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TRANSCRIPT
GARY WATERS
PUBLISHED BY
OBOE - AIR OPERATIONS OVER BORNEO, 1945
Gary Waters
Published by Air Power Studies Centre
RAAF Base Fairbairn Canberra
1995
ii
(C) Commonwealth of Australia, 1995
The views are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the official policy or position of the Department of Defence, the
Royal Australian Air Force or the Government of Australia. This
document is approved for public release.
This book is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the
purposes of private study, research, criticism, or review as
permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may be reproduced by
any process without written permission. Inquiries should be made
to the publisher.
National Library of Australia
Waters, Gary, 1951-.
Oboe.
Bibliography.
Includes index.
ISBN 0 642 22590 7.
1. World War, 1939-1945 - Aerial operations, Australian. 2. World War, 1939-1945 - Campaigns - Borneo. I. Australia. Royal Australian Air Force. Air Power Studies
Centre. 11. Title.
Designed by Defence Publications
Published and distributed by:
Air Power Studies Centre
RAAF Base FAIRBAIRN
Canberra, ACT, 2600
AUSTRALIA
Telephone (06) 267 6458
Facsimile (06) 267 6382.
iii
ABSTRACT
This book analyses the air operations conducted over Borneo in
1945 as part of the series of joint operations known as Oboe.
The lead-up to the Oboe operations is discussed as an essential
precursor, describing the situation at the time. Each of the
three operations - Tarakan Island, Labuan Island-Brunei Bay, and
Balikpapan - is discussed in turn, with a focus on the phases of the operations, the air support and fighter control
organisations, and administration (including logistics, medical
and personnel issues).
Armed with this holistic view of the air operations themselves
and the supporting operations, the book draws together the
principal observations. The final chapter analyses the doctrine
of the time and assesses the degree to which the observations
accord with the doctrine.
iv
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
Gary Waters joined the W in January 1969. He qualified as an
accountant and economist, was employed as a Supply officer, and
later qualified as a computer programmer. His more recent
postings have included RAF Bracknell, United Kingdom, where he
attended the RAF Advanced Staff Course in 1985, and RAAF Staff
College, Fairbairn Canberra from 1986 to June 1989, where he
served as an instructor, as Director of Air Operations Studies,
and finally in 1989 as Director of Studies during the review of
the W ' s Command and Staff Course. In June 1989 he was posted
to the newly formed Air Power Studies Centre, where he
contributed to the writing of the RAAF's inaugural doctrine - AAP
1000.
From January 1990 he was the RAAF visiting fellow to the
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National
University, where he produced two books - RAAF Air Power
Doctrine: A Collection of Contemporary Essays, ( 1990), and The
Architect of Victory: Air Campaigns for Australia, (1991). In
May 1991 he was posted back to the Air Power Studies Centre,
where he produced a book entitled Gulf Lesson One - The Value of Air Power: Doctrinal Lessons for Australia, (1992).
He then served in the Directorate of Logistics Development and
Planning during 1992, during which time he edited a book called
Line Honours: Logistics Lessons of the Gulf War (1992). In
January 1993, he was promoted to group captain and posted as the
Director of the Air Power Studies Centre. During that time he
has co-edited another two books - one with John Mordike entitled
Regional Air Power Workshop Darwin 24-26 August 1993, and the
other with Mark Kelton entitled Air Power Presentations 1993.
v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
An enormous amount of time has gone into researching this book,
and to my family I owe an apology for begrudging them so much of
my time, but also a large vote of thanks for assisting with
typing, formatting and so forth. So to Carolyn, Scott, Brett and
Emma, many thanks for all your help and patience.
To my colleagues at the Air Power Studies Centre, I am indeed
grateful for their assistance and encouragement over the two
years that this book was in the making - so thank you to Doctors
Alan Stephens and John Mordike and Wing Commanders Mark Lax and
Ric Casagrande. The maps were drawn by Sandra Seignarack, and
absorbed quite a deal of her time - my vote of thanks seems hardly just compensation.
Throughout the entire project, my good friend and mentor
Professor John McCarthy has been there when I needed him. Thank
you John. So too has Group Captain Phi1 Morrall provided
sterling support and continued encouragement.
Finally, to those many good friends who show up each year at the
RRAF history conference, thank you for indulging me and assisting
me with my research. You are too numerous to name, but please
take care and I hope to see you at our future conferences.
vii
CONTENTS
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
MAPS
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER ONE: THE LEAD-UP
CHAPTER TWO: OBOE ONE - TARAKAN
CHAPTER THREE: OBOE SIX - LABUAN ISLAND-BRUNEI BAY
CHAPTER FOUR: OBOE TWO - BALIKPAPAN
CHAPTER FIVE: OBSERVATIONS
CHAPTER SIX: DOCTRINE
CONCLUSION
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
ix
xii
viii
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AA ACM
ACS
AF AFDS
AIF
ALO
ALP
A0
AOC
AOC-in-C
AOP
ASP
ASR
ASS
ASV
ASW
AVM
C-in-C
CAIRS
CAP
CAS
CO
CP
CSA
D/F
DDT
E/A
F-Day
FEAF
Frag
GC I
W C
HE
HF
Anti-Aircraft
Air Chief Marshal
Airfield Construction Squadron
Air Force
Airfield Defence Squadron
Australian Imperial Forces
Air Liaison Officer
Air Liaison Party
Area of Operations
Air Officer Commanding
Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief
Air Observation Post
Air Support Party
Air Sea Rescue
Air Support Section
Anti-Surface Vessel
Anti-Submarine Warfare
Air Vice-Marshal
Commander-in-Chief
Close Air Support
Combat Air Patrol
Chief of the Air Staff
Commanding Officer
Command Post
Commander Support Aircraft
Direction Finding
Dichloro-Diphenyl-Trichloroethane
Enemy Aircraft
1 ~ u l y 1945
Far Eastern Air Forces
Fragmentary Message (from Air Tasking Schedule)
Ground Control Intercept
General Officer Commanding
High Explosive
High Frequency
HQ IFF
km
LASU
lb
LOCS
LST
LW/GCI
LW/AW
M/T
MCRU
MC S
MFCU
MTB
MTU
NCO
NE
NE I
NGS
NWA
0 A
OBU
P- ay
POL
POW
PRO
PT
R/T
RAAF
RAN
RDF
RIMU
RNZAF
RSU
SA0
SAR
Headquarters
Identification Friend or Foe
Kilometre
Local Air Supply Unit
Pound
Lines of Communication
Landing Ship Tank
Light Weight/Ground Control Intercept
Light Weight/Air Warning
Motor Transport
Mobile Control and Reporting Unit
Medical Clearing Station
Mobile Fighter Control Unit
Motor Torpedo Boat
Mobile Telecommunications Unit
Non-Commissioned Officer
North East
Netherlands East Indies
Naval Gunfire Support
North Western Area
Objective Area
Operational Base Unit
1 May 1945
Petrol, Oil and Lubricants
Prisoner of War
Public Records Office
Patrol Torpedo
Radio/Telephony
Royal Australian Air Force
Royal Australian Navy
Radio Direction Finding
Radio Installation and Maintenance Unit
Royal New Zealand Air Force
Repair and Salvage Unit .
(Renamed Repair and Servicing Unit on 1 January 1945)
Support Air Observer
Search and Rescue
SW
SWPA
TAF
TMO
US
USAAC
USAAF
USAF
uss VHF
VIP
WA
WOP
Z- ay
South West
South West Pacific Area
Tactical Air Force
Transportation and Movements Office
United States
United States Army Air Corps
United States Army Air Force
United States Air Force
United States Ship
Very High Frequency
very Important Person
Western Area
Wireless Observer Post
10 June 1945
MAP 2
China (Taiwan
i i C
"d Hong Kong
i
$ J ii \ 4 Manila
I
Celebes Sea Jolo" Archipelago
6'Tawi Tawi " Sanga Sanga v Morotai
I ,'
,", >A ('~uching
Java Sea
Semarang ,,Surabaya --, .--- c-p * Kangeag. ,[LJ- --4 ,? T i m r Sea Java ,?j--Bali
i --. P A/*..& i . . " 4 L CL_ c* Malang Den Pasar
0 1,OO ZOO 491 Miles
MAP 3 BORNEO
D,? Kudat / J '
S,
f ,~ana"\, Sandakan Jesselton J. i NORTH,
*h.-.
Labuan l s g c BORNEO &'-L
J
v''* Pensingan "./' !,/@runeil , . ?.. .. . , ~alabakan L,"_. ?; '" "16
/ Miri -3'' Tawao * "1
i' Mensalung-; sj* Bintulu -:c Tarakan Is
!~ >>
Sibu \, i
Sarawak -' ' _ _ . '"\
.l W
Balikpapan $f Manggar Sepinggan
2
i L,
Kotawaringin \
f'
"--.-.-% R
~andjermasln? +
d )P J-'%=
/' L; G t f b a n i o
0 100 200 300
U miles
MAP 4 TARAKAN ISLAND
*A+' Sadau Is
",W . C A~ri 4
--'\ \ . \ - ",
Anzacwwy .Tarakan i \.
'\ 'Tnwn 6 ;-
'<, I\
\~
Karis Is \\ a
\.>v
' . -.... % . . p
c,,
,.') I .P ,l Pamoesian ;
Cape i,
Pasir 'Q I i
5 L-",-/
Miles
MAP 5 LABUAN ISLAND - BRUNEI BAY
,' I I I I .- 40 60
Miles
fd ))
,," !'
s'
i / timbalai ~abuah,, Strip\
( Labuan i
@own, I j p---> C~LJ,
Brown Bea:h 1' {Avictoria Hbr i l l I
I I I I 0 1 5 Miles
.- .,.,,
:L ., , -:
Jesselton j, i
+" C-? : Vapar
,G , . \.-*'
Labuan Is I Kitau .
,l-Padas..R. L a b u a n ~~4 Beaufort
O 5 3%- '\ Keningau Brunei ~aj;;' ' Westow
Brooketon ! . Tenom 2- ,..<)Q Muara Is ;-' " Lawas
I .,- .i. Limbung prGnej ,, --..S
o I Miles 5 ,/.iown <:G,, f North ~ f i ! Limbang '
Borneo Kuala Belait
'w=-.-': Seria . CL- Lutong ). \.,. . : L ~ - ~ .. .~runei
'7 F ~. , L . Miri : ',. Brunei ,:
L, ' ,
/ -" .: : ' Sarawak , . s \ ~
. . Borneo i . .. . . .
MAP 6 BALIKPAPAN
Red
I I I I
0 2 4 6 Miles
I
xviii
INTRODUCTION
xix
The retaking of Borneo by the Allies in 1945 (known as the Oboe
operations) was achieved mainly by Australian forces conducting
joint operations. Borneo was important for strategic reasons (in
particular its location near Singapore and its oil resources),
and as this study will show, for operational reasons as well -
principally because Australian forces acted at the operational
level of war. At a time when the Australian Defence Force is
attempting to define the operational level of war and the
philosophy and requirements of joint operations, it is timely to
analyse the events in Borneo in 1945, more so since 1995 marks
the fiftieth anniversary of the Oboe operations.
This is not a study of the joint operations themselves, but
rather an analysis of air power's role in those joint operations
on Borneo in 1945. While clear and unambiguous air power
doctrine was not articulated at the time, many of the theoretical
and operational concepts had been tested and refined. That is
the purpose of this book - to identify those concepts and examine
their relevance to the conduct of air operations during Oboe.
For the reader to appreciate the context in which the operations
were conducted, Chapter One is devoted to discussion on the
Japanese invasion of Borneo, Japanese force strength in 1945, the
Allies' Montclair plan (Victor and Oboe phases), the role of Air
Vice-Marshal Bostock, the conditions at Morotai, and the
importance of doctrine to operations.
Chapters Two, Three and Four then analyse the particular air
operations related to each of the Oboe operations - Tarakan,
Labuan Island-Brunei Bay, and Balikpapan. Each of these chapters
identifies the overall objective, the intelligence available, the
planning and command and control, before the air operations
themselves are analysed. Each operation can be broken down into
phases, which helps provide an understanding of the implicit
doctrine at the time - air attacks on Japanese airfields and principal infrastructure that could support the Japanese,
followed by air attacks on the landing beaches (since the three
Oboe operations began with amphibious landings), and then the
close air support operations conducted in concert with the
Australian soldiers as they captured the respective objective
areas. In addition, there are several types of air operations
which warrant discussion, as well as the air support and fighter
control organisations and the supporting administration, all of
which help to clarify the doctrine under which the RAAF operated.
Description of the air aspects of the three Oboe operations is
necessary in some detail to identify the observations that can
be made which are of relevance to doctrine. In Chapter Five,
these observations are brought together in an operational sense,
and then discussed in Chapter Six in a doctrinal context. Most
of the doctrinal issues to arise are associated with direct air
support. Air support in the Middle East and European theatres
was developed and refined by the time of the Oboe operations and
several important doctrinal issues emerge from these other
theatres of which the RAAF in the South West Pacific Area would
have been aware. Additionally, the RAAF had developed some
expertise at direct support during the Allied victory at Milne
Bay and afterwards. Accordingly, these issues are discussed in
Chapter Six.
Fundamental to any doctrinal analysis of air support must be an
examination of Tedder's principles. After all it was probably
Tedder more so than any other airman who turned the spotlight on
air support doctrine. The views of Lord Tedder, Air Vice-Marshal
Wrigley (the Australian) and General 'Hap' Arnold are examined
in brief for comparative purposes. Then, using Tedder's
principles, the conduct of air support of the Oboe operations is
assessed, and comment made about the correlation between these
principles and the actual conduct of operations. Finally, some
comment on the immediate post-war doctrine to emerge is
warranted, so that the Oboe operations may be viewed
xxi
retrospectively, in terms of what was said about how air
operations should have been conducted.
That the Oboe operations were a tremendous tactical success goes
without saying. Irrespective of their perceived contribution to
the Allied strategy in forcing Japan to surrender, the simple
fact that the operations were conducted warrants detailed
analysis - more so since the Australian forces did function at
the operational as well as tactical level. While certain aspects
of Oboe have been addressed by historians, no one has drawn
together the important observations from the way in which the
RAAF conducted operations and set them in a doctrinal context.
This book does that.
CHAPTER ONE
TEE LEAD-UP
Substantial studies have been undertaken of the part played by
the RAAF in the European theatre during World War 11, and in
recent years, there has been an increasing focus on the Pacific
theatre. While much of that recent attention has focused on the
South West Pacific Area (SWPA), RAAF operations in Borneo have
tended to be ignored.
This is surprising as the First Tactical Air Force (1st TAF)
played a major role in the Montclair plan for operations in
Borneo, Netherlands East Indies (NEI) and the Philippines, in
1945. Montclair formed part of the Allied plans to clear
Japanese-occupied territories in the SWPA, south of Luzon, once
Luzon had been seized. Montclair involved the re-occupation of
thewesternvisayan-Mindanao-Borneo-NE1 area, with the plan being
prepared by General Headquarters on 25 February 1945.'
