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Re-Thinking the Anthropological and Ethical Foundation of Economics and Business: HumanRichness and Capabilities EnhancementAuthor(s): Benedetta GiovanolaSource: Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 88, No. 3, 15th IESE International Symposium onEthics, Business and Society Business and Management: Towards More Humanistic Models andPractices (Sep., 2009), pp. 431-444Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40295010 .

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Re-Thinking the AnthropologicalandEthical Foundation of Economics andBusiness:Human Richness and CapabilitiesEnhancement

Journalof BusinessEthics (2009) 88:431-444DOI 10.1007/sl0551-009-0126-9 Springer2009

BenedettaGiovanola

ABSTRACT. This articleaimsatshowingthe need for asound ethical and anthropological oundation of eco-nomics and business,and arguesthe importanceof acorrectunderstandingf humanvaluesandhumannatureforthe sakeof economicsandof businesseshemselves. tis suggested hatthe ethical-anthropologicalide of eco-nomicsandbusinesscanbe graspedby takingAristotle'svirtueethicsandAmartyaSen'scapability pproach CA)asmajorreferencepoints.We hold thatan "Aristotelianeconomicsof virtues",connectedwith the CA's notionof humanrichness,canpromotethe shiftto the conceptof personhood,and can lead to a more "humanized"business,by fosteringhuman flourishing,the enhance-ment of human capabilities, nd the pursuitof a morehumanedevelopment or eachandevery person.KEYWORDS: AmartyaSen, Aristotle,business,capa-bility approach,economics,virtue ethics,MarthaNuss-baum,richness,personhood,philosophical nthropology,rationality

Is it possible to provide an ethical and anthropo-logical foundation for economics and business?And,more specifically, is ethics nternal to economics andbusiness or is it just a kind of deus ex machina hatenters the scene ex post, to "correct" negativeexternalities?Are the anthropologicalescriptions andprescriptionsabout the behavior of economic agentsand business actors consistent with the way in whichpeople do behave and ought to behave as humanbeings? Or is there a conflict between acting as aneconomic agent (or as a business actor) and acting asa human being?Leaving these questions in the background, thisarticle argues the need for a sound ethical andanthropological foundation of economics and busi-ness, and shows that a correct understanding ofhuman values and human nature is crucial for botheconomics and businesses themselves. The centralconviction is that only an ethical-anthropologicalunderpinning can help us to rise above the majorshortcomings of economics and business. The ethicalaspect of this underpinning will show the need toquestion the mainstream notion of economic ratio-nality and to reconnect economic rationality withthe ethical dimension of the human being and hu-man fulfillment. The anthropologicalimension willbe based on the need to criticize the standardnotionof homo oeconomicusnd to provide a "richer" andmore complex idea of human being, and thus ofeconomic agents and business actors too. Bothdimensions are strictly interconnected, since thenotion of rationality prescribeshow agents ought tobehave, and such prescriptions, in turn, cannot beseparatedfrom an underlying idea of human beings'basic features.

A preliminary ersionof this articlewas presentedat the 15th'InternationalSymposiumon Ethics,Businessand Society"held by IESE Business School (Barcelona,May 16-17,2008).BenedettaGiovanola,Ph.D. is Researchern MoralPhilosophyandAssistantProfessort the UniversityofMacerata Italy),where he teaches"Ethicsand Economics" nd "EthicsandCommunication".Her scientific esearchmainly ocuses onphilosophical anthropology and appliedethics, especiallysocialand economic ethics,businessethicsandpublicethics. She is therecipient f theHelen PotterAward2005,for herarticle Personhoodnd Human Richness. Good andWell-Being n the CapabilityApproachand Beyond', Re-view of SocialEconomy 63(2), 2005, 94-107.

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432 Benedetta GiovanolaTo date,therehavebeen severalmportant riticalinvestigationsaimed at overcoming the flaws ofeconomics and business. With regardto economic

theory,very important inquiries in the field ofexperimentaland cognitiveeconomicshave soughtto highlightthe role of cognitivebiasesat stakeineconomic choices (Kahnemanand Tversky, 1979,2000; Kahnemanet al., 1982; Simon, 1982, 1997,2000). Their findings undermine some basicassumptions f economic theory, such as its notionof rationality.These considerations lso tie in withrenewed attention to the importanceof the emo-tional dimensionat stake n economic choices(e.g.,Slovic et al., 2002). Another criticismof the flawsofeconomicsis motivatedby the attempt o re-embedeconomicsin the social context (Hirsch, 1976) andto re-establish he connection between economicsand ethics(Sen,1977, 1985, 1987a,b, 1999a).As weshallsee below, these approaches lso entail a sharpcriticismof the notion of rationalityas it is under-stood in economic theory. Despite their heteroge-neity, the differentapproaches nd criticismsareallvery importantin acknowledgingthat cognitive,ethical, and social limits are alwayspresentwhenagents (and thus, economic agents too) make achoice.Similarcriticismshave also been turned uponbusiness, nalyzingdecision-makingwithin organi-zations. The problem here consistsin seeing howindividualand collective choices are limited or en-hancedby ethical,cognitive,andsocialelements hatplaya fundamental ole in a company'sorganizationandactivity.In thiscase aswell, the centralquestionis whether an organization rovidesan environmentconducive to human growth and fulfillment andwhether good corporatepolicy can encourageandnourishindividualgrowth, by fostering he oppor-tunities or allthe employeesto developtheirtalentsand potential.These concerns have been explicitlyrecognized by managementstudies and form thebasis of "humanisticmanagement"(Ml, 2003),whose inquiriestacklethe issue of the relationshipbetween business and management,on the onehand,andthe humancondition on the other.As will be argued ater n thisarticle,some of themostinteresting ttemptso conceiveeconomicsandbusiness n connectionwith the fosteringof humanfulfillmentassumeAristotle'stheories as a startingpoint (Collins,1987;Crockett,2005; Koehn, 1995;

