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Getting Heidegger Offthe West CoastCarleton B. ChristensenPublished online: 06 Nov 2010.

To cite this article: Carleton B. Christensen (1998): Getting HeideggerOff the West Coast, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy,41:1, 65-87

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Getting Heidegger Off the West Coast

Carleton B. Christensen

Australian National University

According to Hubert L. Dreyfus, Heidegger’ s central innovation is his rejection ofthe idea that intentional activity and directedness is always and only a matter ofhaving representational mental states. This paper examines the central passages towhich Dreyfus appeals in order to motivate this claim. It shows that Dreyfusmisconstrues these passages significantly and that he has no grounds for readingHeidegger as anticipating contemporary anti-representationalism in the philosophy ofmind. The misunderstanding derives from lack of sensitivity to Heidegger’ s ownintellectual context. The otherwise laudable strategy of reading Heidegger as aphilosopher of mind becomes an exercise in finding a niche for Heidegger inDreyfus’ s own unquestioned present. Heidegger is thereby mapped on to anintellectual context which, given its naturalistic commitments, is foreign to him. Thepaper concludes by indicating the direction in which a more historically sensitive,and thus accurate, interpretation of Heidegger must move.

In the last twenty to twenty-five years, interest in the though t of Martin

Heidegger has burgeoned. This is in large part due to Hubert L. Dreyfus’ s

influential interpretation. Dreyfus’ s general interpretative strategy is to read

Heidegger as, first and foremost, a genuinely theoretical philosopher with

important things to say in opposition to the dominant subject/object model of

cognition and action. He develops this general idea into a fairly detailed

interpretation of Heidegger which sits well with contemporary naturalist

sensibilities, at least if these sensibilities are sufficiently laid-back and non-

reductive to assuage fears of crude scientism. In this way, almost single-

handedly, he has secured for Heidegger a certain respectability even in

quarters by nature and tradition hostile to such ostensibly obscurantist,

`unscientific’ philosophy.

As Dreyfus reads him, Heidegger’ s central achievement lies in his antici-

pating contemporary anti-representationalist critiques of representational

theories of mind. Heidegger’ s prime innovat ion and novelty is to challenge

the subject/object model of mind which has dominated philosophy and

psychology from Descartes through Husserl to the present. The subject/

object model construes the knowing and acting `self’ as a `subject’ which is

always related intentionally to the world via `representations’ of `objects’ .

Heidegger, according to Dreyfus, rejects this: `Heidegger accepts intentional

directedness as essential to human activity , but he denies that [all]

intentionality is mental, that it is, as Husserl (following Brentano) claimed,

the distingu ishing characteristic of mental states ’ (pp. 50Ð 51; original

Inquiry, 41, 65±87

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emphasis). In other words, while Heidegger concedes that intentionality is

essential to being a `subject’ or `self’ , he rejects the traditional idea that it is

always and only a feature of the standard folk-psychological states and

experiences. Intentionality is not always and only what Dreyfus calls

representational intentionality, i.e. the being in, or having of, the standard

folk-psychological intentional states and experiences (pp. 72Ð 74). While `we

sometimes experience ourselves as conscious subjects relating to objects by

way of intentional states such as desires, beliefs, perceptions, intentions, etc.’

(p. 5), Dreyfus’ s Heidegger also insists that our actually relating to objects

by way of such standard folk-psychological states and experiences is `a

derivative and intermittent condition’ (p. 5). Only when our normal,

everyday dealings with familiar things become problematic, or break down

completely do psychological states and experiences with any kind of mental

or representational content arise (p. 76). Speaking both for himself and for

Heidegger, Dreyfus insists that when breakdown occurs and `I start to

deliberate, I do not just notice mental states that were already there; I start to

have [such mental states as] beliefs and desires’ (p. 78). Representational

intentionality itself, whether cognitive or volitive, theoretical or practical, is

thus indeed an intermittent condition founded in `a more fundamental sort of

intentionality’ (p. 49) which Heidegger calls `being-in’ or `being-amidst’

(pp. 44Ð 46). In general, Heidegger maintains that `all relations of mental

states to their objects presuppose a more basic form of being-with-things

which does not involve mental activity’ (p. 52). This more basic form of

being-with-things is an intentional, but quite non-representational skilful

engagement with everyday things Ð what Dreyfus calls `absorbed coping’ .

Such skilful coping with everyday things only takes place against a

background familiarity with organized wholes of such things, e.g. rooms,

offices, and public places furnished in their typical ways. Dreyfus claims at

least at one place that such background familiarity is what Heidegger means

`being-in-the-world’ (pp. 102Ð 4).

Now the thesis that in everyday skilful engagement with familiar things no

`representations’ , i.e. no standard folk-psychological states or experiences,

are necessarily involved is rather counterintuit ive, at least when taken

literally. Surely, when I am routinely hammering away, I do see that or how

the nail is going as it should , namely, straight, as I intend. Surely, I quite

literally perceive, come the appropriate moment, that the nail has been

hammered in as required, so that it is time to stop hammering. So is Dreyfus

right in attributing the above-mentioned thesis to Heidegger? Does

Heidegger ever say that in so-called `absorbed coping ’ with everyday things

there is no representational intentionality , in the quite radical sense that all,

or indeed even most, of the above everyday descriptions are false? There are

two ways to approach this question. One can look to the sources and ask if

the passages Dreyfus adduces as evidence for his interpretation really say

66 Carleton B. Christensen

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what he claims they say. Or one can attempt to draw an alternative overall

picture of Heidegger from which it follows that Heidegger does not say,

perhaps even contradicts, what Dreyfus puts into his mouth. (I have outlined

such an alternative picture in Christensen [1997] .) Although both approaches

are essential for any truly comprehensive critique of Dreyfus’ s interpretation,

it is clear that they cannot both be undertaken in one paper. Here I concen-

trate exclusively on the first. Specifically, I examine the most important

passages to which Dreyfus appeals to see whether they really say what

Dreyfus claims they do. Having shown that this is not so, I give some further

reasons for rejecting any suggestion that Heidegger is saying the kinds of

thing Dreyfus attributes to him. Finally, I suggest the direction to be taken by

any attempt to develop a more accurate reading of Heidegger as a theoretical

philosopher with important things to say on `mind’ , `intentionality’ , and the

like.

I. Dreyfus and Heidegger’ s Critique of the Traditional Doctrine ofIntentionality

Does Heidegger ever say that in so-called `absorbed coping ’ there is no

representational intentionality , even in a minimal, folk-psychological sense?

There are three central passages, all from GP , which, at least when taken out

of context, appear more than any others to give Dreyfus the evidence he

needs. I look at them in the order in which Dreyfus appeals to them.

Although I shall be concentrating primarily on these three passages, I will

also occasionally consider passages from other Heidegger texts to which

Dreyfus appeals.

(i) The first passage is from 9 (b), S. 89 (Hofstadter, pp. 63Ð 64). As cited

by Dreyfus (p. 51), it reads as follows:

The usual concepti on of intentio nality . . . misconstru es the structure of the self -directed ness-to ward, the intention. This misinterp retatio n lies in an erroneou ssubjectiv izing of intentio nality . An ego or subject is supposed , to whose so-calledsphere intentio nal experiences are then supposed to belong . . . The idea of a subjectwhich has intentio nal experiences merely inside its own sphere and is . . .encapsul ated within itself is an absurdit y which misconstrues the basic ontolog icalstructur e of the being that we ourselve s are. (BP, 63Ð 64, origina l emphasis) .