Borneo had been ruled by a group of sultans, with the Sultan of
Brunei being the most powerful. Dutch interest then appeared in
the Seventeenth Century, and British interest in the Nineteenth
Century, when trade routes to China and trade from British Penang
and Singapore came under threat. Sarawak, and later Labuan
Island (in Brunei Bay) were ceded to the British. Formal
treaties were signed in 1888, separating British Borneo,' Brunei
and Sarawak (British protectorates) and Dutch Borneo.
It was not until 24 September 1941 that Sarawak released its own
constitution. Just as the people of Borneo had every right to
believe that oppressive and colonist rule was at an end, Japanese
forces arrived on the scene. Oppression, torture and massacre
would be of proportions not previously witnessed. And so it was
that Japan invaded Borneo on 16 December 1941, only nine days
' George Odgers, A i r War A g a i n s t Japan 2943-1945, Australian War Memorial, 1957, p.433.
British North Borneo is now known as Sabah
2 Oboe
after the attack on Pearl arbor.^
The alarm bells for an impending attack by the Japanese had been
ringing for some years. As Ernest Hemingway had observed in
Manila earlier in 1941, 'Japan must have oil. If the Netherlands
East Indies and America do not agree to deal with her in
quantities sufficient to keep her reserves intact, she will act.
She will drive to the Netherlands East Indies. And she will take
them'.4
Even earlier, the US Ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew said (on
12 September 1940), 'The German victories have inspired Japan's
militarists as a golden opportunity to carry their dreams of
expansion into effe~t'.~ On 27 January 1941, Grew became even
more alarmed and sent a telegram to US Secretary of State Cordell
Hull, in which he advised of a plan for a surprise mass attack
on Pearl Harbor if trouble loomed between Japan and the US. He
advised further 'that the attack would involve the use of all the
Japanese military fa~ilities'.~
As if that had not been sufficient warning, Brigadier 'Billy'
Mitchell sounded his concerns as early as 1934, when he said 'The
Japanese will not politely declare war. They are treacherous and
will stop at nothing. Hawaii, for instance, is vulnerable from
the sky. .... And Hawaii is swarming with Japanese spies. As I
have said before, that's where the blow will be struck - on a
fine, quiet Sunday morning'.'
' Athol Moffitt, Project Kingfisher, Angus & Robertson, NSW, Australia, 1989, p.xi.
See Sky Phillips, Secret Mission to Melbourne, November 1941, Sunflower university Press, Kansas, 1992, p.1.
ibid, p.23.
ibid, p.87.
' ibid, p.74.
l T h e Lead-Up 3
Borneo was strategically important due to its location near
Singapore, the Philippines and Netherlands East Indies all of
which had yet to be invaded by Japan. Borneo's oil reserves - accessible and in quantity - were attractive to Japan. The first invasion force landed at Miri, which brought the oilfields at Miri and Seria and the refinery at Lutong under Japanese control.
The retaking of these areas, as well as Labuan Island, has
special significance therefore, and is described in detail in
Chapter Three. Lack of defences meant that within days of the
16 December invasion, the whole of Borneo, including several
other rich oilfields, were under Japanese control.
By early 1942, the Japanese air forces exercised control of the
air throughout the entire NE1 area. The Tainan Air Corps, flying
from Tainan Base had taken Bali Island, Jolo Island, Tarakan,
Balikpapan and Bandjermasin.8 The naval air force distribution
at the beginning of the Philippines campaign (8 December 1941)
included: The Tainan Air Corps (the 1st Air Corps) ; The Takao Air
Corps (3rdAir Corps), which operated from Kaohsung (Takao Base);
The Kanoya Air Corps, which operated from Taichung (Taichu Base);
The lOOlst Air Corps operating from Chiai (Kagi Base); and The
Toko Air Corps operating from Tungkan (Toko Base)."
In the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese had air forces
that were 'highly mobile and capable of most effective offensive
operations against an unprepared enemy. They had only a limited
concept of strategic bombing and a relatively small aircraft
production; and they were unprepared for a long war of attrition
against the air forces of a much stronger industrial nation'."
Masatake Okumiya and Jiro Horikoshi, with Martin Caidin, Zero! T h e S t o r y o f the J a p a n e s e Navy A i r Force 1937-1945, Cassell and Company Limited, London, 1957, p.60.
i b i d . p.56.
' O PRO, Air 40/2201 - Report of Japanese Air Order of Battle Conference 5-23 February 1945, Washington DC, p.1.
4 Oboe
After defeats at Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal the Japanese
air forces of 1943 had to adopt essentially a strategic defensive
role. They embarked on a fighter production program (at the
expense of bombers) and sought to conserve strength as they built
up their fighter capability. Their tactics were to strike at
night and where forced to concentrate numbers of aircraft, they
tended to do so for relatively short periods.
By 1944, the Japanese were making concerted efforts in all
theatres to avoid combat losses," and they relied now on land-
based air power almost exclusively (as they attempted to rebuild
their carrier forces). In late 1944, they were forced to operate
in strength to try to stop the Allied advance. The
'hopelessness' of the situation probably gave rise to the notion
of suicide attacks.
The assessment in early 1945 was that 'at each stage of the
Allied advance the Japanese have been caught making belated
efforts to develop adequate air installations and facilities'."
The assessment was also that continued and heavy pressure by the
Allies would see the Japanese qualitative and quantitative
inferiority exacerbated. The Japanese simply could not mount
operations exceeding 30 aircraft, and were virtually restricted
to night operations only.
The February 1945 assessment went on: 'the Japanese are not
likely to risk aircraft losses in the defense [sic] of any areas
outside of the main islands of Japanf.13 Furthermore, in an
assessment on enemy intentions in South-east Asia and the East
Indies, the Washington conference concluded: 'Japanese air forces
deployed south of Formosa may be expected to suffer progressive
deterioration. The increasing difficulties of supply and
replacement, plus the more urgent need for all available aircraft
'l i b i d , p.2.
" i b i d , p.3.
l3 i b i d , p.4.
The Lead-L@ 5
in Japan Proper, and adjacent areas, will cause the Japanese to
rely increasingly upon local ground forces without substantial
air support for the defense [sic] of these outlying positions.
The tendency will be to deploy the air strength remaining in the
southern areas for the defense [sic] of the Malaya Peninsula,
Palembang and the French Indo-China coast'.14
In relation to air bases the Japanese had constructed a close
network to afford the necessary flexibility, but had failed to
provide sufficient development of service facilities. By 1945
only a handful of major bases had adequate mechanical facilities,
disabled aircraft on minor airfields would remain unserviceable,
there was by now a shortage of skilled service personnel
especially in the outlying areas, and inadequate radio
navigational aids had been provided at many of the minor
air£ ields . l5
Another problem for the Japanese were the aircraft losses that
were starting to mount up. For example, by April 1945 losses
were so bad that training units were receiving tactical
commitments. One particular example should suffice - on 22 April
1945, one training unit in China received 25 fighters and began
conducting tactical operations.16
The Allies were certainly aware of the parlous state of the
Japanese Air Forces which was reflected in the observation that:
'In all combat areas of the Pacific, Japanese air activity is
purely defensive and has resolved itself down to a series of
uncoordinated local reactions to Allied Naval and Army Air Forces
ibid, p.5.
l5 ibid, pp.10-11.
'"PRO, Air 40/2208 - Japanese Air Forces Order of Battle Report No 77 of 22nd April 1945. Also see Report No 76 of 15th April 1945 which mentions a number of training units of the 10th Air Fleet providing aircraft and crews for operations with the First Mobile Base Air Force.
attacks'." Nevertheless, those local reactions could be
characterised by tactics that: involved suicide attacks,
implemented radar-evasion measures, reflected improved bombing
and fighter methods (including improved defensive tactics), and
showed increased proficiency in night operations."
The Allies' Montclair plan had emerged on 15 February 1945" with
assumptions that the strength and disposition of hostile ground
forces would remain unchanged in the MoluCCaS, Borneo and
southern Philippines. In addition, hostile air opposition was
expected to be limited to suicide and harassing operations by
small forces, and sufficient enemy air strength in the Borneo-NE1
area would necessitate moderate air cover over friendly naval
assault forces and supply convoys.
Two different series of operations were envisioned. The Victor
phase (or series) aimed to reoccupy enemy-held areas in the
Visayas, Palawan, Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. The Oboe
phase (or series) aimed to reoccupy Java and subsequently to
consolidate the taking of enemy-held parts of British Borneo and
NEI. The effect of Montclair would be to isolate Japanese forces
from Japan, rendering the rich resources throughout the area
virtually useless. Enemy naval and air components in NE1 would
be rendered impotent and ground troops would be immobilised, in
that they would be unable to obtain reinforcements and resupply.
" PRO, Air 40/2217 - Headquarters Allied Air Forces Intelligence Report 'Japanese Fighter Tactics', January 1945, p.4.
l8 PRO, Air 40/1761 - RAAF Command Intelligence Summary No 9 of 31 March 45, p.17.
'' Ten days before it was formally prepared.
T h e Lead-Up 7
~acArthur's~%perations throughout the entire South West Pacific
Area were characterised by 'the movement forward of air power by
successive bounds in order to gain local air superiority, provide
adequate cover for the advance of surface elements, and isolate
each successive enemy position prior to the final assault of all
arms ' .21
As part of the Victor phase, landings were made on Panay, Cebu
and Negros, and on 3 April, Tawi Tawi Island was captured by US
forces.22 Tawi Tawiwas to feature in the subsequent Oboe phase.
Landings followed at Jolo, Basilan and Cotabato (on Mindanao),
which essentially brought the Victor phase to a close by 17
April. The stage was now set for the Oboe phase, the objectives
of which were to seize Java, destroy enemy forces in NEI, re-
establish the NE1 government in its capital, and establish a base
for subsequent operations against Japanese forces throughout the
area.
Although the original intention was to conduct six distinct
operations as part of the Oboe phase, only three were carried
out. The original six were: Oboe One - Tarakan Island, Oboe Two - Balikpapan, Oboe Three - Bandjermasin, Oboe Four - Surabaya (or
MacArthur was appointed as Commander-in-Chief, which in today's parlance could be equated with a joint force commander. He exercised command through three principal subordinates - Commander Allied Naval Forces, Commander Allied Air Forces and a task force commander who had responsibility for ground forces. The task force commander for the Borneo operations was General Morshead, Commander 1st Australian Corps. The American, General Kenney, was Commander Allied Air Forces, although he effectively delegated operational control to Air Vice-Marshal Bostock.
'l See T. Dodson Stamps and Vincent J. Esposito, eds., Combat A i r F o r c e s o f W o r l d War 11, v o 1 . 2 , O p e r a t i o n s i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n and P a c i f i c T h e a t e r s , US Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., 1956, p.297 as cited in Timothy D. Gann, Lt Col, USAF, F i f t h A i r F o r c e L i g h t and Medium Bomher O p e r a t i o n s d u r i n g 1 9 4 2 and 1 9 4 3 : B u i l d i n g t h e D o c t r i n e and F o r c e t h a t T r iumphed i n the B a t t l e o f the B i s m a r c k Sea and the Wewak R a i d , Air University Press, Alabama, November 1993, p.2.
2 Z Odgers, p.432.
8 Oboe
~atavia"), Oboe Five - East Netherlands East Indies, and Oboe Six - British Borneo. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (in the US)
decided that the Oboe sequence would be altered, and advised
General MacArthur on 4 April that Oboe Six would follow Oboe One.
Four days later, Oboes Three, Four and Five were suspended and
the precise area of attack in Oboe Six was given as the Labuan
Island-Brunei Bay area.%-s the official historian George
Odgers observed 'It was significant that three operations of the
Oboe series . . . . would take the Allies into the oil-producing centresr ."
There has been considerable controversy over Australia's role in
being assigned essentially to 'mopping up operations',
particularly in relation to the 'mandate campaigns' and the
Borneo operations, and not being employed on attacks on Japan
itself. The controversy associated with the 'mandate campaigns'
- in New Guinea, New Britain and the Solomon Islands - and with the Borneo operations is dealt with by John Robertson and
Professor John McCarthy in some detail.26 It is not the purpose
of this study to fuel the debate or discuss it any further, but
it is necessary to make the observation in the first instance,
that the Oboe operations were undertaken, and to observe that
little in-depth analysis of these operations has been
forthcoming. This, in itself, provides sufficient impetus for
this study.
Batavia is now known as Jakarta.
Odgers, pp.433-434.
See John Robertson and John McCarthy, Australian War Strategy 1939-1945, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia Queensland, 1985. The mandate campaigns are discussed at pp.401- 416, and the Borneo operations at pp.417-427.
The Lead-Up 9
Importantly, once Air Vice-Marshal ~ostock~' realised the
opportunity for a joint Australian operation, he proposed to
General KenneyZ8 that RAAF Command should exercise operational
control over 1st TAF, as 1st TAF provided air support for 1
Australian Corps. 1 Australian Corps had responsibility for the
conduct of the Oboe operations. While it is tempting to suggest
that Bostock was driven by altruistic motives to ensure a good
Australian showing, he must surely have been concerned at the
continuing use of the 1st TAF in purely defensive operations.
He was keen to see 1st TAF used as a 'forward offensive formation
rather than in a garrison r~le'.~"
Bostock was also given operational control of RNZAF elements
(under AVM Isitt), and the 13th Air Force (under General
Wurtsmith) was to support Bostock when needed. Bostock was given
the responsibility 'to designate the targets and coordinate the
timing of the American and Australian mission^'.'^ Accordingly,
Bostock established an Advanced Headquarters of RRAF Command at
Morotai on 15 March, close to 13th AF Bomber Command's
headquarters. Headquarters 1st TAF was also at Morotai, under
the command of Air Commodore Cobby. Morotai had been captured
by the Allies in September 1944."
Just as the issue of Australian forces being assigned to the
Borneo operations rather than to more 'strategic' operations was
seen as a distraction to the compilation of this book, so too was
'' Bostock was in command of RAAF Command, headquartered in Brisbane.
Kenney was, in essence, MacArthurrs air component commander, having taken over from General Brett.
2 9 Quoted in Odgers, p.435.
30 ibid.
" Liberators operated from Pitoe strip, while fighters operated from Wama. See Michael V. Nelmes, Tocumwal to Tarakan: Australians and the Consolidated B-24 Liberator, Banner Books, Canberra, 1994, p.110.
10 Oboe
the Jones-Bostock situation. The division of responsibility and
the continual disputes between these two have been covered
else~here,~' and will not be discussed further. As Dr Alan
Stephens has argued, both Bostock and Jones had 'legitimate
grievances' - Bostock because he could not exercise control over
the support services he needed, and Jones because he could not
exercise control over how the RAAF was employed in operation^.^^ Perhaps the answer to the whole sorry affair would have been, as
Dr Chris Coulthard-Clark has suggested, to have made Jones an air
marshal on his appointment as CAS.~'
As RAAF and Australian Army personnel arrived at Morotai, they
found the conditions crowded and unhygienic. As noted in a
recent book on Liberator operations, 'It should [have been]
renamed Mudatai, the mud sticks closer than Adelaide
As well, many units experienced 'great difficulty' in their
movement to ~orotai . Apart from these appalling conditions, '' 1st TAE units found it difficult to obtain replacementpersonnel.
