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[TC 54] 8

(3) High altitude wide-angle vertical photographs covering the battle area, enlarged, gridded, and supplemented by oblique photography. (To be used only when time does not permit (1) or (2) above.)

c.· The provisions of paragraph 38, AR 300-15, remain In efiect but the follow-

ing map accuracies are considered acceptable: ( 1) For topographic maps, the error in distance between two points separated

by not to exceed 5,000 yards shall not exceed 25 yards. Eeyond 5,000 yards the error between two points shall not exceed one-half of one percent of the distance

between the two points. (2) Planimetric maps and photomaps will be considered of acceptable accuracy

when compiled by radial line methods using suitable vertical photography. d. In addition to the photography required for producing maps or photo­

maps, field artillery requires periodic intelligence photographs, both vertical and oblique. Oblique photographs used for fire control and for coordination with other arms in target identification will be made with a depression angle that will insure showing the horizon and will be printed with a "Merton" type grid (these photographs without grids are acceptable if grids are not available).

SECTION VII CAPTURED PERSONNEL AND DOCUl\IENTS

21. FM 30-15.-a. Some confusion has resulted from the interpretation of paragraph 9, "Action by Unit Effecting Capture of Prisoners of 'Var," FM 30-15, with respect to search. The basic doctrine is expressed in paragraph 9a and briefly is: "Prisoners of War will be searched for weapons as soon as possible and for documents as soon as such documents can be properly handled." It is a function of theater comma11ders to publish detailed procedure applicable to their theaters. 'l'hese procedures should take into account the type of warfare and the character of the enemy. For example, in the absence of a Japanese translator, no attempt can be made to separate any printed or written material into categories "of military value" or "of no. military value." As a further ex:­ample, Japanese prisoners generally ar.e most responsive to interrogation 12 to 24 hours after capture, while Caucasian prisoners should be interrogated as soon as possible. No procedure for Interrogating prisoners should prohibit front line troops from attempting to gather information of immediate tactical value. All troops should be familiar with prisoner of war proceclure to include whenever possible, a demonstration of initial capture, search, segregation, and interro-

gation. b. The Intent of paragraphs 5 and 9, Fi\1 30-15, is to insure examination of

enemy personnel and documents by the best qualified personnel a·milable. They should not be used as a basis for bypassing pertinent intelligence echelons. The safest guide in the handling of enemy documents to insure maximum intelli-gence being deri"l'ed from them by all intelligence echelons is that they should enter intelligence channels as soon as possible after their capture or collection and be transmitted through them until their final exploitation at \Var Depart­ment leYel. Paragraph 5a (1) F~1 3()-15, containing the sentence "In an isolated combat area, further interrogatio11 may be made at the highest headquarters in tlle area prior to el'acuating prisoners of war to theater headquarters," is par­titularly applicable to task force headquarters for ampllibious operations.

[.~.G. 3~3 (17 Aug 44).]

BY Ol:UER OF THE SECRETARY OF \V 3-R:

O FFI('JAL: J. A. L:LIO,

MajoT General, 1.'11e Adj!dant General.

G. C. l\IARSHALL, Chief of Staff.

AG0497B U.S . GOVERNMENT PRitHINii OFFICE: 1944.

I I

RESTRICTED [TC 54]

TBAINING CIRCUL.AB} WAR DEPARTl\1Ei'<T, No. 54 WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 24 August 1944.

(Effective until 24 August 1945, unless previously rescinded.)

Section Correction In Training Circular No. 48, War Department, 1944____________________ I Combat inte!Hgence ---------------------------------------------------------- II

/ __ Correction in Training Circular No. 18, War Department, 1911.-The parenthetical line at top of page 1 is changed to read as follows:

(Effective until26 J uly 1945, unless previously rescinded.) [A. G. 311.23 (24 Aug44).]

