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The economic transition in Central

Asia: Implications for democracyJohn Glenn

a

aDepartment of Politics, University of Southampton, UK

Available online: 06 Sep 2010

To cite this article: John Glenn (2003): The economic transition in Central Asia: Implications for

democracy, Democratization, 10:3, 124-147

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The Economic Transition in Central Asia:

Implications for Democracy

JOHN GLENN

Ten years have now passed since the August coup of 1991 heralded the collapse of theSoviet Union. Whilst many of these states have successfully navigated themselvesthrough the processes of democratic transition and consolidation, others have not.Although each of the states within the Central Asia region have held elections so that

we can speak of some sort of formal democracy having been established, substantivedemocracy within these states is either absent or falls short of the mark. This articleidentifies the obstacles to democratic transition and consolidation arising from currenteconomic circumstances and the leaders appraisal of the political costs of furtherdemocratization.

Introduction

The August coup of 1991 eventually resulted in the end of an era that hadwitnessed the unprecedented division of Europe into two competingideological camps and their attendant social systems. Yet, despite a decade

of transition within Central Asia, fully fledged democracies have failed tomaterialize. This article identifies the obstacles to democratic transition andconsolidation arising from current economic circumstances and the CentralAsian leaders appraisal of the political costs of further democratization.The article examines how the economic decline of the last decade affectsthree main issues that are of concern to the presidents of these countries: thedecline in presidential popularity, the rise of non-democratic forces, andregional competition. It is argued that although these leaders probablyalready had concerns over these three issues, the precipitous decline in theirstates economies has served to exacerbate certain social tensions bringing

these issues to the top of the political agenda.The springtime of nations that followed the dissolution of the Soviet

Union had in fact begun earlier in eastern Europe. Triggered by the Sovietembrace of the Sinatra Doctrine as a replacement for the centralism of theBrezhnev Doctrine these states were finally given the option of doing ittheir way. The desire for such independence was dramatically illustrated bythe breaching of the Berlin Wall at the end of 1989. The unique events of

Democratization, Vol.10, No.3, Autumn 2003, pp.124147PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

John Glenn is a Lecturer in the Department of Politics, University of Southampton, UK.

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this period not only bestowed independence on eastern Europe and the 15states of the former Soviet Union but also fortified the so-called third-

wave of democratization.

1

But whilst many of these states havesuccessfully navigated themselves through the processes of democratictransition and consolidation, others have not.2 Included within the lattergroup are the states of Central Asia, defined here as Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Although traditionallyTajikistan is included in any definition of Central Asia, this article will onlydeal with the other four states, since the civil war in Tajikistan has createda political and economic landscape that is somewhat different to the othercountries of the region.3

Although each of the states within the Central Asia region have held

elections, so we can speak of some sort of formal democracy having beenestablished, substantive democracy within these states is either absent orfalls short of the mark. Of course, within each of these states the conditionsvary enormously in comparison with each other. For example, it might bemore accurate to divide the region into a more democratized northern tierand a less democratized southern tier; the former consisting of Kazakhstanand Kyrgyzstan (because the media is less controlled, and several trueopposition parties contest the elections) and the latter consisting ofUzbekistan, and Turkmenistan where the media is strictly controlled andpolitical parties are essentially Potemkin parties.4 But even in Kazakhstanand Kyrgyzstan where, by and large, opposition parties are permitted togather support without overt government control, the tendency has recentlybeen towards a strong form of presidential rule.5 Even if one were toconcede that these two states have established multi-party democracies,they have not managed to maintain the kind of political environment thatone usually associates with full blown democracy, or, to employ RobertDahls term, they have not yet established themselves as fully fledgedpolyarchies.6 In general, then, the Central Asian leaders seem to have beenmore concerned with portraying their states as multi-party democracies tothe outside world rather than ensuring the existence of substantiverepresentation of the populations interests.

A succinct outline of the last ten years of democratization is not possiblehere. The reader is therefore directed to several references that provide anoverview of that process.7 Recent events would suggest that the situation hasremained relatively unchanged. Parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan andKyrgyzstan are more democratic than their southern counterparts in the sensethat they involve the participation of opposition parties. However, theelectoral process in both countries continues to be severely criticized bymonitors from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe(OSCE).8 Although presidential elections continue to take place (January

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1999 for Kazakhstan and October 2000 for Kyrgyzstan), in both countries thecandidates that would have presented effective opposition were unable to run.

In Kyrgyzstan, a special commission was set up to test the variouscandidates knowledge of Kyrgyz. Felix Kulov, the main oppositioncandidate, refused to take the test, thereby assuring President Akaev an easyvictory. Kulov has since been jailed for abuse of power during his period inoffice as vice-president. In Kazakhstan, the former prime minister, AkezhanKazhegeldin, was not allowed to run because he had attended anunauthorized political meeting.9 In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan none of thetrue opposition parties have been able to run in elections. Instead, politicalparties endorsed by the presidents have been created. In Turkmenistan, it wasannounced in December 1999 that Niyazov would become president for life

and although parliamentary elections were held in the same month, only oneparty, the Democratic Party, was allowed to run. In Uzbekistan presidentialelections did take place in January 2000 which resulted in Islam Karimovobtaining 91.9 per cent of the vote. But this was hardly unexpected given theabsence of any true opposition candidate and the elections were subsequentlycriticized by the OSCE. It was only after his victory that Karimov invited thepolitical opposition to return to Uzbekistan.10

There has also been much discussion in the comparative literatureexamining the decade of change in the countries of the former Soviet blocover which is the best approach to adopt when analysing the transitionswithin these countries. There are those who have argued that largecomparisons using a large set of countries from many regions will yieldinteresting insights into the processes of democratization within thecountries of the former Soviet bloc.11 For example, Linz and Stepan utilizethe experiences of southern Europe and South America to investigate theimportance of prior regime type, transition pacts and mass mobilizationupon the transition paths of eastern Europe.12 Others have questioned thevalidity of such broad comparisons and how far such general models cantravel in a changing international context and an environment so heavilyinfluenced by communism. Such writers have tended to opt for small ncomparisons choosing to limit their research within the bounds of theformer Soviet bloc or, more often, within a sub-region of this field.13

Whilst recognizing the possible benefits of large cross-countrycomparisons, this account focuses on problems of democratic transition andconsolidation within the Central Asian region. Also, rather than examiningthe various dimensions involved in facilitating the transition to, and finalconsolidation of, democracy, it examines some of the conditions that seemto impede the transition to a full democracy in the Central Asian states.14 Ofcourse, this is mainly a shift of emphasis: impeding and facilitating factorscan often be the opposite faces of the same coin. But by choosing the label

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impeding factors the inquiry seeks to highlight some of the difficulties thatactually confront the leaders of these countries ten years after the

dissolution of the Soviet Union. This should not be thought to imply that thepolicies within each state are justified. Rather the thesis is that theseconditions do constrain the leadership but there is a strong volitionalelement to the policies currently adopted.15

There are several possible reasons why the leaders within Central Asiahave not been inclined to embrace democracy. First, it might be argued thatdemocracy does not have historical antecedents within the area and pre-Soviet and Soviet traditions of rule continue to prevail. Because of thisabsence of historical roots, democracy has failed to become so ingrained thatit is regarded as a value in itself and instead is evaluated according to what

tangible political gains it can offer. Hence, the leadership sees little reasonfor implementing further democratic reforms. Second, the leaders may beconcerned that under fully competitive elections they would not be returnedto power. Third, they may be concerned that non-democratic forces mayachieve power and begin to undo the democratic reforms previouslyimplemented. The drive towards democracy would therefore not only be awaste of time but also may bring instability in its wake as the pro-democraticforces, with their aspirations dashed and unable to be heard in a politicalforum, openly challenge the newly installed government. In other words, thereform process would not lead to a polity that legitimizes and accepts asnormal conflict within the democratic framework. Democracy would fail toconsolidate and establish itself as the only game in town, conflict would notbe contained within the confines of the normal political process andinstability would ensue.16 Fourth, it is also possible that the regionalcomplexities within each state may mean that Rustows backgroundcondition of national unity does not obtain and that the heads of state areworried that the various democratic institutions will divide along regionallines.17 This may either result in political disputes remaining within thedemocratic framework and then a point of stalemate is reached when day today government becomes unworkable, or, in the worst case scenario, conflictis not contained within the democratic framework that has been established.