Meikle, 1995, 1996; Van Staveren,2001, 2007;Vranceanu,2005).The most influentialattempt o applyan Aristo-telian approachin addressingcontemporaryeco-nomic mattersand to reconnect economics withethicsis seen in the research arriedon by AmartyaSen and Martha Nussbaum, who developed an"Aristotelian-informed"approach, namely, thecapability approach(hereafter, CA).In this article,I will tryto show that the CA canoffer additional nsightsinto both economics andbusinessandcanlead towardthe sound,ethicalandanthropologicaloundationof economicsandbusi-nessthat we aresearching or.In order to supportthis claim, the next sectionpursuesa critiqueof the standardnotion of eco-nomicrationality ndarguesn favorof a connectionbetweeneconomicrationality ndethicalrationality.Furthermore,his section demonstrateshat such aconnectionis strictly inked with the elaboration fan anthropologicalodel that is much more complexthan homo oeconomicus.The followingsectionsuggestshatthe ethicalandanthropologicalide of economicscan be grasped ytaking Aristotle'svirtueethicsas a majorreferencepoint: an Aristotelianperspectiveon economics -namelyan "economicsof virtues" is elaboratedoshow that economics is} and ought to be, about humanvalues nd that it canfoster humanflourishing.The third section startsby considering he influ-ence of Aristotle on the CA and engagesAmartya en'sversionof theapproach s a theoreticalframeworkaimed at re-establishinghe connectionbetween ethics and economics and at highlightingthe importanceof aplurality f capabilitieso do andto be. Thissectionalsodedicates pecificattention oSen's redefinition of the anthropologicalmodelunderlying conomics,by focusingon the notion ofanthropologicalichness. ere it is argued hatthis no-tion can provide a foundation for a differentanthropologicalmodel and can promote the shiftfrom the notion of egoistic ndividual o the conceptof personhood.The last section applies the "Aristotelian-in-formed" CA's ethical-anthropologicaleflection tobusiness o arguefor a more "humanized" usinessand to show thateconomics and business heorycanbe compatiblewith ethics, the fosteringof humanvaluesand the enhancementof humancapabilities.



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Re-Thinking the Anthropological and Ethical Foundation of Economics and Business 433Beyond the homo oeconomicusOne of the majorobstacles o the interrelatednessbetween ethics and economicsis linked with eco-nomictheory'sclaimto be as scientificas the naturalsciences.Accordingto this claim,economic theorystudies human choice behavior under resourceconstraints;n contrastto ethics, it does not dealdirectly with ends, but only with the means torealizegiven ends (Robbins,1932).1However, as has been rightlynoted, the possi-bility of a purelypositiveeconomic inquirycan bequestioned, or everyinquiry s led by some valueseven those of scientific nquiry andsome specificvaluesplaya fundamentalolein determiningwhichquestionsshouldbe asked(Hausmanand McPher-son, 2006).Moreover,it is also important o note that themoralobligationsof economic agentscanbe both acause and a consequence of importanteconomicphenomena,becauseon the one side moralobliga-tions can influencethe agents'decisionsand theirbehavior n economic processes,and on the otherhand economicphenomenacan have an impactonagents' motivational structure,by enhancing orlimiting heir"moral"preferences; t the sametime,economic phenomena are influenced by the waytheyaredescribed ndevaluated y economicagentsand economists (Hausmanand McPherson,2006,p. 306 f.). Still, human behavior (includingeco-nomic behavior) s influencedby a wide range ofnormativeandethicalconsiderations.However, how is it possibleto draw this con-clusion? n order o answer hisquestion,we need tofocus on the notion of rationality,hich is a centralissue of economics. Now, what does rationalitymeanin economics?According to mainstream economic theory,rationality consists in maximizing one's utilityfunction(which is expressedn termsof individualpreferenceshierarchicallyanked)undera resourceconstraint. Thus, rationality means exclusively"economicrationality,"which is the groundof theinfluential ationalchoice theory2and concernstherelationshipetweenpreferences ndchoices:a choiceis rational f it is determinedby a rationalset ofpreferences,nd the set of preferencesis definedwithinthe contextsof utilityheory.Thismeans hatan individual s rational f, and only if, his or her

preferencescan be representedby ordinal utilityfunctions,and his or her choices maximizeutility(HausmanandMcPherson,2006).It is thusclear hateconomictheorydoes not offerany specificprescription egarding he nature,con-tent, or value of preferences,whose rationality sassured y two purely ormal onditions:completeness,according o which it is possibleto expressa pref-erence or a rational ndifferenceamongall the pos-siblealternatives;ndtransitivity,ccording o which,if option A is preferred o B and option B is pre-ferred o C, then optionA is preferredo C too; thismeans thatpreferences or A, B, and C are not onthe samelevel, but arehierarchicallyanked.Theseformalconditionshavealso been defined n termsof

"internalconsistencyof choice", which is at thebasis of the so-called "weak" form of rationality(Sen, 1977).Such an understanding f rationality,however,does entail some serious flaws. In particular, hepossibilityof rankingall the preferences n a hier-archic and transitive way presupposes perfectknowledgeof all the possiblealternativeso make arationalchoice, that is, a choice that maximizesutility. The requirementof perfectknowledge, to-gether with that of self-interestmaximization,de-fines the so-called"strong" ormof rationalitySen,1977), which leads to very seriousshortcomings. nfact, its fundamentalassumptionsare particularlyproblematic, speciallyf we analyze hoicebehaviorin conditions of risk or uncertainty, since ourrationality, ar from being unlimited, is a boundedrationality,3s Simon (1982, 1997, 2000) has shownin an excellentway.Furthermore,research on cognitive biases inexperimental economics and experimentalgametheory has shown that human behaviorfrequentlydeviatesfrom rationalchoice theory.4This is whyKahnemanand Tversky (1979, 2000) and Kahn-eman et al. (1982) argued or the need to abandon"folkpsychology" on which the standard otionof economic rationality elies- and to direct atten-tion to the framingof decisions,which means tohighlight the psychologicalcomplexity of humanchoices (see also Slovic et al., 2002).Despitesomelimits,theseinquiries oftenwith acontributionfrom the neurosciences (hence, thebranchof neuroeconomics) pursuea critiqueandaredefinitionof the monisticconceptionof rationality



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434 BenedettaGiovanolaunderlying mainstream economics, and aim atovercomingsome flawsandbiasesof rational hoicetheoryand neoclassical conomics.