1/ __ Combat intelligence.-In view of certain deficiencies not!'(! in combat intelligence both in training and operations, the following is publi:;bed for the information and guidance of all concerned:

Paragraphs SECT!O~ I. Gen~ral-------------------------------------------------------- J-4 II. Intelligence personneL------------------------------------------- 5-7

III. Intelligence in higher units--------------------------------------- 8 IV. Intelligence in lower units________________________________________ fl-J 1 V. Intelligence specialists teams ______________________________________ J 2-17

VI. Maps and photographs ___________________________________________ 18-20 VII. Captured personnel and documents __________________ _

21 SECTION I

GENERAL

1. Importance.-1\lany failures of combat intelligence during operntions have been reported. Failtn·e of combat con~mander·s to realize that these instances are often failures of command bus been a contributing factor. Lack of int~>rest on the part of some commanders in the activities of !heir G-2 sections has been in contrast to their emphasis on the technical and tactical pro&iency of other !c'le­ments of theit· commands. During tmining and planning per·iods, G-2 failures seldom produce noticeable or disastrous results. On the other hand, a G-4 unfamiliar with supply agencies or a G-3 unfamiliar with tactical units is imnwrli­ately made the subject of command action. A G-2 "·ho has little knowledge of the agencies m·aiJable for combat intelligence may remain unnoticed ot· ma~' PYP!l

be held in high regard for his pr·oticiency in some unrelated special duty. l\loclern war invoh:es many sources of information whose full benefit cannot be reali;,ed without extensh·e training and preparation.

2. Purpose.-l•'l\I 100-;:; includes doctrine relative to combat intelligenf'e. F:II 101-5 prescribes intelligence staff functions. The F:\I 30- sel"ies coYers intelli­gence functions, procedures, and forms. This training circular sets forth certain elements of combat intelligence that require emphasis (sees. II through IV) and certain additional information not completely or adequ:J.tely coYered by existing War Department publications (sees. V through VII). It pertains both to com­manders and their intelligence ofikers.

3. Responsibility.-Combat intelligence includes aU military intelligence per­taining to countries with which we are at war. Combat intelligcnre for any mili­tary unit includes evaluated and interrJreted information of the ene>my and of enemy held installations and territory whiclJ is useful to the unit in planning and xecuting its mission. Each commander in all echelons is respon~ible for his own ombat intelligence. He must obtain all intelligence essential to his command hether by his own means or by request on other headquarters. He also collects

nformation for higher heatlquart!'rs a11d for lower or neighboriug units. He is ssisted in this respect by his Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. The term "G-2" as sed herein includes A-2 and S-2 whererer appropriate. 4. Training responsibility.-Combat intelligence training in the L'nited

tates is a function of the Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Army ervice Forces under War Department policy and general supenision. An

0 497B 598702'--44

[TO 5-i] 2 exception exists in the case of certain specialized training which is conducted under the direct control of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff. Each commander is completely responsible for combat intelli­gence training within his own co=and. He is assisted in this respect by his

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. SECITION II

INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL 5. Qualifications of unit G-2's.-The following will be used as a guide by

commanders in selecting or judg~ng his unit G- 2, A-2, or S-2: a. Since a primary function of a unit G-2 pertains to the information to be

gathered, a knowledge of the operations of nis own type of unit is necessary in addition to a complete understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the

reconnaissance elements thereof. d. Since collecting agencies vary widely in character, actiYitY, and control,

ability to systematize, coordinate, and supervise is mandatory. The same care

as in the selection of the G-3 is required. c. An unbiased mind that will use all sources of information is necessary.

"!30 percent of intelligence comes from a particular source" is a common remark

that is seldom justifiable. d. A sympathetic and helpful attitude toward the "troops" must be demon-

strated by the presentation of intelligence in ·usable form ancl by positive action to insure timely distribution. (Elaborate presentations of the situation to com­manders baYe covered up a lack of intelligence to the troops.)

e. A sincere interest in operations, demonstrated by a close G-2/G-3 rela­tionship, insures that all plans and orders tal{e advantage of the latest intelll­gence. ("We depend on G-3 for our photography, etc." is a typical remark indi­cating bypassing an ineffectual G-2.) Similarly, this close relationship is essential with respect to planning and supervising intellig~nce training.