Dreyfus clearly regards this passage as amongst his best evidence for the

central claim that Heidegger is drawing attention to `a new kind of inten-

tionality (absorbed coping) which is not that of a mind with content directed

toward objects’ (p. 69). For this passage is adduced precisely in support of

the claim that Heidegger is denying that, in all cases, intentionality `is . . .

the distinguishing characteristic of mental states ’ (p. 51; original emphasis).

Getting Heidegger Off the West Coast 67

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Even a cursory examination of this quotation within its larger context

shows that Heidegger is not claiming anything like this. For if this passage

really were denying that all intentionality is representational, then it would

surely have to occur within a larger discussion in which Heidegger talks

precisely of `absorbed coping ’ . After all, `absorbed coping ’ is Dreyfus’ s only

example of non-representational intentionality and it is hard to see what else

could qualify as such. Yet throughout his entire discussion in 9 (b)

Heidegger does not talk, even once, of our `unthinking ’ (p. 94) skilful

engagement with familiar things, but exclusively of perception! Indeed,

Heidegger refers precisely to perception in what Dreyfus has omitted from

the first two sentences of his quotation. Quoted fully, these sentences read:

The usual concept ion of intentio nality misunders tands that toward which Ð in thecase of percepti on Ð the perceiving directs itself . According ly, it also misconstru es

the structur e of the self-dir ectedness -toward, the intentio . This misinterpr etation lies

in an erroneou s subjecti vizing of intentio nality .1

So whatever Heidegger is saying here, whatever the erroneous subjectivizing

is of which he speaks, it is an erroneous subjectivizing of perception. It

would, however, be absurd to say that, pace the tradition, perception is non-

representational Ð unless, of course, one understands by `representation’

something quite non-minimal, non-folk-psychological, non-Searlean and

non-Husserlian, namely, an entity quite literally in the mind which the mind

in some way manipulates, thereby achieving what is folk-psycholog ically

called perceiving an object. So already there is substantial evidence against

any claim that this passage underwrites the central contention of Dreyfus’ s

interpretation.

This becomes all the clearer when one investigates what Heidegger

actually means by the erroneous subjectivizing of perception. Heidegger

discusses this in 9 (b) of GP , S. 86Ð 91. There it is introduced as the second

of two ways in which the notion of intentionality has traditionally been

misinterpreted, the first being so to speak its complement, namely, erroneous

objectivizing, which apparently consists in treating intentionality as a

relation in a quite standard sense between a subject and an external object.2

It

is important to note how Heidegger opens his discussion of this second kind

of misinterpretation: he describes it as `a new kind of misinterpretation to

which non-phenomenological philosophy almost universally falls victim’ .3

Heidegger thus clearly associates the tendency to subjectivize intentionality

primarily with non-phenomenological philosophy. So his very opening

words indicate that he does not wish to accuse Husserl, or for that matter

Scheler, of erroneous subjectivizing. Yet it is essential to Dreyfus’ s

interpretation that Heidegger should regard Husserl just as guilty of

erroneous subjectivizing as either Descartes or, say, Brentano.

68 Carleton B. Christensen

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That Heidegger is thinking of neither Husserl nor Scheler becomes even

clearer in the course of his discussion. According to Heidegger, the tendency

to subjectivize intentionality arises when, as in erroneous objectivizing, one

persists in the naõ È ve assumption that intentionality is some kind of relation in

the standard sense, yet unlike the erroneous objectivizer, is sophist icated

enough to appreciate that intentional phenomena such as perceivings can be

in error. Appreciation of this possibility combines with the naõ È veteÂcommon

to both erroneous objectivizing and erroneous subjectivizing to encourage

the though t that the bearer of intentionality is related to something purely

subjective, something which does not exist independently, but rather belongs

in a subjective, immanent sphere.

Intentional experiences (Erlebnisse ), it is said , are qua items which belong to thesubjecti ve sphere , in themselves related only to what is itself immanent to this

sphere . Perceptions as something psychica l direct themselves towards sensation s,

mental images, memory traces and determination s which are added by a similarlyimmanent thinkin g to what is in the ® rst instance subjecti vely given .

4

Given this characterization of erroneous subjectivizing, Heidegger would

perhaps regard Descartes, Locke, and Hume as at least occasionally guilty of

it. Most likely, he has Brentano in mind since it is a common, if arguably,

mistaken, interpretation5

of the early Brentano that he was led by the

possibility of error to regard the intentional object as in some way immanent

to the mind.6

It is clear, however, that Heidegger could not possibly have

Husserl in his sights. For Husserl explicitly attacks and ridicules the view

that intentional states and experiences are directed at anything `in the mind’ .

When in this very subsection Heidegger insists that `[t]hat towards which

perception . . . is directed is the perceived itself’ ,7

he is using, and knows

himself to be using, a form of words derived from Husserl. With Husserl, and

by no means against him, Heidegger says:

In everyda y behavio r, say, in moving around this room, taking a look around myenviron ment, I perceiv e the wall and the window. To what am I directe d in thispercepti on? To sensation s? Or, when I avoid what is perceived, am I turning aside

from represen tationa l images and taking care not to fall out of these represen tationa limages and sensation s into the courtya rd of the university building ?

8

In no way, then, does Heidegger count Husserl amongst the erroneous

subjectivizers. So whatever the critique of traditional conceptions of

intentionality Heidegger is giving here, it does not touch Husserl. It is

therefore mistaken to subsume Heidegger’ s critique of Husserl under this

critique of the tradition. Yet this is precisely what Dreyfus does, indeed must

do. If the erroneous subjectivizing mentioned in the passage he quotes in

support of his interpretation really did consist in failure to appreciate that not

Getting Heidegger Off the West Coast 69

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all intentionality is representational, then Husserl would indeed be guilty of

this offence, and Heidegger would indeed accuse him of it. It is clear,

however, that given what Heidegger means by erroneous subjectivizing,

neither of these two things is true. This passage is not directed against

Husserl, and thus not directed against any conception of intentionality

according to which all intentionality is representational in that minimal sense

to which Dreyfus himself, as he fully appreciates (p. 50), must appeal.

In fact, in this whole subsection, as in the account of intentionality he

gives in 5 of PGZ, Heidegger clearly sees himself as building on Husserl’ s

account of intentionality . This is shown by the following passage: speaking

of perceptual hallucination Heidegger says:

I can only ostensibl y or apparent ly (Vermeintlich ) grasp something if I, as the subject

which grasps (als Erfassende r), intend something at all. Only than can intending take

on the modi ® cation of merely ostensibl y or apparen tly intending. The intentional

relation does not arise ® rst through the actua l indepen dent presence of the objects ,

but rather lies in the perceiving itself , whether or not this perceiving be free of

illusion or deluded . Perceivin g must be perceiving-of something in order for me to be

able to be deluded about anythin g.9

There is nothing at all critical of Husserl in this, as the decidedly Husserlian

language shows. There is no reference here to a kind of intentionality which

is not a consciousness of something; indeed the only reference is to Husserl’ s

own favoured case of intentionality , namely, perception. Dreyfus says that

`(e)verything . . . turns on Heidegger’ s critique of Husserl’ s theory of

intentionality’ (p. 50), and in this he is certainly right. A correct inter-

pretation of Heidegger’ s critique of Husserl’ s brand of phenomenology is

indeed the key to understanding Heidegger himself. To suggest, however, as

Dreyfus does, that the objections raised here to the traditional doctrine of

intentionality constitute even part of Heidegger’ s critique of Husserl

amounts to a fundamental misunderstanding both of these objections and

of this critique.