Although, there has been interesting work carried out on democracy asan inculcated value and the importance of an affective mind set towardsdemocracy, both in the population and its leaders, this study focuses on theother three factors outlined above.18 This is not to say that pre-Soviet andSoviet traditions are not an important, or even, the major factor as to whythese countries have failed to democratize further. Rather, the aim is to raisethe further dimensions that others tend to ignore. Thus the article examinesthe impact of the economic decline of the last decade on the decline inpresidential popularity, the rise of non-democratic forces, and regional


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competition. It argues that although these leaders probably already hadconcerns over these three issues, the precipitous economic decline has

served to exacerbate certain social tensions bringing these issues to the topof the political agenda.

The Economy Ten Years On

There are some difficulties in comparing the economies during the Sovietperiod and afterwards because the Soviet system used to measure netmaterial product (NMP) rather than gross domestic product (GDP).Although much of the data has been re-worked so that they are compatiblewith measurements of GDP, certain inaccuracies are bound to remain.19

Anyway, the precipitous decline in the national economies of the CentralAsia states overshadows any minor corrections that may be necessary. Table1 illustrates the deleterious impact that the concomitant dissolution of theSoviet Union and economic liberalization has had on economic growthwithin the region. The dismantling of the integrated economy was bound tohave a devastating effect, but this was especially so in regions like CentralAsia where much of the production was based in the primary sector. Atroughly the same time, several of the states also initiated reforms in order tomove from the former command economy to a market economy.

Most of these economies began to recover in 1996 and 1997 but werethen stymied by the Asian crisis and the ensuing financial collapse.However, despite this inhospitable environment all four states displayedstrong positive economic growth in the last few years. Kyrgyzstansextremely strong growth in 1997 and its relatively strong growth since thenis mainly a result of the Kumtor gold mining operation coming on line.20

Similarly, Kazakhstans improving economic situation can be largelyattributed to the opening of the oil pipeline from the Tengiz oil field situatedclose to the Caspian Sea to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. The

128 DEMOCRATIZATION

TABLE 1

ECONOMIC GROWTH IN REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (PERCENTAGES)

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Kazakhstan 0.4 0.4 13.0 2.9 9.2 12.6 8.2 0.5 1.7 1.9 1.7 9.6 13.0Kyrgyzstan 8.0 3.0 5.0 19.0 16.0 20.1 5.4 7.1 9.9 2.1 3.7 5.1 5.3Uzbekistan 3.7 1.6 0.5 11.1 2.3 4.2 0.9 1.6 2.5 4.4 4.1 4.0 3.0Turkmenistan 6.9 2.0 4.7 5.3 10.0 17.3 7.2 6.7 11.3 5.0 16.0 17.6 12.0

Data for 2000 are preliminary actuals, mostly government estimates and 2001 represent EBRD projections.Source:Annual Report 2000 of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development(London: Ventura Litno

Ltd, 2000), p.16 andAnnual Report 2001 of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development(London: Ventura Litno Ltd, 2001), p.21.

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rather erratic results for Turkmenistan during this period reflect thecurtailment of gas supplies to Ukraine in 1997 in retaliation for non-

payment of services; the resumption of this trade helped to produce positivegrowth in 1998. This improvement in GDP was given further impetus by theincreased volume of crude oil that was extracted during 1998.21 On top ofthis, in 1999, the country benefited from bumper harvests of wheat andcotton.22 From 1997 to 1998, Uzbekistan not only had to contend with theramifications of the Asian crisis but also a decline in cotton productionalongside a decline in cotton and gold prices. However, Uzbekistanseconomy is less liberalized than either Kazakhstans or Kyrgyzstans andthe economic downturn may therefore have had less of an impact. Inaddition, increased output in the construction and trade sectors partly offset

the losses mentioned.

Table 2 presents the GDP of east European and former Soviet Unioncountries from 1989 to 2001 relative to their GDPs in 1989. There areseveral points to note from this table. First, in comparison with easternEurope the former Soviet Union (FSU) has fared much worse in terms ofoverall production. However even in eastern Europe, this seeminglypositive picture should be tempered by taking into account the possibleGDP growth if the dissolution of the Soviet bloc had not occurred. Thiswould leave only Poland, Slovakia and Hungary with possibly a greatergrowth rate under the free market than if an evolved form of the previous


TABLE 2

REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IN THE TRANSITION ECONOMIES, 19892001

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Poland 100 88.4 82.2 84.4 87.6 92.1 98.6 104.5 111.7 117.1 121.8 126.7 128.1Hungary 100 96.5 85.0 82.4 81.9 84.4 85.6 86.8 90.7 95.1 99.1 104.3 108.3Slovakia 100 97.5 83.3 77.9 75.1 78.7 84.0 89.3 94.8 98.7 100.6 102.8 106.2Czech Rep. 100 98.8 87.3 86.9 86.9 88.9 94.1 98.2 97.4 96.3 95.9 98.7 102.2Baltic States 100 97.8 89.9 67.9 58.2 55.2 56.4 58.8 63.7 66.7 65.6 69.2 73.4Belarus 100 98.1 96.9 87.6 81.0 70.8 63.4 65.2 72.6 78.7 81.4 86.1 89.6Moldova 100 97.6 80.5 57.2 56.5 39.0 38.5 36.2 36.8 34.4 33.2 34.0 36.0Ukraine 100 96.4 88.0 79.2 68.0 52.4 46.0 41.4 40.2 39.4 39.3 41.6 45.4Russian Fed. 100 97.0 92.2 78.8 71.9 62.8 60.2 58.2 58.7 55.8 58.8 64.1 67.3Azerbaijan 100 88.3 87.7 67.9 52.2 41.9 37.0 37.4 39.6 43.6 46.8 52.0 57.1Armenia 100 94.5 83.4 48.6 44.3 46.7 49.9 52.8 54.6 58.6 60.5 64.1 70.3Georgia 100 84.9 67.0 36.9 26.1 23.4 24.0 26.7 29.5 30.3 31.2 31.9 33.3Kazakhstan 100 99.0 88.1 83.4 75.8 66.2 60.8 61.1 62.1 60.9 62.6 68.7 77.8Kyrgyzstan 100 104.8 96.5 83.2 70.3 56.2 53.1 56.9 62.5 63.9 66.2 69.8 73.5Uzbekistan 100 99.2 98.7 87.7 85.7 81.2 80.5 81.9 86.1 89.9 93.9 97.6 102.0Turkmenistan 100 101.8 97.0 82.5 83.7 69.2 64.2 68.5 60.7 65.0 76.0 89.4 107.7Tajikistan 100 100.2 91.7 62.1 52.0 40.9 35.8 29.8 30.3 32.0 33.1 35.9 39.5

Source: Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe 2002, No.1 (Geneva: EconomicCommission for Europe, 2002). Data for the Soviet Union prior to 1991 (Turkmenistan until 1992) arebased on NMP (net material product).