The biases of the standardnotion of economicrationality realso connected with the formalchar-acter of its prerequisites.n particular, lthoughtheprerequisitesof rationality are formal and noassumption boutthe content ofpreferencess made,economicscannotbe "value-neutral",s t claims. notherwords, economics, even though it seeks neu-tralityto ethics, ends up by endorsinga specificethicalposition.In fact, indifference o the contentof preferences implies an ethical ubjectivismnd ethicalrelativism,ccording o which the identificationandchoice of values are relative to each and everyindividual, and individual preferencesexclusivelydepend on the individual'sethics, whatever thosemay be. This is basedon the conviction that indi-vidualwell-beingis the onlyelementthatcountsandthat, even if different ndividualshave differentac-counts of well-being and differentpreferences,allthe sets of preferencesare on a par for the func-tioning of economic processes.To put it anotherway, even if nothing is stated about the content ofpreferences, this principle of "minimal benevo-lence" (Hausmanand McPherson, 2006, p. 65) -according o which, otherconditionsbeing equal, tis morallygood thatpeopleenhance heir own well-beingandsatisfyheirown preferences restsuponaview of economic agentsas utility maximizersandself-interested ndividuals(Hausmanand McPher-son, 2006, p. 64). Such a view leadsto the HomoOeconomicusodel to which a great part of con-temporary conomic theoryrefers.In brief,we cansay that homo oeconomicuss an exclusively self-interested individual, seeking to maximize self-interestandperfectlyconsciousof the consequencesof his or her choices.From these considerations,it follows that aredfinitionof the neoclassicalnotion of economicrationality is fundamental, and also involves areconsiderationf the anthropologicalmodelproperto (neoclassical)economic theory, according towhich human beings would be oriented to self-interestachievement and to preferencemaximiza-tion (and,then, to the improvementof theirwell-being or utility) under resource constraints.5Aninquiryinto the missingethical capabilitiesn thestandardnotion of economic rationalityis thus

needed, andrequiresa revision of the anthropolog-icalmodel underlyingeconomics.Toward an "economics of virtue"If the standard otion of economicrationalityntailssome deficienciesthat have an ethical dimension,and if it lacks an adequateethics, which ethicaltheorythen can fill the gap?The suggestionof thisarticle s to takea majorethical radition Aristotle'svirtue thics as a referencepoint andto focus on acontemporary pproach hat has been widely influ-enced by Aristotle's hought: thecapabilitypproach(CA).6In general, he CA can be definedas a theoryof humandevelopmentand qualityof life, or as "abroadnormative ramework or the evaluationandassessment of individual well-being and socialarrangements"Robeyns, 2005, p. 94), the corecharacteristic f which is the focus on peoples'"capabilitieso do and to be" (Sen, 1987a, b, 1993,1999a),namely,what people areeffectivelycapableto do and to be (whereaspeople'seffectivestates fdoing andbeing are called unctionings)Actually t is importanto point out that- aswillbe clarifiedater n this article the CA is neitheramere reformulationof Aristotelian heories,nor asimple neo-Aristotelianapproach,but rather, anapproachthat seems to be compatiblewith Aris-totle's reflection on ethics (Van Staveren,2007,p. 31) andeconomics;this is why the CA could bedefinedas an "Aristotelian-informed"pproachhatdoes,however,entail ts own peculiaritiesnd showsinfluences romothertheories hatin some cases etit deviatefrom a "pure"Aristotelian nderpinning.More specifically,Aristotleprovides us with a"richer"conceptual frameworkfor analyzingtherelationshipbetween economics (and business)andethics. Relying on an Aristotelian ramework, heCA deepensthe analysis f these connectionsandisthe theory that most prominently highlights theimportanceof a plurality f capabilitieso do and tobe, and captures he Aristotelian ocus on the plu-ralityof life dimensions o flourish. n general,bothAristotleand the CA argue he relationship etweenethics andeconomicsby highlightinghe crucial oleof the ethicalandevaluativedimension n economicprocesses.Economicsthen, cannot do without theconsiderationof ethicalassumptions nd outcomes,



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Re-ThinkingheAnthropologicalndEthicalFoundationfEconomicsndBusiness 435because such assumptionsand outcomes deeplyinfluence economic behavior.This ethical dimen-sion can be graspedby puttingforward he role ofhuman values,which go far beyond merely eco-nomic ones and can re-orient economic activitybeyondthe pursuitof mereself-interest,owardthepursuit of human fulfillment. This is why bothAristotleandthe CA share he attempt o show thateconomicsis, and ought to be about human values.Let us startwith Aristotle: t is interesting o notethat an Aristotelianperspectiveis at the basis ofsome recentattempts o show the intrinsicconnec-tion between ethics, economics,and humanflour-ishing (Meikle, 1995; Van Staveren, 2001, 2007).According o these approaches,Aristotle s creditedwith givinga centralrole to four ethicalcapabilities(moral commitment, emotion, deliberation, andhumaninteraction),which are neglectedby main-stream economic theory (van Staveren, 2001).Highlightingthese ethicalcapabilities lso entailsarevision of the anthropologicalmodel underlyingeconomics.Aristotle'sheoryindeed represents compellingstartingpoint and a fruitful heoreticalhorizon forestablishinghe close link between ethics and eco-nomics,andshowingthatthe latter s not an end initself,but a meansto achieve furtherends that areextra-economic, and concerned more generallyabout "human flourishing"(eudaimonia)nd the"goodlife" (Pol,I, 9, 1257b,40-1258a, 2). Humanflourishing r eudaimoniaefinesthe "humangood"- that is, the good which is properto the humanbeing - and "implies he possessionand the use ofone's maturepowersover a considerableperiod oftime", "the fulfillmentof the naturalcapacitiesofthe humanspecies"(Cooper, 1975, p. 89, n. 1).According to Aristotle, economics (oikonomike)has a functional,not finalistic,nature and it is anecessary, utnot sufficient,nstrumentorattaininga good life. Goodlife, in fact,even thoughit cannotdo without the possessionof materialgoods, doesnot exhaust tself n sucha material omponent,butdependsratheron a pluralityof humandimensions.Wealth, Aristotlestates,is "a set of instruments"(Pol,I, 8, 1256b,37-38) and bears ts value"onlyifit is 'useful', hatis, in functionof somethingelse"(NE, I, 5, 1096a, 5-7). Analogously,crematistics(chrematistike),r the acquisition of goods, is"accordingo nature"only to the extentto which it

