is not responding to what we knowtoday, but rather preparing for what tomorrowmight bring.

Looking out toward the middle of thiscentury, the opportunities and challengesabound. Demographic change will seedeveloped nations adapting to agingpopulations, while developing nations facethe challenge of rapid population growth thatwont necessarily be matched by economicdevelopment. The pace and breadth oftechnological advancements will changeour perception of our role in the workplace,reveal new opportunities for health advancesand facilitate the deepening of globalcommunications. But as access to technology

increases, we will facenew risks to our securityboth at home and abroad. The industrialisation ofthe developing worldwill present resource andenvironmental challengeswhile generating wealthand prosperity for someof the most impoverishednations. In the West in particular, a rise ofindividualism and, amongst many, a growingsense of disconnection from long-establishedgoverning structures will challenge traditionalsystems. The growth of cities will provideopportunities to make better use of theworlds resources but will expose many of themillions living in coastal cities to the risks ofooding as rising sea levels and more frequentand destructive weather events begin totest resilience. And climate change and theconsequences of warming will affect food andwater availability for many.

Ultimately, Global Strategic Trends is designedto inform policy-makers as they grapple withthe opportunities and threats that the futurecould bring. And the choices that they makecould have as great an impact on the future asthe trends themselves.

Rear Admiral John KingwellDirector, Concepts and Doctrine

Conditions of release Foreword

Global Strategic Trends describes a strategiccontext for Defence and security lookingout to the middle of the century. It takesa comprehensive view of the futurederived through research headed by theDevelopment, Concepts and Doctrine Centre(DCDC).

This publication is the fth edition of GlobalStrategic Trends. It is benchmarked at 30 April2014. Developments taking place after thisdate have not been considered.

The ndings and deductions contained inthis publication do not represent the officialpolicy of Her Majestys Government or that ofUnited Kingdoms Ministry of Defence (MOD).It does, however, represent the view of theDevelopment, Concepts and Doctrine Centre,a department within the MOD.

This information is Crown copyright Ministryof Defence (MOD) 2014 and the intellectualproperty rights for this publication belongexclusively to the MOD. No material orinformation contained in this publication

should be reproduced, stored in a retrievalsystem, or transmitted in any form outsideMOD establishments, except as authorisedby both the sponsor and the MOD, whereappropriate. This information may be subjectto privately owned rights.


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vGlobal Strategic Trends

Contents

Foreword ..............................................................................................................................................................................iii

Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................................vii

How to use ..........................................................................................................................................................................ix

Synopsis ..............................................................................................................................................................................xiii

Executive summary ......................................................................................................................................................xv

Methodology ...............................................................................................................................................................xxiv

Part 1 Thematic 1

Demography .....................................................................................................................................................................3

Gender ................................................................................................................................................................................11

Urbanisation ...................................................................................................................................................................17

Resources .........................................................................................................................................................................21

The Environment ........................................................................................................................................................31

Health ..................................................................................................................................................................................41

Transport ...........................................................................................................................................................................49

Information .....................................................................................................................................................................55

Education .........................................................................................................................................................................61

Automation and work .............................................................................................................................................67

Corruption and money ...........................................................................................................................................75

Identity and the role of the state .....................................................................................................................83

Defence spending and capabilities ...............................................................................................................93

Part 2 Geographic 99

Northern America ...................................................................................................................................................101

Latin America and the Caribbean ................................................................................................................109

Europe ..............................................................................................................................................................................117

Middle East and North Africa ..........................................................................................................................125

Sub-Saharan Africa .................................................................................................................................................133

Central Asia ...................................................................................................................................................................141

South & East Asia and Oceania .......................................................................................................................147

Polar regions ................................................................................................................................................................155

Space ................................................................................................................................................................................165

Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................................................170

Contact details ..............................................................................................................................................................172
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Global Strategic Trends (GST) describes astrategic context for those in the Ministryof Defence (MOD) and wider Governmentwho are involved in developing long-termplans, policies and capabilities. Without astrategic context there is a risk that planners,policy-makers and capability developers mayassume a future that adheres to preconceivedthoughts and assumptions. As well asproviding a strategic context, this fth editionof GST (GST 5) identies long-term threatsand opportunities, out to 2045. GST doesnot attempt to predict the future it cannot.Rather, it describes those phenomena thatcould have a signicant impact on the futureand combines these differing perspectivesto produce a multifaceted picture ofpossible outcomes.

The need for the MOD to set out the futurestrategic context was articulated in the 1998Strategic Defence Review. To meet thatrequirement, the Strategic Trends Programmewas started in 2001 and the rst edition of GSTwas published in 2003. Subsequent ly, GST,along with the Future Character of Conict(which will be renamed the Future OperatingEnvironment when it is released in 2014) havebeen key elements of the MODs contributionto both the National Security Strategy and theStrategic Defence and Security Review and weexpect them to play similar roles in the future.

GST is the rst step in a series of MOD long-term planning activities. By providing a globalcontext, further work will then be able toexamine its implications and develop policyand capability options to meet the resultingchallenges. While GST is produced principallyfor MOD it has utility for others involved inlong-ter m planning. We have beneted from

considerable engagementwith those outside MOD from academia, business andgovernment both domesticallyand internationally. In sodoing, we have deliberately attempted toavoid a single, subjective perspective.

The starting point for GST is identifying trends(discernable patterns of change) an exampleis the growth in world population. The nextstep is projecting those trends forward 30years, analysing their potential consequencesand using this to build a series of picturesof what the future could look like in 2045.Finally, these components are combinedto produce a strategic context, includingdefence and security implications, againstwhich policies, capabilities and plans can betested and rened. Key scenarios illustratehow these trends could interact and shocks provide the reader with examples of how thestrategic context could be radically altered byunexpected events. In addition, alternativeoutcomes emphasise that there are severalpossible ways trends could impact on thefuture.

Following a complex mapping process(explained further in the methodologysection) we have identied 13 clusters oftrends and drivers with particularly stronglinkages. This provides the overall structurefor the document, rather than the STEEPmethod 1 used in GST 4. Some trends (mostnotably those relating to economics, religion,technology and globalisation themes that

1 STEEP analysis provides broad headings forgrouping information: social, technological,economic, environmental and political.

Introduction


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Introduction

Synopsis, Executive summary and keyimplications for defence and security This section provides a brief overview,summarises the major trends, drivers andtheir implications, as well as highlighting keyimplications for defence and security.

Part 1 Thematic This part brings together important trendsand drivers under related themes. Therelationships between themes, trends anddrivers are described and the implicationsfor defence and security are highlighted.Where a geographical relationship has beenidentied, the theme is cross-referenced to theappropriate geographical analysis (Part 2).

Part 2 GeographicDrawing on region-specic research, andexpanding on the observations made inPart 1, this part considers regional and(where appropriate) country-specic effectsof themes, trends and drivers.

Shocks Throughout GST 5, text boxes containing shockswill alert the reader to the inherent uncertaintywhen looking 30 years into the future. Eventscould occur that would disrupt trends, leadingto a future that looks very different. T heseevents or shocks only have a low probabilityof occurring, but because of their potentiallyhigh impact, it is important to consider somein more detail, allowing for possible mitigatingaction to be taken. The terrorist attacks ofSeptember the 11 th or the 2008 global nancialcollapse are historical examples of low-probability events happening with signicantlong-term consequences.

ScenariosScenarios illustrate ways in which trends anddrivers from multiple themes could interact.

Alternative outcomesWhen discussing trends and drivers, wehighlight the outcome judged to be the mostlikely. However, there are several credible waysthat particular trends could interact and affectthe future. The alternative outcome boxeshighlight other plausible ways that trendscould develop.

For those readers who have a particularinterest in the way that trends are likely toaffect specic parts of the world, the secondpart of GST 5 focusses on what 2045 may looklike in eight regional groups as well as Space:

Northern America

Latin America

Europe

Middle East and North Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa

Central Asia

South & East Asia and Oceania

Polar regions

Space.

