FF3

€A,trsaf? ,(*v,i f D*r-L.ear r(

frJ'^r -7: 6 bm/ , 'u.{s'

( rl i ,1 - g/^*L*# 2ol q, tr/- id I

,,Today ls acood Day to Die!"Transporters and Human

BADGER:

SKINNY PETE:

Extinction

William laworski

BADGER: Dude, you are tripping! I',m not dead! I'm on the star-

ship Enterprise mackin' on Yeoman Rand while the

Andorian with the disruptor is back on Talos IV or

whatever.\rhat do you think all those sparkles and shit are?

Transporters are breaking you apart' man' down to

your molec,.rles and bones. They're making a copy'

That dude who comes out on the other side-he's not

you; he's a color Xerox'

So you,re telling me every time Kirk went into the

transporter h. *u, killing himself ? So over the whole

series there's like a I47 Kirks?

At least! Dude, yo, why do you think McCoy never

likes to beam nowhere? cuz he's a doctor, bitch! Look

it up; it's science.

SKINNY PETE:

-Breaking Bad, "Blood MoneY"

you probably think you,re human. Most people do. But if you're con-

vinced of that, you shouldn't get ,rry*h.r. fiear a transporter' The

reason is simpl., it would shred yo., to bits, iust as Skinny Pete says'

you wouldn,t volunteer to be shredded to bits by more conventional

rneans (axes, meat grinde rs, bat'leths)-at least not if you're into sur-

vival. yet that,s precisely wh at a transporter is supposed to do' So if

you're into ,.rrriual, you shouldn't set foot in a transporter'

I'1,t, llllrttt,tlt' \l'tt lt,'1" 'tttrl l'ltrlttsttltlry' liirst l:tliti()ll' li'tlitt'tl lry

r, ).)Ol{r l,,lril \\'tlr t ,". trttlr',, lrtl l'rrl'lislrt'tl l0 lt' lry l()llrr WrlCt

ht'virr \. |)t't k,'t .ttttl f 't""tt I lil't'rl'

N' \r,tt'.. I l,l

l,.l

152 WILLIAM JAWORSKI

There are two ways you could resist this conclusion. First, you couldgive up on-believirg you're human.You could claim that you,re a dif-ferent kind of being, one capable of survivirg the transporter process.Second, you could give up on swruiual. You could claim that the con-venience of using transporters outweighs the importance of whetheryou or any other human survives the process. But beflore consideringthese responses, it's worth asking whether traiisporters are possible inthe first place.

'nl cannae change the Laws of physics!,,

There are good reasons to think Star Trek transporters are impos-sible' Consider another device simpler prorotype of a Star Trektransporter: a matter-energy-matter (MEM) ronrlritn, (Figure 14.1).The MEM converter works in three stages. First, it scans an object andrecords the positions and states of all oith. fundamenral physical par-ticles that compose it. Second, the converter disintegrates the obiect.Third, it assembles an exact replica of the obiect by ipnritioning fun-damental physical particles according to rhe ,..nrd it created duringits original scan.

There's reason to think that MEM converters are impossible-namelS the uncertainty principle, an implicarion of qrrrrrum the-ory origin ally formulated by the physicist Werner Heisenberg (1901-197 6) '1 According to this principr., the properties of quanrum parti-cles come in pairs, such as their position and momentum. The more we

Record basedon scan

Assembledreplica

Originalobject

F'igurc l4.l

@@

@

@@II0w:r nrrril('r'-('n('r'lry-rrrrrttt.r'(r\4 l.l\,1 )r.,rt\.r.rr(,r \r.,r1s.

lltAN:;f rt )l lll ll-; ntll r lll lMAt'l I xllNt;ll( )N 153

know about ()tlc l)t-oPt.r lV ilI .l l).ilr., tlrt' l('ss wt' lill()w ltbtlttt tlrc tlthcr;

s,., the more wc l<rrow :rlrorrl tlr.'l)()sitiorr of'lt (lLllllttttttt plrrticle', the

lcss we know zrlrout its rn()rrrcrrttnn llttcl vice vcrsa. I'tlr the Mt'M con-

vcrter to do its job, it would have to create an exact physical repltca of

rlre obiect inside it. That means it would have to record accurately the

,roperties of all the particles that compose the obiect. But the uncer-

rainty principle implies that the machine can't do this-not even fot a

single particie. The more accurate the converter's information about

rr pzrticle,s position, the less accurate its information about that pa?