f. A consciousness of security must be evident both in the G-2 personally and in connecti0n with security or counterintelligence meusures within the command. (Positive steps are required but preoperational security has been carried to the

extreme of not informing agencies who had work to do.) g. Since interpretation of information and estimation of enemy capabilities

are influenced by knowledge of enemy tactical doctrines and methods, familiarity with the military background of the enemy is necessary.

h. A practical knowledge and appreciation of maps and mapping activities should be demonstrated by a close working relation with tbe unit or topographic engine('r. (An early task force G-2 requested his maps the day before sailing, they had to be produced and flown to overtake the convoy in Panama.)

i. Familiarity with aerial photographs must include a knowledge of the means of obtaining them, their distribution and interpretati<>l'!'. In appropriate echelons, personal or other intimate contact with the organic, supporting, or cooperating

aerial photographic unit is required. j. The G-2 should work closely and consistently with G-2's of higher, lo,ver,

and adjacent units. Direct communication is authorized and should be en­com·aged between G-2's of all echelons on intelligenre matters, however care must be taken to insure that command matters pass through command channels.

6. Retention of trained pen;onnel.-a, La~k of appreciation of the amount of training and experience required to produce suitable intelligence personnel bas on more than one occasion caused their rapid and unwarranted dissipation. "Rewarding"' of capable intelligence personnel by transfer into other lines of activity is often as objectionable as the transfer of nonqualified personnel into intelligence positions. As far as practicable, commanders should use trained intell\gence personnel in intelligence positions. Promotions should generally

be made from one intelligence position to another. AGO 497B

3 [TO 54}

b. Intelligence specialists teams or individuals of one or more types are made available on occasion to commanders of regiments, divisions, corps, and higher commands (prisoner of war interrogators; military intelligence interpreters; photo interpreters; order of battle specialists). These specialists have had lengthy training for particular purposes and their use for other than these purposes or their dissipation within the command must be guarded against.

7. Recognition and reward.-Recognition of an excellent intelligence Job is often overlooked. Prior accurate determination of enemy dispositions by intelligence personnel may contribute as much to the success of a tactical mission or at least to t11e saving of lives in connection therewith as tl1e actualleadPrship of troops in combat. Reward in this connection must be as prompt and liberal as in other fields. 1\Iorale of intelligence personnel cannot be maintained unless such a command policy is adopted_

SE;CTION III I~TELLIGENCE IX HIGHER UXITS

8. Responsibility.-During planning phases, large headquarters have responsi­bilities toward lower units similar to those of the War Department toward theaters in their formative periods. Theater G-2's establish means and methods for collecting all information of potential value for future operations and coordi­nate the efforts of subordinate agencies. They also coordinate theater work with that of the War Department, Allies, and Navy where applicable. The importance of this over-all long-range intelligence responsibility cannot be over­emphasized. The operation and organiza(ion of theater intelligence should be such that a maximnw of intelligence can be presented to any task force or task force planning staff when an operation in a particular m·ea is decided, together with as ruucb of the necessary augmentation of personnel and equipment required by the task foece as can be reasonably anticipated. Three points pertinent to higl1er headquarters are selected for emphasis.

a. Tables of Organization and Equipment are necessarily such that addi­tional intelligence personnel and equipment are usually necessary for specific missions. This addition normally includes a Yariety of intelligence specialists. Time is always required to select and train such personnel whether in the United States or in the theater, and it is normally a theater responsibility to anticipate requirements on a sound and reasonable basis.

b. Terrain intelligence of all types, including maps, terrain studies, and target information must be accumulated on a long-range basis. In many areas, this terrain intelligence depends primarily on aerial photography. The theater or similat· commander has the key responsibility in this respect, particularly for ccordinatiHg requirements of air, ground, and amphibious forces. It is his func­tion to designate requirements and to req-uire the accomplishment by the air commander_ Tl1e G-2 of a theater or similar command must analyze require­ments and make appropriate recommendations for command decision.

c. The long-range preparation and planning for which the G-2 of a higher headquarters is responsible can be more effective if many personal contacts with the G-2's of lower echrlons are made. By personal visits as well as formal con­ferences, the G-2 becomes acquainted with his intelligence officers and their methods of work. lie discovers their special abilities and individual weaknesses. This preparation for combat intelligence in battle is probably us Yaluable as any other prepm·atory step tha.t can be taken.