aims at obtaining"the goods necessary o live anduseful to the communityof the State or the family"(Pol, I, 8, 1256b, 29-30), but it degenerates ntounnaturalcrematisticsf it overcomes the limit ofnecessityandbecomes an end unto itself.Thus, theacquisitionof goods (crematistics) nd the art ofmanaging hem (economics)areimportant,but onlyinsofaras they maintain heir functional nature.Incontrast, hey become "againstnature" f they areassumedasan end.An ideal of self-moderation s thus at stake inAristotle'sunderstandingf economic affairs: n theone hand, (material)wealth is to be evaluatedbyhow it contributes o a good andflourishingife;onthe otherhand,onlyby workingout the constitutiveelements of a good and flourishinglife can weidentifywhat to demandfromthe economy.The good life is a virtuous life: according toAristotle,virtuesare thosedispositions"forwhich aperson becomes good and well performing itsfunction"(NE, II, 6, 1106a,22-24): virtuesare realand actual raitsof the character nd thus contributeto the formationof a good character.Moreprecisely,Aristotle states that virtue is "a dispositioncon-cerningchoice, consisting n a medietasa Mean]inrelationto us" (NE, II, 6, 1106b, 36-1 1076a, 1):sucha Mean,found asit is betweentwo extremes, sevidentlyof a qualitative atureand,fromthe pointof view of good, it representsan optimum, r anexcellence.The virtuousactionis indeed teleologi-cally oriented toward excellence, i.e., toward theformationof a good character ndthe fulfillment f agood life (i.e., human flourishingor eudaimonia):thereforeany specific human activity - and thuseconomicactivity oo - oughtto be orientedby thereference o this telos eudaimonia,ndeed).The wayin which virtue should be pursued s indicatedbydeliberation,hatis, a voluntaryactof humanwill, arealchoice, rather hanthe determinate utcome ofanalgorithm,dependingon external onstraintsvanStaveren,2001, p. 8).In conclusion,accordingto an Aristotelianper-spective, economic affairs are not free-standing;consequently,sound economic theories (andprac-tices) cannot be defined by merely quantitativeparametersbut need to be assessedby qualitativecriteria, he most importantbeing the opportunity,for each agent, to realizehis or her own potentialand thus to fulfillhimself or herself n a flourishing



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436 BenedettaGiovanolalife. In other words, endorsingan Aristotelianper-spectivemakes it possibleto think of economics asmeanstoward humanflourishingand excellence.

Theseconsiderations aveimportant ounterpartsfroma philosophical-anthropologicalerspective. nfact,whereasneoclassical conomicsdepictshumanbeingsas "disembodiedand disembeddedndividu-alistswho only have subjective preferences", heAristotelian framework implies that there is "ashared though differentiated human nature",namely, "a sharedhumantendency o become irtuousand not&virtuous humannature"of an essentialistkind (vanStaveren,2001, p. 10).The above conceptmeans thathumanbeingsarealso considered capable of acquiringvirtues thatperfect them. As a matter of fact, since actionscannot be separatedrom the people who performthem and depend,first,on the agent'smotivationalstructureeven more than on "exogenous enforce-ment"mechanisms,and since there existsa mutualrelationbetween actions(andchoices)andcharacter(andpreferences),t is possibleto arguethatprefer-ences (andthuscharacter) resubject o a change ntime.Human richness and capabilitiesenhancementAt thisjuncture,the concept of capabilityntersthescene. In fact,according o a capabilityperspective,humanbeingsare not apriori ntities: hey fulfillandactualizethemselvesthrough their agency,namelythroughtheircapabilitieso do and to be. But whatis a capability?ccordingto Sen, the term "capabil-ity" means substantivereedom, .e., a realopportunityobe and to do something,which best expresses hepositiveside of freedom (Sen, 1999a).This is whySenargues hatpositivefreedom(freedom oachievesomething)can be defined in terms of a person'scapabilitySen, 1999a, p. 25) or, in other words, itcanbe seenin the formof "individual apabilitiesodo thingsa personhas reason o value"(Sen, 1999a,p. 56). In other words, capabilitys the substantivefreedom to achieve alternative unctioningcombi-nations (Sen, 1999a, p. 79): functionings, n theirturn,arestatesof doing andbeing.According to Sen, the identification of funda-mentalcapabilitiess context-dependent:hisis why

he rejectsany attemptof "fixinga cemented ist ofcapabilitieshatis seen asbeing absolutely omplete[...] and totallyfixed", since "puretheory cannot'freeze'a listof capabilitiesorall societies orall timeto come" (Sen,2005a,p. 158).7His ideais thattheidentificationof fundamental apabilitieshouldreston "publicreasoning",which is definedas a dem-ocraticprocedureaimed at creatingthe space forsharedevaluationsSen,2005a,p. 163).At the sametime,however,he expresseshe needfor an "ethicalobjectivity", which entails respect for individualpluralevaluations ndthe importanceof developing"viewsfroma 'certaindistance'" Sen,2004, p. 161,2005a,p. 160 f.).In thisregard,t is interestingo note thatSen, inadvocatingsuch an ethical objectivity,specificallyrefers to Aristotle and argues the need for an"Aristotelianethics" based on the "fulfilmentofvaluableunctionings nd the capabilityo createandenjoy these functionings" Sen, 2006, p. 52). Evenfrom these brief considerations,t is thus clearthatthe CA embraces ome majorAristoteliandeas: nparticular,he CA recovers he foundingelementsofAristotle'sethical theory, his idea of the good asinterconnectedwith humancapabilities nd functi-onings,his focus on the multi-dimensional nddy-namic character f humanbeings,aswell ashis ideathathumanbeingsflourishandfulfillhumannaturein particularways thatvaryfrompersonto person,even if they all strive toward human flourishing(eudemonia).he comparisoncould go so far as toconsider the notion of capability tself as corre-sponding o Aristotle's deaof dynamisSen,1993,p.126). Furthermore, s has been rightlynoted, "thevaluational exercise put forwardby the CA hasstrongAristotelian oots" (Comim, 2008, p. 164),and this has also been recognizedby NussbaumandSen (1988, p. 315).It is thus evident that even if Aristotle s not theonly one to exert an influence on the CA, hisinfluence is crucialand has been explicitly recog-nizedby Nussbaum 1986, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1995,2000) and later by Sen as well (1987a, 2006; seealso Nussbaum and Sen, 1988, p. 308 ff.).8 Inparticular,with regardto economics, Sen recog-nizes in Aristotle the founder of the "ethical ori-gin" of economics, which he seeks to restore,incontrast to the prevailing "engineering"approach(Sen, 1987a).