ticle,s momentum. The MEM converter could thus never get enough

accurate information to generate a physical replica'

\rhat,s true of the MEM converter is also true of the transporter,

since both seem to involve the same kinds of processes. Since the MEM

converter is impossible, it follows that the Star Trek" transporter is

impossible as well. of course, rhe engineers who designed the star

Trekrransporter knew about the uncertainty principle and built the

device with a,,Heisenberg compensator."2 But this just pushes the

problem back since "compensatirrg" for quantum-level uncertainty is

itself somerhing rhar seems impossible in principle.3

'nSuppose TheY Went Nowhere?"

Even rf transporters were possible, you still shouldn't want to step into

one. \7ould iou let yourr.lf be shot by a varon-T disruptor that tears

your body apartmolecule by molecule ?4 rf you're into survival, then

the answer ; surely no. yet, despite the evident lack of pain, this is

precisely what the transporter does to you. of course, the transporter

is different in that it doesn't disinte grate the quantum-level bits that

compose you, but converts them to energy, transmits them somewhere,

and then purs them back rogether.S But *hnt makes you think that the

reassembled bits would compo se you and not merely an exa ct replica

of you? you might say, .'.well, itb the same bits, and if it's the same

bits, then it must be the same person composed of those bits!" The

protl.m is, you carit really believe that.

Here,s why: suppose that you're currently composed of a finite num-

['rer of bits, call them PtrPzrPsr " ' , Pr'suppose now that you die' and

th rough natural dec"*p"rition those bits get scattered throughout the

lri<rsphere. Suppose, moreover, that due to a number of chance occur-

r.cr-lces over the next 300 years, those bits come to compose some non-

Irrrrrrlr-l rrrrirrrrrl., s,ch as a clog or rr tri[-rble. Therc's ntlthing impossible

154 WILLIAM JAWOHAXI

Itll,tlt tlllrt.'l'ltt'llrtsic ltlrysiclrl hirs tlrrrt r'r,rrf)r\(.\,,,.rr.(.,() tlifl't.r.-ent froltt tlrc [lrtsic Physical ltits that corrr[)()sc tlt,,ris rurtl rr.ihStcs-rrrcltrees and rocks and tables ,for that matter. If, in th;. pirs t,l) r,l)zrp t, ... ,Pn came to compose you as you are now, they could ,rir^i'rly'cometo compose a dog or a tribble or some other kind of thin g later on.Do you really think that later thing would be you? Flavirrg the samecomponent bits doesn't impl y thatthe same individual i, .J-posed ofthose bits.

ttRgmember , r ,

But maybe you think a person cansurvive being decomposed into bitseven if a human can't. What? !? That's right: mrybe you think that per-sons) like you and I, can survive being b"rok.r, io*n into bits becausewe're not humans- Frumans are complex physical systems, membersof the primate species Homo sapiens. They can't survive extensivedecomposition. But maybe you and r are not humans, not membersof an animal species, not physical beings ar all. This is wha t substancedualists clarm.6

According to substance dualists, we have no physical properties orparts' The human you see in the mirror when yo; d* yo,ri hnir, pur onmakeuP, or shave isn't really you-when Deanna Troi and Kira Neryssee the ff faces reflected with the respective guises of aRomulan and, aCatdassian, it's merely their bodies that have been altered, but Deannaand Kira ate still the same persons.T You might be connected to thehuman you see in the mirror in some way. You might take a keeninterest in what it does and how it's affected by things. you mighteven treat it as if it's really you; but, accordirg to r,rbstance dualists, itisn't' Persons are instead pure ly mental beings. You have mental statessuch as thoughts, feelings, and perceptions, brt accordirg to substancedualists, none of those states are essentially embodied in the physicalparts of humans. In fact, it's possibJe for you to exist without anyphysic al parrs ar all-a pure menta I ipirit.

