1

Germany, the Atlantic Slave Trade, and the New World Plantation

Economies, 15th to 18th Centuries1

Klaus WEBER

(The Rothschild Archive, the United Kingdom;

Institut für Geschichte der deutschen Juden, Germany)

1. Introduction

When seeking the protagonists of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and of the New World

plantation economies, which relied heavily on unfree labour, Germany does not easily come

into our minds. Before the belated creation of a nation state, in 1871, Germany had always

been a country with an insignificant merchant marine, and without colonies. The only more

widely known attempt to engage directly in the slave trade was the short-lived

Brandenburgisch-Africanische Compagnie, which was established by Prussia in 1680 and

maintained its own fortress on the West African coast. Its ships sailed under the flag of

Brandenburg, until it was wound up in 1711.2 Scholarly studies on the Atlantic World are

dominated by English-speaking authors, and from their point of view, Germany was a

land-locked, economically backward country. As Charles P. Kindleberger put it: “Apart from

those in its cities of Hamburg, Lübeck and Cologne, the Germany of the Holy Roman Empire

lacked effective merchants for the marketing of Renish cloth, Silesian linens, and East

Prussian grain and timber.”3 He believes that only from the early 19th century did German

1 This text draws heavily on: Klaus Weber: Deutschland, der atlantische Sklavenhandel und die

Plantagenwirtschaft der Neuen Welt (15. bis 19. Jahrhundert), in: Journal of Modern European History

(special issue “Europe, Slave Trade, and Colonial Forced Labour”) 7 (2009) 1, pp. 37-67. 2 Jürgen Nagel: Die Brandenburgisch-Afrikanische Compagnie. Ein Handelsunternehmen, in: Scripta

Mercaturae 30 (1996) Heft 1, pp. 44-94. Hermann Kellenbenz: Die Brandenburger auf St. Thomas, in:

Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas 2 (1965), pp. 196-217. 3 Charles P. Kindleberger: World Economic Primacy: 1500-1990. Oxford - New York (1996), p. 22

2

merchants established in London – notably Rothschild, Schroder and Baring – achieve a

deeper integration of Germany into world economy. The eminent German historian

Hans-Ulrich Wehler agreed that all German territories were excluded from the European

colonial and commercial expansion.4 Even Jürgen Osterhammel, who acknowledges that the

slave trade was the essential motor of trans-Atlantic economy, insists that only a very small

number of Germans participated in this trade, and when doing so, they never used German

ports for the turnover of the commodities involved.5

More recent studies have challenged the assumption that early modern Germany was not

an integral part of the western hemisphere. Margrit Schulte Beerbühl, for example, traced

more than 500 German merchants who were established in London during the period

1680-1820. They maintained close commercial links between England, its colonies, and

Germany, including both the Hanseatic cities Bremen and Hamburg, and regions in the deep

hinterland of Central Europe. Yet, even among this large group, the author identified just one

individual who was directly involved in the slave trade as a ship owner around 1700 (a certain

Peter Paggen from a rural town near Bremen).6 But when including not only entrepreneurs

who were immediately involved as owners of slave ships, but also those Germans who had

invested capital in the large joint stock slaving companies, a larger group emerges. It also

includes prominent merchant bankers, such as the Barings, who had arrived in London from

Bremen during the first half of the 18th century and soon became members of the Company of

Merchants Trading with Africa, and investors from Germany‟s financial markets Frankfurt

4 Hans-Ulrich Wehler: Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, vol. 1: 1700-1815, München (1987), p. 53.

5 Jürgen Osterhammel: Sklaverei und die Zivilisation des Westens, München (2000), p. 11.

6 Margrit Schulte Beerbühl: Deutsche Kaufleute in London. Welthandel und Einbürgerung (1660-1818),

München (2007), p. 112.

3

and Augsburg.7 Eric Saugera‟s meticulous study on the slave trade in Bordeaux has shown

that there was a significant direct involvement of Germans, running their ships under the

French flag. Bordeaux was the second French slaving port, after Nantes. Out of 411 slavers

leaving from Bordeaux between 1700 and 1793, 27 were owned by Germans and

Swiss-Germans established in Bordeaux.8

This paper will further include indirect involvement with the slave trade, such as

production and provision of barter commodities for the African coasts, and processing and

distribution of colonial goods produced by slaves on the plantations of the New World. The

production of sugar had driven European expansion into the Atlantic, and sugar will also serve

as an excellent example to demonstrate Central European interests in this process. Only in also

acknowledging these indirect links, will the macroeconomic conditions of German

participation, and its scope, become evident.

The paper will first recount the earliest entanglements of German entrepreneurs with the

Atlantic economy, and then demonstrate the continuity of interests far into the 18th century.

The second chapter will offer a few case studies to illustrate the particular profile of the

merchants involved. Finally, the paper will offer some quantitative data in order to illustrate

the impact these trading links had for the economy of Central European hinterlands.

2. From the early beginnings to the phase of the Thirty Years War

7 Anne T. Gary: The Political and Economic Relations of English and American Quakers (1750-1785),

Oxford (PhD thesis) (1935), p. 506. 8 Eric Saugera: Bordeaux port négrier. Chronologie, économie, idéologie, XVII

e-XIX

e siècles, Biarritz -

Paris (1995), pp. 351-362.

4

Earliest German interests in the sugar economy probably date back to the Crusades, when

contact with Islamic culture was intensifying. Europeans learned for the very first time the

techniques of sugar cane cultivation, and the extraction and refining of sugar. During the 13th

and 14th centuries, the Orders of Christian Knights, namely the Templars, created sugar

plantations on the Mediterranean islands of Rhodes and Cyprus, which were worked with

enslaved prisoners of war. The capital for these investments came from Venice and Genoa,

and to a minor extent from Southern Germany.9 From the Levant (the Eastern Mediterranean),

the sugar economy expanded via Sicily to the southern coasts of Spain and Portugal. From the

1420s the Ravensburger Kompanie acquired sugar cane fields near Valencia (Spain), and

erected a sugar mill. The Kompanie had been created in the South West of Germany around

1380, for the export of linen textiles to Southern Europe. Yet, during the very decade in which

this trading company also embarked on the sugar business, the Spaniards and Portuguese

began their expansion into the Atlantic. Their first step was the Spanish conquest of the

Canary Islands and the Portuguese colonisation of Madeira. The sub-tropical climate of these

islands allowed for a significant increase of the plantations‟ productivity, which caused a

decline of the sugar prices at the Antwerp stock exchange from 30 grams of silver per

kilogram of sugar in 1430 to only five grams in 1500. This was the main reason why the

Ravensburger Kompanie sold its Valencian estate, in 1477, in spite of the excellent quality of

their product.10

At the same time, sugar – hitherto only enjoyed by princes, popes and a small

elite of merchants and noblemen – became affordable to an ever expanding group of

consumers.

9 Barbara L. Solow: Capitalism and Slavery in the Exceedingly Long Run, in: Barbara L. Solow / Stanley L.

Engerman (eds.): British Capitalism and Caribbean Slavery: The Legacy of Eric Williams, Cambridge

(Cambridge Univ. Press) (1987), pp. 51-77, see pp. 53-55. 10

William D. Phillips jr.: Sugar in Iberia, in: Stuart B. Schwartz (ed.): Tropical Babylons: Sugar and the

making of the Atlantic World, 1450-1680, Chapel Hill - London (2004), pp. 27-41, see pp. 33-34.

5

If the Ravensburger had suffered from this expansion of the sugar economy, other

German merchants were among the protagonists of the first genuine mass production of sugar.

In 1508, the Welser family acquired one of the largest estates on the island of Tenerife.

Investments in land and sugar mills on neighbouring La Palma followed. Agents of this major

German industrial and financial trust were also present on Madeira and at the Lisbon stock

exchange, which had become a key hub of the sugar trade.11

The Canary Islands, Madeira and

São Tomé (an island off the coast of tropical West Africa, colonised by the Portuguese) were

in fact the great laboratory in which Europeans developed all the agricultural, logistical and

financial techniques which became fundamental for establishing the plantation economies of

the New World:

- employment of unfree labour (indentured European, local slave and imported African slave

labour);

- agro-industrial techniques of crop-raising;

- organisation of long-term credits for this capital-intensive business;

- efficient marketing of the product in Europe.

When the Spaniards established sugar plantations on their first Caribbean colony Santo

Domingo, the Welsers were once more in the business. From c.1530 until 1556 they held

shares of major estates and, more importantly, acquired an Asiento for the importation of

African slaves, in 1528. It was one of the first of these monopoly contracts which the Crown

sold to private businessmen, in order to secure a smooth supply of labour to the New World,

where European diseases were causing a heavy death toll among the indigenous population.

The 1528 Asiento was issued at the price of 20,000 ducats, for delivering 4,000 slaves.

11

Alberto Vieira: Sugar Islands. The Sugar Economy of Madeira and the Canaries, 1450-1650, in: Schwartz

(ed.), Tropical Babylons, pp. 42-84, see pp. 47, 67, 69.

6

Portuguese slave traders, experienced in this sector for decades, were sub-contracted for the

actual transportation. The contract was duly fulfilled by 1538.12

Even during this early phase, German merchants not only benefited from the Asiento and

from running plantations, but also from producing barter commodities for the purchase of

slaves on the African coast. Most prominent among the early providers of such goods was the

Fugger family. Like the Welser dynasty, the Fuggers were from the Southern German

financial and industrial city of Augsburg, and both are considered the major protagonists of

early capitalism north of the Alps. The Fuggers, at that time even more powerful than the

Welsers, were engaged in Central European textile production, in Alpine and Hungarian

copper mining and processing, in the Venetian spice trade, and they had leased large estates

from the Spanish Knight Orders. As bankers of the Vatican and of the Emperors of the Holy

Roman Empire, they exercised huge political power in Europe. Only recently, in April 2008,

was the wreck of a ship discovered which grounded on the coast of Namibia around the year

1530. Among its cargo were 17 tons of copper, with the Trident – the Fuggers‟ trade mark –

engraved on the metal sheets.13

This trade to Africa had continuity: in a contract sealed with

the Portuguese Crown in 1548, the Fuggers secured themselves the delivery “of 7,500

hundredweight of brass bracelets, 24,000 saucepans, 1,800 bowls, 4,500 barbers‟ basins, and

10,400 large kettles within the period of four years. All this brassware was […] explicitly […]

destined for the trade with the Guinea Coast.”14

From the 1530s the Portuguese colony of Brazil was being developed as a sugar colony,

and due to an abundance of arable land, water and timber (which was needed as fuel in the

12

Jörg Denzer: Die Konquista der Augsburger Welser-Gesellschaft in Südamerika (1528-1556), München

2005, pp. 51-55. 13

I owe the reference to this ship wreck to Prof. Jack Owens (Idaho State University). 14

Mark Häberlein: Die Fugger. Geschichte einer Augsburger Familie (1367-1650), Stuttgart 2006, p. 80.

7

process of sugar refining), it became the world‟s major producer of raw sugar. Here again the

Fuggers and merchants from Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle were on the scene with substantial

investments in plantations and mills. Brazilian plantations flooded European markets with ever

increasing quantities of sugar.15

During the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), Iberian dominance of the Atlantic basin

suffered heavily, in particular by the Dutch conquest of Brazilian sugar regions and intrusion

into the trans-Atlantic slave trade. The war also contributed to the decline of the Fugger and

Welser dynasties. Accordingly, German participation – including that of monarchs and private

businessmen – shifted from Spain and Portugal to Holland. In 1621, Johann Friedrich Duke of

Württemberg, invested 30,000 florins into the newly created Dutch WIC, which had been

created specifically for the purpose of breaking into the plantation empire and slave trade of

the Portuguese. In 1629, Imperial civil officers complained that Frankfurt citizens spent

enormous amounts on shares in the Dutch maritime trade. To cut off this drain of capital to the

Emperor‟s arch-enemy, they even advised that all postal correspondence between Frankfurt

and Holland should be secretly monitored. Yet, not only was capital flowing out of the country,

it was also coming in. Johann von Bodeck (1554-1631), at that time the wealthiest man in

Frankfurt, had arrived from Antwerp as a Protestant refugee, transferring his business to the

German banking capital. He made his fortune in the copper trade and in loans to German

territorial rulers, which in fact makes him a successor of the great houses of the Fuggers and

Welsers. The Imperial officers claimed he had invested “several tons of gold” in the Dutch

maritime companies. He was among those who made Frankfurt the successor of the Empire‟s

previously leading financial cities of Nuremberg and Augsburg. Still, capital from the latter

15

Stuart B. Schwartz: A Commonwealth within Itself: The Early Brazilian Sugar Economy, 1550-1670, in:

Schwartz (ed.): Tropical Babylons, pp. 156-200, see pp. 159-160. Eddy Stols: The Expansion of the Sugar

Market in Western Europe, in: Schwartz (ed.): Tropical Babylons, pp. 237-288, see pp. 262-263.

8

place continued to a play role in the Atlantic slave trade. Augsburg bankers and entrepreneurs

like Marx Konrad von Rehlingen acquired large amounts of shares both of the Dutch East

Indian (VOC) and West Indian Companies (WIC). Rehlingen alone held shares worth 50,000

florins in both companies. He had also invested 110,000 florins in English maritime enterprise,

much of it in the African trade.16

German participation in the English slave trade increased after the Spanish War of

Succession, when Britain obtained the Asiento (1713) for supplying Spanish America with

slaves. This enabled Britain to succeed Portugal in the role of the leading slave trading nation.

Again, German investment followed the shifts of political and economic power among the

seafaring nations.17

Germans figured both among the directors of the Royal African Company

– e.g. Peter Meyer from Hamburg – and of the South Sea Company – e.g. Abraham Korten

from Elberfeld. Both Meyer and Korten were also members of the East India Company. This

is not surprising, given the impressive share of Indian calicos among the commodities bartered

for slaves.18

The importance of the Dutch, English and French East India Companies for the

slave trade is often underrated.

3. German participation during the “Second Atlantic System”

16

Heinz Schilling: Innovation through Migration: The Settlements of Calvinistic Netherlanders in

Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Central and Western Europe, in: Histoire Sociale - Social History 31

(May 1983), pp. 7-33, see p. 22-23. Reinhard Hildebrandt: Interkontinentale Wirtschaftbeziehungen und ihre

Finanzierung in der ersten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts, in: Hermann Kellenbenz (ed.): Weltwirtschaft und

währungspolitische Probleme seit dem Ausgang des Mittelalters, Stuttgart - New York (1981), pp. 61-76,

see pp. 66-69. 17

Between 1701 and 1725, British vessels shipped c. 380,000 Africans to the Americas; from 1751 to 1775

the figure stood at 860,000. In these periods, Portugal shipped 378,000 and 473,000 Africans, respectively.

David Eltis: The Volume and Structure of the Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Reassessment, in: William and

Mary Quarterly 60 (2001), p. 43. 18

Schulte Beerbühl: Deutsche Kaufleute in London, pp. 111-112 (also see annot. 224), pp. 342-344,

134-139.

9

The Dutch historian Piet Emmer has distinguished two major phases of Atlantic trade: Until

well into the 17th century, European wars, piracy, lack of nautical experience and routine, and

instability in recently established colonies still engendered considerable risks for long-distance

maritime trade. Its most capital intensive and hazardous sector, the slave trade, was therefore

mostly carried out under Asiento conditions or by large monopoly companies, such as the

Dutch West India Company, the French Compagnie des Indes, and the British Royal African

Company. It was these companies that established the costly trading forts on the West African

coast. In the late 17th century, the European sea powers concluded a number of peace treaties,

gradually pacifying the Atlantic World, significantly reducing piracy, and subsequently

reducing transaction costs. This encouraged individual slave traders to enter into the business.

They operated more flexibly and efficiently than the large monopoly companies and thus

contributed to the end of the “First Atlantic System”.19

By 1700, most of the large joint-stock

companies had been abolished. Private enterprise characterised the “Second Atlantic System”,

and Herbert Klein even claims that the slave trade on the African coast in particular became a

domain of free trade. Typically, two or three partners would figure as owners and outfitters of

a ship and raise additional capital from a larger group of smaller investors. The entire group

thus constituted a small joint-stock company, but it was created for the purpose of one single

slaving expedition only. The contract would run for five to seven years, which was the time

span usually required until all the accounts of such a complex business were settled.20

During the 18th century, German traders too followed this pattern. They usually did so by

establishing themselves in a sea port of a slave trading nation, such as the Netherlands, France,

Spain, or Denmark, and operating under the respective flag. Examples from Cadiz and

19

Piet C. Emmer: The Dutch in the Atlantic Economy, 1580-1880. Trade, Slavery and Emancipation,

Aldershot (1998), pp. 12-32. 20

Herbert S. Klein: The Atlantic Slave Trade, Cambridge (1999), pp. 78-82.

10

Bordeaux will illustrate how German merchants linked the Central European economy with

Atlantic markets. During the 18th century, Cadiz was the major entrepôt for trade with Spanish

America, and Bordeaux was the most important French seaport for receiving the produce from

the French Caribbean, such as sugar, coffee, indigo and cotton. As mentioned above, it was

also the second French slaving port. Textiles and metalware constituted the foremost barter

commodities on African coasts. Throughout the centuries, textiles constituted c.50 percent of

all the goods which Europeans shipped to Africa.

Ellermann, Schlieper & Co

An appropriate example is provided by the Ellermann family, originating from two villages

near Osnabrück: Ibbenbüren and Venne. The villages and their region were well-known for the

Europe-wide distribution of the linen cloth and high quality knives they produced.21

. Around

1720, Johann Arnold Ellermann established a branch of their business in Cadiz. According to

Spanish taxation sources, by mid-century it had become the single most successful German

firm established there.22

During the 1730s, Johann Arnold Ellermann settled in Hamburg,

where he became a distinguished member of the city‟s chamber of commerce, and was elected

its chairman in 1744. At the same time, his brothers and nephews continued to run the Cadiz

branch and established another branch in Amsterdam. He also became a ship owner. By 1746,

21

Hannelore Oberpenning: Migration und Fernhandel im „Tödden-System“: Wanderhändler aus dem

nördlichen Münsterland im mittleren und nördlichen Europa des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts, Osnabrück

(1996). 22

Manuel Bustos Rodríguez: Los comerciantes de la Carrera de Indias en el Cádiz del siglo XVIII

(1713-1775), Cádiz (1995), pp. 223-224.

11

he sent his own first frigate to Cadiz and on into the Mediterranean. From 1752 until 1761

Johann Arnold Ellermann also held a seat in the assembly of the Hanseatic citizenry.23

The scope of his operations is reflected in his correspondence with Juan Cologan, a

member of an Irish merchant family established in the Canary Islands. These islands were an

important Atlantic staple place for smuggling into the Americas, a last port for supplying slave

ships on their way to Africa, and one of the major Spanish staples for German linen. Cologan

was particularly interested in Westphalian and Silesian linen, which constituted the bulk of

Hamburg exports, due to the huge demand in Atlantic markets.24

During the 1760s, the

Ellermann trading company in Cadiz entered into a partnership with Johann Jakob Schlieper,

thus forming Ellermann, Schlieper & Co. Schlieper had come from the town of Benfeld (near

Strasbourg) in the Alsatian cotton processing region, and had married a Spanish woman. In

1776, his daughter Francisca María married Prudencio Delaville, a French merchant from

Nantes. In Nantes, the Delavilles were one of the leading families engaged in the slave trade,

and in Cadiz, Prudencio Delaville and his brother Armand François were shareholding

partners of the Compañía gaditana de negros, at that time the largest Spanish slave trading

enterprise. Supplying this company with textiles for the barter trade on the African coasts was

most probably one of the intended effects of this familial and commercial alliance established

by the trading house Hermann, Ellermann & Schlieper.25

Merchants like the Ellermanns built

networks that linked Germany‟s textile regions directly with transatlantic markets.