There is, unavoidably, a huge degree ofuncertainty in what we describe. We willhave got some things wrong, there will beunidentied shocks and surprises, as wellas phenomena that we had not envisaged.Parts of the document may, at rst glance,seem contradictory. There will inevitably beinconsistencies because we are aiming todescribe a variety of possible futures ratherthan predicting a single, certain outcome.Although we try to give a picture of the worldin 2045, you may see references to differentdates in the document where we have drawnon sources not perfectly aligned with ourtimeframe. Because we are looking so farinto the future, much of what we describeis, inevitably, based on extrapolation and (adegree of) imagination. Extrapolation maynot, of course, be linear. Unlike the methodused in GST 4, we have not attempted toassign probabilities, given the inherentuncertainty that could be misleadingand simplistic. Instead, we hope you willrefer to GST 5 regularly and draw your ownconclusions from the information we havepresented. This, we believe, will be the mosteffective way of helping you think about thefuture and how to embrace it.

would have been called ringroad issues inprevious issues of GST) run through all of thefollowing groups, and are discussed as theyarise rather than in their own sections. Wehope this brings them to life more clearly. The 13 overarching themes are:

Demography Gender Urbanisation Resources

The Environment Health

Transport

Information

Education

Automation and work

Corruption and money

Identity and the role of the state

Defence spending and capabilities.

Contained within these sections are anumber of scenarios which explore someof the most important connections andinter-dependencies between trends, givinga brief indication of a few of the challengesand opportunities that these linkages couldproduce. While we have set out what webelieve are the most plausible trends, ourwork on strategic shocks has shown howsignicant outlying disruptive events canbe. The most signicant of these shocks arediscussed with the relevant trends. AlthoughGST 5 may initially seem to have a rathergloomy, Malthusian 2 outlook, we believe thatpolicy-makers can have a signicant impact onthe future, and hence there are considerablegrounds for optimism.

2 The view that the population tends to increase at agreater rate than its means of subsistence, resultingin the population checks of war, famine andepidemic. Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 11thedition.

We hope you

will refer to GST 5egularly andraw your ownonclusions fromhe information

we haveresented.

How to use


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How to useHow to use

Thematic Geographic


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Our lives andthe world we livein will almostcertainly changeover the next thirty years, with theimpacts felt by all.

Our lives and the world we live in will almostcertainly change over the next 30 years, withthe impacts felt by all. We will probably livelonger and know more. By 2045, the globalpopulation is likely to grow by two billion, withfar-reaching consequences for how, and where,we live. Changing demographics could createnew threats and opportunities, with agingpopulations in many developed countries andyouth bulges in some developing countries. This is likely to be coupled with a growingnumber of migrants across the globe as webecome more connected. Gender inequalityis likely to remain in 2045, driving povertyand insecurity in large parts of the world.Governments may come under immensepressure to address the coming challenges,and if social expectations fail to be met, socialunrest or even violence could ensue. Over70% of a growing global population looksset to live in urban areas by 2045. Whereurbanisation is managed successfully, it couldspur economic growth and create a betterquality of life. Handl ed poorly, people may livein slums, without adequate infrastructure and

services driving an increase in communicablediseases and poverty, possibly leading to violentinsurgencies.

With more people living longer, demand forresources will almost certainly grow. We arelikely to need more food, water and bettersanitation. However, without successfullymanaging water stress, including more effectiveinternational cooperation, it is likely that 3.9billion people will suffer water shortages.Demand for energy could more than double by2045, although non-polluting power sourcesand better energy storage may offset some ofour reliance on coal and hydrocarbons.

As we increase the stress we place on thenatural environment, our need to understand,protect and preserve it will almost certainlygrow. Climate change, a rise in sea levels,desertication and reducing biodiversity areall issues that could affect us even more overthe next 30 years. They are likely to impact onagricultural production and shing, and couldexacerbate humanitarian crises. It is possible,however, that new technologies may holdsolutions to some of these problems.

Physical inactivity, unhealthy diets andincreased life expectancy could lead to anobesity epidemic as well as rises in non-communicable diseases such as dementia.But signicant improvements in health andmedicine could let us live longer and be moreproductive. We are likely to be able to makemedical diagnoses faster, more cheaply andwith greater accuracy. Innovative methodscould be introduced for drug and treatmentdelivery. Medicines may even be tailored to apersons genetic make-up, providing safer andmore effective treatment.

Technological progress is occurring in almostall aspects of human life and is likely to causesignicant change by 2045. Everyone andeverything seem certain to become moreconnected, with revolutionary advances in howwe acquire, store and analyse information. I fcurrent trends continue, there are likely to bedramatic increases in computing power thatcould enable us to predict and monitor manyaspects of our lives and surroundings. T hismay mean that complex global issues canbe modelled and predicted, such as climatechange, population movements, diseasepatterns and economic trends. B ut peopleare likely to nd it increasingly difficult to go

Synopsis


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Synopsis

This fth edition of Global Strategic Trends(GST 5) aims to describe possible f utures toprovide a strategic context for policy- anddecision-makers across Government. Thirteenbroad thematic areas have been identied,with eight geographic regions and a sectionon space. Some trends (most notably thoserelating to economics, religion, technologyand globalisation) are so important that theyrun through all of the subject areas, and arediscussed as they arise rather than in their ownsections, to bring them to life more clearly. Inthe process of identifying threats, challengesand defence and security implications forpolicy- and decision-makers, there may be atendency for the document to seem rathernegative in its outlook. This is an inevitableconsequence of its purpose. There is ofcourse scope for human ingenuity to have asignicant impact on the f uture, and hencethere are considerable grounds for optimism.

Demography The global population is likely to grow tobetween 8.3 and 10.4 billion by 2045, largelybecause of increasing life-expectancy,declining levels of child mortality andcontinuing high birth rates in manydeveloping countries. 1 Growth is not likelyto be evenly distributed and will probablybe slower in developed countries. Some,including Japan and parts of Europe, arelikely to experience a decline in population.In developing countries, rapid populationincrease and urbanisation will probablychallenge stability. Age and genderimbalances may exacerbate existing politicaland social tensions while a growing youth

1 UN categories are used for developed anddeveloping countries.

population, especially in the Middle East,Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, couldprovide a reservoir of disaffected youngpeople. Conversely, if harnessed, they couldprovide a boost to their economies. Migrationis likely to increase, with people movingwithin, and outside, their country of origin toseek work or to escape the effects of climatechange.

GenderGlobal gender equality and opportunity gapswill almost certainly continue in economic,social and political spheres out to 2045.Although womens autonomy is likely togradually increase in most regions, entrenchedgender disparities will probably remain asmajor drivers of poverty and insecurity. Asis the case today, women are likely to havegreater opportunities and autonomy indeveloped countries than elsewhere in theworld, but are unlikely to achieve total parit ywith their male counterparts, particularly whensocial expectations inhibit the role of womenin society. In some regions of the world,

womens rights and feminist movements arelikely to continue to face a backlash fromthose with vested interests in maintaining thestatus quo.

UrbanisationWith 70% of the global population likely tolive in cities by 2045, urbanisation will be aparticularly important theme in developingcountries. Urbanisation is likely to enhanceeconomic and social development, but without mitigation measures may alsolead to pressure on infrastructure (and theenvironment) which could contribute tosocial tensions within the urban population.

Executive summaryoffline and maintaining privacy could becomemore challenging. There could also be anincreasing threat of cyber attack from criminalsand terrorists as information, communicationsand critical national infrastructure becomemore integrated.

Our changing technological world is likelyto have a tremendous impact on the waywe are educated in the future. Improvedcomputing power and Big Data meansthat teachers are likely to have access to vastquantities of information. Learning is likely tobe stimulated through exercises, games andsimulations enabled at the touch of a button.Although face-to-face education is unlikelyto disappear, teachers will probably becomemore like learning advisers, guiding studentsthrough digitally-delivered, personally-tailorededucation. Social networking is likely to playan important role in collaborative learning,through real-time discussion and virtualclassrooms. Learning is unlikely to end atschool and university rather, lifelong learningwill probably become the norm. There is likelyto be a growing emphasis on the transferabilityand constant upgrading of qualications.Global inequality in education is likely to remain,particularly as a digital education is unlikelyto be available to all. There will probably stillbe a gender gap, despite near-parity for girlsand boys at the primary level. H owever, thedisparity between developed and developingcountries is likely to reduce. It is even possiblethat by 2045 the majority of the worlds childrenwill have enjoyed a university or higher-leveleducation.