Vulcans seem to be substance dualists. They think thatthey,re non-physical beings that are merely connected ro rheir bodies. At the endof The \Yrath of Khan, Spock exposes himself to lethal rudtation lev-els in order to save the Enterprise. Before doing So, he places hiskatra-his "living spirit"-lvlthin McCoy. Larer, in The iearch fo,Spock, Sarek tells Kirk that the katrais Spock himself: ,.Only his bodywas in deathr" Sarek says. "He entrusted you with his very essence,

I IIANIiI'()HIEFIS AND HUMAN EXTINC1ION 155

rr rtlr ('v('r'yt lrrrrg llr.rt wrls not of tl-rc lrorl y. ... lt ts t ltc Vtrlcllt't wrlyrvlrt'rr tlrc lrotly's cntl is ncar." \When Spclck's bocly is regeneratccl ()n

tlrt'lrlrrrrct Genesis, I(irk sets out to return Spock-hts katra-to thett

| ,,tly. If Sarek is right, then Vulcans are not physical beings. A Vulcan's(',r\('ncc is "not of the body." A Vulcan is instead a nonphysical personu'lro's connected to a Vulcan body, and who could be connected t<r

,tlrcr bodies-just as Spock connected himself to McCoy.lf Vulcans are nonphysical beings, then it's possible for them to

r r\(' transporters safelg since they're not affected by what happens to.r Vulcan body when it enters a transporter. Suppose that Spock isrrritially connected to Vulcan Bodyl . \7hen Vulcan Bodyl steps intorlrc transporter, it gets disintegrated, and the transporter generates an

r'\rrct repltca)Vulcan Body2. Since Spock, a nonphysical being, is unaf-Iccted by the disintegration process, he can be reconnected to Vulcanlir rdy2. So, even tf a Vulcan's body gets energi zed to bits, the Vulcanpt'rSon-the nonphysical being-remains intact.

\X/hat is true of Vulcans could also be true of us: perhaps we too are

rr<rnphysical beings who are merely connected to human bodies. Thelr uman you see in the mirror isn't really you; you don't really have hair,t'yes, or other physical parts; you don't really have a physical location;\/ou can't really get chopped, blown up, or ene rgrzed to bits. If that'stlre case, then you could survive a transporter.

Substance dualism, though, has a number of troublit g implica-t ions. If we persons are nonphysical beings, how are we able tointeract with bodies ? Physical interaction requires spatial location.When one billiard ball strikes another, that strikirg happens at a spe-

cific location where the surface of one ball impacts the surface ofthe other. But if you're a nonphysical being, you have no location.How then are you able to interact with a body? Even if we couldrrccount for mental-physical interaction, what accounts for each per-son interacting with only one particular body? If Kirk and Spock are

both transported simultaneously, why is it that Kirk interacts at theend of the process with Fluman Body2, while Spock interacts withVulcan Body2 ? If we are nonphysical beings, there's no reason tothink that any of us are necess arrly tied to only our current bodies.It shouldn't require the elaborate alien technology on Camus II forJanice Lester to take control of Kirk's body in "Turnabout Intrud er"(TOS).

Furthermore, if substance dualism is true, many of our moral intu-itions are blown out the airlock. \7hy is killing a human so bad? Ifsubstance dualism is true, then humans aren't persons; so in killing a

156 wil I tnM.,Awonriht

hurrritrr, y<lrr'rc ltot killrlrg il pcrs()n, but rrrt,r.r.ly,rlr.strol,rrrli lris or hcrbody' It rnight be m.rc rikc'an act of virrrrrrrrisrrr trt.srr.ryirrg sorlc-onet property. Likewise, think about what happc,,, ,,, ;i" katra <tfthe young Spock whot been r"g.r.rri"d o, G";;r;;:;;r;';, mind issimple, but he has one_ rrorr"th"-l"rr, as evidenc.a Uf fril-"irlirnr p",f:':'r: it destroyed when Spock'r'ior*is restored to it? If so, thenisn't the vulcan priestess T'i,ar committingn urder by destroying thekatra of the young regenerated Spock?s

l'm a Doctori Not a Sout!,,

Maybe you can't bring yourserf to believe substance duarism. Maybeyou're convinced that you,re basically a physical U"i"s.-;r. ,fr*.any views that claim rhat you,re a physical being but deny thatyou're human? ,,'\)7hat Are Little Giris Made Of?" (TOS) suggestsone of them. Kirk is herd captive on Exo III by the famous scientisrRoger Korby, who,s_creating ixperime.rtrl "rd.oidr. f"rffi.rr". ,,android replica of Kirk. The android, he says, is ,,only a machine,,,but it didn,t have to !".