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system had continued. In general, though, the economies of the easternEuropean countries have improved to a far greater degree than the FSU

states. This is because of several factors, not least of which is the successfulreorientation of trade links.23

But what is most striking is the devastation wrought on the economiesof the former Soviet Union in general with some countries having their GDPcut to a third of their 1989 levels. Even the relatively more industrializedand strategically located Baltic region has failed to achieve outputsanywhere near their 1989 levels. Apart from Tajikistan, then, the CentralAsian region has fared better than many other regions of the former SovietUnion. However, these states have only recently exhibited stable positivegrowth and Tajikistan is operating at just over a third of its 1989 output

(Tajikistans poor performance is not surprising given its descent into civilwar in 1992).Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have managed to sustain positive growth

since 1996, and by 1999 all of the Central Asian states had attained positiveoverall growth. However, optimism for the future should be tempered. Table2 summarizes the cumulative impact that the transition has had upon theCentral Asian states. This decline in economic performance is even moredramatic when taking into account the economic record of the precedingdecade. During the period 1980 to 1989, these economies grew as follows:Kyrgyzstans economy grew by four per cent; Kazakhstans by two per cent;Uzbekistans by three per cent; Turkmenistans by four per cent. The decadepreceding this period also had strong positive growth with most of therepublics obtaining slightly higher growth than the 19801989 period.24

These figures should be treated with some caution given the differentmethods of measurement adopted during the Soviet period and also thealleged inflation of production figures (done in order to curry favour withthe Moscow elite) and satisfy the demands made upon the regions by thecentre.25 But even allowing considerable leeway because of this, the resultsindicate that for at least a decade these countries have been operating wellbelow 1989 levels. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan would appear to haveimproved their GDP beyond the rates of 1989. However, their economicperformance may not be as strong as it first appears. It should be noted thatthe manner in which real GDP is calculated in Uzbekistan does lead to somedifficulties in assessing the real impact of the Asian and Russian financialcrises.26 Similarly, there is a large discrepancy between the figures givenabove for Turkmenistan and the figures generated by the European Bank forReconstruction and Development, which estimates that TurkmenistansGDP in 2000 was running at 75 per cent of output generated in 1989. 27

Two other points need to be considered. First, much of the economy ofCentral Asia is based on the production of primary products, the prices and

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yields of which can be quite volatile and the economic performances ofthese economies fluctuate accordingly. In addition, the worsening terms of

trade for primary products looks set to continue. The possible exception isoil, which is unique because of OPECs influence, although until recentlythe price of this commodity had also declined considerably. In the lastdecade, Central Asia has experienced significant declines in the prices ofgold, cotton, cereals and other primary products.28 The second long-termproblem confronting these states is the age structure of their societies whichexhibit the classic pyramid-shaped age structure typical of youngdeveloping countries.29 Although the birth rate has slowed in recent years,the increasing number of young adults seeking work presents a majorproblem for the authorities.

In human security terms, the economic decline has had a dramaticimpact upon the population. If we compare income levels during the lateSoviet period with income levels during the transition, it is apparent thatduring the latter period per capita income declined sharply. Taking a povertyline of US$120 (purchasing power parity) per capita per month at 1990prices and comparing the percentage of the population in poverty in198788 with 199394 we find that for Kazakhstan the percentage inpoverty has increased from 5 per cent to 50 per cent; in Kyrgyzstan from 12per cent to 84 per cent; in Turkmenistan from 12 per cent to 57 per cent; andin Uzbekistan from 24 per cent to 47 per cent.30 A degree of caution needsto be applied to these figures as the poverty line is in some degree arbitrary;for example, the World Bank uses $1 a day and sometimes $2.15 a day as ameasure of absolute poverty rather than $4 per day. This may explain therather high percentage rate given for Kyrgyzstan.31 But, on the other hand,the figures are based on Family Budget Surveys, which tend to bias againstthe inclusion of the extreme poor such as migrants and are also biasedtowards the sampling of particular socio-economic classes.32 In addition tothis, such data fail to take into account the number of people obtaining extraincome from the unofficial economy.33

Another way of measuring poverty is to establish the value of a foodbasket at the minimum subsistence level and costs of other essentialexpenditures within the country. Although this does not have the advantageof facilitating international comparisons (poverty levels are nationalminimum subsistence levels), it should provide an informed estimate ofnational poverty levels. According to these data, which are based onincomes, for 1996 the poverty rate in Kazakhstan was 34.6 per cent and by1998 this had increased to 43.4 per cent. In 1997 it was estimated that inTurkmenistan the proportion of the population at or below the poverty linetotalled 30 per cent. For Uzbekistan, 44.5 per cent of the population wasbelow the national minimum wage in 1994 and 27.6 per cent in extreme


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poverty in 1996. In Kyrgyzstan the proportion of the population in povertyduring 1996, based on expenditure rather than income, was 43.5 per cent,

by 1999 this had increased to 55.3 per cent.

34

The figures for Kyrgyzstan arelower than previously quoted because they have been recalibrated to takeinto account the crisis of 199798 and the resulting change in patterns ofconsumption.35

The statistics based on income fail to take into account domesticproduction and are therefore higher than those based on expenditure. Forexample, the figure for Turkmenistan fails to take into account a high rateof production of home goods in rural and poor households, it was found thatthe latter generally had twice as many cattle as high income households.36

Similarly, for Kyrgyzstan, prior to the recalibration mentioned in the

previous paragraph, the difference between income and expenditure rates ofpoverty was as high as 19 per cent.37 Unfortunately, a direct comparisonbetween the data based on the national poverty line and the data employingan international standard is not possible. Though one must use these figurescautiously, they indicate a huge increase in the number of people livingbelow the poverty line within these states. The figures since 1996 forKyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan also indicate that the poverty rate in these twocountries has further increased and in all probability the situation hasdeteriorated further in both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. It is too early tosay whether this is a short-term effect of the Asian and Russian crisis orwhether it indicates a long-term decline in the economic well-being of alarge part of the population.

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TABLE 3

CHANGES IN INEQUALITY GINI COEFFICIENTS ( INCOMES) FOR

CENTRAL ASIA

1986 1993 1997

Kazakhstan 0.258 0.327 0.347Kyrgyzstan 0.259 0.353 0.47Uzbekistan 0.246 0.333 0.421Turkmenistan 0.250 0.358 0.41a

aBased on consumption, survey year 1998.

Source: Kaser and Mehrotra, Distribution of Income, in Roy Allison (ed.), Challenges for theFormer South (London: RIIA, 1996), p.263; Branco Milanovic,Income, Inequality, andPoverty during the Transition from Planned to Market Economy (Washington: WorldBank, 1998), Appendix 4; United Nations Development Programme, Human

Development Report For Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS: 1999 (Bratislava:UNDP, 1999), p.20; World Bank, Making Transition Work for Everyone: Poverty and

Inequality in Europe and Central Asia (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000), AppendixD; Jane Falkingham, Welfare in Transition (London: CASE, 1999), p.11; and UNDP,

Human Development Report 2001: Uzbekistan (Tashkent: UNDP, 2000).

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Alongside this growth in poverty rates, Central Asia has experienced aconcomitant increase in the level of inequality during the transition period.

Table 3 gives a comparison of the Soviet and post-Soviet period using Ginicoefficients, based on incomes, as a form of measuring inequality(0 represents perfect equality and 1 represents perfect inequality).

As can be seen from Table 3, the Gini coefficient for all four of theCentral Asian countries increased dramatically between 1986 and 1993,ranging from seven points for Kazakhstan to over ten points forTurkmenistan. For all four states the situation deteriorated further during thelater period of transition but some fared better than others, for example,Kazakhstans Gini coefficient increased from 0.327 in 1993 to 0.347 in1997, compared to Kyrgyzstan which experienced a decline of over ten

points from 0.353 to 0.47. It should be noted that the information is basedon incomes to allow a comparison of the Soviet and post-Soviet period. Thismay have the effect of exaggerating the real degree of inequality because,unlike expenditure based data, it does not include economic activities suchas work on private plots of land, an activity that is very common within theregion. However, even if we employ expenditure-based data the increase ininequality is still very high, with Kyrgyzstan scoring 0.42 (1997),Kazakhstan scoring 0.35 (1996) and, as indicated in Table 3, Turkmenistanscoring 0.41 (1998).38

A more tangible assessment of inequality within the region is to comparethe highest and lowest deciles by percentage share of income/consumption.In doing so, we find that: in Kazakhstan (1996) the richest 10 per cent hada 26.3 per cent share of consumption compared to 2.7 per cent for thepoorest 10 per cent; in Turkmenistan (1998) the top 10 per cent had a 31.7per cent share compared to 2.6 per cent for the lowest decile; in Kyrgyzstan(1997) the richest 10 per cent received 31.7 per cent of national income andthe poorest 10 per cent received 2.7 per cent of the national income. 39 In1999, Uzbekistan had an income decile ratio for the top ten per cent ofearners compared to the bottom ten per cent of 10.7 and this would translateinto similar figures given above for Kyrgyzstan.40


The previous section detailed the impact that the economic decline of thelast ten years has had upon the Central Asian population. Of course, thenumber of people in poverty varied according to the form of measurement,but it is clear that in just one decade there has been a massive increase inpoverty across the region. The current heads of these states came to poweronly shortly before independence and have presided over the economy forthe last decade. The deleterious level of welfare outlined in this article istherefore closely associated with their periods in office. Specific support


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for these leaders, whereby support is given on a quid pro quo for thefulfillment of demands, is obviously very low as a result of these political

systems failing in particular areas of provision such as the economy, socialwelfare, health etc.41 The socio-economic decline in the last decade is boundto give these leaders cause for concern as regards their chances of re-election in fully competitive elections. The presidents of these states aretherefore reluctant to democratize any further because to do so may initiatethe demise of their own political careers.