So bad did this become that tours of duty had to be extended,
AVM Jones was Chief of the Air Staff and had administrative responsibility for the RAAF, while Bostock had operational responsibility. For further discussion on the 'RAAF command scandal' see Odgers, pp.436-439, Alan Stephens, Power Plus Attitude, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1992, pp.64-67, and John Robertson and John McCarthy, Australian War Strategy 1939-2945, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia Queensland, 1985, pp.337-356.
33 See Alan Stephens, 'The Office of the Chief of the Air Staff', in Australia's Air Chiefs: RAAF History Conference 1992, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1992, p.8.
" See C.D. Coulthard-Clark, 'An Extraordinary Group of People: Personalities from the 1920s to the 1970s', in Australia's Air Chiefs: RAAF History Conference 1992, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1992, p.29.
35 Nelmes, p.115.
36 Odgers, p.440.
" Although George Odgers paints a grim picture of the conditions, he still suggests that 'conditions at Morotai were not unpleasantr. See Odgers, p.440.
The L e a d - 4 11
simply because transportation could not be found to bring the
replacements to Morotai." Complaints were common of deficiencies
in essential equipment, misallocation of technical staff (for
loading parties for instance), insufficient environmental
training, and shortages of personnel. This is an important point
as similar complaints arose during the Oboe operations
themselves.
Continuing irritation at the type of operations being conducted
by the RAW reached crisis point on 14 April. Eight identically-
worded resignations (including two from group captains) brought
the command of 1st TAF under scrutiny by Bostock. He
recommended, on 22 April, that Air Commodore Cobby and two of his
principal staff officers (Group Captains Simms and Gibson) should
be transferred. The timing of these changes was most unusual,
as will be seen from the Tarakan operation. Cobby was actually
on Tarakan, just after the landing and before the island had been
recaptured, when he was replaced.
Problems at Morotai may have been a reflection of even wider
discontent, especially in relation to lack of flying. For
example, when No 25 Squadron was equipped with Liberators at
Cunderdin, Western Australia, aircrew complained about lack of
flying time. Operational policy limited each squadron's flying
to 516 hours per month, for maintenance reasons (timing for
scheduled maintenance). The crews argued that this meant too
much idle time and insufficient training time. Subsequently, the
figure was increased to 900 hours. But all this occurred in the
first few months of 1945,39 which may also have contributed to
discontent and lower morale at Morotai.
Air Vice-Marshal Jones agreed with Bostock's recommendations as
to replacement of the three key senior officers at Morotai, and
ibid, p.441.
Nelmes, p.126.
12 Oboe
also suggested to the Minister for Air that a commissioner or
judge should conduct an enquiry. Commissioner Barry was
appointed to conduct the enquiry and found that the operational
activities had to be called into question and that the 1st TAF
commander had 'failed to maintain proper control'." Cobby
denied that he had failed in his duty as a commander when he
appeared before the Barry commission, but his protestations
appear not to have persuaded Barry.
With this background of poor living conditions, a divided control
of the RAAF (Jones and Bostock) and a conviction by many airmen
that their operations were not 'militarily justifiable'," one
may indeed pause to wonder how the Oboe operations could have
been conducted at all. After all, the controversy about
Australian operations was not confined to the RAAF - similar
questions had been raised by the Army and by Australian
politicians.
Despite this poor setting, Oboe One commenced on 1 May 1945 and
Tarakan Island was taken. However, the airfield on the island
could not be used for extensive air operations. Use of Tarakan
airfield was a fundamental assumption in planning for Oboe Six
which centred on Labuan Island/Brunei Bay and Oboe Two -
Balikpapan (which was to provide an advance operating base).
Oboe One had been scheduled for 23 April, but finally occurred
on 1 May. Oboe Six occurred on 10 June (having been brought
forward to protect oil and rubber resources within the Brunei Bay
area), and Oboe Two was deferred from 18 May to 1 July.
The individual operations provided the RAAF with considerable
operational experience, in situations where the RAAF had full
planning responsibility. While there were certain similarities,
and this is only to be expected because the operations occurred
'O Odgers, p.446.
4 ' ibid, p.450.
The Lead-Up 13
so close in time, there were unique lessons that can be derived
1 from each of the operations. The importance of examining the
Oboe operations in detail goes without saying, but the value of
this study is that it also analyses the conduct of operations in
light of doctrine prevailing at the time.
While doctrine adopts many guises and is used in many different
ways, it offers several broad but positive benefits, in
particular: a conceptual framework; general guidance in specific
situations; a foundation for the air force (including force
structure, strategy, tactics, training and procedures); guidance
for establishing employment priorities; a sounding board for
testing, evaluating and employing new technologies and new
policies; and a rationale for the organisation and employment of
air forces.
Doctrine is a set of principles only: organisational and
employment means still have to be established. Directives help
establish the organisational means and tactical procedures help
establish the employment means. These directives and procedures
however lack the time-enduring hallmark of doctrine. They most
certainly are guided by doctrinal principles, but are also
affected by political and technological issues which can be quite
transitory.
Doctrine is sourced from three areas - theory, technology and historical experience. Theory, in the guise of far-reaching
conceptual thinking is most necessary, but is nevertheless
hypothetical, emanating from the vision of theorists. Vision
alone is not enough - it does not provide sufficient substance.
The second area - technology - has at times taken its cue from
doctrine (that is, doctrine has lead technology), but there have
'' See Gary Waters, 'Air Power Doctrine', in Waters and Dr John Mordike, Regional Air Power Workshop 1993, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1993, pp.43-44.
14 Oboe
been many technological breakthroughs that occurred for reasons
other than doctrine, and doctrine must be flexible enough to
accept such changes. That said, existing doctrine should not be
discarded out of hand with each technological change.
Experience provides the real substance about what has and has not
worked in the past, and the circumstances of the time.
Experience moves the air force of today beyond hypotheses or
educated guesses and into the realm of providing 'proof'. It
adds a practical dimension to the theoretical one. It also
carries with it a requirement to retain objectivity and a sense
of awareness about the conditions of the past and the changes of
the present. Critical analysis of what happened and why is
necessary so that institutional shibboleths which cannot be
proved, can be treated with care.
Thus, the static theoretical and practical dimensions come
together with the dynamic one of innovation (through
technological and procedural change) to form doctrine.
This study analyses the planning and conduct of air operations
in the three Oboe operations - devoting one chapter to each - and then brings together the operational issues within a doctrinal
framework. The framework has had to be constructed as there is
no record of the precise doctrine of the time.
One final point that needs to be made in this opening chapter,
which adds to the context of the Borneo operations and which is
referred to in subsequent chapters, is the Japanese brutality
visited upon local inhabitants and Prisoners of War (POWs). No
more telling comment can be made than that by Athol Moffitt as
the investigating officer into Japanese atrocities in 1945. He
was moved to note ' - his spirit was such that he refused to die. He was thin and his legs looked paralysed. The Japs beat him
over the head to kill him, but still he lived - I saw his face,
which hardly looked like a face anymore - his head was battered
and his cheeks were swollen up into his eyes - a bluish mass of
The Lead-Up 15
pulp. I can understand now what is said about the brutality of
the Japs to our people when this is what they do to their own
people'
Perhaps the most infamous circumstances occurred at Sandakan.
A total of some 2000 Australians and 750 British POWs were
transported to Sandakan, Borneo in 1942 and 1943, to build a
military airfield. Between late 1943 and July 1945 - the completion of the Oboe operations - three 'death marches' and other brutality at Sandakan had resulted in less than 50 of those
2750 left alive." Not only were Australian and British POWs to
suffer, but so too were thousands of Javanese labourers and
Chinese and Indian locals.
Athol Moffitt argues that the Japanese behaviour would, at times,
be contradictory, with moments of kindness to POWs, yet moments
of 'utter brutality or inhuman disregard of the life or limb of
pris~ners'.'~ He goes on to suggest that the token incident of
kindness was seen by the Japanese as more indicative of their
nature, and the periods of brutality and inhumanity were seen as
irrelevant because they occurred in the line of duty.
" Athol Moffitt, Project Kingfisher, p.45.
" Even more distressing evidence of wanton brutality is presented in Chapter 4.
Moffitt, p. 106.
CHAPTER TWO
OBOE ONE - TARAKAN
OVERVIEW
General MacArthur issued his Operation Instruction (No 99)
directing 9th Australian Division of 1st Australian Corps
(using 26 Brigade Group) to seize Tarakan' capturing the
Island; to destroy enemy forces there; to provide facilities
for air and naval units to support subsequent operations
against Balikpapan; to protect and conserve petroleum
producing and processing facilities; and to re-establish the
Netherlands East Indies (NEI) civil government.' Naval support
was provided by Task Group No 78.1, Allied Naval Forces, South
West Pacific Area (SWPA).
RAAF Command, Allied Air Forces, was allotted a five-fold task
of:
* Neutralising all enemy resources that could interfere
with the success of the operation.
* Providing air protection of the assault, follow-up and
re-supply shipping convoys.
* Supporting 26th Brigade Group AIF during the assault and
consolidation phases.
Tarakan is about 25 kilometres long and 18 kilometres wide at its widest point. The island is near the Sesajap River in North East Borneo. Tarakan township has as its port, Lingkas, on the south-west coast, offering docking facilities and a harbour. The island is over 2,000 kilometres from Darwin by air, 1,400 from Singapore and 450 from Balikpapan.
Japanese attacks on Tarakan had begun on 11 January 1942 (at 0300 local time) and by 14 January the Dutch garrisons had been defeated. Thus, the Japanese had occupied Tarakan for more than three years when Oboe One was launched.
18 Oboe
* Establishing air forces at Tarakan airfield to provide
air support for 26th Brigade Group during 'mopping up'
operations.
* Carrying out air operations in support of future
operations in the Borneo area.
1st TAF (RAAF)' and the 13th AF (USAAF)' provided the air
forces, with responsibility for planning and conducting air
operations being vested in the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief
(AOC-in-C) RAAF Command.' They were also supported by heavy
bomber Liberator squadrons of the North west6 and western'
areas of RAAF Command. No 24 Squadron was the first RAAF
Liberator squadron to form, followed by 21, 23 and 25
Squadrons.
Air Commodore Cobby (Officer Commanding 1st TAF - based in
Morotai) appointed Group Captain Arthur who was Commanding
Officer No 78 Wing, to be Task Force Commander, Tarakan. No
"st Tactical Air Force (Royal Australian Air Force).
13th Air Force (United States Army Air Forces). At this stage, the United States of America did not have a separate air force. The USAF was not formed until 1947. The USAAF had, in turn, originated only in June 1941, when it was renamed from the US Army Air Corps (USAAC).
While the use of the title AOC-in-C caused controversy and was never settled, this study uses it to clearly differentiate between Bostock and the AOCs subordinate to him. The controversy is discussed in George Odgers, Air War Against Japan 1943-1945, Australian War Memorial, 1957, p.439.
No 23 Squadron from Darwin, Northern Territory.
' No 25 Squadron from Cunderdin, Western Australia. No 25 Squadron flew via Corunna Downs or Truscott airfields in support of the Tarakan operation. In April, they attacked Den Pasar (on Bali), and Malang (on Java). One of the aircraft on the Malang attack (26 April) ditched into the sea. The crew was captured, imprisoned at Batavia (Jakarta) and beaten and tortured, but still managed to survive the war. See Michael V. Nelmes, Tocumwal to Tarakan: Australians and the Consolidated 8-24 Liberator, Banner Books, Canberra, 1994, p.127.
Tarakan 19
78 Wing had only 10 days to prepares as No 81 Wing which was
planned to be used and appeared in the Operations Instruction
(No 78/1945) could not move all its units forward from
Noemfoor and Townsville in time.
The assault on Tarakan occurred on P-Day (1 May 1945) .' Air
forces were supposed to be established on Tarakan by 7 May,
but due to problems in preparing the airstrip, Tarakan
airfield was not available for air operations until 30 June
(almost eight weeks late). Because air support for ground
operations over that period could not be provided by aircraft
from Tarakan, distant bases had to be used, with all the
attendant difficulties that carried. Bases such as Tawi-Tawi,
Sanga Sanga, Zamboanga, Samar, Palawan and Morotai were used.
The strategic importance of Palawan was that it allowed
further expansion of Allied air power. Apart from the main
strip at Puerta Princessa, there were two emergency landing
grounds - Iwahig and ~aytay."
While Air Vice-Marshal Bostock believed the conduct of air
operations was generally satisfactory, he was concerned that
incorrect action had been taken on certain occasions,
particularly in relation to fighter protection of the assault
shipping convoy and the employment of RAAF heavy bomber
squadrons of the 1st TAF (RAAF). There were also instances of
breaches of Close Air Support (CAIRS) control procedures.
Two bomber squadrons based at Morotai did not meet their
commitments on 1 May because the aircraft were withdrawn from
service for scheduled maintenance (as the allotted number of
flying hours had been reached). The aircraft were
a George Odgers, A i r War A g a i n s t Japan 1943-1995, p.453.
P-Day was postponed from 29 April to 1 May to take advantage of a higher tide which would lift the LSTs further onshore.
ID See Air Ministry Intelligence Summary No 290 of 24 March 1945, p.19; copy held Hendon Archives.
2 0 Oboe
serviceable, which led Air Vice-Marshal Bostock to write later
in May 1945:
'it is inexcusable to allow consideration of routine
maintenance procedure of this nature to preclude the
employment of aeroplanes in operations in support of an
assault on a beach head'."
OBJECTIVE OF OBOE ONE
The overall objective of Oboe One was to seize the airfield at
Tarakan, destroy enemy forces on Tarakan Island, and re-
establish the NE1 civil go~ernment.~~ The Allies had
established a pattern for such assaults - to isolate the site from re-supply and re-inforcements, to neutralise enemy air
and sea support, to destroy enemy troop concentrations and
then to provide air cover to the assault team. Minehunting
and Motor Torpedo Boat (MTB) operations were fundamental to
the plan and 13th AF aircraft were used to provide air cover
for these operations.
The plan called for a landing by 26th Brigade Group (under
Brigadier D.A. Whitehead), two RAAF Airfield Construction
Squadron (ACS) teams, a boat company, US Army engineer
elements and a company of the NE1 infantry battalion. The
plan was to land at Lingkas Beach, with a field battery being
landed at Sadau Island first (some 5,500 metres to the north-
west of Lingkas). The decision was taken to land on Lingkas
Beach because it was the only one of the possible landing
points connected to the airfield by a road of reasonable
quality. The soft mud of Lingkas and the other Tarakan
beaches would not support the artillery battery, hence its
positioning on Sadau Island on 30 April, the day before the
l' RAAF Command AAF, SWPA, Report of OBOE ONE Operations, May 1945, p.2.
T a r a k a n 2 1
assault.