.,By .o",i"Li.rg the process,,, Korby tellsKirk' "I could've transferred'you, your very consciousness into thatandroid-your soul, if you wish,'all of yor.,,s Th;..,, ;;"irnfrr.,_cal view that makes sense out of Korbyt basic idea, one known asconstitutionalism.loconstitutionarism craims that you and I are constituted&y humans.To sav that X is constitute d.!y i i-pri.,

"t t.r* *o iffi

"uor, xand Y: first, X and y share all ,lr. ,"rrr. purtsl and, second, X and y arcdifferent things. Imagine *.r, L9, ,i#. ; lump of clay into a srarucof Kahless the unforgettabre. rn"r"t'ro p art ofthe statue that isn'tpart of the lump, and rhere,s no part of the lump ,fr"i r..ri ,f* irr, ,rfthe statue. Yet, despite having alith. r.* prr*, constitutionaliits say,the starue and the lump are di-fferent rnrrg"tr"."r* ;., h;;;Iiif...n,properties- The lump, for instance, axistJd before ,rr. ,rrr,r. Jia; ,na,unlike the statue, it can survive b"irrg rqurrh"d. irhi";.lria il.i,rf.r_ent from itself, and because th" rtri.r"

"nd lump h#dt#;; or,rr-erties, constitutionarists concrude that th"f -r.t be different things.According to constitutionalists, th. ,rh" is true of you and thchuman you see in the mirror. you and Jr, hr-r., have ail the s.rrrcparts-all the same liT!:, digits, internal organs, and so on. yer yorrand that human are differen"t things, .ry .or,rrirutionarists, hecirtrst,you and that human have differe.rt f..rp"rti.s. Unrikc frr:rr rrrrr,rrrr, firr.

IIIANSPORTERS AND III.IMAN I X IIN( . IIr rI{ 157

iltstancc, y()tl could survive the contlllt'lt'r'('l)t;trt,nr(.nl ()l y()sl- lrprlyparts with robotic parts.

Imagine that we begin the process of replacing yoLrr lrurnan, bieleg-ical parts with robotic parts-like what the Borg do to Captarn Picilrclin "The Best of Both \Worlds" (TNG). Imagine, however, that insteaclof leavitg some of the original hum an parts behind, we replace all ofthem. Every one of your original human parts is replaced bty aroboticpart. According to constitutionalists, it's possible for you to survivcsuch a process and become a robot. Even if your brain were replaccclby an artrficial positronic implant, many constitutionalists reason thatso long as the implant copied your brain's neural processes, it woulclalso copy your mental states-in particular, your first-person perspec-tiue of yourself and the world around you. And, they say, so long asthat first-person perspective exists, you'd continue to exist. \il/hen, i,"Life Support" (DS9), Dr. Bashir replaces half of Vedek Bareil's cere-brum, Bareil feels somewhat different, but his mental states appe ar tobe largely intact. Although Bashir doesn't believe Bareil could rrruirr.complete replacement of his cerebrum-telling Kira, "FIe may looklike Bareil. He may even talk like Bareil. But he won't be BareilD-this may only reflect technological limitations thatcould be overcomein the future. It isn't possible, however, for the human you currentlyshare your parts with to become a robot. That human is essent ially abiological being; it can't become a nonbiological being like a robot.Hence, Iou can survive different kinds of changes than that humancan. A thing can't differ from itself, so you and that human must bedifferent things. Constitutionalists conclude that human isn't you; itmerely constitutes you.

Suppose you're a constitutionalist. \X/hat can you say about trans-porters ? You can say that initially you are consritured by Flumanl .

\)7hen Humanl steps into the transporter, it is disintegrated andreplaced by Hu man1. Since Human2 is an exact replica of Hurrroll ,you're now constituted by Fluman2. tX/hat ensures that Hum an2 con-stitutes you and not a mere replica of you? According to constitu-tionalists, you're essentially a mental being. Moreover, what makesyou the unique individual you are is that you have the rnental statesyou do, and those mental states are determinecl by thc copfigurrttierrof your physical parts. Since Fluman2 has thc sanlc copfigurrrtierr 6fphysical parts as Humanl, it must give rise to tlrc srurrt. l<irrtls of n'r(.rr-tal statcs. Alltl sitrcc Humanl and I-lunrrur2 lliv('r'ist.[o rlrr.s:urrt, liirrrlstlf tttt'llt:ll st:ll('s,, I lrttltilttr tltust coltstiIuft'y()u illl(.1'llr(, lt'lllrspg;l jrrsl:ls I Irllll;lll; r ott',ltlttlr'tl V()1 lrt.lirt't. it.

