George R. Famini, PhD

George Famini Consulting, LLC

Risk is the likelihood of a specific effect within a specified period

◦ Function of probability, consequences and vulnerability1

◦ Consequence alone is not risk

◦ Toxicity alone is not risk

Hazard is the property or properties of a chemical or a situation with the potential for causing damage

Determining Risk is important because:

◦ It is not just about consequences

◦ High consequences with zero frequency yields no risk, just as a high occurrence (frequency) with zero consequences

◦ Can be used to quantify hazards, consequences and risks

◦ Can be used to quantify mitigation steps

1Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe

It is essential to derive the risk drivers so that applicable mitigation steps may be taken.

2

Multicriteriate Decision Analysis (MCDA)

◦ Most applicable to solving problems that are characterized as a choice among alternatives.

Dividing the decision into smaller, more understandable parts

Analyzing each part

Integrating the parts to produce a meaningful solution

◦ Generally requires consensus building

◦ Although metrics are required it is a qualitative tool

Risk Management Tables (RMT)

◦ Qualitative only

◦ Requires definition of scales

◦ May use MCDA in defining impact/consequences and probability/likelihood

Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA)

◦ Considers Risk as a function of frequency/probability and consequences

◦ Requires numbers for each step

◦ Very time intensive

◦ Can incorporate distributions (aka, include uncertainty)

Many examples of MCDA, RMT and QRA in literature1,2,3

3

1Blakely, David, et al, A Screening Toll to Prioritize Public Health Risk, BMC Journal, 20132S. Kooistra, H. Paulus, S. Bowen and G. Famini, "CSAC Screening Assessment," 2007.3G. Famini, S. Sharp and D. Reed, "Executive Report for the 2008 Chemical Terroism Risk Assessment," 2008.

Systems Definition

Hazard Identification

Scenario Definition

Frequency/Likelihood

Development

Consequence Development

Risk EstimationSufficient?

Risk Based Recommendations

Risk Mitigation

No

Yes

4

SCIPUFF used to construct all downwind plumes1

Either a spreading circular pool (low temperature/pressure) or a 2 phase jet (high temperature/pressure)assumed for initial release

Other parameters (temp, wind speed, direction) were identical

Assumptions Used

◦ USCG/AD Little 1974 Report on Liquid Ammonia Solvation used (60% solvation in seawater; 100% solvation below 8-10 cm)2

◦ Positive Buoyancy of Ammonia

◦ Hydration Effects considered, has no to limited effect3

Consequence Generation

◦ LCt contours used to estimate fatalities5

◦ Plumes overlayed on population grid generated by A. Cohen4

5

1For a description of SCIPUFF see www.sage-mgt.net, [Online]. 2 A. D. Little, Inc, "Prediction of Hazards of Spills of Anhydrous Ammonia on Water," 1974.3 S. R. Hanna, Personal Communication4A. Cohen, Hazmat, LTD, Personal Communication, 20175 D. Sommerville, S. Channel, B. Battat and K. Park, "Review and Assessment of Ammonia Mammalian Lethality Data and the development of a Human Estimate," Chemical Security Analysis Center, 2010.

Legend

Salmon = LCT90-LCT99

Red=LCT50-LCT90

Orange=LCT10+-LCT50

Yellow= LCT05-LCT10

Green=LCT01-LCT05

6

2500 Ton Ship Release• LCt01 yield about the same downwind

distance for a 2500 ton ship release as for the 62.5 ton iso tank release

• 500-600 meters• Due to difference in release

mechanism• Ship release is a low pressure, low

temperature release• Iso tank release is a high pressure,

high temperature release

• Demonstrates the importance of needing to consider ALL of the parameters surrounding the tank, rupture, etc

• Also shows the importance of considering the concepts of Safer Design Strategies and Inherently Safer Technologies

• Moderating conditions is essential

From G.R. Famini, S. R. Hanna, I. Sykes, “Assessing the Downwind Hazards Associated with Ammonia Release”, 2017

5 iso tanks simultaneous release (62 Tons)

Failure rate used as the frequency, published by the UK Health and Safety Executive1