23

Klaus Weber: Deutsche Kaufleute im Atlantikhandel (1680-1830): Unternehmen und Familien in

Hamburg, Cádiz und Bordeaux, München (2004), pp. 224-225. 24

In 1753, Cadiz received some 47 percent of Hamburg‟s duty-paid linen exports to Spain, while 33

percent were shipped to the Canary Islands. Staatsarchiv Hamburg, Admiralitätskollegium, 371-2, F6, vol.

18 (1753). 25

Bibiano Torres Ramírez: La compañía gaditana de negros, Sevilla (1973), pp. 40, 80-81. Weber:

Deutsche Kaufleute, pp. 273-275. Johann Peter Hermann, the third partner, was a nephew of the Ellermann

founder generation.

12

During the 18th century, Spain was but a minor player in the Atlantic slave trade. By the

1710s, France in contrast had risen from a non-player in this business to the third nation,

ranking behind Britain and Portugal.26

Its ascent was owed to the spectacular success of the

sugar plantations of the French Antilles. Due to their extremely fertile soils, these islands

outperformed Brazilian production. Through much of the century, sugar from Saint-Domingue

alone covered up to three quarters of consumption in the Western hemisphere.27

The African

dimension of German trade is therefore even more obvious in Bordeaux than in Cadiz. It is

probably best personified in the merchants Friedrich Romberg and Johann Jakob Bethmann.

Friedrich von Romberg

Born 1729 in a small village close to the iron manufacturing city of Iserlohn, Friedrich

Romberg learned his logistic skills as head and founder of a Brussels-based long distance

transportation enterprise, linking Flanders with Italy. Another important business of his was

provisioning the French navy ports of Brest and Cherbourg with naval supplies, such as ropes,

masts, hemp and tar. During the American War, which was a boom period for the neutral flag

of the Austrian Netherlands, he also became an important ship owner. Within a few years, he

established the shipping company Fréderic Romberg fils & Ricour in Oostende, a maritime

insurance company in Bruges, the slave trading company Romberg & Cie in Ghent (for

business mainly with Cuba), and a calico factory in Brussels. In 1783, he further created the

Bordeaux slave trading company Romberg, Bapst & Cie. Minor shareholding partners in this

firm were Georg Christoph Bapst, from a family of financiers originating from Palatine, and

26

Eltis: The Volume and Structure, p. 43. 27

Herbert S. Klein: African Slavery in Latin America and the Caribbean, Oxford - New York (1986), pp.

56-58.

13

the Brussels banking brothers Walckiers. All these enterprises were complemented with shares

in the textile production in the Iserlohn area, particularly in an important linen bleaching plant.

In 1784, Romberg was knighted by the Emperor Joseph II.28

Within a few years, the company Romberg, Bapst & Cie became the major slave trading

and plantation firm in Bordeaux, extending its slaving expeditions as far as Mozambique.

During this feverish boom period of the plantation economy, rising prices for African unfree

labour had made many planters become debtors of the slave traders. The latter increasingly

took over indebted plantations, or at least the plantation management. Their claims were then

satisfied with the produce from these estates. Romberg, Bapst & Cie acted likewise. At the

outbreak of the Revolution, the company owned or managed some 20 plantations on

Saint-Domingue, producing predominantly cotton and indigo. It had permanently five to six

slave ships in service, which represented a capital of c. 400,000 livres tournois. The pay for the

200 seamen employed on them gave rise to running costs of 100,000 livres per annum

(officers not included).29

The enormous turnaround of capital and the poor reliability of its

customers caused the shipping company to run into crisis, accelerated by a long-term decline

of the prices of colonial goods. By 1788, the total sum owed by the planters amounted to 4.72

million livres. In the following year, a consortium of twelve Bordeaux trading houses – seven

of them led by Germans, most prominently among them Johann Jacob Bethmann – raised 4.15

million livres to prevent the collapse of Romberg‟s firm. But its downfall was accelerated by

the slave revolt on Saint-Domingue, which started in 1791 and ultimately led to the Haitian

Revolution. Further efforts were made, but they only served to increase the total financial

28

Françoise Thésée: Négociants bordelais et colons de Saint-Domingue. Liaisons d‟habitation. La maison

Henry Romberg, Babst & Cie. 1783-1793, Paris (1972), p. 23-26. Weber: Deutsche Kaufleute, pp. 195-198. 29

Jean Tarrade: Le commerce colonial de la France à la fin de l‟ancien régime: l‟évolution du régime de

l„Exclusif de 1763 à 1789, Paris (1972), p. 46. Thésée: Négociants bordelais, pp. 51-72, 38-39.

14

losses. When the final settlement of accounts was made in 1807, they amounted to the

impressive sum of 34.24 million livres. The failure of the company had repercussions in

important European places of finance, and almost ruined the heirs of Bethmann, being the

most reputable member of the German community in Bordeaux.30

Johann Jakob von Bethmann

Johann Jakob von Bethmann (1717-1792) had been established in France as early as 1740, and

through his marriage with the daughter of the wealthy Bordeaux ship-owner Pierre Desclaux,

he soon became one of the city‟s major shipping magnates. The marriage into this elite family

also won him a license for direct trade with Canada and the French Caribbean. During his

business life, he sent ships to the colonies at least 53 times (mostly with the participation of

other shareholders), and he commissioned at least five new vessels to be built. In 1766, he

successfully applied for the post of Imperial consul in Bordeaux, and in 1776 he was granted

an Imperial knighthood.31

Johann Jakob was a brother of Johann Philipp and Simon Moritz Bethmann, who ran the

Frankfurt banking house Gebrüder Bethmann. At that time, their bank and that of the Metzler

family were the dominant houses of the German financial capital. The Metzler family, too, had

a presence in Bordeaux. Two of their sons, Jean Albert (1742-1767) and Peter Metzler

(1748-1823), would represent the family business on Saint-Domingue, Guadeloupe and

Martinique. Given the considerable capital demand of the Atlantic slaving and plantation

economies, Atlantic ports like Nantes and Bordeaux maintained close links with merchant

30

Thésée: Négociants bordelais, pp. 195-197, 200. 31

Wolfgang Henninger: Johann Jakob von Bethmann 1717-1792. Kaufmann, Reeder und kaiserlicher

Konsul in Bordeaux, 2 vols, Bochum (1993).

15

bankers in the financial capitals of Germany and Switzerland32

, who in turn maintained close

relations with Central European cotton and linen processing industries. On its continental side,

the Frankfurt bank Gebrüder Bethmann acted as the primary capital lender to rural

proto-industries all over Germany. On leasehold it ran large Saxon copper mines, copper being

one of the crucial raw materials in Atlantic ship building. The Bethmann bank had developed

its own particular commercial profile, distinguishing it from major banking houses in Atlantic

port cities. It made almost 90 percent of its profits in rural manufacturing areas like the

Rhineland and Saxony, with not a single of its major clients established in places exceeding

50,000 inhabitants.33

This does not indicate that Gebrüder Bethmann was simply a continental

enterprise – on the contrary, the bank financially linked rural manufactures with the Atlantic

markets on which these depended.

As early as the 1760s, Bethmann had considered participation in the Danish Guinea

Company, with financial backing from his Frankfurt brothers, but prudence led them to stand

back from the plan (the Danish company went bankrupt in the following decade).34

With his

1789 support of 200,000 livres to the Romberg company he did in fact become a shareholder

in a large slave trading enterprise. The cases of Romberg and Bethmann are by no means

unique. The importance of German financiers in the Atlantic slave trade is also exemplified by

the above-mentioned Baring Brothers, established in London, and by Heinrich Carl

Schimmelmann (1724-1782), whose career took him from a provider of military supplies to

the Prussian army during the Seven Years War to Denmark‟s minister of finance, major

32

For the Swiss aspects of the slave trade and plantation complex see Thomas David / Bouda Etemad /

Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl: Schwarze Geschäfte. Die Beteiligung von Schweizern an Sklaverei und

Sklavenhandel im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert, Zürich (2005). French language edition: La Suisse et l‟esclavage

des noirs, Lausanne (2005). 33

Friedrich Zellfelder: Das Kundennetz des Bankhauses Gebrüder Bethmann, Frankfurt am Main, im

Spiegel der Hauptbücher (1738-1816), Stuttgart (1994). 34

Henninger: Johann Jakob von Bethmann, pp. 353-355.

16

Danish slave trader, and owner of sugar estates on the Danish Caribbean colonies St. Thomas,

St. Croix and St. Jan.35

4. Quantitative assessment

Did this presence of a small German merchant elite in major port cities of colonial empires

have any tangible impact on the Central European hinterlands? This question can only be

answered by an assessment of the exportation of Central European products and the influx of

colonial goods on Central European markets.

The taste of consumers in colonial markets is reflected by an 1806 report of British

merchants to Parliament: “The Spanish Traders are very strongly prejudiced in favour of

German linens ... When a Spanish trader comes into a store in a British [Caribbean] Island,

the first article he asks for is German linens ...”.36

This demand dated back far into the 18th

century: in a 1744 report on the British linen trade with the West Indies, the eminent Jamaican

plantation owner William Beckford informed the Parliamentary Committee that “all the

Negroes and the poor White People are generally cloathed with German linens, from 6d to 9d

an Ell, called Osnabrughs”. A Mr. Ashley, similarly, reported that the 70,000 slaves on

Barbados were “usually clothed with Foreign „Osnabrughs‟”.37

Such labelling demonstrates

that the products from particular Northern German regions had made themselves a name, as

„stout Weser flaxen‟, „true born Osnabrughs‟, „true born Tecklenburghs‟, or „Creguelas de

35

Christian Degn: Die Schimmelmanns im atlantischen Dreieckshandel. Gewinn und Gewissen,

Neumünster (1974), pp. 2-10, 91, 96-98, 104, 490, 405. 36

Otto-Ernst Krawehl: Hamburgs Schiffs- und Warenverkehr mit England und den englischen Kolonien

1840-1860, Köln - Wien (1977), p. 441. 37

British Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons, Sessional Papers of the Eighteenth Century, Reports

& Papers 1742-1760, vol. 19: Report on Linen 1744, Wilmington (1975), pp. 18-19. I owe this information

to Dr. Margrit Schulte Beerbühl (Düsseldorf).

17

Westphalia‟ (the Weser is the navigable river linking the hinterland with Bremen; Osnabrück

is a city, Tecklenburg a county in the province of Westphalia).38

These fabrics were not only in demand in American colonies, but also in Africa. Herbert

Klein has even claimed that on West African coasts, Indian cottons which “were in great

demand in the seventeenth century”, were replaced “by German-produced linens from Silesia

in the early decades of the 1700s as the prime textile import”.39

The portion of German

manufactures among the barter commodities used for the purchase of African slaves can

indeed hardly be underestimated. Sources very rarely offer information on the origin of such

goods, but where such information is available the portion of manufactures made in Germany

is surprisingly high. One of those rare examples is provided with the slave ship Amiral, which

left Bordeaux for the Guinea coast in 1744. Just as on most slavers, the bulk of its cargo

consisted in textiles. Out of the total of 5,095 bales of cotton and linen it had on board, 1,440

derived from Nantes, only 675 from Rouen and 260 from Amsterdam, but as much as 2,720

from Hamburg.40

The German economist Johann Georg Büsch (1728-1800) already

highlighted the importance of German linen on African markets, in mentioning a ship having

left the French port of Lorient in 1720, with cargo made up entirely of textiles imported from

Hamburg.41

Such observations on overseas markets are confirmed by data from German regions of

textile production. From the 1740s to the 1780s, more than three quarters of Silesia‟s linen

38

Edith Schmitz: Leinengewerbe und Leinenhandel in Nordwestdeutschland, Köln 1967, pp. 33, 86, 92. 39

Herbert S. Klein: The Atlantic Slave Trade, Cambridge (1999), p. 114. Klein unfortunately makes no

reference to the source of the information. 40

Saugera: Bordeaux port négrier, pp. 246, 352. Eric Saugera notes that the load of the Amiral was typical

for West African markets. 41

Johann G. Büsch: Versuch einer Geschichte der Hamburgischen Handlung nebst zwei kleineren Schriften

verwandten Inhalts, Hamburg (1797), pp. 88-89. In his account, Büsch makes reference to a report by the

French voyager Desmarchais.

18

products – its annual value was oscillating roughly between three and six million taler – were

destined for the Atlantic nations of Western Europe and their respective export markets. Some

of it was even shipped directly to the Americas.42

Far smaller territories also exported large

quantities. In the late 1780s, the County of Ravensberg (in Westphalia; not to be confused with

the above-mentioned Ravensburg) exported annually linen worth some 0.75 million taler.43

The British example demonstrates the importance of these textiles on Atlantic markets: In

the first half of the eighteenth century about 15 percent of all imports to Britain consisted of

linen. As Karin Newman has pointed out, 70 to 80 percent of all imported linen textiles came

from Germany, and 90 percent of this volume was re-exported across the Atlantic. This means

that about two thirds of all British linen exports were of German origin. Irish linen followed in

second place, and English textiles only ranked third.44

If all the bales of German-made linen

re-exported in one of these years had been unrolled and pieced together, it would have

produced a length of 11,000 kilometres – large enough to span the Atlantic from Britain to

New England, and on to Jamaica.

The French and Spanish contexts provide similar examples. The accounts of the

important French trading house of Fornier frères, established in Cadiz, reveal that about two

thirds of its textile purchases during the years from 1768 to 1786 were made in Germany. Out

of the total expenditure of 12 million reales, roughly 3 million were spent in Hamburg, 1

million in Bremen and 2 million in Silesia. Something between 1.5 and 2 million reales was

spent in Holland, probably also for German fabrics, as Dutch ports served as important outlets

42

Alfred Zimmermann: Blüthe und Verfall des Leinengewerbes in Schlesien. Gewerbe- und Handelspolitik

dreier Jahrhunderte, Breslau (1885), pp. 460-467. 43

Edith Schmitz: Leinengewerbe und Leinenhandel in Nordwestdeutschland (1650-1850), Köln (1967), p.

81 44

Karin Newman: Anglo-Hamburg Trade in the Late Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries,

(unpublished PhD thesis) London (1979), p. 202.

19

for Westphalian goods. Only some 35 percent of the purchases were made in France.45

At the

same time, the Spanish textile industry too absorbed important quantities from Central Europe.

According to Pierre ViIlar, the Catalan industries imported in the year of 1793 only some 1.2

million ells of linen (equivalent almost 1.1 million metres) from Hamburg, which were

usually printed or dyed before being re-exported as Spanish fabrics.46

How can the undeniable export success of Central European merchandise on Western

markets be explained? The main key to understanding this is the Early Modern Price

Revolution. The term, famously coined by Earl Hamilton, is used to describe the effects of

excessive Spanish American silver mining, which caused a decline in wages and prices

stretching across the Atlantic and deep into Europe, from the beginning of the Spanish

Conquista. Inflation spread with the bullion itself, from the Mexican and Peruvian mining

centres to Cuba, with the silver-laden Spanish galleons across the Ocean to Seville and Cadiz.

There, prices rose faster than in Northern Spain, and in Spain they rose faster than in France

and Italy.47

In France and Italy price levels were above those in England or the Netherlands,

but still, Dutch and English wages and prices were even above those in German lands.

And this is the point. This Price Revolution instigated an intercontinental competition for

labour. The comparably cheaper Central European wages attracted production of goods

45

Robert Chamboredon: Une société de commerce languedocienne a Cadix: Simon et Arnail Fornier et Cie

(Nov. 1768-Mars 1786), in: Antonio García-Baquero González (ed.): La burguesía de negocios en la

Andalucía de la ilustración, Cadiz (1991), vol. 2, pp. 35-53, see pp. 35, 49. 46

Pierre Vilar: La Catalogne dans l'Espagne moderne. Recherches sur les fondements économiques des

structures nationales, vol. 3, Paris (1962), pp. 118, 126. I owe this reference to Dr. Niels Wiecker. 47

The first modern scholar to treat this problem systematically has been Earl J. Hamilton: American

Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501-1650, Cambridge (Mass.) (1934). Earl J. Hamilton: War

and Prices in Spain, 1651-1800, Cambridge (Mass.) (1947). Since, there have been quite some debates on

the causes of this inflation, and today, a multi-causal explanation is generally accepted: next to the growth of

bullion, a number of other factors contributed to this longue-durée inflation: population growth,

dissemination of cashless payment techniques, increasing velocity of circulation etc., yet the effects remain

the same.

20

destined specifically for Africa and the Americas. These circumstances favoured the growth of

Central European proto-industry. The Atlantic dimension is essential to our understanding of

this development. On the Atlantic markets Alsatian, Westphalian or Silesian textile products

were more competitive than their French or Dutch counterparts, let alone Spanish fabrics.

Yet, these macro-economic factors not only benefited German export trade, but also the

importation of colonial goods. Given the surplus of French sugar production, the neutral city

state of Hamburg almost naturally became one of the major trading partners of France, and

one of the principal places in the North for processing and re-distributing sugar and other

French plantation products. In 1727, about 200 sugar refineries were operative in the

Hanseatic City, and more than 400 by 1805. In Amsterdam, their number reached a mere 90

around 1750, in Rotterdam there were far less.48

The numbers in French ports cities were

even lower.49

According to a 1807 report, Hamburg had received in 1788 from Bordeaux

alone far more merchandise (worth 35.6 million mark banco) than from all English ports

taken together (summing up to 11.9 million mark banco) only. Most of the imports from

France consisted in sugar and coffee.50

Key players in managing this flow of commodities

were Huguenots who had come to Hamburg from the 1680s, when the intolerance of Louis

XIV drove many of them from their homelands. By transferring energy-intensive sugar

48

Astrid Petersson: Zuckersiedergewerbe und Zuckerhandel in Hamburg. Von den Anfängen bis zum Ende

der Kontinentalsperre, in: Hamburger Wirtschafts-Chronik N.F. 1 (2001), pp. 53-81, see pp. 55-58. Weber:

Deutsche Kaufleute, pp. 387, 392. Jonathan Israel: Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740, Oxford 1989,

p. 265. Soetbeer claims even 450 for the year 1805; see Adolf Soetbeer: Über Hamburgs Handel, vol. 1,

Hamburg (1840), p. 18. 49

Warren Scoville: The Persecution of the Huguenots and French Economic Development 1680-1720,

Berkeley - Los Angeles (1960), pp. 241. 50

Archives Nationales, Paris, F12

566-595 (Commerce et industrie, départements hanséatiques). The figures

are taken from a Hamburg report, dated 30 June 1807 and directed to France, on the devastating commercial

consequences of the blockade. In this context, the figures of trade with France may have been deliberately

exaggerated, but they certainly reflect the importance of this sector of Hanseatic trade. I owe the reference to

this source to Prof. Silvia Marzagalli (Nice).

21

refining from French Atlantic seaports to the estuary of the Elbe River, they took advantage of

the lower costs for labour and fuel. In 18th century French Atlantic seaports, complaints were

common about the low wages and cheapness of coal in places like Hamburg.51

Central and Eastern Europe were the primary markets for sugar from the French

Caribbean Islands. Occasionally, German textile workers were even paid with barter

commodities such as sugar, coffee and tobacco. The general decline of prices for these

products and the extra purchasing power generated by the export-orientated German

„proto-industries‟ allowed even rural population to consume considerable quantities of these

formerly exclusive goods.52

5. Global competition and demographic effects

Germany‟s labour-intensive proto-industries typically emerged in regions where poor soil and

climate obliged the rural population to earn additional income, to purchase food

supplementing their local harvests. Their poor wages attracted textile producers to transfer

manufacturing to such provinces. The general tendency was a move from more western and

more urban to more eastern and rural areas. With ever increasing volumes of German

manufactures being exported, these hitherto poor regions became permanent importers of food,

which enabled them to escape from the Malthusian trap. In consequence, most of the

demographic growth in 18th century Germany was generated in these areas, and in particular

51

Archives départementales de la Gironde (Bordeaux), C 4265 (Registre ou sont transcrites des Lettres ...

de la Chambre de Commerce ..., 1774-1785), fol. 169. Also see Klaus Weber: La migration huguenote dans

le contexte de l‟économique atlantique: l‟exemple de Hambourg, in: Guido Braun / Susanne Lachenicht

(eds.): Les états allemands et les huguenots, München (2007), pp. 125-136. 52

Peter Kriedte: Vom Großhändler zum Detaillisten: der Handel mit Kolonialwaren im 17. und 18.