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Re-ThinkingtheAnthropologicalnd Ethical Foundationof Economics nd Business 437In order to do develop his ethical approach toeconomics, Sen pursues his well-known criticism ofmainstream economic rationality and its underlying

"narrow view" of the person (the homo oeconomicusmodel), according to which human beings are seenmerely as the "location of their respective utilities"(Sen and Williams, 1982). In opposition, he high-lights the motivational complexity of every humanchoice (and thus of economic choice too), and ex-plores a plurality of capabilities to do and to be(actions and ways of being) as the basis of humanbehavior and human identity. In particular, hedemonstratesthat, if people behaved in the way ra-tional choice theory prescribes, they would act like"rationalfools" (Sen, 1977).The redefinition of (economic) rationality (onwhich the actions of economic agents rely) is thusstrictly linked with more sophisticated assumptionsabout the notion of the agent usually assumed byeconomic theory as a strictly "economic agent".This is why Sen's earlier works sought to criticizethe standardnotion of the economic agent as homooeconomicus.Human beings, he argued, are muchmore sophisticated than the way economic theorydepicts them (Sen, 1977) and human actions anddecisions arenot only driven by self-interest,but alsoby sympathyand commitment.n particular,commit-ment is strictly connected with a person's moralprinciplesand can also diverge from personal well-being: it can modify a person's goals and his or herrational choice, by giving importance to otherpeople's aims that cannot be included in the pursuitof personal interest (Sen, 2005b, p. 7). Theseconsiderations clarify Sen's redefinition of (eco-nomic) rationality:by recognizing the importance ofcommitment and moral obligations, (economic)rationalitycan no longer be conceived as mere self-interest maximization, and the rational economic

agent can no longer be conceived as a mere selfishutility maximizer. In particular,rationalityincludes acritical scrutiny of valuesand objectiveshat underlieevery behavior (Sen, 2002, p. 53 f.): its majorfunction therefore is of an ethical-normativeind, andis strictlyconnected with the capabilityto think andact with wisdom. In other words, rationality,according to Sen, concerns the identification offundamental human values and objectivesand theirconcrete fulfillment through practice. Furthermore,the importance of commitment and the scrutiny of a

person's values and objectives are also connectedwith the notion of personal dentity,which is definedby the way a person considers himself or herself,according to his or her values and objectives. Per-sonal identity however, is strictly linked to socialidentity,a,person's capability to identify himself orherself with other persons, to consider himself orherself in relation to others.9 This is why in his laterworks, Sen no longer focuses exclusively on theidentity of the economicagent, but rather on theidentity of agents,human beings that perform actionsin relation with other human beings (Sen, 1999b,2007).Throughout his reflection, Sen tackles both eth-ical and philosophical-anthropological issues at thebasis of economics: in particular,both his criticism ofneoclassical (utilitarian) economic theory and hisredefinition of rationality have an ethical oundationand are grounded in the need to overcome a narrowanthropological view and to show the anthropologicalcomplexity of human beings. However, what doesanthropological complexity mean? In order to an-swer this question, we need to develop a twofoldline of thought.First, the CA attributeshigh importance to humandiversity. This implies respect for difference andplurality, since each person differs from everyoneelse, and there is a plurality of (different) persons.However, such a respect for difference and pluralitydoes not degrade into a form of subjectivism, norinto radical individualism. On the lines of Aristotle,the CA assumes that there are important spheres ofshared human experience (grounding xperiences)hatdefine fundamental capabilities, which ought to bepreserved and fulfilled in a virtuous life (Nussbaum,1993). There are also, nevertheless, differences andplurality among individuals that need to be pre-served. Thus, we might argue, at the level ofhumanity in general, there are universal apabilities,but personal (and particular)ways of developingthem. As one might notice, the acknowledgment ofthe diversity among human beings is also consistentwith the CA's understandingof human flourishing asinfluenced by Aristotle. In fact, as we have seen,according to Aristotle, human beings flourish andfulfill human nature in particularways that vary fromperson to person. CA stresses this point, arguing thatflourishing depends on the development of ourcapabilities, which are always personal.



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438 BenedettaGiovanolaThere salsoa second evelofanalysis,which refersto the conceptof aperson.At thislevel anotherkindof diversitybecomes evident, the diversitywithin