The 13th AF lay smoke screens along the beach of Tarakan and
bombed obstacles on the beach immediately prior to the
assault. Naval units provided Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) and
the artillery battery on Sadau Island also contributed to the
clearing of obstacles. These obstacles consisted of double
apron barbed wire fences and rows of vertical posts, rails and
pipes. l3
INTELLIGENCE
The main areas of intelligence of relevance to air operations
were: estimates of enemy strengths, likely effects of weather,
and specific information on the airfield at Tarakan. Enemy
airfields which could influence the Tarakan operation, in
order of their priority of probable employment were: Manggar
and Sepinggan; Api, Sandakan, Tawao and Labuan; and Miri,
Kudat and Bintulu. Staging airfields were at Kuching and
Oelin. Intelligence reports contained estimates of enemy
strengths as discussed below.14
Japanese anti-aircraft (AA) strengths were:
* 12 heavy AA positions (with eight occupied, and effective
ranges of 12,000 feet for 75mm to 24,000 feet for 127mm).
* 39 medium AA positions (with 15 occupied, and effective
range of 5,000 feet).
* 9 light AA positions (with one occupied, and a range of
. 2,000 feet).
E.G. Keogh, T h e South West P a c i f i c 1941-45, Grayflower Productions, Melbourne, 1965, p.436.
l-hese estimates are contained in 1 Australian Corps Intelligence Review No 2, 10 April 1945.
2 2 Oboe
* Possibility of two searchlights, and two radar or RDF
stations.
Japanese operational air strength was Miri (3), Labuan (21).
Bandjermasin (17), Balikpapan (12); constituting a total of 53
combat aircraft which encompassed 28 fighters, six dive
bombers, eight medium bombers, eight float planes and three
reconnaissance aircraft. There were an additional 97 aircraft
at Celebes (14), Java and Lesser Sundas (71), and Mindanao
(12). Additionally, there were 343 enemy aircraft in other
areas which had the potential to provide support. These
encompassed Sumatra (74), Malaya (85), French-Indochina (143),
and Thailand (41).
Furthermore, it was anticipated that during the first five
days the following additional forces may be committed: fifteen
fighters, five night fighters, sixteen light and medium
bombers, eight float planes and three reconnaissance aircraft.
After the first five days there was potential for even more
forces to be deployed, including forty-two fighters, six night
fighters, twelve light and medium bombers, eight float planes
and three reconnaissance aircraft. These figures are at
slight variance with those contained in RAAF Operations
Instruction No 78/45, but the important point is that on
paper, the Japanese had sufficient forces to impede the
Allies' ability to take Tarakan Island.
Despite the numbers of Japanese aircraft in the vicinity, the
intelligence assessment was that Borneo was no longer afforded
the priority it once had, and the enemy's aircraft were
unlikely to be risked as they would be required to defend
higher-priority areas nearer to Japan. Hence, the target
priorities of the Japanese Air Force were expected to be
shipping, beach-heads, air base, dumps, installations and
troop concentrations. Suicide attacks were also considered a
possibility.
Tarakan 23
Weather
Implications of climatic conditions on air operations were
assessed by the RAAF as follows:15
a. Poor to fair mission success for high-level bombing due
to the presence of broken cloud.
b. Poor mission success for incendiary bombing due to the
humid climate.
c. Fair mission success for observation and photography due
to the light cloud cover in the mornings.
d. Fair to good mission success for air-to-ground support,
although visibility was assessed as questionable.
e. Good mission success for parachute operations, with low
winds and good flying conditions.
The Airfield
Tarakan airfieldT6 measured 4,900 feet by 105 feet, and had a
NE/SW bearing of approximately 58 degrees. The surface was
all-weather, tarred or oiled coral, with 10,000 feet (3,000
metres) of dispersal lanes, 21 dispersed points (including
five bomber and 10 fighter revetments), and hardstanding
capacity for 300 aircraft.
An additional runway could be constructed, aligned NW/SE and
crossing the existing runway at right angles at its centre. A
runway of 4,000-5,000 feet (1,200-1,500 metres) could be
l5 RAAF Operations Instruction No 78/45.
l6 Precised from No 1 Australian Corps Intelligence Review No 2, 10 April 1945.
2 4 Oboe
achieved (up to 8,000 feet with extensive filling of a swamp).
However, the runway would be at variance with prevailing
winds. There was no other suitable site on the island for an
airfield; however, a seaplane base could be established at
Lingkas port.
The Works organisation was tasked with providing a runway
(5,000 feet X 100 feet), two alert aprons, undispersed parking
areas (four squadrons of fighters and one Air Observation Post
(AOP) flight), a Mobile Fighter Control Unit (MFCU)
headquarters, and a base operations building and control
tower.
Later, the Works organisation was required to provide
increased undispersed parking for three squadrons of attack
aircraft and one squadron of Air Sea Rescue (ASR) aircraft,
followed by additional parking for the staging of two fighter
and two attack squadrons. In addition, various receiver and
transmitter buildings, wing and squadron headquarters
buildings, air stores parks, alert huts, fuel storage, bomb
storage, access roads, a dry off-loading area, service aprons,
a bore-sighting range and an air evacuation building were to
be provided.
RAAF PLANNING
In anticipation of Oboe One, Operations Instruction No 63/45
promulgated the roles for Nos 77 and 78 Wings and No 452
Squadron.
No 78 Wing
No 78 Wing was allocated Nos 75, 76 and 80 Squadrons (P.40
Kittyhawks), as well as No 452 Squadron (Spitfires) for Oboe
One. Initial planning indicated that No 81 Wing (replaced by
Tarakan 2 5
No 78 Wing) was to conduct air alert patrols with one squadron
and bombing and strafing with the other two. From the 17th
to 30th April, the Wing was to maintain continuous daylight
air alert over Tarakan, with six aircraft on constant air
alert.
The Wing's three squadrons were to carry out the following
tasks:
* One squadron was to provide day and night defence of
Tarakan (six aircraft on constant ground alert during
daylight; one aircraft on air alert and one aircraft on
ground alert during the moonlight period). On 11 April,
this squadron was to be relieved by No 452 Squadron and
was then to carry out bombing and strafing sweeps against
specified targets.
* One squadron was to be used for direct support operations
in support of 26th Brigade.
* One squadron was to act as a reserve, carrying out
restricted operations until 15 April. From 27 March
until 15 April, that would involve providing convoy
protection on the Morotai-Brunei Bay run. The squadron
was to operate from Sanga Sanga and four aircraft were to
be constantly over convoys during daylight hours.
No 77 Wing
No 77 Wing Beaufighters were to conduct bombing, strafing,
rocket and sweep missions. Prior to 17 April, the Wing was to
provide convoy protection against enemy submarines and
aircraft, with four aircraft constantly over the convoy during
daylight hours.
2 6 Oboe
No 452 Squadron
No 452 Squadron was to take over full day and night air
defence of Tarakan. Six aircraft were to be on constant
ground alert during daylight hours. During moonlight hours,
one aircraft was to be on air alert and one on ground alert.
Other Forces
As well as the Spitfire squadron and the Kittyhawk and
Beaufighter wings, other RAAF forces were involved. No 82
Wing aircraft (comprising Beaufighters of Nos 22, 30 and 31
Squadrons) were to maintain 12 sorties per day carrying 6000
lbs of bombs per sortie. No 16 AOP Flight (Austers) was to
carry out four sorties per day, each of one hour duration. No
113 Air Sea Rescue (ASR) Flight was to conduct one four-hour
sortie per day.
Additionally, on the ground were No 114 Mobile Fighter Control
Unit (MFCU), No 38 Operational Base Unit and seven radar
stations - Nos 167, 168, 308, 309, 312, 354, 355.
Division of Responsibility
Operations Instruction No 78/45 promulgated the following
division of responsibility for 1st TAF and 13th AF.
With effect from 4 April 1945, 1st TAF (RAAF) ceased to
operate under operational control of the Commanding General
13th Air Force USAAF with control being transferred to
AOC-in-C RAAF Command. In this, the RAAF was responsible to:
* Continue destruction of enemy forces, air bases and
installations.
Tarakan 2 7
Continue destruction of enemy sources of war materials,
lines of communications and troop concentrations.
Provide air protection for convoys into and out of
Morotai as requested.
* Provide tactical reconnaissance and aerial photography as
requested.
* Conduct long-range attacks against selected targets in
NE1 . * Provide Air Support Sections and Air Support Parties.
Prior to 1 May, assist in destruction of hostile ground
forces on Tarakan Island, oil storage and other enemy
installations that posed a threat to Allied amphibious
operations.
* On l May, establish Advanced Headquarters 1st TAF on
Tarakan.
* On 7 May, establish one fighter wing (wing headquarters,
three squadrons of Kittyhawks, one squadron of Spitfires
and one AOP flight of Austers).
* On 16 May, establish one attack wing (wing headquarters,
three squadrons of Beaufighters and a detachment of
Catalinas for ASR).
* On 21 May, establish staging facilities for two squadrons
of P.38~ (13th Air Force). (note - these were originally
to be Kittyhawks, Beaufighters and Mosquitoes).
* Take over responsibility for fighter protection (day and
night) of the Objective Area (OA) and maintain air
defence of Morotai (also day and night). Provide Close
2 8 Oboe
Air Support (CAIRS) to No 26 Infantry Brigade Group on
request.
* Begin preparation to support Oboe Six.
* Provide safe-hand air courier services as necessary.
* Provide courier service (daily) from Manila to Tarakan
and return.
* Support 31st American Division on Morotai as requested.
Responsibility of 13th Air Force was to:
- Continue long-range bombing attacks against Japanese
airfields and installations within staging range of
Tarakan.
- Prosecute diversionary attacks against Tawao.
- Conduct aerial photography to support RAAF Command.
- Attack Lingkas and Pamoesian tank areas, heavy gun
positions and barracks.
- Provide convoy protection.
- Provide Combat Air Patrol (CAP), night fighters, and
strike forces as required by RAAF Command.
AOC North Western Area (NWA) similarly was to continue
destruction of Japanese targets, but also to establish an air
blockade over Arafura, Timor and Banda Seas and Flores Sea
(between Timor and Sulawesi), and to conduct aerial minelaying
operations.
Tarakan 29
AOC 1st TAF and AOC NWA jointly were to assure air defence of
forward bases, and provide ASR, air transportation and medical
evacuation.
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AIR OPERATIONS
Advanced Headquarters, which was still part of Headquarters
RAW Command (located in Brisbane), was established at
Morotai, adjacent to Headquarters 1st Australian Corps. RAAF
Command (under AVM Bostock) was on the same relative command
level as 1st Australian Corps (under General Morshead) and 1st
TAF (under Air Commodore Cobby) was on the same relative level
as 9th Australian Division (under General Wootten). As
mentioned earlier, Air Commodore Cobby appointed Group Captain
Arthur who was Commanding Officer No 78 Wing, to be Task Force
Commander, Tarakan.
AOC-in-C IUlAF Command was responsible for the higher direction
of the air forces involved. AOC 1st TAF was responsible for
the immediate direction of operations. Operational control of
13th Air Force aircraft in the area appears to have been
retained by 13th AF, USAAF, although General Kenney's order of
5 September 1942 clearly allocates operational control to AVM Bostock over all units assigned or attached.='
To complicate W command issues, just as Air Commodore Cobby
joined the Command Ship USS Rocky Mount, the Brunei Bay
operation (Oboe Six) was brought forward to precede the
Balikpapan operation (Oboe Two) and 1st TAF was given the
responsibility for Oboe Six. As well, Cobby learned that AVM
Bostock wanted to replace him (Cobby) and two of his most
senior officers.
l' See John Robertson and John McCarthy, Australian War Strategy 1939-1945, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia Queensland, 1985, p.340. Several 13th AF tasking documents imply that 13th AF aircraft were to remain under operational control of Americans at all times.
3 0 Oboe
Immediately after Air Commodore Cobby established his
headquarters ashore on Tarakan Island on 5 May, he left for
Morotai and was replaced by Air Commodore Scherger who arrived
on 10 May. Additionally, Cobby's Senior Air Staff Officer
(Group Captain Gibson) and Senior Administrative Officer
(Group Captain Simms) were replaced respectively by Group
Captains Murdoch and ~uncan."
CONDUCT OF AIR OPERATIONS
The air plan was divided into three phases. Prior to 2 6
April, enemy airfields that could be used for staging
operations were attacked, enemy sea lanes blockaded, and
targets of military importance in the O~~qestroyed. From 26
April to 1 May, air operations were intensified against
targets of military importance in the OA, in support of land
operations (pre-assault phase) and in protection of the
convoys and surface vessels. From 1 May, direct air support
operations, convoy protection, fighter defence of the OA, and
air observation were all carried out.
Phase One (Prior to 26 April)
Enemy-held airfields in Borneo, Celebes (now Sulawesi) and
Java were attacked from the 11th to the 25th April. These
successful attacks led to the absence of enemy land-based
aircraft in the OA just prior to and during the amphibious
Is The replacements occurred due to the 'Morotai Mutiny' of 19 April 1945 when eight senior RAAF fighter pilots submitted identically-worded letters of resignation. This was discussed briefly in Chapter 1. Dr Alan Stephens refers to this 'Mutiny' as 'another consequence of poor leadership' in Alan Stephens, Power Plus Attitude, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1992, p.71.
19 Contemporary terminology refers to an Area of Operations or AO. However, in 1945, it was referred to as an Objective Area (OA), which will be used henceforth.
Tarakan 3 1
assault. The air superiority achieved by allied air forces
meant that the common practice of suffering heavy casualties
during amphibious assaults could be avoided.
These attacks were prosecuted by the 13th AF operating from
Samar and Morotai and RAAF Nos 21 and 24 Squadrons operating
Liberators from Morotai (where they had re-located on 8-10
April). In addition, targets in the Tarakan area were
attacked heavily by medium bombers (B.24 Liberators and B.25
Mitchells) and fighters (P.38 Lightnings) of the 13th AF prior
to 26 April. Bulk storage oil tanks at Lingkas and Pamoesian
(the principal oilfield)" were destroyed and attacks were
launched against barracks, warehouses, supply and personnel
areas, radio and radar stations and gun positions.
Additionally, Liberators from No 23 Squadron (Darwin, Northern
Territory) and No 25 Squadron (Cunderdin, Western Australia)
bombed targets in Java and NEI, including airfields at Malang,
Den Pasar, Bingkalepa, Kendari and Ambesia. Others flew
shipping searches and blockade missions over Macassar Strait,
and Celebes, Arafura, Timor, Banda and Flores Seas.
As Len Gairns, a B.24 pilot with No 25 Squadron, recalled (in
1993) of his attack mission - 'Our orders were to stay over
the target at night for four hours. It was a nuisance raid to
keep the whole of Java quiet or noisy, whichever way you look
at it. We had 30 X 100 pound bombs and we would fly over
three separate cities . . . . . . . drop one bomb and clear off and go and do the other two cities, and then keep repeating the
job. Each of these places was very heavily defended ...... We did that for three nights running'.21
20 Tarakan oil was obtained from two major fields at Pamoesian and Djoeata, and from two minor fields at Sesanip and Tjangkol.
