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GLOBAL EUROPECENTRE POLICYPAPER 2015Towards a European Global Security Strategy:Challenges and Opportunities

Professor Elena Korosteleva, Igor Merheim-Eyre,Eske Van Gils, Irena Mnatsakanyan

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TOWARDS A EUROPEAN GLOBALSECURITY STRATEGY: CHALLENGESAND OPPORTUNITIES

Executive summary

This report briefly examines the interplay between the European securitystrategic vision and capabilities, its institutional architecture and policyimplementation practices, with a particular focus on the EU consular affairs,EU democracy promotion and EU engagement in frozen conflicts under theNeighbourhood Policy (Appendices 1-3).

This report contends that in order for the EU to develop an effective andsustainable global security strategy, it first, has to reconcile the vision of itsstrategic priorities within its inter- and intra-institutional settings. Second,a serious effort is required to develop an integrated view on European security,which does not only focus on the internal dimensions of the EU Securitystrategy (capabilities), but also equally draws on its external aspects –a genuinely inclusive approach that would blur internal and external dimensionsof security. For this to succeed a deeper understanding of a partnership-building process (especially of strategic partnership) is needed. Finally, whilelegitimation of the new security vision is essential within the EU, a greateremphasis should be placed on its external environment, which must not onlyinclude a cross-cutting approach to multiple policy instruments as suggested bythe EEAs, but more essentially, their connection with the interests and needs ofthird parties. Case-studies in appendices elaborate further on some specificaspects of the EU security within the eastern neighbourhood context.

1 A summary of this policy paper was published as written evidenceby the House of Lords as part of the Call for Evidence ‘The StrategicReview of the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy’, available athttp://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/strategic-review-of-the-eus-foreign-and-security-policy/written/22127.html

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SETTING THE SCENE: FROMFRAGMENTED TO A MORE INTEGRATEDEUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY

In summary, the EESS was strategically focused onthe EU’s external aspects of security. It was context-laden and particularly relevant to a specific timeperiod promoting narrowly defined multilateralismand strategic partnerships. This precipitated areview of the EU security strategy in 2008, in anattempt to balance out its strategic priorities, whichthe next section addresses.

European (Internal) Security Strategy2010 (EISS)The 2010 ESS focused more exclusively on theinternal aspects of the ESS, with the purpose tostrengthen the EU operational capacity, and develop‘a larger consensus on the vision, values andobjectives which underpin EU security’ (2010:7).

It identified three strategic objectives:• Protecting people in Europe as part of the globalresponse

• Addressing global threats: including terrorism,organised crime, cybercrime, cross-border crime,violence, and natural and man-made disasters

• Developing a European Security Model (ESM)consisting of common tools; cooperation andsolidarity between Member States (MS) and allEU institutions; and recognising ‘a greaterinterdependence between internal and externalsecurity’ (Ibid: 12).

Ten Action Guidelines were envisaged for theimplementation of EU internal security strategy:• a wider and more comprehensive approach tofacilitate horizontal and vertical cooperationsynergies;

• more effective democratic control and judicialsupervision of security activities;

• a more proactive and intelligence-led approach –for prevention and anticipation of conflicts

• a more comprehensive model for informationexchange

• more operational cooperation, involving effectivecoordination by COSI of law-enforcement andborder-management authorities and EU agencies

• more cooperation in judicial matters• better integrated border management• commitment to innovation and training• more cooperation with third countries, based on‘mutual interest, concerns and possibilities’(Ibid:29)

• more flexibility to adapt to future challenges

2 Corresponding author. We wish to thank Professor RichardWhitman for his feedback on the earlier draft of this paper

3 Sustainable partnerships when defined, should account for theinterests and needs of participating sides to avoid breakdown ofcommunication as in the case of EU-Russia relations in 2014 andEU-China relations in early 2000s

The overview below explores the opportunities andgaps in the EU security thinking in the process offostering an effective, sustainable and legitimateEuropean Global Security Strategy (EGSS) (June2016). In particular, sections 1.1-1.3 highlight a ratherfragmented inter-institutional vision of EU securitystrategy and its priorities, underscoring the need for(i) a more integrated understanding of the externaland internal aspects of EU security; (ii) a morecomprehensive inter-institutional architecture and itsobjectives; and (iii) more reflective external approach,with an emphasis on strategic partnerships. Thesethree priorities are subsequently evaluated in sections2-4, and conclude with general and specificrecommendations relating to EU consular affairs, EUdemocracy promotion and EU conflict approachunder the ENP/EaP in the appendices.