Technology is highly likely to change ourworking environment. B y 2045, robots orunmanned systems (able to carry out complextasks without a human operators directinvolvement) are likely to be as ubiquitous ascomputers are today. Ma chines are likely tobecome more sophisticated and lifelike. Wecould also see robots used in many more areasof work and society, including caring roles,customer-serv ice, surgery and in combat. Thiswill probably mean a period of adaption andchange, as robots take on some traditionallyhuman roles. Ther e will almost certainly bechallenges to overcome, such as establishingwhether we can learn to trust robots . Bu t

it is not just the increasing use of machinesthat has the potential to change the way wework. As the population alters, the workforcemay change as well people are likely towork longer. We are likely to place a greateremphasis on exible working, short-termcontracts and working away from the office.

So much change will almost certainly affect ourperception of identity. And again, technologicaldevelopments are likely to drive change.Advances in human augmentation maymean we can enhance our sensory capability,become more physically able and improve ourcognitive functions. However, it is unlikely thistechnology will be available to all, potentiallycontributing to the increasing inequality theworld faces.

How the state functions in this changing worldwill almost certainly alter. Individua ls may feelless connected to their country of origin as theymigrate more frequently and identify morestrongly with online communities of interest.Private companies and non-governmentalorganisations could grow in power, providingservices that used to be the responsibility of thestate. Internationally, countries may be moreclosely connected, with stronger trading andpolitical blocs.

Widespread and challenging implicationsfor defence and security will almost certainlybe generated by this increasingly connectedworld, with its rapidly advancing technologyand evolving societies. The face of somearmed forces may change, with an increasinguse of unmanned systems and women in

combat roles. Milita ries and security forcesmay be asked to meet the challenges of morehumanitarian disasters, and attacks by non-state actors and cyber-criminals may increase.As more people live in cities, it is likely thatsome future adversaries will be found in larger,more complex urban environments, possessinga greater level of information and better accessto technology than they do today.


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Executive summaryExecutive summary

non-state actors. Technology is highly likelyto play a signicant role in both enabling andcombating corruption.

State-backed currencies will almost certainlystill be the dominant form of money in 2045,although alternative currencies are likely toexpand, constituting the main shift in thenancial landscape. Criminal transactionsmay increasingly be made using alternativecurrencies, with a possible growth in theanonymous raising and transferring of fundsby terrorist groups. Governments could haveless inuence over alternative currenciesand, as a result, may be less able to shapethe global nancial system or raise revenuesthrough taxation. A single internationalcurrency within the timeframe is improbable,with the US dollar likely to remain the mostimportant global currency by 2045. China islikely to allow greater nancial liberalisation,contributing to its possible overtaking of theUS in terms of GDP within the next 30 years. This is likely to contribute to some erosionof the pre-eminence of the dollar as thedominant global reserve currency. Increasedglobalisation could also make transmission ofnancial shocks more widespread.

Identity and the role of the state The state will almost inevitably be thedominant actor in international affairs in 2045.Private or semi-state owned companies andnon-governmental organisations are likelyto exert increasing inuence, but are lesslikely to exercise state-like legal and decision-making powers. Individuals may dene

themselves less by their nationality, withgrowing migration and stronger links to virtualcommunities. Rising costs, demands, technicalcomplexity and need for specialisation couldsee private and other non-state entitiesincreasingly functioning as the primaryproviders of those services that states havetraditionally delivered, such as security. Somestates may lose their monopoly on force, asprivate security contractors are increasinglyemployed and as some private companies takemore responsibility for their own security. Theextent to which these changes happen underthe control of s tate-based decision-makers islikely to vary between countries according totheir stability and forms of governance.

Personal privacy will very probably beincreasingly difficult to achieve in the yearsleading up to 2045, as identity is ever-moredened by online activities. People are likelyto demand higher levels of privacy protectionfrom governments and businesses. Religionwill probably remain a signicant componentof identity, with the spread of representativegovernments providing the space forsome religions to become increasinglypolitically assertive. A range of technologicalenhancements have the potential to transformhuman identity by improving sensoryperception, physical performance and perhapseven giving us the ability to control fear andother emotional states.

Defence spending and capabilitiesChinese defence expenditure is likely to rivalthat of the US over the next 30 years, reectingChinas growing economic strength. Thesetwo global powers are likely to spend farmore on defence than any other country,accounting for almost half of the worlds totaldefence spending by 2045. Indias defencebudget could see it occupying a second tierby 2045. Russia is likely to increase defencespending, although not quickly enough tomatch that of China, the US or India. Europeancountries are likely to continue to spendsubstantial amounts on their armed forces,although their spending is unlikely to increasesignicantly unless a major threat emerges.Advances in technology are likely to lead toincreasingly effective non-lethal capabilitiesand increase the precision of weapons. This islikely to alter the nature of conict.

Northern AmericaBy 2045, Northern Americas population islikely to grow to between around 394-478million and become more ethnically diverse.Climate change is likely to open up shippingroutes during the summer months, as wellas new areas for extra cting minerals andhydrocarbons in the Arctic. However, it isalso likely to cause signicant harm throughheatwaves, droughts, and ooding across theregion. Northern Americas economic outlookis positive, boosted by newly accessibleenergy reserves, and it is expected to integrateever-more closely with the global economy.While security challenges (including the threat

of terrorism) will probably endure, the region islikely to remain stable and politically inuential. The India-US relationship has the potential tobecome signicant in the timeframe, but thepre-eminent relationship for the region is likelyto be between China and the US, par ticularlyas trading partners. However, there will almostcertainly remain a number of issues thatcould give rise to tensions between the twocountries.

Latin America and the Caribbean

Latin America and the Caribbean are likelyto remain politically and economicallyfragmented, with individual countries pursuingbilateral relationships rather than forming astrong unied bloc. Br azil and Mexico arelikely to show the strongest growth in theregion, with both countries likely to be majorglobal economies (in terms of GDP) by 2045.Rising sea levels and extreme rainfall are likelyto expose a number of large and populouscities in coastal regions around South Americato additional ooding risk. Socially, weakgovernance is likely to continue to inhibitprogress in a number of countries, with thegrowing consumer class being increasinglyvocal in its challenge to regimes. Some LatinAmerican countries are highly likely to havemature military-industrial complexes andarmed forces capable of performing on theglobal stage by 2045. Regional stability ishighly likely to endure, although producingand globally distributing narcotics will almostcertainly continue, with an increasing homemarket. However, the emergence of a fully-edged narco-state is unlikely.

EuropeEurope is likely to remain a substantial part ofthe global economy, with the euro and thesingle market still likely to exist by 2045. EUmembership is likely to expand, although it isunlikely that all countries who wish to join willbe included. The effects of climate changeare likely to be less severe in Europe than inmost other regions, although increased waterscarcity in the south may limit agriculturalproductivity there. Energy consumptionis likely to decrease out to 2045, althoughhydrocarbons will probably continue to bethe continents main source of fuel. Europe

is likely to face a range of security challenges,but disagree internally over how to addressthem. As the US focusses increasingly onAsia, Europe will almost certainly be expectedto make a greater contribution to its ownsecurity. Russia is likely to continue to bea major power, maintaining a substantialcapability for regional intervention by 2045.China and Europe are unlikely to view eachother as threats and may become partners inmanaging future crises.