See Group Captain Gary Waters, 'The Tarakan Operation - Air Power Lessons', in The RAAF in the SWPA 1942-1945: RAAF History Conference 1993, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1993, p.137.
3 2 oboe
Bombing was to avoid excess damage to the following:
* docks, bridges, waterworks, navigation aids;
* lighthouses ;
* the provincial capital;
* Lingkas beach area;
* Pamoesian-Lingkas road and oil pipeline;
* Tarakan airstrip and road to Lingkas;
* Karoengen sawmill and jetties;
* Lingkas powerhouse;
* Pamoesian River barge landing stage;
* all oilfields (except tanks at Lingkas and Pamoesian);
and
* all hospitals.
On 12 April, 13th AF Lightnings attacked a gun position at
Tarakan. On 13 and 15 April, six B.24~ of Nos 21 and 24
Squadrons attacked a personnel area in Tawao (during the
first attack, 67% of bombs fell in the target area; during the
second attack, 75% fell in the target area). On 16 April,
nine B.24~ from Nos 21 and 24 Squadrons bombed Tarakan, with
the primary target being the Pamoesian tank farm (three tanks
were damaged or destroyed)." The secondary target was the
Lingkas tank farm (two tanks were destroyed and two were
damaged).
2 2 This was the first attack by Liberators against Tarakan.
Tarakan 3 3
On the next day (17 April), six B.24~ attacked the barracks
area of Tarakan. Similar attacks occurred on 19 April, this
time conducted by nine B.24~ from Nos 21 and 24 Squadrons.
Also on 19 April, nine B.24~ hit the dump area of Tawao.
On 20 April, Manggar airfield at Balikpapan was bombed, and on
the 21st, the Sepinggan storage area at Balikpapan was bombed.
Also, on 20 April six Beaufighters of No 31 Squadron conducted
strafing runs along the waterfront, protecting US B.25
Mitchells that were conducting low-level photography. Anti-
Aircraft (AA) positions were strafed until the guns stopped
firing. One oil tank and a warehouse were hit. AA fire was
meagre, light to heavy and ina~curate.'~
Phase Two (26 April to 1 May)
Attacks were continued against AA positions, supply dumps,
barracks and other military buildings, warehouses, coastal
defence gun positions, and other oil storage installations.
Smokescreens were laid to cover engineers engaged in breaching
the remaining obstacles on the beach. In addition to the
obstacles mentioned earlier, there was also a 25 feet-wide
anti-tank ditch which prevented ready access from the beach to
the coastal road. Aircraft arrived 30 minutes late to conduct
the three scheduled smoke-laying runs. TWO runs were
eventually conducted, which provided good cover to the
engineers, but the third was made to the seaward side,
resulting in the engineers being silhouetted until the smoke
drifted in-shore.
Continual strafing and bombing of enemy positions on the beach
forced the Japanese to withdraw inland from Lingkas, leaving
their strongly-built pillboxes which were sited in an
2 3 These details have been compiled from a number of papers contained in the Oboe One Box File held by RAAF Historical Section, Canberra.
3 4 Oboe
embankment and which provided good fortifications from which
to defend the beach.
The assault convoy sailed from Morotai on 27 April, with the
1st TAF (RAAF) providing fighter cover until dusk. The convoy
comprised 69 vessels.24 Despite the Operations Instruction
which requested cover be provided through the dusk period as
well, the fighter cover was not forthcoming on that first
evening. Neither was the dawn cover for 28 April provided,
although it too had been ordered. Throughout the day, cover
was provided but the timing of relief flights was poor and one
relief experienced difficulty in locating the convoy.
Provision of fighter cover improved subsequently.
Not all pilots appeared to be aware that they could be
vectored to the convoy by the Fighter Director Ship (also
detailed in the Operations Instruction). Moreover, RAAF
pilots appeared to have been inadequately briefed as to
communications procedures and IFF codesz5 to be used.26
The RAAF provided cover from Morotai to a position at
longitude 125 degrees East (about 400 km). From the 123rd
Meridian to Tarakan (about 600 km), the 13th AF provided
fighter cover (including at dawn and dusk). This cover was
reported as satisfactory in all respects. Reference point for
fighter direction was Lingkas Southern Pier (latitude 3
degrees 17 minutes north, longitude 117 degrees 35 minutes
east) and was referred to as 'John'. Radar contacts were to
'' George Odgers, Air War A g a i n s t Japan 1943-1945, p.456.
25 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) codes allow an aircraft or ship to interrogate another aircraft or ship for a responding 'friendly' code.
2 6 Lack of punctuality of RAAF fighters, use of incorrect IFF codes, and problems with dawn and dusk cover should not have occurred as the details were specifically set out in RAAF Command Operations Instruction No 78/1945. Perhaps the fact that the information was contained as far from the front of the Instruction as Appendix H may have had some bearing.
Tarakan' 35
be reported by bearing and distance in nautical miles from
'John'. Aircraft within 75 miles (120 kilometres) of the OA
were reported to Commander Support Aircraft.
In the main, anti-submarine patrols were provided as
requested, with one minor lapse on the first day, which was
caused by 'a misunderstanding of requirement^'.^'
Shore defences, supply and personnel areas were attacked on
28th and 29th by 29 Mitchells and 11 Lightning~.~'
The Toli Toli seaplane base was hit by two Beaufighters on 26
and 27 April. A re-visit on 1 May resulted in no sightings
and the alternate at Lalos was hit.
US P.38s, B.25~ and B.24~ attacked airfields and aerodromes on
26, 28 and 29 April at Kuching, Miri, Tarakan, Gorontalo
(secondary target), Samarinda, Balikpapan, Labuan, and Kudat."
Phase Three (From 1 May Onwards)
Air strikes by the 13th AF along the landing beaches on 1 May
were not conducted as planned. Adverse weather prevented the
aircraft from arriving on time and even with an extension
granted from the Attack Force Commander, not all aircraft
could be brought over the target in time. However, those that
did bomb, provided excellent coverage.
Direct support aircraft arrived on station every two hours
from 1 May, but on that first day, due to communications
2' RAAF Command AAF, SWPA, Report of OBOE One Operations, May 1945, p.6.
28 George Odgers, Air War Against Japan 1943-1945, p.456.
29 This material was compiled from papers contained in the Oboe One Box File held by RAAF Historical Section, Canberra.
36 Oboe
failures with the Commander Support Aircraft (CSA)," not all
aircraft were used. For the first three days (from the
morning of 1 May to the night of 3 May), 17 missions (43
sorties) were flown in direct support of ground forces. Bombs
dropped included 250-lb and 500-lb General Purpose bombs and
clusters of 20-lb fragmentation bombs. P.38 Lightnings, B.24
Liberators and B.25 Mitchells successfully provided direct
support.
On 1 May, medium and heavy bomber aircraft attacked the beach
area and gun positions for 45 minutes before H-Hour. The
Japanese had already been forced to withdraw inland from
Lingkas, and this, coupled with the bombing of the foreshore,
allowed the assault battalions to land unscathed.
From 7 May, 1st TAF was to provide CAIRS to its 'maximum
ability'. Once 1st TAF relieved 13th AF of all CAIRS
commitments, CSA ashore passed to the RAAF.
On 29 May, two Beaufighters fired on and hit two enemy
aircraft in the air, but the aircraft escaped. This was the
first time Beaufighters had encountered airborne enemy
aircraft in 18 months.31
In areas with heavy concentrations of enemy forces, heavy
artillery, Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) and napalm-bomb air
strikes were used to allow the Pioneer Battalions to advance.
The bombing was accurate but there was little evidence of any
Japanese killed; however, they were forced to abandon their
positions. Sixteen days after the landing, Australian forces
reached the east coast, NE1 troops occupied the southern
'"he Commander Support Aircraft, whether afloat (in the Command ship USS Rocky Mount) or ashore had operational control of all aircraft in the Objective Area, and was in direct communications with all aircraft tasked with providing direct support.
George Odgers, A i r War Against Japan 1943-1945, p.460.
Tarakan 3 7
peninsula and two-thirds of the island was in allied hands,
including the Pamoesian and Djoeata oilfields.
By 15 June all organised resistance had ended.32 In clearing
remaining enemy strongholds, dropping of 'inflammable belly
tanks' proved effective. Mopping up operations continued
until 27 June when a native ceremony was held in the Pamoesian
oilfields celebrating the rout of the Japanese. A cow was
slaughtered and its head buried near the restored pumphouse.
This local custom meant that the evil spirits were buried and
bad accidents would not occur on the field. On 29 June, an
Auster reconnaissance aircraft landed on the airstrip and on
the 30th, 20 Kittyhawks arrived.
There are conflicting reports about the effectiveness of
napalm, which appears explicable. Inspections of enemy
positions on Tarakan indicated that the bombing was well-
directed but did not achieve any direct hits on enemy
positions. The burnt area from each napalm bomb covered
approximately 30 by 40 metres, but was only superficial in
that while undergrowth leaves were burned, branches of trees
were only charred and leaves on the trees were only withered.
Despite this, the general feeling among AIF personnel was that
the Japanese soldiers withdrew whenever subjected to napalm
bombing.
Use of Napalm
After-action reports (dated 4 July 1945) indicate that P.38~
flew at 200-300 feet, at high speed, which prevented highly-
accurate attacks with napalm. The belly tank of napalm
adopted an erratic path on release, thus compounding the
problem of accuracy. Furthermore, many targets were on ridges
and were obscured by hills and other ridges; hence, aircraft
" ibid, p.461.
3 8 Oboe
had to make their attacking run along the ridge line to have
any likelihood of hitting their targets. There were also
cases of tanks not releasing immediately ('hanging-up').
The containers of napalm needed to be streamlined and have a
tail welded on. The problem was not only technical though, as
pilots tended to bomb the mortar smoke itself (which had
drifted) rather than the source of the smoke. This smoke was
used as a target indicator.
The interesting point here is that the RAAF continued to use
belly tanks, even though the Americans had passed on details
of modifications that they had developed to improve accuracy."
A 55-gallon drum, with a tail fin from a 1000-lb General
Purpose bomb spot-welded to its base had been used by the
Americans. Different igniters had been developed for land and
sea targets - a white phosphorous igniter for targets on land, and a sodium igniter for targets on water. Both igniters
could be carried in the case of targets situated in wharf and
dock areas.
These drums (with tail fins) could be loaded empty on to the
aircraft and then filled with the napalm mixture. The effect
of temperature variations could be accommodated by using only
50 gallons of mixture in each 55-gallon tank.
Reconnaissance
Australian Army Air Liaison Officers (ALO) specially trained
in air observer duties provided valuable reconnaissance on the
1st and 2nd of May, flying in B.24 Liberators of the 1st TAF.
This reconnaissance provided information on the changing
situation on the ground and assisted air co-ordinators in
33 See memo TR18 of 25 April 1945, from Operational Research Section of 1st TAF, held in Oboe One Box File, RAAF Historical Section.
Tarakan 3 9
finding and recognising targets against which attacks had been
ordered.
Direct communications between these ALOs and the Air Support
Parties (ASP)34 would have been useful, especially in terms of
ASPS displaying ground panels to mark positions of friendly
ground forces.
On 3 May, the support air observation aircraft failed to
appear as the RAAF aircraft had expended the total operational
hours allocated. This inflexibility of planning ran counter
to the claims of the RRAF about the flexibility of air power.
The problem was rectified quickly and support air observation
missions were resumed without further difficulties.
Air Observation Post Operations
Four Auster aircraft were to provide, at an early stage of the
assault, local reconnaissance, air observation, short-range
communications flights and medical evacuation. The landing at
Lingkas was the first one in which an RAAF flying unit
accompanied the troops ashore. Flight Lieutenant R.H. Drabsch
was the Officer Commanding No 16 AOP flight of 83 Wing. He
reported that the Austers were landed from LSTs and readied
for flight within 1 1/2 hours (under constant sniper fire).
Despite this alacrity, the aircraft could not be used until a
temporary strip was prepared. The first aircraft that tried
to use the strip crashed, and before the strip could be
finished, Tarakan airfield was captured by the allies. The
remaining three aircraft were disassembled and carried to
'' An Air Support Party (comprising one officer and 11 other ranks) was allotted to each battalion headquarters. There was also one Air Support Section (comprising one officer and 24 other ranks) which was allotted to the Brigade headquarters, which was meant to be CO-located with Advanced TAP (RAAF) Headquarters.
4 0 Oboe
Tarakan airfield.
Courier Services
RnAF Catalinas provided daily courier services between Morotai
and Tarakan (about 1100 h) and Manila and Tarakan (about 1300
km). Courier services operated to the complete satisfaction
of all users except on 1 May when the pilot of the Morotai-
Tarakan courier reported to the wrong person over the radio.
He reported to the Fighter Director instead of CSA afloat;
this would appear to be another indication of lack of
knowledge of the contents of the Operations Instruction No
78/1945.
Combat Air Patrol
The 13th AF provided CAP over Tarakan. Four fighters were
maintained on-station during the day and two provided cover
during dawn and dusk. RAAF aircraft were to take over CAP
duties on 7 May, but because of the unserviceability of the
Tarakan strip, 13th AI? continued to provide CAP until 15 May.
When the RAAF assumed CAP responsibility from this date, they
operated Kittyhawks of No 76 Squadron and Beaufighters of No
77 Wing from Tawi Tawi, in the Sulu archipelago. Tawi Tawi
was about 300 kilometres from Tarakan.
The procedure was for No 76 Squadron (of No 78 Wing) to cover
Tarakan in the morning and for No 77 Wing to do likewise in
the afternoon. No 76 Squadron also attacked Sandakan and
Kudat, in co-operation with 13th Air Force aircraft.
" 5 Historical records contain a brief report by Flight Lieutenant Drabsch on AOP operations.
Tarakan 41
DDT Spraying
The 13th AF was tasked with the DDT spraying of 2,600 acres as
an anti-malarial measure. The concentration of DDT was 1/2 lb
per acre, in the form of 5% solution in oil solvent with a
0.014% concentration of Pyrethrum added. The 13th AF carried
out DDT spraying on the lst, 3rd and 6th May.
AIR SUPPORT ORGANISATION
The Commander Support Aircraft (CSA) onboard the USS Rocky
Mount had operational control of all aircraft in the OA. He
was in direct communications (over the Support Air Direction
net) with all aircraft tasked with providing direct support.
Aircraft that were airborne over the OA were allotted to
targets by the CSA, based on requests from the Brigade
Commander. Once RAAF Air Support Parties/Section were
established ashore, operational control passed from CSA afloat
to CSA ashore.
An RAAF officer was appointed as the airborne co-ordinator,
and was airborne over the OA as required. Communications with
CSA and aircraft on station to provide air support were over
the Support Air Direction net. The airborne co-ordinator
recommended targets to CSA and co-ordinated strike details
with the aircraft on station (either by radio or by leading
the strike aircraft to the targets and indicating which were
to be attacked).
One Army Air Liaison Officer (ALO), trained as an Airborne
Observer, was airborne over the OA during daylight hours to
provide detailed information of the ground situation to the
CSA. The Airborne Observer communicated with CSA over the
Support Air Observer net.