humanbeingsthat we mightcall intrinsiciversity.nfact, diversity s also seen in internalcharacteristicswithin every person, as shown by the notion ofcapabilitytself:people have variousaspirations, e-sires,preferences nd,aboveall,variouscapabilities.The misleadingutilitarian narrowview" of humanbeingsconsistsexactlyin overlookingtheir intrinsicpluralism ndin reducing hemto one function,andmoreover o amerelyquantitative ne, that of utilitymaximization.Similarto the attention to diversityamong ndividuals,the attention to human com-plexity and intrinsiciversity s also consistentwiththe CA's Aristoteliannotion of flourishing,whichdependson different ife-dimensions nd not on justone function: this means that human beings arecomplexentities hatarecharacterizedy an intrinsicanthropologicalmultidimensionality s well as theinterconnectionof differentdimensions.Thispointhasimportant mplicationsor the wayeconomicshouldbe understood.In fact, Sen distin-guishesbetween the idea of being "well-off' andthat of being "well", or of having "well-being".The idea of being "well-off' conveys opulenceandrefersto a person'scommandover exteriorthings,whereas the idea of being "well", or of having"well-being",refersto somethingin a personthat(s)he achieves. The latter expressesa distinctivelypersonalquality ackingin the former(Sen, 1985).We can saythatin the second case,the personcanflourish,whereasin the first, (s)he can only maxi-mize his or her utility and enjoy opulence. Butflourishing,as we have seen, means realizingthehighest Good in a virtuous life in the highlyimportant ontext of socialrelations.How, then,canhumanbeingsflourish?Of course,not by focusingon quantitative-economicalwealth (opulence),butratheron aninternalqualitative ichness,which goesbeyond the concept of opulence; only such anintrinsic and qualitativeconstitutivepluralitycanfoster self-realizationand flourishing.In order tofurther develop this point, we can speak of an"anthropological onstitutiveplurality", n whichdifferentdimensionsand capabilities re connected(Giovanola,2005).10Now, the notion that best expresses the"anthropological onstitutiveplurality"and makes

the basicassumptionsof the CA's idea of person-hood explicitis the notion of human ichness,hichseemsa very central ssueassumedby, andimplicitin, the majorideas of the CA itself:why humanrichness,andwhat does it mean?The notion of human richnesshas been widelydiscussedby a thinkerwho, along with Aristotle,exertedgreatinfluence on the CA: KarlMarx, inhis firstwritings.The Marxiannfluenceon the CAhas been explicitly acknowledged by both Sen(1980, 1985, 1987a)andNussbaum 1988,2000):inparticular, hey refer to Marx'sfocus on positivefreedom (Sen, 1987a) and to his Aristotelianunderstanding f human functionings(Nussbaum,2000), which are said to be closely linked to thenotion of capability Nussbaum,2000; Sen, 1980,1985, 1999a).Now, Marx's interpretationof the notion ofrichness s intrinsically onnected with his idea ofpositive freedom and his understanding f humanfunctionings, nd can be graspedhrougha capabilityperspective.In fact, in his Manuscripts,arxarguesthat insteadof consideringrichnessand povertyaspolitical economy does, one should rather payattention o the "richhumanbeing".11According oMarx,such a "rich" humanbeing needs both plu-ralityof human dimensionsand relationshipswith otherhumanbeingso fulfillhis own potential,that is, tobecome reallyhuman, nd thus social.On one hand,humanbeingsshouldbe capablef, i.e., freeto, fulfilltheir own potential and to function in differentways.On the otherhand,both povertyand richnessshould gain a "human,and thereforesocialmean-ing": in other words, the highestrichness or eachhuman being is other human beings, and such arichness s felt in the form of a need (Marx,1844,ThirdManuscript).his means that self-realizationcan fully succeed only if the social and relationaldimensionof personhood s recognized,sinceeveryperson is intrinsicallyrelational. In other words,through their relationaldimension,human beingscan become "richer," ince theirrelationshipswithothersincreasetheir identity.This recognition,farfrom turninginto something ike a communitarianidentity, highlightsthe importanceof the interper-sonalrelationalitynd meansthat interpersonalela-tions can changeeach one's personal dentity.Thiselementis particularlyrucial n the CA too and isstrictlyinked to the role of commitmentand to the



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Re-ThinkingheAnthropologicalndEthicalFoundationfEconomicsndBusiness 439interconnection etweenpersonaldentityand socialidentity.These considerationsintroduce another veryimportant feature expressed by the notion ofanthropologicalichnessandimplicit n the CA, thedynamicdimension of personhood. The CA'sintrinsicplurality, ndits focus on the dimensionof"beingableto do andto be" shows the importanceof a dynamic(andnever ending) process n whichpeople constitutetheir identity,and pursuehumanflourishing.This also means that the way we are can bechangedby developingour capabilities.This is alsoevident from the CA's re-interpretationof theAristotelianGreekconceptof eudaimonia:ccordingto the CA, in fact, humanflourishingconsists n acomplex self-realization, ut the basic idea is thatthereareotherpossibilitieshanthe one I am real-izingnow: there s neithera fixednora firm form ofthe self.In thisregard, he conceptof richness eemsto express n the best way this openness to newpossibilities f the self.In short, the notion of anthropologicalichnesss ableto express he followingdimensionsof identity: heintrinsiclurality f capabilities nd life dimensions,whichwe coulddefineas the intrapersonalelationalityof the self;the interpersonalelationality,amely,thesocio-relationalimension of the self, accordingtowhichhumanbeingsare ntrinsically relational,"othat each one "needs"to be in relationwith theothers; and the dynamicdimension of the self,according o which identity s a dynamicnotion, forhumanflourishings an ongoing and never defini-tively defined process.This is why the notion ofhuman richness,as noted above, can serve as theultimate oundationorCA'sconceptof personhood(Giovanola,2005).Toward a more "humanized" businessIf we attemptto applythe ethical-anthropologicalconception outlined above to businessand man-agement,the latterwould undergosuch substantialchanges hatthey would depart n no smallmeasurefrom their prevailingassumptions. n general,theethical-anthropologicalinquiry that has beendevelopedin the previoussectionsaims at recon-necting business theory and practice with the