Jahrhundert, in: Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte (1994,1), pp. 11-36.

22

among the landless rural poor, who depended even more on income in cash. In the

Westphalian linen regions of Bielefeld and Osnabrück, population grew from 42 inhabitants

per square kilometre in 1722 to 74 inhabitants in 1801. Around that year, the German average

per square kilometre was around 40 to 45 inhabitants.53

Similar figures from proto-industrial

regions in Silesia (linen), Pomerania (linen), Swabia (linen, clocks) and Bohemia (linen, metal

ware, glassware) indicate how widespread this phenomenon was.54

In some areas, growth of

population between 1750 and 1800 even exceeded 100 percent. Hans-Ulrich Wehler reckoned

that the causes of this “Demographic Revolution” are still unknown, but that the 18th century

proto-industrial development might provide some approach to the problem.55

He failed to

provide empirical evidence, but it seems very much that this assumption hits the nail on the

head.

It is noteworthy that the concentration of export-orientated proto-industries in specific

regions resembles the situation in pre-colonial Indian port cities, such as Goa, Madras and

Pondicherry. The demand of the European East India Companies for cotton fabrics, mostly

destined for Africa, had actually transformed these hitherto insignificant coastal towns into

important economic hubs. The European companies and their indigenous agents encouraged

textile workers from inland regions to settle in and around the port cities, and to produce

specifically on demand.56

Typical features of this coastal economy were also shared by

German textile regions:

53

Clemens Wischermann: Preußischer Staat und westfälische Unternehmer zwischen Spätmerkantilismus

und Liberalismus, Köln (1992), p. 87. 54

Frank Göttmann: Der Raum zwischen oberer Donau und Schweizer Alpen im 18. Jahrhundert: eine

integrierte agrarisch-gewerbliche Wirtschaftsregion, in: Scripta Mercaturae 25 (1991) Heft 1/2, pp. 1-40.

Arthur Salz: Geschichte der Böhmischen Industrie in der Neuzeit, München - Leipzig (1913), p. 283. 55

Wehler: Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, vol. 1, pp. 69-70. 56

Tsukasa Mizushima: Globaler Handel und binnenwirtschaftliche Entwicklung: südindische Hafenstädte

in der vorkolonialen Zeit, in: Hamburger Wirtschafts-Chronik N.F. 7 (2007), pp. 117-150. Kirti N.

23

- competitiveness bought about by low cost of labour;

- dependency of home industries on foreign buyers and on export in general;

- monetarisation of rural economies;

- high demographic growth;

- dependency on importation of food.

The global dimension of the development of Central European proto-industries is

reflected in the fact that textile workers in German hinterlands and on South Indian coasts had

in fact been forced to enter in a direct competition for African markets. It was not nations that

were having economic relations, but specific markets and manufacturing regions from three

continents, interacting with each other in the context of a global competition in wages, prices

and qualities. It is worthwhile recalling that both the German and the Indian boom regions then

suffered from the 19th century industrialisation of European textile manufacturing.

6. Summary

In contrary to the widespread assumptions about the economic backwardness of early modern

Central Europe, and its separateness from the Atlantic world, entrepreneurs from the Holy

Roman Empire did actively participate in the process of European expansion. This implied the

investment of capital from Southern Germany in the 15th century sugar economies of Madeira

and the Canary Islands and in the 16th century sugar economies of Santo Domingo and Brazil.

Since the 1620s, with the intrusion of the Netherlands into the Atlantic world, German capital

Chaudhuri: The Structure of the Indian Textile Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, in:

Tirthankar Roy (ed.): Cloth and Commerce. Textiles in Colonial India, New Delhi - London (1996), pp.

33-84. see pp. 43, 45, 56. Prasannan Parthasarathi: The Transition to a Colonial Economy. Weavers,

Merchants and Kings in South India 1720-1800, Cambridge (2001), p. 73.

24

shifted from the Iberian Empires to the large Dutch monopoly companies, which were created

specifically for the purposes of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and production of raw sugar in

Brazil. During the Thirty Years War, the city of Frankfurt increasingly replaced Augsburg as

the German financial capital, and accordingly channelled much of the German investments

into slave trade and plantations. During this period, England also joined the small group of

nations owning New World plantations and trading slaves. Consequently, German investors

also channelled significant amounts into the English slave trade. Now, there were increasingly

businessmen from more northern regions (e.g. Elberfeld, and coastal areas) among them.

After the turn to the 18th century, when European treaties had created safer conditions for

maritime trade, and monopoly companies went in decline, Germans adapted to these

conditions and established smaller, but nonetheless efficient slaving companies in the port

cities of Spain, France, and the Austrian Netherlands. Like the protagonists of the previous

centuries, these entrepreneurs typically united the maritime dimension with close links to or

direct participation in the production of barter commodities for the purchase of African slaves,

mostly textiles and metalware manufactured by the workers of rural home industries. The

enormous capital demand of the slave trade and the plantations complex also drew on Central

European sources. It is noteworthy that the most eminent German banking dynasties had

always been heavily involved, ranging from the Fuggers and Welsers in the 16th century,

through Bodeck in the 17th, to the Bethmanns and Metzlers in the 18th century.

African markets and the growing slave populations of the plantations in both Americas

absorbed huge quantities of Central European products. The relevant manufacturing regions,

hitherto economically disadvantaged, benefited from the demand generated in extra-European

regions. While the subsequent influx of bullion and of colonial goods triggered a significant

25

demographic growth in rural Germany, the African continent suffered from the demographic

losses caused by the slave trade.

26

British Atlantic Slave Trade and East Indian Textiles, 1650s-1808

Kazuo KOBAYASHI

(Osaka University, JAPAN;

JSPS Research Fellow)

Introduction

In this paper I try to answer the question of why Britain was able to purchase more than three

millions slaves before abolishing the slave trade in 1807. During the period the British

engaged in the trade in the Atlantic Ocean they also traded with other areas such as

Continental Europe, the Baltic Sea regions, Asia and others. Britain imported grains, raw

materials, colonial goods, and luxury goods from these areas. Some were re-exported to fulfill

the demand of buyers and to promote other trades.

There are many studies that discuss factors of the expansion of British overseas trade.

Some suggest that consumption-oriented change led to the growth of workforce demand in

colonial America and the Caribbean Islands.1 Others argue that the credit systems in West

Africa contributed to the dominant position of Britain among its European competitors in the

eighteenth century.2

It is certain that demand for labor was a sine qua non for continuing the slave trade in that

period. But this statement only explains the motivation for the trade. Also, the financial

institutions in West Africa probably promoted the trade. However this argument seems only to

explore the aspect of efficiency. Therefore, if we want to answer the question I posed at the

beginning, other perspectives will be required.

Thus I try to shed light on the commodities exported or re-exported from British ports

from the perspective of international trade. In order to complete this task, I use not only the

official records of British external trade, the well-known Customs 3 and 17, but also two

1 J. M. Price, „What Did Merchants Do? Reflection on British Overseas Trade, 1660-1790‟, Economic

History Review, 2nd Ser., 68-2, 1989, pp. 267-284; D. Richardson, „The Slave Trade, Sugar, and British

Economic Growth, 1748-1776‟, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 17-4, 1987, pp. 739-769. See also R.

Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery: An Economic History of the British West Indies 1623-1775, Baltimore, 1974. 2 P. E. Lovejoy and D. Richardson, „Trust, Pawnship, and Atlantic History: The Institutional Foundations of

the Old Calabar Slave Trade‟, American Historical Review, 104-2, 1999, pp. 333-355; P. E. Lovejoy and D,

Richardson, „“This Horrid Hole”: Royal Authority, Commerce and Credit at Bonny, 1690-1840‟, Journal of

African History, 45-3, 2004, pp. 363-392.

27

merchants sources to compensate for the deficit in those records.3 These sources are not only

helpful in exploring the value and volume of the trade, but also in finding out the trading

routes.

Ch. 1 British Commercial Expansion in the Early Modern Period

1. British Commercial Sphere: the Age of „Commercial Revolution‟

According to Ralph Davis, England underwent a major change in its trading trend from the

second half of the seventeenth century. Up to the middle of that century, woolen textiles

produced in England had been the leading product for external trade. However, as trade with

East India and the Atlantic world grew, the proportion of woolen textiles diminished. Instead,

re-exported commodities produced in both areas reached about 30 percent of the total value of

exports in the late 17th century. This phenomenon, called the „Commercial Revolution‟, meant

a growth in the significance of trade with non-European regions.4

As to the background that caused this change Jacob Price points out three factors of

demand: (1) the increase of demand in England for „exotic‟ goods from the Atlantic and Asian

worlds and raw materials from Continental Europe; (2) the increase of demand in north-west

European countries for goods of the Asian and Atlantic worlds that were re-exported from

England; (3) the increase of demand in the Atlantic world for English products and goods from

Asia and Europe.5 The increasing dependence on non-European goods stimulated the shipping

industry in England. Moreover, the demand for raw materials such as wood and iron for that

industry and the navy led to an expansion of trade with the Baltic Sea regions.6 These trends

continued even into the 18th century.

There is no doubt that London was the most important port in England during this period,

even though it had some structural problems. According to trade statistics, although its

position relatively declined as the share of outports rose after the 1740s, the pace was slow.

Rather, London still maintained about 70% of the total value of imports and more than 65% of

3 Regarding the statistical records of the British trade, I rely on the following works. E. B. Schumpeter,

English Overseas Trade Statistics 1697-1808, Oxford, 1960; M. Johnson, Anglo-African Trade in the

Eighteenth Century: English Statistics on African Trade 1699-1808, J. T. Lindblad and R. Ross (eds.),

Leiden, 1990. 4 R. Davis, „English Foreign Trade, 1660-1700‟, Economic History Review, 2nd Ser., 7-2, 1954, pp.

150-166; R. Davis, „English Foreign Trade, 1700-74‟, Economic History Review, 2nd Ser., 15-2, 1962-63,

pp. 285-303; R. Davis, A Commercial Revolution, London, 1967. 5 Price, „What Did Merchants Do?‟.

6 D. Farnie, „The Commercial Empire of the Atlantic, 1607-1783‟, Economic History Review, 2nd Ser.,

15-2, 1962-3, pp. 205-218.

28

the total value of exports (including re-exports) by the 1770s, and overwhelmed the total value

of all other ports in trade with every area (except for Ireland).7

There are many factors that sustained the leading position of London in this period. For

example, the increase of population (from 575,000 in 1700 to 959,000 in 1801) and the

development of industry boosted the demand for provisions and raw materials. Also, many

chartered companies, such as the East India Company (EIC), placed their headquarters in

London. In addition, there were many important commercial and financial institutions like the

Bank of England, the Lombard and West End Banks, and the Royal Exchange. Furthermore,

the geographical location, in that the Thames was not so far from the high seas, was also

suitable to trade.8

It was merchants who played a key role in the period of the „Commercial Revolution‟. In

1771 there were more than 230 companies in just four streets of the City, and the number

increased during the eighteenth century.9 However their activities were inseparable from the

state, especially the Royal Navy. In wartime, they needed protection from the navy. On the

other hand, they supplied wood products and naval goods imported from the Baltic Sea areas

and North America. Thus there was a mutual relationship between merchants and the Royal

Navy in the 17th and 18th centuries.10

What is more, the regulation system that the Navigation Acts represented protected British

interests in its colonial trade. Under this system all colonial trade had to be carried in British or

colonial ships. This meant the exclusion of Dutch shipping so that the First Anglo-Dutch War

took place soon after the establishment of the Act of 1651. The Acts were changed and revised

again and again until the repeal of 1849.11

2. British International Trade in the Eighteenth Century

7 C. J. French, „“Crowded with traders and a great commerce”: London‟s Domination of English Overseas

Trade, 1700-1775‟, London Journal, 17-1, pp. 27-33; H. G. Roseveare, „The eighteenth-century port of

London reconsidered‟, in A. Guimera, D. Romero (eds.), Puertos y Sistemas Portuarios (Siglos 16-20):

Actas del Coloquio Internacional El Sistema Portuario Español, Madrid, 1996, pp. 37-52. 8 French, „London‟s Domination‟, pp. 29-30; K. Morgan, Slavery, Atlantic Trade and the British Economy,

1660-1800, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 91-93; C. Gill, Merchants and Mariners of the 18th Century, London,

1961, pp. 9-11. 9 Gill, Merchants and Mariners, p. 10.

10 J. M. Price, „The Imperial Economy‟, in P. J. Marshall (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire:

The Eighteenth Century, Oxford, 1998, p. 79. It can be said that merchants also contributed more or less to

the establishment of the so-called „Fiscal Military State‟ of the eighteenth century. P. K. O‟Brien,

„Inseparable Connections: Trade, Economy, Fiscal State, and the Expansion of Empire, 1699-1815‟, in

Marshall, The eighteenth century, pp. 53-77. 11

P. J. Marshall, „Britain without America-A Second Empire?‟ in Marshall, The eighteenth century, pp. 576,

585-586; Davis, „English Foreign Trade, 1660-1700‟, p. 153.

29

As mentioned above, the value of re-exports began to increase from the late seventeenth

century, and marked its „Golden Age‟ 12

in the 1770s. In this section, we set out to

comprehend more concrete features of British trade in the eighteenth Century based on

statistical records.

Imports

In the 18th century the total value of British imports expanded about five times. As Table 1

shows, the annual average of British imports grew from about ￡4,790,000 (1701-1705) to

about ￡23,960,000 (1796-1800). Although the years 1796-1800 saw the start of the

Napoleonic wars, the statistical records still show an increasing tendency.

Table 1 The Total Value of British Imports and Exports, 1701-1800 (Unit: ￡1,000)

Imports Exports (incl. Re-exports)

1701-1705 29,332 23,971

1721-1725 38,945 33,281

1746-1750 57,062 37,149

1771-1775 79,163 64,422

1796-1800 163,700 119,780

Source: Schumpeter, Trade Statistics, pp. 15-16.

Note: Specie is excluded from these values.

During this period the greatest trade was with the British West Indies. While its value

(￡610,000) was smaller than that of Germany (￡660,000) in 1701-1705, rapid growth

followed, especially in the second half of the century, and it became the most valuable region

where Britain traded (￡590,000, 1796-1800). In addition to that, Colonial America, later the

United States, Canada and Newfoundland also played similar roles to the British West Indies.

These places provided Britain and other European countries with sugar, tobacco, dyestuffs,

rice and raw materials like wood and cotton. Most of them were produced in slave

plantations13

12

Toru Matsui, Sekai Shijo no Keisei [The Making of a World Market], Tokyo, 1991, p. 198. 13

Schumpeter, Trade Statistics, p. 18.

30

Table 2 The Volume and Value of Textiles Imported by EIC, 1701-1810

Volume of Textiles Value of Textiles Total Value of Import

(Unit: piece) (Unit: ￡) (Unit: ￡)

1701-1710 2,774,811 1,665,815 2,700,860

1711-1720 5,521,034 3,490,957 4,783,805

1721-1730 7,826,955 4,150,928 6,332,930

1731-1740 7,652,189 4,286,018 6,558,927

1741-1750 7,717,935 5,224,402 7,779,032

1751-1760 5,274,696 4,185,138 7,786,580

1761-1770 6,669,230 5,402,703 10,967,768

1771-1780 8,871,203 7,809,414 15,705,052

1781-1790 7,644,347 7,612,661 22,529,948

1791-1800 13,421,526 10,632,461 29,760,737

1801-1810 21,101,976 7,662,976 28,932,323

Source: K. N. Chaudhuri, The trading world of Asia and the English East India

Company, 1660-1760, Cambridge, 1978, Appendix 5; H. V. Bowen, The

East India Company: trade and domestic financial statistics, 1755-1838,

UK Data Archive, Study No. 5690, 2007

(http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/findingData/snDescription.asp?sn=5690,

accessed on 3rd December 2008).

The East Indies that India represented also became one of the most important regions for

British international commerce. As is well-known, East Indian textiles such as calico and

muslin were sought-after items in the world. They made up more than 50% of the total imports

from East India during most of the eighteenth century, as Table 2 suggests. Mass flooding of

the market with cotton textiles imported by the EIC led to opposition campaigns by domestic

manufacturers of woolens and silks that caused prohibitive measures to be enacted in the early

stages of the eighteenth century. However, there were loopholes that allowed some kinds of

cotton textiles to be imported from India or to be re-exported to other countries/regions.14

14

D. Ormrod, „English re-export and the Dutch staple market in the eighteenth century‟, in D. C. Coleman

and P. Mathias (eds.), Enterprise and History: essays in honour of Charles Wilson, Cambridge, 1984, pp.

89-115. In this article Ormrod argues that more than two thirds of the East India textiles imported were

re-exported to Amsterdam until the 1740s.

31

Therefore, in spite of such a ban, the value and volume of imported cotton textiles from India

grew almost 10 times throughout the eighteenth century.

As already mentioned, imports from the Baltic Sea regions that followed the Atlantic

regions and the East Indies in terms of volume played a key role in promoting the English

„Commercial Revolution‟ at the time. In particular, Maria Bogucka calls the latter-half of the

eighteenth century the „raw material stage‟, when a wide range of raw materials such as wood

(oak, inside panels, and masts), iron, flax and hemp, and some provisions were imported

through the Sound.15

As to goods from Continental Europe, linens from Germany should be noted. As E. K.

Newman underscores, German linens contributed to the English „Commercial Revolution‟ in

the eighteenth century, especially in its first half.16

These textiles were also re-exported to

Africa to exchange for slaves and African goods.

Exports

The total value of British exports also jumped more than five times. According to Table 1, the

annual average value of British exports increased from ￡ 5,870,000 (1701-1705) to

￡32,740,000 (1795-1800).

In the eighteenth century the importance of Germany, especially Hamburg, as a

„Gateway‟ rose rapidly. While the value of exports to Germany was smaller than that to the

Netherlands which was the main destination for British exports at the beginning of the century,

Germany replaced the Netherlands as a center for commodity distribution after the 1780s. In

the years 1781-1785 the value of exports to Germany reached about ￡1,280,000, more than

￡500,000 greater than the value of exports to the Netherlands. This rise of Germany was due

to the policy of neutrality of Hamburg from the third Anglo-Dutch War to the Napoleonic

War.17

More importantly, exports to the Atlantic world increased dramatically in the eighteenth

15

M. Bogucka, „The Role of Baltic Trade in European Development from the ⅩⅥth to the ⅩⅧth centuries‟,

Journal of European History, 9-1, 1980, p. 11; Toshiaki Tamaki, Hoppou Yoroppa no Shogyo to Keizai,

1550-1815nen [Commerce and Economy in Northern Europe, 1550-1815], Tokyo, 2008, Ch. 5. 16

E. K. Newman, Anglo-Hamburg Trade in the Late Seventeenth Century and Early Eighteenth Century,

unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1979. 17

Schumpeter, Trade Statistics, p. 17; Tamaki, Hoppou Yoroppa, p. 300. The reasons for the growth of

Hamburg are analyzed in detail in the following article: M. North, „Hamburg: “The Continent‟s Most

English City”‟, in M. North, From the North Sea to the Baltic: Essays in Commercial, Monetary and

Agrarian History, 1500-1800, Aldershot and Hampshire, 1996, Ch. 6.

32

century.18

Their value grew from only ￡850,000 (including the value of re-exports,

￡320,000) to ￡13,900,000 (re-exports ￡1,290,000). A large amount of textiles such as

English woolens and East India cottons were exported or re-exported from British ports.