Middle East and North AfricaOver the next 30 years, the Middle East andNorth Africa (MENA) are likely to remainvolatile areas, with high potential for tension

and some violent conict. The aftermath ofthe Arab uprisings of 2011 may still resonatein some countries, with civil unrest likely.Identity politics and sectarianism will almostcertainly be key characteristics of the politicallandscape, constituting a serious challengeto good governance. Countries in MENAare unlikely to be able to break the cycle ofpower politics, patronage, religious tensionand authoritarianism. Social, environmentaland economic issues will probably continueto threaten the regions stability out to2045, including an under-employed youngpopulation, a decline in natural energyresources and the effects of climate change.

Europe is likely to remain a substantial part of global economy

ersonal privacywill very probablye increasinglyifficult to achieven the yearseading up to

045, as identity increasinglyened by onlinectivities.

Some Latin Americancountries arehighly likely tohave maturemilitary-industrialcomplexes andarmed forces

capable of performing on theglobal stage by2045.


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Sub-Saharan AfricaSub-Saharan Africa will almost certainly remaina region of signicant political and economicdifferences by 2045 but overall the regionseconomy should grow possibly rapidly.However, economic performance is likely tovary sharply from country to country, with alack of infrastructure and political instabilitylikely to continue to provide some of thebiggest challenges to sustained growth. The region is likely to see the fastest rise inpopulation growth of anywhere in the world,

with some countries populations morethan doubling by 2045. Governance in theregion is likely to improve and the currenttrend towards representative government islikely to continue, although this will probablybe resisted by some authoritarian regimes,possibly leading to violence. The risk ofstate-on-state conict is likely to reduce butwill almost certainly remain a concern. Bycontrast, the threat from intra-state conictand from terrorism is likely to endure - andcould worsen. The African Unions ability todeal with crises is likely to improve, but it willprobably still require international assistancefor more demanding situations. Technologyis likely to facilitate links between differentparts of the region and with the wider world,thereby increasing economic productivityand improving governance. If current trendscontinue, most people in the region are likelyto have access to the Internet by 2045. Climatechange is likely to have a severe impacton some parts of sub-Saharan Africa, withagriculture particularly badly affected. Theregion is likely to continue to face signicant

rates of infection from communicablediseases such as HIV/AIDS and malaria. But it isconditions such as diabetes and cancer that arelikely to pose the greater health threat by 2045.

Central AsiaDespite the divergent paths taken by theve Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan andUzbekistan) since their independence from theSoviet Union, each remains vulnerable to socialand economic risks. These potential problemsstem from internal threats caused by weakinfrastructure and institutions, as well as theirrelations with external actors. As a result, the

region is susceptible to ethnic conict, suddenpolitical transitions, economic shocks, foodinsecurity and natural disasters all potentiallyposing strategic threats beyond Central Asia tothe rest of the world.

South & East Asia and OceaniaChina and India will almost certainly continueto be the dominant powers in the regionby 2045, with their economies ensuringthat South & East Asia makes the biggestcontribution to the worlds GDP. Japan is likelyto continue to have the regions third-largesteconomy. In Oceania, Australia will almostinevitably remain the dominant power andhave the largest economy. South & East Asiaand Oceania are likely to continue to containover 50% of the worlds population by 2045,presenting both benets and challenges.China and India are likely to continue todevote considerable resources to ensuringeconomic growth and both countries arelikely to continue to seek a strong economicrelationship with the US. The ways thatChina and India manage their so cietiesdemands and their internal methods ofgovernance will be important to the regionsdevelopment. Both countries are likely tobecome increasingly dependent on theglobal economy for their long-term stability,prosperity and security.

Polar regionsClimate change is the principal driver ofchange in the Arctic and Antarctic, withincreasing temperatures and precipitation.As Arctic and Antarctic sea ice retreats, many

areas that are currently inaccessible couldbecome open to commercial exploitation,particularly of oil and gas. The opening-upof the Arctic is likely to focus attention onthe regions governance arrangements, but,despite challenges, current arrangementsare likely to endure out to 2045. Large-scalemilitary confrontation in either region isunlikely, but it is possible that some countries depending on their internal politics mayseek to project power in the Arctic if theyconsider their interests in the region to beunder threat. In Antarctica, the currentgovernance arrangements are likely to endureout to 2045, but the Antarctic Treaty System

could come under pressure to accommodateincreased commercial exploitation withincarefully managed bounds.

SpaceOur reliance on space technology in a numberof commercial and military areas will almostcertainly increase out to 2045. Technological

advances are likely to further reduce thecost of manufacturing and launching spacevehicles, making space increasingly accessibleto (and protable for) countries, companies,organised crime and private individuals. Asreliance on space grows, so could the impactof damage caused by deliberate attack, spaceweather and orbital collisions.

Key defence and security implicationsEach section in GST 5 ends with a number of defence-related deductions. The followingare the most important of those defence and security implications. Rather than attach anyadditional prioritisation to them, they are listed simply in the order in which they appear inthe document.

Technological developments will probably allow diasporas to remainmore closely connected to their native countries. Consequently, issuesfrom homelands are likely to be brought into host countries, and viceversa. Diasporas may also provide an impetus for governments tointervene - or refrain from interfering - in their citizens countries oforigin. Lack of integration of migrant groups could exacerbate socialtensions.

3

Increasing numbers of women are likely to have fr ont-line combat rolesin armed forces worldwide, mirrored by growing female participation inarmed resistance movements and terrorist groups.

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Sexual violence will almost certainly continue to be a feature of conictand state violence and, used as a weapon of war, has the potential to be asignicant factor in instability. However, countries and their armed forcesare likely to face greater international scrutiny and legislation against suchactivities.

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Failed and failing cities, in both developed and developing countries,could pose major security challenges (such as social unrest and eveninsurgencies) with the potential for country-wide repercussions. If morepeople live in urban areas, security and armed forces will almost certainlyneed to operate in this environment to a greater extent. Adversa ries couldrange from government-controlled militaries to armed non-state groupswith criminal or malign intent.

17

Urbanisation concentrates populations, potentially making them morevulnerable to the effects of natural disasters, disease and deliberate actsof violence. With most urban areas in coastal regions, cities are likely to beparticularly vulnerable to the effects of rising sea levels.

17

Growing use of nuclear energy raises the possibility of ssile materialbeing obtained by non-state actors as well as countries operating outsideinternational laws, potentially causing security threats.

21

Extreme weather events, such as ooding and droughts, are likely toincrease in both frequency and intensity in a number of regions. Extremeevents will almost certainly continue to cause widespread damage andloss of life, although our warning mechanisms, defences and ability torespond may also improve in the same timeframe.

31

As Arctic andAntarctic seace retreats,

many areas thatre currentlynaccessible could

ecome openo commercialxploitation,articularly of oilnd gas.


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i xxiiiGlobal Strategic Trends Global Strategic Trends


Armed and security forces, both at home and abroad, are likely to be morefrequently tasked with providing humanitarian assistance and disasterrelief, perhaps supporting indigenous responders.

31

Greater reliance on automated technologies could provide scope forterrorists and criminals to disrupt the transport system through cyberattacks.

49

As more of our work and social activities depend on interconnectedinformation and communications networks which may, in places, beextremely vulnerable to attack there could be more opportunities forcriminals and terrorists to have a gr eater impact on our day-to-day lives.

55

An increasing number of devices capable of collecting sensor data couldintensify levels of surveillance. Stealth vehicles may nd it more difficult toremain hidden and the ability to prosecute covert operations, especiallyin urban environments, is likely to become more technically challenging. This is particularly signicant given the probable increase in the size ofurban areas, along with the growing use of surveillance to prevent crime.

55

Unmanned systems are likely to have an increasing role in combat,potentially transforming the way that wars are fought. Militar y decision-making is likely to remain a human preserve, at least in western countries,but it is possible that the actual ghting will no longer be a solely humanendeavour.

67

The cost of unmanned systems is likely to fall, while the ease ofmanufacturing complex items rises, making unmanned systems muchmore widespread and harder to regulate. Criminal and terrorist groups arelikely to nd it easier to gain, hold and use unmanned capabilities.

