getting tough on juvenile crime an analysis of costs and benefits

8/14/2019 Getting Tough on Juvenile Crime an Analysis of Costs and Benefits

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POLITICAL ECONOMY

WORKING PAPERS

Getting tough on juvenile crime: An analysis of costs and benefits

Simon M. Fass and Chung-Ron Pi

Political Economy Working Paper 04/01OCTOBER 2001

SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS

RICHARDSON, TEXAS 75083-0688

AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY/ AFFIRMATIVE ACTION UNIVERSITY


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GETTING TOUGH ON JUVENILE CRIME:

AN ANALYSIS OF COSTS AND BENEFITS

Simon M. FassAssociate Professor of Political Economy, School of Social Sciences

University of Texas at Dallas

Chung-Ron PiSenior Analyst, Dallas County Juvenile Department

Abstract : Recent decades have seen juvenile justice shift focus from the child and treatment to theoffense and accountability. This change, manifest in juvenile codes that support punishment anddoctrines that include transfers to adult criminal court, has had significant caseload and fiscal impact.However, scarcity of pertinent research and of analysis of costs and benefits leaves unclear whetherthe new, get tough approach achieves greater delinquency reduction than its predecessor. Combinedwith a quasi-experimental empirical simulation of the effects of punitive sanctions, a cost-benefitanalysis of alternative dispositions in Dallas County, Texas, suggests that harsher sentence canindeed prevent some offenses. The value of this gain, however, is much less than what it costs to

produce. As a result, by consuming public resources that might otherwise be invested in more productive purposes within or outside the justice system, the policy of toughness visits substantialopportunity costs on communities that embrace it.

This paper is based on findings of a research project sponsored by the Office of Juvenile Justice andDelinquency Prevention (OJJDP), U.S. Department of Justice (grant number 98-JN-FX-0001). Theopinions expressed herein are those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect views of theOJJDP.


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GETTING TOUGH ON JUVENILE CRIME:AN ANALYSIS OF COSTS AND BENEFITS

During the last thirty years the juvenile justice system's traditional focus on the child and on applyingappropriate methods of diagnosis and treatment has been supplanted by an approach that focuses onthe offense and on ways of holding the child accountable for it (Feld, 1991, 1999a). Thistransformation reveals itself in a number of ways. Important among them are: juvenile codes thatexplicitly support the aims of punishment, accountability, and protection of public safety; courts thatoperate under offense-based doctrines that include determinate sentencing, extended jurisdictionstatutes, and mandatory minimum sentences; and relaxation of obstacles to transferring juvenile

offenders to adult criminal court (Bishop et. al., 1998; Feld, 1990, 1999b; Torbet et. al., 1996).

One factor contributing to this transformation has been the inability of researchers to show evidencethat rehabilitative strategies curb delinquency (Bishop et. al., 1998). Although an early claim byMartinson (1974) that nothing works proved an overstatement, subsequent investigations, such asLipsey (1992), showed that unambiguously effective programs were, and remain, exceedingly rare.

Another factor is public perception of increasing rates of juvenile crime, especially of the violent

sort. Highly-publicized media accounts of violence, exaggerated talk about an explosion in juvenile crime rates during the 1980s and early 1990s, hyperbolic predictions by Blumstein (1995),DiIulio (1995), and Snyder and Sickmund (1995) of an imminent demographic "crime bomb" thatmight accelerate these rates, and other like claims fueled growing public apprehension and frustration(Smith et. al., 1999). This climate contributed to charges that juvenile justice authorities, rather thanaddressing public safety concerns, coddled offenders by continuing to operate within the treatment-rehabilitation framework (Butterfield, 1997). It also contributed to incessant political calls to dosomething to assure public safety and, ultimately, to broadened electorate and legislative support for"get tough" policies. An extreme example in the 1995 Texas juvenile code is determinant sentencesof up to forty years for certain felonies (Bishop et. al., 1998; Fritsch and Hemmens, 1996). 1

The impact of this shift is evident in national-level data on juvenile court practices. Between 1988and 1997 there was an estimated 48% increase in the total number of delinquencies (Puzzanchera et.al., 2000). At the same time, there was a disproportionate 75% increase in the number of petitioneddelinquency cases, a 67% increase in the number of adjudicated cases resulting in formal probation,and a 56% jump in the number of cases that resulted in out-of-home placement (i.e., incarceration).Impact is also evident at the state level. The 1995 Texas code, by exposing substantially highernumbers of young people to formal sentencing with progressively restrictive sanctions rather thandiversion to informal intervention and counseling, has led to exploding caseloads, especially

placement, and mounting fiscal pressure. This pressure, in turn, has driven local boards thatadminister the code to experiment with alternate programs they hope will achieve outcomescomparable to placement but at lower cost, such as various forms of intensive supervision probation,and short-term boot camp instead of long-term placement.


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standing, is whether the added suffering and/or votes are commensurate with the extra effort neededto elicit them.

Two factors contribute to this lack of clarity. One is scarcity of pertinent empirical research (Bishopet. al., 1998). A recent review by Aos et. al. (2001), for example, identifies only a dozen rigorousstudies that use experimental or quasi-experimental methods to compare outcomes between milde rand harsher sentences on juveniles with similar offense histories and demographic characteristics. 2 The other factor is that cost-benefit analysis, a method of social inquiry expressly designed to helpanswer questions about the relationship between gains and the effort required to produce them, isinfrequent in juvenile justice research (DiIulio, 1996; Welsh and Farrington, 2000a, 2000b). 3

Addressing these factors directly, we present a case study analysis that combines a quasi-experimental empirical simulation of the effects of more punitive dispositions with dollar valueestimates of associated benefits and costs to clarify answers for one jurisdiction: Dallas County,Texas. Specifically, we look at net benefits associated with sentencing juveniles, whose offensehistories qualify them for stronger treatment, to: probation rather than deferred prosecution; intensivesupervision probation rather than regular probation; local residential placement under county custodyrather than intensive supervision; and placement under state custody by the Texas Youth

Commission (TYC) rather than local placement.After briefly reviewing shortcomings and strengths of the cost-benefit procedure, we lay out the dataand methods used to estimate: differences in numbers of re-offenses and re-dispositions that followinitial shifts to more restrictive sanctions; and dollar values for unit costs and benefits. Combiningthese estimates, we then present our findings for each disposition pair in terms of net benefit and interms of cost-effectiveness. These suggest that tangible costs incurred by the justice system are notmatched by tangible cost-saving benefits. Together, system benefits from reduction in re-dispositions, and victim and other benefits from reduction in re-offenses, are not large enough tooffset initial investment in harsher sanction.