To fend off this criticism Dreyfus might appeal to a passage from another

lecture of Heidegger’ s, namely, MAL. As cited by Dreyfus (pp. 52Ð 53), this

passage reads:

[Existence ] not only brings a modi ® cation of the traditio nal concep t of consciou sness

and of mind; the radical formulation of the intended phenomenon in an ontolog y of

Dasein leads to a fundamental, `univers al ’ overcoming of this position . From there

the previou s concep t of intentionality proves to be a restricted concepti on . . .

Because of this restricti on, intentionality is conceived primarily as `to take as’ [as

meaning-giving] . . . . Thus every act of directin g onesel f toward something receive s

the character istic of knowing, for example, in Husserl .10

70 Carleton B. Christensen

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Surely this passage shows that the traditional concept of consciousness and

intentionality which Heidegger is criticizing is one that he regards Husserl as

endorsing.

Once again, however, it is crucial to read the passage in its entirety, i.e.

without Dreyfus’ s substantial omissions, and in its context. Heidegger begins

by insisting with Husserl, aga inst all erroneous subjectivizing, that

intentional phenomena are related not to subjective entities in the subject’ s

immanent sphere, but rather to the very entities they purpor t to relate to,

namely, ordinary things. He then says that intentional phenomena are not

themselves sufficient for such intentional relatedness; they are rather

founded in what he calls being-amidst entities, which is in turn grounded in

existence in Heidegger’ s special sense of this word. Heidegger then

continues as follows:

With this, the limits of the previou s interpre tation and functio n of the concept ofintentio nality , as well as its fundamental signi ® cance, become visible . This concep tnot only brings a modi ® cation of the traditional concep t of consciou sness and ofmind; the radical formulation of the intended phenomenon in an ontolog y of Daseinleads to a fundamental, `univer sal’ overcoming of this position . From the standpointof such an ontolog y, the previous concep t of intentio nality proves to be a restricte dconcepti on insofa r as it takes intentionality to be a comporting towards present- at-hand entitie s (ein Verhalte n zu Vorhandenem ). This explain s why one is incline d toregard self-awareness (Selbsterf assung ) as an internal ly directed ontic intentio nality .Furthermore, because of this restricti on, intentio nality is conceiv ed primarily as `tomean’ (Meinen ), whereby meaning is understood as an indiffe rent characte r ofknowing. Thus every act of directin g onesel f toward something receives thecharacte ristic of knowing, for example, in Husserl , who characte rizes the basicstructur e of all intentio nal comporting as o . In this way, all intentio nality is inthe ® rst instance a knowing intendin g, on which other modes of comporting toentities are then built up. Scheler ® rst made clear, in particul ar in the essay `Love andKnowledge’ , that these intentio nal comportments are quite differen t and that loveand hate, for example, actually found knowing. Schele r is appropr iating here motifsfrom Pasca l and Augustine .

11

A crucial first step towards understanding what Heidegger is saying here

consists in appreciating that the subject of the second sentence in this

passage is not existence, as Dreyfus has it, but the concept of intentionality.

This correction puts a quite different spin on the entire passage. In the first

sentence Heidegger speaks amongst other things of the limitations of the

previous interpretation of intentionality and it is clear from the rest of the

passage that by this previous interpretation he means the account of

intentionality given by Husserl and his disciples. At the same time, it

becomes equally clear that in the next sentence, with which Dreyfus’ s

quotation begins, it is this Husserlian account of intentionality that is said to

have a fundamental critical significance for traditional notions of mind and

consciousness. Not existence, but Husserl’ s concept of intentionality brings a

Getting Heidegger Off the West Coast 71

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modification of these traditional concepts! Indeed, it is the Husserlian

concept of intentionality which, when elaborated with sufficient radicality in

a Heideggerian ontology of Dasein , leads to an overcoming of these

traditional conceptions. So here Heidegger is siding with Husserl’ s concept

of intentionality against traditional notions of mind and consciousness. Once

again we see that one must not subsume Heidegger’ s critique of Husserl

under his critique of the tradition.

But of course Heidegger is also criticizing Husserl in this passage. He says

that Husserl’ s concept of intentionality only leads to such an overcoming

when the phenomenon it intends is formulated radically, i.e. in Heideggerian

fashion. So according to Heidegger, Husserl’ s concept has, as it stands,

certain limitations which prevent it from realizing its full promise. What are

these limitations? The clue lies in the fact that, as the paragraph immediately

preceding this passage makes quite clear, Heidegger is focused primarily on

perceptual intentionality . This focus on perception intimates what Heidegger

is getting at when he says, in criticism of Husserl, that Husserl’ s concept of

intentionality is restricted `insofar as it takes intentionality to be a

comporting towards present-at-hand entities (ein Verhalten zu Vorhande-

nem )’ . Dreyfus has omitted this crucial clause from his version of the

passage, just as he has failed to note Heidegger’ s focus on perception. He

thus obscures the fact that what Heidegger is alleging against Husserl is that

the latter conceives intentional content, in particular, the intentional content

of perception, in too restricted a way.

How so? Substantiating the following account of what Heidegger is

getting at here would require provid ing an alternative reading which cannot

be undertaken here (see Christensen, 1997) . The general point, however, is

that, as Heidegger sees things, Husserl conceives the objects of perception as

if they were `contextless’ or subject-indifferent, in the sense of being given

exclusively in ways which do not reflect or presuppose that the subject of

perception is currently engaged in some specific goal-directed activity, with

all the volition s (intentions and desires) and indeed affections (what

Heidegger calls one’ s Befindlichkeit) that this entails. Thus, this concept of

intentionality tends to exclude from perceptual content such subject-relative

properties and relations as `being too far away to grasp with one’ s hand’ ,

`being too hot to drink now’ or `stepping out in front of one dangerously

close, i.e. so closely that one cannot continue with what one is currently

doing ’ . Instead, it tends to construe intentional objects objectivistically, as if

they were given only under such `contextless’ and subject-indifferent

descriptions as `being approximately two metres away from one’ , `having a

temperature lying within a range high enough to cause painful sensations of

heat’ , or `stepping out in front of one between two to three metres away at

five to eight kilometres per hour ’ .

72 Carleton B. Christensen

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In the middle of this passage, Heidegger begins to intimate what is

responsible for this restricted view of intentional ity and its content.

Traditional, non-Husserlian notions of consciousness and mind embraced

the metaphysical attitude. That is, they all assumed that theoretical activity is

the business of discovering what all phenomena `truly’ or `really’ are.

Consequently, they felt compelled to construe intentional relatedness to the

world as in principle explicable in terms of the `contextless’ , subject-

indifferent entities, properties and relations of which theoretical activity

gives us knowledge. With this, however, the tradition has encumbered itself

with the falsely objectivizing picture of everyday perceptual content outlined

above. Relatedly, the tradition is now able to conceive cognition as if it were

a `faculty’ separable from the non-cognitive `faculties’ of volution and

affection. The tradition now takes a fateful step: on the basis of its restricted

view of perceptual content and perceiving it assumes that cognizing and

perceiving are the same across the board, whether one is talking about

whatever cognizing and perceiving goes on in theoretical activity or about

everyday cognition and perception. Everywhere cognition and perception are

as they are in theoretical activity, namely a disinterested, volitively and

affectively unconditioned noting (Meinen) of how things are to which all

volitions and affections are contingent accretions.