In addition, even if these states were to democratize further it is not atall certain that democratic consolidation will be guaranteed. The decline inthe economies of the Central Asian states in the last decade is closelyassociated in the minds of the public with independence and the move away

from a command economy towards a market economy, no matter howlimited such economic liberalization has been in practice. Such economicliberalization is also regarded by the population as implicitly connected todemocratization. Given the economic performance in the last decade,support for democratization may be called into doubt. Second, thus far, thecurrent economic system does not compare favourably with the previouscommand economy. Support for a less democratic, more welfare-orientatedalternative political system is a real possibility. The economic benefits thatderived from the Soviet system may generate a desire to return to a morepredictable economic and political system, albeit not necessarily of thecommunist variety. The leaders of these states are therefore confronted withthe paradox that more democracy may mean less if a political party is votedin that is not particularly in favour of maintaining the system under whichit obtained power. Furthermore, given the inequality that has developed inthe last ten years, any move away from the present system is likely toprovoke resistance from those who are benefiting from the current state ofaffairs, leading to a period of increased instability.

All of the above would suggest that the problems of stability thatconfront these countries during a transition to democracy would raiseserious doubts about the process, in the minds of the presidents. The IslamicMovement of Uzbekistan, led by Juma Namangani (Jumabai Khojiev) andnumbering approximately 2,000, had been operating within the southern tierof Central Asia.42 It is alleged that this movement was responsible for thebombs that exploded in Tashkent in 1999. The movement also gainednotoriety when a contingent numbering approximately 1,000 took fourJapanese geologists and a Kyrgyz interpreter hostage in the Bakten Provinceof Kyrgyzstan, demanding large sums for their release.43 However, since theterrorist events of 11 September 2001 and the probable death of themovements leader in Afghanistan it is highly likely, given their links withthe Taliban, that their influence has waned somewhat, at least in the short

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term. There are two other major Islamic movements within the region, Hizbal-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party) and a splinter group from this

movement,Akramiyya. These two groups are mainly located in Uzbekistan,Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, butHizb al-Tahrirhas also begun a recruitmentdrive in Kazakhstan, and leafleting by the group has occurred throughoutCentral Asia. It is thought that initiallyHizb al-Tahriradvocated change viapropaganda, but since the crackdown in Uzbekistan (1998) the use ofviolence to achieve political ends is no longer ruled out.44

The events of 11 September, the changing political climate inAfghanistan and the US presence within Central Asia has led to a changingpolitical and strategic environment within the region. Therefore, estimatingthe probability of a non-democratic alternative establishing itself within any

of these states is of course very difficult to ascertain. A leading expert onIslam within the region has argued that the idea that radical Islam mightpresent a threat to the stability of society seems quite far-fetched, that is,although the threat from the IMU and other movements is real there is a lackof support from the general population.45 It is also clear that the CentralAsian leaders are quite adept at using the spectre of a non-democraticIslamic regime instrumentally to maintain their grip on power. However,although these movements lack mass support, they do present a source ofinstability and uncertainty within the region.

It would seem natural to assume that the most difficult period of theeconomic transition has passed and that therefore the greatest threat topolitical stability is now over; however, this may not necessarily follow.Some studies suggest that rising expectation amongst the population andrelative deprivation, rather than objective deprivation, are importantcatalysts of social movements, which may explain why some revolutionshave occurred at times of rising prosperity.46 Other studies concur that theexpectations of the population are extremely important, but argue thatrevolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objectiveeconomic and social development is followed by a short period of sharpreversal.47 Either way, this literature indicates that social unrest may alsotake place during a period of economic improvement if such expectationsare not satisfied. If there is any economic improvement in the next fewyears, then it is important for the mass of the population to experiencetangible economic benefits from this. It should be said that if the recenteconomic history of other developing countries is anything to go by, then itis unlikely that this will be the case. Indeed, the trend for many developingcountries has been that economic inequality and social deprivation for thepoorest within the populations concerned have increased.48


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Regional Considerations

Although in Central Asian countries class cleavage is important and the

increasing inequality already indicated highlights its salience for thecontemporary period, it is important that we do not neglect the ethnicdimension within the region.49

Two countries, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, have large ethnic minorities.Kazakhstan has a large Russian population constituting 30 per cent of thetotal population and mainly residing in the north of the country.50 Kyrgyzstanhas both a large Russian minority constituting 12.5 per cent of the populationthat resides mainly in the north and a large Uzbek minority constituting 13.8per cent of the overall population that resides mainly in the south-west in theFerghana Valley.51 The location of the Russian population in the north of both

of these countries is especially significant. This is because the northern areasare the most industrialized.52 The rural/urban cleavage, based respectively onthe primary and secondary/tertiary economies, therefore also has an ethnicelement to it. Any socio-economic differences between the urban and ruralareas have therefore served to exacerbate tensions between the Russianpopulation and the titular nationalities.

In 1998, the majority of the rural population in Kazakhstan earned lessthan 3,000 Tenge (83.4 per cent), this was almost double the rate of theurban population (43.5 per cent). In the south, where more than 50 per centof Kazakhs reside, 55.5 per cent of the population had incomes below the

subsistence level compared to that of, say, the central and eastern regions,which had 22.7 per cent and 27.15 per cent respectively. The western andnorthern regions had poverty rates that were closer to the national averagewith 39.4 per cent and 34.3 per cent respectively.53 In 1997, the poverty ratefor Kyrgyzstan (based on expenditure) in urban areas was 28.5 per cent ofthe overall population compared to 64.5 per cent in rural areas. Mappingpoverty rates by ethnicity indicates that, in 1997, only 17.8 per cent ofRussian households were below the poverty level compared to 67.4 per centof Kyrgyz.54

The situation in the southern region of Kyrgyzstan is somewhat

different; relations between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz reached their zenith in theOsh riots of 1990. Such tensions that currently exist have been exacerbatedby Uzbekistans bombing of Kyrgyz territory in August 1999 in an attemptto dislodge rebels belonging to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan whohad taken the four Japanese geologists and a Kyrgyz interpreter hostage.55

The southern area of Kyrgyzstan suffers from extremely high rates ofpoverty (70 per cent in Jalal-abad Oblast and 60 per cent in Osh Oblast) andmuch higher rates of unemployment than elsewhere in the country; forexample, the level of unemployment in the Osh Oblast is double the

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national average.56 The situation is complicated by the fact that theUzbeki/Kyrgyz border within the Ferghana Valley is disputed by both

parties, excacerbating existing tensions between the two groups.

57

Problemsin the area should be understood within the context of extremely high ratesof poverty and unemployment within the region.58 The two governmentshave recently begun talks aimed at settling the border dispute, and if suchdiscussions are successful they will go some way towards easing tensions.However, this depends on the final agreement. Rumours of a possible landswap between the two governments will, if they turned out to be true, havea highly destabilizing effect in the current situation.59 Even if thenegotiations are agreeable to all parties, the poor socio-economic conditionswithin the Ferghana Valley suggests that many difficulties would remain.