European (External) Security Strategy2003 (EESS)The 2003 ESS of 2003 was explicitly externallyfacing, underlying the importance of developing auniform response (’effective multilateralism’) toglobal challenges – ‘No single country is able totackle today’s complex problems on its own(2003:1)’ – and the need to enhance the EU’spresence and leadership in the global governancesystem.

Three particular objectives were recognised asstrategically important:• Addressing global threats: including terrorism,proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,regional conflicts, organised crime, and statefailure

• Building security in the neighbourhood – to‘promote a ring of well governed countries, withwhom we can enjoy close and cooperativerelations’ (Ibid:8)

• Fostering effective multilateralism – ‘a rule-basedinternational order’ (Ibid:9) – by developing closercooperation with WTO, NATO, OSCE and regionalorganisations (ASEAN, MERCOSUR, and AfricanUnion)

Four Action Guidelines were envisaged for theimplementation of the EU’s external securitystrategy:• a more active approach to realising EU strategicobjectives;

• developing more capabilities especially via EU-NATO cooperation;

• more coherent alignment of the EU Foreign andSecurity Policy (CFSP) and Security and DefencePolicy (CSDP);

• and a more open approach to strategicpartnership-building

The EU has considerably progressed in fostering a common vision for theEuropean Security Strategy. It moved beyond the national priorities ofindividual Member States to collectively consider the interests of the EuropeanUnion (EU) as a whole, and to separately articulate its external (2003) andinternal (2010) security priorities. At the same time, more challenging tasks stilllie ahead relating to (i) the facilitation of a joined-up vision, merging externaland internal dimensions of security; (ii) the development of a joined-up inter-institutional approach involving all Members States and EU institutions, andconnecting policy instruments and geographical silos into a European SecurityModel (ESM); and (iii) the fostering of sustainable partnerships (including ofstrategic interest) with regional and global actors.3 If successful, this wouldenable the EU to extend its security impact well beyond its borders, and to movecloser to its aspiration to become a global (rather than regional) security player.

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The report suggests that this could be achieved byway of fostering:• a joined-up approach which would (i) connect theabove policy instruments ‘not only in conflicts andcrises, but across all fields of EU external action’(Ibid:20), and (ii) overcome geographical silos,and vertical and horizontal inter- and intra-institutional divisions;

• a sharper definition of ‘strategic partnerships’ formaximising the EU’s global influence (Ibid: 15).

This call for reflection, however, instead ofsynergising the internal and external dimensions ofsecurity, shifts the emphasis back on to the latter(the external aspect of EU security), and thedevelopment of capabilities, which would notsucceed without a proper partnership-buildingapproach and the EU’s decentring from its ownagenda. Global (and a more comprehensive) visionis effectively missing from the discussion.

In summary, the above overview of the EU strategicobjectives and actions explicitly highlights thefollowing ‘disconnects’ in the EU’ security thinking:• there is a definitive need to develop an integrated

approach to European security which wouldmerge the external and internal aspects into acomprehensive and global strategy;

• there is an urgent need for a joined-up approach,which would draw on cross-institutional, cross-governmental and cross-policy thematicperspectives – for the purpose of building acomprehensive EU security model, which couldbe applied across the board;

• there is urgency to understand and connect withthe EU external environment, especially by way ofdefining the meaning of partnerships (includingof strategic interest), and developing greaterawareness about the recipient side.

We will explore and offer recommendations for eachof the three priorities below.

1 Towards a comprehensive andglobal strategy (Member States andEU institutions)

While a joined-up strategy is envisaged for thedeveloped of the EGSS, across institutions,government agencies and thematic policies, there isno integrated vision and understanding between themain EU institutions as to how to achieve thisobjective and drive it forward.

The European Council is tasked by the treaties tooffer a strategic direction for the EU’s development,especially at the time of crises. While realising theimportance of developing a ‘common,comprehensive and consistent EU global strategy’,it nevertheless narrows its concerns to thecapability-building initiatives (by way ofempowering COSI to coordinate and monitorimplementation actions) and to renewing the EISSfor 2015-20, with a particular responsibility forfostering systematic EU defence cooperation,mobilising EU instruments, ensuring sufficientdefence budget in support of EU defence actionsand monitoring the progress of implementation ofInternal Security strategy (9798/15; JAI442: 10-11).The external dimension of security is circumscribedto an area of intensifying partnerships with the UN,NATO, OSCE and AU (EUCO 22/15:5-6), the kind ofmultilateralism which so far has not proved effective.This ‘micro-management’ and selectivemultilateralism (while ignoring new and emergentregional and global players – BRICS, EurasianUnion etc), may hinder EU leverage, and hamper itspositioning (2020+) as a global leader.