Now Heidegger believes that Husserl, as much as he rejects the idea of

things as they `truly’ are, and a special discipline called metaphysics which

establishes that such and such a level of description gets at things as they

`really’ are, retains a residual allegiance to some consequences of the

metaphysical attitude underlying traditional notions of mind and conscious-

ness. In particular, because he retains the idea of perception as an intentional

relation to a subject-indifferent, present-at-hand entity (Vorhandenes), he

shares in the traditional prejudice that everyday cognizing and perceiving are

but unsystematic forms of theoretical cognizing and perceiving. So for

Husserl, too, all forms of cognition and perception, even the non-theoretical

kinds, are disinterested, colourless notings of how things are upon which all

volitions and affections are founded. This is why Husserl conceives

intentionality primarily as `meaning something’ , i.e. Meinen `whereby

meaning is understood as an indifferent character of knowing’ .12

According

to Heidegger, the only significant thinker within the phenomenological

tradition not to have succumbed to this residual prejudice is Max Scheler.

So what Heidegger is doing in this passage, first and foremost, is

criticizing the traditional conception of intentionality for a number of faults

only some of which are shared by Husserl. To do this is obvious ly not to

convict Husserl of endorsing the traditional conception itself. In fact, the

objection that Heidegger is voicing here against Husserl is that he retains a

residual allegiance to an aspect of the traditional conception of intention-

ality, even though in other respects he has done so much to overcome it. That

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this is Heidegger’ s position is made quite clear in the basically similar

passages of 5 in PGZ. This section of Heidegger’ s lecture contains his most

detailed presentation of Husserl’ s theory of intentionality and phenomen-

ology. And here, too, amidst a basically Husserl-inspired account of

intentionality, we find Heidegger registering a similar dissatisfaction with

the way Husserl takes knowing, indeed, theoretical knowing, as exemplary.

Speaking of Husserl, Heidegger says:

Intentio is understood in phenomenology also as the act of meaning [Vermeinen ].

There is a connecti on between meaning and the meant, or noesis and noema. No

means to perceiv e [vernehm en ] or come to awareness , to apprehend simply, the

perceiving itself and the perceived in the way it is perceived. I refer to these terms

because they constitu te not merely a terminology , but also a certain interpre tation of

what it is to be directed intentio nally at something . Every directedness towards

something , fear , hope, love, has the characte r of directed ness which Husserl calls

noesis . Inasmuch as o is taken from the sphere of theoreti cal knowing, one gives

an accoun t of the practica l sphere as based in the theoreti cal .13

Note two things about this passage: first, it shows quite clearly what was said

above, namely, that what Heidegger objects to about Husserl’ s terminology

of noesis and noema is that it reflects the traditional assumption that the

intentionality of everyday life can be best understood as an unsystematic

form of what goes on in theoretical activity. Heidegger thus does not reject

Husserl’ s terminology because it misconstrues an allegedly non-represen-

tational intentionality as if it were representational. Heidegger here is not

interested in defending the non-representational against the representational,

but rather the non-cognitive against the cognitive, and the non-theoretical

against the theoretical. It hardly needs to be said that these three distinctions

are not the same, though Dreyfus tends to link them together, e.g., in the way

he binds Heidegger’ s account of how the theoretical arises out of the non-

theoretical into a larger account of how, in so-called breakdown, the

representational arises out of the non-representational (pp. 69Ð 84). Second,

while Heidegger rejects the specifically Husserlian terminology of noesis

and noema, he nevertheless fully endorses its general spirit and character.

For he adopts what he regards as a less tendentious version of Husserl’ s

notions for all intentional comportments. In so doing , he uses language

adapted straight from Husserl: in all intentional comportments

[w]e . . . have an inheren t af® nity between the way something is intended, the

intentio , and the intentum , whereby intentum , the intended , is to be understood in the

sense just develop ed, not the perceived as entity , but the entity in the how of its

being-p erceived , the intentum in the how of its being-intended . Only with the how of

the being-intended belongi ng to every intentio as such does the basic constitu tion of

intentio nality come into view at all, even though only provisionally.14

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We find Heidegger here committed to what is basically the standard

Husserlian line that to be intentional is to have or involve Husserlian

intentional content. To all intents and purposes, then, Heidegger is endorsing

the claim that everything intentional is representational in the sense defined

above, namely, satisfaction of some folk-psychological predicate which

articulates what is misleadingly called a `propositional attitude’ .

Thus nothing is achieved by appeal to the passage from MAL which

Dreyfus quotes in truncated form on pages 52Ð 53. When we look at this

passage in its entirety, restore it to its context and compare it with similar

passages in PGZ, we see that it lends no support to Dreyfus at all. It should in

any case be obvious that this passage and its cousins in PGZ could not be

criticizing Husserl for failing to appreciate that not all forms of intentionality

are representational. For in this and the other passages Heidegger, while

referring to Scheler, does not criticize him. Yet Scheler, no less than Husserl,

overlooks Dreyfus’ s non-representational `absorbed coping ’ .

In fact, Heidegger, unlike Dreyfus, does not lump Husserl and Scheler

indiscriminately together with modern philosophers from Descartes to

Brentano Ð as if first there was darkness, then there was Heidegger and all

was light. As we have already seen, Heidegger’ s critique of Husserl is by no

means just a variation on his critique of the tradition and of pre-Husserlian,

pre-phenomenological conceptions of intentionality in particular. A careful

reading of 11Ð 13 of PGZ, where Heidegger elaborates in some detail a

critique of Husserl and previous phenomenology, makes it clear that

Heidegger objects not primarily to Husserl’ s theory of intentionality but to

the latter’ s methodological attitude. What Heidegger primarily objects to

about Husserl is the way he unwittingly retains the assumption that

phenomenological reflection on consciousness and intentional phenomena

can achieve its goals by idealizing these entities, i.e. by abstracting from

their specificity and individuality.

(ii) We come now to Dreyfus’ s second central passage from GP. This is

taken from 21, S. 439Ð 40 (Hofstadter, p. 309), and, as cited by Dreyfus

(p. 65), reads as follows:

We do not always and continu ally have explici t percepti on of the things surrounding

us in a familiar environment, certainly not in such a way that we would be aware of

them as expressl y availabl e . . . In the indifferent imperturb ability of our customary

commerce with them, they become accessibl e precisely with regard to their

unobtrusive presence . The presupp osition for the possible equanimity of our dealing

with things is, among others , the uninterrupted quality of that commerce. It must not

be held up in its progress .

Dreyfus takes this passage to show that, according to Heidegger, when

skilfully using hammer and nail, `I am not aware of any determinate

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characteristics of the hammer or of the nail. All I am aware of is the task, or

perhaps what I need to do when I finish’ (p. 65).

But once again it is crucial both to restore this passage to its context and to

include that part of it which Dreyfus has excised. Some corrections of the

translation are also useful:

We do not continu ally and explicit ly perceiv e each one of the things surroun ding usin a familiar environment, certainly not in such a way that we would be aware ofthem as expressl y available . Precisely by not explicit ly ascertain ing and con ® rming

their presenc e at hand we have them around us in their own distincti ve way, just asthey are in themselves . In the indiffe rent equanimity of our customary commercewith them, they become accessibl e precisely in their unobtru sive presence . The

presupp osition for the possible equanimity of our dealing with things is, amongothers, the uninterrupted quality of that commerce . It must not be held up in itsprogress.