This observation does not necessarily imply that getting tough on juveniles is wrong. For one thing,cost-benefit analysis does not have a special capacity to make such judgement. Also, certainintangible benefits that we ignore, retribution for its own sake and vote enhancement, for example,may compensate for the shortfall. However, our finding does suggest that by consuming tangible

public resources that might otherwise be invested in more productive purposes within or outside the justice system, toughness visits substantial opportunity costs upon communities that embrace it.

Overview of Cost-Benefit Analysis

Cost-benefit analysis, at root, is a procedure for systematically displaying and comparing favorableand unfavorable consequences of alternative courses of action. By identifying and, whereappropriate, quantifying and valuing the positive and negative consequences of policy, it can help


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Unfortunately, as can happen when there is failure to distinguish between method and the way it isapplied, the promise that cost-benefit analysis holds for juvenile justice is sometimes undermined by

exaggeration of its usefulness. Some zealous advocates view the procedure as a logical, rigoroustechnique that supplies definitive answers to policy questio ns. Adopt the action that maximizes benefits while minimizing costs, they say, and all will be well. 4

But cost-benefit analysis cannot produce unequivocal answers. Especially in domains such as juvenile justice where it is hard to quantify, monetize, or even identify many important benefits andcosts (e.g., pain and suffering of victims and offenders), the procedure yields findings that are toouncertain to serve as exclusive policy guides. One source of uncertainty, common to all forms of

social analysis, is the already-noted scarcity of suitable data on which to base robust estimates of policy effects. Most studies in the justice field, as a result, invent h y pothetical scenarios and thensuggest what cost-benefit relationships might look like under them. 5

Another source, as DiIulio and Piehl (1991) note, is imprecision in assigning money values. There iswide variation in dollar estimates for tangible costs and benefits, i.e., items that have market prices,and intangible costs and benefits, i.e., items that dont have these prices. Especially awkward,

because estimates can vary by a factor of two thousand or more, are dollar values of such things aslives saved or lost, pain and suffering incurred or avoided, and quality of life heightened ordiminished. 6

A third source of uncertainty is analytical bias. Cost-benefit analysis is a subjective operation thatalways adopts a particular point of view: that of society as a whole viewed through the lens ofeconomic theory, which after Gittinger (1982) w e call economic analysis; or those of individualsand organizations within it, financial analysis. 7 For any perspective, analysts have wide latitudeto decide which costs and which benefits they include, to determine which of these costs and benefitsare assigned monetary values, and to choose among several methods of estimating the values. In theirturn, decision makers and other consumers of studies have scope to argue that findings of cost-

benefit analysis at odds with their opinions are caused by incorrect dollar estimates, inappropriateinclusion or exclusion of certain costs and benefits, or some other source of prejudice.

Taken together, these uncertainties make it hard for cost-benefit analysis to provide unambiguousanswers about whether benefits are sufficient in relation to costs. Difficulty, however, should in noway suggest that the method is useless - among other sensible reasons because the alternative toambiguous answers is, simply, no answers. Absent answers, deliberations on the merits of policy arecondemned to continue to turn mainly on preferences shaped by congeniality, ideology, and politicalexpediency of the moment; quality of rhetoric brought to bear on arguments; and other enigmaticinfluences. In other words, although cost-benefit analysis yields uncertain answers, incorporatingthem into the decision making process helps to narrow the much greater, incessant uncertainty thatconfounds juvenile justice. Even if the method cant supply the answers, it can help a lot, as thefollowing tries to demonstrate.


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county and state. Main benefits expected from these extra outlays, depending on point of view, areadditional gains in child maturation (manifesting themselves, for instance, as immediate or longer-

term improvements in employment, earnings, health, civic participation, school attendance, academicgrades, etc.), greater offender suffering, more offenses prevented, or a combination of these.

We do not have reliable measures for behavioral progress or for distress. Our analysis, necessarily partial, therefore focuses on a relatively narrow question: What are the likely effects, first in terms ofdifferences in numbers of re-offenses and associated re-dispositions and then in terms of differencesin money values, of expending extra resources on harsher sanction? Specifically we ask: What wouldhappen if juvenile offenders get regular probation rather than deferred prosecution, intensive

supervision probation instead of regular probation , local placement rather than intensive supervision probation, and TYC rather than local placement? 10

Data to answer the question about numbers come from the records of 13,144 individuals referred tothe department during 1994-97. They committed 58,650 juvenile and adult infracti ons and received17,124 dispositions between their first referral and the end of 1999 (Table 1). 11 Each of ourobservations is an initial disposition even t that ranges from the mildest sanction, deferred

prosecution, to the harshest, TYC placement. 12 Although data allow tracking for up to five years offollowup, 1994-99, sample size in the fifth year is too small to produce meaningful results.Accordingly, our analysis tracks four years (though most tables show three because there are nostatistically significant differences in year four).

Table 1: Sample Size, by disposition and length of followup

followup from start of disposition

disposition 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years

deferred prosecution 7,124 6,801 5,068 3,242

probation 5,117 4,799 3,263 1,862

intensive supervision probation 1,317 1,188 649 255

local placement 2,331 2,165 1,533 944

TYC placement 1,235 1,136 842 548

all dispositions 17,124 16,089 11,355 6,851

To estimate effects of substituting one disposition for another, we apply to these data a negative binomial regression procedure that controls for the influences on re-offense and re-disposition patterns of race and ethnicity, sex, age at first referral and at disposition, number and type of priorreferrals, and number and type of prior adjudications. 13 The exercise yields an estimate of the


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offenders receive from probation officers and imposition of court orders that they must follow.Juveniles do not necessarily behave differently under probation than under deferred prosecution. It is

just that their misbehavior is spotted. However, as a result of being picked up for technical violationsand status re-offenses in the first two years, the number of misdemeanors declines by 5.4 offenses inthe first year (in range of 2.2 to 8.5), and 3.6 in the second (0.1 to 6.9). For felonies, significant in thethird year only, the model predicts a mid-range increase of 3.9 offenses.