English woolen textiles shared about 30% of the total export value to British North America in

1772. On the other hand, German linens and East India cottons were popular in tropical areas

like Africa and the Caribbean islands.19

This point will be analyzed in the next chapter.

Also, British trade with Asia underwent expansion of exports as well as imports during

the first half of the eighteenth century. The value of exports to Asia increased from ￡750,000

in 1701 to ￡1,300,000 in 1750. The main export was bullion, especially silver, which made

up from 70% to 90%.20

At that time, the EIC as well as other European East India Companies carried vast

amounts of bullion to Asia to exchange for Asian goods like tea, pepper, spices and textiles.

According to calculations by Jan de Vries, the value of bullion re-exported to Asia was 16%

(￡ 6,200,000) of the total imports into Europe in 1676-1700, which grew to 25%

(￡156,000,000) in 1776-95. After peaking in 1726-50 (32%: ￡122,500,000), the value

gradually decreased. This downward movement was related to the British acquisition of power

to levy taxes in Bengal and Surat in the 1760s. After that the British did not need to bring

bullion to Asia any longer.21

Connection Atlantic and Asia

As noted above, the period of „Commercial revolution‟ saw remarkable expansion of the

volume and value of trade with the Atlantic world and Asia. American bullion flowed into Asia

via the route of the Cape of Good Hope, that of Manila-Acapulco, and that of the Baltic Sea

and the Levant. In turn, spices and pepper, cotton textiles, and tea were imported from Asia

and had a profound impact on European lifestyles.

Comparing their proportions of total imports in English international commerce in the

first half of the 1770s, the Atlantic took c. 40% and Asia 15%. This indicates that the

importance of the Atlantic trade was significantly large.22

As already mentioned, this was

18

The Atlantic world comprises the Americas, the British Caribbean islands, and Africa. 19

Price, „The Imperial Economy‟, pp. 87-88; Davis, „English Foreign Trade, 1700-74‟, p. 303; R. Davis,

The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade, Leicester, 1979, pp. 95, 103. 20

Chaudhuri, The trading world of Asia, pp. 507, 517. 21

J. de Vries, „Connection Europe and Asia: A Quantitative Analysis of the Cape-route Trade, 1497-1795‟,

in D. Flynn, et al. (eds.), Global Connections and Monetary History, 1470-1800, Aldershot, 2003, pp. 78-79. 22

Schumpeter, Trade Statistics, p. 18. The same trend is found in French international trade. The value of

imports from the Atlantic accounted for 40% of total imports, but Asia only 5%. This small proportion was

33

mainly due to the plantation based economy of the Caribbean islands and the Americas. It is

well-known that this economy was sustained by the tireless transmission of slaves from the

African coasts for more than three centuries. Thus the Atlantic slave trade was the crucial

factor in maintaining staple production in the early modern period: indeed Malachy

Postlethwayt called it „the Great Pillar‟.23

However, as I mentioned in Table 2, both the

volume and value of imports from Asia increased throughout the eighteenth century. In

particular, textiles of which Indian cotton goods made up the majority accounted for 60-70%

of the total in the first half of the century and 30-50% in the second.

As Beverly Lemire argues, the interaction between India and Europe in the seventeenth

and eighteenth centuries was inseparably linked to the shaping of fashion and the advent of

consumer markets for the early modern industrial ages, and Indian cottons played an

incomparably important role in providing European consumers with new tastes. Indian cottons

were consumed as clothing like gowns, waistcoats, and kerchiefs round the neck as well as

interior decoration such as cushions, coverlets, and drapes. These Asian goods attracted not

only the upper social class but the lower classes.24

A review of the French trade says „it is not

cheap […] it is fashion, and it is a certain vanity that makes the women of the lower classes so

curious about calicoes. Dressed in light or printed cottons, they think themselves no longer at

the same level of women of their social station […] they think themselves superior to their

social condition because ladies of quality too wear calicoes‟.25

In the early modern age, Indian cottons captured the world market from regions in the

Indian Ocean to Europe and the Americas, and their quality was regarded as the global

standard. Prior to the fifteenth century, Indian cottons acquired markets in East Asia, the

Western Pacific, and the China Seas, and maintained commercial routes via East Africa,

Central Asia, Persia, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean. For instance, they were

exchanged for pepper in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, they also played an important role

in the purchase of African slaves on the West African coasts in European commerce after the

due to defeat in Asian competition with Britain in the mid-eighteenth century. Nevertheless this trend shows

that the Atlantic trade was important for both Britain and France. de Vries, „Connection Europe and Asia‟, p.

93. 23

M. Postlethwayt, The African Trade, the Great Pillar and Support of the British Plantation Trade in

North America, London, 1745. 24

B. Lemire, „Revising the Historical Narrative: India, Europe, and the Cotton Trade, c. 1300-1800‟, in P.

Parthasarathi and G. Riello (eds.), The Spinning World: A Global History of Cotton Textiles, 1200-1850,

Oxford, 2009, pp.214-225. 25

Cited in G. Riello, „The Globalization of Cotton Textiles: Indian Cottons, Europe, and the Atlantic World,

1600-1850‟, in Parthasarathi and Riello, The Spinning World, pp. 266-267. Another good example can be

found in Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme (1670) by Molière. In this play the bourgeois Monsieur Jourdain, eager

to be a gentleman, shows off his calico in front of his teachers.

34

fifteenth century. Thus, prior to the eighteenth century, Indian textiles were sought-after

around the world, and were also without doubt „the first global commodity‟ in terms of

production, consumption, and exchange, and prepared the way for the „global consumer

markets for the modern industrial age‟.26

Also, East Indian textiles were closely related to the British Industrial Revolution. The

origin of the industrial revolution has been a controversial topic. For example, Joseph Inikori

explains it in terms of „Import Substitution Industrialization‟ and stresses the role of West

Africa in encouraging the international competitiveness of British textiles as compared with

East India cottons in the process.27

However, Maxine Berg focuses more upon social aspects

in her recent works. In early modern Europe, the import of Asian goods shaped a new

consumer society in which people pursued „luxury‟. This drove Europeans to augment their

knowledge of consumer markets and to begin to „imitate‟ Asian commodities. Moreover

British manufacturers could utilize the resources and markets of the British Empire and create

their own luxuries. This led to the industrial revolution in England.28

In either case it is clear

that the impact of Asian trade on the early modern European, especially British, economies

should not be neglected.

Ch. 2 Significance of East Indian Cottons in the Atlantic Slave Trade

1. Anglo-African Trade and East Indian Cottons, 1699-1808

The recent project of compiling a database of the Atlantic slave trade under the leadership of

David Eltis and David Richardson has shown that about 12.5 million slaves were shipped from

Africa in the years 1501-1867.29

The British share was approximately 25% over the whole

26

Lemire, „Revising the Historical Narrative‟, p. 226; P. Parthasarati and G. Riello, „Introduction: Cotton

Textiles and Global History‟, in The Spinning World, p. 2. 27

J. E. Inikori, Africans and the Industrial Revolution in England: A Study in International Trade and

Economic Development, Cambridge, 2002. Similar arguments may also be found in studies by Japanese

economic historians, for example, H. Kawakatsu, „Momen no Seihou Denpa: Ajianai Boueki kara Taiseiyou

Keizaiken e [Cotton Diffusion to the West: from Intra-Asian Trade to the Atlantic Economy]‟, The Waseda

journal of political science and economics, 270-2, 1982, pp. 100-135; M. Kawakita, Kogyoka no Rekishiteki

Zentei [Historical Conditions of British Industrialization: Empire and Gentlemen], Tokyo, 1983. 28

M. Berg, „In Pursuit of Luxury: Global History and British Consumer Goods in the Eighteenth Century‟,

Past and Present, 182, 2004, pp. 85-142. 29

The database is open to the public on the website. D. Eltis et al. (eds.), Voyages: the Trans-Atlantic Slave

Trade Database (hereafter TSTD), 2008 (http://www.slavevoyages.org/ accessed on 1st April 2009). See

also modified numbers, D. Eltis and D. Richardson, „A New Assessment of the Transatlantic Slave Trade‟,

in D. Eltis and D. Richardson (eds.), Extending the Frontiers: Essays on the New Transatlantic Slave Trade

Database, Yale, 2008, pp. 6-7.

35

period, though its shipments of slaves were almost equal to those of Brazil/Portugal, the

largest participant, in the eighteenth century. In the middle of the seventeenth century Britain

transported c. 30,000 slaves from Africa, and then underwent three major expansion phases

(1650s-1680s; c.1710-c.1730; 1740s-c.1770),30

which were related to changes of trade

organizations like the Royal African Company and to the emergence of new trading ports such

as Bristol and Liverpool. In the final decade of the eighteenth century British shipments of

African slaves grew to nearly 400,000.

No other European country experienced such an expansion in the Atlantic slave trade

during the period that Britain engaged in it. The Dutch carried about 30,000 slaves in the early

decades of the eighteenth century and marked 60,000 slaves at the peak of their trade (1760s).

The French slave trade also shipped under 30,000 slaves in the first decade of the eighteenth

century, but expanded this to nearly 300,000 slaves in the 1780s. However the French trade

dropped sharply to just over 70,000 in the next decade. Even the Portuguese did not maintain

their volume throughout the eighteenth century.31

Now we can ask the question once again.

Why did Britain grow so rapidly during that period? Why could the British purchase such vast

numbers of slaves in West Africa?

To answer this question, it is necessary to investigate the goods which were

exported/re-exported from British ports. In order to ascertain this, it is indispensable to survey

trade statistics such as Customs 3/17. Marion Johnson compiled the value of Anglo-African

trade from 1699 to 1808 based on Customs 3/17 per year/decade.32

According to Figure 1,

total imports from Africa remained at approximately the same level throughout the period,33

while total exports (including re-exports) made a great leap, especially from the

mid-eighteenth century. The value of total exports grew from around ￡900,000 at the

beginning of the eighteenth century to more than ￡10 million at the end of the century. This

trend coincided with the growth of the slave trade. Although the final decade saw a rise of

prices due to the French Revolution and the Napoleonic War, it is fair to state that British

exports continued to rise throughout the eighteenth century.34

30

D. Richardson, „The British empire and the Atlantic slave trade 1660-1807‟, in Marshall, The eighteenth

century, p. 443. 31

Eltis and Richardson, „A New Assessment‟, pp. 6-7. 32

Johnson, Anglo-African Trade in the Eighteenth Century. I am greatly indebted to Dr. Ryuto Shimada for

bringing a copy of the dataset from Leiden University. 33

The blue line of total imports in Figure 1 includes the value of ivory, gums, dyestuffs, foodstuffs, oils,

and so on. 34

Matsui, Sekai Shijo, p. 295.

36

Figure 1 Total British Exports to and Imports from Africa, 1699-1808

Source: Calculated from L. J. Touwen and P. K. Doom „Statistics on Anglo-African Trade,

1699-1808‟, in Johnson, Anglo-African Trade in the Eighteenth Century, p. 53.

Figure 2 illustrates the composition of commodities exported from Britain between 1699

and 1808. It is clear that textiles retained the largest proportion among articles for export.

Their value increased more than thirteen times from c. 570,000 pounds in 1699-1708 to c. 7.5

million pounds in 1799-1808. Apart from textiles, military goods, iron and steel, cowries, and

beads were exported to Africa as well.35

The figure shows that military goods, iron and steel,

and cowry shells shared about 20% of exports during that period, and that these values also

grew near ten times throughout the eighteenth century.

35

Beads were perhaps collected on the Mediterranean Sea. For example, William Davenport, a Liverpool

merchant, imported beads from Livorno, and re-exported them to Cameroon. See B. L. Anderson, „The

Lancashire bill system and its Liverpool practitioners: the case of a slave merchant‟, in W. H. Chaloner and

B. M. Ratcliffe (eds.), Trade and transport: essays in economic history in honour of T. M. Willan,

Manchester, 1977, pp. 59-97. Cowries were used as currency in West Africa. See J. Hogendorn and M.

Johnson, The Shell Money of the Slave Trade, Cambridge, 1986.

37

Figure 2 Composition of Exports from Britain to Africa, 1699-1808

Source: Calculated from Touwen and Doom „Statistics on Anglo-African Trade‟, pp. 52-60.

As Figure 3 shows, there were several characteristics of textile exports to Africa. First,

woolens shared the largest ratio at the beginning of the eighteenth century, but this ratio was

reduced to 20-30% after the 1720s. Second, British cottons made an appearance from the

middle of the century. This sudden emergence is related to the beginning of the industrial

revolution in Britain. Third and most important, East Indian textiles maintained their hold of

30-60% of exports throughout the 18th century. At their peak, Indian cotton piece goods

comprised c. 30% of total British exports to Africa. Their value grew more than 20 times from

￡130,000 to more than ￡3,200,000 during the century.36

Even in the final phase of the

British slave trade the value of East Indian textiles exceeded that of English cottons. Indian

textiles were also the leading product in the French-African trade, and they shared about 40%

of the total exports to Africa in the late eighteenth century.37

36

L. J. Touwen and P. K. Doom, „Statistics on Anglo-African Trade 1699-1808‟, in Johnson, Anglo-African

Trade, pp. 54-55. 37

J. Tarrade, Le commerce colonial de la France à la fin de l'ancien régime: l'évolution du régime de

«l‟Exclusif» de 1763 à 1789, Tome 1, Paris, 1972, p. 125.

38

Figure 3 Composition of Textiles from Britain to Africa, 1699-1808

Source: Calculated from Touwen and Doom „Statistics on Anglo-African Trade‟, pp. 54-55.

However, Customs has some drawbacks. The volume and value calculated from it do not

represent the cases in which ships called at other ports before arriving at their final

destinations. Thus we have to state that the volume and value calculated from Customs should

be modified. In the early modern period, there were many ships which called at Dutch ports to

purchase goods subsequent destinations. Also, we can find evidence of voyages that passed by

the Canaries and Madeira on their way to Africa.38

Again, Customs does not show the

regional differences of the African coasts. For example, although textiles were not so

important in order to exchange for peppers, dyestuffs, and ivory on the Grain Coast or Sierra

Leone, they were indispensable for purchasing African slaves and gold on the Gold Coast and

in the Bight of Benin.39

Hence the figures derived from Customs should be carefully treated

38

Richardson calculated the number of ships that reached Africa via Madeira and Cape Verde, and modified

the data of Johnson upward. D. Richardson, „Cape Verde, Madeira and Britain‟s Trade to Africa, 1698-1740‟,

The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 22-1, 1994, pp. 1-15. 39

C. E. Kriger, „“Guinea Cloth” Production and Consumption of Cotton Textiles in West Africa before and

during the Atlantic Slave Trade‟, in Parthasarati and Riello, The Spinning World, p. 124. See also, P. D.

Curtin, Economic Change in Precolonial Africa: Senegambia in the Era of the Slave Trade, Madison, 1975;

D. Richardson, „West African Consumption Patterns and Their Influence on the Eighteenth-Century English

Slave Trade‟, in H. A. Gemery and J. S. Hogendorn, The Uncommon Market: Essays in the Economic

39

and need to be more or less upwardly adjusted.

Nevertheless, even if the volume of Indian cotton textiles appearing in the records of

Customs were upwardly revised, the fact that Indian cottons shared a leading role throughout

the eighteenth century would not change. Now we should pause and ask what kinds of Indian

cottons were imported into Africa. East Indian textiles comprised diverse fabrics: Calicoes,

Chintz, Guinea Stuffs, Nicanees, Photaes, Tapseils and others.40

These cloths were consumed

for protection of the body, but also for decoration and demonstration of prestige in West Africa.

In particular, unusual colors and designs were in demand.41

Moreover, there were local cotton

industries in West Africa. Recent anthropological studies show the possibility that East Indian

cottons complemented the local production of textiles in West Africa and that they also might

have stimulated new varieties of textile production.42

2. Activities of English Merchants

Existing studies of the Atlantic slave trade and global history have pointed out the importance

of East Indian cottons in that trade. Kenneth Pomeranz points out the importance of the East

Indian cottons in the British Atlantic slave trade by relying on the work of H. S. Klein.43

However, the detailed routes of commerce between Asia and Africa via Britain have yet to be

explored. In order to demonstrate the connections, I use here some sources of two British

merchants who engaged in the slave trade for part of their lives: Thomas Hall and Thomas

Lumley.44

By so doing, we can come to know the activity of the merchants and the detailed

linkage between commodities at that time. This will be helpful in deepening our understanding

of the intricate networks of early modern international trade.

Thomas Hall & Co.

Thomas Hall (1692-1748) was a merchant who worked in Ostend and London in the early

History of the Atlantic Slave Trade, New York and London, 1979, pp. 303-330. 40

S. B. Alpern, „What Africans got for their slaves: a master list of European trade goods‟, History in Africa,

2, 1995, pp. 6-11. 41

J. Thornton, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1800, Cambridge, 1998, p. 50. 42

Kriger, „“Guinea Cloth”‟. 43

See, K. Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern Economy,

Princeton, 2000, p. 271; H. S. Klein, „Economic aspects of the eighteenth-century Atlantic slave trade‟, in J.

Tracy (ed.), The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750,

Cambridge, 1993, pp. 290-293. I should mention that Klein‟s argument on East India textiles in African

trade was also based on the statistics calculated by Johnson. 44

I owe this information to Prof. David Richardson.

40

eighteenth century. He was a captain, shipowner, commercial agent, and financier, and traded

with Continental Europe, China, and Latin America. Also, he was an influential person as a

contractor of shipping. In his old age, he had a country house and invested his money in

agricultural land like many other successful merchants. He continued to work hard until he

passed away in mid-century. His activities were typical of the merchants of the day in many

points.45

The conditions of his childhood are unknown. According to Conrad Gill, who wrote a

biography of Hall, the first record of him states that he was a purser on the Essex, permitted by

the EIC in 1716 and setting out on a voyage to Guangdong. This status was given by his

friends and the famous captain Richard Pinnel.46

After this voyage he experienced a turning point in his life. At that time the War of the

Spanish Succession ended and peace came to the Netherlands. There were attempts to promote

economic integration in the Low Countries through overseas trade. In particular, the Asian

trade attracted attention and there were increased ambitions to import spice, silks, tea, and

coffee. Under these circumstances, Hall was asked to engage in the trade with China in Ostend.

He went on board the Maison d‟Autriche, whose captain was James Naish, and went to

Guangdong in early 1719. Next year he came back to Ostend with Chinese goods and gold. In

1723 he again sailed to Guangdong as captain of the Marquis de Prié, and around the same

time as Senior Captain he commanded the voyage of the ship St. Joseph. However, this was

the last time trade tool place on the basis of private partnerships.47

In 1725 Hall decided to go back to London and work as a merchant and shipowner, not as

captain. At that time, he used bills of exchange for his transactions. Most of these bills were

drawn either on Antwerp or on London. Jacques de Pret in Antwerp and Pinnel in London

received Hall‟s bills and might probably have disposed of them to one of the financial houses.

Hall expected the success of his business in his mother country. So he bought stock in the

Bank of England and the South Sea Company and invested in some English vessels. His stock

in the Bank of England reached ￡10,000 at the end of 1725 and he purchased a further

￡2,000 worth again ten months later.48

In the beginning of his commercial activities in London, he was condemned by the EIC

and the government for his engagement in trade in Ostend, and had to pay them fines of

￡1,400 and ￡700 respectively. Through this procedure, Hall settled with them, and was able

45

Gill, Merchants and Mariners, p. 11. 46

Gill, Merchants and Mariners, pp. 12-13. 47

In the same year the Ostend East India Company was founded. It was aimed to trade with Asia and Africa

on the basis of Antwerp capitals. The company was the bearer of Asian trade until its dissolution in 1731. 48

Gill, Merchants and Mariners, pp. 41-42.