In addition, we need to take into account the regional dimension withinCentral Asia and the informal social networks that exist on a regional basis.In this sense, Central Asia is similar to many other newly emerging states inthat political socialization tends to be to the particular kinship, lineage orvillage group as a subsystem of the larger territorial jurisdictional system,rather than to the larger system.60 Given that the system at the national levelis struggling to provide the economic goods to satisfy the population it islikely that the reliance on such informal networks has increased. All fourleaders have acknowledged this trend towards regionalism.61 Although eachpresident has endeavoured to counter the growth of such regionalism, iflarge disparities exist between the regions it is likely that such regionaldifferences will come to the fore leading to greater political instabilitywithin the states concerned.

The Kazakh nation is divided into three sub-groups, the Great Horde(zhuz) located in the south of the country, the Middle Horde in northern,central and eastern Kazakhstan and the Lesser Horde located in the west ofthe country.62 It should be clear from the figures given above on poverty byregion that the southern region occupied by the Great Horde suffers fromthe highest rates of poverty followed by the western region occupied by theLesser Horde. The situation is complicated by the fact that within several ofthese regions there exist certain oblasts that are centres of prosperity. Ratingthese using gross added value per capita, some of the highest rated regionsare: Almaty City, mainly because its former status as the capital means itcan derive income from its service industries; Aktube, Mangistau andAtyrau in the west because of oil and mineral extraction; and Pavlodar andKaraganda in north-east and central Kazakhstan respectively because ofmineral extraction.63

Several political issues arise from such wealth generation. First,although wage levels are correspondingly high for these regions, so is thecost of living. Once this is taken into account wage levels are quite low for


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regions such as Aktube, Atyrau and Mangistau in comparison to the wealthgenerated there. Second, despite these regions producing a high rate of

wealth per capita, extremely poor sub-regions, or raions, exist within someof these oblasts, for example Kzylkoginskii Raion in Atyrau Oblast orZhelezinskii Raion in Pavlodar Oblast.64 Finally, several of these wealth-producing regions also provide the state with positive tax revenue that isthen re-distributed to other areas. In 1998, Mangystau, Akmola, Pavlodar,Atyrau and Almaty City were all net contributors to state revenue but onlyAtyrau and Almaty City are consistent net contributors.65 The fact thatthese regions are net contributors to state revenues combined with the twoissues above have led to some governors of these regions to openly questionthe degree of taxation to which they are subject.66

The Kyrgyz are divided into many sub-national groups and these, in asimilar fashion to the Kazakhs, form the constituent elements of largerfederations. Unlike the Kazakhs, the Kyrgyz are divided into two majorfederations (rather than three), the Otuz Uul in the north and the Ich Kiliklocated in the south.67 As mentioned earlier, the southern area suffers fromextremely high rates of poverty. Two of the three poorest oblasts, Jalal-abadand Osh, which have poverty levels of 70 per cent and 60 per centrespectively, are in the south with only the neighbouring northern oblast ofTalas registering such high rates.68 Again, the geographical location of themain wealth-producing oblasts is significant. The three oblasts with thehighest rate of gross regional product, Bishkek, Chui and Issyk-Kul Oblast,are located in the north of the country.

Unsurprisingly, the issues of wealth generation, levels of taxation and thedegree of revenue redistribution have arisen. The southern sub-groupingpoint to the extremely high levels of poverty within the region and the needfor a greater share of the budget whilst the north feel that the system punishesthose who generate the most for the country. This issue is unlikely to goaway, especially now that the Kumtor gold-mining project is operational inthe north-east Issyk-Kul region. Throughout the 1990s relations between thecentre and the south have been tense with the latter strongly resisting whatthey see as greater control by the former. Following the re-election of Akaevin October 2000 there were a series of demonstrations in southernKyrgyzstan.69 The kidnapping of the four Japanese geologists and theirinterpreter by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in the Batken region wasalso deeply worrying for the government.70 Even though at present thismovement is pan-Islamic in nature, one of the current concerns of thegovernment must be the possibility that it will take on a more separatistcharacter within its southern regions.

Politics in Uzbekistan is said to reflect a contest among five regions Ferghana, Khorezm, Samarkand/Bukhara, Surkhandarya/Kashkadarya, and

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Tashkent with Ferghana and Tashkent the most influential out of the five.71

A study conducted in1994 indicated that Tashkent City and Ferghana had the

highest per capita money income whilst Karakalpakstan, Khorezm andNamangan had the lowest. By 1998 some of the rankings had changedsomewhat with Tashkent City, Navoi and Ferghana regions having thehighest incomes with Dzhizak, Surkhandarya, Namangan, Tashkent regionsand Karakalpakstan having the lowest.72 However, it should be emphasizedthat this comparison is based solely on per capita monetary income. Ittherefore fails to take into account variations in household size betweenregions as well as the differing levels of household husbandry (which wouldusually be greater in rural areas thereby partially compensating for lowermonetary income).73 Yet it is still noteworthy that the gap between the richest

and poorest regions outlined above have increased from a factor of 3.1 in1996 to 4.7 in 1998.74 Unfortunately, there is little information on budgetaryreallocation between the regions, but if such inequality persists or indeedincreases as the data suggest then issues of inequality and redistribution willregister at the top of the political agenda with increasing regularity.

There are seven main clan groupings within Turkmenistan: the Tekke,Ersary, Yomud, Gklen, Salor, Saryk and Chowdor.75 The Tekke is thelargest and most politically influential group amongst these seven; it istherefore not surprising that President Saparmurat Niyazov is from thisgroup. Competition for political influence is mainly between the Tekke andYomud clans. In addition, there is said to be rivalry within the Tekke groupbetween the Akhal and Mary Tekhines (neighbouring regions in the southof the country). However, although the Akhal region ranks slightly higherthan Mary in per capita income, the greatest differences are between bothAshgabat City and the Balkan region and the rest of the regions due to theservice industry in Ashgabat and the oil production in the Balkan region.76

For example, the city of Ashgabat, located in the south, had almost doublethe per capita income and the oil-rich Balkan region, located in the west,had triple the per capita income of other regions, such as Mary andDashoguz.77 However, once again, the cost of living in these areas is higherand once this is taken into account the disparities are considerably reduced.But Ashgabat and Balkan still attain the highest rankings for humandevelopment of all the regions, although the disparities are not as great asone would assume from just considering the per capita incomes of theregions.78 In similar fashion to Kazakhstan, the question of how to re-distribute the wealth derived from mineral extraction, such as oil and gas, islikely to remain high on the political agenda and will increase in importanceif such regional disparities continue. This is especially so given the rivalrybetween the Tekke and Yomud and the fact that the latter reside in the oilrich region adjoining the Caspian Sea.


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The second part of this study has questioned whether Rustows background

condition of national unity obtains within this complex region. The leadersof the Central Asian states are confronted with a reduction of societalconsensus within their respective states, whether from inter-ethnic or intra-ethnic divisions, or sometimes both. However, it is difficult to assess howdeep these divisions actually are at the moment. It would appear that theyare currently manageable, but that there is a tendency for this reliance oninformal social networks to increase under worsening social and economicconditions. The legitimacy of the state depends upon the balancedrepresentation of the various interest groups existing within its borders. Thisextends to the economic sphere where the provision and extraction of

resources from the citizens of a state may become highly charged if theprocess is carried out in a partisan manner. Any further economic declinemay therefore further exacerbate existing divisions, Given that the systemat the national level is struggling to provide the economic goods to satisfythe population it is likely that the reliance on such informal networks hasincreased. All four leaders have acknowledged this trend towardsregionalism.79 For example, President Karimov recently warned that

it is a priority of the highest political importance to urge the needenergetically to cut short regionalism and the formation of cliqueswhich are hampering our common cause ... it should be borne in mind

that an exaggerated local patriotism and its aggressive advancementimpede the consolidation of the nation, inevitably lead to internalseparatism and cultural isolation, and give rise to a series of otherthreats to the stability and security of state and society.80

Although each president has endeavoured to counter the growth of suchregionalism, if large disparities exist between the regions it is likely thatsuch regional differences will come to the fore, leading to greater politicalinstability within the states concerned. Once again, this places the leaders ofthese states in a quandary when considering democratization. There is the

possibility that giving greater political representation to the various ethnicor sub-national groups will encourage such groups to turn inward and focuson their difference at the expense of a more general form of citizenship.81

Recent work on transitions to democracy has indicated that such a period isbedevilled by instabilities. Given the diversity of interests that exist withinmulti-ethnic societies, it is difficult for the state to attend to all of thedemands of all the groups all of the time. It has been suggested that undersuch conditions there is a tendency for elites to get their issues on theagenda by drumming up nationalist sentiment for their causes. Given suchsupport the state may acquiesce to such demands but this practice runs the

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risk of engendering hypertrophied forms of nationalism and furtherinstability.82 Second, by promoting greater representation of other ethnic

groups and pursuing more equitable distribution of resources the leaders ofsuch states may find that they have alienated their own support base,possibly to the extent that new contenders surface to challenge them.