Table 2: Estimated Difference in Number of Re-offenses Resulting from Change in Initial Disposition, 1 per 100 initial juveniles, by type of offense and year of followup

technical, status offenses 2 misdemeanors 2 felonies 2

initial disposition year 3 lower

bound

mid-

range

upper

bound

lower

bound

mid-

range

upper

bound

lower

bound

mid-

range

upper

bound

Total 2 (mid-range)

1 17.1 20.9 24.9 (8.5) (5.4) (2.2) 15.5 2 0.0 1.5 3.7 (6.9) (3.6) (0.1) (2.1) 3 0.3 3.9 7.7 3.9

probationrather thandeferred prosecution

Total 17.1 22.4 28.6 (15.4) (9.0) (2.3) 0.3 3.9 7.7 17.3 1 5.3 11.7 18.5 11.7 2 0.0 3 0.0

intensive supervisionrather than

probation Total 5.3 11.7 18.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.7 1 (39.0) (31.8) (24.6) (21.8) (16.4) (11.1) (20.2) (15.2) (10.2) (63.4) 2 0.0 6.5 13.2 6.5 3 3.9 14.4 25.2 0.0 6.7 14.7 21.1

local placementrather thanintensive supervision

Total (39.0) (31.8) (24.6) (17.9) (2.0) 14.1 (20.2) (2.0) 17.7 (35.8) 1 (40.8) (37.5) (34.1) (7.1) (3.6) 0.0 (7.4) (3.8) (0.1) (44.9) 2 (10.1) (7.8) (5.4) (7.8) 3 (0.2) (0.1) 0.0 (20.0) (10.5) (0.6) (10.6)

TYC rather thanlocal placement

Total (51.1) (45.4) (39.5) (27.1) (14.1) (0.6) (7.4) (3.8) (0.1) (63.3) Notes: 1. All figures shown are statistically significant at the 5% probability level.

2. Numbers in parentheses are negative, indicating fewer re-offenses compared to the milder sanction.3. Year 4 is omitted from the table because differences in that year are not statistically significant.

Additional monitoring imposed by substituting intensive supervision for regular probation yields asingle result, a mid-range rise of 11.7 technical violation and status re-offenses in the first year.Broader impacts appear only with the offense suppression effects of incarceration, as when local

placement replaces intensive supervision. Here there are large mid-range declines in technicalviolations (31.8), misdemeanors (16.4), and felonies (15.2) in the first year. These are followed byincreases: 6.5 felonies in year two, 14.4 misdemeanors and 6.7 felonies in year three. Similarly, whenTYC substitutes for local placement, significant drops in numbers of violations show up in all years,misdemeanors during the first and third years, and felonies during the first year.


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These differences result from and run together with differences in re-dispositions, which we show formid-range values in Table 3. Numbers are necessarily less in this case because many re-offenses are

not serious enough to warrant p rosecution and because re-dispositions often follow a string ofinfractions rather than every one. 16Our re-disposition models thus consist of five equations. Two arefor first and second year re-dispositions in the juvenile system, with a third equation capturing atime-lag effect in our data of large numbers of first-year offenses adjudicated during the second year.We do not apply these equations to juvenile data for the third and fourth years because results arestatistically insignificant. For these years we apply two equations to the sub-sample of adult data.Further, because the re-disposition models use only cases that have at least one re-offense during thefollowup period, resulting in a smaller number of valid cases, we impose another restriction. Instead

of predicting re-dispositions for each offense class, feasible only for first and second year juveniledata, our estimates for years three and four predict re-dispositions for all offenses. Reflecting the juvenile codes emphasis on accountability, the table underscores that most re-dispositions aresevere. In the first and second years, roughly 60% of all re-dispositions for the probation cohort arelocal and TYC placements. Proportions rise progressively toward 100% for the other cohorts. Foradults, likewise, jail or prison is the dominant sentence in 70% or more of cases.

Table 3: Estimated Difference in Number of Re-dispositions Resulting from Change in Initial Disposition 1 per 100 initial juveniles, by type of offense and year of followup

difference in number of re-dispositions 2

juvenile system adult system Total

initial disposition year 3 probation intensivesupervision

local placement

TYC placement probation

county jail

state jail prison

1 2.08 2.08 4.58 1.66 10.41

2 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.14) 3 0.21 0.36 0.08 0.11 0.76

probationrather thandeferred prosecution

Total 2.05 2.05 4.54 1.62 0.21 0.36 0.08 0.11 11.03 1 0.47 1.33 4.24 1.73 7.77

2

3

intensive supervisionrather than

probation

Total 0.47 1.33 4.24 1.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.77 1 (1.92) (0.77) (13.82) (22.26) (38.77) 2 0.06 0.06 0.19 0.70 1.02

3 0.78 1.84 0.57 0.90 4.09

local placementrather thanintensive supervision

Total (1.86) (0.71) (13.63) (21.56) 0.78 1.84 0.57 0.90 (33.66) 1 (0.51) (5.13) (5.64) 2 (0.51) (0.51) 3 (0.35) (1.51) (0.55) (0.81) (3.22)

TYC rather thanlocal placement

Total (0.51) 0.00 0.00 (5.64) (0.35) (1.51) (0.55) (0.81) (9.37)


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This accounts for the increase in numbers of technical and status offenses in the first year, and in thesecond year to a lesser extent, when probation substitutes for deferred prosecution.