41

to launch his business in England. Also, at about the same time, he became engaged to and

married Mary Hallet, whose father was a Member of Parliament, and rented a large house in

Great Ormond Street in the west of the City.49

In England, Hall was involved with two businesses: shipping and the tea trade. As a

ship‟s husband, he organized the associates who provided the necessary capital to build ships.

He also made arrangements for ship building, then appointed captains, officers and crew. In

addition, he paid wages, and arranged insurance. Furthermore, his engagement with the tea

trade in Europe was based on a network of merchants. When he was in Ostend, he associated

with Jacob Senserf in Rotterdam, and J. Anthony Crop, Dieterick Smith, and Van Berchem in

Amsterdam. In addition to these merchants in the Netherlands, Lastrop Pietersoon was also a

partner of Hall in Hamburg. Smith was an especially important person for Hall. Hall imported

Dutch linens from Smith50

and sold him coffee from Java and other places.51

Some of them

were re-exported to Wichman Lastrope in Hamburg via Smith.52

Hall kept in touch with

Smith at 7- to 10-day intervals. Since Smith had some friends who were leading officials of

the Dutch East India Company (VOC), he could collect and supply inside information of great

value in forecasting prices.53

China (the Qing dynasty) traded with European countries. The concern of the European

countries was Chinese tea. Tea producers in China increased production to keep up with

European demand. As a result, more tea was imported into European markets, and provided

benefits for stockholders of companies, wholesalers and retailers. However the Netherlands

was an exception, because Dutch merchants fell behind those of other countries in the

Hamburg market, and had few markets except their own domestic ones. In the face of this

situation, Hall and many other merchants gave up dealing in tea.54

While Hall was engaged in the tea trade, he also launched an Atlantic trade. Like his East

India trade, this had a lot to do with Pinnel. The character of the Atlantic trade at that period

was that ships called at the Dutch ports of Rotterdam or Amsterdam in order to purchase

cargoes for African trade. For example, the Court of Directors of the South Sea Company

records that sending „the ships Mermaid and Essex designed for Angola & Buenos Ayres […]

to Holland to take in the goods wanting to compleat their Cargoes‟.55

The reason for calling at

49

Gill, Merchants and Mariners, pp. 42-45. 50

C 103/131: Invoice of Thomas Hall, 20th Sep. 1729, The National Archives of the UK (hereinafter TNA). 51

C 103/131: Invoice of Thomas Hall, 30th Jun. 1732, TNA; C 103/131: Account of Thomas Hall, 19th Feb.

1732, TNA; C 103/131: Invoice of Thomas Hall, 4th Aug. 1733, TNA. 52

C 103/133: Account of Wichman Lastrope in Hamburg, 4th Apr. 1730, TNA. 53

Gill, Merchants and Mariners, pp. 52-55. 54

Gill, Merchants and Mariners, pp. 56-59. 55

Add. Mss. 25503, 21st Feb. 1729, p. 385, The British Library.

42

Holland was that „Indian cottons were cheaper there than they were in England; Linens from

Germany were readily available; and there were large stocks of firearms of the types most

favoured in Africa‟.56

Although the origin of this style of trade remains unknown, similar

information can be found in documents of the late 1710s.57

Table 3 List of Goods Purchased by the Mermaid (in Rotterdam, 13th May 1732)

Sletias 46 Cases 6,478 (2,300 pieces)

Calico 4 Cases 1,006 (100 pieces)

Sletias 34 Cases 5,021 (1,700 pieces)

Britannia (Long) 1 Case 235 (55 pieces)

Britannia (Short) 4 Cases 436 (218 pieces)

Linen (Stripe) 5 Cases 1,000 (100 pieces)

Britannia (Long) 6 Cases 1,757 (601 pieces)

Britannia (Short) 20 Cases 3,690 (1,591 pieces)

Cambric 14 Cases 2,080 (517 pieces)

Linen 2 Packs 1,038 (14 pieces)

Totals (including others and charges) 23,335

Source: C 103/130: Invoice of Thomas Hall from Senserf & Co. , Rotterdam, 13th May,

1732, TNA.

Table 3 illustrates the kind of goods Hall bought in Rotterdam. The Mermaid, whose

captain was John Butler, set off from London at the end of March 1732. The table shows that

Hall purchased various textiles, especially linen textiles called Sletias.58

We can see that

linens, probably made in Continental Europe, took up the largest part of the products

purchased in Rotterdam. In terms of quantity the total volume of linens reached 4,000 pieces

and its value was more than ten times as much as the East Indian pieces. This evidence may

suggest that the British Atlantic trade more or less depended upon the commercial relationship

56

Gill, Merchants and Mariners, p. 77. 57

Letter from Richard Harris to the Secretary of the Board of Trade (?), London, 21st Sep. 1719, in E.

Donnan (ed.), Documents illustrative of the history of the slave trade to America, vol. 2 (the eighteenth

century), Washington D. C., 1931, pp. 241-242. 58

Sletias was linen originally produced in Silesia. In 1593-1607, the Dutch shipped about 30 million yards

of Sletias to the Gold Coast and it was viewed as “the most popular cloth”. Alpern, „What Africans got for

their slaves‟, p. 9.

43

with Continental Europe in those days.59

During the period Hall engaged in the Atlantic trade,

Northwest Europe was going through a relatively stable phase, so that British merchants might

easily trade with their counterparts in Continental Europe.

Thomas Lumley & Co.

Thomas Lumley was also a merchant in London from the late eighteenth century to the

nineteenth century. As far as I can ascertain from his documents in the National Archives, UK,

his birth and infancy remain obscure. However, the London Directory shows us that he was

working as a Warehouseman in Gutter Lane in the City of London around 1800.60

He bought

East India cottons directly from the EIC regularly61

and sold them on to merchants in London,

Liverpool, Dover, Guernsey and other places. Most of those merchants were engaged in the

slave trade, and Lumley also invested in the trade eight times in 1803-1808.62

Hence, by

following his activities, we can unravel the detailed routes of cotton goods from India to

Africa.

The Appendix is based on his Journal and TSTD. Although this chart could no doubt be

improved by using other sources, we can obtain a lot of information about his daily

transactions and each merchant‟s trade. We also can notice that some merchants in Liverpool

bought East Indian goods from Lumley and shipped them to West Africa to exchange for

African slaves. Jonathan Ratcliff, George Case, James Brown, Thomas Huson, Charles

Fairclough, John and James Aspinall, Thomas and Samuel Hinde, and John Bolton, who were

all merchants in Liverpool, bought far more Indian textiles than other merchants.63

From the table of the Appendix, we can infer that Lumley played an important role in

supporting Liverpool‟s slave trade at that time.64

Lumley was requested to sell East Indian

cottons by these merchants. For example, a letter written by Fairclough says that Lumley

supplied the Polly, in which Fairclough invested, with Indian goods on 25th November and 4th

59

Newman, Anglo-Hamburg Trade, p. 292. 60

cf. London Directory (Kent‟s Directory, 1801-1808). 61

C 114/155: Cash Book, Jan. 1801-Mar. 1803, TNA. 62

According to TSTD, Lumley invested in the Bedford (three times), the Betsey, the Frederick (twice), and

the Harriott (twice). 63

The names of ships owned by Liverpool merchants are written in his Journal, so we can connect this

information with TSTD. 64

Liverpool merchants also often called at the Isle of Man which was known as a tax-free haven for goods

until the mid-eighteenth century. They purchased East Indian textiles, cowrie shells, beads, arms, iron goods,

and so forth from Manx merchants who imported them from Holland. See K. Morgan, „Liverpool‟s

Dominance in the British Slave Trade, 1740-1807‟, in D. Richardson, S. Schwarz, and A. Tibbeles (eds.),

Liverpool and Transatlantic Slavery, Liverpool, pp. 21-22.

44

December 1799.65

In the early 1800s Lumley was involved with about 30 percent of voyages

from Liverpool to Bonny in the Bight of Biafra, which was the largest trading port for the

Liverpool slave trade in the second half of the eighteenth century.66

The Appendix shows that

7 of 26 voyages (27%) which sailed from Liverpool to Bonny were indirectly sustained by

Lumley in 1801; 6 of 22 voyages (27%) in 1802; and 2 of 8 voyages (25%) in 1803. Lumley

supplied each ship with more 2,500 pounds of Indian textiles, and they bought around 300

slaves in West Africa. This may suggest that the growth of the Liverpool slave trade was

dependent upon commercial networks with London, not only financial ones.67

Now let us examine a detailed example of Lumley‟s slave trade. As far as I know, the

reason why he began to invest in the slave trade is unclear, but probably he stored information

through his transactions with other merchants. The first voyage in which he invested was that

of the Bedford in 1803-1804. During all his voyages he, as a vessel owner, remained in

London, and consigned the shipping of goods to captains.68

Captains were notified of the

basic details of their voyages in advance by “Instructions”, and there was a postal network

through which they could receive new Instructions in the West Indies. In Lumley‟s case, the

tonnages of the ships were from 200 to 280, the crews were from London, other areas in

England, Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Germany, Sweden, Italy, United States, and Africa. They

consisted of captain, first mate, second mate, third mate, surgeon, carpenter, cooper, cook, and

many seamen. Wages depended on status and age.

The first voyage of the Bedford was aimed at purchasing goods and gold dust at Accra on

the Gold Coast, and 225 African slaves and African products at the River Congo on the coast

of Angola. The merchandise shipped to Africa chiefly comprised East Indian goods and British

goods such as muskets, and was consigned to Captain William B. Lane from Ireland. The total

value of the merchandise loaded in London reached about ￡5,500 (except for charges), and

the goods were insured. They were separately packed in puncheons, bales, or cases. Most of

65

C 114/2: Letter from Charles Fairclough to Thomas Lumley, London, 7th Mar. 1801. The Indian goods

sold by Lumley were probably shipped from Liverpool to Africa, and then the Polly sailed to Kingston with

295 slaves, Redwood, and ivory. The ship was loaded with many cargoes such as 9 hogsheads of sugar, 95

tons bar wood, and 779 bags of cottons, and departed from Jamaica on 27th January 1801. BT 6/235: Trade

Statistics, Jamaica, 1799-1801, TNA; TSTD, Voyage 83137. 66

See Lovejoy and Richardson, „“This Horrid Hole”‟. 67

B. L. Anderson, „The Lancashire bill system and its Liverpool practitioners: the case of a slave merchant‟,

in W. H. Chaloner and B. M. Ratcliffe (eds.), Trade and transport: essays in economic history in honour of T.

M. Willan, Manchester, 1977, pp. 59-97. Regarding the financial network, Mina Ishizu explores the linkage

between local banks and the Liverpool Atlantic trade. See M. Ishizu, „Local finance and overseas trade

during the Industrial Revolution: an examination of the financial arrangements of a Liverpool merchant‟,

paper for the Economic History Society Annual Conference, University of Reading, March 2006. 68

This kind of trading can be considered common among merchants of the day. Price, „What did Merchants

do?‟.

45

them were intended to buy slaves and African produce. Also, there were some bags of East

Indian rice and beans for slave provisions. The invoice shows that East Indian cottons made up

the overwhelming majority of consigned goods (c. 80%: 3,484 pieces, ￡3,887) in this case.

In particular, Bejutapauts (692 pieces, ￡605), Chintz (573 pieces, ￡817), Bafts (456 pieces,

￡912), and Nicanees (400 pieces, ￡265) were the main products, followed by alcoholic

drinks like brandy and wine, and muskets.69

The Bedford set off from London on this first voyage on 4th May 1803. After the

purchase of 246 slaves and some ivories in Africa, the ship sailed to and arrived in Kingston

on 28th November. While slaves were sold there, 48 tons of logwoods and fustick, 46 planks

of mahogany, 13,654 pounds of coffee, 15 tons of Nicaragua wood, and 2 casks of copper

were loaded on the ship. It left for London on 30th March 1804.70

A similar style of trade can

be found in the second and third voyages of the Bedford.71

I speculate that since the period when Lumley was trading saw the French Revolution and

Napoleonic Wars in Europe, it might have been difficult for him to trade with merchants in

Continental Europe, unlike in the earlier time of Hall. Because French privateers seized enemy

ships in the English Channel in wartime, there was a greater risk in visiting ports in

Continental Europe. In addition, Dutch imports of East Indian textiles probably stopped at the

end of 1799 when the VOC went into liquidation.72

Thus the importance of British ships

calling at Continental Europe before sailing to Africa might have decreased during that period,

and British merchants might have been more or less compelled to collect goods for themselves.

That point should be explored in more detail.

Conclusion

To wind up this paper, I summarize the result of the discussion once again. In order to

understand the growth of the British Atlantic slave trade, I first located it in the context of

69

C 114/158: Invoice of Thomas Lumley & John Ramsden, London, 5th Mar. 1803, TNA. 70

When the Bedford arrived in Kingston, the trade statistics of Jamaica counted 221 slaves and 13 ivories.

CO 142/21: Shipping Returns, Jamaica, 1801-1804, pp. 100, 146, TNA; TSTD, Voyage id=80455, Bedford

(1803). 71

Regarding the second voyage of the Bedford, see C 114/158: Invoice of Thomas Lumley & Co., London,

1st Aug. 1804, TNA; C 114/158: Manifest of Bedford 2nd Voyage, TNA; CO 142/42: Shipping Returns,

Jamaica, 1804-1807, p. 34, TNA; TSTD, Voyage id=80456, Bedford (1805). See also for the third voyage of

the Bedford, C 114/158: Invoice of Thomas Lumley & Co., London, 1st Jul. 1806, TNA; C 114/158:

Account of Thomas Lumley & Co., London, 1806-1807, TNA; C 114/158: Sales Records of Thomas

Lumley & Co., London, 1807, TNA; C 114/158: Manifest of Bedford 3rd Voyage, TNA; CO 142/24:

Shipping Returns, Jamaica, 1804-1807, p. 141; TSTD, Voyage id=80457, Bedford (1807). 72

Riello, „The Globalization of Cotton Textiles‟, p. 265.

46

early modern international trade and pointed out that the slave trade expanded in parallel with

other trade of the day. Then I focused on East Indian cottons, the most important goods in

promoting the Atlantic slave trade, and tried to depict some trading routes based on original

sources of English merchants. As a result, I reach the conclusion that the growth of the British

Atlantic slave trade should be considered from a global perspective, especially in its linkage

with Asia.73

Such a perspective would contribute to deepening our understanding of the

integration of eighteenth-century global connections via money, goods, and migrations.

73

In the context of British imperial history, Peter Marshall has proposed such a wider perspective to figure

out the “British Empires” during the transition period. See P. J. Marshall, „The First and Second British

Empires: A Question of Demarcation‟, History, 29, 1964, pp. 13-23; P. J. Marshall, The Making and

Unmaking of the Empires: Britain, India, and America c. 1750-1783, Oxford, 2005.

47

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.

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London

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Jan.

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Gold

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308

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gsto

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Dec.

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8.

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9.

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.

Jan.

25

London

122.1

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London

390.

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30

268.

6.

Feb.

80.

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11

0.1

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8

15

London

94.

3.

24

London

238.

8.

26

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ondon

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na

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ar.

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unknow

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nada

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ar.

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old

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.

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as（

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h）

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aic

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Apr.

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23

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ark

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ay.

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1

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52.1

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iverp

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ne

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84.

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onny

395

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era

ra

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erp

ool

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6.

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1.

14

London

178.1

2.

6

34.1

9.

15

London

997.1

3.

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erp

ool

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n696.1

5.

Jul. 1

0C

am

ero

ons

285

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inia

c

23

216.

.

187.

1.

91.1

6.

So

urce

: C

114/1

54: Journ

al of

Thom

as L

um

ley &

Co., 1

801, T

NA

; T

ST

D.

1802

A.

Gold

sm

id S

on &

D.

Ele

ason

Bro

wn R

ogers

& R

ogers

William

& T

hom

as P

ary

Capta

in J

ohn L

ivin

gsto

ne

Robert

Bent

John &

Jam

es P

arr

id: 81329

John B

olton

sam

e a

bove?

Bri

ggs(?

)

Ric

hard

Miles &

Co.

William

s

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

John B

olton

id: 82923

Capta

in J

ohn L

ivin

gsto

ne

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

John &

Jam

es A

spin

all

id: 81946

L.

B.

Cohen

Novis

Sw

anzy &

Hutt

on

Capta

in S

tark

ey

Sam

uel P

ott

er

& C

o.

Jam

es W

orr

all &

Co.

id: 83387

Ric

hard

Miles &

Co.

id: 82280

Bro

wn H

uson &

Co.

id: 83218

J.

M.

Rusels

heim

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

Joseph P

orl

al &

Co.

Ric

hard

Miles &

Co.

id: 81018

Ric

hard

Miles &

Co.

id: 80419　

*ow

ner:

J.

Miles

William

& T

hom

as P

ary

Hym

en C

ohen &

Co

Ale

xander

Rid

dell

Hym

en C

ohen &

Co

Sam

uel P

ott

er

& C

o.

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

Pri

ncip

al P

lace o

f

Sla

ve P

urc

hase

Tota

l S

laves

em

bark

ed

Pri

ncip

al P

lace o

f

Sla

ve L

andin

gO

thers

(TS

TD

id, etc

.)

Hym

en C

ohen &

Co

Date

of

Sale

Custo

mer(

s)

City

Nam

e o

f V

essel

Valu

e o

f

Sale

s(￡

s.d

.)

Date

Voyage

began

Tota

l129 r

ecord

s o

f tr

ansactions

Liv

erp

ool: 3

4-(

26%

)58,9

14.1

8.

9

Sarg

ent

Cham

bers

& C

o.

Joseph P

orl

al &

Co.

Burt

on S

pencer

& C

o.

Moses S

am

uels

Bonny: 7-

Liv

erp

ool-

Bonny: 7/2

6 (

27%

)

Ric

hard

Miles &

Co.

id: 80390

William

& T

hom

as P

ary

Rip

ley &

Riv

ier

& C

o.

Bro

wn R

ogers

& B

row

ns

Sarg

ent

Cham

bers

& C

o.

Sam

uel M

cD

ow

al &

Co.

id: 80307

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

William

Aspin

all

cf.

tra

nsaction o

n S

epte

mber

30

S.

B.

Cohen

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

Bro

wn R

ogers

& B

row

ns

50

25

Liv

erp

ool

320.1

4.

29

130.

.

30

126.

.

19.

.

9.

7.

6

Jul. 1

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442.1

0.

7303.

3.

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ican

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6.

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ug.

18

Bonny

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cent

10

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erp

ool

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l A

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bie

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ug.

15

West

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al A

fric

a377

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ix

13

London

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4,3

80.

7.1

0Jul. 2

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cent

14

18.

1.

3

15

London

111.

.

17

London

Kerr

ie244.

8.

Jul. 2

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Jam

aic

a

20

London

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5.

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.

234.1

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.

Aug.

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8

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6.

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London

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ool

354.1

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16

Liv

erp

ool

Pru

dence

499.

5.

6S

ep.

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21

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24

247.

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26

6.

3.

580.1

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3

Sep.

6360.

.

9L

iverp

ool

Westm

ore

land

9,5

95.

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ct.

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Gold

Coast

166

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nid

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171.

.

118.

.

16

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5.

Liv

erp

ool

Kin

gsm

ill

3,4

00.

0.

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ct.

15

Bonny

439

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as

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18

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erp

ool

Thom

as

1,7

43.

2.

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ct.

11

Bonny

311

Tri

nid

ad

Liv

erp

ool

Win

dsor

Castle

280.

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ct.

13

unknow

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Thom

as（

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h）

21

436.1

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Liv

erp

ool

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ore

land

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22

65.

.

24

65.

2.

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erp

ool

Earl

of

Liv

erp

ool

645.

7.

O

ct.

24

unknow

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uri

nam

e（

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h）

25

London

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ign

4,7

65.1

3.

N

ov.

7B

onny

355

Tri

nid

ad

27

Liv

erp

ool

Thom

as

608.