The EEAS has offered an apt and reflective reportoutlining the need to radically rethink the EU’s securitystrategy. It believes that traditional multilateralism is nolonger responsive to the new challenges, and the EUneeds a more inclusive strategy forward. At the sametime, the report shows a limited understanding, on theone hand, of how the synergies between the external

Furthermore, two specific operational steps wereprioritised, which remit and rationale, however,caused much contention at the national level ofMember States (Home Office 8293/15, 2015):1 the development of the operational capacity of

COSI – Standing Committee on OperationalCooperation on Internal Security;

2 the establishment of an internal security fund topromote the implementation of EISS.

In summary, this EISS focussed exclusively ondeveloping internal capabilities and institutions toimprove the strategy’s implementation practices.Consequently, this excessive emphasis on internalinstruments, capacities and agencies brought aboutmore inter-institutional fragmentation and conflict ofinterests than the desired unity of response andcoordinated action.

Towards a European (Global) SecurityStrategy 2015/16 (EGSS)The EU currently finds itself in the process ofreflection and development of a new ESS, this timeaiming to foster an integrated (cross-institutional andcross-thematic) global vision on European security.Not only is it driven by a changing globalenvironment, which has become more inter-connected, more complex and more contested(EEAS 2015), the process also involves much-needed reflection of (i) possible synergies betweenexternal and internal aspects of security, (ii) existingincoherence between the multitude of instrumentsand agencies; and (iii) the limited leverage over theexternal environment, which prevents the EU topunch its weight and act a global effective player(Ibid: 1-2).

The High Representative’s (HR) report (EEAS 2015)offers a comprehensive overview of the achieved,and also outlines the challenges ahead. Notably, itidentifies five specific geographic regions – abroader European neighbourhood (WesternBalkans, EaP region, and Turkey), MENA, Africa,Atlantic partnerships and Asia – where it believesthe EU could make a difference, and should treatthese regions as its priority. To do so, it requires theEU’s external action instruments to be fit for purposeand have:• more direction and strategic vision• more flexibility• more coordination• more leverage and• more capabilities

At the same time, while acknowledging theavailability of multiple instruments and policies(Ibid:14-15) – ie CFSP, CSDP, counter-terrorism (CT),cyber issues, humanitarian assistance, trade,migration policy, climate policy, ENP andenlargement – the HR’s report underscores the neednot for their proliferation, but rather, for their moreeffective, better integrated and coordinated use.

SETTING THE SCENE: FROMFRAGMENTED TO A MORE INTEGRATEDEUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGYCONT

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While the Council believes that empowering COSIshould be a priority, to facilitate its closercooperation with the Commission, EEAS and JHAagencies; its remit and capability are seriouslyquestioned by the European and national agencies.The Commission, on the other hand, insists onempowering EU delegations and their betterintegration into decision-making processes inBrussels. The EEAS, conversely, is more concernedwith a top-down re-building of the cross-sectoralarchitecture of the external action policies, whichmay cause further intra- and inter-institutionaltensions. Consequently, an institutional re-mappingmay require further institutional changes involvinggreater discretion and leadership by the EEAS, if agenuine ‘joined-up approach to all EU fields of EUexternal action’ were to be forged.

Overall, there is no vision or understanding of whatthe ESM should be, institutionally and thematically,and whether (and how) it should pursue an all-encompassing security style over the targeted set ofpolicy priorities.

In relation to the individual thematic policies –enlargement, neighbourhood, migration, energy, CTand Security and defence – the EEAS calls for thedismantlement of policy and geographical silos. Atthe same time, the conclusions of the inter-parliamentary conference (September 2015)suggest that a more differentiated approach toindividual policy’s contents and objectives should bethe priority.

The best way forward would be indeed to prioritiseindividual policies – the ENP, migration, trade, bordermanagement and energy – with the view to expandtheir impact and connectivity, before consideringblurring their operational and geographical silos. Formore detailed overview and suggestion seeAppendix 1 on the EU strategic role in consularaffairs; Appendix 2 – on EU relations withAzerbaijan; and Appendix 3 – on EU approach tofrozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space.