When juveniles on probation re-offend again, most are placed in local or TYC facilities for extended periods, constraining their ability to re-offend during these periods. However, when juveniles ondeferred prosecution re-offend, most receive probation. Although this probation increases detectionof further re-offenses, the number of individuals on probation that start their trajectory with deferred

prosecution is much less than the number initially sentenced to probation. The number of detected re-offenses is therefore small. As a result, the offense detection effect is overshadowed by the offensesuppression effect of placing re-offenders that start their trajectory with probation (i.e., 100

individuals initially sentenced to it). This accounts for the drop in misdemeanors in the first andsecond years when probation substitutes for deferred prosecution. Conversely, when the offensesuppression effect is removed as juveniles reach adulthood, mainly in the third year, there is anincrease in felonies. With some variation in details, similar combinations of offense suppression andoffense detection effects also explain differences in re-offense patterns for the other disposition pairs.

Unit Values for Justice System Costs and Benefits

Movements of individuals from shifts to more punitive sanction through subsequent re-offenses andre-dispositions are accompanied by streams of costs and benefits. The initial change in sentencing,which we imagine to apply to 100 juveniles for each disposition pair, incurs an initial incrementalcost equal to the difference in average justice system costs between the harsher and milder sanction.Subsequent increases in re-dispositions then visit additional, marginal costs on the system, whiledeclines provide marginal cost-saving benefits. In parallel, as we discuss in the next section,subsequent increases in re-offenses impose added costs on victims, their families, and various service

providers (e.g., fire, ambulance, medical, etc.), while decreases offer loss-prevention gains.

Average, incremental, and marginal unit costs that we use to calculate net justice system benefits aresummarized in Table 4. To estimate total average costs we followed an activity-based costing

procedure described in Wayson and Funke (1989), adopting a few shortcuts due to time and resourcelimitations. The first step in this procedure traced the processes through which individuals move foreach type of disposition. The next step identified all component activities that take place under eachdisposition, and all resources consumed in producing each activity: direct and indirect, labor andcapital. Table A-2, in the appendix, details the component activities and their unit costs.

Establishing the level of resources consumed required repeat interviews with staff of the DallasPolice Department and the countys juvenile probation unit, public defenders office, districtattorneys office, and other pertinent individuals to derive estimates of personnel time allocated to thedifferent activities (e.g., hours or days per week or month per client). Multiplying staff time by wagesand salaries yielded estimates of the direct human resources cost of each activity for each disposition.


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Though there are differences between cases that follow different disposition tracks, especially between deferred prosecution and the others, after police activities are done most go through a

standard process that starts at intake assessment and ends at final disposition. Main differences between dispositions tend to involve ancillary activities that are part of one process but not another,such as matching the child with an appropriate placement facility. There are also variations inintensity or duration for the same activities, such as length of stay in detention pending courtappearance, duration of supervision in the community, or time spent in out-of-home placement.Another difference is type of court hearing, e.g., plea and disposition, trial before court, trial before

jury, etc., but we found no systematic variation across dispositions on this score. Large costdifferentials between dispositions result mainly from what happens after a disposition decision, i.e.,

short-term community supervision at one end versus long-term placement in an out-of-hometreatment facility at the other.

Table 4: Justice System Unit Costs, by type of disposition ($2000)

cost per case Juvenile System deferred

prosecution probation intensive

supervision local

placement TYC

placement police (referral, arrest, and/or investigation) $420 $610 $750 $700 $1,060detention screening, case review $90 $120 $120 $120 $120Detention - $1,250 $2,170 $6,670 $6,500intake, assessment - $610 $610 $610 $610court activities 1 $1,200 $1,200 $1,200 $1,200supervision (probation and/or parole) $540 $2,200 $3,670 - $840residential facility 2 - - - $25,850 $31,510services (community and/or aftercare) - $1,070 $1,580 $600 -

Total average cost $1,050 $7,070 $10,100 $35,750 $41,850Incremental cost for initial shift in disposition 3 - $6,020 $3,030 $25,650 $6,100

Marginal cost per re-disposition 4 - economic - $1,240 $1,770 $6,260 $7,320- financial - $2,120 $3,070 $27,250 $33,320

Adult System probation county jail state jail prison and parole

Total average cost 5 $5,630 $3,400 $21,060 $58,460Marginal cost per re-disposition - economic and financial 4 $985 $595 $3,685 $10,230

Note: 1. Includes court, district a ttorney, liaison, defense counsel and public defender. Values are the same for all disposit ions.2. Includes facility matching and case preparation for local placement.3. Incremental cost is the additional cost of shifting to the harsher disposition, i.e., the difference in average costs.4. Marginal cost is the cost associated with one additional re-disposition.5. Includes police and court costs.

To arrive at final estimates for each activity and disposition, we multiplied the direct humanresources cost by three indirect cost factors derived separately for departmental overhead (e.g.,

l b fit t t ffi i t d hi l t ) h d f th t


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Incremental, or additional costs of shifting from milder to harsher sanction are then the differences inadjacent averages. For example, substituting TYC for local placement requires an incremental cost of

$6,100 per juvenile (i.e., $35,750 minus $41,850). Averages are appropriate for establi shing theseincremental costs when we imagine disposition shifts that involve 100 juveniles at a time. 18

For marginal costs (or benefits) associated with change in numbers of subsequent re-dispositions,values that are very hard to estimate accurately, we adopted a low-high estimate range: 10% and 25%of average costs. Because analysis results were almost the same when using 10% or 25%, we showmarginal values in Table 4 at the center of the range, 17.5%, to simplify presentation. Marginalvalues for economic cost-benefit analysis, however, are not the same as for financial analysis. This is

because Dallas County and the TYC use private contractors to perform many disposition-relatedactivities.

In economic analysis, where the presumed point of view is the community as a whole seen throughthe lens of economic theory, the marginal cost to society of adding one or a few more juveniles to a

public or private counseling service or to a public or private placement facility operating at less thanfull capacity is small. The fee that a private contractor charges to provide for the juvenile is usually

based on the average cost of supplying the service, not the actual marginal cost. As consequence,economic cost-benefit analysis does not equate marginal values with the fee. Rather, marginaleconomic costs for the juvenile system in Table 4 are set equal to 17.5% of average costs.