8.

Bro

wn C

ass &

Co.

id: 83574

John &

Jam

es A

spin

all

cf.

tra

nsaction o

n S

epte

mber

18

Charl

es &

John W

hele

r &

Co.

Robert

Hum

e

John &

Jam

es P

arr

id: 81117

Georg

e C

ase &

Co.

id: 84079

Thom

as L

um

ley &

Co.

Ogle

& W

alton

cf.

tra

nsaction o

n S

epte

mber

9

William

Forb

es

id: 82169

Joseph P

orl

al &

Co.

John &

Jam

es A

spin

all

id: 83765

William

& T

hom

as P

ary

William

& T

hom

as P

ary

A &

P C

ohen

Railto

n &

Rankin

gs

Ogle

& W

alton

id:8

4007

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

Sarg

ent

Cham

bers

& C

o.

J.

De P

rade

John &

Jam

es P

arr

id: 83254

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

William

& T

hom

as P

ary

Hym

en C

ohen &

Co

P.

W.

Bra

ncker

id: 80162（

?）

William

& T

hom

as P

ary

William

& T

hom

as P

ary

William

& T

hom

as P

ary

Sarg

ent

Cham

bers

& C

o.

Doxat

& D

uett

William

& T

hom

as P

ary

John E

wbank

Novis

Sw

anzy &

Hutt

on

Thom

as B

ennet

Gra

y F

reem

an

Joseph P

orl

al &

Co.

A &

P C

ohen

Rip

ley &

Riv

ier

& C

o.

M.

De L

onguem

arr

C &

W.

Bin

gle

y

Hym

en C

ohen &

Co

Joseph P

orl

al &

Co.

Rip

ley &

Riv

ier

& C

o.

Charl

es &

John W

hele

r &

Co.

Ale

xander

Rid

dell

Ric

hard

Miles &

Co.

id: 82125

Sam

uel &

William

Hin

de

id: 81040

John T

hom

as &

Co.

id: 81569

Nic

hola

s C

arl

isle

& C

o.

id: 81920

Rip

ley &

Riv

ier

& C

o.

P.

J.

Dennis

M.

De L

onguem

arr

*part

ners

hip

with R

ivie

r ?

Rip

ley &

Riv

ier

& C

o.

J.

De P

rade

Sarg

ent

Cham

bers

& C

o.

John&

Jam

es P

arr

cf.

tra

nsaction o

n J

uly

10

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

51

536.1

1.

Oct.

14

514.

2.

3

84.

.

15

112.1

0.

21

Liv

erp

ool

Active

3,2

66.

9.

6N

ov.

27

West

Centr

al A

fric

a310

Tobago

Liv

erp

ool

23.1

3.

6

9.

.

31.1

6.

30.

8.

3

22

677.

1.

9

23

3.1

7.

11.

.

26

Liv

erp

ool

Lord

Sain

t V

incent

2,2

89.1

7.

N

ov.

23

29

77.1

7.

77.

0.

8

Nov.

2125.

3.

8136.

.

180.1

3.

2

57.1

0.

6

18.

4.

6

4.1

0.

10

202.

2.

7.1

0.

17

8.1

5.

Dec.

2145.

.

4L

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ool

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3.

10

261.

8.

18

264.1

6.

6

27

1,0

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7.1

0

30

1.1

7.

4

6.1

6.

31

5.

.

Jan.

5193.

6.

8

London

Sir

W.

Dougla

s670.

6.

9F

eb.

5W

est

Centr

al A

fric

a310

Georg

ia

14

Liv

erp

ool

1.

5.

6

19

201.

.

15.1

7.

6

Feb.

8L

iverp

ool

Agre

eable

979.1

3.

M

ar.

8unknow

n310

Basse-T

err

e

9206.

5.

225.

.

10

38.

.

26

6.1

7.

6

Mar.

5L

ondon

Bedfo

rd4,4

83.1

9.

6M

ay.

4C

ongo R

iver

246

Kin

gsto

n

24

255.

1.

6

4.

5.

8

25

1.

4.

26

89.1

5.

8

29

Liv

erp

ool

Auro

ra908.

1.

6A

pr.

28

unknow

n291

Kin

gsto

n

31

21.1

7.

6

So

urce

: C

114/1

54: Journ

al of

Thom

as L

um

ley &

Co., 1

802, T

NA

; T

ST

D.

1803

Sarg

ent

Cham

bers

& C

o.

Georg

e C

ase &

Co.

id: 80402

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

Railto

n &

Rankin

gs

A.

Gold

sm

id S

on &

D.

Ele

ason

Bro

wn R

ogers

& C

o.

Sarg

ent

Cham

bers

& C

o.

Rip

ly M

iles &

Co.

John R

am

sden

id: 80455　

*L

um

ley's

part

ner

Sam

uel &

William

Hin

de

id: 80126

Gra

y F

reem

an &

Co.

Sarg

ent

Cham

bers

& C

o.

Ogle

& W

alton

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

John E

wbank

Pri

ncip

al P

lace o

f

Sla

ve L

andin

gO

thers

(TS

TD

id, etc

.)

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

Cald

cle

ugh B

oyd &

Reid

id: 83510

Liv

erp

ool-

Bonny: 5-/

22(2

3%

)

Date

of

Sale

Custo

mer(

s)

City

Nam

e o

f V

essel

Valu

e o

f

Sale

s(￡

s.d

.)

Date

Voyage

began

Pri

ncip

al P

lace o

f

Sla

ve P

urc

hase

Tota

l S

laves

em

bark

ed

William

& T

hom

as P

ary

Tota

l125 r

ecord

s o

f tr

ansactions

Liv

erp

ool: 2

3-(

18%

)68,8

08.1

6.

B

onny: 6-

Callett

& T

hom

sett

Thom

as D

ixon

A &

P C

ohen

William

Aspin

all

John F

indle

y

Rig

oud B

ett

ye &

Co.

William

& T

hom

as P

ary

William

& T

hom

as P

ary

William

& T

hom

as P

ary

William

& T

hom

as P

ary

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

Jam

es A

llen

Sarg

ent

Cham

bers

& C

o.

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

Robie

chon &

Mounie

n

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

Bro

wn R

ogers

& B

row

ns

L.

B.

Cohen

Benja

min

Devaynes

id: 82358

Jam

es A

llen

Sarg

ent

Cham

bers

& C

o.

Cass &

Bro

wn

Georg

e C

ase &

Co.

id: 80026

B.

Maw

dsle

ycf.

id: 80026 (

join

t in

vention ?

)

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

Sarg

ent

Cham

bers

& C

o.

Bro

wn R

ogers

& B

row

ns

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

Rip

ley &

Riv

ier

& C

o.

52

Apr.

179.1

0.

16

125.

8.

25

294.

2.

3

26

Liv

erp

ool

Nim

ble

232.

5.

6M

ay.

26

unknow

n286

St.

Thom

as（

Dutc

h）

May.

6L

iverp

ool

Dilig

ent

1,4

66.

5.

Jun.

18

Bonny

366

Dem

era

ra

Jun.

6264.

5.

19

34.

.

21

nill(

?)

23

London

John a

nd J

am

es

2,5

31.1

6.

6Jul. 1

3B

onny

439

Kin

gsto

n

Jul. 1

188.

.

12

50.

8.

13

66.1

1.

9

58.

3.

9

26

103.1

0.

49.

7.

6

27

128.

7.

6

30

London

Port

au P

rince

1,3

74.

8.

6S

ep.

7B

onny

433

Kin

gsto

n

Sep.

9130.

7.

6

Liv

erp

ool

Mari

a1,7

25.1

2.

O

ct.

6B

onny

395

Havana

Liv

erp

ool

Thom

as

1,5

07.

1.

6O

ct.

6unknow

n307

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16

Liv

erp

ool

Mari

a611.

7.

6

Liv

erp

ool

Thom

as

519.

8.

6

30.

.

Allis

on

2,2

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5.

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ent

225.

8.

26

11.

3.

4

Oct.

12

6.

.

Nov.

1504.

.

14

6.

.

16

99.

.

17

Liv

erp

ool

Beaver

1,4

10.1

4.

6D

ec.

20

310

Dec.

3330.

.

Laure

l1804.

Feb.1

3W

est

Centr

al A

fric

a225

Dem

era

ra

Ura

nia

1804.

Feb.1

3W

est

Centr

al A

fric

a208

Dem

era

ra

10

359.1

4.

6

12

88.

8.

13

42.

.

60.

.

14

4.

9.

4

Liv

erp

ool

103.

9.

6

15

Liv

erp

ool

120.

6.

6

26

46.

.

29

Liv

erp

ool

153.1

7.

6

31

London

Eagle

8,6

20.1

2.

1804.

Feb.1

captu

red

47.

8.

9

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

Ale

xander

Rid

dle

Burt

on S

pencer

& C

o.

Georg

e C

ase &

Co.

id: 82949

William

& S

am

uel H

inde

id: 81041

Bro

wn C

ass

Jam

es A

llen

John W

heele

r &

Co.

Robert

Bent

id: 82066

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

A.

Gold

sm

id S

on &

D.

Ele

ason

Charl

es &

John W

heele

r

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

Joseph C

ohen &

Co.

Robert

Bent

id: 83156

Charl

es L

ayto

n

John &

Jam

es A

spin

all

id: 82464

John &

Jam

es A

spin

all

id: 83766

John &

Jam

es A

spin

all

cf.

tra

nsaction o

n S

epte

mber

9

John &

Jam

es A

spin

all

cf.

tra

nsaction o

n S

epte

mber

9

H.

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53

An Iranian Port City of Bandar Abbas in the 18th Century:

A Case Study of the East India Company‟s Brokers

Norifumi DAITO

(Kobe University, JAPAN)

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to examine the activities of the English East India Company‟s

brokers at Bandar Abbas in the first half of the 18th century. It is tried to find out that

how Bandar Abbas declined during that period.

Bandar Abbas is located on the north shore of the Strait of Hormuz, the mouth of

the Persian Gulf (see Map1 and Map2).

This port was established by the Safavid dynasty after the conquest of Hormuz in

1622. Until then Hormuz had been the major port in the Persian Gulf controlled by the

Portuguese. The Safavids, after expelling the Portuguese from the port, relocated its port

function to the opposite shore and named it Bandar Abbas. The major officers of Bandar

Abbas were the governor (ḥākem/solṭān/khān) and the customs-master (shāhbandar),

who were appointed by the Safavid authorities1.

Bandar Abbas was highly developed as a major port of international trade in the

Gulf during the 17th and early 18th centuries. This port connected many areas along the

Indian Ocean with the major cities of Iran such as Shiraz, Esfahan, Yazd, and Kerman.

In particular, sea routes for coastal areas in India played an important role in the Indian

Ocean trade, through which enormous amount of specie was exported from Iran in

return for the Indian goods such as cotton textiles, indigos and peppers2.

Bandar Abbas attracted many merchants from Europe as well as Asia. After the

establishment of the town, three European East India Companies set up factories at

Bandar Abbas; the English (the EIC, 1623-1762), the Dutch (the VOC, 1623-1759), and

1 For the Safavid political administration of Bandar Abbas, see [Haneda 2001], [Floor 2006:

272-320]. 2 For the trade in Bandar Abbas and the Persian Gulf in the 17th century, see [Klein 1993-4].

54

the French (perhaps from the late 17th century)3.

But due to the collapse of the Safavid dynasty and the turmoil in Iran in the 1720s,

Bandar Abbas began to decline.

The cause of the turmoil was the conquest of the Safavid capital city Esfahan by

the Afghans in 1722. They marched from Qandahar, one of the chief cities in Khorasan

and occupied Esfahan after seven months seize. From then on, conflicts between the

Afghans and remnant forces of the Safavids had spread all over Iran4. Bandar Abbas

was also occupied by the Afghans in the late 1720s [Floor 1998: 309]. But after the

Safavids drove the Afghans out of Esfahan in 1729, the port was restored to their rule in

the early 1730s [Lockhart 1958: 424]. The situation around Bandar Abbas became

unstable and insecure during that period and affected the trade badly5.

As for the events during the resurgent Safavid period, it should be noted that

Ṭahmāspqolī Khān, a virtual ruler of the dynasty, attempted to create a navy at Bushehr

from 1734. It was a striking change because the Safavids did not have their own ships or

seamen but relied on European naval powers to maintain security in the Persian Gulf

[Floor 2007: 1-21]. After assuming the throne with the name of Nāder in 1736, he

actively dispatched his brand-new navy against Oman (1737-40 and 1742-4)6.

However, during the reign of Nāder Shāh, the trade at Bandar Abbas did not return

to its previous level. Contrary to that, merchants were forced to bear expenses of his

navy and were oppressed by arbitrary rule7. After the assassination of Nāder Shāh in

1747, Bandar Abbas went bad to worse with conflicts among local powers and its role

ended as an international port around 1760 [Floor 2007: 39-40, 93-4].

There have been four studies on the decline of Bandar Abbas. All of them have

traced the process of decline following the trade statistics of the EIC and the VOC.

[al-Khalifa 1988] examined the economy in the Gulf, based on EIC‟s trade

statistics from 1700 to 47. It is mainly concerned with the effect of EIC‟s activities on

the regional economy.

[Floor 1989], [Floor 2006] and [Floor 2007: 39-94] are all based on VOC‟s trade

statistics. [Floor 1989] and [Floor 2006] explored VOC‟s trade after 1747 and during the

Afsharid period (1736-53), respectively. [Floor 2007: 39-94] paid more attention on the

economic situation of Bandar Abbas after 1747.

3 For the EIC, see [Ferrier 1970], [al-Khalifa 1988]. For the VOC, see [Floor & Faghfoory 2004],

[Floor 2009a], etc. 4 For the situation in Iran in the 1720s, see [Lockhart 1958].

5 For the situation in Bandar Abbas in the 1720s, see [Floor 1998: 63-70, 205-21, 291-360].

6 For the Nāder Shāh‟s campaigns in Oman, see [Lockhart 1935].

7 For the situation in Bandar Abbas during the reign of Nāder Shāh, see [Floor 2009b: 101-77].

55

The trade statistics of the EIC and the VOC are important historical sources to

understand the economic situation of Bandar Abbas. However they can only show the

trade conditions of those companies.

Therefore, this paper focuses on merchants in Bandar Abbas, especially Indian

merchants.

During the Safavid period, a larger section of the town population were Indians

such as Moltanis or banyans [Kaempfer 1968: 138]8. They played an important role in

the trade between India and the Persian Gulf, especially in the textiles trade. They were

also major players in the financial market and exported a big amount of the available

specie from Iran [Floor 2006: 304]9.

In the proposed study, it will be attempted to examine the activities of three

banyans who served the EIC as brokers at the Bandar Abbas in the first half of 18th

century. In doing so, the study will show that what changed at the port and why this

change happened, for a better understanding of the way it declined.

The best available source for the study is the EIC‟s diaries and consultations kept at

Bandar Abbas (IOR, G/29/2-14). They are called Gombroon Diary because Bandar

Abbas was well known as Gombroon to English traders. This paper will make use of the

Diary from November 1st, 1708 to July 31st, 1746. The dates used here are all based on

the Julian calendar10

.

1. Activities of Banyans as Broker

It is intended to examine the banyans‟ activities as EIC‟s brokers. In doing so, it will be

attempted to show that they were widely involved not only with EIC‟s trade but also

8 Moltan is a city in the Punjab Province of Pakistan. Banyan found in European sources at that time

is often applied to Hindus and Jainists, in particular their merchants. 9 For the activities of Indian merchants in the Indian Ocean World from 16th to 18th centuries, see

[Nagashima 2000]. For the Indian merchants living and working in diaspora communities dispersed

across Central Asia, Afghanistan, Iran, Caucasus, and much of Russia from 16th to 19th centuries,

see [Levi 2002]. 10

Gombroon Diary is preserved in the British Library, where it consists a part of India Office

Records. Unfortunately, there are a number of gaps in this records, as the following table will show.

G/29/2 contains the Diary from August 1st, 1708 to July 31st, 1710.

G/29/3 contains the Diary from November 23rd, 1726 to March 14th, 1727.

G/29/4 contains the Diary from March 16th, 1727 to July 31st, 1727.

G/29/5 contains the Diary from November 20th, 1728 to July 31st, 1730 and from August 1st,

1731 to July 31st, 1737.

G/29/6 contains the Diary from August 1st, 1737 to July 31st, 1738 and from August 1st, 1739 to

July 31st, 1746.

56

with the management of factories in Iran.

(1) Chittorah

The first broker was named Chitrah/Chittrah/Chittorah/Chittora. There is little

information about him. It is not clear that when he started acting as a broker, but he was

in service from as late as 1706 [IOR, G/29/3, f. 6b]. He lived at the port with his family

[IOR, G/29/3, f. 18a, etc.].

He was involved with EIC‟s exporting. He loaned the EIC money for the purchase

of Kerman wool [IOR, G/29/2, f. 15b, etc]11

and secured the available specie for export

[IOR, G/29/2, f. 9b, etc.].

He was also involved with the management of the factory at Bandar Abbas. He

paid some of the Company‟s expenses for them [IOR, G/29/2, f. 2a, etc.] and made up

their accounts [IOR, G/29/2, f. 13b].

In return for these services, his right was safeguarded. According to Masashi

Haneda, among the royal favors obtained by the EIC, one privilege safeguarded the

right of banyans belonging to the EIC [Haneda 2005: 130]. In addition to that, his

family was also protected by the Company and the protection continued even after his

death [IOR, G/29/3, f. 18a, etc.].

(2) Kessourjee

The second broker was named Kesourjee/Kessourjee12

. He was the son of Chittorah

[IOR, G/29/4, f. 73b]. After succeeding his father in about 1725 [IOR, G/29/3, f. 9a], he

remained in the position until his death in September 1729 [IOR, G/29/5, f. 80a]. He too

lived with his family [IOR, G/29/3, f. 18a, etc.].

He was widely involved with EIC‟s trade.

Concerning the importing, he bought EIC‟s goods such as iron, rice, and woolen

manufactures and sold them to other merchants [IOR, G/29/3, ff. 4a-b, etc.], [IOR,

G/29/3, f. 16b], [IOR, G/29/5, f. 75a]. In return, he received 1 percent brokerage from

the Company [IOR, G/29/3, f. 16b]. He went between the EIC and other merchants in

the trade of lead and woolen manufactures [IOR, G/29/5, f. 2b], [IOR, G/29/5, f. 35b,

etc.]. In addition, he selected some money changers called shroffs (ṣarrāf) for the

11

For the Kerman wool trade by the EIC and VOC, see [Matthee 1993]. 12

Jee is a spelling variant of ji, one of suffixes found in personal names in Gujarati [Ram Mehrotra

1994: 63-84].

57

Company [IOR, G/29/3, f. 14b].

Concerning the exporting, he also loaned the EIC money for the purchase of

Kerman wool [IOR, G/29/4, f. 78b] and secured the specie for export [IOR, G/29/5, ff.

3b-4a]. The EIC transported other merchants‟ goods as well, as their own on their ships.

He collected the former in time for their departure [IOR, G/29/5, f. 3b, etc.].

He was involved with the management of the factories at Bandar Abbas and

Esfahan.

As for the management of the factory at Bandar Abbas, he collected a duty,

imposed on ships sailing in the Gulf by the EIC. In the late of 1720s, the EIC tried to

force the ships to pay for their passes [al-Khalifa 1988: 96-7] and he collected the fee

for them [IOR, G/29/4, f. 12b, etc.]. He also paid some of the Company‟s expenses for

them [IOR, G/29/5, ff. 48a-b, etc.]. For instance, he paid salaries to the EIC‟s staffs for

the Company, among whom were Armenians and Persians [IOR, G/29/5, f. 75b, etc.].

Furthermore, he brought food and necessities into the factory [IOR, G/29/4, f. 79b, etc.]

and could procure ships for the Company [IOR, G/29/4, f. 15a].