Conclusion

This article began with an outline of the possible reasons for the stalledprocess of democratization in Central Asia. Plausible explanations includedthe possibility that pre-Soviet and Soviet traditions of rule continue toprevail and because of this absence of historical roots, democracy has failed

to become ingrained as a value in itself, but instead is evaluated accordingto what tangible political gains it can offer. Thus the leaders of these statessee little reason for implementing further democratic reforms. Withoutdismissing this possibility, however, the account has focused on severalother factors.

Although difficult to gauge accurately, the economic decline is bound tohave adversely affected support for the political system, jeopardizing thechances of democratic transition. Scharpf usefully divides democraticlegitimacy into input-orientated legitimacy and output-orientatedlegitimacy. The former is defined in terms of government by the people:Political choices are legitimate if and because they reflect the will of thepeople. The latter is defined in terms of government for the people,where political choices are legitimate if and because they effectivelypromote the welfare of the constituency in question.83 Most developingstates these days find themselves in an economic environment that makesattaining output legitimacy extremely difficult; and without minimumlevels of welfare provision it is hard to see how a state can successfullymake a transition to democracy, thereby establishing input legitimacy. Theassessment carried out here indicates output legitimacy is lacking for theCentral Asian states. That means the political considerations that have beenintroduced into the analysis must be included in any full explanation of thestalled democratic process. The possibility of the Central Asian leadersbeing re-elected under completely free and fair elections is hindered by thefact that they came to power only shortly before independence and havepresided over the economy for the last decade. The welfare declines areclosely identified with their periods in office, thereby affecting the specificsupport for these leaders. But if the democratic process were to be pushedfurther forward, less democratic but more welfare-orientated parties mightcome to power and rollback the existing democratic reforms. Since 11September 2001 and US intervention in Afghanistan, the probability of this


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happening in the short term has waned considerably but the possibility of itoccurring in the long term still remains. Increasing regional disparities are

likely to engender tensions at the sub-national level but these are morelikely to lead to sporadic and extremely small-scale conflicts at the locallevel rather than major fault-lines developing at the governmental level.

Given these problems confronting the Central Asian states sinceindependence, the prioritizing of stability over democracy isunderstandable. The overriding concern for stability is clearly evident in,for example President Islam Karimovs statement that

inequality creates the danger of social instability in any country ...Extreme social contradictions may lead to internal confrontations andeven to civil wars That is why the most important task of the

democratic state is to neutralize acute social contradictions, to alleviatethe inevitable difficulties of this period by adopting preventativemeasures and accommodating people to a new social environment. 84

However, it is also true that each one of the presidents has grown accustomedto the benefits of holding office and have become quite adept at using thespectre of both regionalism and non-democratic Islamic movementsinstrumentally to maintain their grip on power.85 Nonetheless, the obstaclesto further democratization are both real and tangible and even if these leaderswere replaced by more reform-minded presidents, they would confront thesame difficulties that presently beset the current leadership.

Although it is understandable therefore that the Central Asian leadershave not wholeheartedly embraced a move towards either democracy, in thecase of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, or the implementation of furtherdemocratic reforms, in the case of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, there arealso risks associated with maintaining the status quo. There is a danger thatif political demands are not represented through some form of electoralprocess, then the population will seek other means to achieve their politicalobjectives, a possibility illustrated by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistanand by sporadic protests in the other three states.86 At the same time, thereis some evidence that income inequality is higher today in the stalledtransition countries than in the more advanced reformers, and that this issomehow related to the way in which democratization in the broader senseof the word prevents state capture by governing elites.87 The deteriorationin welfare and, worse, a continuation of this trend will do little to providethe societal stability that the Central Asian leaders seek. Neither thedecision to create a faade of democracy, as in Turkmenistan andUzbekistan, or to stall the transition process, as in Kazakhstan andKyrgyzstan, is likely to provide a solution to such problems in the long termeven if it does shore up stability in the short term.

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NOTES

1. Huntington argues that the third wave of democratization began in the 1970s in the southern

tier of Europe: Portugal, Greece and Spain. Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century (Norman, OK and London: University ofOklahoma Press, 1991).

2. There is a burgeoning literature on the democratic transitions within the Soviet bloc, forexample, Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot (eds), The Consolidation of Democracy in East-Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Nikolai Biryukov andVictor Sergeyev, Russian Politics in Transition: Institutional Conflict in a Nascent

Democracy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997); Geraint Parry and Michael Moran, Democracy andDemocratization (London: Routledge, 1994); Juan Linz, Transitions to Democracy, TheWashington Quarterly, Vol.13, No.3 (1990), pp.14364; Larry Diamond, The Global

Resurgence of Democracy (London: John Hopkins University Press, 1993); Attila Agh, TheTransition to Democracy in Central Europe: A Comparative View,Journal of Public Policy,Vol.11, No.2 (1991), pp.13351; Paul Lewis, Democratization in Eastern Europe,Coexistence, Vol.27, No.4 (1990), pp.24567; Attila Agh, The Comparative Revolution

and the Transition in Central and Southern Europe,Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol.5,No.2 (1993), pp.23152. For literature on the difficulties associated with democraticconsolidation, refer to Geoffrey Pridham, Stabilising Fragile Democracies (London:Routledge, 1996); idem, Political Actors, Linkages and Interactions: DemocraticConsolidation in Southern Europe, West European Politics, Vol.13, No.4 (1990), pp.10317;Philippe Schmitter, The Consolidation of Democracy and Representation of Social Groups,

American Behavioral Scientist, Vol.35, No.4/5 (1992), pp.42249; Attila Agh, The Politicsof Central Europe (London: Sage, 1998), Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, New States, NewPolitics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997);Douglas Blum,Russias Future: Consolidation or Disintegration? (Boulder, CO: WestviewPress, 1994); Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot, Democratic Changes & Authoritarian

Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus & Moldova (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1997). Refer also to the literature cited in the footnotes that follow.

3. For a detailed analysis on the difficulties confronting Tajikistan, refer to Shirin Akiner,Tajikistan: Disintegration or Reconciliation (London: RIIA, 2001).

4. That is, they have been created with the support of the presidents and do not constitute a realopposition.

5. See for example John Anderson, Kyrgyzstan: Central Asias Island of Democracy?(Amsterdam: Harwood, 1999), pp.2364; Douglas Frantz, Kyrgyzstan Trying to Rebuild itsDemocratic Reputation, New York Times, 11 May 2001, p.3; and Sally Cummings,Kazakhstan: Centre-Periphery Relations (London: RIIA, 2000), pp.78.

6. Refer to Robert Dahls Polyarchy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971) for whathe considers to be the requirements for the establishment of democracy.

7. John Anderson, The International Politics of Central Asia (Manchester: ManchesterUniversity Press, 1997); Dilip Hiro, Between Marx and Mohammed(London: HarperCollins, 1994); Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asias New States: Independence, ForeignPolicy and Regional Security (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996;

and John Glenn, The Soviet Legacy in Central Asia (London: Macmillan, 1999).8. OBSE: sotrudnichestvo s Kazakhstanom prodolzhitsya, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 13January 1999, p.1; Demokratiya i Etnopsikhologiya v Politike, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 14March 2000, p.5.