In financial cost-benefit analysis the point of view is that of actors within society. In this perspective,an agency wanting to estimate how much more it would have to spend later on, or how much cost-saving it might expect as a result of shifting juvenile s to harsher disposition, must equate marginalcost with the contractors fee, i.e., with average cost. 19 Because the 17.5% applies only to activitiescarried out internally while costs for contractor services within each disposition are set equal to theiraverage values, marginal financial costs for the juvenile system are substantially higher thaneconomic costs.

For the adult system, however, marginal economic and financial costs are both set at 17.5% ofaverage costs because private contractor involvement, mainly for county jail, is modest. Given thesmall number of cases sent to county jail, application of a separate (and higher) estimate for themarginal financial cost of this sentence would have negligible impact on analysis results.

Unit Values for Costs and Benefits to Victims and Others

Re-offenses that precede re-dispositions engender tangible and intangible costs to victims, offenders,and others in the community, the prevention of which register as benefits. Miller et. al. (1996)

provide a long list of such costs and benefits. However, we choose a narrower set of items that, inaddition to being easier to monetize, are seen as especially important in the eyes of victims and mostothers: property losses from damage, theft, fraud, etc.; outlays for emergency responses by fire,


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other reasons because values for it are arbitrary (e.g., they range from $7,500 to more than $15million per life) and because strategic selection of a particular value allows cost-benefit analysis to

reach any conclusion.20

We nevertheless include this item to see how it affects results in financialanalysis.

The lower portion of Table 5 summarizes our schedule of estimated average economic and financialcosts for each offense class under differing assumptions. The figures vary considerably. Totaleconomic costs associated with a felony, for instance, range from $ 10,290 when assuming low valuesfor services and output, to $19,940 when assuming high values. 21 Likewise, total financial costsstretch from $12,270 with low estimates for services and output to $22,370 with high estimates or,including quality of life at $34,550 per felony, $56,920.

Table 5: Unit Costs to Victims and Others, by type of offense ($2000)

cost per offense delinquency

cost item assumption status offense,technical violation misdemeanor felony

property loss, damage - excluding value of stolen items 1 $0 $32 $365 - including value of stolen items $0 $126 $2,795

police, fire, ambulance 2 $0 $1 $78

medical services $0 $40 $454 social, victim services - low estimate $0 $1 $5

- high estimate $0 $6 $53 mental health services - low estimate $0 $2 $27

- high estimate $1 $17 $267 output, earnings - low estimate $0 $50 $9,360

- high estimate $0 $100 $18,720 quality of life $0 $1,157 $34,550 Total for economic analysis 3 - low estimate for services, output $0 $130 $10,290

- high estimate for services, output $1 $200 $19,940 Total for financial analysis 4 - low estimate for services, output $0 $220 $12,720

- high estimate for services, output $1 $290 $22,370 - high estimate plus quality of life $0 $1,450 $56,920

Notes: 1. Includes value of damage caused during robbery and vehicle theft.2. Covers non-disposition activities at time of offense, e.g., traffic control, backup police, fire fighting, etc .3. Excludes value of stolen items.4. Includes value of stolen items The first of several steps to arrive at these values was dis-a ggregation

of the 58,650 juvenile and adult infractions in our sample into their constituent elements. 22 Secondwas to distinguish between offenses that incur victim and other non-justice system losses and thosethat do not. Relying on judgement of Juvenile Department staff, this exercise identified only onestatus or technical violation, intoxicated driving, that engendered losses. There were 53 suchinfractions during the reference period, or about 0.6 % of all violations. For misdemeanors, weestimated that 14,630 offenses, or 59 % of the total, incurred losses. The share for felonies was 86 %.

Third was to assign baseline dollar values for victim and other losses to each discrete charge that


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(1997) provided values for arson-related losses, Maguire and Pastore (1999) for burglary of vehicles,and Miller et. al. (1996) for remaining items.

Values for fire, ambulance, and police services not already included in disposition costs are based onanalysis of detailed expenditure data for the City of Dallas. Police and fire department data areorganized in a way that allows straightforward calculation of basic response costs (including orexcluding transport to hospital), false alarms, and so on, and of a factor to account for centraladministrative overhead and capital. Miller et. al. (1996) is our source for baseline medical servicecosts, and f or valuations of social and victim services, mental health services, and lost output andearnings. 24 We also use Miller et. als value for quality of life, i.e., $1.9 million for death, lessersums for injuries.

In step four, after adjusting figures to year 2000 dollar terms, we derived weighted average values foreach category of loss by offense class and sub-class, with variations for the different assumptionsnoted above. Table 5 summarizes the result, detailed in appendix Table A-3. These tables indicatethat the average value of property loss and damage from a misdemeanor is $126 when stolen itemsare included, i.e., viewed from victims financial perspective. When the items are excluded, i.e.,viewed in the economic perspective as a transfer within society, the value is $32. For felonies,respective amounts are $2,795 and $365. 25

The tables also show two values for social and victim services, mental health services, and lostoutput, one labeled high estimate and the other labeled low. High values for social and victim,and mental health services are figures that we borrow from Miller et. al. (1996). However, Miller et.al. seem to exaggerate the frequency at which victims avail themselves of these services. But wehave no better estimates. Accordingly, to see how lower figures affect analysis, we take lowestimates as 10% of the high ones. Likewise, the high value for lost output borrows from Miller et.al. Low estimates are half these values. We incorporate a low estimate here to account for theobservation that victims of juvenile crime, by and large, have characteristics similar to those ofoffenders, notably lower than average earnings potential and shorter than average life expectancies.