fosteringof human values and the enhancementofhuman capabilities.he question now is whetherrational economic activity in business (usuallyidentifiedby the pursuitof self-interest ndprofit) scompatiblewith ethicalactivity, and whether thepursuitof efficiency s compatiblewith the fosteringof humanulfillment. he analysisof these ethical s-suesalsorequiresa deep reflectionon the vision ofthe humanbeing at the basis of business,althoughmost prevailingbusiness theories lack an adequateanthropologicalnvestigation.On the firstpoint,we can state hatwith regardobusiness, recognizing the role of ethics meansaffirming hat"if ethicsis not alsoacknowledgedasvalidin itselfand desirable y all membersof a firm,includingits managersand owners, it will not beconvincingand effective"(Koslowski,2008, p. 36).In otherwords,it is necessaryo show that ethicsisnot external,but internal o businessbehavior,sinceit does play a fundamental ole in the structureofpreferencesand desiresof businessactors. In thisregard, he Aristotelianrameworkandthe CA canofferus fruitfulelements,by highlighting he role ofhumanvalues n economic choicesandby pointingout the mutualrelationbetween actions(andchoi-ces) and characterandpreferences).On the secondpoint, both Aristotleand the CAhelp us develop a differentanthropologicalodel onwhich businesscan rely. Thanksto theirreflection,we candevelopmorehumanmodels n businessanda "humanized" ompanystrategy Andrews,1989),and carryout more humanistic anagement, hat is"managementhatemphasizeshe humanconditionandis oriented o the developmentof humanvirtue,in all its forms, to its fullestextent" (Ml, 2003,p. 79).It is not by chancethat some of the most inter-esting attempts o conceive business n connectionwith the fostering of human fulfillment assumeAristotle'sheoriesas a startingpoint (Collins,1987;Crockett, 2005; Koehn, 1995; Meikle, 1996;Vranceanu,2005): in this context, some scholarshave developedan "Aristotelian pproach o busi-ness"to talkaboutcorporations ndorganizationsngeneral (Solomon, 1992, 2004). The basic idea isthat, accordingto Aristotle, one has to think ofoneselfasa memberof the largercommunity- thePolis orhim, the corporation,he society,and so onfor us- and striveto excel, to bringout what is best



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440 BenedettaGiovanolain ourselvesandour sharedenterprise.What is bestin us - our virtuesare, in turn, definedby thatlarger community, and therefore no ultimateantagonismexists between individual self-interestand the greaterpublic good (Solomon,2004). In thisview, the corporations seen asa community,andischaracterizedby the search for excellence, theimportanceof integrityand soundjudgment.All ofthis can lead to a more cooperativeand humanevision of business,where the virtues of honesty,trust, airness, ndcompassionbecome central n thecompetitivebusinessworld, and moral courage isneeded (Solomon, 1992). Accordingto thisview, acompanyshouldbe consideredas a communityofpersonsrather than a mere instrumentfor profit,could fosterthe developmentof humanvirtues andtherefore akeinto accounteveryone'sneed to growas a person through human virtues (Ml, 2003,p. 85).However,even if the mostimportant onstituentsof every organizationare humanbeings, we rarelyfind a definition of business heorythatdirectlyre-fers to individuals,or that is "human-based".TheCA can help us to fill this gap and to think ofbusiness as "human-based,"by focusing on theconstitutive elements of personhood, that a more"human" business should promote. As we haveseen, the CA explicitly recognizesthe fundamentalrole of a sound anthropologicaloundation,but itdoes not explorein anysubstantive ensethe natureof the corporateeconomy, nor does it specificallyaddressbusiness matters. Nonetheless, in recentyears, the CA has been furtherdeveloped in anorganizational ontext by Cornelius and Gagnon(1999), Corneliuset al. (2008),andVogt (2005). Inparticular,t has been used to analyzethe ethicalaspects of participativegovernance (Collier andEsteban, 1999) and to understandequalityin theworkplace Cornelius,2002;CorneliusandGagnon,1999, 2000, 2002, 2004).Still, its application o businesscould be particu-larlyfruitful to link businesswith the fosteringofhuman values and the promotion of authenticallyhumancapabilities.f we applythe mainfeaturesofanthropologicalrichness to businessand manage-ment, the latter will be intrinsicallyaimed atenhancingpeople's capabilities intrapersonalela-tionality of personhood), at promoting genuineinterpersonal relationship in the workplace

(interpersonalelationality f personhood),atlettingemployeesgrow as a personthroughtheirpractice(dynamic dimension of personhood), finally, atcontributingo the pursuitof human ulfillment nda good life.ConclusionAssumingAristotle's hought and the CA as theo-reticalframeworkcan providea sound ethicalandanthropologicalfoundation of business. Such afoundation is particularlynecessary and urgentnowadays, when economic activity and businesshaveevergreater tructuralffectson humanbeings,the significanceof which go farbeyondeconomics.In fact,such effectscanalsoconcernextra-economicareas,such as the constitutionof personal dentityandinterpersonalelationships. orexample,one ofthe greatest ocial costsof irresponsibleompaniesstheproductionof socioeconomicuncertainty nd, nparticular, he inability of a growing number ofindividuals to project into the future, with thedevelopment,alsoin theirprivate ife, of short-termengagements, and intermitting family and loverelations(Boltanskiand Chiapello,1999, pp. 503-507), with further mpactat the level of personality(Palmade, 003).A reform, then, is needed, especiallybecausecontemporary developments of capitalism havecompromised he reproductionof those valuesand"anthropologicalypes" hat allowedtheworkingofcapitalismtself at its origins,and have substitutedthem by more and more quantitative alues (Cas-toriadis,1996). Now, if we want to avoidreducinghumanbeingsto a corollaryof economy, an ethicaland anthropologicaloundation s needed, because eventhe economy, as we have seen, is not independentfrom people'slives and, at a more radicalevel, af-fectsvalues, dentity,andinterpersonal elationships.This is why we need more human models in eco-nomics andbusiness. n thisregard, he CA, with itsattempt o re-establishhe (oftenperceivedaspara-doxical) interconnectionbetween ethics and eco-nomics and with its inquiry into "richer"anthropologicalmodels, can serve as an adequatetheoretical ramework.In otherwords,the CA helpsus to thinkof eco-nomics andbusinessasmeans orhuman lourishing,



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Re-ThinkingtheAnthropologicalnd Ethical Foundationof Economics nd Business 441rather hanasendsin themselves. The reason lies in theCA's focus on capabilityenhancement and its elabo-ration of an ethical-anthropological underpinningfor economics. The core of this underpinning is thenotion of human richness,which makes it possible toovercome the emphasison self-interest and personalwell-being as utility maximization, and to promotethe shift from the notion of the egoistic (economic)individual,o the concept ofpersonhood. his ultimatelyrefersto CA's understandingof the concept of humanbeing as a normative concept, and to its focus on thenotion of a "common humanity" (Nussbaum, 1993).According to this framework, business practiceswould be able to foster human fulfillment and theenhancement of individuals' capabilities, and couldcontributeto the pursuitof amore humanedevelopmentfor each and everyperson.12