67

The expansion of alternative currencies may make it easier to transfer andretain funds anonymously and hence harder for governments to freezecriminals assets or sanction rogue regimes. Criminal and terrorist groupsmay also nd it easier to transfer funds between jurisdictions.

75

The pressures of globalisation are likely to mean that individual countrieswill nd it increasingly difficult to act unilaterally most countries arelikely to be less powerful. This could lead to a reduction in conict. Thestate is still likely to have the most important voice in international affairs,but out to 2045 the private sector and non-state organisations are likelyto become more inuential. Ther e is likely to be an increase in the useof private security companies by governments interdependencies maystrengthen, despite their largely separate motivations.

83

Some augmentation of humans with embedded sensors and computingdevices is likely to occur within the 2045 timeframe. This may provideadvantages such as improved situational awareness, health monitoring,and the ability to modify physiological and psychological states toincrease performance and enhance resilience. Mind-controlled machineryis likely to become much more sophisticated, with human brain-to-braincommunication possible by 2045.

83

The US and China are likely to have similarly sized defence budgets,potentially out-spending the rest of the world by 2045. India could have adefence budget equivalent to the EUs total spending on defen ce.

93

Increasing real-terms equipment costs may mean that platforms becomemore expensive. Consequently, higher levels of defence spending maynot lead to armed forces larger than todays.

93

Although China is likely to surpass the US in terms of GDP, the US is stilllikely to remain, militarily, the most powerful country in the world.

101

NATO is likely to remain the key security alliance for Northern Americancountries, although US (and possibly Canad ian) commitments elsewhere

in the world may mean that European countries will have to take on moreof the burden of maintaining security in their region.

101

There are a number of issues and treaties which may involve the US andChina in armed conict with potentially dire consequences regionallyand globally.

101

NATO is likely to remain the key organisation for military crisismanagement, although its cohesion may be challenged by diverse threatperceptions, a US focus on Asia and internal disagreement on its globalrole. The Alliance could be reinvigorated by the need to band together toaddress a deteriorating security situation in Europes near abroad.

117

Internal terrorist threats are likely to continue in the Middle East andNorth Africa, as are attacks on other nations from groups based in theregion. Although Al-Qaida has been damaged in recent years, Islamicfundamentalism will almost certainly continue to fuel terrorist networksout to 2045.

125

In sub-Saharan Africa, the combined challenge of an increased population,demands on resources and the effects of climate change (particularlydrought) on food and water supplies are likely to lead to tension, whichcould result in conict.

133

Chinas military is becoming more capable and has increasing globalreach. By 2045, Chinas military capability may be close to matching thatof the US, perhaps exceeding it in some areas. Indias military capability isalso likely to increase but probably not to the point where it rivals that of

China or the US by 2045.

147

The East and South China Seas may be ashpoints for confrontationbetween China and the US and allied countries. Similarly Kashmir, theKorean Peninsula and the border between China and India are likely to beareas of tension. The risk of a major state-on-state conict in the regioncannot be ruled out.

147

Commercial activity expansion in the Arctic Ocean may require extensivemonitoring to safeguard Arctic countries sovereignty.

155

Increasing reliance on space-based technologies, particularly in developedcountries, means that any large-scale disruption to satellites (such assolar superstorms) could have signicant consequences for electricitydistribution, communications, navigation, logistics and weather forecasts.

165


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v xxvGlobal Strategic Trends Global Strategic Trends

A timeframe looking out 30 years means there is a huge degree of uncertainty in the world thatwe describe, which by its nature, is based on extrapolation and a degree of imagination.

Insight(1 to 2 years)

Trends(3 to 5 years)

Foresight(5 to 10 years)

Farsight(10 to 30 years)

Uncertainty

Predictability

FutureNow

Review of previous data The Strategic Trends Programme has beenrunning as a continuous research programmesince 2001 and as a consequence there isa considerable body of material on trendsand drivers. We began writing this fthedition of Global Strategic Trends (GST 5) byreviewing our existing data to identify anyinconsistencies and enduring trends. Themes,trends and drivers from editions one to fourwere mapped and compared. This producedan enduring trends map that showedsimilarities and some areas of contradiction.

Identifying gapsIn a parallel exercise, we engaged with a rangeof external contributors to explore the gapsin our existing research. We considered anumber of new areas as a result.

Research topicsFrom the enduring trends map, output fromour external engagement and a continuingprocess of in-house gap analysis, we identiednearly 30 research topics. These were a mix ofnew areas and existing themes that neededsubstantial updating. Researchers, fromthe Development, Concepts and DoctrineCentres (DCDC) Futures Team, wider Defenceor academia, wrote extensive essays on eachtopic, consulting widely and paying particularattention to defence and security implications.

Breakdown, analysis and mapping These essays were then analysed and mappedby DCDCs Defence Analysis and Research(DAR) Team to identify drivers, factors andtrends. Ultimately, this produced a verydetailed cluster map, drawing together bothour previous work and new research. The map

ordered themes and drivers into their top-levelthematic areas, highlighting interactions anddependencies. How these relationships relateto one another helped us to understand therelevance and importance of our ndings. Theprocess also highlighted ideas that are basedon assumptions or assertions that needed tobe substantiated with additional evidence.

Draft sections for consultationShort draft sections based on either atheme or particular region were sent forlimited consultation across Government,industry, think-tanks and academia. Extensiveengagement took place both in the UK andabroad, with visits to Brazil, China, France,India, NATO Allied Command Transformation,Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa,Sweden, the United Arab Emirates and theUnited States of America. Other internationalexchanges were conducted electronically,with Norway and Slovakia. We are gratefulfor the generous amounts of time and effortexpended on reviewing these drafts whichGST 5 has beneted from enormously. It

was always our intention for GST 5 to bean inclusive and transparent, proactivelyengaging part of the Strategic TrendsProgramme, for wider benet to policy- anddecision-makers.

Consolidation, writing and editing The nal phase consisted of consolidating ourwork and incorporating feedback from theconsultations, writing up our ndings, addingscenarios to highlight key potential outcomes,including certain strategic shocks, andsubjecting our work to a nal round of peerreview and editing.

Methodology

Methodology


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1

This section brings together related trends anddrivers under important themes. We describethe relationships between themes, trendsand drivers and highlight the implications fordefence and security.

Where a geographical relationship has beenidentied, the theme is cross-referenced to theappropriate regional section in Part 2.

Part 1

ThematicDemography ....................................................................3

Gender ...............................................................................11

Urbanisation .................................................................17

Resources ........................................................................21

The Environment ......................................................31

Health .................................................................................41

Transport .........................................................................49

Information ...................................................................55

Education ........................................................................61

Automation and work ..........................................67

Corruption and money ..........................................75

Identity and the role of the state ...............83

Defence spending and capabilities ..........93


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3Global Strategic Trends

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Global population growth The current world population of around7.2 billion is expected to increase by almostone billion in the next 12 years and reachbetween 8.3 and 10.4 billion by 2045. 1 Drivingfactors for such an increase are a decline ininfectious diseases, high birth rates in thedeveloping world, improving maternal andneonatal health, improved sanitation anddeclining under-ve mortality. Most of thepopulation growth will probably occur, as itdoes today, in developing countries (mainly insub-Saharan Africa), while the population indeveloped countries is likely to remain largelyunchanged at around 1.3 billion. Developingregions are likely to account for approximately97% of global population growth by 2050,with 38% taking place in the least developedcountries. Africa is likely to account for 49% of

1 Global population is expected to reach 8.323 (ifthere is a low birth rate), 9.308 (if there is a mediumbirth rate) or 10.352 billion (if there is a high birthrate) by 2045. This foreca st is drawn from UN (2012)World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision,United Nations Department for Economic and SocialAffairs hereafter referred to as UN WPP, available athttp://esa.un.org/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm

global population growth by 2050. Populationincreases in poor areas may magnify existingpoverty, generating an unsustainable demandfor public services (for example, education,health and sanitation), unless there is a parallelincrease in economic development. Conictsover scarce resources are possible and couldbe an obstacle to development where it ismost needed.