Analysis Findings

Tables 6 through 9 present the results of our analysis. In different ways, they show the net benefitover four years - positive when benefits exceed costs and negative when costs exceed benefits -associ ated with shifting 100 juveniles to the more restrictive sanction in each of the four disposition

pairs. 26 Our first finding is that harsher sanctions do not produce positive net benefits for the justicesystem (Table 6). Whether looked at from an economic or from a financial perspective, cost-saving

benefits, if any, from reduction in numbers of re-dispositions during the followup period are notsufficient to fully offset the initial incremental cost of tougher sentencing. From a financial

perspective, county, state, municipal, and federal agencies expend a combined net of $801,000 (plusor minus $35,500) over four years when probation replaces deferred prosecution. Likewise, net mid-


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probation rather thandeferred prosecution ($602,000) ($654,000) $10,500 ($801,000) $35,500

intensive supervision rather than probation ($303,000) ($346,000) $16,000 ($486,000) $72,500

local placement rather thanintensive supervision ($2,565,000) ($2,368,000) $53,500 ($1,519,000) $133,000

TYC rather thanlocal placement ($610,000) ($548,000) $15,500 ($395,000) $40,500

Note: 1. Values in parentheses are negative net benefits, i.e., net costs.

Financial outlays even exceed initial incremental costs in the first two disposition pairs, probationinstead of deferred prosecution and intensive supervision instead of probation. This is because thesesentences, as we discussed in relation to Table 3, are followed by increases in re-dispositions. Theinverse applies to the other two pairs because they are followed by fewer re-dispositions. That is,although local placement instead of intensive supervision requires an initial incremental investmentof $2,565,000, cost-saving benefits stemming from fewer re-dispositions (i.e., $1,046,000 at the mid-

range), lower the aggregate financial burden to $1,519,000. Similarly, cost-saving benefits of TYCinstead of local placement reduce net fiscal outlays from $610,000 at the start to $395,000 at the endof four years.

Our second finding is that tougher sanction does not always produce positive net benefits for victimsand others and, when it does, gains are substantial only after including a value for quality oflife.(Table 7). Specifically, probation in lieu of deferred prosecution, rather than reducing them,increases costs to victims and others. The reason, noted in our earlier discussion of re-offenses (see

Table 2), is that this shift, though it suppresses misdemeanors during the first two years, is followedin the third year by increased numbers of felonies imposing high victim costs that wipe out priorgains. The result is a net (mid-range) loss over the period of $76,580, or $188,600 with quality oflife. This is a lose-loseoutcome, with public agencies and victims both bearing higher costs. Less

perverse, intensive supervision in lieu of regular probation yields no victim benefits warrantingmention because this action produces only increases in technical violations and status offenses,infractions with negligible impact. Although the justice system bears a higher cost, the benefit tovictims and others is effectively zero.

Table 7: Net Benefit to Victims and Others of More Restrictive Sanction, per 100 initial juveniles, $2000 1

category 2 all categories 3

initial disposition property

loss,damage

police, fireambulanceservices

medicalservices

social,victimservices

mentalhealthservices

output qualityof life excluding

quality of life includingquality of life


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3. Due to rounding, these totals may not sum exactly.

In contrast, local placement instead of intensive supervision generates positive net benefits of$66,600 at the mid-range, or $171,800 with quality of life. Here, big gains associated with first-year declines in misdemeanors are cut back somewhat by large increases in numbers ofmisdemeanors and felonies in subsequent years. Also, because the probability range for our estimateof total re-offenses is quite wide - running from -17.9 to +14.1 misdemeanors and from -20.2 to 17.7felonies (see Table 2) - the range for victim net benefits is also wide: $114,000, or $354,000 withquality of life. These figures, bigger than their respective mid-range values (i.e., $66,600 and$171,800), imply that this disposition shift also carries with it a chance of producing negative net

benefits for victims and others. So the only disposition substitution that produces unambiguous positive net benefits for victims and others is TYC for local placement, with net gains at the mid-range value of $88,800, or $235,300 with quality of life.

Combining justice system and victim net benefits, our third finding is that total net benefits arenegative for all disposition pairs (Table 8). Whether viewed from an economic or financial

perspective, the total dollar value of benefits from reduced numbers of re-dispositions and re-offenses, even when adopting a high estimate for services and output and incorporating quality oflife, is unlikely to come close to the total dollar value of costs. The possible exception, seen from a

financial perspective that incorporates $1.9 million as the value of human life, is TYC in lieu of local placement. The estimated probability range here is a negative net benefit lying between -$318,000and -$8,000 (i.e., -$163,000 $155,000). The upper bound of the range is still a net cost of $8,000,or $80 per juvenile, but it is close enough to the break-even point to imply that benefits have achance of equaling or exceeding costs when the number of serious offenses and associated re-dispositions prevented is large in relation to the incremental investment needed to produce theseeffects. Only substitution of TYC for local placement exhibits this capacity in our model, and onlywhen quality of life is assigned a value in excess of $1.9 million. However, if one rejects the

premise, as does the economic perspective, that gains or losses in quality of life are benefits orcosts to society, or if one views the putting of a dollar value on life as lacking analytic meaning orutility (e.g., because it is so arbitrary), then substitution of TYC for local placement looks no better incost-benefit terms than the other disposition pairs.

Table 8: Total Net Benefit of More Restrictive Sanction, per 100 initial juveniles, $2000 1

total net benefit 2 assuming:: initial disposition low value for

services and output

high value for

services and output

high value for services and

output plus quality of life Economic Net Benefit probation rather thandeferred prosecution ($691,000) $29,500 ($726,000) $50,500 not applicable intensive supervision rather than

probation ($346,000) $16,000 ($346,000) $16,000 not applicable local placement rather than


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local placement rather thanintensive supervision ($1,479,000) $188,000 ($1,448,000) $247,000 ($1,370,000) $487,000 TYC rather thanlocal placement ($345,000) $57,500 ($308,000) $75,000 ($163,000) $155,000

Notes: 1. Numbers in parentheses are negative net benefits, i.e., costs.2. Total net benefit combines net benefit to justice system with net benefit to victims and others.


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These findings are highly sensitive, among lots of other things, to our choice of non-system cost and benefit items to include in analysis, and to our dollar valuations of them. Weve not examined gainsand losses to offenders and their families, nor the value of retribution (i.e., punishment for its ownsake), nor other items. It is often impossible to quantify such things or to derive reasonable dollarestimates for them. Had we used $7,500 as the value of a human life rather than $1.9 million, ourfindings would remain intact. Adoption of $15 million might change everything.