This maintains consistency across different transportation modes

Human error estimates not considered

History/Sample Statistics incorporated into HSE report

Statistical distributions not considered

Uncertainties currently not considered

7

1Health and Safety Executive, “Failure Rate and Event Data for Use Within Risk Assessments”, 2012

Utilized standard Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) methodology

𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 =

𝑖=1

𝑛

𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖

fi = failure rate frequency for operation i

ci = consequences for operation i

Risks for each step are added

Permits

◦ Computation of overall risk

◦ Identification of “critical” steps

◦ Inclusion of uncertainty

8

9

North South

Small vessel unload to pipeline:

Iso Tanks Loaded in Egypt

Unload at Haifa

Unload at Ashdod

10

Direct Unload to Tanker Truck

Small vessel unload to pipeline

Iso Tanks Loaded in Egypt

Ship to Ship Transfer to IsoTanks Moored

Offshore Buoy

Ship at Dock (storage)

Ship offshore

Ship to Ship Transfer

Offload to Road Tanker (Hardarm)

Offload iso containers

Load iso tanks onto truck bed*

Store containers at dock

Load iso tanks onto ship (Egypt)

Tanker on road (from Dock)

Tanker on road (from HN)

Iso container on Road/Rail*

Offload to Pipeline

Pipeline from Dock to HN

Load Truck at HN

Transfer to HN Storage

Transfer to HS Storage

Store at HN

Store at HS

* Includes transport via road and rail

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Scenario Failure Rate Multiplier LikelihoodConsequence

ScoreRisk Score

1 ISO container (on Road) 5.00E-06 1 5.00E-06 10 5.00E-05

1 ISO container (storage) 5.00E-06 1 5.00E-06 20 1.00E-04

Load truck at HN 7.00E-06 18 1.26E-04 10 1.26E-03

Offload 21 iso 3.80E-05 21 7.98E-04 20 1.60E-02

Offload 49 iso 3.80E-05 49 1.86E-03 20 3.72E-02

Offload to pipeline 7.00E-06 1 7.00E-06 110 7.70E-04

Pipeline to HN (25 ton/hr) 6.5E-09 1000 6.50E-06 110 7.15E-04

Ship at dock (2500 ton) 5.00E-07 1 5.00E-07 50 2.50E-05

Storage at dock, 21 iso 5.00E-06 21 1.05E-04 20 2.10E-03

Storage at dock, 49 iso 5.00E-06 49 2.45E-04 20 4.90E-03

Store at HN 5.00E-07 1 5.00E-07 50 2.50E-05

Store at HS 5.00E-07 1 5.00E-07 30 1.50E-05

Tanker trucks from HN to HS 2.20E-07 18 3.96E-06 10 3.96E-05

Transfer from iso to HN storage (49 total) 7.00E-06 49 3.43E-04 10 3.43E-03

Transfer from iso to HS storage (21 total) 7.00E-06 21 1.47E-04 10 1.47E-03

Transfer from Pipe to storage 7.00E-06 1 7.00E-06 110 7.70E-04

Transfer from truck to HS storage 7.00E-06 18 1.26E-04 10 1.26E-03

13 Iso Tanks on Road 5.00E-06 13 0.000065 10 0.00065

21 Iso tanks on Road 5.00E-06 21 0.000105 10 0.00105

32 Iso Tanks on Road 5.00E-06 32 0.00016 10 0.0016

49 Iso Tanks on Road 5.00E-06 49 0.000245 10 0.00245

Ship/Pipeline/Tanker

Truck

Ashdod, 21 Iso

Tanks, Road

Haifa 49

Tanks Road

Ship at Dock (storage) 2.50E-05

Offload to Road Tanker

(Hardarm)

Offload iso containers 1.60E-02 3.72E-02

Store containers at dock 2.10E-03 4.90E-03

Tanker on road (from HN) 3.96E-05

Iso container on Road 1.05E-03 2.50E-03

Offload to Pipeline 7.70E-04

Pipeline from Dock to HN 7.15E-04

Load Truck at HN 1.26E-03

Transfer to HN Storage 7.70E-04 3.43E-03

Transfer to HS Storage 1.26E-03 1.47E-03

Store at HN 2.50E-05 2.50E-05

Store at HS 2.50E-05 2.50E-05

Total Composite Risk 4.89E-03 2.06E-02 4.81E-02

Relative Risk 0.07 0.28 0.65

Total Risk for Iso Containers 6.87E-2

12

13

Vary number of Ports (Haifa, Ashdod)