4 2 Oboe
To provide the communications for forwarding of air support
requests, one RAAE Air Support Section (comprising one officer
and 24 other ranks) was allotted to the Brigade/Advanced TAF,
(RAAE) Headquarters; and one RAAE Air Support Party (one
officer and 11 other ranks) was attached to each battalion
headquarters. Each Party and the Section was in direct
communications with the CSA (over the Support Air Request
net) . Air support requests could originate from forward unit
commanders, Brigade Headquarters, the Airborne Co-ordinator,
or the Airborne Observer. Battalion Headquarters' requests
were lodged with their respective RAAF Air Support Party (ASP)
and Brigade Headquarters' requests were lodged with the RAAF
Air Support Section (ASS).
Air support requests followed the format:
- Map reference.
- Target description (eg troops, machine guns, supplies
etc) .
- Time over target (eg NOT before ..... hours, NOT after ..... hours, or time immaterial). This information was
vital for co-ordinated air and ground attacks.
- Position of forward troops, to avoid fratricide.
- Special instructions such as:
* target indication (smoke marker or reference to
special feature such as '200 yards south of road
junction');
* whether air attack was to be co-ordinated with
ground attack; and
Tarakan 4 3
* alternative target.
- Target bombline, in which natural features were used,
rather than a grid line.
All direct support was controlled from the Command ship USS
Rocky Mount and the CSA (Afloat) until 3 May, when control
passed to the CSA (Ashore)." The ASPs landed with the assault
battalions but were unable to establish communications for
more than two hours, and even then communications were not
satisfactory as Army No 108 lightweight portable HF R/T sets
had to be used until the ASPs' heavier equipment could be off-
loaded. Good communications were not forthcoming until the
morning of the following day, once that heavy equipment was
ashore and became operable.
Tactical loading of ships at Morotai had been poor in that
personnel and their equipment were separated during loading.
The problem was compounded at Tarakan as unloading priorities
were insufficient to ensure that the equipment could be
provided when needed, and LSTs with some of the equipment on-
board became stuck in the mud at a distance from shore. As
well, the anti-tank ditch on the foreshore caused further
delays.
The poor tactical loading could be attributable to the late
arrival of the ASS, ASPs and No 114 Mobile Fighter Control
Unit (MFCU) at Morotai which necessitated unloading and
loading equipment without sorting it, or indeed even knowing
if it were all re-loaded for Tarakan.
Advanced Headquarters 1st TAF and Brigade Headquarters were
not located together once ashore and the ASS had to function
inside the Brigade Headquarters as an ASP. The decision had
been made that one ASS could cover both the Advanced
The CSA was provided by 13th AF, with a CSA observer provided by the RAAF.
44 Oboe
Headquarters 1st TAF (RAAF) and Headquarters 26th Australian
Infantry Brigade because both headquarters would be physically
adjacent. Delays were experienced in receiving all equipment
in similar fashion to the three ASPS allocated to the
Battalion Headquarters.
To make matters worse, long-range communications equipment of
the 1st TAF's Mobile Telecommunications Unit (MTU) was not
unloaded from the Headquarters ship before it departed Tarakan
on 3 May, and interim communications had to be provided by No
114 MFCU. Long-range communications were needed to link
Tarakan to Palawan, Zamboanga, Leyte and ~0rotai.j'
ASPS were to provide regular reports on friendly ground force
positions so that CSA could maintain a bombline. As well as a
target bombline for direct air support aircraft, a bombline
was determined over which friendly troops could not cross.
ASPS were kept informed by Battalion Headquarters of changes
in position of forward troops. Brigade Headquarters, in
conjunction with ASS, determined and advised the bombline.
Because too little information was received, CSA found it
necessary to insist on maximum information on friendly forces
being provided at the time of each request for direct air
support.
An observation recorded by Flight Lieutenant R. MC. Stewart,18
Officer Commanding No 2 ASP, was that lack of effective
opposition meant a fast rate of advance, and not all alert
aircraft could be used. However, all support requested was
provided on time. Aircraft attacked alternative targets and
some were handed to another sector (presumably a different
'' 13th AF Fighter Command was at Palawan, Commander Maritime Air Group was at Zamboanga, Headquarters 13th AF was at Leyte, and Headquarters 1st TAF was at Morotai.
From a note by Flight Lieutenant MC. Stewart, contained in the Oboe One Box File held by RAAF Historical Section, Canberra.
Tarakan 4 5
ASP).
Compounding the problem, the Brigade Commander left the
headquarters ship on 1 May and ordered that only targets which
were located well in advance of his troops could be attacked
unless he gave specific approval. CSA was, therefore, unable
to order strikes until satisfactory communications were
established with Brigade Headquarters ashore.
Once the ASPs and the ASS obtained their own equipment,
requests for direct air support were passed without
difficulty, although reception was degraded during afternoons.
Procedurally, the ASPs did not appear to realise the need to
listen to the Support Air Observer net at all times and thus
the Battalion Commanders were not always provided with the
best information available. A considerable amount of direct
air support was prevented from being used during the first two
days due to indifferent communications, both for procedural
planning and equipment shortfall reasons.
An observation to arise from Tarakan in terms of close air
support was that withdrawal of friendly troops to permit
bombing of enemy positions created problems in that a
withdrawal of say 900 metres meant that the time taken to re-
occupy previously-held positions after bombing ceased was
approximately one hour, in which time Japanese forces could
reinforce their own positions.
Another issue was that fire support from ground elements was
most effective within ranges of 90 metres. If these elements
had to withdraw just 180 metres, they were no longer able to
influence enemy positions once bombing ceased. Thus, for both
reasons, if medium or high-level bombing was not intense
enough to saturate and destroy the target area, there was
little point in having friendly troops withdraw, only to find
they needed to fight to regain positions previously held.
There were even calls to adopt a policy of 'lesser withdrawal'
4 6 Oboe
and accept the additional risk of fratricide.
The effect of High Explosive (HE) and napalm bombing (which
was minimal) led to a recommendation for development of a
retarded, delay-fused napalm-type incendiary, fitted with a
bursting charge. Recommendations were also made for supply
dropping to be effected in future from Catalina or transport
aircraft, and for long parachute cords to be fitted such that
stores would still reach the ground even if the parachutes
became entangled in trees.
Maps and Map References
Most maps used were suitable; however the map of Tarakan
Island (scale 1:25,000) had grid squares sub-divided into 25
sub-squares, each marked with the appropriate letter for that
square. The amount of printing obscured some of the map's
detail. Subsequently, different colours were used and only
occasional grid squares were sub-divided and lettered.
ASPS passed map references in the form of six figure co-
ordinates to the Headquarters ship. On board the ship, the
co-ordinates had to be converted to four figures and one
letter to conform to the standard system used with support
aircraft.
Equipment
Some of the ASS and ASP equipment was not sufficiently mobile
which necessitated occasional use of landlines to link the ASP
to its Battalion Headquarters. Battery charging posed
problems as well. The chargers were too noisy to be used at
night (for fear of disclosing positions, and they interfered
with night patrols) and had insufficient output to fully
charge batteries during the day to compensate for power used
Tarakan 4 7
on the many transmitters and receivers. Furthermore, the
chargers themselves were difficult to maintain.
Re-organisation Of Air Support
As a result of problems experienced during the Tarakan
operation, the RAAF subsequently reorganised the provision of
air support. ASPS were more suitable for attachment to
Brigade Headquarters rather than to Battalion Headquarters and
a smaller organisation which would be capable of operating and
moving without vehicles was needed at the Battalion level.
The fluidity of battle during the early stages of an assault,
with the probability of frequent enemy contacts, meant that
reliable and effective ASS/ASP communications were essential.
The new organisational structure was as follow^:'^
* Air Support Section (as a component of the Air Formation
Headquarters tasked with providing air support), to be
located at the Air Formation Headquarters, which itself
would be located close to the Headquarters of ,an Army
Division. The ASS would contain 30 signals personnel
plus several officers.
* Two Air Support Parties to be allocated on the basis of
one ASP at each of the two Brigade Headquarters. The ASP
would contain 17 signals personnel plus one officer.
* Four Air Liaison Parties (ALP) to be allocated on the
basis of one ALP at each of four Battalion Headquarters.
The ALP would consist of three signals personnel.
This structure was based on a standard tactical deployment of
an Australian Infantry Division. The new ALPS had to be self-
'' This structure was first promulgated in RAAF File No 311.2373 dated 16 May 1945, a copy of which is held by RAAF Historical Section, Canberra.
4 8 Oboe
contained and capable of operating for seven days without
resupply, except in cases of complete breakdown or loss of two
personnel.
FIAAF FIGHTER CONTROL ORGANISATION
1st TAF (RAAF) had the responsibility of establishing early
warning facilities in the OA. This involved two radar
stations and a headquarters section of MFCU (to provide the
link between the radar stations and the Fighter Director Ship)
being established and operational 14 hours after the landing.
Subsequently, two additional stations were to be established
at Sadau Island and Cape Pasir by 6 May. In addition, the
communications network was to be expanded considerably to
provide seven High Frequency (HF) and four Very High Frequency
(VHF) channels.
As with ASS and ASP equipment, poor tactical loading of No 114
MFCU40 and unloading priorities meant that non-essential
equipment was unloaded well in advance of the radar stations.
Moreover, the Ground Control Intercept (GCI)" station
equipment had been loaded on two different vessels and
erection of the radar had to be delayed by one day. Technical
faults compounded the problem with the GC1 radar and it was
not functional until 6 May.
The air warning station (the second radar)" was not unloaded
until late on 2 May and erection could not begin until dawn
4 0 The term Mobile Control and Reporting Unit (MCRU) is now used in the RAAF; although in 1945 the unit was referred to as a Mobile Fighter Control Unit (MFCU).
41 GC1 stations were used to control fighters. The effective area of control may be represented by a circle of 50 miles radius (80 kilometres), surrounding the station.
'2 Air warning stations were used to give early warning of approaching aircraft out to 50-150 miles (80-240 kilometres).
Tarakan 4 9
the following day. Furthermore, vehicles with radar equipment
appeared to be mis-directed and considerable effort was wasted
in tracing the vehicles and the much-needed equipment.
Some 56 personnel of the MFCU were required ashore to erect
and operate the radar equipment but were held on-board the
'Titania' to form a working party. Meanwhile, surplus
personnel were ashore, causing congestion.
Approximately half the equipment for the two air warning
radars to be erected on Sadau Island and Cape Pasir was
unloaded on 4 May. The sets were meant to be operational by
the 6th but all attempts to trace the remaining equipment
proved unsuccessful.
Siting of the MFCU beside the GC1 station would have provided
the best effect, but difficulty was experienced in doing so
because of siting priorities made by Army authorities. The
need to establish a GC1 site on the beach-head within four
hours of landing was later questioned. It was argued that it
would be far better to maintain direction/control from the
Headquarters ship for an additional two to three days, thereby
allowing the GC1 station to be set up at the best available
site - to achieve more reliable results for the remainder of the operation.
No 1 Australian Air Formation Signals Unit lay landline
communications from the MFCU to Headquarters 1st TAF well
before the radar stations were established. At least, in this
respect, planning and execution came together.
There was an obvious need for training of RAAF officers in
beach movement, of Army personnel in matching unloading
priorities for ASS/ASP to respective headquarters, and in
rehearsal for setting up GC1 and air warning stations.
Additionally, the use of common codes and cyphers was shown to
be necessary. During the first few days of the assault, the
50 Oboe
13th AF and the ASS at Tarakan experienced difficulty in
communicating due to the use of different codes and cyphers.
ADMINISTRATION
Embarkation and disembarkation created problems for most
units. As an illustration, the example of Headquarters No 30
Squadron is cited. The Headquarters, as part of No 77 Wing,
was ordered to report for embarkation at 0830 hours on 4 May.
Embarkation did not begin until 1530, and the nine officers
and 99 other ranks were split over two ships - the Manoora and
the Westralia. The convoy left Morotai at 0630 on 5 May, and
No 30 Squadron Headquarters disembarked at Tarakan at 0930 on
the 7th. The personnel did not have an allocated camp site
and had to live with No 78 Squadron personnel, using verandahs
and rooms of a damaged house, and borrowed tents for
accommodation. Even after a camp site was allocated, they
still had to wait until 16 May, when appropriate tools,
equipment and mechanical transport arrived. By 18 May, they
were finally established at their own camp site.')
The traffic congestion at Tarakan also proved to be a problem
and was compounded by the unloading of personnel and equipment
before areas had been cleared of the enemy. Thus, too many
people were held in a small area that required ease of access
to facilitate subsequent unloading and dispersal. An RAAF
Police squadron leader advised that from the time of the
landing on 1 May until 2100 hours the following day, 1500
vehicles had passed along the road (which was less than two
kilometres long). Thus, vehicles had to be parked along a
piece of highway which was essential for the movement of
supplies to the front and to evacuate casualties. In fact, a
4 3 See 24/5/Air (47A) of 29 May 1945, held as folio 147 of Oboe One Box File, RAAF Historical Section.
Tarakan 5 1
line of vehicles was just behind the advancing troops.44
Planning staff at Headquarters 1st TAF remained in close
contact with the Air and Administrative planning staffs of
Advanced Headquarters (W). RAAF re-supply to the Tarakan
area was handled through a RAAF staff officer attached to
Advanced Land Forces Headquarters.
I?ost action reports indicated the following weaknesses in
i~dministrative arrangements:
* Initial ship loading in Australia was poor (compounded by
loading around the Easter period and inadequate military
control over loading).
* Logistics supplied by units were inadequate for
requirements.
* Orders and instructions were not produced and circulated
in time to be seen by all personnel.
* Some responsible officers did not appear to read orders
and instructions that were circulated in time and hence
implementation of procedures was found wanting.
* Rehearsal for loading procedures (and unloading and
subsequent erection of equipment and facilities) was not
conducted.
* Units carried too much surplus equipment and vehicles
were often over-loaded or poorly loaded.
* Unit personnel and equipment were separated in different
vessels.
'bee 2/17/1B of 11 May 1945, held as folio 135, Oboe One Box File, RAAF Historical Section.
52 Oboe
* Not all commanding officers travelled with their units.
The various problems experienced at Tarakan led Group Captain
Murdoch to argue that:'5
* personnel and equipment must travel together on one ship.
* Manifests must be maintained to prevent loss and mis-
direction.
* Units should not be unloaded until required.
* A traffic circuit must be established to clear the
landing area rapidly, and suitable parking areas must be
set up.
* Unloading must occur in a pre-planned order.
* Personnel should be briefed thoroughly and given maps of
the landing and camp site areas to obviate the need for
each person to reconnoitre his camp site, which added
significantly to traffic congestion at Tarakan.
Comunications
Despite several planning conferences on the use of radio
signals and radar, and promulgation of clear instructions for
the use of radios, RAAF aircraft tasked with providing air
cover over the assault convoy still used incorrect frequencies
and call signs when communicating with the convoy. AS
mentioned earlier, the wrong IFF code was used on at least one
occasion and the first courier aircraft used the wrong
frequency and call sign (and hence reported to the wrong
person).