It is helpful in this context to also examine the situations cost-effectiveness, i.e., net justice systemdollars required to avoid one delinquency, and leave decision makers and others free to judgewhether the outlay is worth what it yields. Our finding here, consistent with the previous, is thatexcept for TYC in lieu of local placement, harsher sanction is a fairly expensive way to preventserious offenses (Table 9). Substitution of probation for deferred prosecution, for instance, leads to a

mid-range decrease of 9.0 misdemeanors, an increase of 3.9 felonies, and thus a net reduction of 5.1delinquencies over the followup period. This means that the justice system expends between$150,000 and $164,000 (i.e.,-$157,000 $7,000) in financial terms to prevent one delinquency.

Table 9: Effect of More Restrictive Sanction on Justice System Cost Effectiveness ($2000) 1

difference in numberof delinquent re-offenses 2 initial disposition

justice systemnet benefit

per 100 initial juveniles misdemeanors felonies total

net justice systemoutlay perdelinquency prevented

Economic Cost-Effectiveness probation rather thandeferred prosecution ($654,000) $10,500 (9.0) 3.9 (5.1) ($128,000) $2,100 intensive supervisionrather than probation ($346,000) $16,000 0.0 0.0 0.0 not applicable local placement rather thanintensive supervision ($2,368,000) $53,500 (2.0) (2.0) (4.0) ($592,000) $13,400 TYC rather thanlocal placement ($548,000) $15,500 (14.1) (3.8) (17.9) ($31,000) $900 Financial Cost-Effectiveness

probation rather thandeferred prosecution ($801,000) $35,500 (9.0) 3.9 (5.1) ($157,000) $7,000 intensive supervisionrather than probation ($486,000) $72,500 0.0 0.0 0.0 not applicable local placement rather thanintensive supervision ($1,519,000) $133,000 (2.0) (2.0) (4.0) ($380,000) $33,300 TYC rather than

local placement ($395,000) $40,500 (14.1) (3.8) (17.9) ($22,000) $2,300 Note: 1. Numbers in parentheses indicate decrease in number of re-offenses.

At the very least, this outlay is superior to that of intensive supervision in lieu of probation, where amid-range cost of $486,000 produces no delinquency reductions (because this shift only affectstechnical offenses and status violations). It is also superior to local placement in lieu of intensive


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then they imply that they believe the cost to the community of one delinquency has a mid-rangevalue of at least $157,000. If worth less, then beyond serving as means to augment constituencysupport in the political arena, there is no obvious purpose in their willingness to spend that many taxdollars to prevent it. Likewise, a delinquency must be perceived to cost the community at least$380,000 if the way to avoid it is by substituting local placement for intensive supervision, $22,000 ifTYC is preferred to local placement.

Conclusion

Our findings, only as accurate and as useful as our data and methods allow, are specific to DallasCounty. They cannot be readily generalized to jurisdictions with very different justice policyregimes, system cost structures, demographic characteristics, and economic milieus. Notwithstanding

this caution, we are confident in suggesting that communities which pursue policies of morerestrictive sanction, if curious about relationships between costs and benefits, are likely to discoverthat material gains to victims and others, though perhaps substantial, do not make up for the addedspending needed to produce the gains.

Even if these policies reduce offenses, including serious ones, the composition of infractions that fallunder the rubric of delinquency is such that the average value of prevented losses to victims andothers is modest. At the outside, we reckon it to be about $57,000 per felony. At the same time, the

instrument used to obtain this benefit is extraordinarily blunt, our model suggesting, for example, thatit requires local placement of 100 juveniles to generate a net mid-range reduction of two feloniesover four years. The arithmetic is then unambiguous: a $2,565,000 incremental investment inincarceration prevents two felonies that, had they happened, would have cost victims and others$114,000.

Though it may point out that this relationship represents an inefficient use of resources, cost- benefit analysis does not and cannot say that spending $2,565,000 to get a return of $114,000 is

bad. The procedure is not certain enough, not complete enough, to provide such a definitiveassertion. In addition to costs and benefits to offenders, the value of retribution, and other things,weve not accounted for the political pros and cons of advocating harsher sanction. Dollars areimportant. But in the political arena of decision making, where judges and other key actors areelected, so too are votes, building of constituencies, and the like. In this arena decision makers mayhave sound reason to act, or at least to appear to act tough.

Nevertheless, our cost-benefit analysis suggests that while there may be tangible and ethereal gains,

say, from actions that prevent two offenses, these actions impose substantial opportunity costs because equal or greater tangible gains also flow from not preventing them and allowing victims andothers to suffer the consequences. Not spending $2,565,000 on incarceration is $2,565,000 that can

be expended on valued public goods and services within the justice system and outside, or returned totaxpayers. This sum is consequential for a jurisdiction with two million people, as $360 millionwould be for the entire country if the county figure is extrapolated to it. So if real or imagined


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Appendix

Table A-1: Independent Variables Used to Estimate Re-offenses and Re-dispositions variable name description mean standard dev.

RACE_W caucasian = 1, african-american is the reference group 0.2850 0.4514 RACE_H hispanic = 1, african-american is the reference group 0.2913 0.4544 RACE_O other ethnic group = 1, african -american is the reference group 0.0227 0.1488 FEMALE female = 1, male = 0 0.1820 0.3859 AGEF1314 age at first referral 13-14 = 1, ages under 12 is the reference group 0.4362 0.4959 AGEF15 age at first referral 15 = 1, ages under 12 is the reference group 0.2078 0.4057 AGEF16M age at first referral 16 and over = 1, ages under 12 is the reference group 0.1616 0.3681 AGED1314 age at disposition 13-14 = 1, ages under 12 is the reference group 0.2661 0.4419 AGED15 age at disposition 15 = 1, ages under 12 is the reference group 0.2572 0.4371 AGED16M age at disposition 16 and over = 1, ages under 12 is the reference group 0.4187 0.4934