15

Now this passage is located in a very long paragraph in which Heidegger

claims that `(b)ecause everything positive becomes particularly clear when

seen from the side of the privative’ ,1 6

we must orient ourselves on how

things show themselves in breakdown if we wish to understand the particular

temporal character of equipment. This indicates that Heidegger’ s use of the

adverbs `explicitly’ and `expressly’ are to be taken seriously: Heidegger is

saying that, when operating in a familiar environment, we have no explicit

awareness of the things we are dealing with. Heidegger’ s real position thus

could be, and I think is in fact, the following: in any familiar environment we

are always seeing the familiar things around us as a group, as a diffuse and

inexplicit totality, i.e. precisely in their unobtru sive presence as the things in

the room. Precisely because we have this background awareness we are able

to see what is relevant, and able not to see what is not Ð `see’ here taken in

the sense of what Heidegger calls natural perception of individual things, e.g.

of the chair we need to avoid, in contrast to the picture on the wall, whose

presence is irrelevant to what we are currently doing . We are aware of the

totality and it is for this reason that we are able to see some things (the

relevant things) in their relevance, while not having to see other things. The

passage quoted above from GP is clearly compatible with this position and

thus in no way says what Dreyfus thinks it does, namely, that we have no

awareness of individual things and their determinate characteristics.

But surely, one might object, Heidegger cannot be simply making the

point that when dealing with familiar things we have no explicit awareness

of these things. The point is so obvious as not to be worth making. But once

again the appropriate response lies in taking seriously the sentence omitted

by Dreyfus, namely, `Precisely by not explicitly ascertaining and confirming

their presence at hand we have them around us in their own distinctive way,

just as they are in themselves’ . For this sentence indicates why it is indeed

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worth Heidegger’ s while to make an otherwise insignificant point : hovering

in the background here is Heidegger’ s desire to counter the traditional

metaphysical notion that the being of things as they appear to us in our

unprob lematic dealings with them is somehow subjective, less `real’ and `in

itself’ , than how they appear in theoretical observing and examining. What

and how things are at the level of practical dealing with them, their everyday

identity and appearance, is just as real as the identity they have under

theoretical description and explanation. If, however, we wish to get at this

everyday being, we must recognize that because we are not expressly or

explicitly aware of familiar things in our dealings with them, we must access

this being via its privative form, that is, by examining how these things show

themselves when there is a hitch or, to use Dreyfus’ s word, a breakdown.

(iii) The third of Dreyfus’ s three central passages from GP is taken from

15, S. 232 (Hofstadter, p. 163); it is quoted by Dreyfus (p. 66; original

emphasis) as follows:

The equipmenta l nexus of things , for example, the nexus of things as they surroun d

us here, stands in view, but not for the contemplato r as though we were sitting here inorder to describ e the things . . . . The view in which the equipmental nexus stands at

® rst, completely unobtrusive and unthoug ht, is the view and sight of practica lcircumspectio n , of our practica l everyda y orientat ion. `Unthough t’ means that it isnot thematically apprehended for delibera te thinkin g about things; instead , in

circumspection , we ® nd our bearing s in regard to them. . . . When we enter herethrough the door , we do not apprehend the seats, and the same holds for the

doorknob. Neverthel ess, they are there in this peculia r way: we go by themcircumspectly , avoid them circumspectly , . . . and the like .

The crucial words and phrases here are `unthought’ (unbedacht) and

`deliberate thinking about things ’ (ein Bedenken der Dinge). Heidegger says

that `unthought’ means here not `thematically apprehended’ ; as he says in

the sentence immediately following the quoted passage, `[t]he stairs, the

corridors, windows, chair and set, board and the other things are not

thematically given’ .17

As elsewhere, so, too, here, thematic apprehension

means explicit, deliberate awareness in the sense of deliberately thinking to

oneself, e.g. `That red chair there is broken, so I had better avoid it’ , `That

book which someone has dropped on the floor in front of me’ , and so on. It is

obvious that, all else being equal, we are not aware of things in the room in

this sense; if we were, there would be a combinatorial explosion of things we

apprehended upon entering the room.

It is equally obvious, however, that to say this is not to say that we have no

awareness of individual things, and thus of these things as thus and so . That

Heidegger fully appreciates this obvious point, and is thus not saying what

Dreyfus imputes to him, becomes even clearer once a crucial mistranslation

of this passage is corrected. The last sentence of the quoted passage reads in

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Hofstadter’ s translation as follows: `Nevertheless, they are there for us in this

peculiar way: we go by them circumspectly, avoid them circumspectly,

stumble against them, and the like.’18

The German, however, reads as

follows: `Gleichwohl sind sie da in dieser eigentuÈ mlichen Weise, daû wir

umsichtig an ihnen vorbeigehen, umsichtig vermeiden, daû wir uns sto û en

und dergleichen.’1 9

Notice that the verb `vermeiden’ in this sentence does

not have the accusative plural pronoun `sie’ as its object. This means that the

nominal clause `daû wir uns sto û en’ is its true object. So the sentence must

be translated as follows: `Nevertheless, they are there for us in this peculiar

way: we go by them circumspectly, we circumspectly avoid stumbling

against them and the like.’ So translated, this sentence intimates that our

skilfully avoiding the things in the room is not at all as `extensional’ as

Dreyfus would have it. It is not just a matter of automatically responding to

the presence of such things as chairs by going around rather than running

into them. Rather, our everyday dealings with the things in a room are quite

`intensional’ Ð `intensional’ in the sense that they essentially involve seeing

things in their specificity as chairs to be avoided, and so on. It is a matter of

circumspectly behaving with regard to, or even with care towards, them.

This intimates the importance of taking seriously the preposition `zu’ in

Heidegger’ s notion of `Sichverhalten-zu’ (self-comportment towards). Pace

Dreyfus, there is something subjectively circumspect and purposeful about

Umgang mit innerweltlichem Seienden .

This suggests something already hinted at in the discussion of the previous

passage: Heidegger’ s practical circumspection, while not explicit, i.e. self-

conscious, is certainly an ever-present seeing of the individual things

relevant to what one is doing in their relevance for what one is doing against

a background awareness of a diffusely present totality of things Ð what

Heidegger calls the equipmental nexus (Zeugzusammenhang). It is, as

Heidegger himself says, a sight which guides:2 0

the individual entities seen,

because seen in their relevance, are seen as internally related to this

background nexus against which they so to speak stand out. Let us note that

just as awareness of these individuals is embedded in the background

awareness, so, too, the background awareness of the equipmental nexus only

occurs with this foreground-seeing embedded in it. Practical circumspection

is a foreground seeing of relevance moving around within this background

awareness.

II. Some Ancillary Objections

Given the disparity which the previous section has shown to exist between

how Dreyfus interprets Heidegger’ s critique of traditional intentionality and

what Heidegger appears to intend, one must expect to find other mismatches

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between Dreyfus’ s interpretation and Heidegger’ s texts. There are in fact at

least three ways in which Dreyfus’ s Heidegger seems not to be present in the

texts:

(i) C learly, both in the account of the proper role of so-called

representational intentionality , which emerges at the level of deliberate

coping, and in the account of originary transcendence, which consists in an

ostensibly completely general, always activated skill of knowing how to

bring one’ s specific skills to bear in familiar situations, the notion of

`absorbed coping ’ has a lot of work to do. Yet Heidegger himself, who is

notorious for thinking up distinctions, real or otherwise, and giving them

neologistic titles, has no term for what on Dreyfus’ s account must be one of

his most central concepts. Absorbed coping is certainly not what Heidegger

calls `Umgang in der Welt und mit dem innerweltichen Seienden’ ,2 1

i.e.

dealing within the world with entities in the world. For Heidegger explicitly

introduces this term as another name for our everyday being-in-the-world; it

therefore encompasses at least both absorbed coping and deliberate coping.

Furthermore, some kinds of Umgang can have a theoretical rather than a

practical point, since that kind of Umgang which Heidegger calls Besorgen ,

i.e. concern, our dealings with entities as non-`selves’ , includes the everyday

practice of science.2 2

Yet Dreyfus contrasts `coping ’ , both absorbed and

deliberate, with so-called detached, objectifying theoretical reflection (pp.

