Global Conference on the Prevention of Genocide

McGill UniversityOctober 13, 2007

Making Prevention Feasible: A United Nations

Emergency Peace Service?

“A proposal & recent global initiative to address our five big challenges in preventing and managing armed conflict”

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Challenges Leading to Crisis

1. Preventing genocide & crimes against humanity

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Challenges leading to crisis:

2. Preventing armed conflict

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3. Protecting civilians at risk

Challenges leading to crisis:

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4. Prompt start-up of peace operations

Challenges leading to crisis:

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5. Addressing human needs in emergencies

Challenges leading to crisis:

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What is available to:

We do have a universal organization already committed to these challenges…

Prevent genocide and armed conflict Protect civilians at high risk Prompt start-up of peace operations Address human needs in emergencies

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No dedicated capacity of its own to:• Stop large scale atrocities• Enforce treaties, convention or laws• Conduct peace operations• Preventive deployments• Protect civilians

In order to act:1.Security Council must authorise a response2.Request assistance from its Member States3.National governments must agree to lease their personnel and

resources

UNITED NATIONSNot reliable, prompt or

optimally effective!

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Existing Arrangements

UN Standby Arrangements System

African Union Standby Forces

NATO

European Union ‘Battlegroups’

SHIRBRIG

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The current arrangements only provide ‘conditional’ access to national

standby resources. “Many Member States have argued against the establishment of a standing United Nations army or police force, resisted into entering into reliable standby arrangements, cautioned against the incursion of financial expenses for building a reserve of equipment or discouraged the Secretariat from undertaking planning for potential operations prior to the Secretary-General having been granted specific, crisis-driven legislative authority to do so. Under these circumstances, the United Nations cannot deploy operations ‘rapidly and effectively’ within the timelines suggested.”

Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations Para 90 (2000)

…Under these circumstances, the United Nations cannot deploy operations ‘rapidly and effectively’ within the timelines suggested.”

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National Governments Tend to Wait, Watch & Often Defer…

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• Later, larger efforts are often needed to stem wider escalation and spread of armed conflict

• Millions continue to die and millions suffer

• Millions of refugees and internally displaced people

• Hundreds of $ billions required for post-conflict re-construction and recovery

The Implications

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The UN must have a capacity to respond:•Reliably•Rapidly•Robustly•Coherently (integrated)•Cost-effectively

So what now?

A United Nations Emergency Peace Service

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Requirements (everywhere)

Safety and securityLaw and orderUseful services for human needs

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• Former proposals remain contentious and opposed

• Array of useful services attracts deeper and wider support

• Expands on legitimate, reliable emergency services needed, yet still unavailable world-wide

• A UN Emergency Service has broad appeal

• May shift global social and national political responses

• A ‘UN Emergency Service’ is a tougher concept to oppose

Why the Concept of a ‘UN Emergency Peace Service’ ?

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What is Proposed as a UN Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS)?

A permanent UN formation A ‘first responder’ available immediately Requires authorization by the UN Security Council Multidimensional and multifunctional service Military, police and civilian elements Prepared for rapid deployment to diverse crisis Pre-trained, well-equipped 18,000 personnel

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What is Proposed as a UN Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS)?

Co-located at a new UN base Static operational headquartersTwo mobile field headquartersIntegrated, modular formationRobust securityCivilian policeSkills and services to address human needs

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Office ofOffice ofSRSGSRSG

Pers 3 MIL, 2 POL,10 CIV.-Senior MILAD, POLAD & CIVAD-Policy & Legal

EMC LiaisonEMC LiaisonCell: DPA, DPKO, OCHA,UNHCR, Field Log & National Support

SUPPORTSUPPORT

Pers 50 MIL, 10 POL&CIV Pers 100 MIL, 1500CIV-Contingency Move -Administration Planning -Personnel-Staging -Housing-Mission Support -Finance-Rotation/Augmentation -Host Nation Support Planning-Airlift/Sealift Contracting-Deployable Movement Support Teams

Deployment Cell

Base Support & Infrastructure

OPERATIONSOPERATIONS

Pers 100 MIL Pers 25 POL Pers 25 CIV -Contingency -Contingency -Contingency Planning Planning Planning -Operations -Operations -Operations -Training -Training -Training -Logistics -Personnel -Personnel -Personnel -Legal Advisors -Advisors

[Joint 24/7 OPS Cell]

MilitaryStaff

CIVPOLStaff

CivilianStaff

TRAININGTRAINING

Pers 5 MIL, 2 POL., 2 CIV Pers 10 MIL, 2 POL, 2 CIV Pers 4 MIL, 2 POL, 4 CIV -Ongoing Development of -Set & Assess Standards -Long-Term Planning Doctrine -Course & Curricula -Lessons Learned -SOPS Development -Multidisciplinary -ROE Options -Training & Exercises Think Tank -Interoperability

Doctrine Training Standards

Research &AnalysisMilitary Police Civilian

Annex A

Operational Level

UN Emergency Peace Service

Permanent Operational Level

Headquarters and BasePersonnel:

270 MIL

40 POL

1540 CIV

SRSGSRSG

DEPLOYABLE ELEMENTSDEPLOYABLE ELEMENTS

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Mission HQ (Tactical) Civilian Police