SECTIO:'i' IV

I~TELLIGE~CE IN LOWER UXITS 9. Planning.-a. Prior to assignment of a definite mission to a lower unit, its

intelligence agencies are used as follows: (1) Training.

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(2) ·Temporary assignment to higher echelons for general planning, for ex­ample, pools of interrogators, translators, interpreters, and photo interpreters.

(3) Working on the over-all program for example, topographic units are assigned portions of the theater mapping program.

( 4) Developing intelligence plans for specific missions, as directed by higher headquarters.

b. Responsibility for its own intelligence planning starts within a unit imme­diately upon assignment of the mission. The extent of prior planning by higher headquarters varies but, in any case, each commander is responsible for his own unit, whether by his o"~>n means or by request upon other headquarters. Prompt and positive action is required for all intelligence necessary to the unit. All in­telligence including that received from higher headquarters must be adapted to the needs of the unit; it is normally inappropriate merely to republish that received from higher or lower headquarters.

10. Intelligence during combat.-G-2, A-2, and S-2 functions during com­bat include the following, all of them being continuous:

a. General supervision and coordination of all intelligence acth·ities pertaining to his unit and detailed supervision of his own intelligence staff. ~l.'his item should not be passed over lightly. In appropriate echelons, reconnaissance parties or forces, interrogators, interpreters, counterintelligence personnel, photo inter­preters, aerial photographic units, topographic troops, technical intelligence agen­cies, and others are included.

b. Determination of the information to be gathered based upon the commander's desires and intentions and the needs of higher, lower, and neighboring head­quarters.

c. Initiation of action to collect the information in a coordinated manner, including the preparation of requests or directives for the >arious activities mentioned in a above.

d. Interpretation and evaluation of the information received. e. Prompt and proper dissemination of information or intelligence, Insuring

that all necessary dissemination is made but that no recehing headquarters is burdened with large quantities of worthless information.

f. Liaison with higher, lower, and adjacent G-2's. Effecti\·e intelligence depends largely upon interchange of information. No unit can complete the entire intelligence picture by itself. F'or this reason continuous liaison bet'l\·een appro­priate G-2 sections is encouraged, including frequent personal visits by unit G-2's to next lower G-2's.

g. Counterintelligence and security measures. Safeguarding of military infor­mation is normally a G-2 function but successful security during combat requires careful coordination with the other staff sections.

11. Terrain intelligence.-Weaknesses of intelligence officers in lower units with respect to maps and photographs have been evident. The intelligence officer shouid be the unit expert, advising where appropriate, and supervising instruc­tion. l\lany S-2's cannot readily visualize map and photograph scales or make and present suitable terrain studies. The intelligence officer should be instrumental in correcting such errors as transmission of incorrect map coordinates or misspelled names (particularly in areas where many names are quite similar). He should instigate training in the use '0f defense overprints and special purpose maps, sketches, and diagrams. He should insure that situation maps contain data appro­priate to his echelon.

SECTION V

INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS TEA~JS

12. Training and use.-a. Under the direct supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, individuals are selected, t rained,

AG0 497B

5 [TC M ]

and formed into intelligence specialists teams to meet special intelligence require­ments in the various theaters. Teams are normally trained and supplied only as a result of theater requests. Within theaters, maximum flexibility and economy in the use of these teams is normally obtained by the IJOOl system, that is, a theater pool of teams (and/or individuals) is maintained for attachment to task forces, an army pool for attachment to corps, etc. Regiments, divisions, or similar units are provided with the specialists required for certain operations, while higher headquarters utilize them at other times on long·range work.

b. Paragraphs 13 through 17 describe the principal teams. The descriptions are generally related to ground force use or use by higher headquarters. These descriptions pertain to the present status of these teams. In general, teams are provided when it is not economical or practical to 11rovide equivalent personnel in the T;o·s of units to which they will be attached. Incorporation of personnel in such T;o·s is constantly under study.

a. The activities of the specialists teams must be cooruinated with other intelligence activities. Each team should at all times be familiar wilh the intelligence plan as well as the particulm· information expected of them in order to exploit the team specialty to the greatest possible extent along line;,; consistent with lhe essential elements of information.