Vary number of iso containers coming into each port

Vary transportation mode from Port (road, rail, combination)

Higher number of iso containers increases risk

64 IsoContainers

Asdod 13 isotanks road

only

Asdod 21 isotanksroad only

Haifa 32 isotanksroad only

Haifa 49 isotanksroad only

Total Composite Risk 6.17E-2 1.63E-2 2.06E-2 4.50E-02 4.81E-2

Relative Risk 0.32 0.09 0.11 0.23 0.25

Ashdod, 13 Iso Tanks, Rail

Asdod 13 isotanks road only

Ashdod, 21 Iso Tanks,

Rail

Ashdod, 21 Iso Tanks,

Road

Total Composite Risk 3.28E-02 1.63E-02 6.61E-02 2.06E-2

Relative Risk 0.24 0.12 0.49 0.15

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Road transport is less risky due to few transfer operation

Rail is roughly double the risk for same number of iso tanks

Rail require road transport to rail head, and road transport from rail to Haifa South, increasing loading/unloading operations

Total Composite

Risk

(Fatalities/Year)

2.3E-2 4.89E-3 6.17E-2 1.77E-2 4.87E-3

Relative Risk 0.15 0.03 0.40 0.38 0.03

Tanker Truck Loaded at

Dock

Ship/Pipeline/Tanker Truck

Iso ContainersShip to Ship

TransferOffshore

Buoy

15

Operation Tanker Truck Iso Container

Annual Number of Containers 1600 6400

Number of Operations Four Times Less Four Times More

Stability of Load More Stable Less Stable

Tank Pressure 5-7 Atm 8-12 Atm

Inspection Every 5 years Every 2 years

Because of fewer operations, lower pressure and higher tank integrity, the tanker truck is 3 times lower in risk than the ISO tanks.

If the “Triad” is employed, the reduction in tanker trucks needed, coupled with low pressure operations for the ship and pipeline,

further reduce the risk, to a total of 15X

Over 15 different Scenarios Considered

The iso tank scenarios have higher risk

Frequency component is increased for scenarios with more operations

More operations for a scenario tends to increase risk

Operations offshore have the lowest risk (as would be expected)

Pressurized containers tend to have higher failure rates than refrigerated containers

Pressurized containers tend to give greater downwind plumes, and greater fatality estimates than similar sized refrigerated containers

Uncertainty has not been calculated

Consideration should be given to Inherently Safer Technology (IST) concepts1: Simplification, Moderation, Minimization, Substitution

1Center for Chemical Process Safety, Inherently Safer Chemical Processes, New York, 2009

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Low temperature processes lower the risk of scenarios that utilize them.

The tanker ship/pipeline/truck scenario ( the “triad”), which has several low temperature/cryogenics operations, generates the lowest risk. It represents the safest solution.

Rail transport of iso containers, is about 2 times higher in risk than the similar sized road based iso container transport.

Scenarios with higher numbers of operations will generally have a higher risk.

Utilizing fewer iso containers will reduce the risk.

Reducing the number of tanker trucks will reduce the risk.

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19

Ship/pipeline/truck

◦ 2500 ton Ship: 600 m maximum plume distance1

◦ 25 Ton/hour pipeline: 350 m maximum plume distance1

◦ Tanker Truck: 400 m maximum plume distance1

Iso Tanks

◦ 1 Iso Tank Rupture: 300 m downwind plume1

◦ 32 Iso Tanks Rupture: 900 m downwind plume1

◦ 64 Iso Tanks Rupture: 3450 m downwind plume1

Public receptors are inside of only the 64 iso tank rupture plume

Type of storage is critical

◦ Iso tanks and tanker truck are high pressure, high temperature

◦ A catastrophic release of this type of container will result in longer downwind effect

◦ Ship and pipeline are low temperature

Mitigation is possible for ship and pipeline, more difficult for iso tanks and tanker trucks

201Based on LCT01 distances