" See 1/2/9 of 29 May 1945, held as folio 123 in Oboe One Box File, RAAF Historical Section.
Tarakan 5 3
Logistics
Logistics received a 3 1/2 page Appendix (Appendix F) to the Headquarters RAAF Command Operations Instruction No 78/1945.
Despite specific detail such as 15 days initial supply of
,aviation POL (petrol, oils and lubricants), 25 days of motor
transport POL, and 30 days supply of rations, instructions
were very general.
For example, in conjunction with BAAF Headquarters, 1st TAF
units were asked to provide adequate initial supply of bombs,
ammunition, pyrotechnics and explosives; RAAF technical and
airborne supplies; and RAAF non-technical, non-airborne and
non-common-usage stores. There was no further level of detail
given.
PREPARATION OF TARAKAN AIRFIELD
Two Airfield Construction Squadrons (ACS) were believed to be
essential to construct the necessary works requirements that
would permit RAAF aircraft to begin operating from Tarakan
airfield from 7 May. However, due to the poor surface, much
of the heavy equipment proved useless and could have been left
at Morotai. Moreover, most of the work required manual
labour, which could be provided by local natives; hence, the
second squadron was not needed.
Another observation that can be made is that ACS personnel
began disembarking on 2 May, although the airfield was not
captured until the 5th. Consequently, personnel and their
heavy equipment compounded the congestion problem mentioned
earlier
4 6 See report by Group Captain Rooney, on file 1/2/9, held as folio 131 of the Oboe One Box File, RAAF Historical Section.
54 Oboe
work on the airfield was delayed because, as just mentioned,
the airfield itself was not captured until the evening of 5
May. It was seriously damaged, waterlogged and mined. A RAAF
bomb disposal unit cleared 114 mines from the airstrip and
dispersal areas during 6 and 7 May." One intelligence report
observed that on Tarakan, 'land mines, booby traps and depth
charges had been used on an unprecedented scale'." As areas
were cleared of mines, Japanese would infiltrate through an
extensive tunnelling system and lay more mines at night.
Continued enemy action and sniper fire affected work on the
airfield during the first few days. Then, heavy rain on 10
May and enemy shelling on 19 and 20 May slowed work on the
airfield even further. The shelling was followed up on 26 and
28 May by Japanese air attacks. Continual harassment on the
ground occurred nightly. As a result, ACS personnel, who had
worked all day, were posted as guards at night. The
experience of Tarakan led to 1st TAF arguing later that
personnel who had reached their limit of physical endurance
during daytime should not be posted as guards at night.
Wet weather, a corresponding high water table, bad soil
conditions, and lack of suitable paving materials conspired
against the hard work of the ACS engineers. By 6 June, the
engineers required only four dry days to have the airfield
serviceable. Yet, from the 6th to 25th June, there were only
two dry days. Finally, the first aircraft (other than an
Auster) landed at Tarakan on 28 June, and operations began two
days later (to support the Balikpapan operation). Even then,
problems continued, in that the strip was not suitable for
Beaufighter operations and they had to be withdrawn to
Morotai. Kittyhawks continued to operate.
" George Odgers, A i r War A g a i n s t Japan 1943-1945, Australian War Memorial, 1957, p.458.
4 8 RAAF Command Intelligence Summary No 20 of June 16 1945, p.23; held as PRO, Air 40/1761.
Tarakan 55
In relation to the delays experienced in readying the airfield
at Tarakan, Air Chief Marshal Sir Neville McNamara observed:
'It was terribly frustrating as you can well imagine. I was
with 75 Squadron, and when we eventually did get away (from
Morotai) we went in two waves of 12'." As the aircraft
approached a weather front, the formation became separated.
ACM McNamara was the first of this flight to land at Tarakan.
One aircraft ran out of fuel and ditched in the ocean, near a
PT boat (the pilot was rescued), two others ran out of fuel as
they landed at Tarakan (with one sustaining damage), and
another landed with only one engine working (although this was
as a result of a mechanical problem). But, as ACM McNamara
was moved to comment - 'all in all it was a near disa~ter'.'~
On the subject of the usefulness of the strip, ACM McNamara
commented that pilots could only take off to the west and land
into the east. As he said, 'it was one of the few airfields
in the world where one end rose and fell with the tide. There
was in fact a bulldozer buried beneath the strip because it
just sunk to such a depth that they gave up trying to get it
outr . 51
The inability to develop the airfield fully, or on time, and
indeed the shortcomings of intelligence which suggested that
an airfield could be developed, meant that most of the 1st
TAF's combat strength remained at Morotai and contributed
little to the operation. Since the primary reason for
launching Oboe One was to establish an airfield on Tarakan,
the operation would have to be regarded as a failure. The
real tragedy is that as Air Commodore Scherger said:
-
" The 12 Kittyhawks were led by a Beaufighter. See Group Captain Gary Waters, 'The Tarakan Operation - Air Power Lessons', in The RAAF in the SWPA 1942-1945: RliAF History Conference 1993, p.135.
50 ibid.
ibid, p.136.
56 Oboe
'it was quite obvious.......that a satisfactory strip
could never be constructed, nor indeed could a strip be
made, capable of intensive use for even a short period'.52
52 ibid, p.461.
CHAPTER THREE
OBOE SIX - LABUAN/BRUNEI BAY
OVERVIEW
Eight days after Oboe 1 started, the fighting in Europe ended.
For the Australians in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA), the
fighting still had a long way to run after 8 May. Despite the
situation in the SWPA, the Australian War Cabinet began its plans
for de-mobilisation.
It was important that Oboe Six be completed on time as some of
the assault shipping forces and ground force elements had to be
released for Oboe Two - the Balikpapan operation. The Objective
Area (OA) for the Labuan/Brunei Bay operation was to extend
almost 300 kilometres along the north-west coast of Borneo (from
Miri in the south to Jesselton' in the north). The object was to
secure Labuan Island and Brunei Bay to ensure uninterrupted air
and naval operations to help seize Miri-Lutong and Seria.'
The 1,300 square kilometres of sheltered Brunei Bay provided the
best anchorage in the area. Establishment of air and naval
facilities there would complete a chain of mutually-supporting
bases, some 2,500 kilometres long, which would allow allied air
and naval cover to be provided along the coast from Singapore to
Shanghai. As well, Japanese overland Lines of Communication
(LOCs) and escape routes into Indo China and Malaya could be
interdicted. Moreover, Brunei was at the geographical centre of
enemy occupied areas - including Sulawesi, Bali, Java, Sumatra,
Jesselton is now known as Kota Kinabalu. It is 160 kilometres north east of Brunei town and housed the headquarters of the army constabulary and the residence of the Governor of British North Borneo.
Oil producing fields were at Miri and Seria, with a refinery at Lutong. Miri field had been in production since 1910, while Seria was discovered in 1928. Miri-Seria supplied 28% of the East Indies crude oil and 40% of black oil. Lutong refinery ranked fifth amongst the refineries in the east Indies before the war started.
5 8 Oboe
Malaya and Indo China.3
Japanese forces had landed in Brunei Bay and Kuching on 24
December 1941. Japan relied on the oil from Miri and Seria and
rubber from Kuching, Brunei and Jesselton. In 1944, Brunei was
a major Japanese advance naval base, but as the Japanese Southern
Fleet suffered a series of reversals, the base was used more as
a staging port for coastal shipping.
Throughout the area, road infrastructure was poor, but the sea
and rivers provided reasonable means of movement. Also, at low
tide, the beach could be used. Brunei Bay offered the best
harbour along the Brunei north-west coast, with Labuan Island
commanding the northern and southern seaward entrances. The
island measures 22 kilometres (north-south) by 10 kilometres
(east-west). Labuan township and its port of Victoria Harbour
are sited in the south-east corner of the island. Two airfields
(built by the Japanese) were in the south but both had been
damaged by bombing. The largest airfield offered a strip that
was 4,000 metres long. The smaller airfield known as Timbalai,
just five degrees from the equator, was not planned to be used
by the Allies.
Fundamental to overall mission success would be the ability of
the air forces to support the amphibious landings and subsequent
land operations. As Air Vice-Marshal Bostock was to observe
after the operation: 'the conduct of air operations was generally
satisfactory and it was apparent that commanders of wings and
squadrons had benefitted as a result of experience during the
Oboe One ~peration'.~
Air distances in kilometres to Brunei Bay are as follows: Balikpapan - 650, Tarakan - 300, Morotai - 1450, Sanga Sanga - 480, Zamboanga - 730, Manila - 1150, and Miri - 100. Road distances from Miri (in kilometres) were: to Lutong - 15, Seria - 67, and Brunei - 155.
Report of Oboe Six Operation, Morotai, June 1945, signed by AVM Bostock, p.2.
Labuan/Brunei Bay 5 9
Bostock went on to summarise the two worst problems experienced
during Oboe Six, in relation to air operations. On 8 June, B.24
Liberators of 13th AF failed to obtain prior permission to bomb,
which was subsequently referred to as a 'serious breach of
combined operations procedure^'.^ The second problem arose when
No 80 Wing did not provide dusk cover for the convoy because the
commander of the wing decided not to mount the mission despite
clear orders to do so.
On the positive side, the loading at Morotai was far more orderly
than had been the case for Oboe One; although difficulties were
still experienced in the OA - such as difficult beach conditions and excessive numbers of vehicles.
No 110 Mobile Fighter Control Unit (MFCU) , which was at Morotai, was supposed to be attached to No 80 Wing for deployment to
Labuan. However, because of depleted equipment and lack of
personnel, it was unable to be deployed and No 111 MFCU, attached
to No 78 Wing, deployed instead. No 111 MFCU did not arrive in
Morotai until two days before the convoy departed for Labuan.
In his concluding comments in the foreword to the Oboe Six
report, AvM Bostock stated that General MacArthur was delighted
with the results of Oboe Six and had indicated to his senior
commanders that 'the execution of the Brunei Bay operation has
been flawle~s'.~
USN Task Group 78.1 provided the convoy. The 230 vessels sailed
in different echelons (one from Tarakan, one from Leyte, and
several others from Morotai), with the main echelon (consisting
of 76 vessels) departing Morotai on 4 June. The main group
suffered three nights of storms en route to Labuan; their
suffering was made worse because most of the troops were
ibid.
ibid, p.3.
6 0 Oboe
accommodated on open decks.
OBJECTIVE OF OBOE SIX
MacArthur's Operation Instruction issued on 21 April listed the
aims for the task force as being: to establish an advanced fleet base in Brunei Bay, to recover and protect oil and rubber
resources, and to re-establish British Government control. No
1 Australian Corps (9th Division less 26th Brigade Group) was
given the task.'
It was to be a three-phase operation as follows:
* Neutralise Japanese airfields so that enemy aircraft would
not oppose allied landings, and destroy defence
installations in the OA.
* Conduct multiple landings on Labuan Island and near Brunei
town; secure the airfield on Labuan; and, from Labuan,
conduct further landings along the north-west coast to
secure Brunei Bay from the north.
* Consolidate the OA; establish the advanced fleet base;
conduct shore-to-shore operations south of Miri; protect
and develop oil and rubber resources; and re-establish
British civil administration.'
A beach 1,400 metres long (code-named Brown Beach) at Hamilton
Point in Victoria Harbour afforded the best site for a landing.
At the same time as Brown Beach was secured, an overland assault
would be needed to capture the wharves and jetties at Yellow
Beach (inside the bay near Bro~keton)~ and another amphibious
' 26th Brigade Group was at Tarakan. E.G. Keogh, The South West Pacific 1941-45, Grayflower
Productions, Melbourne, 1965, p.444.
"rooketon is 32 kilometres south west of Labuan.
Labuan/Brunei Bay 61
landing on Muara Island (to clear Japanese troops)."'
For the assault on Yellow Beach, a landing would be made first
at Green Beach, on the other side of the peninsula. On Muara
Island, the best beach from which to operate was at Red Beach,
but first a landing would have to be made on White Beach,
followed by an overland assault on Red Beach. Red Beach would
provide a transshipment point for forces and equipmentmoving to
Yellow Beach, on the mainland. All landings were to be made on
Z-day, 10 June 1945.
INTELLIGENCE
Japanese Anti-Aircraft Strengths
Only one coast defence gun position was located, near Ramsay
Point. No artillery pieces were believed to be on Labuan;
although 12 medium gun positions (only one of which was manned)
and 12 light Anti-Aircraft (AA) positions were identified on 25
April 45." AA fire had not been noticed over Labuan since 9
May. In the Brunei area, four light AA positions had been
detected at Cape Sapo and one heavy and one light AA position at
Brooketon. l'
The Miri airfield and Lutong refinery were protected by 15 medium
AA positions (11 of which were occupied), 11 heavy AA positions
(none of which were occupied), six light AA positions and one
searchlight position. In the Miri township, an additional eight
heavy AA positions (two occupied), a searchlight, and a medium
'O Muara Island, at the north-west end of Brunei Bay near Brooketon, is three kilometres long and almost one kilometre wide.
" See 1 Australian Corps Intelligence Review No 3 dated 8 May 45, p.4, held in Labuan boxfile as folio 53.
6 2 Oboe
dual-purpose position were present. At Kuala Belait,13 there
were two medium and three light AA positions, all of which were
unoccupied. At Seria, three light and four medium positions had
been detected."
Enemy Airfields
The main air bases which posed threats to the convoy were the
airfields and float plane bases in North Sulawesi. The main
threats to the Oboe 5ix base were from airfields in south-west
Borneo, Malaya (with possible staging through Soebi Ketjil-
Natoena), or French Indo-China. In the case of the convoy,
allied aircraft from Balawan could respond; whereas in the latter
case, the enemy bases were over 1,000 kilometres away.
The following airfields were still serviceable at the end of
April: Brunei, Timbalai, Jesselton, Kudat, Ranau (emergency use
only), Keningau and Bintulu. The airfield at Miri and the main
airfield at Labuan were unserviceable.
Outside the OA, but within range, were many other airfields - Kuching, Soebi Ketjil, Sepinggan, Manggar, Singkawang (three
airfields), Kotawaringin, Tabanio (two runways), and Oelin (three
runways). Other staging fields were at Asa, Dajoe, Lahad Datu,
Melak, Mukah, Sandakan, Sibu and Boelin Island (Natoena).
Anticipated Enemy Reaction
Enemy reaction at the amphibious landing sites was expected to
be similar to that at Tarakan. Hence, Japanese forces were
expected to position themselves on the high ground behind the
" Kuala Belait, at the mouth of the Belait River, was the administrative centre for Seria oilfield.
l4 1 Australian Corps Intelligence Review No 3, pp.9-10.
Labuan/Brunei Bay 6 3
beaches and to use mines along roads and on the airfields. Booby
traps could be expected in the town areas.
Enemy Aircraft Strengths
Because Oboe Six posed a greater threat to Japan's LOCs with its
southern bases than did Oboe One, the possibility of air attacks
from French Indo-China, Malaya or Sumatra was always likely.