As for the management of the factory at Esfahan, he encouraged EIC‟s money

changer there, to supply their staffs with some subsistence money [IOR, G/29/3, f. 4a].

Moreover, he could negotiate with the government at Bandar Abbas for the

Company [G/29/4, ff. 23a-b, etc.].

In return for these services, his right was also safeguarded [Haneda 2005: 130].

This privilege was confirmed by the Afghan king Ashraf (r. 1725-9) [IOR, G/29/3, f. 7b].

He and his family were protected by the EIC whenever they or their property were in

danger [IOR, G/29/5, f. 17a, etc.].

(3) Sanchar

The third broker was named Sanchar/Sankhar. He was not related to his two

predecessors. He had dealt with the EIC in the Kerman wool trade before he succeeded

Kessourjee [IOR, G/29/5, ff. 60b-61a, etc.]. Sanchar officially took over as a broker in

April 1730 [IOR, G/29/5, f. 106a]. He too lived with his family. He had his agent at

Masqat for trade [IOR, G/29/5, f. 343b, etc.].

He was also widely involved with EIC‟s trade.

Concerning the importing, he bought EIC‟s woolen manufactures and sold them to

other merchants [IOR, G/29/5, f. 143b, etc.]. In return, he too like his predecessors

received 1 percent brokerage from the Company [IOR, G/29/5, f. 220a, etc.]. In addition

to that, he went between the EIC and other merchants or the local government in the

58

woolen manufactures trade [IOR, G/29/5, f. 105b, etc.], [IOR, G/29/6, ff. 230a-b].

Concerning the exporting, he too loaned the EIC money for purchase of Kerman

wool [IOR, G/29/5, f. 222b, etc.] and collected other merchants‟ goods to load them on

the Company‟s ships in a similar fashion as Kessourjee [IOR, G/29/6, f. 12a]. In

addition, he weighed the specie for export [IOR, G/29/6, f. 29b].

Moreover, he was involved in controlling private trade. All the people at the

factory were forbidden to make any contracts, unless it was made in the presence of

Cheif or broker in his name [IOR, G/29/5, ff. 126b-127a].

He was also involved in the management of the factories at Bandar Abbas and

Esfahan.

As for the management of the factory at Bandar Abbas, he also paid some of the

Company‟s expenses for them [IOR, G/29/5, f. 136b, etc.] and brought food and

necessities into the factory [IOR, G/29/6, f. 49b]. Besides, he was put in charge of all

the repair work of the factory [IOR, G/29/5, f. 142a, etc.].

As for the management of the factory at Esfahan, he loaned the EIC money for the

payment of expenses at Esfahan [IOR, G/29/5, f. 109b, etc.].

In return for these services, like his predecessors, his right was safeguarded

[Haneda 2005: 130]. One privilege granted to the EIC by Nāder Shāh forbade anybody

to force him for anything [IOR, G/29/5, f. 340b]. He and his family was also protected

by the Company [IOR, G/29/6, f. 56b].

2. Activities as a Mediator between the Local Government and the EIC

In this chapter, it is attempted to take up a case which tells that EIC‟s brokers acted as a

mediator between the local government and the EIC. The case will show that the broker

had a heavy influence in the port city as a mediator between them till the late 1720s at

earliest.

This point has already been discussed in detail in my article [Daito 2009].

Therefore I would like to explain the outline of it here.

The case was recorded in Gombroon Diary on July 4th, 1727.

At that time, as it is mentioned earlier, Iran was unstable with conflicts between the

Afghans and the remnant forces of the Safavids. Around Bandar Abbas, many powers

tried to assume control over the port.

Bandar Abbas was under a Persian governor, who tried to defend his position.

Around the port was a man who proclaimed himself to be a prince of the Safavids. He

aimed to rule the port. From Esfahan, a former customs-master, marched with the

59

support of the Afghans. His purpose was to recapture his former post13

. In addition, an

Arab ruler of Basidu, a small port situated at the southwest end of Qeshm Island, too

aimed to rule Bandar Abbas.

The EIC tried to secure their rights and interests.

These rights were deeply involved in the establishment and development of Bandar

Abbas. As mentioned earlier, Bandar Abbas was established by the Safavids after the

conquest of Hormuz in 1622, when the EIC transported the Safavid troops on their ships

to the island and bombarded against the Portuguese stronghold. In reward for this

contribution, Safavid King ʻAbbās (r. 1587-1629) allowed the EIC to receive half of the

customs revenues of the new port, provided they maintained two ships of war in the

Gulf to guard against any retaliatory action by the Portuguese [Lockhart 1958: 362].

This privilege was reconfirmed by the successive kings14

.

In 1727, the EIC pressed the governor at the port to give them their share of

customs. Furthermore, they launched an expedition against Basidu demanding the ruler

for the same because he proclaimed himself to be a Shawbunder (shāhbandar) of

Bandar Abbas. As a result, the EIC was in a position to affect the course of events.

Under these circumstances, the EIC‟s broker induced the Company to recognize

the governor‟s authority15

.

3. Decline of Broker

In this chapter, it is tried to examine the changes that occurred in the status of the broker

in the late 1730s. In doing so, it is attempted to demonstrate the economic condition of

the broker which severely deteriorated at that time persuading him to stop acting as a

broker.

On October 4th, 1739, Sanchar requested the EIC to permit him to resign from his

post (Doc. 1). Doc. 1 points out two facts.

Firstly, the EIC refused to sell their woolen manufactures in the last year and

13

His name was Mirzah Zaid Ally (Mīrzā Zāhed „Alī), a member of „Evāz Beyg family from Lar.

As of 1668, when the administration of the Persian Gulf ports was farmed out, if not earlier, until

1728, the function of shāhbandar of the Gulf was practically monopolized by them. As of 1730 there

is no more farming of the customs administration [Floor 2006: 238, 290-3, 296-304]. 14

However, It would seem that the EIC only received at best 10 percent, and often less, of what was

due to them. They finally acquiesced in receiving an annual payment of 1000 tomands (tomān) in

lieu of half the customs revenues as of 1670 [Floor 2006: 312-5]. For more information on the

privilege, see [al-Khalifa 1988: 19-43], [Haneda 2007: 203-6]. 15

For interpreters at Bandar Abbas, see [Haneda 2005], [Haneda 2006], [Haneda 2009].

60

denied him of the credits he enjoyed before. It indicates that his economic condition

deteriorated to the point where he could no longer be a good trading partner of the

Company.

Secondly, he was often charged with money by the local government for the reason

he was EIC‟s broker. It shows that due to the aforementioned situation, the EIC was no

longer active in protecting him.

Sanchar was permitted to work as a broker until his debts were cleared and he

discharged what he owed to the EIC [IOR, G/29/6, f. 124a]. However from then on, he

had not acted as a broker as before16

.

The case on October 20th, 1742 confirms this (Doc. 2).

The EIC expressed inconvenience dealing with the government and the usefulness

of the broker. It indicates that the broker‟s virtual resignation created a new situation

where the local government and the EIC dealt directly with each other.

Conclusion

So far it has been examined that the banyans who served the EIC as brokers at the

Bandar Abbas in the first half of 18th century. In context to this, the following results

were obtained.

1. EIC‟s brokers in the first half of 18th century were widely involved not only with

EIC‟s trade but also with the management of the factories in Iran.

2. Based on that, they had a heavy influence in the port city as a mediator between the

local government and the EIC till the late 1720s at earliest.

3. The economic conditions of the broker severely deteriorated in the late 1730s and he

stopped acting as one. It created a new situation where the EIC dealt directly with

other merchants and the local government.

These results lead us to the following conclusion. The relationship between the

local government, the EIC and their broker could bring order to Bandar Abbas till the

late 1720s at earliest. However, by the decline of the broker in the late 1730s, the

relationship was broken off. As it is mentioned above, in the late 1730s, Nāder Shāh

attempted to create his own navy in the Persian Gulf. The case of EIC‟s brokers

indicates that this movement to build a new order in the Gulf was a major cause for the

16

He stopped buying the EIC‟s woolen manufactures in June 1740 [IOR, G/29/6, ff. 97b-98a], while

he continued to go between the EIC and other merchants in its trade [IOR, G/29/6, f. 152a, etc].

61

change of the relationship17

.

Map 1 Iranian Plateau and Persian Gulf

17

The EIC received their share of customs of Bandar Abbas until 1735-6. However in March 1737,

the privilege was substituted by a grant of one third of customs collected on goods imported by the

English ships. For the Company, the new arrangement was a major setback from the days when they

enjoyed half the customs revenues of the port [al-Khalifa 1988: 35, 99]. The decision made by Nāder

Shāh also must have been influenced by the progress of his project in the Gulf.

62

Map 2 The north shore of the Strait of Hormuz

Map1 and Map2 are based on the maps of [Haneda 2001: 2].

63

Bibliography

The Unpublished Sources

IOR, G/29/: India Office Records, East India Company Factory Records: Persia and the

Persian Gulf.

Kaempfer, E. 1968, K. Meier-Lemgo (ed.), Die Reisetagebücher Engelbert Kaempfers.

Wiesbaden.

The Published Sources and the Secondary Works

Daito, N. 2009, “Bandare Abbas ni okeru Igirisu higashi Indo gaisha no „tsuyaku‟”.

Kaiko toshi kenkyu, 4, 97-106.

Ferrier, R.W. 1970, British-Persian Relations in the 17th Century. Ph.D. dissertation,

University of Cambridge.

Floor, W. 1989, “The Decline of the Dutch East Indies Company in Bandar „Abbas”.

Moyen Orient & Océan Indien, 7, 45-80.

Floor, W. 1998, The Afghan Occupation of Safavid Persia 1721-1729. Paris.

Floor, W. & Faghfoory, M.H. 2004, The First Dutch-Persian Commercial Conflict: The

Attack of Qeshm Island, 1645. California.

Floor, W. 2005, “Dutch Trade in Afsharid Persia (1730-53)”. Studia Iranica, 34, 43-94.

Floor, W. 2006, The Persian Gulf: A Political and Economic History of Five Port Cities,

1500-1730. Washington, D.C.

Floor, W. 2007, The Persian Gulf: The Rise of the Gulf Arabs: The Politics of Trade on

the Persian Littoral, 1747-1792. Washington, D.C.

Floor, W. 2009a, “Dutch Relations with the Persian Gulf”. In: L.G. Potter (ed.), The

Persian Gulf in History. New York, 235-259.

Floor, W. 2009b, The Rise and Fall of Nader Shah: Dutch East India Company Reports,

1730-47. Washington, D.C.

Haneda, M. 2001, “Bandare Abbas to Perushiawan kaiiki sekai”. Rekishigaku kenkyu,

757, 1-11, 42.

Haneda M. 2005, “Bandar Abbas and Nagasaki: An Analysis of the Reaction of the

Safavid Government to Europeans from a Comparative Perspective”. Annual of

Japan Association for Middle East Studies, 20(2), 119-130.

Haneda, M. 2006, “Les compagnies des Indes Orientales et les interprètes de Bandar

„Abbās”. Eurasian Studies, 1-2, 175-193.

Haneda, M. 2007, “Higashi Indo gaisha to Ajia no umi”. Tokyo.

Haneda, M. 2009, “Canton, Nagasaki and the Port Cities of the Indian Ocean: A

64

Comparison”. M. Haneda (ed.), Asian Port Cities, 1600-1800: Local and Foreign

Cultural Interactions. 13-23.

al-Khalifa, K.K. 1988, Commerce and Conflict: The English East India Company

Factories in the Gulf, 1700-47. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Essex.

Klein, R. 1993-4, Trade in the Safavid Port City Bandar Abbas and the Persian Gulf (ca.

1600-1680): A Study of Selected Aspects. Ph.D. dissertation, University of London.

Levi, S.C. 2002, The Indian Diaspora in Central Asia and its Trade, 1550-1900. Leiden.

Lockhart, L. 1935, “Nadir Shah‟s Campaigns in Oman, 1737-1744”. Bulletin of the

School of Oriental Studies, 8(1), 157-171.

Lockhart, L. 1958, The Fall of the Ṣafavī Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia.

Cambridge.

Matthee, R. 1993, “The East India Company Trade in Kerman Wool, 1658-1730”. In: J.

Calmard (ed.), Etudes Safavides. Paris & Teheran, 343-383.

Nagashima, H. 2000, “Indoyo to Indo shonin”. In: K. Kabayama, etc. (eds.), Isuramu,

kan- Indoyo sekai. Tokyo, 141-165.

Ram Mehrotra, R (ed.). 1994, Book of Indian Names. New Delhi.

Doc. 1

[IOR, G/29/6, f. 56a]

[16] Sankhar Waiting on the Agent this Morning, hinted

[17] some Suspicions of the Hon' Company's having given

[18] Orders to discharge him from the Brokership, as they had

[19] refused to let him have the last years Cloth, tho' so small

[20] a Quantity, & his Debt to them lessened within a Trifle

[21] Complaining also of his Sufferings from the Government

[22] who under the Distinction of being our Broker, he said,

[23] and with the Notion of his prodigious Gettings, had

[24] taken from him at times, as he cou‟d make appear

[25] by his Books, to the amount of above four thousand

[26] Tomands, besides Obliging him to trust them great Sums

[27] otherways, All which as a private Merchant he shod

[28] have been exempted from. That he had likewise Money

[29] Owing him from Europeans, which either thro' Death

[IOR, G/29/6, f. 56b]

[1] or Disability he shou'd hardly ever recover: and inf[-]

65

[2] that the decline in Trade of late, & the little prospect

[3] he saw of its reviving whereby he might be encouraged

[4] to sit under these hardships, but on the contrary new

[5] ones approaching which his present Circumstances w[-]

[6] not allow him to Submit to, with other Reasons, but

[7] principally, That of the Ho Companys denying him

[8] their Credit as before, Determined him to take our Lea[-]

[9] for his resigning, after he had collected his Debts, & clea[-]

[10] off the remainder of what he Owed the Hon‟ Company

Doc. 2

[IOR, G/29/6, f. 230a]

[33] In part of Payment of what the Beglerbeggy Owes us for the

[IOR, G/29/6, f. 230b]

[1] Kings Merchants Transferred, with Stores & other Article[-]

[2] has now sent four Horses Valued at Ten Tomands each, An[-]

[3] this is the inconvenience of dealing with these Governmen[-]

[4] People, tho' unavoidable Formerly indeed when the Broker w[-]

[5] Circumstances they used to direct themselves to him so that

[6] did not appear to the Company but the matter being Change[-]

[7] they nevertheless expecting to be obliged in their wants, We?r[-]

[8] Applied to, But as yet we have been able to keep on tolerabl[-]

[9] Terms & either by assignments on the Bannians or othe[-]

[10] means secured the Money tho' we have been sometime o[-]

[11] of it, The Dutch are fair to Submit to the like (& indeed [-]

[12] particular Merchant) but they have been so ill treated that

[13] they have as some of their Heads Confess'd a Debt outstan[-]

[14] of above One Thousand Tomands from the Government.

66

Regenerating Trade Diaspora:

Supra-regional Contacts and the Role of “Hybrid Muslims”

in the South China Sea since the late 10th to mid-13th Century

Masaki MUKAI

(Osaka University, JAPAN)

Introduction

To reconstruct the formation and transition of the “diasporic” communities of Muslims

around the South China Sea including Arab-Persian immigrants and other people of

various ethnicity formed by conversion and hybridization is the subject of great

importance in several ways.1 Firstly, because it concerns in the history of the people of

trans-national activities that constitute an important topic not only for the Maritime

Asian History and also for the Global History studies in a way by rethinking the

paradigm of modern nations and nation states and paying more attention to the

human‟s activities crossing borderlines and discover some new features of nations,

imagined communities and networks in the past.

This subject is also closely connected with the evolutional history of the hybrid

Chinese Muslims which has been an important topic in the historical research of

diverse "Islamic" traditions in the East. As is partly introduced in this paper, this was

not a seamless process and we can observe several sets of cycles formed by

1 As for the definition of “trade diaspora (and diaspora),” see Cohen 1971; Curtin 1984. In order to

put the specific argument of this paper into much wider context of comparative history, I am

tentatively borrowing this concept in referring to "widely dispersed but mutually interconnected

communities" of Islamic people including Arab-Persian descendants partly mixed with

Han-Chinese and other indigenous populations and was historically formed in the region

surrounding the South China sea mainly through commercial migration and voluntary conversion. I

put stress not on their negative motive of persecution or specific center or homeland but on the

continuity or successiveness of the wide spread Sino-Muslim cultural tradition while whether they

shared a common identity as an imagined "Islamic world" is under question (see Haneda 2005). As

a recent research on Maritime Muslim communities as “trade diaspora,” see John Chaffee,

“Diasporic Identities in the Historical Development of the Maritime Muslim Communities of

Song-Yuan China,” Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient 49, no. 4(2006):

395-420.

67

interruptions and regenerations of their “diasporic” community and trade network.

However as a whole process, we can see it as a continuous one. The first interruption

and regeneration took place during the 10th century prior to the beginning of the Sung

dynasty. The second set is observed in the early Yuan period. And the third one is

around mid-fourteenth century.

In this paper, I would like to show a preliminary overlook focusing on the earliest

stage of supra-regional activities of Islamic people and their roles as mediator in the

frontier societies of the South China coastal region paying attention to these sets of

interruption and regeneration.

(1) The Formation of Arab, Persian Trade Diaspora in the East ?

In the early Song, a lot of tributary missions came from the countries of the “South

Sea.” A certain part of the tributary missions seems to have a close relation to the

activity of Arab and Persian sea-traders Dashi bozhu 大食舶主. Dashi 大食 is the

transcription of the Persian word, Tāzī (or Tājik) which means “an Arab, Arabia” (or “a

Persian, one of Arabian origin brought up in Persia”)2. Bozhu might be the direct

translation from the Persian word, nākhudā, meaning “head of ship,” which was

commonly used around the Indian Ocean.

The first record of the missions from Dashi says that merchant ships (shangchuan

商船) carrying tribute did not stop to come and go thereafter. Pu Ximi, the head of

tributary mission of the caliph, in 976 and his son Pu Yatuoli or Pu Yatili (*Abū Ādil),

later appeared as bozhu 舶主(“head of ship”) and fanke 蕃客(“foreign guest”). These

examples tell us that the tributary missions of Dashi king was actually carried out by

merchants (See Table 1).

The sea-traders spreading over the Asian Sea played a key role for the formation of

the Maritime Asian trade network by connecting the Chinese empire and ports and

polities.

For example, Dashi ships of Arab, Persian merchants were visiting the South

China via Champa and Java. In 971, Dashi, Champa and Java sent tribute to (Li Yu 李

煜 of the )Southern Tang.3

Furthermore, the Sea-traders dragged new participants into the Maritime Asia. In

977, The Brunei (Boni 勃泥) king decided to send the first tributary mission after he

had heard about the Song by Pu Luxie 蒲盧歇 who is considered to be Arab, Persian

2 F. Steingass, A Comprehensive Persian-English Dictionary including the Arabic Words and

Phrases to be met with in Persian Literature (London: Kegan Paul, 1930; reprint, New Delhi,

1973), 273, 806. 3 See Song shi, chap. 490, Waiguo zhuan, “Dashi.”

68

and had left China for Java and drifted to Brunei.4The map shows above-mentioned

situation that Dashi ships were heading to China and they dragged other country

(Brunei, here) into the circle of maritime contacts.