In most developed countries, birth rates havedeclined due to changes in attitude and

way of life the most important of which isan increase in the status of women. 2 Somecountries have seen a recent increase in birthrates, although this is likely to be a temporaryphenomenon. Overall, global birth rateshalved between 1950 and 2010, droppingfrom 5 to 2.5 per woman, 3 and are likely tocontinue to decline. Newly-industrialising

2 Population Bulletin of the UN (2002), Completingthe Fertility Transition

3 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs(2010), The Worlds Women 2010: Trends andStatistics, available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/Worldswomen/WW_full%20report_color.pdf

Demography

The global population is likely to grow to between 8.3 and 10.4 billion by 2045, largelybecause of increasing life-expectancy, declining levels of child mortality and continuinghigh birth rates in many developing countries. Growth is not likely to be evenlydistributed and will probably be slower in developed countries. Some, including Japanand a number of European countries, are likely to experience a decline in population.In developing countries, rapid population increase and urbanisation will probablychallenge stability. Age and gender imbalances may exacerbate existing political andsocial tensions while a growing youth population, especially in the Middle East, CentralAsia and sub-Saharan Africa, could provide a reservoir of disaffected young people.Conversely, if harnessed, they could provide a boost to their economies. Migration islikely to increase, with people moving within, and outside, their country of origin to seekwork or to escape the effects of climate change.

Most of the populationgrowth will probably occur,

as it does today,in developingcountries.
http://esa.un.org/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htmhttp://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/Worldswomen/WW_full%2520report_color.pdfhttp://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/Worldswomen/WW_full%2520report_color.pdfhttp://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/Worldswomen/WW_full%2520report_color.pdfhttp://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/Worldswomen/WW_full%2520report_color.pdfhttp://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/Worldswomen/WW_full%2520report_color.pdfhttp://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/Worldswomen/WW_full%2520report_color.pdfhttp://esa.un.org/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm


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5Global Strategic Trends Global Strategic Trends

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countries in east and south eastern Asia haveexperienced reducing numbers of children perwoman and a resulting decrease in the ratioof productive workers to dependents. Thesefactors have contributed to their vigorouseconomic growth, and are likely to be a modelthat others seek to emulate.

Methods to slow population growth vary, asdo their success. Mandated measures such asChinas one child policy have created long-term problems, such as a signicant genderimbalance. Other approaches, however, showthat it is possible to slow population growthwith popular consent. 4 For example, sexeducation, access to contraception, reducingchild mortality (negating the need for largefamilies to ensure survival of family lines),and encouraged emigration policies haveall helped to reduce growth rates. In manysocieties, bearing children grants a womanstatus in her community, but increasingfemale literacy and employment, as well as

4 Bangladesh is a good example of a society thathas managed to reduce its high birth rates on avoluntarily basis.

improvements in contraceptive technologyand availability, are changing such culturalattitudes. 5 Women are becoming moreempowered without needing to have severalchildren.

Age and gender imbalancesImbalances across regions and countries arelikely to exacerbate existing political and socialtensions. The global median age is increasing(although the rate of increase is slower in

developing countries) with those aged 60or over comprising the fastest growingpopulation age-group. Indeed, by 2045, 750million people are likely to be over 65 yearsold.6 For those countries with increasinglyelderly populations, requirements such aspublic pensions, health services and long-term care are likely to be ever-more pressing priorities which could reduce defence

5 Montgomery, K. (2009), The Demographic Transition

6 Christine Lagarde (2014), A New Multilateralism forthe 21st Century: The Richard Dimbleby Lecture

spending in most affected countries. 7 Somedeveloping countries do not provide welfareand will not be directly affected by this trend.A declining working population coupledwith increasing welfare costs are likely tolead to the retirement age increasing (as hashappened in some developed countries). Forsome governments, a rising welfare burdenis likely to lead to them re-evaluating howthey provide social welfare. In societies withan ageing working population, older peopleare likely to hold an increased proportion of

7 ISS (2013), Enablin g the Future European Militar yCapabilities, available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Report_16.pdf

positions with authority and inuence which, ifnot managed effectively, could disenfranchisethe younger generation. Compoundingthis, young people may feel frustrated atthe increasing cost of supporting a growingelderly population, particularly if they believethey have been disadvantaged by their elders.

Women are likely to still represent 55% ofthe worlds population in 2045 and currentgender imbalances in some areas are notanticipated to change signicantly in this time.Some Asian countries are likely to continueto experience an uneven male to femalepopulation balance out to 2045, due to sex-selective abortions, child abandonment anddiseases which disproportionately affect girls.

For example, due to its demographic legacy,China may have 48 million more men thanwomen by 2045, 8 potentially exacerbatinggender imbalances in receiving countriesif Chinese emigration increases. Increasingnumbers of young men may be f rustratedat being unable to nd a wife and could lackthe stability that a family life provides. Male-dominated societies also tend to be moreauthoritarian and violent. Studies monitoringthe level of violence exhibited by states during

8 UN WPP,op. cit. Figures based on medium birth ratefor China at 2045.

mbalances acrossegions andountries are likely

o exacerbatexisting politicalnd socialensions.

Alternative outcome: Care costs

Ageing populations and increaseddependency ratios may create fundingpressures, particularly in developedcountries. However, advances inhealthcare and changes in educationmethods may see the cost of providingthese services fall, as people becomehealthier, work longer and educationbecomes de-centralised.

Global population by ten-year age group and sex

100+

90-99

80-89

70-79

60-69

50-59

40-49

30-39

20-29

10-19

0-9

0 0100 100200 200300 300400 400500 500600 600700 700800 800Millionsof people

Agegroup

Source: UN (2012), World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision

20152045

20152045

Male Female

A growing population and a declining growth rate

Source: UN (2012), World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision

10

8

6

4

2

01950 1970 19901960 1980 2000 2010 2020 2030 2045

P o p u

l a t i o n

( b i l l i o n s )

10.4

9.3

8.3

0.59

2.5

1.79

High Medium LowFertility estimate

Growth rate% (medium fertility estimate)

2012


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international crises show that the severityof violence decreases as domestic genderequality increases.9

Globally, there are already three billion peopleunder the age of 25, and this group is likely toincrease.10 The proportion of young adultsis likely to grow most rapidly in sub-SaharanAfrica, but there are also likely to be signicantrises in Central and Southern Asia. In MiddleEastern countries, the proportion of young

adults will probably reach its peak during thecoming decade and by 2045 the majority ofthe population is likely to b e between theages of 15 and 59.11 If managed effectively,a high proportion of working age adultscould provide countries with an economicboost, but if the rising expectations of youngadults are not met, social unrest could follow.Avoiding unrest is likely to depend on effective

9 Caprioli, M. and Trumbore, P. F. (2003), IdentifyingRogue States and Testing their Interstate ConictBehavior, available at http://lib.znate.ru/docs/index-124184.html

10 Lagarde, op. cit.11 UN WPP,op. cit.

governance together with positive andinclusive economic development. However,these conditions will probably only be met ina limited number of affected countries.

MigrationMigration is likely to increase or, at least,remain constant. 12 In 2005, 191 million peoplelived outside their country of origin. Todaythere are 232 million (this gure alreadyexceeds our earlier assessment in the 4th

edition of Global Strategic Trends).13 Thosecountries attempting to limit immigrationare likely to be only partially successful. Inpreceding decades, migration has beencharacterised by people moving from Asia andAfrica to Northern America and Europe.

12 Statistics on migration from UN WPP,op. cit. andOECD (2009), The Future of International Migrationto OECD Countries

13 Fig ures from UN WPP, op. cit. show that the numberof international migrants has already risen above232 million (compared to GST 4s estimation that 230million people would live outside their countries oforigin by 2040).