9. Kirgizstan: And the Winner is, The Economist, 4 November 2000, p.105; Kirgizstan: AnInspector Calls, The Economist, 17 February 2001, p.81; Kazakhstan: After the Landslide,The Economist, 16 January 1999, p.67.

10. National Forum Announces Niyazov Leader and President for Life, BBC Summary ofWorld Broadcasts: Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union , 31 December 2000, G/1;Islam Karimov Snova Izbran Prezidentom, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11 January 2000, p.5;President Karimov Says God is on his Side, Calls on Opposition to Work for Homeland,

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 25January 2000, G/1.


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11. Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists andConsolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to Go?, Slavic Review, Vol.53,No.1 (1994), pp.17385; idem., From an Iron Curtain to a Paper Curtain: Grounding

Transitologists or Students of Postcommunism?, Slavic Review, Vol.54, No.4 (1995)pp.96578.12. See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:

Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: JohnHopkins University Press, 1996).

13. Valerie Bunce, Should Transitologists Be Grounded?, Slavic Review, Vol.54, No.1 (1995)pp.11127; idem, Paper Curtains and Paper Tigers, Slavic Review, Vol.54, No.4 (1995),pp.97987; Jon Elster, Claus Offe and Ulrich Preuss,Institutional Design in Post-CommunistSocieties (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Dawisha and Parrott, TheConsolidation of Democracy; Biryukov and Sergeyev.

14. See Seymour Martin Lipset, The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited, AmericanSociological Review, Vol.59, No.1 (1994), pp.122.

15. See Pridhams division of democratic transition literature into functional and geneticapproaches in his Democratic Transitions in Theory and Practice: Southern EuropeanLessons for Eastern Europe, in Geoffrey Pridham and Tatu Vanhanen, Democratization in

Eastern Europe: Domestic and International Perspectives (London: Routledge, 1994), p.16.16. Linz and Stepan, p.5.17. Dankwart A. Rustow, Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model, in Geoffrey

Pridham (ed.), Transitions to Democracy: Comparative Perspectives from Southern Europe,Latin America and Eastern Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1995) p.72.

18. A good summary of these perspectives can be found in Richard Samuelss unpublisheddoctoral thesis entitledEvaluating the Support for Democracy in Post-Communist Europe:The Case of Poland (Southampton: Department of Politics, University of Southampton,2001).

19. A new system of economic accounting was agreed upon in 1993 called the System ofNational Accounts (SNA). All CIS countries have reworked economic data since 1990 to fitthis standard, except Turkmenistan, whose SNA data starts from 1992.

20. Output also benefitted from increased production of oil as a result of new technology. SeeKyrgyz Republic: Recent Economic Developments, IMF Staff Country Report No.99/31(Washington: IMF, 1999), p.8.

21. Crude oil increased from 5.3 million tons in 1997 to 6.6. million tons in 1998. Much of theTurkmen share of this is exported after refining, this also increased from 2.5 million tons in1997 to 4 million tons in 1998. See Turkmenistan: Recent Economic Developments, IMFStaff Country Report No.99/140 (Washington: IMF, 1999), p.8.

22. Economic Survey of Europe 2000, No.1 (Geneva: Economic Commission for Europe, 2000),p.89.

23. Ibid., p.5 and Table B.15 of the Appendix.24. Between 1971 and 1980 the growth figures were as follows: Kyrgyzstan 4.4 per cent,

Kazakhstan 4.4 per cent, Uzbekistan 6.2 per cent and Turkmenistan 4 per cent. World Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market(New York: Oxford University Press,

1996), p.173.25. See Demian Vaisman, Regionalism in Uzbekistan, in Yaacov Roi (ed.),Muslim Eurasia:Conflicting Legacies (London: Frank Cass, 1995). For a record of Soviet denunciations, referto the 27th Congress of the Communist Party in Current Soviet Policies IX: The

Documentary Record of the 27th Congress of the Communist Party (Columbus: The CurrentDigest of the Soviet Press, 1986).

26. Republic of Uzbekistan: Recent Economic Developments, IMF Staff Country ReportNo.00/36 (Washington: IMF, 2000), pp.111. It should also be noted that the IMF concludesthat the manner in which the official state consumer price index is calculated tends tounderestimate price rises. This tends to exaggerate real GDP because the deflator employedis based on the (underestimated) CPI.

27. Annual Report 2000 of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, (London:Ventura Litno, 2000), p.16.

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28. On how to calculate the impact of the changing terms of trade on GDP see David Tarr,HowMoving to World Prices Affects the Terms of Trade in 15 Countries of the Former SovietUnion, Working Paper WPS 1074 (Washington: World Bank, 1993); also refer to Republic

of Kazakhstan: Selected Issue and Statistical Appendix, Staff Country Report No.00/29(Washington: IMF, 2000), Chapter 5 on the evolution of terms of trade, pp.7492; andRepublic of Uzbekistan, pp.9-10.

29. Jane Falkingham, From Security to Uncertainty: The Impact of Economic Change on ChildWelfare in Central Asia, Unicef-Innocenti Working Paper No.76 (Florence: Tipografia,2000), p.3. For figures on this see Istochniki Sredstv Sushchectvovaniya Naseleniya

Respubliki Kazakhstana [Sources of Income of the Population of Kazakhstan] (Almaty:Statistics Agency of the Kazakh Republic, 1999), pp.269; Kyrgyzstan v Tsifrakh (Bishkek:National Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2000), pp.21113; Human

Development Report 1999: Uzbekistan, (Tashkent: Centre for Economic Research, 1999),pp.745; and Human Development Report 1999: Turkmenistan, (Tashkent: Center forEconomic Research, 1998), p.95.

30. Human Development Report 1999: Uzbekistan, p. 20 and Jane Falkingham, Welfare inTransition: Trends in Poverty and Well-being in Central Asia (London: Centre for Analysisof Social Exclusion, 1999).

31. For an example of this see Christine Jones and Ana Revenga (eds),Making Transition Workfor Everyone: Poverty and Inequality in Europe and Central Asia (Washington: World Bank,2000), Appendix A. On the problems of estimating absolute poverty see Falkingham, Welfarein Transition, pp.1617.

32. Branko Milanovic, Income, Inequality, and Poverty during the Transition from Planned to Market Economy (Washington: World Bank, 1998), p.147, and Jane Falkingham and JohnMicklewright, Surveying Households in Central Asia in Jane Falkingham, Jeni Klugman,Sheila Marnie and John Micklewright (eds), Household Welfare in Central Asia (London:Macmillan, 1997), pp.4260.

33. It was estimated in 1995 that the unofficial economy produced the equivalent of 34 per centof GDP in Kazakhstan, 7 per cent of GDP in Uzbekistan and 1218 per cent in Turkmenistan.Refer to Emine Grgen, Harry Snoek, Jon Craig, Jimmy McHugh, Ivailo Izvorski and Ron

van Rooden,Economic Reforms in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,and Uzbekistan (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1999), p.14.

34. Uroven Zhizni Naseleniya v Kazakhstane (Almaty: Statistics Agency of the KazakhRepublic, 1999), p.189 and Kazakhstan Human Development Report: Challenges for 2000(Almaty: Akyl Kitaby, 2000), p.28; Human Development Report 1998: Turkmenistan,(Ankara: Ajans-Trk, 1998); p.64, Human Development Report: 1999: Uzbekistan, p.27;

Rezultaty Vyborochnogo Obsledovaniya Monitoringa Bednocti (Bishkek: National StatisticsCommittee of the Kyrgyz Republic, 1999), p.94 and National Human Development Report2000: Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek: ST.art Ltd, 2000), p.57.