Table 1. The Tributary Missions of Arab, Persian Sea-traders in the Early Song

Period

Year (C. E. ) Member of Embassies Master or Country

968 Unknown Dashi 大食

971 Li Hemo 李訶末 Dashi/ Sanfoqi 三佛齊

973 Unknown Dashi

974 Bu Luohai 不囉海 (Ibrāhīm?) Dashi king, Caliph 訶黎佛

975 Unknown Dashi

976 Pu Ximi 蒲希密 Dashi king, Caliph

977 Pu Sihao or Pu Sina 蒲思郝 / 蒲思那

with Mahemo 摩訶末 (Muammad?),

Puluo 蒲羅 / 蒲囉

Dashi

993 Li Yawu 李亜勿 Dashi/ “bozhu” Pu Ximi

995 “bozhu” Pu Yatuoli 蒲押陁黎 (The son of Pu

Xi-mi)

“bozhu” Pu Ximi

999(a) Pu Yatili 蒲押提黎

999(b) Wenmao 文茂 “fanke” Pu Yatili

：

1003 Poluoqin 婆羅欽 Dashi

：

1008 “fanke” Li Mawu 李麻勿 “bozhu” Li Yawu

(Sources: Song shi 宋史 , chap. 490, Waiguo zhuan 外國傳 (Biography of Foreign Countries); Song

hui yao ji gao 宋會要輯稿 , Fanyi 蕃夷 7, 9; and Yu hai 玉海 , chap. 154; and Xu zi zhi tong jian

chang bian 續資治通鑑長編 , passim.)

4 See Song shi, chap. 489, Waiguo zhuan, “Boni”; Song hui yao ji gao, Fanyi 7, p. 8.

69

Map 1. The Movements of Arab Persian Merchants and Transition of the Zone of

Intensive Maritime Trade Activities from the South Sea to South China Coastal

Region.

(2) The Disappearance of Arab, Persians and Appearance of Hybrid

Sino-Muslims

A detailed account on an Arab (or Persian) sea-trader Pu Ximi 蒲希密 tells us the fact

that the Song court did not promote an active maritime trade policy but it addressed an

imperial edict to Guangzhou and the leader of foreign settlement to invite foreign

merchants. Judging from the text of his biao 表 (the letter to the emperor) written by

highly sophisticated Classical Chinese following the orthodox terminology of celestial

kingdom, the Chinese literati who were familiar with this kind of classical texts must

have helped to prepare biao for the tributary mission.5 In this way, the foreign

merchants in Guangzhou, such as above mentioned Pu Ximi, were able to play an

exclusively important role as mediator utilizing connections with these local Chinese

elites.

An orthodox discourse on the Maritime trade during Song period is about the

problem of the “Disappearance of Islamic merchants.” The view that the overseas

activities of Chinese merchants developed during the Song period is commonly

accepted. A conventional view relating to above is the “expel” of Muslims by Chinese

5 See Song shi, chap. 490, Waiguo zhuan, “Dashi.”

70

merchants from the South China Sea and Southeast Asian trade.6 However, this

explains only one side of what actually happened by seeing the difference of people

too rigidly and overlooking the aspects of contacts and assimilations.

In the case of “Muslim merchants,” there were two aspects in the process of

assimilation with Chinese merchants. One is assimilation in the types of business and

the other is cultural assimilation.

Figure 1. The Grave Stone of Pu banyuan dated 1264 and the Old Muslim

Cemetery in Bandar sri bugawan, Brunei (Source: Franke and Ch‟en 1973).

An example of Arab, Persian descendants in the “dual” process of assimilation can

be seen in an old Chinese stele found in the Muslim cemetery in the capital of Brunei

darussrusalam, Bandar sri bugawan (See Figure 1). It says, “The grave of Pu 蒲,

banyuan 判院 (a local official title) from Quanzhou erected in 1264.” It clearly

indicate the process of Sinicization in culture because it was written in Chinese and in

business type for their base of activity is considered to have been in Quanzhou.7

6 Shiraishi Akiko (1964:26) pointed out that the development of overseas activities of Chinese

merchants expelled Islamic merchants around South China Sea except some Sinicized ones.

Kenneth Hall (1985: 196-197) suggests that other than the development of Chinese merchants,

political disorder around Persian Gulf after the decline of the Abbasids in the mid 10th century

caused the decreasing Arab role in Southeast Asian trade between twelfth and thirteenth centuries. 7 See Franke and Ch‟en 1973. The credibility of a very rare book Xishang zazhi refering to the

71

What is worth noticing is the dead person‟s official title. According to my

preliminary research on the examples of foreigners bearing official titles, we can find

several ways in which foreign merchants obtained official titles. There were foreign

merchants who obtained official titles through various ways.

(A) Since, as early as the Northern Song period, some merchants were granted the

title of martial official such as langjiang 郎將 or jiangjun 將軍 as a reward for their

tributary activity. The meaning of it is explained by a scholar that these official titles

had the function to assure their credibility and gain their prestige toward Chinese

merchants and officials of the Maritime Trade Supervisorate (shibosi 市舶司 ).8

(B) There were also foreign merchants who tried to obtain a local official rank by

money or by an illegal way. For example, in 1124, the old woman of foreign origin

named Pu brought the bribes of foreign exotics to the imperial court and asked for an

official rank for her son. The account says that a eunuch helped her.9 It is possible to

view that for the foreign merchants, to become official was a good way to pursue a

safer living basis than to depend only on an unstable maritime trade.

(C) It was also very common during Southern Song period to grant foreign

merchants, official titles as reward for carrying exotics or guiding the embassy of

foreign country. For example, in 1136, a lower-rank martial official title, chengxinlang

承信郎 , and a set of official suits was given to Pu Luoxin 蒲囉辛 from an “Arab or

Persian barbarian country” (Dashi fanguo 大食蕃國 ) who built a ship and carried

frankincense and paid the tax equal to 30‟000 guan copper coins to the Maritime Trade

Supervisorate at Quanzhou 泉州 . The account reveals that the aim of this reward by

the emperor was to prompt foreign merchants to bring more frankincense. In 1156,

Pujin, who had resided in Guangzhou for a long time and was already granted

chengxinlang, was promoted to be zhongxunlang 忠訓郎 by his merits of tributary

(jinfeng 進奉 ). Previously, he had come as the member of embassy from Sanfoqi. At

the same time, Pu Yanxiu 蒲延秀 was granted chengxinlang, following the example

of Chen Wei‟an 陳維安 who had guided the embassy from Champa the other day.10

In Addition, we cannot neglect another important meaning of granting official title,

that is, official approval of their local influence. And we have a good example of this

person of Brunei inscription and introduced by Zhuan Weiji (“Wenlai-guo quanzhou songmu kaoshi

[An Interpretation of the Song period‟s Quanzhou Grave from Brunei],” Haijiaoshi yanjiu

[Maritime History Studies], no. 2[1990]: 80-84) was argued by several scholars and mostly

questioned. See articles by Chen Tiefan and Wolfgang Franke, Lin Shaochuan and Gong Yuanming

in Haijiaoshi Yanjiu, no. 2(1991) and Xie Fang in Haijiaoshi yanjiu, no. 1(1998). 8 See Shiraishi 1964: 25.

9 Pu yang wen xian 莆陽文献 , Liezhuan 列傳 (Biographies) 32, “Lin Ji 林枅 .”

10 Song hui yao ji gao, Fanyi 4-94; 7-48.

72

pattern. It is an example of famous foreign merchant of Quanzhou――Pu Shougeng

蒲壽庚. He was granted the titles of zhaofushi 招撫使 (commander of local militia)

and shibo tiju 市舶提擧 (head of the office of maritime affairs) during the last years

of the Southern Song.11

In my opinion, these titles were not more than a nominal

approval of his private militia consisting of thousands men and a substantial control of

maritime trade at Quanzhou lasting 30 years.12

Map 2. The Presumed Area of Pu Shougeng's Residence in the Quanzhou City

(Based on Fujian sheng quanzhou shi diming bangongshi (ed.), Fujian sheng

quanzhou shi diminglu (Place Names of Quanzhou City in Fujian Province), 1982.

His family‟s local influence seems to have lasted until the Yuan period. The old

street names preserved in nowadays Quanzhou city are said to have relation with the

lost residence of Pu Shougeng (See Map 2). For example, (1) Jiangwu Lane(Jiangwu

xiang 講武巷 , the place of Pu Shougeng's Jiangwu hall [Jiangwu tang 講武堂 ) (2)

11

So1991; So2000:106-114,301-305. 12

See Mukai 2007: 67-96.

(1)

(2) (3)

(4)

(5)

(6) (7)

(A)

(B

)

(C

)

Jin Jiang

(Jin River)

The walled city of Quanzhou

during Song-Yuan period

The other places related with foreigners and maritime trade in present Quanzhou city: (A) Qingjingsi

清浄寺 (Old Mosque first built in Song period) (B) The site of the Maritime Trade Supervisorate of the

Song (C) Jubao jie 聚寶街 (gathering treasures street)

73

Chess-board Gurden(Qipan yuan 棋盤園 ), Pu Shougeng made a part of his Flower

Garden [Huayuan] into a big chess-board, (3) Donglu Lane(Donglu xiang 東魯巷 ,

the place of Pu Shougeng's study) (4) Zaozi Lane (Zaozi xiang 灶仔巷 , the place of

kitchen for Pu Shougeng's barracks), (5) 33 rooms (Sanshier jian 三十二間 , rooms

for 33 beauties who act as pieces on the big chess board in his garden in the storied

building of Pu Shougeng's residence), (6) Great Narrow Gate (Da‟ai men 大隘門 , the

gate of Pu Shougeng's residence), (7) The edge of Flower Garden (Huayuan tou 花園

頭 ) (see Map2). When we mapped all of these place names, his residence covered

most part of the foreign settlement in Quanzhou. It suggests that local influence of

foreign people in Chinese port city should not be underestimated.

(3) Implication of the Surrender of Pu Shougeng toward the New Order

In 1276, Pu Shougeng “betrayed” the Southern Song dynasty and surrendered to the

Mongols with the thousands of his private militia and the citizens of Quanzhou. The

map 3 shows the military situation of the southeast coast of China around 1276, the

period of final battles between Song and Yuan dynasties.

We can see square flames rimmed with black, gray and white colors in the map.

The flame rimmed with black and gray color is the military and governmental

headquarters of the Yuan dynasty. And with white color is of the Song dynasty. Then

the flames without color are private military forces of the coastal regions they kept

neutral attitude during the battles between the Song and the Yuan.

Through this map, it is clear that the situation is very different from what

obviously believed in many respects.

Firstly, as Professor Lo Jungpang and Xiao Qiqing‟s studies show, the Mongol

empire had already built the powerful navy by 1276.13

Furthermore, the Mongols obtained many Song battle ships during the war on the

Yangze river. For example, the battle of Jiaoshan 焦山 was a crucial turning point for

that the Mongols defeat the Song Navy and which was a fatal damage for the Song

dynasty. In the battle, the Mongols obtained 7 hundred sea-going jonks called White

Spallow battle ships (baiyaozi 白鷂子 ).14

And soon later, the Mongols copied the

design and made 100 White Spallows. As a result, when they built the Navy and its

headquarter is called Supreme Marshal Office of the Coast at Dinghai 定海 (Yuanhai

13

See Lo 1955; Xiao 1990. 14

Su Tianjue 蘇天爵 , Guochao mingchen shilüe 國朝名臣事略 , chap. 2, “Chengxiang henan

wudingwang 丞相河南武定王 ” (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, p. 29); Guochao wenlei 國朝

文類 , chap. 70, Yuan Mingshan 元明善 , “Gaocheng dongshi jiazhuan 藁城董氏家伝 ,” p.9

(Yuanwenlei 元文類 , Taipei: Shijie shuju 世界書局 , 1989, p.772).

74

zhaotaoshi 沿海招討使 , later moved to Qingyuan 慶元 [Ningbo, today] and

elevated in rank as duyuanshuaifu 都元帥府 ), they had at least 5000 soldiers and 800

sea-going battleships.15

And it is said that the Yuan fleet boarding several hundred

thousands‟ trained soldiers crossed the ocean to siege Southern Song capital Lin‟an 臨

安 ―Hangzhou, today.16

Other figures on the map were obtained from various

contemporary historical sources.17

As a contemporary historical source reveals, one of the Song loyalists and local

military chief called Zhang Zhezhai 張哲齋 tried to gather other military forces along

the South China coastal region for the battle against the Mongols. Although the plan

met with failure and he was soon executed, the victory of the Mongol was not solid if a

lot of maritime forces had supported him.18

Under these circumstances, Pu Shougeng‟s

surrender was timely and highly appraised and fully rewarded by the Mongols after the

war.

Long believed view that the Mongol army was mainly consisted of cavalry and

foot soldiers and not good at naval battle is not more than a myth. So, we must

reconsider the role of Pu Shougeng who previously believed to be purely a mercantile

figure and contributed to the Mongols by giving tade ships for the Mongols navy.

However, if we closely observe the military situation around 1276, it is obvious

that Pu Shougeng‟s contribution was still important for the Mongol‟s victory against

the Song. The Southern Song princes and his followers, escaped from the capital

Lin‟an and fled to Fuzhou ,still had a quite large military forces as shown on the map.

Add to this, Pu Shougeng‟s contribution was not merely supplying ships. Rather, his

actual contribution was in the battles and it had significant under the realm of the

Mongols. We can observe his participation in the naval battles against the remaining

Song followers by a few surviving records.19

The connection with a Jalayil commander, Suodu which in turn in the overseas

missions to the countries in the South Sea during early Yuan period should have

formed and consolidated in the process of cooperation in the battles against the

Southern Song loyalists. In this sense, the determining fact in the Pu Shougeng‟s

15

Yuanshi, chap. 132, Liezhuan 列傳 (Bigraphies) 19, Halatai, p.3216. 16

Yuan bingzi pingsonglu 元丙子平宋録 (Qing period manuscript in Beijing University Library);

Pingsonglu 平宋録 (Shoushangecongshu 守山閣叢書 edition), the tenth month of the twelfth

year of Zhiyuan 至元 period. 17

Figures of private military forces of the coastal region are mainly based on Yuan shi, Shizu benji

and that of the Song navy is based on “Guangwang benmo 広王本末 ”( in Songji sanchao

zhengyao 宋季三朝政要 ), the eleventh month of the Jingyuan 景元 period (1276). 18

“Zhang Tiezhai” in Wenshan xiansheng wenji 文山先生文集, chap. 19, zhuan (Biographies). 19

Liu Yueshen 劉岳申 , “Wen Tianxiang zhuan 文天祥傳 ” in Wenshan xiansheng wenji, chap.

19.

75

activities in the next stage was a military contribution as a private military force in the

battles. In this sense, how the personal ties bonded key persons is crucial for better

understanding of a background of the maritime trade and overseas missions conducted

in the new order under the Mongols.

Map3. Military Situation of the Southeast Coast of China around 1276

The ruling system of South China was constructed by the hands of Mongol

generals stationed there and the connections of each branches of the Yuan troops was

kept in the administrations after the war.20

The same is true in Fujian province. There were two distinct troops in Fujian

20

See Tsutsumi Kazuaki, 1996, 1998, 2000.

76

administration which is originated from the former military order. When Pu Shougeng

surrendered, there were two major headquarters dispatching the branch troops and

conducting subjugation of the region. The troop under Mangγudai was a branch of the

army corps headquartered at Hangzhou. Another one under Suodo was a branch of

Jianxi army corps (See Table 2).

Pu Shougeng participated the battle in corporation with Suodu and his militia was

connected with the troop of Suodu and he himself became an official of the Mobile

secretariat of Jianxi. Then the connection with Suodu and also his maritime trade

network was important for his subsequent activities in the field of foreign relation

under the Yuan regime. And another figure Mangγudai became even more eminent and

influencial in Fujian and Zhejiang region and seems to have tried to control the

maritime trade in opposition to former Song trade network under Pu Shougeng. For

example, in 1278, Mangγudai arrested an envoi dispatched to foreign country by

Suodu and Pu21

. Behind him should be the network of Central- and Western Asians.

Because he had a close connection with a Central Asian Muslim official Shihab al-Din.

And using his fleet he sometimes seize trade ships to obtain illegal duties22

.

What I have described above is in a sense how the former Song trade network was

absorbed into the Yuan regime. And this is one example of what already theoretically

said that is how the over Eurasian network was completed in the east because of the

unification of long divided China by the Mongols. Furthermore, the significance of Pu

Shougeng‟s surrender was not only for his contribution to the dynastic change but also

for his participation in the formation of the new order of the overseas relationship.

Conclusion

Through above-mentioned examples of earliest stage of the activities of Arab, Persians

and their offspring around South China Sea, we can (at least partly) observe that the

evolution of their “diasporic” communities was not a seamless process and we can see

several sets of interruptions and regenerations. These occasional disruptions were

considered to be related to the shift of gravity in the Cross-Cultural exchanges in the

maritime world.

21

See Yuan shi 元史 , chap. 12, Shizu benji 世祖本紀 (Basic Annals of the Emperor Shizu) 9,

the seventh month on the nineteenth year of Zhiyuan 至元 period, p. 245 (Zhonghua shuju 中華

書局 edition). 22

See Dayuan shengzheng guochao dianzhang 大元聖政國朝典章 , chap. 22, hubu 戸部 8,

“Shibo zefa ershisan tiao 市舶則法二十三條 ,” p.47 (Yingyin Yuanben Dayuan shengzheng

guochao dianzhang 影印元本大元聖政國朝典章, Taiwan: Wenhai chubanshe 文海出版社 , 1964

[reprt., Kyoto: Zhongwen chubanshe 中文出版社, 1976, 2vols.],vol.2, pp. 1061-1062).

77

Guangzhou and Quanzhou had successively constituted twin location of Arab,

Persians migration and focus points of Cross-Cultural exchanges on the South China

coast. Approximately after the decline of the Tang rule in the early 10th century, the

gravity of Cross-Cultural exchange seems to have moved from Guangzhou to the Straits

of Malacca. By 970s, the Arab, Persian sea-traders‟ active tributary missions to the Song

court represents the revival of the active role of the ports on the South China coast and

then, the retreat of the Arab, Persians in the South Sea during the Southern Song period

again lead to the shift of the major role in the Cross-Cultural exchange to the Southeast

Asian ports.

As Janet L. Abu-Lughod pointed out, the Straits of Malacca gained its importance

when China retreated and, in reverse, it reduced importance when China actively

embarked to the maritime world. Accordingly, the Chinese overseas expansion and the

destiny of the Straits were interrelated.23

Moreover, the role of comprador was not

only for the ports of the Straits but also for those of the South China coastal region that

had been the main base for the Chinese overseas endeavor. So what is crucial for the

prosperity and the decline of the ports of the Straits and the South China coastal region

was a shift of zone of the intensive trade activity and active port city in area of

maritime communication. And I prospect that it is also the case for the situation around

the southward expansion of the Yuan dynasty in the next stage.

On the other hand, as a whole process, we can still see the period argued in this

paper as a consistent cycle. As we have seen, during the Song period, bozhus and fankes

of Arab-Persian origin were active and their offspring, Pu Shougeng expanded influence

from the late Song to early Yuan. At least pay attention to the trans-regional activities of

trans-periodic succession is important to see this long term transition can be seen as one

continuous period. When we focus on whole process of “trans-periodic” succession of

the Islamic groups, further studies may discover the long cycle of Maritime trade

network from 10th century toward “the Age of Commerce” as one continuous process.

This can be a contribution to overcome the dynasty-divided historiography.

23

Janet L. Abu-Lughod pointed out that the “natural” role of the ports along the Straits (of

Malacca; e.g., Palembang, Jambi and so on) was that of comprador , a role that is both politically

contingent and economically unstable. And especially in relation with Chinese maritime

development, we can observe a see-saw like transitions in the importance of the ports in the Straits.

She wrote, “Whenever the Chinese moved aggressively outward, the intermediary ports

paradoxically became more prosperous but less important. Whenever the Chinese pulled back from

the western circuit or, even worce, interdicted direct passage of foreign ships into their harbors, the

ports in the straits flourished, but only because Chinese vessels took up the easternmost circuit

slack by meeting their trading partners at Palembang, Kedah, or, later, Malacca” (Abu-Lughod

1989: 311).

78

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