3 Towards more effective andsustainable Strategic Partnerships

To enable the successful development andimplementation of the EGSS, the EU needs toradically rethink the meaning of ‘partnership’(including of strategic interest). While the notion ofpartnership has been extensively used in the EUexternal discourse, it avails no proper meaning.4 Asone EU senior official commented: ‘It is true the EUhas an evolving meaning of “partnership”. The EUhas developed strategic partnerships and specialrelations with substantial partners, whom the EUtakes seriously... whereas, [for example] partnershipunder the ENP is [aimed] for smaller countries.’5 Thisdifferentiation also infers whether partnership-building should be driven by mutual interests (as instrategic partnerships) or solely by EU norms(known as conditionality approach). As practiceshows, even if it is driven by reciprocity in strategicpartnerships, the EU tends to dominate and behaveas a norm-maker, in trying to ‘socialise’ its partnersinto the EU’s way of thinking.6 This is problematic asit violates the very nature of partnership, andprevents the EU from learning about its externalenvironment, as EU-Russian relations have recentlyattested to.

RecommendationsPremised on the above analysis, the followinggeneral recommendations could be made:• First, in order for the EU to develop an effective

and sustainable global security strategy, it has toreconcile its vision and understanding of strategicpriorities within its inter- and intra-institutionalsettings, which would involve more coordinationfrom the EEAS

• Second, a serious effort is required to develop anintegrated view on European security, which willnot only focus on the internal dimensions of EUSecurity model, but will equally or even to agreater extent, consider the external aspects ofsecurity – a genuine inclusive approach thatwould blur internal and external dimensions ofsecurity. For this to succeed a deeperunderstanding of a partnership-building process(especially of strategic partnership) is needed.

• Finally, while legitimation of the new securityvision is essential within the EU (by way ofsecurity consultative forums), the emphasisshould also be placed on its externalenvironment, which will not only include a cross-cutting approach to multiple policy dimensions,but more essentially, their connection with theinterests and needs of the third parties. Case-studies in appendices offer some specificrecommendation on selected aspects of EUsecurity vis-à-vis the eastern neighbourhood: theEU’s role in consular affairs, democracypromotion and engagement in frozen conflicts.

and internal dimensions of security could beachieved (still placing more salience on the internalaspects of security); and on the other, how to foster ajoined-up approach to overcome ‘horizontal andvertical silos which hamper the EU’s potential globalrole’ (EEAS 2015:20).

Conversely, the Commission, while also advocatingfor the development of a shared European SecurityAgenda on Security between the Union and MemberStates, places more emphasis on forging ‘a globalperspective with security as one of our mainexternal priorities’ (COM (2015) 185: 20). At thesame time, likewise the Council and the EEAS, itprioritises the reconfiguration of the EU instrumentsand policies, rather than developing a fullunderstanding of the external environment, eg byway of defining the meaning and objectives of apartnership-building approach.

The European Parliament, in turn, believes, that themain priorities should lie in developing mechanismsof legitimising security strategy (via EU SecurityConsultative Forum) and establishing performanceindicators for key EU instruments (includingbenchmarks and road-mapping, and their regularmonitoring) (PE557.263v01-00).

In summary, while there is an understanding of theneed to develop a joined-up approach to securitywhich would synergise its external and internaldimensions, and would define common priorities toadvance the EU’s global potential, there is a limitedinter-institutional vision for the shared agenda and forthe need to develop a more ‘outside-in’ perspective –via strategic partnerships and joint interests.

2 Institutional architecture andcapabilities: tensions andopportunities

Stemming from the above, there are also a numberof tensions emerging from the envisagedinstitutional operationalisation of the forthcomingEuropean Security Model.

4 For detailed discussion see Korosteleva, E (2014) The EU and itsEastern Neighbours: Towards a more Ambitious Partnership?Routledge

5 Interview with a senior official, DG RELEX, College of Europe,6 September 2010

6 This has been especially noted and openly resisted by Chineseand Russian officials. For more details see Korosteleva (2014)

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Appendix 2: A case-study of EU-Azerbaijan relations andrecommendations

Eske Van GilsRelations between the EU and Azerbaijan aregenerally conducted in an amicable way, and co-operation is overall strong, in particular in the field ofeconomy and (energy) trade. However, there aresignificant tensions over two policy areas, namelyvalue promotion and the way the Nagorno-Karabakhconflict is being addressed in bilateral relations.