EU16.128.3

US15.730.7China

Japan

12.4

62.9India

4.726.1

4.7

6.74.6

Russia6.62.5

Brazil6.62.3

Mexico 5.31.6

Indonesia5.41.2

Turkey4.51.1

Australia2.51.0

Saudi2.30.9

South Africa 2.00.6

Nigeria3.10.5

Kazakstan1.20.2

Ethiopia0.90.1

World83.2

Worldin 2045243.1

Canada3.31.5

Chile 1.00.3

Algeria 1.00.3

Egypt3.10.5

Iran3.31.0

France3.82.2

Germany4.73.2

UK4.32.3

Republic of Korea4.41.6

2045

Now

Key

Economic growth

Gross Domestic Product (adjusted for purchasing power parity)*, expressed in US$ trillion at 2012 values.

* Purchasing power parity is used to show a countrys comparative economic strength byexpressing domestic values in the equivalent US$ that would be required to purchase thesame amount of goods and services in the US domestic market.

Source: Based on analysis by the MOD economics unit 2014

However, out to 2045, a growing number ofmigrants will probably move between andwithin Asia and Africa, with Asia becomingan increasingly important destination.Developed countries will almost certainlycontinue to attract signicant numbers ofmigrants. As is the case now, most migrantsare likely to be seeking work , althoughtechnological advances could lead toreducing demand for less skilled migrantworkers and increasing demand for highly-and multi-skilled people. Temporary largedisplacements due to crises will probablycontinue to occur with high local impact and the magnitude of such events is likelyto be amplied by increased populationdensity.

oportion of young adults is likely to grow most rapidly in sub-Saharan Africa

Global economic centre of gravity shifting

The steady rise of emerging economies in Asia will cause the worldseconomic centre of gravity the average location of economic activity byGDP to continue its move eastwards.

Source: Quah, D. (2011), The Global Economys Shifting Centre of Gravity (adapted by DCDC)

20141980 2045

f managed

ffectively, aigh proportionf working agedults couldrovide countries

with an economicoost.
http://lib.znate.ru/docs/index-124184.htmlhttp://lib.znate.ru/docs/index-124184.htmlhttp://lib.znate.ru/docs/index-124184.htmlhttp://lib.znate.ru/docs/index-124184.html


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Climate change is likely to drive some peoplefrom areas that are particularly badly affected,although not everyone who wishes to leaveis likely to be able to do so. Millions of peoplemay be trapped in vulnerable areas becauseof the high costs of migration, unable to raisethe capital needed for moving away. 14

During 2010-2050, the number of internationalmigrants to developed countries is likelyto be about 96 million, whereas the excessof deaths over births is projected to be 33million, implying total net growth. The mainestimated net receivers of migrants are likely tobe the US, Canada, UK and Australia, while themain estimated senders are Bangladesh, China,India and Mexico.15 Without immigration,the population in most developed countriesis highly likely to reduce. Those developedcountries that do see population growth,therefore, will almost certainly see an increasein the size and importance of their ethnic

14 Gover nment Office for Science (2011), Migrat ionand Global Environmental Change, available athttp://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/published-projects/global-migration/reports-publications

15 UN WPP,op. cit.

minority communities. While some ethnicgroups are likely to integrate effectively andbe economically successful, some are likelyto be poorly integrated and economicallydisadvantaged this may lead to tension andinstability.16 Some countries, for exampleJapan, are likely to face par ticular challenges.In light of Japans long-standing sensitivityto the otherness of gaijin (non-Japanese),immigration to Japan has been strikinglylimited and assimilation of newcomers moreso. Immigration, along with globalisedcommunications, is likely to contribute to a

growing cultural mix and complexity withincountries. While the norms of receivingcountries are likely to impact on migrants,the reverse may also be true. Technologicaldevelopments are likely to allow diasporasto remain more closely connected to theirnative countries and hence they are likely tobring issues from their homeland into thehost country, and vice versa. Diasporas mayalso provide an impetus for governments tointervene in their citizens countries of origin or to refrain from intervening.

16 See, for example, the European Commission series ofcohesion reports.

Defence and security implications Areas with larger youth populations and poor governance are likely to suffer from

instability, which could lead to unrest or conict within the 2045 timeframe. Lack of integration of migrant groups could exacerbate social tensions. Technological developments will probably allow diasporas to remain more closely

connected to their native countries. Consequently, issues from homelands are likelyto be brought into host countries, and vice versa. Diasporas may also provide animpetus for governments to intervene or refrain from interfering in their citizenscountries of origin.

A growing consumer classA rapidly growing consumer class (those whospend more than ten US dollars a day) willalmost certainly be a key driver of the globaleconomy. By 2030, this group is likely to growto more than ve billion from two billiontoday,17 while the proportion of consumerswho are European and North American is likelyto shrink from 50% today to just 22%. Rapidgrowth in many Asian countries, particularlyChina and India, is shifting the economiccentre of gravity south and east. This looks

likely to more than double Asias share ofthe consumer class from its current level of

17 Lagarde, op. cit.

30% to around 64% by 2030.18 As well as itseconomic importance, this group is likely todemand, and receive, more political inuence. Typically, they are likely to be more mobile,place greater value on education, and be lessaccepting of the status quo. The likely growthof the consumer class may, however, mask arise in global income inequality. Currently, 70%of the worlds population lives in countrieswhere disparities between the wealthiest andpoorest have grown over the last 30 years. 19

18 Roh de, D. (2012), The Swelling Middl e, available athttp://www.reuters.com/middle-class-infographic

19 Lagarde, op. cit.

Rapid growthin many Asiancountries, particularlyChina and India,is shifting theeconomic centreof gravity southand east.

share of the growing consumer class could more than double Chennai, India
http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/published-projects/global-migration/reports-publicationshttp://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/published-projects/global-migration/reports-publicationshttp://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/published-projects/global-migration/reports-publicationshttp://www.reuters.com/middle-class-infographichttp://www.reuters.com/middle-class-infographichttp://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/published-projects/global-migration/reports-publicationshttp://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/published-projects/global-migration/reports-publicationshttp://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/published-projects/global-migration/reports-publications


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Political decision-makers The World Economic Forum reported that,of 110 countries it surveyed in 2006, 86% hadimproved their gender equality performance,while 14% had regressed. 1 Womensparticipation in politics has accelerated duringthe last decade with the propor tion of womenin national assemblies increasing from 11.6%in 1995 to 18.4% in 2008. Since 2004, theproportion of seats held by women in nationalparliaments has increased by 2% in developingas well as developed countries. If this trendcontinues, there would be an additional 10%of such seats by 2045. Trends indicate that, incountries with a quota system, such as those

in Africa, formal parity is likely to be achievedmore readily, although other measures alsohave a role to play in determining womenslevels of political inuence. Globally,women often lack the resources to accessparliamentary level politics. They nd barriersat selection and campaigning stages as wellas prejudicial attitudes during elections. As aresult, women at this highest level of politicsare likely to continue to be predominantly

1 World Economic Forum (2013), The Global GenderGap Report, available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_Report_2013.pdf

drawn from elite societal groups. Barriers toentering formal politics make it likely thatwomen will continue to be comparativelybetter-represented in non-governmentalorganisations and civil society, playing animportant role in peace- and state-building. This could take on particular signicance if,as seems likely, such organisations take onan increasing role in meeting global aid anddevelopment needs.

Self-determination Trends suggest that, particularly in thedeveloping world, improvements in womensdegree of autonomy over personal decisions

such as those relating to their employment,marriage and health are likely to be slow.Such change may require alterations in socialattitudes and ways of life as well as legislation;and all segments of society may need tobe involved. It can be difficult to quantifyor measure gender inequality, but womensaccess to services such as contraception andhealth care can often be used as a proxyindicator for their degree of autonomy. Forexample, women with little say over their ownreproductive autonomy are unlikely to be ableto access family planning services. The rateof increase in women using reliable family

Gender

Global gender equality and opportunity gaps will almost certainly continue ineconomic, social and political spheres out to 2045. Although womens autonomy islikely to gradually increase in most regions, entrenched gender disparities will probablyremain as major drivers of poverty and insecurity. As is the case today, women are likelyto have greater opportunities and autonomy in d eveloped countries than elsewherein the world, but are unlikely to achieve total parity with their male counterparts,particularly when social expectations inhibit the role of women in society. In someregions of the world, womens rights and feminist movements are likely to continue toface a backlash from those with vested interests in maintaining the status quo.