NUMFEL1 one prior felony referral = 1, no prior felony referral is the reference group 0.3273 0.4692 NUMFEL2 two prior felony referrals = 1, no prior felony referral is the reference group 0.1462 0.3533 NUMFEL3M three prior felony referrals = 1, no prior felony referral is the reference group 0.1517 0.3588 NUMREF2 two total prior referrals = 1, one prior referral is the reference group 0.1880 0.3907 NUMREF3 three total prior referrals = 1, one prior referral is the reference group 0.1156 0.3198 NUMREF4M four and more total prior referrals = 1, one prior referral is the reference group 0.3179 0.4657 DRUG_DUM any prior drug referral = 1, otherwise = 0 0.2037 0.4028 PERS_DUM any prior assault referral = 1, otherwise = 0 0.3392 0.4734 STAT_DUM any prior status referral = 1, otherwise = 0 0.1679 0.3738 PROP1 one prior property referral = 1, none is the reference group 0.3918 0.4882 PROP2 two prior property referrals = 1, none is the reference group 0.1581 0.3649 PROP3M three prior property referrals = 1, none is the reference group 0.1766 0.3813 TVIOL1 one prior technical violation = 1, none is the reference group 0.0865 0.2811 TVIOL2M two or more prior technical violations = 1, none is the reference group 0.0540 0.2259 PRADJ_DU any prior adjudication = 1, otherwise = 0 0.2001 0.4001 PRPLM_DU any prior residential placement = 1, otherwise = 0 0.0601 0.2378


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Table A-2: Estimated Juvenile Justice System Unit Costs, by type of disposition and activity

direct cost total cost disposition and associated activity unit per unit subtotal

indirectcost $1997 $2000

Deferred Prosecution police case $260 $260 $140 $390 $420detention screening case $20 $20 $30 $50 $50case review case $20 $20 $20 $40 $40six-month supervision (180 days) day $1 $180 $320 $510 $540

Total $480 $510 $990 $1,050Probation

police case $380 $380 $200 $580 $610detention screening case $50 $50 $70 $110 $120detention (6.93 days) day $80 $560 $620 $1,180 $1,250intake assessment case $240 $240 $340 $580 $610

district attorney case $80 $80 $120 $200 $210district court case $200 $200 $280 $480 $510court liaison case $80 $80 $110 $190 $200defense counsel, public defender case $260 $260 $0 $260 $280supervision (365 days) day $2 $870 $1,210 $2,080 $2,200community services (44% of cases for 80 days) day $10 $420 $590 $1,010 $1,070

Total $3,140 $3,540 $6,670 $7,060Intensive Supervision Probation

police case $460 $460 $240 $700 $750detention screening case $50 $50 $70 $110 $120

detention (12.6 days) day $80 $970 $1,080 $2,040 $2,170intake assessment case $240 $240 $340 $580 $610district attorney case $80 $80 $120 $200 $210district court case $200 $200 $280 $480 $510court liaison case $80 $80 $110 $190 $200defense counsel, public defender case $260 $260 $0 $260 $280ISP supervision (182.5 days) day $6 $1,010 $1,410 $2,430 $2,570

probation supervision (182.5 days) day $2 $430 $600 $1,040 $1,100community services (65% of cases for 80 days) day $10 $620 $870 $1,490 $1,580

Total $4,400 $5,120 $9,520 $10,100Local Placement

police case $430 $430 $230 $660 $700detention screening case $50 $50 $70 $110 $120detention (41 days) day $70 $2,980 $3,320 $6,290 $6,670intake assessment case $240 $240 $340 $580 $610district attorney case $80 $80 $120 $200 $210district court case $200 $200 $280 $480 $510court liaison case $80 $80 $110 $190 $200defense counsel, public defender case $260 $260 $0 $260 $280

placement matching and case preparation case $160 $160 $220 $370 $400contract, department facility (270 days) day $90 $24,010 $0 $24,010 $25,450aftercare services (72 days) day $3 $240 $330 $570 $600

Total $28,730 $5,020 $33,720 $35,750TYC Placement

police case $660 $660 $340 $1,000 $1,060detention screening case $50 $50 $70 $110 $120detention (39.6 days) day $70 $2,900 $3,230 $6,130 $6,500intake assessment case $240 $240 $340 $580 $610


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26 The tables are based on application of system unit costs to predicted differences in numbersof re-dispositions, and unit costs for victims and others to differences in numbers of re-offenses.Gi en the range of ncertaint in o r predictions of re offenses and re dispositions there is


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Given the range of uncertainty in our predictions of re-offenses and re-dispositions, there isnecessarily a corresponding range of uncertainty for estimates of net benefit. At the same time, thereis variation in the assumptions that underlie our dollar value estimates (i.e., economic versusfinancial perspective, high estimate for services and output versus low, inclusion versus exclusion ofquality of life). This means that there is a specific range of probable values for the net benefit for

each combination of assumptions. To address uncertainty, we adopted a Monte Carlo simulation procedure to generate probable ranges for net benefits under each set of assumptions. The procedurerandomly sampled predicted differences in re-offenses and re-dispositions from their respective 95%

probability distributions, i.e., between their lower and upper bounds. Every run of the simulationselected one re-offense and one re-disposition figure for each disposition pair and year of followup.At the same time, it multiplied each figure by the relevant unit cost for the system and for each offive sets of assumptions about unit costs to victims and others (i.e., two economic net benefits, oneassuming a low and the other a high estimate of service and output costs; and three financial net

benefits, one assuming a low estimate of service and output costs, the second a high estimate, and thethird the same high estimate plus a value for quality of life), all discounted at an annual rate of 5%to bring them to year 2000, present value terms. Summed over four years, the procedure yieldedone net benefit estimate for the justice system and, after adding victim and other losses and gains,two total economic net benefit estimates and three total financial net benefit estimates. Repetition ofthis procedure 1000 times for every disposition pair produced 1000 estimates for each of the six net

benefits, distributed as 95% probability distributions between lower and upper bounds on each sideof a mid-range dollar value.

getting tough on juvenile crime an analysis of costs and benefits

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