70Ð 83). Finally, while Dreyfus’ s notion of `absorbed coping ’ is in one way

too narrow to encompass all of what Heidegger regards as Besorgen , in

another, it is too broad. For Dreyfus uses the notion as encompassing not

merely Besorgen , i.e. our dealings with entities as non-selves, but also what

Heidegger calls FuÈ rsorge ,2 3

i.e. solicitude, or dealings with entities as other-

`selves’ . Thus, Dreyfus speaks of `our shared transparent activity of coping

with equipment (concern) and coping with people (solicitude)’ (p. 150).

Not merely does Heidegger, however, not bother to distinguish what on

Dreyfus’ s interpretation one must surely expect him to distinguish. Dreyfus’ s

notion of coping, whether absorbed or deliberate, fails to map in any easy

way onto certain very important distinctions Heidegger does make.

Consequently, it threatens to obliterate these genuinely Heideggerian

distinctions, or at least obscure their significance. Heidegger distingu ishes

in the first instance concern (Besorgen), solicitude (FuÈ rsorge), and care itself

(Sorge ). Besorgen comprises all our dealings and interactions, whether

theoretical or practical, with entities in their capacity as non-`selves’ .

FuÈ rsorge comprises all our dealings with others in their capacity as such

other `selves’ or `subjects’ . Heidegger’ s central concept of Sorge or care is,

in the first instance, the `genus’ of the first two; this is intimated by the way

Heidegger deliberately exploits the fact that the first two terms have the noun

Sorge and the verb sorgen as their root. In the second instance, however,

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Sorge is not just what is common to Besorgen and FuÈ rsorge , it is also one’ s

relation to self, a relation which is realized only in and through one’ s relation

to entities as such (Besorgen) and one’ s relation to others (FuÈ rsorge) and

which can be either authentic or inauthentic. The crucial thing to note here is

that Besorgen is distinct from FuÈ rsorge in virtue of what it, so to speak,

operates on: it operates on entities as non-selves.

Dreyfus’ s coping, on the other hand, is much more diffuse; it seems we are

coping absorbedly, whether we are working with wood or playing in a

basketball team or teaching a class. Yet it would be clearly wrong to regard

such `coping’ as what is common to Besorgen and FuÈ rsorge . Certainly, if

such `coping’ is in any way common to these two, it is not so in the way in

which Heidegger holds Sorge to be common to both. So Dreyfus’ s notion

cuts completely across Heidegger’ s distinctions between Besorgen and

FuÈ rsorge . It maps in no straightforward way on to distinctions and concepts

in Heidegger’ s own texts; the claim that it is to be found in Heidegger, that

indeed it constitutes the heart of Heidegger’ s critique of Husserl, inten-

tionality, and the tradition, and is the core notion in Heidegger’ s account of

everydayness, must constitute at best an extremely radical reconstruction of

Heidegger.

(ii) Dreyfus insists that, according to Heidegger, traditional representational

intentionality Ð beliefs, intentions, desires, and so on Ð only arises at the level

of deliberate coping, when some kind of hitch forces one to deliberate about

what one is doing and what one is operating with (p. 78; cited above). If this

is right, then Heidegger cannot maintain that deliberation (UÈ berlegung ) is a

feature of all kinds of Besorgen as such. For if it were, then representational

intentionality would be implicated in all kinds of practical Besorgen ; not

merely would there, there could be, no distinction in Heidegger between

absorbed and deliberate coping. This would immediately falsify Dreyfus’ s

central contention that Heidegger wants to draw our attention to a non-

representational form of intentionality .

Unfortunately for Dreyfus’ s interpretation, Heidegger does indeed allow

deliberation as just such a general feature. He says:

In any particul ar using or manipulat ing of entitie s the synoptic circumspectio n(`»uÈ bersichtl iche« Umsicht ’ ) of concer n (Besorgen ) brings the ready-to-hand closerto Dasein in that it lays out (Auslegung ) what has been sighted . This speci ® c,circumspectly interpretive bringin g-close r of what is to be taken care of we calldelibera tion. The scheme peculia r to delibera tion is the `if-then’ ; for example, if thisor that is to be made, put to use, or averted , then these or those means, circumstancesor opportunities are require d. Circumspect delibera tion illuminates the particul argiven situatio n of Dasein in the practica l setting (Umwelt) with which it isconcern ed. . . . Deliberati on can be performed even when that which in delibera tionis circumspectly brought closer is not palpably ready-to-hand and within immediate

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sight . The bringin g-close r of the surroun ding practica l setting in circumspectdelibera tion has the existenti al sense of being a making presen t . For envisaging isonly a mode of making present . In envisaging, delibera tion sees directly what isneeded but unavailable. Envisagin g circumspection does not relate itself to `mere

represen tations ’ .24

It is clear enough from this passage, murky as it is, that Heidegger is talking

about the practical circumspection which guides25

all concern, all taking care

of things (Besorgen). But if this should be doubted , one need only note the

very last sentence on the previous page, where Heidegger speaks of

exhibiting the genesis of science by characterizing the circumspection

`which guides `̀ practical’ ’ concern (`̀ das »praktische« Besorgen’ ’ ).’26

So the

deliberation of which Heidegger speaks here is not at all something that

comes only with a hitch in so-called absorbed coping; it is an integral feature

and character of the practical circumspection which guides all engaged

activity with entities.

Interestingly, on page 73 of his book Dreyfus himself uses elements of the

passage just quoted. Using a slightly altered version of the Macquarrie and

Robinson translation, he has Heidegger say:

Deliberati on can be performed even when that which is brough t close in itcircumspectivel y is not palpably availabl e and does not have presence within theclosest range . . . . In envisaging, one’ s delibera tion catches sight directl y of thatwhich is needed but which is unavailable.

What is interesting about this passage, apart from the unnecessarily obscure

translation of `in der naÈ chsten Sichtweite anwesend ist’ as `have presence

within the closest range’ , is a rather surprising omission. Right in its

middle, Dreyfus has left out two sentences which make it clear that

deliberation is associated quite generally with what Heidegger calls

`making-present’ (GegenwaÈ rtigen), and not just with envisaging (Ver-

gegenwaÈ rtigen). In other words, deliberation consists in a quite general

seeing of needed means, relevant circumstances or opportunities to be

exploited, whether or not these means, circumstances or opportunities are

actually given in the context of practical activity. It is thus not exclusively

associated with the long-range planning (pp. 72Ð 73) and anticipation of

means, relevant circumstances, or opportunities which according to

Dreyfus is what Heidegger means by envisaging, and which Dreyfus

clearly regards as involving representational intentionality (pp. 73Ð 74).

Given this generality, what Heidegger means by deliberation is precisely

an anticipation of relevant means, circumstances, and opportunities which

may well be quite context-bound and thus the kind of making-present to be

found even in engaged practical activity which is going smoothly, i.e. in

what Dreyfus calls `absorbed coping ’ .

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(iii) Dreyfus’ s Heidegger is out to attack the identification of intentionality

with representational intentionality . Dreyfus says, as we saw earlier, that

while `Heidegger does not deny that we sometimes experience ourselves as

conscious subjects relating to objects by way of intentional states such as

desires, beliefs, perceptions, intentions, etc., . . . he thinks of this as a

derivative and intermittent condition that presupposes a more fundamental

way of being-in-the-world that cannot be understood in subject/object terms’

(p. 5). In such everyday intentional behaviour as my hammering a nail,

provided everything is going well, I have no representational states or

experiences at all. So where Heidegger talks about such activity , we must

expect to find him not describing such activity in any representational ways

at all.