35. The figures for 1997 originally quoted a poverty rate of 51 per cent (World Bank andNational Statistics). This has been re-evaluated and the rate quoted by the UNDP is now 42.9per cent. The problem arises because the poverty level is calculated from the cost of a basketof goods, recalibration was necessary because of the need to reassess household consumption

patterns. SeeNational Human Development Report, p.57 andRezultaty Vyborochnogo , p.94.36. Human Development Report 1998: Turkmenistan, pp.646.37. Rezultaty Vyborochnogo, p.94.38. Jones and Revenga, Appendix D.39. World Development Report 2000/2001 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.282.40. Human Development Report 2001: Uzbekistan (Tashkent: UNDP, 2001), p.3.41. David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (Chicago, IL: John Wiley and Sons,

1965), p.268.42. Christian Caryl, In the Hot Zone,Newsweek, 8 October 2001, pp.3843.43. Clashes in Southern Regions, The Times of Central Asia, 30 September 1999, p.1; Morgan

Liu, Evaluating the Appeal of Islam in the Ferghana Valley, , 1August 2000.

44. Yaacov Roi,Islam in the CIS: A Threat to Stability (London: RIIA, 2001), pp.323.


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45. Ibid., p.82.46. W.G. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice: A Study of Attitudes to Social

Inequality in Twentieth Century England(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), p.21.

47. James Davies, Toward a Theory of Revolution, American Sociological Review, Vol.27,No.1 (1962), p.6. I wish to thank Richard Samuels for bringing this range of literature to myattention.

48. Caroline Thomas, Global Governance, Development and Human Security: The Challengesof Poverty and Inequality (London: Pluto Press, 2000), p.25.

49. In the following discussion ethnic and sub-ethnic divisions are treated as cleavages. Thesedivisions have empirical and normative elements, so that they can be referred to as conscioussocial divisions and such divisions are often expressed in organizational terms. On the threequalities of social cleavages refer to Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, Identity, Competition,and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates 18851985(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), ch.9.

50. Compared to Kazakhs, who constitute 53.4 per cent of the population. SeeNatsionalnyiSostav Naseleniya Respubliki Kazakhstana (Almaty: Statistics Agency of the KazakhRepublic, 1999).

51. See Kyrgyzstan v Tsifrakh, p.214. For statistics that give a slightly higher figure refer toKyrgyzstan Common Country Assessment(Bishkek: UNDP, 1999), p.34.

52. For a detailed breakdown of industrial and agricultural production see Kyrgyzstan v Tsifrakh,pp.2867 and Statistical Yearbook 1999: Republic of Kazakhstan, (Almaty: StatisiticsAgency of the Kazakh Republic, 1999), pp.1969. For English language sources seeKyrgyzstan Common Country Assessment, p.29.

53. Kazakhstan Human Development Report, pp.28 and 29.54. Kyrgyzstan Common Country Assessment, p.49.55. Alisher Khamidov, Frustration Builds Among Uzbeks in Southern Kyrgyzstan,

, 26 March 2001, pp.13; idem, Clashes in Southern Regions, TheTimes of Central Asia, 3 September, 1999, p.1.

56. Based on individual poverty, without allowing for savings introduced by economies of scalein the household, the poverty rate was 77 per cent in Jalal-abad Oblast and 67.7 per cent in

Osh Oblast. National Human Development Report, p.65. For unemployment rates seeKyrgyzstan Common Country Assessment, p.15.

57. Chinobnichii Proizbol Mozhet Privecti K Tragedii,Nezavizimaya Gazeta , 23 January 2001,p.5.

58. Ahmed Rashid, IMU Gradually Developing into Pan-Central Asian Movement,, 4 April 2001.

59. Arslan Koichev, Batken Residents Furious Over Secret Kyrgyz-Uzbek Deal,, 25 April 2001, pp.12.

60. Gabriel Almond, Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics, in GabrielAlmond and James Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas, (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1960), p.30.

61. Refer to Nursultan Nazarbaev, Ideological Consolidation of the Society as an EssentialPrerequisite to Kazakhstans Progress, Kazakhstan Weekly, No.50, 15 December 1993, p.6

and Suparmurat Turkmenbashi, Address to the Peoples of Turkmenistan (Ankara: Nurol,1993), p.17.62. Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1987), p.11.63. National Human Development, p.30.64. Ibid., pp.30, 64865. Cummings, p.21.66. Ibid., p. 23; and Olcott, Central Asias New States, p.80.67. See Alexander Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush,Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide

(London: C. Hurst & Company, 1985).68. Talas had a rate of 69.1 per cent household poverty in 1999.National Human Development

Report, p.65.69. Protestors Demand Election Rerun,BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: Eastern Europe

and the Former Soviet Union, 1 November 2000, G/1; Opposition Says Authorities Put

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Down Two Protest Rallies on 24 December,BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: EasternEurope and the Former Soviet Union, 29 December 2000, G/3.

70. For coverage of these events refer to Terrorist Take Hostages at Batken Region of Osh

Oblast, The Times of Central Asia, 12 August 1999, p.1 and Captive Japanese GeologistsFreed in Southern Kyrgyzstan, The Times of Central Asia, 28 October 1999, p.1.71. Vaisman.72. Human Development Report 1999: Uzbekistan, p. 2673. Aline Coudouel et al., Regional Differences in Living Standards in Uzbekistan, in

Falkingham et al., p.107.74. Human Development Report 1999: Uzbekistan, p.26.75. For a full list of Turkmen tribes and a precise breakdown of the size and location of these

groups see Bennigsen and Wimbush. On the historical antagonisms between the Turkmen seeMehmet Saray, The Turkmens in the Age of Imperialism (Ankara: Turkish Historical SocietyPrinting House, 1989) and Nikolay Muravyov, Journey to Khiva through the TurkomanCountry (London: Oguz Press, 1977), p.102 (first published in Russia in 1822).

76. The major oil fields of Nebit-Dag and Kotur-Tepe are located in the Balkan region.77. The per capita income of Balkan and Ashgabat were $8,999 and $5,394 respectively

compared to Dashoguz , Mary, Lebap and Akhal which were $2,497, $2,909, $3,505 and$4,123 respectively. Human Development Report 2001: Turkmenistan (Ashgabat: UNDP,2001), p.100.

78. The Human Development Index rankings for Ashgabat and Balkan were 0.760 and 0.756respectively, compared to 0.7000 and 0.711 for Mary and Dashoguz respectively. Ibid.,p.100.

79. Nursultan Nazarbaev, Ideological Consolidation of the Society as an Essential Prerequisiteto Kazakhstans Progress, Kazakhstan Weekly, No.50, 15 December 1993, p.6;Turkmenbashi, p.17.

80. Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the 21st Century (Surrey: Curzon Press,1997), pp.623.

81. Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, Return of the Citizen, in Ronald Beiner, TheorisingCitizenship (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), p.304.

82. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Democratization and War, Foreign Affairs, Vol.74,No.3 (1995), pp.7997; idem, Democratization and the Danger of War, InternationalSecurity, Vol.20, No.1 (1995), pp.538.

83. Many thanks to Rob Frith for bringing this literature to my attention. See Fritz Scharpf,Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (New York: Oxford University Press,1999), p.6; also idem, Economic Integration, Democracy and the Welfare State, Journal of

European Public Policy, Vol.4, No.1 (1997), pp.1836.84. Karimov, p.129.85. Unfortunately there is little information available on this. For an excellent analysis of how

President Nazarbayev and his family have used his office to amass a personal fortune seeMartha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise (Washington, DC: CarnegieEndowment for International Peace, 2002).

86. For example, the opposition rallies demanding democracy which were suppressed in

Turkmenistan, the protests by Russians in north Kazakhstan and the demonstrations shortlyafter Akaevs election in southern Kyrgyzstan. Protestors Demand Election Rerun andOpposition says Authorities Put Down Two Protest Rallies.

87. That is, institutional accountability, public monitoring of state activity, transparency ofprocedures, strong civil society and media, all of which act to prevent state capture by agoverning elite for private rather than public gain. See Christine Jones and Ana Revenga, ALook at Income Inequality, in idem,Making Transition Work, pp.13978.

Manuscript accepted for publication July 2002.


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