Notes1- Such a position is systematized in a view of eco-nomics as a positive or descriptive cience, which takesnatural sciences as a model and differs from normativeeconomics (which aims at evaluatingeconomic processesand outcomes, and formulates prescriptiveudgments onwhat oughtto be done to realize an optimal level of wel-fare - hence the name welfare conomics).2' Rationalchoice theory is a framework or under-standing and often modeling social and economicbehavior.Since a long time, it has been the dominantparadigmn economics,but in recentdecades t hasbe-come more widely used in other disciplinessuch associology, political science, philosophy,and anthropol-ogy. Rational choice theory usuallyassumes he view-point of the individual(methodological ndividualism)and restsupon the idea that individuals hoose the bestactionaccording o stablepreference unctionsand con-straintsacingthem.3 The term"boundedrationality"ndicates hatper-fectly rationaldecisionsare often not feasible, due tothe finite computational esourcesavailable or makingthem; it is used to designaterationalchoice that takesinto account the cognitive limitationsof both knowl-edge and cognitive capacity,and is concernedwith thewaysin which the actualdecision-makingprocess nflu-encesdecisions.4' Also deprivationand adaptation an make humanbehaviourdeviatefrom rationalchoice theory'sassump-tions. Such issues, however, even if they are veryimportant, annotbe addressedn this article.

Actually,mainstream conomics is not only con-cerned with the issue of individualwell-being, but alsowith the definition and measurementof social welfare,which is defined by the principleof Pareto-optimality.The latter, however, identifies optimality with effi-ciency (a Pareto-optimal tate of affairsdefinesan effi-cient allocation of resources) and generates seriousproblems,the principalone being the impossibilityoftackling equity reasons and solving the trade-offbetween efficiencyand equitv.6" The CA approachhas been developed by the In-dian economist A. Sen and the AmericanphilosopherM. Nussbaum.However, the focus here will be on A.Sen's version of CA, rather han on Nussbaum's, or theformerdevelops greaterdetail on the ethical-economicside of CA, whilst the latter deals more specificallywiththe philosophical-politicalide. Even if Sen and Nuss-baum are the main exponentsof the CA, thereare vari-ous (and in many casesimportant)differencesbetweenthem, which, however, do not fall within the purviewof this article.For a detailedanalysisof similarities nddifferencesbetween Sen and Nussbaum,see Robeyns(2005) and Giovanola(2005, 2007).7 The difference between Sen and Nussbaum onthis point is clear.In fact, the Americanphilosopherhasdefined a list of fundamentalhuman capabilities(seeNussbaum,2000, 2006).8' On the Aristoteliannfluence on Nussbaum'sCA,see Alexander(2008), especiallyChap. 3 entitled"Aris-totle and Nussbaum'sHybrid Theory of Capabilities"(pp. 125-146). Among the majorthinkers and scholarswho have influenced the CA, a fundamentalrole isplayedby John Rawls. Rawlsianinfluence is especiallyevident in Sen'sattemptto extend Rawls' focus on pri-mary goods in a "non-fetishist"direction (Sen, 1980)and in his criticism of Utilitarianism Sen, 1999a; Senand Williams,1982); Rawlsian influenceon Nussbaumis evident throughout her works and culminates inNussbaum(2006), where she discussesboth similaritiesand differencesbetween her capability-informedhilo-sophical-politicalapproachand the Rawlsian theory ofjustice. Rawls' influence is particularlymportantsinceit is strictlyconnectedwith the CA's versionof liberal-ism and its criticismof utilitarianism,which play a fun-damentalrole in both Sen's and Nussbaum's heory (onthe tension between CA's liberalism nd the Aristotelianinfluence, see Giovanola,2007). Influence on the CAhas also been exertedby KarlMarx (throughboth Senand Nussbaum),Kant, Grotius,the Stoic tradition(thatespeciallyinfluenced Nussbaum),A. Smith, K. Arrowand, more in general, the exponents of social choicetheory (who especiallyinfluenced Sen). Of course, adetailedinquiryinto such influencescannot be carried



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442 BenedettaGiovanolaout in this article. Nonetheless it is important to pointthem out for the sake of clarity.For further inquiry into Sen's concept of identity,see Sen (1999b); for an interpretation of Sen's argu-ments, see Davis (2003, pp. 150-166), and Giovanola(2007). For an overview on the role of interpersonalrelationships in economics, see Gui and Sudgen (2005).la It is worth mentioning that Sen adopts the expres-sion "constitutive plurality", although he uses it mainlyas a feature of evaluation. In fact, he distinguishes a"competitive" from a "constitutive" plurality, arguingthat the former regards different views that are alterna-tive to one another, whereas the latter describes a kindof "intrinsic diversity" internal to a certain view,embracing different, though not mutually exclusive, as-pects (Sen, 1987b).11 Marx uses the German term "Reichtum" (Marx,1844, Drittes Manuskript, Sect. 2. PrivateigentumundKommunismus),which is usually translated as "wealth".However, since Marx aims at giving it a differentmeaning from the prevailing political-economic one,here I will translate it with "'richness".12' Human development is an expression used in CA,and the United Nations Human DevelopmentReports akethe CA as their theoretical framework.

AcknowledgmentsThe author would like to thank all the participants ofthe 15th "International Symposium on Ethics, Businessand Society" (IESE Business School, Barcelona, May16-17, 2008) and especially Claus Dierksmeier, for theirhelpful comments. In addition, the author would like tothank Francesco Totaro, Gianluca Busilacchi, JulianRode, and the anonymous referees for their thoughtfulcomments on earlier versions. Special thanks are due toDomnec Ml for his helpful advice and comments onseveral issues discussed in this article. Thanks are alsodue to Sheila Beatty for her linguistic edition of the text.

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Department f Philosophyand Human Sciences,Universityof Macerata,Via Garibaldi20, 62100 Macerata, talyE-mail:[email protected]

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