This, however, is precisely what Heidegger does. In 5 of PGZ Heidegger

speaks precisely of `a concrete and natural perception, the perception of a

chair which I find upon entering a room and push aside, since it stands in my

way’ .27

Here Heidegger is speaking of a perceiving which is embedded in

what Dreyfus would surely have to regard as a paradigm case of allegedly

representationless `absorbed coping ’ , namely, everyday dealing with house-

hold objects in the organized totality of equipment which constitutes a room

full of furniture and other accoutrements. Indeed, Dreyfus himself appeals to

this case as a prime example of `absorbed coping ’ , speaking extremely

vaguely of my `set’ or `readiness’ to cope with chairs, which is nothing

representational but rather a skill for dealing with them (p. 103). It is true

that Heidegger, having spoken of the concrete, natural perception we have

when dealing with everyday things, goes on to say that he is talking here of

`the most common kind of everyday perception and not perception in the

emphatic sense, in which we observe only for the sake of observing’ .28

But

this harms rather than helps Dreyfus’ s cause because it intimates fairly

directly that Heidegger is not at all pleading the case of the non-

representational against the (minimally) representational, but rather defend-

ing the non-theoretical against the primacy of the theoretical and the non-

cognitive against the primacy of the cognitive.

In fact, the whole account of intentionality which Heidegger gives here is

perfectly compatible with, is indeed an endorsement of, Husserl’ s account of

intentionality. Heidegger says, for example, that in his lecture he `will

attempt to show that intentionality is a structure of lived experiences

(Erlebnisse ) as such’ .29

So, for Heidegger as for Husserl, intentionality is a

structure of lived experience, just as the word `Erlebnis’ is, pace Dreyfus

(p. 68), just as much Heidegger’ s term as Husserl’ s. Admittedly, Heidegger

does say that intentionality , being a structure of lived experience as such, is

`not a coordination relative to other realities, something added to the

experiences taken as psychic states’ .30

But this is hardly un-Husserlian; in

fact, at this point Heidegger is attacking the conception of intentionality he

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attributes, rightly or wrongly, to thinkers other than Husserl, in particular, to

Brentano.

In the meantime, let us note how Heidegger uses the word `Verhaltung’ in

5 of PGZ. Dreyfus makes much of the fact that Heidegger uses the term

`Verhaltung’ (comportment) to designate what has the structure of

intentionality. According to Dreyfus, Heidegger does this because the word

`comportment’ has no mentalistic, representational connotations, unlike the

more traditional terminology of `lived experience’ (Erlebnis) and the more

Husserlian terminology of `acts’ . In this way, thinks Dreyfus, Heidegger

intimates that what has intentionality need not be psychological, hence

representational in any standard sense, and thus need not have any

representational content, any noema, in Husserl’ s sense. As we have seen,

however, while Heidegger does reject Husserl’ s terminology of noesis and

noema, he does not do so for the reasons Dreyfus claims. Indeed, Heidegger

remains, as we have seen, fundamentally committed to the standard

Husserlian line that to be intentional is to have or involve Husserlian

intentional content. Precisely in this section, where he uses the word

`Verhaltung’ repeatedly, he adopts the position that everything intentional is

representational in a minimal sense that is perfectly Husserlian. So

Heidegger’ s actual use of the word `Verhaltung’ in this section simply does

not bear Dreyfus out.

Why, then, does Heidegger speak of `Verhaltungen’ , i.e. comportments?

Dreyfus is right to say that Heidegger chooses this word because it does not

have certain traditional connotations to which he objects. But these

connotations, and Heidegger’ s objections to them, are not what Dreyfus

claims they are. Before one can truly understand Heidegger’ s preference for

the word `Verhaltung’ , however, one must first understand what Heidegger

really objects to about the subject/object model of the `subject’ , `self’ , or

`mind’ . This brings us back to the need for a positive alternative to com-

plement a purely negative critique. I will thus conclude by indicating the

general form and desiderata of an alternative interpretation.

III. Retrieving Heidegger

In order to identify Heidegger’ s real innovat ion and novelty regarding the

concepts of `self’ and of intentionality, one must understand what he means

by Dasein . In particular, one must determine what Heidegger means when he

says that Dasein is the entity `which, in its very Being, comports itself

understandingly towards that Being’ .31

That this is Heidegger’ s most

fundamental preliminary characterization of Dasein is shown by his

description of it as indicating `the formal concept of existence’ .32

It is thus

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that characterization the unpacking of which brings one to the most

fundamental understanding of what it is to be a `subject’ or `self’ .

Curiously, Dreyfus does not appreciate the architectonic significance of

this fundamental initial characterization. A remarkable feature of Dreyfus’ s

account is just how cursory his interpretation of this is; in his hands, it plays

no structuring, unifying role at all. This is perhaps not surprising, since

Dreyfus seems not to appreciate Heidegger’ s methodological notion of

formal indication.3 3

At no point, for example, does he consider the

significance of Heidegger’ s remark that `[i]n our preparatory discussions

(Section 9) we have brough t out some characteristics of [Dasein ’ s Ð C.B.C.]

Being which will provide us with a steady light for our further investigation,

but which will at the same time become structurally concrete as the

investigation continues’ .34

Because he fails to see that the enterprise of

Being and Time consists precisely in unpacking such formal indications,

Dreyfus sees no need to show how the various insights and novelties he

attributes to Heidegger, in particular the latter’ s alleged insight into non-

representational `absorbed coping ’ , flow from the abstract structure which

formal indications such as this most fundamental one mark. True, on page 52

he does quote Heidegger as saying that `[t]o exist . . . means, among other

things, to be as relating to oneself by comporting with beings’ .35

He also

begins his fourth chapter by recalling how an essential feature of Dasein’ s

ontolog ical make-up is that it takes a stand on itself and its existence (p. 61).

Even so, no real effort is made to explain how Heidegger’ s initial

characterizations lead, when elaborated, to Dreyfus’ s `absorbed coping ’ as

an essential ontolog ical feature of Dasein . This general failure to understand

how Heidegger proceeds in Being and Time also explains Dreyfus’ s even

more remarkable insensitivity to the special significance Heidegger gives to

the notion of understanding. For Dreyfus, understanding is just one more

`Existential’ alongside others. Indeed, when Dreyfus roundly declares that

for Heidegger `primordial understanding is know-how’ (p. 184), thereby

acquiescing in the fashionable assimilation of Heidegger to Ryle and Dewey,

he reduces the significance of Heidegger’ s concept of understanding to zero.

Any truly adequate account of the early Heidegger will consciously

reverse this reduction of central concepts to a number of details listed

alongside many. It will read him in a way which brings out the essentially

systematic thrust of his earlier work. And it will achieve this by reading

Heidegger in a far more historically oriented way than Dreyfus does. For

Dreyfus simply does not read Heidegger in context; this is presumably what

Habermas was getting at when he remarked36

that Dreyfus treats Being and

Time as if it had just washed up as flotsam on the shores of some Californian

beach. In the otherwise commendable effort to make Heidegger intelligible ,

Dreyfus one-sidedly maps him on to debates and problems within con-

temporary cognitive science and North American philosophy of psychology.

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In so doing , he misconstrues Heidegger’ s undoub ted opposition to the

traditional subject/object model as an anticipation of contemporary anti-

representationalist positions, which attack computationalism and classical AI

for using computational analogues of Cartesian representations in their

psychological theories and models. Once he has in this way been brough t up

to speed with Dreyfus’ s own unquestioned present, Heidegger now appears

as a proto-participant in contemporary North American debates, hence as

someone who accepts the almost universal naturalist consensus which

governs such debates.