Companies

Disaster Relief &Humanitarian

Assistance Team

Human RightsMonitors & Educators

Conflict Resolution Teams

Peacebuilding Advisory Teams

DDDRRR team

Environmental Crisis Response

Team

Medical Teams

Public Affairs

Technical Recce Unit

Light Armoured

RecceUnit

Motorized Light Infantry

Battalion

Amoured (Wheeled) Infantry Battalion

Helicopter Squardron

Engineer Battalion

Medical Unit

MIL-450 Pers2 flights of 8 utility Helis

1 flight of 3 Heavy Lift Helis

1 flight of Armed Scout Helis

MIL- 2 x 600 Pers

MIL- 2 x 600 Pers

MIL- 4 x 50 Pers

Augmented by CIV

MIL-500 Pers-3 Field Squadrons

-3 Support Troops

MIL-400 Pers-Forward Surgical Teams

POL- 3 x 125 Per

CIV- 2 x 30 Per

CIV- 2 x 10 Per

CIV – 2 x 10 Pers

CIV- 2 x 10 Pers

CIV- 10 Pers

CIV- 10 Pers

CIV- 100 Pers

CIV- 2 x 10 Pers

Civilian PoliceCompanies

Civilian PoliceCompanies

Mission HQ(Tactical)

Technical Recce Unit

Technical Recce Unit

Light Armoured

RecceUnit

Motorized Light Infantry

Battalion

Amoured (Wheeled)

Infantry Battalion

Disaster Relief &Humanitarian

Assistance Team

Human RightsMonitors & Educators

Conflict Resolution Teams

Public Affairs

Annex B. Composition of Deployable ElementsDeployable Elements for a UN Emergency Peace ServiceUN Emergency Peace Service(assume 2 MHQ with 2 complete formations)

(assigned to UN Base under a Static Operational HQ and 2 Missions HQs)Total Personnel in Each: MIL 5000, CIV 304, POL 400

MSN HQ Includes:Military, Police and Civilian StaffPolitical and Legal AdviceTranslation/Comms/Signals/Intell.Defense & Security PlatoonNGO Liaison Team

Deputy/SRSG

Military&Police Commander

MIL-1 x 250 Pers

CIV-1 x 20 Pers

POL- 1 x 20 Pers

Technical Recce Unit

Logistics Battalion

MIL- 2 x 150 Pers

MIL- 1 x 500 Pers

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A ‘UN 911’ designed to be:

• A complement to existing arrangements (UN, national, and regional)

• A ‘lead service’ or ‘first-responder’

• Deployable within 48 hrs, sustainable for 6 months

• Competent in diverse emergencies

• A cost-effective investment for ‘we the people’ and the international community

UNEPS Key Components

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Why this Model for UNEPS?

• Alleviates pressure on national governments

• Builds on and beyond the existing UN foundation

• Universal composition to ensure universal legitimacy

• Advanced training, equipment and standards to ensure cohesive sophisticated service

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• Corresponds to requirements of UN missions

• Provides useful incentives to address human needs

• Assures services to restore law and order

• Maintains robust disincentives to dissuade or deter and repel further violence

• Ensures a more rapid, reliable, effective response when the need is imminent

Why this Model for UNEPS?

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1. Number of armed conflicts and war crimes

2. Massive suffering and violent deaths

3. Size, duration and number of peacekeeping operations

4. Pressure on national governments and national armed forces to contribute in the high-risk, critical start-up phase of operations

5. High costs associated with violent conflict and post conflict reconstruction

UNEPS would Help Reduce:

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Any Progress in Global Initiative? • International working group of senior scholars,

with executive and secretariat in New York

• 40 CSOs actively supporting, over 350 endorsing

• U.S. H. RES ‘213’ United Nations Emergency Peace Service Act of 2007

• Increasing Representation World-Wide

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Representatives of Diverse Sectors Agreed that:

Concept is far more appealing

Case is more compelling

Model is more appropriate

UNEPS has more potential

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Attract and mobilize people organizations eventually governments

Support partnerships global network

UNEPS Potential

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Objectives for 2007

• Educational outreach

• Ongoing research to detail requirements

• Generate constituency world-wide at all levels

• Be prepared for the next favorable moment (2008?)

Your Thoughts & Questions? A United Nations Emergency Peace Service?

Dr. H. Peter Langillehpl@globalcommonsecurity.org

In cooperation with ‘Global Action to Prevent War’

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Special thanks for permission to use photos is extended to:

The United Nations

Human Rights Watch

Genocide Watch

Presentation created by:

Dr. H. Peter Langille, Global Common Security.org

Robbyn Evans, rae Communications.com

Credits

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Is This Really Credible or Any Improvement?

As noted in the 1995 Canadian report, Towards A Rapid Reaction Capability For The United Nations:

“As professional volunteers develop into a cohesive UN force, they can assume responsibility for some of the riskier operations mandated by the Council, but for which troop contributors have been hesitant to contribute.

UN volunteers offer the best prospect of a completely reliable, well-trained rapid reaction capability.

Without the need to consult national authorities, the UN could cut response time significantly, and volunteers could be deployed within hours of a Security Council decision…

No matter how difficult this goal now seems, it deserves continued study, with a clear process for assessing its feasibility over the long term.”

... “No matter how difficult this goal now seems, it deserves continued study, with a clear process for assessing its feasibility over the long term.”

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Merit and professionalism Universal representation Not national/political affiliation Contracted and assigned Extensive preparation/training Reliability, readiness, dedication Flexibility in managing diverse

assignments Paid, full-time (UN Civil Servant)

Personnel Selection

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1. National government approval (may be needed urgently)

2. National defence approval (personnel and resources)

3. UN Security Council approval (waits for 1. and 2.)

Removes 1 & 2 and should Improve 3rd Decision-Making Level

All have developed unique excuses for inaction!

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• Provides a dedicated, ‘lead service’; a ‘first responder’ for the critical, initial 4-6 months of complex peace operations.

• Functions until replacement/rotation needed and secured from multinational contingents

• Provides a modular formation that can be tailored

• Cost-effective and a sound investment for saving lives and money

Why this Model for UNEPS?