13. Interrogation prisoner of war team (IPW).-a. This team consists of two officers and four enlisted men, all qualifieu as linguists. It bas sufficient equipment for its own operation including transportation. It is organiz~d for 24-hour duty and includes indiYiduals specifically qualified for interrogation, examination of captured documents, stenography, and routine team functions (supply, administration, chauffeurs, etc.) The team operates under the G-2 of the unit to which it is attached, performing the following primary duties as directed (FM 30-15) :

(1) Interrogation of prisoners of war, captured ciyi!ians, and friendly troops who have escaped from enemy control.

(2) Assistance in planning an!} organizing for handling prisoners of war. (3) Examination and exploitation of captured documents in connection with

interrogation or otherwise. b. While the number of teams required will vary with theater conditions,

the average requirement will be four teams per division. This allows one team per regiment as 1·equired and one or more at divisions, corps, or higllet· head­quar ters. These teams are not applicable to Japanese prisoners. (See par. 17.)

14. Military intelligence interpreter team (MII).-a. This team consists of two officers and four enlisted men all qualified in the required language with additional language qualifications in certain cases (for example, Flemish in nddition to French). It has sufficient equipment for its own operation including transportation. It is organized for 24-bour duty and includes indi>iduals spe­cifically qualified for inteqHeting, translating documents of all types, typin~, chaufiemiug, and team administration and supply. The team operates undt>e the G-2 of the unit to which it is attached, performing the following primary duties as directed:

(1) Interpreting in connection with the civilian population and allied mili­tary personnel.

(2). Liaison duties with neighboring allied units. (3) Sending, 1·eceiving, or monitoring radio, telephone, or telegraph com­

munications. (4) Translating of documents of all types. b. 'Vhile the number of teams required will vary with thf'nter conditions, the

average requirement will be one team for each division, corps, and army. These teams :ire not applicable to the war against Japan. AG0497B

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[TC 54] 2 exception exists in the case of cerlain specialized training which is conducted under the direct control of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff. Each commander is completely responsible for combat intelli­gence training within his own co=and. He is assisted in this respect by his

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. SEoriON II

INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL 5. Qualifications of unit G-2's.-The following will l)e used as a guide by

commanders in selecting or judg~ng his unit G-2, A-2, or S-2: a. Sin~e a primary function of a unit G-2 pertains to the information to be

gathered, a knowledge of the operations of 1:\is own type of unit is necessary in addition to a complete understanding of tbe capabilities and limitations of the

reconnaissance elements thereof. d. Since collecting agencies vary widely in character, activity, and control,

ability to systematize, coordinate, and supervise is mandatory. The same care as in the selection of the G-3 is required.

c. An unbiased mind that will use all sources of information is necessary. "90 percent of intelligence comes from a particular source" is a common remark

that is seldom justifiable. d. A sympathetic and helpful attitude to'\Vard the "troops" must be demon·

slrated by the presentation of intelligence in ·usable form and by positive action to insure timely distribution. (Biaborate presentations of the situation to com­manders have covered up a lack of intelligence to the troops.)

e. A sincere interest in opet·ations, demonstrated by a close G-2/G-3 rela­tionship, insures that all plans and orders tal'e advantage of the latest intelli­gence. ("We depend on G-3 for our photography, etc." is a typical remark indi­cating bypassing an ineffectual G-2.) Similarly, this close relationship is essential with respect to planning and supervising intellig~nce ti·aining.

f. A consciousness of security must be evident both in the G-2 personally and in connectic:>n with security or counterintelligence meusures within the command. (Positive steps are required but preoperational security has been carried to the extreme of not informing agendes who bad work to do.)

fl. Since interpretation of information and estimation of enemy capabilities are influenced by knowledge of enemy tactical doctrines and methods, familiarity with the military background of the enemy is necessary.