158 wtLtlAM JAWoRSKI

Would the Real Riker Please Beam UP?

Constitutionalism is an exciting theo ry that is the basis for many Sttrr

Trek episodes. But it faces the fission problem, which CommandcrRiker experiences firsthand in "second Chances" (TNG). Eight years

earlier, while serving as a lieutenant aboard the U.S. S. PotemkinrRikerwas part of an away team sent to Nervala IV.-When beaming back t<t

the ship, the transporter beam was split by an atmospheric distortionfield, and two replicas of Riker mater rahzed: one aboard the Potemkin,

the other on the planet's surface. Here's the problem: accordit g toconstitutionalists, an individual's mental states make him or her the

unique individual that he or she is. But at the moment they material-

rzed, both replicas of Riker were physic ally indistinguishable. On the

constitutionalist view, that means they must be mentally indistinguish-

able as well: other than having distinct first-person perspectives, they

must have exactly the same mental states. Which of them, therefore,is the real Riker ?

There are four options: (a) the replica on the planet is the real one,

(b) the replica on the ship is, (c) both of the replicas are) or (d) nei-

ther of them is. Commander LaForge endorses option (c). "Both were

mater tahzedfrom complete patternsr" he says, so both are real. But this

view can't be right. One thing can't be identical to two things. More-over, the replica on the ship and the one on the planet have different

locations and are constituted by different humans. Upon materializ-irg, each has its own unique first-person perspective continuous withthat of the original Riker, and each immediately begins accumulatingdistinct sets of memories over the next eight years. A thing can't differ

from itself, so the replica on the ship and the one on the planet cannot

both be \7ill Riker. Option (d) must be rejected since the whole idea

is to give an account of how you could survive the transport process,

and (d) implies that Riker doesn't survive it.11 That means constitu-

tionalists must endorse either (a) or (b), only one of the two replicas

can be the real Riker. !

Since the replica on the ship and the replica on the planet are

mentally indistinguishable, there seems to be no principled reason

to choose one over the other as the real Riker. If an individual's

mental states make him or her the unique individual that he or she

is, and both replicas have mental states that have perfect continuitywith Riker's at the moment he tells the Potemkin, " l'.t-t ergrzer" then

they're both equally good candidates for beirrg thc r'('rll l(il<cr. It seems,

then, that constitutionrllists hrrvc no choict' lrul sirrrply [o pick one

TRANTII'()f I I FHS AND HUMAN EXTINGTION 159

()r. tlrt. ptlrt.r ,rr l,rtr,rrrly. llut irr plrilosoltlry, llt'itt1i :tl'lritrrtt'y itrst istt'l

c'ool.

"What'S So Damn Troublesome about NotHaving Died?"

Whether because of the fission problem or for some other realsoll'

constitutionalism might not appeal to you. Maybe you're convincccl

that you're really human after all. Must you then avoid transporters?

Only if you think suruiual rcquires identity. One way of resolving thc

fission problem without being arbitrary is to claim that both Rikers

are.qrrnlly " survivors " of the original Riker, though neither is strictly

identical with him.12 If survival is just as good as identitS then evcrl

if the human who comes out of the transporter isn't really the humatr

who went in-your child, your spouse, your best friend-the replica

is srill indistinguishable from that human, and you could treat that

replica in the same way you would've tre ated the original. The replicrr

would be mentally continuous with the original-continuous enough

to count as his or her " survivor."One problem with this response is that it appears to be incompatiblc

with lninrfor love rsparticular.\7hen you love a person, the oblect of

your love isn't the characteristics the person has, but the person him-

self or herself. Someone's kindness, sense of humor, intelligence, and

other characteristics might be lovable tool but loving a person's char-

acreristics is different from loving the person himself or herself. Other

people might have the same characteristics as your beloved, and yet

;." mighinor love tbem. tWhile Commander Riker is "flattered ...

,or, nfi by Troi's burgeoning romance with Lieutenant Riker and she

admits finding it ha.d ro separate her feelings for the two of them,

Troi doesn't love Lieutenant Riker just because he has Riker's charac-

teristics. If love is particular in this way, then it would be no comfort

knowing that youi loved ones had been annihilated and replaced by

replica, ,hr, had all the same characteristics, for however lovable those

characreristics might be, you'd still be deprived of the real objects of

your love: the individuals themselves.