Womens participationin politics hasacceleratedduring the lastdecade withthe proportionof womenin nationalassemblies

increasing.
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_Report_2013.pdfhttp://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_Report_2013.pdfhttp://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_Report_2013.pdfhttp://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_Report_2013.pdf


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planning has stalled. Currently, more than220 million women in developing countrieswho want to delay or avoid pregnancy lackaccess to effective methods of contraceptionand voluntary family planning services. Fewerthan 20% of women in sub-Saharan Africa andbarely one-third of women in South Asia usemodern contraceptives. In the US, birth ratesare increasing, which is ascribed to a declinein access to contraceptives, terminations andeducation in family planning. The unmetneed for reliable birth-control methods islikely to continue out to 2045, with signicant

regional variations owing to a variety of socialand cultural factors.

EmploymentIn most countries, women are less likely thanmen to be employed or looking activelyfor a job. Participation rates are highest inlow-income countrieswhere a majority ofwomen are active because they are involvedin unpaid subsistence agriculture, althoughthey are less involved in paid activities outsidethe householdand where few youth andadults are enrolled in education. Only 1% ofthe worlds titled land is owned by women agure that has not changed for over ten years

and is likely to remain roughly the same by2045. I t is estimated that women account fortwo thirds of the 1.4 billion people currentlyliving in extreme poverty and make up 60%of the 572 million working poor in the world. This general trend in economic activity is likelyto remain in 2045.

In the past two decades, the overall numbersof females participating in the labour forcehave remained stable. Changes in gendernorms and the roles of men and womenhave also begun to shift. However, women indeveloping countries still retain the doubleburden of being responsible for (unpaid)domestic and care work, as well as takingon increasing roles in paid work o utsidethe home. Gender inequalities in futureemployment are likely to centre on womennot having equal access to higher-quality jobs,with commensurate pay and treatment. As aresult of their lower educational attainment,domestic responsibilities and socially ascribedgender roles, women are more likely to workin informal employment. These characteristicsare highly likely to persist by 2045.

Women tend to be more active in the labourmarket in developed countries, especiallythose with extensive social protectioncoverage and in so cieties where part-timework is possible and accepted. Female wealthcreation is likely to continue to increase withindeveloped economies. In 2009, womencontrolled 27% of global wealth (roughlyUS$ 20.2 trillion)2 but only 24% of seniormanagement roles are lled by women. The

2 The Boston Consulti ng Group (2010), Levellin g thePlaying Field, available athttps://www.bcg.com/documents/le56704.pdf

UKs Equalities and Human Rights Commissionestimates it will take 70 years at the currentrate of progress to see an equal numberof female and male directors of FTSE 100companies. 3 In the UK, the gender pay gapstands at 15%, with women on averageearning 5,000 less a year than their malecounterparts. This disparity is even greater inpart-time jobs, going up to 35%. Followingthe trend over the last 30 years, it is likely that(within the industrialised world) the gender gapin terms of pay is likely to reduce out to 2045.

Many of the worlds defence and securityorganisations are likely to incorporate specicgender equality targets, and it is likelythat by 2045 all formal barriers to womenbeing involved in front-line combat will beeliminated in most developed countriesarmed forces. Mimicking changes in militaries,it is also probable that in 2045, armed resistancemovements and terrorist groups will includegreater numbers of women than at present.

3 Morse, F. (2014), Intern ational Womens Day 2014,available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/international-womens-day-2014-the-shocking-statistics-that-show-why-it-is-still-so-important-9177211.html

-income countries, the majority of women are involved in unpaid service

Female wealthcreation is likelyto continue toincrease withindevelopedeconomies butonly 24% of senior

managementroles are lled bywomen.

Alternative outcome: Rapid gender equality

By 2045, womens rights and status insociety could improve at an even greaterrate than current trends suggest, furtherreducing the gender gap. Increasesin gender equality have historicallyhad a substantial impact on povertyand the global economy, simply byimproving womens access to birthcontrol, education and increasing theiropportunities.

Women in front-line military roles will become increasingly commonplace Female Israeli Defence Force soldier
https://www.bcg.com/documents/file56704.pdfhttps://www.bcg.com/documents/file56704.pdfhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/international-womens-day-2014-the-shocking-statistics-that-show-why-it-is-still-so-important-9177211.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/international-womens-day-2014-the-shocking-statistics-that-show-why-it-is-still-so-important-9177211.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/international-womens-day-2014-the-shocking-statistics-that-show-why-it-is-still-so-important-9177211.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/international-womens-day-2014-the-shocking-statistics-that-show-why-it-is-still-so-important-9177211.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/international-womens-day-2014-the-shocking-statistics-that-show-why-it-is-still-so-important-9177211.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/international-womens-day-2014-the-shocking-statistics-that-show-why-it-is-still-so-important-9177211.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/international-womens-day-2014-the-shocking-statistics-that-show-why-it-is-still-so-important-9177211.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/international-womens-day-2014-the-shocking-statistics-that-show-why-it-is-still-so-important-9177211.htmlhttps://www.bcg.com/documents/file56704.pdfhttps://www.bcg.com/documents/file56704.pdf


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Part 1

EducationEducational achievement is seen as a goodpredictor for future economic activity. Overall,the gender gap in primary education hasshrunk, and global primary enrolments arenow 48% for girls and 52% for boys. Thesestatistics on enrolment may mask the numbersof children, often girls, who fail to completetheir primary education because they areremoved from school to marry early or tocontribute to household income. While trendsfor girls and young women are improving,adult women still account for two-thirds of themore than 770 million illiterate adults in theworld.4 This has not changed signicantly inrelative terms over the past two decades and itis unclear whether it will improve signicantlyby 2045.5

Violence against womenGlobally, around 35% of women haveexperienced physical or sexual assault, and

4 OECD (2011), Shifting Wealth, Shifting GenderRelations?, available athttp://www.oecd.org/dev/pgd/48619715.pdf

5 Ibid.

as many as 38% of murders of women arecommitted by a husband or partner. Factorsassociated with perpetration of sexual violenceinclude beliefs in family honour and sexualpurity, ideologies of male sexual entitlementand weak legal sanctions for sexual violence.Violence is also likely to continue to be usedas a weapon of war. Conservative estimatessuggest that 20,000 to 50,000 women wereraped during the 19921995 war in Bosnia andHerzegovina,6 while approximately 250,000to 500,000 women and girls were targetedin the 1994 Rwandan genocide. 7 Violence

against women has tremendous costs, f romgreater health care expenses to losses inproductivity, impacting national budgets and

6 Based on reports by the Government of Bosniaand Herzegovina and the European Commission.Ward, J. (2002), Bosnia and Herzegovina, If NotNow, When?: Addressing Gender-based Violencein Refugee, Internally Displaced, and Post-ConictSettings, cited in UNIFEM (2014), Facts and Figureson Peace and Security

7 UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of humanrights in Rwanda (1996), Report on the Situation ofHuman Rights in Rwanda

overall development. 8 In 2045, this globalgure is likely to have only marginally declinedcompared to today. Sexual violence willalmost certainly still impact negatively on asignicant minority of women.

Human trafficking ensnares millions of womenand girls in modern-day slavery. Womenand girls represent 55% of the estimated 20.9million victims of forced labour worldwide,and 98% of the estimated 4.5 million forced

8 UN Women (2013), Facts and Figures: EndingViolence Against Women, available at http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/facts-and-gures ; World HealthOrganisation (2013), Violence Against Women,available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs239/en/

into sexual exploitation. 9 With furtherglobalisation, there could be an increase intrafficking and slavery by 2045, althoughthe trend may be mitigated by improvedsurveillance technology and internationalcooperatio

global strategic trends - department of defense.pdf

Documents