In both cases, a main hindrance appears to be thatcurrent policy-making mechanisms do not allow forsufficient input from Azerbaijan, and that therelationship is therefore not truly based on principlesof partnership. Azerbaijan appears to beincreasingly denouncing this EU’s one-sided policy.The Azerbaijani government has indicated that itfeels ‘not heard’ by Brussels, and that its ownnational (security) concerns are not being takenserious the EU (interviews with Azerbaijanirepresentatives, May 2015). There are signals thatthe country is now re-considering certain aspects ofco-operation with the EU (see eg APA 2015).

In terms of security this is problematic becausereduced co-operation with Azerbaijan may harm theEU’s own security interests as well, and due tolimited input the EU might systematically miss out onvaluable information on the regional context thatAzerbaijan possesses.

With regards to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,Azerbaijan has indicated that it wishes furtherengagement from the EU in the conflict resolutionprocess, following disappointment in the OSCEMinsk Group’s efforts (Babayev 2014). While the EUis reluctant to become directly involved (Council2010b: 2), it does not appear to communicate itsviews and arguments clearly, and moreover,Azerbaijan perceives that the EU upholds differentnarratives on the matter in relations with Armenia.This issue not only undermines the EU’s credibilitybut also increases Azerbaijan’s frustration over thematter – the government has indicated that it islosing its patience and that it may undertake militaryaction in case the international community does notintervene pro-actively. Again, allowing more inputfrom Azerbaijan (as well as Armenia) would benefitthe case, and a strategy should be designed notsolely by the EU but together with all relevant actors.

Externalisation in this case refers not merely to ‘SmartBorders’, but also to the increasing participation ofthird countries in the management of EU externalborders, a particularly important tool in the EU’seastern neighbourhood. The externalisation of EUborder management through visa issuance (‘visadiplomacy’) is, unlike in the case of consularprotection of EU citizens, about the prevention ofpotential risks reaching the borders of the EU, bymanaging migratory flows and security threatsbeyond the borders of the Union. Rather than basedon exclusionary politics of fence-building, it acts as afilter by incentivising local reform and capacity-building through a managed but inclusionary processof visa facilitation and visa liberalisation. The successof such approach is highlighted in the low number ofillegal crossings on the eastern borders (Frontex2015), and Moldova’s successful reforms in borderand migration management.

RecommendationsTo consider the growing importance of consularaffairs as a vital external aspect of EU internalsecurity, highlighting the need for reciprocity betweenthe internal and external dimensions of EU security

To utilise the new Council Directive on consularprotection (Council of the EU; 2015/637) as anopportunity to strengthen consular cooperationbetween Member States on both inter-ministerial andlocal level, and make a more strategic use ofexisting structures on the European level, inparticular, the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism incontingency planning

To explore the emerging ‘visa diplomacy’ in the EU’seastern neighbourhood, as an important instrumentof facilitating more ‘inclusive’ relations with ourimmediate neighbours, and managing potentialsecurity risks beyond the borders of the Union, whichrelates to point 3 of general recommendations (p7).

Appendix 1: A case-study of the EU’srole in Consular Affairs

Igor Merheim-EyreNew external security threats and the process ofEuropean integration have resulted in theemergence of new actors and practices, nottraditionally associated with the consular sphere,including the protection of EU citizens outside of theEuropean Union (EU), and the issuance ofSchengen visa.

Over the past two decades Member States of theEuropean Union have been developing a frameworkwithin which a citizen in distress may seek assistancefrom consular or diplomatic representatives ofanother Member State if their state is not representedin a particular third country outside of the Union.

The consular protection of EU citizens can be linkedto a general shift within the EU towards ‘soft’ securityissues, such as man-made and natural disasters(Merheim-Eyre 2014), but also on post-disasterresilience (Lundborg & Vaughan-Williams 2011).Over the past two decades, EU Member States havesought various way of developing joint post-disastercontingency planning both within and outside theborders of the EU. In this context, consular protectionof citizens takes place in the form of evacuations,immediate humanitarian or medical assistancethrough EU-funded or individual Member States’responses. While daily assistance to EU citizens inareas such as loss of passport or imprisonmentremains the most frequent consular tasks, post-disaster response is an increasingly important partof local and national contingency planning.

Issuance of Schengen visa to non-EU citizens isanother consular dimension that has known a shifttowards growing competencies at the European leveland towards externalisation beyond the Union.