h. A practical knowledge and appreciation of maps and mapping activities should be demonstrated by a close working !"elation with the unit Ol" topographic engineer. (An early task foi:ce G-2 requested his maps the day before sailing, they had to be produc.ed and flown to overtake the convoy in Panama.)

i. Familiarity ~Yith aerial photographs must include a knowledge of the means of obtaining them, their distriblltion and interpretatioa-. In appropriate echelons, perRonal or other intimate contact with the organic, supporting, or cooperating aerial photographic unit is required.

j. The G-2 should work closely and consistently with G-2's of higher, 1o'\Ver, and adjacent units. Direct communication is authorized and should be en­couragE>d between G-2's of all echelons on intelligence matters, however care must be tal,en to insure that command matters pass through command channels.

6. Retention of trained personnel-a. La~k of appreciation of the amount of training and experience required to produce suitable intelligence personnel bas on morE> than one occasion caused their rapid and unwarranted dissipation. "Rewarding'' of capable intelligence personnel by transfer into other lines of activity is often as objectionable as tbe transfer of nonqualified personnel into intelligence po~i tions. As far as practicable, commanders should use trained intellig!'nce personnel in intelligence positions. Promotions should generully be made from one intelligence position to another. AG0497B

3 [TC 54j

b. Intelligence specialists teams or individuals of one or more types are made available on occasion to commanders of regiments, divisions, corps, and higher commands (prisoner of war interrogators; military intelligence interpreters; photo interpreters; order of battle specialists). These specialists have bad lengthy training for particular purposes and their use for other than these purposes or their dissipation within the command must be guarded against.

7. Recognition and reward.-Recognition of an excellent intelligence Job ls often overlooked. Prior accurate determination of enemy dispositions by intelligence personnel may contribute as much to the success of a tactical mission or at least to the saving of lives in connection therewith as the actual leadership of troops in combat. Reward in this connection must be as prompt and liberal as in other fields. 1\lorale of intelligence personnel cannot be maintained unless such a command policy is adopted.

SECTION III IXTELLIGENCE I~ HIGIIER UNITS

8. Responsibility.-During planning phases, large headquarters have responsi­bilities toward lower units similar to those of the War Department toward theaters in their formative periods. Theater G-2's establish means and methods for collecting all information of potential value for future operations and coordi­nate the efforts of subordinate agencies. They also coordinate theater work with that of the War Department, Allies, and Navy where applicable. The importance of this over-all long-range intelligence responsibility cannot be over­emphasized. The operation and organization of theater intelligence should be such that a maximum of intelligence can be presented to any task force or task force planning staff when an operation in a particular area is decided, together with as much of the necessary augmentation of personnel and equipment required by the task fot·ce as can be reasonably anticipated. Three points pertinent to higher headquarters are selected for emphasis.

a. Tables of Organization and Equipment are necessarily such that addi­tional intelligence personnel and equipment are usually necessary for specific missions. This addition not·mally includes a variety of intelligence specialists. Time is always required to select and train such personnel whether in the United States or in the theater, and it is normally a theater responsibility to anticipate requirements on a sound and reasonable basis.

b. Terrain intelligence of all types, including maps, terrain studies, and target information must be accumulated on a long-range basis. In many areas, this terrain intelligence depends primarily on aerial photography. The theater or similar commander has the key responsibility in this respect, particularly for coordinating requirements of air, ground, and amphibious forces. It is his func­tion to designate requirements and to require the accomplishment by the air commander. The G-2 of a theater or similar command must analyze require­ments and make appropriate recommendations for command decision.

c. Tl1e long-range preparation and planning for which the G-2 of a higher headquarters is responsible can be more effective if many personal contacts with the G-2's of lower echrlons are made. By personal visits as well as formal con­ferences, the G-2 becomes acquainted with his intelligence officers and their methods of work. lie discovers their special abilities and individual weaknesses. This preparation for combat intelligence in battle is probably as valuable as any other preparatory step that can be taken.

SECTIO~ IV

I::\'TELLIGEXCE I~ LOWER U~ITS 9. Planning.-a. Prior to assignment of a definite mission to a lower unit, its

intelligence agencies are used as follows: (1) Training .

.AGO 4D7B