Greater sensitivity to, and awareness of, Heidegger’ s own intellectual

background would guard against such aberrations. Only it would allow one

genuinely to realize Dreyfus’ s guiding exegetical idea that Heidegger is to be

read first and foremost as a theoretical philosopher. At the very least, such

sensitivity would preclude the, at times, quite surprising scholarly defects of

Dreyfus’ s account, for example, his reading of a passage quoted from

Dilthey3 8

as a comment on Dilthey (p. 69). More importantly, however,

greater awareness of context would allow one to see that Heidegger’ s views

on `mind’ are not pale shadows of contemporary views about intentionality

and the `self’ which, for all their anti-representationalism, are nevertheless

trenchantly naturalist. It would also allow one to see that Heidegger is not at

all concerned to reject, even in part, the idea of representation as such.

Rather, his concern is to show that much early modern philosophy

dramatically fails to understand the true nature of `representations’ , that is,

of intentionality . Heidegger’ s critique of the subject/object model actually

runs tangentially to the concerns of contemporary anti-representationalism.

Unlike Rorty and so many others, he correctly sees that the distinctive

character of the subject/object model lies not in any appeal to `representa-

tion’ as such, but rather in its distinctive interpretation of `representation’ ,

and thus of the subject of `representation’ . What distinguishes the subject/

object model and gives it its genuinely `Cartesian’ character is its

interpretation of `representation’ as a psycho-physical transaction taking

place within a psycho-physical unity which can be modelled in a unified,

natural scientific psycho-physical theory. Heidegger is thus not out to

eliminate `representations’ , not even from a mere portion of the self’ s

intentional activity. Rather, he seeks to understand what it is to be a

representation, and in particular what it is to be something with

representations. Nor is this endeavour driven by some facile desire to

liberate culture, and in particular science, from the yoke of first philosophy.

Rather, it is driven by a concern to `destroy’ the metaphysical tradition so as

to liberate human though t from this tradition’ s currently hegemonic form.

This currently hegemonic form is precisely the metaphysics of naturalism so

rampant in contemporary North America. Heidegger joins with Husserl and

Dilthey in anti-naturalist opposition to the likes of Ernst Haeckel; for this

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reason, what he has to say constitutes a much more radical challenge to

contemporary orthodoxies than Dreyfus either appreciates or desires. For

Dreyfus would not himself reject the very idea of psycho-physics and the

contemporary naturalist consensus.

N O T E S

1 GP, 9, S. 89 (Hofstadter, p. 63).2 Heidegger ® rst uses the term `erroneous objectivising’ on S. 91 (Hofstadter, p. 65), 9 b) of

GP. His discussion of it, however, occurs much earlier in this subsection, namely, on S.83Ð 85.

3 GP, 9 b, S. 86 (Hofstadter, p. 61).4 GP, 9 b, S. 87 (Hofstadter, p. 62); trans. modi® ed.5 That this interpretation is mistaken has been ably argued by Andrew Gardiner, `Keeping

Consciousness in Mind’ (MA thesis, Department of Philosophy, Australian NationalUniversity, 1997).

6 In a similar sounding passage in MAL Heidegger explicitly mentions Brentano Ð see 9, S.168 (Kisiel, p. 134). He also mentions Brentano in 5 c . of PGZ, S. 61Ð 62 (Kisiel, p. 46).

7 GP, 9 b, S. 89 (Hofstadter, p. 63).

8 GP, 9 b, S. 88 (Hofstadter, p. 63).9 GP, 9, S. 85 (Hofstadter, p. 60); trans. modi® ed.

10 MAL, 9, S. 168Ð 9 (Kisiel, p. 134); Dreyfus’ s italics and gloss in the second brackets.11 MAL, 9, S. 168Ð 9; my trans.

12 MAL, 9, S. 168Ð 9; my trans.13 PGZ , 5 c. ., S. 60Ð 61.14 PGZ , 5 c. ., S. 61.

15 GP, 21, S. 439Ð 40 (Hofstadter, p. 309); trans. modi® ed.16 GP, 21, S. 439 (Hofstadter, p. 309).

17 GP, 15, S. 232Ð 3 (Hofstadter, p. 163); trans. modi® ed.18 GP, 15, p. 163.19 GP, 15, S. 232.

20 See SZ, 15, S. 69.21 SZ, 15, S. 66.

22 See SZ, 69 b, S. 358 and S. 364.23 See SZ, 26, S. 121.

24 SZ, 69 a, S. 359; p. 410; trans. modi® ed.25 See SZ, 15, S. 69.

26 SZ, 69 a, S. 358.27 PGZ , 5 a, S. 37.28 PGZ , 5 a, S. 37.

29 PGZ , 5 a, S. 36.30 PGZ , 5 a, S. 36.

31 SZ, 12, S. 53; p. 78; see also GP, 15, S. 224 (Hofstadter, p. 157).32 SZ, 12, S. 53; p. 78. See also SZ, 9, S. 41; p. 67.33 A formal indication (formale Anzeige) is an abstract characterization drawn from the

preceding tradition which both guides explication and is ¯ eshed out in this explication atthe same time. See, e.g., GP, , S. (Hofstadter, p.). For a brief exposition, see Kisiel (1993),

pp. 164 and 178.34 SZ, 12, S. 52; p. 78.35 GP, 15, S. 224 (Hofstadter, p. 157).

36 In Frankfurt in 1989, at a joint seminar on Heidegger held by Apel, Dreyfus, and Habermas.37 See, e.g., van Gelder (1991), esp. p. 380.

38 See Sein und Zeit, 43 b, S. 209.

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R E F E R E N C E S

Christensen, Carleton B. 1997. `Heidegger’ s Representationalism’ , Review of Metaphysics 51,77±104.

Dreyfus, Hubert L. 1991. Being-in-the-World (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Referred to in thetext simply by page number.

Hannay, Alastair. 1990. Human Consciousness (London: Routledge).Heidegger, Martin. 1989. Grundprobleme der PhaÈ nomenologie (Frankfurt am Main:

Klostermann, 2.te Au¯ age). Trans. A. Hofstadter (1988) as Basic Problems ofPhenomenology (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press). Referred to in the text as GP.

Heidegger, Martin. 1978. Metaphysische AnfangsgruÈ nde der Logik (Frankfurt am Main:Klostermann). Trans. T. Kisiel, (1980) as Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (Bloomington,IN. Indiana University Press). Referred to in the text as MAL.

Heidegger, Martin. 1979. Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (Frankfurt am Main:Klostermann). Trans. T. Kisiel, (1985) as History of the Concept of Time (Bloomington, IN:Indiana University Press). Referred to in the text as PGZ.

Heidegger, Martin. 1979. Sein und Zeit, 15.te Au¯ age, (TuÈ bingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag).Trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (1962) as Being and Time (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).Referred to in the text as SZ.

Kisiel, Theodore. 1993. The Genesis of Heidegger’ s Being and Time (Berkeley, CA:University of California Press).

Olafson, Frederick. `Heidegger aÁ la Wittgenstein or `̀ Coping’’ with Professor Dreyfus’ .Inquiry 37, 45Ð 64.

Scharff, Robert C. 1992. `Rorty and Analytic Heideggerian Epistemology Ð and Heidegger’ .Man and World 25, 483Ð 504.

Received 23 June 1997

Carleton B. Christensen, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, Australian NationalUniversity, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia

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