APPENDICES

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7 EU-Azerbaijan ENP Action Planhttp://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/azerbaijan_enp_ap_final_en.pdf (p3).

8 EU-Armenia ENP Action Plan.http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/armenia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf. (p9)

9 Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries.10 July 2009. http://www.osce.org/mg/51152

10 European Forum for International Mediation and Dialogue. 2012.Debriefing EU Mediators. Summary and Key Lessons from adebriefing with former EUSR for the South Caucasus PeterSemneby (p6)

RecommendationsThe EU should focus its resources on itsneighbourhood, however, only on the basis of adifferentiated approach: countries such asAzerbaijan have no need for financial support,however they may appreciate political and securitysupport – which should also become availableoutside of the policy frameworks currently on offer(notably the AA and membership). Since Azerbaijanis not interested in EU membership or integration,enlargement is no useful tool in these relations andmore diverse and effective instruments for co-operation should be made available.

Equal input from partner states is essential: thesepartner states hold crucial information about thesituation in the region (national governments as wellas civil society and experts). Moreover, without anequal input and acknowledgement of nationalsecurity interests, partner states may lose interest inin-depth cooperation with the EU. Therefore, thereview of the ESS should indeed pay more attentionto the operational plans as well as resourcing andallocate a strong role for partners in this process.

The capacity of the EEAS in Brussels should beincreased, to enable thorough processing of policyinput coming from both the EU Delegation inAzerbaijan as well as Azerbaijani actors includingcivil society organisations and the nationalgovernment. Because of its in-depth knowledge andclose cooperation with the local government, the EUDelegation should also obtain a greater role in thedesign of the policies vis- à-vis Azerbaijan.

To prevent losing credibility or partners’ confidence,the EU should pay more close consideration to thecountry’s national security priorities, notably theresolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Whilethe EU may not want to get actively involved in theconflict mediation, what is very important at thispoint is clarity about the Union’s policy, towardsAzerbaijan, Armenia and Russia, which underscorespoints 2 and 3 of the recommendations (p7).

Appendix 3: A case-study of the frozenconflicts in the post-Soviet space

Irena MnatsakanyanThe unresolved conflicts over Nagorno-Karabakh(NK), Abkhazia, and South Ossetia have thepotential to become the next unavoidable wars inthe EU’s Eastern neighbourhood, with a spill-overeffect for the wider Europe. So far the EU’sresponse and engagement with frozen conflicts onthe post-soviet space have been limited. Its majorachievements included appointing an EU SpecialRepresentative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus anddeveloping regional cooperation under the ENP/EaPto positively contribute to conflict resolution. At thesame time, the practice reveals much inconsistencyand ineffectiveness in the EU security approachtowards these specific conflicts, which howeverenjoy much similarity in terms of their geographicproximity to the EU, geopolitical environment,historical roots and dynamics of conflict escalation.While the EU remains the biggest internationaldonor supporting post-conflict rehabilitation in theconflict regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia(Astrov 2011:87) for the past ten years, in the NK’scase it did not manage to establish directengagement in the region.So far, none of the EUrepresentatives managed to visit NK and there havebeen no needs-assessment or fact finding missionsthere. Furthermore, EU Action Plans (APs) forArmenia and Azerbaijan include two contradictoryprinciples: ‘territorial integrity’ for Azerbaijan, andthe ‘right of nations for self-determination’ forArmenia (Kuzmicheva 2011). Additionally, in theAzeri AP the NK resolution is number one priority,7

while in the Armenian AP it is number seven8.

It is believed that more internal inter-institutionalcoherence for the development of the EGSS isnecessary, as well as greater awareness of othergeopolitical players in the region.

Recommendations for improving internalcoherence• The EU should eliminate inconsistency betweenthe two ENP APs for Armenia and Azerbaijan, andinclude unconditional support to the OSCEproposed peace plan based on MadridPrinciples9

• It is necessary to improve coordination betweenthe activities of the Council and the Commissionnot only at the policy planning stage, but also atthe implementation stage. The inter-institutionaldivision of policy responsibilities within the EUmainly between the Commission and Council ishighly fragmented (Wolf 2007:4)

• One of the most crucial issues is to increasecooperation between the actors in Brussels(Commission, EEAS) and in-country officials(EUSR, EU Delegations) during the implementationof the EU crisis management activities.10

Recommendations for improving externalcoherence:• Considering the recognition of Kosovo by mostEU member states, and the EU engagement inAbkhazia and South Ossetia, it is essential thatthe EU directly engage in N-K in the form offinancial and humanitarian support, de-miningactivities, and fact finding missions is significant.