Star Trektransporters thus confront you with three options: (L ) yo,give up thinkirrg ,hrr you're a human , (2) you give up valuing indi-

uid,rnl identity and love, or else (3) you take a shuttlectaft or other

means of transportation, and be thankful that transporters are prob-

ably impossible anyway.

160#

Werner Heisenberg,retischen Kinemarik172-98.

WII I IAM.,AWORSKI

Notes

"riber den anschaurichen Inhart der quanrentheo_und Mechanik," Zeitschrift filr iiirtp +s ft927):2' http : / / en' memory-alpha. wikia. com/wiki/Heisen berg-compensa tor(accessed Ma y 27, iots).

''vvLLL' vv rr\r/

3' Diehard fans of transporters might argue thateven if transporters arephysic ally impossible, th.;;;., '., *rroihysicallyimpossible. If the lawsof nature were differerr,'urrl the ,r..ririnty prirr.ipr. didn,t obtain,then in such a world .tr"rp.rrers wourd b.'plrr;;i.. This argumenrassumes that it's possible forih. Iaws of nature ro be differenr from whatthey are in fact' i"'- if properties nr. po*.rs to produce certain effects,f:T;::Tilil:1. r.,ir,. rn*s of ,,,,,. to be airr.,*t from what theythey'remetaphr,,.l?r',i#;il1?i::ff :;i:lT:r,:::::,1;*:i**1:ried bachelors or square circles can.4' l;T";;,;'ffi: v-alph^.*ikir.com/w ikiNaron-r-disruptor

(accessed

5' see Rick sternbach and Michael oku d,a, star Trek: The Next Genera-tion Technicar Manuar (New york: pocket Books, rggr), ch. 9.6 ' Substance dualism has a venerabl. hir;;;; dating back to plat o (427_347 BcE)' who defend ed aversion of it in The piaedr. r, was defendedin late antiquity and the Middl;Ages by Neopraronirtr, and in the eadyrrttrdern era by Rene Descartes osge-te solin his Meditations on Firstl'hikxophy'The lafter work was the irrrpirrtion for conrempor aryver-si,ns of substance dualism such as the one defended by Richard Swin-burne in The Euorution of the sowr (New york: orforJi-rrriu.rsity press,1986) and in Mind' Brain, and Free wituNew york: oxford universityPress' 2013)' For a discussion of Swinburne's views, see my ..Swinburnc"i";fi'ffi ;i,::;'ff ;i;ior;';;'""''i"Europ,o, jo,rnatrorphi-

see "Face of the Enemy" (TNG) and ,.Second Skin,, (Ds9).There are many technical philorophical obl..tions to substance dualisnr.I discuss them, as well as , urri.ri of comp.rirrg theories, in my pbilos-

;f::r{r{';{r' rf comp* h ;;;;;', n,;o iiJiron (Marden, MA: wi r.y -

IIINNSPORTERS AND HUMAN I X IINC IION

l.yrrr. lt trtltl.r llrrker defe,ds a versionsons antl B<tdies: A Constitution Viewsity Press, 2000).

I0.

161

of constitutionalism in lrcr /rcr_(New York: Cambridge LIniv(,r_

7.

11. An astute reader may think that Riker wouldhave survived thc rrarrs-port process if it had gone normally; he doesn't survive in this cirsc ,rlybecause he's split in two. This response falters, however, since it ,ssr.rr(.sthat Riker would survive a norm al transport process in which his ,rrrtern is replicated only once; but, as LaForge notes, both Rikcrs w(.!.(.produced out of "complete patterns." How could a double succcss l)(. ;rfailure in which Riker doesr,, ,rrvive?See Derek Patfit, Reasons and Persons (New york: Oxford Univcr.siryPress, 1984), pt. III.

12.

7.

8.

9. similarly' Dr' Ira Graves transferred his consciousness into Datat b.cryin "The Schizoid Man" (TNG). Data,s creator, Dr. Noonien S.,rrg,also survived by using the Exo irt..hrologf to rransfer himserf inr.an android body; David Mack,-'star Trekl'The Next Generatittrr-i;'J:K';:ns:

The Persistence'of Memory(New york: p<,c:k.r B<,r,ks,