• The EU cooperation with Russia is an essentialfactor. Russia’s politicization of frozen conflictshas led some Russia-friendly EU member statesto withdraw from supporting a more active EUengagement in the frozen conflicts. Hence, amore uniform position is needed, to develop acoherent security policy towards these conflicts

• There is a need to increase EU cooperation withArmenia and Azerbaijan. The EU’s performance inthe frozen conflicts also depends on the localdemand from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgiafor its involvement in the frozen conflicts. In theconflicts where there was high local demand, theEU involvement was significant. Compared withGeorgia, neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan enjoysvery close relations with the EU, and hence thelocal demand for the EU’s greater involvement inNK is limited.

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European Council (2010b). Eleventh CooperationCouncil between the European Union and theRepublic of Azerbaijan. Brussels: Council of theEuropean Union

European Parliament (2015) Draft Motion for aresolution on European Agenda Security.PE557.263v01-00

Frontex Migratory Routes Map (2015)http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/migratory-routes-map/ (Accessed 25/09/2015)

Guarian, the / Liston, E (2014). Azerbaijan’spresident threatens war with Armenia via Twitter,7/08/2014, available athttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/07/azerbaijan-president-threatens-war-armenia-twitter

Home Office (2015) European Agenda on Security.(36829), 8293/15, to the attention of the HomeAffairs Committee, and European Committee B,House of Commons

Inter-Parliamentary Conference for the CFSP andCSDP. Draft Conclusions. Luxembourg, 3 August

Korosteleva, E (2014) The EU and its EasternNeighbours: towards amore ambitious partnership?Routledge

Kuzmicheva, L (2011) Unresolved Conflicts in theCommon Neighbourhood. SPES Policy Paper,available at http://www.iepberlin.de/fileadmin/website/09_Publikationen/SPES_Policy_Papers/SPES_Policy_Paper_2011_Larisa_KUZMICHEVA.pdf

Lundborg, Tom and Nick Vaughan-Williams (2011).‘Resilience, Critical Infrastructure and MolecularSecurity: The Excess of ‘Life’ in Biopolitics’,International Political Sociology 5:4

Merheim-Eyre, I (2014). Towards a more ambitiousframework for cooperation? FCO Consular Services,the European Union and the challenges of consularprotection; Evidence for the Foreign &Commonwealth Office BoC Semester 4

Merheim-Eyre, Igor (2015). Protecting citizens,securitising outsiders? Consular Affairs and theexternalisation of EU internal security in Bossong,Raphael & Carrapico, Helen (2015). Shiftingborders and politics of EU internal security;Springer Press Berlin

The European Union in a Changing GlobalEnvironment: a more connected, contested andcomplex world. EEAS report. Brussels, June

Wolf, S (2007) Report on The European Union andthe Conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh Territory.Centre for International Crisis Management andConflict Resolution. University of Nottingham

REFERENCES

APA (Azerbaijan Press Agency) (2015). The Cabinetof Ministers to reconsider Azerbaijan’s participationin the Eastern Partnership. Published on 15.09.2015,available at http://en.apa.az/news/232029

Astrov A (2011). The Great Power Mismanagement:The Russian Georgian War and its Implications forthe Global Political Order. Ashgate

Babayev, A (2014). Weder Krieg noch Frieden imSüdkaukasus: Hintergründe, Akteure,Entwickelungen zum Bergkarabach-Konflikt. Baden-Baden: Nomos

Council of the European Union (2015) Draft CouncilConclusions on the Renewed EU Internal Securitystrategy 2015-20. Brussels 9798/15, 10 June

Council of the European Union (2015) CouncilDirective on the coordination and cooperationmeasures to facilitate consular protection forunrepresented citizens of the Union in thirdcountries. Brussels 2015/637, 20 April

European Commission (2015) The EuropeanAgenda on Security. COM (2015) 185 final.Strasbourg, 28 April

European Council (2003) European SecurityStrategy: Secure Europe in a Better World. Brussels,12 December

European Council (2010) Internal Security Strategyfor the European Union: towards a EuropeanSecurity model. Brussels, March

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INFORMATION

About the authors

Elena KorostelevaElena Korosteleva is Professor of InternationalPolitics, and Jean Monnet Chair in EuropeanPolitics, School of Politics and IR, University ofKent. She is co-founder and Co-Director of theGlobal Europe Centre at Kent, LSE DahrendorfProfessorial Fellow, and a Visiting Professor to theCollege of Europe, CIFE and BSU. Elena’s mainresearch interests include EU foreign policies andEU relations with the eastern neighbourhood,democracy promotion and democratisation.Amongst her recent monographs are The EU andits Eastern Neighbours: towards a more ambitiouspartnership (2014 paperback); EU Policies in theEastern Neighbourhood: the practices perspective(2014, with M Natorski and L Simao); EasternPartnership: towards a more ambitiouspartnership? (2012) – all published with Routledge.Elena’s contact email is eak8@kent.ac.uk.

Igor Merheim-Eyre Igor Merheim-Eyre is a Doctoral researcher atSchool of Politics and International Relations(University of Kent), Global Europe Centreresearch assistant, winner of a prestigious 2015University research prize, and a UACES scholar.His research focuses on EU mobility partnershipsand visa liberalisation policies in the easternneighbourhood. His recent publications include ‘Allthings to all people? Internal and ExternalApproaches to Europeanisation’ (editor/contributor,GEC working paper 2014); ‘Quo Vadis?Conceptualising the development of cooperationin European consular protection' (GEC workingpaper, 2014); ‘Protecting citizens, securitisingforeigners? Consular Affairs and externalisation ofEU internal security’ (Springer Press, 2015);‘Visegrad countries and visa liberalisation in theEastern Partnership’, East European Politics andSocieties, special issue (forthcoming 2016). Healso contributed evidence to the FCO inquiries‘The EU and the challenges of consular protection’(June 2014); and ‘Strengthening the security of UKnationals in third countries’ (January 2014), and isa regular contributor on issues of Europeansecurity, consular affairs and the Visegrad Groupin newspapers and magazines. Igor’s emailaddress is im507@kent.ac.uk

Eske van GilsEske van Gils is a Doctoral student at the Universityof Kent, Canterbury, and research assistant to theGlobal Europe Centre at Kent. Her researchfocuses on bargaining power in EU-Azerbaijanrelations, with case studies on value promotion,legal approximation, and security co-operation.Prior to commencing her PhD research, Eskeobtained her MA in European Union Studies at theUniversity of Ghent. She has contributed to theHouse of Lords’ inquiry on the EU Global SecurityStrategy (ongoing), and published a working paperon EU actorness in the Eastern Partnership (GlobalEurope Centre, 2013) and an article on EUrelations with Belarus (Internationale Spectator,2012). Her email address is eeav2@kent.ac.uk.

Irena Mnatsakanyan Irena Mnatsakanyan is a PhD student inInternational Conflict Analysis at the University ofKent and Jean Monnet Chair Assistant. Herresearch discusses the role of the EU as a CrisisManager in the Post-Soviet frozen conflicts. Herresearch explores factors that explain varyingdegrees of the EU crisis management response byexamining Nagorno-Karabakh (1991-1994), SouthOssetia (1991-1992) and Abkhazia (1992-1993).Prior to commencing her PhD at the University ofKent, Irena has obtained an MBA degree fromAmerican University of Armenia and an MA degreein European Studies at the Bremen University. Aftergraduating in 2011 she worked at the EuropeanCommission DG Taxation and Customs Union.She contributed to the elaboration of E-learningmodules on GSP Trade Rules of Origin andCustoms Risk Management projects. Her emailaddress is : im519@kent.ac.uk

Global Europe CentreThe Global Europe Centre (GEC) is a new researchcentre focusing on Europe, its member states, andits place in a changing world.

The Centre brings together leading internationalacademics from politics and international relations,economics, law, business, and European culture inorder to explore the contemporary policychallenges to Europe and its nation states.

At GEC our research is policy-relevant andinterdisciplinary. Our team has a strong trackrecord of engagement with policy makers andinforming decision making in London and inBrussels. Research is also widely disseminatedthrough publications, knowledge transferworkshops, conferences and events.

The Centre has a strong commitment to thecreation of the next generation of ideas innovatorsand policy makers. We run high level consultancyand professional development programmes as wellas learning, teaching and knowledge exchangeactivities and our Global Europe Student Forum.

The GEC is based within the School of Politics andInternational Relations (SPIR) and at the BrusselsSchool of International Studies (BSIS), University ofKent.

GlobalEurope Centre

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Global Europe Centre, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NXE: globaleuropecentre@kent.ac.ukwww.kent.ac.uk/politics/gec

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