Enemy operational air strength was:15 three fighters and eight
float planes on Borneo; eight fighters, five float planes and two
reconnaissance aircraft on Sulawesi; and 15 fighters, 14 bombers,
18 float planes and six reconnaissance aircraft on Java and the
Lesser Sundas - for a total of 79 combat aircraft.16
In the area of potential support, the numbers were more
significant. For example, in French Indo-China there were 40
fighters, 22 bombers, 14 float planes and 10 reconnaissance
aircraft. In Sumatra there were 70 fighters and five
reconnaissance aircraft; while in Malaya, Burma and Thailand
there were 75 fighters, 25 bombers, nine float planes and 13
reconnaissance aircraft. Thus, another 282 aircraft could have
been used to disrupt Oboe Six."
Weather
A weather summary for air operations over the period May-June was
provided in the Operations Instructi~n.'~ Assessments for
bombing, reconnaissance, air-to-ground and parachute operations
l5 Refer to Appendix B to 1st TAF Operations Order 1/1945, Labuan Box File, RAAF Historical Section.
l6 The Operations Instruction 98/1945 showed a total of 99.
" The Operations Instruction 98/1945 showed a total of 280.
Refer Appendix C to Operations Instruction 98/1945.
64 Oboe
were the same as for ~arakan."
The Airfield
One all-weather runway measuring 5,000 feet by 100 feet was to
be constructed, permitting intensive air operations for up to
one month. All-weather alert aprons were to be provided at
each end of the strip, and undispersed parking areas would be
needed to accommodate four squadrons of fighters and one AOP
flight. A building had to be constructed for the MFCU and a
Base Operations building with a control tower also had to be
erected. All these works were required by 16 June.
By 25 June, increased undispersed parking was needed for three
squadrons of attack aircraft and one squadron of Air Sea
Rescue (ASR) aircraft. By 30 June, another two squadrons of
fighters and two squadrons of attack aircraft would need
staging facilities. No 4 Radio Installation and Maintenance
Unit (RIMU) and No 61 Airfield Construction Wing were to
prepare the airfield and facilities.
In addition, buildings were required to house each wing and
squadron, and service aprons were needed for each wing.
Buildings and storage areas were needed for logistics,
including separate special storage areas for fuels and bombs.
Alert huts at each alert apron, an air evacuation building and
a bore-sighting range also had to be constructed.
Refer to Chapter 2 for the assessment.
Labuan/Brunei Bay 6 5
RAAF PLANNING
IRAAP planning was contained in 1st TAF Operations Order No 1/45
(dated 21 May 1945, which was issued in accordance with W
ICommand Operations Instruction No 98/45 dated 13 May 45. Target
date (Z-Day) was 10 June, and had been postponed from 1 June
because 9 Division was not ready on time. D-Hour was the Labuan
landing (0914, Brown Beach); J-Hour the Muara Island landing
(0915, White Beach); and H-Hour the Brunei Bluff landing (0918,
Green Beach).
General Officer Commanding (GOC) Oboe Six was Major General
Wootten, Air Support was under the control of Air Vice-Marshal
Bostock (AOC-in-C RAAF Command), GOC 20th Brigade was Brigadier
Windeyer, GOC 24th Brigade was Brigadier Porter, and Air
Commodore Scherger was AOC 1st TAF.
Tasks for 13th AF
Aircraft of the 13th AF were tasked with the following:
* Locating and destroying specified military targets in the
Brunei-Brunei Bluff-Muara Island area and on Labuan Island
prior to 10 June.
* During the night of 9/10 June, attacking the built-up
objectives in the OA at least once every two hours.
* Providing convoy fighter cover (four aircraft on-station
0730-1800 daily) over specified areas (the task was shared
with the W).
Oboe
Providing two night fighters for dawn and dusk convoy
protection between Morotai and the OA: cover was to be
provided 0600-0730 and 1800-2000 daily.
Providing Combat Air Patrol over the OA (four aircraft on
constant air alert 0730-1730 from 7 June until relieved by
1st TAF - which was expected to be 16 June).
Providing dawn and dusk cover with two night fighters over
the OA from 7 June until relieved by 1st TAF (which was
expected to be 16 June).
Providing close air support south of 5 degrees 10 minutes
North during and subsequent to the assault (using six
Mitchells airborne continuously over the OA 0800-1600).
Providing photographic coverage as requested by AOC-in-C
RAAF Command.
Providing fighter cover and direct support for PT boats in
Brunei Bay from 9 June onwards.
Providing anti-submarine cover for convoys proceeding to
and from Morotai.
Providing weather reconnaissance between Tawi Tawi and
Brunei Bay during the nights of 9-11 June inclusive.
Providing cover for minesweeping operations from 7 June.
Labuan/Brunei Bay 6 7
Tasks for 1st TAF
The aircraft of 1st TAF were also tasked with discrete operations
encompassing:
* Locating and destroying specified military targets in the
Brunei Bluff-Muara Island area and on Labuan Island prior
to 10 June.
* Providing convoy cover with fighters (sharing the task with
13th AF) .
Providing close air support in Brunei Bay, north of 5
degrees 10 minutes North during and subsequent to the
assault.
* Providing an Air Observer over the OA 0730-1600 daily from
6-9 June inclusive. Providing two Air Observers over the
OA 0730-1730 daily from 10 June until relieved.
* Providing ASR between Morotai and the OA and within the OA,
using 13th AF for assistance if necessary.
* Providing a daily courier service between Morotai and
Labuan and between Labuan and Manila. (To carry SWPA
Public Relations officers from General Headquarters).
* Providing aircraft for DDT spraying in the OA from 10 June.
* Providing Austers for reconnaissance on Labuan Island from
10 June.
* Providing officers to act as CSA on each of the
headquarters ships.
6 8 Oboe
On and subsequent to 10 June, strikes were not to be conducted
in the OA unless authori~ed.~~ Furthermore, strikes were to be
cancelled if communications could not be established with CSA.
Restrictions on Operations
The following areas and installations were not to be attacked if
possible: piers and jetties, main roads on Labuan Island, POW and
internee camps, water installations, civil and military
hospitals, oil producing plants at Miri and Seria, and Brunei
town (unless contraryorders were given by Advanced Headquarters,
RRAF Command).
Notwithstanding these exclusions, if any installation or area
could be used to hamper operations of the assault forces, it
could be attacked.
There were also operating restrictions on aircraft. First, they
were to avoid low-flying over, or up and down, waters in the
vicinity of friendly surface craft. Second, theywere prohibited
from attacking surface craft after 6 June unless specifically
authorised by CSA (as PT boats would be operating in the Brunei
Bay area). Additionally, aircrews were advised that Naval
Observation aircraft would be operating in the OA from 8 June.
Also, aircrew were advised to clear and test guns only over areas
not occupied by friendly forces.
Courier Service
From 10 June, 1st TAF Catalinas were to provide a daily courier
service Morotai-Labuan-Tarakan-Morotai. Once the Labuan strip
became operable, C.47 aircraft were to take over from the
See p.3 of Operations Order 1/45.
LabuadBrunei Bay 69
Catalinas.'' They would fly Morotai-Tarakan-Labuan-Tarakan-
Morotai. All courier aircraft were to report to CSA for approach
and landing instructions in the OA.
Line of Approach
From 10 June, all aircraft approaching Labuan were to do so from
l0 nautical miles on a course of 180 degrees, at a height of
1,500 feet or less.
Direct Support
The OA was divided into two sectors at the parallel 5 degrees 10
minutes North. Close support in the southern sector was provided
by 13th AF and in the northern sector, by 1st TAF. As formations
arrived to provide direct support, the flight leader reported to
CSA the number and type of aircraft in the formation, their
position and altitude, time available on station, and type of
bombs carried.
Aircraft would orbit specific points ('Baker' in the north,
'Easy' in the south) until directed to targets by CSA. Flight
leaders reported completion of mission and results to CSA, prior
to their departure from the OA. CSA (Afloat) provided co-
ordination between air and naval strikes - suspending NGS as necessary or determining minimum altitude for aircraft attack.22
Map references were to accordwith the Standard Target Designator
Grid (four figures and one letter). ASPS passed requests to CSA
who, in turn, briefed the pilots. If artillery or mortar smoke
was used to indicate targets, CSA would advise pilots by saying
21 This was expected to be on 16 June.
2 2 The R/T callsign for NGS was PIPEDREAM.
7 0 Oboe
'Splash ... The reference point for fighter direction was Kuraman Island
lighthouse (5 degrees 13 minutes north, 115 degrees 8 minutes
east), code-named 'Sarah'. All radar contacts were reported by
bearing and distance in nautical miles from 'Sarah'.
No 82 Wing
No 82 Wing squadrons operated from Darwin and in-theatre, and
were tasked with bombing specified targets (including possible
staging strips) in the Sulawesi area during the period 21 May-l0
June, and providing Liberators to conduct air observation over
the OA from 0730 to 1600 hours daily from 6-9 June inclusive.
Three Liberators were stationed at Palawan from 5-8 June to
conduct these observation missions.
Two Air Observers were to be maintained over the OA from 10 June,
0730-1600 daily (one aircraft in each sector). On 10 June, the
Air Observer pilots each dropped a stick of six white flares to
signal the target areas inland, for NGS. The flares ignited at
1,500 feet, above the level of smoke and dust." Six B.24
Liberators, which had been based at Palawan for five days,
provided the cover. Other 82 Wing aircraft, operating from
Morotai, attacked targets in the Labuan-Sulawesi area. In this,
they prosecuted attacks in support of the landings on Labuan
Island, Brunei Bluff and Muara Island - dropping anti-personnel bombs from above 5,000 feet.
23 See Operations Order 1/45, p.6.
2 4 The targets indicated were at Labaun Island (1,000 metres west of the point, when the first assault boats were 1,500 metres from the beach) and at Muara Island (over Sapo Point on the island's south-east tip, when the first assault boats were 800 metres from the beach).
Labuan/Brunei Bay 7 1
The bombing by 13th AF and 82 Wing was coordinated by the
Commanding General 13th All aircraft reported to CSA on
entering the area.
No 81 Wing
The only squadron from No 81 Wing to participate was No 76, which
operated from 28 May. Flying from Tawi Tawi, the squadron
provided air alert and convoy cover as directed. From 16 June,
No 81 Wing assumed responsibility for Labuan, with one squadron
arriving on that day, followed by the other two squadrons on 20
June. No 77 Wing Beaufighters escorted the squadrons. The two
squadrons that arrived on the 20th were to carry out direct
support missions and offensive sweeps as directed by Headquarters
1st TAF.
No 80 Wing
No 452 Squadron was tasked to operate from Tarakan once the strip
became operable." From 28 May, No 79 Squadron was to provide:
* Night and day air defence of Morotai.
* Direct. support as requested.
* Attacks on Halmahera.
Four fighters daily between 0730 and 1800 as convoy cover
between Morotai and the OA, east of Longitude 125 degrees
2 5 Eight squadrons from 13th AF and one squadron from No 82 Wing participated.
2 6 On 10 June, strikes against specified targets could be executed without the authority of CSA.
" AS directed in 1st TAF Operations Instruction 63/45.
72 Oboe
East.
* Two night fighters (0600-0730 and 1800-2000 daily) as
convoy cover between Morotai and the OA, east of Longitude
125 degrees East.
Nos 452 and 79 Squadrons continued operating after the landings.
No 457 Squadron (which had been non-operational from 28 May), was
escorted by No 77 Wing Beaufighters as it deployed to Labuan
(flying Morotai-Zamboanga-Labuan), where it assumed night and day
air defence of Labuan. Six aircraft were on constant ground
alert during the day, and during the night one aircraft remained
on ground alert and one on air alert.
No 83 Wing
The wing remained non-operational except for No 9 Local Air
Supply Unit (LASU), a detachment of which operated from Tawi Tawi
on DDT-spraying missions over 24th Brigade, 20th Brigade and the
camp area. Spraying was not to occur until the areas had been
captured. Each brigade commander advised the AOC 1st TAF (on the
primary Headquarters ship) when spraying could begin. The AOC,
through 1st TAF Headquarters Tarakan, then advised No 83 Wing
detachment when spraying could commence.
Six Austers of the wing accompanied the assault party and
conducted operations after the beach-head had been secured.
Additionally, one flight of No 4 Squadron carried out tactical
reconnaissance (four sorties per day) from 16 June.
No 113 ASR
No 113 ASR was responsible for maintaining two ASR aircraft at
Tarakan whenever the strip was occupied by a fighter squadron,
and maintaining two ASR aircraft at Morotai. These aircraft were
Labuan/Brunei Bay 7 3
also to report to CSA if approaching within 50 miles (80
kilometres) of the convoy or the OA on land. In conjunction with
No 113 ASR, the RAN ASR unit maintained two surface vessels each
at Morotai and Tarakan.
No 77 Wing
Operating from Tawi Tawi, the wing conducted bombing, strafing
and sweep missions. From 7-9 June inclusive, between 0730 and
1600, four Beaufighters were on ground alert at Tawi Tawi to
respond to CSA. They were armed for strafing and minimum
altitude bombing.
From 9-13 June inclusive, six Beaufighters provided direct
support from 0730 to 1630 hours daily, with an aircraft arriving
on station every 90 minutes. After the 13th, six Beaufighters
were held on ground alert for CAIRS missions, being armed for
strafing and minimum altitude bombing.
To indicate the areas for air support, 20th Brigade used yellow
fluorescent panels, while 24th Brigade used red panels.
Pyrotechnic signals were also used.
No 78 Wing
No 78 Wing contributed two squadrons in direct support of Tarakan
land forces. From 16 June, the wing was tasked to cover all
convoys in the vicinity of Tawi Tawi, between Longitudes 123
degrees East and 117 degrees 30 minutes East. Between 0730 and
1800 daily, four fighters were on-station; and two night fighters
were on-station 0600-0730 and 1800-2000. These aircraft operated
from Tawi Tawi.
74 Oboe
Other Forces
No 86 Wing's task was to fly to Labuan on 25 June to conduct
rocket, bombing and strafing sweeps with their Beaufighters and
Mosquitoes. No 13 Squadron arrived at Labuan on 30 June to
conduct search missions.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
Command of all amphibious attacks rested with Commander Naval
Task Force who commanded the operation until the landing force
was established ashore - then command passed to the Commanding Officer of the landing force.28 Transfer of command was agreed
by both commanders, all subordinate commanders notified, and a signal sent to Headquarters 9 Division.
The intention was that Headquarters 1st TAF would move from
Morotai to Labuan and absorb the Command Post. Meanwhile,
Advanced Headquarters 1st TAF would remain at Tarakan and
Advanced Headquarters RAAF Command would remain at Morotai.
For the RAAF, 1st TAF was again the main force, with North
Western Area and Western Area in support, and Northern Area in
reserve (but continuing active local operations in Northern
Area). 13th AF was placed in support of RAAF Command, and 5th
AF was available to support 13th AF as necessary. 13th AF
retained operational control of all 13th AF units within the area
of responsibility of W Command. The whole air effort was
under the direction of AOC-in-C RAAF Command (AVM Bostock).
2 8 In the Lutong landing, which occurred at 0930 on 23 June, command passed to CO 2/13 Battalion. The Lutong landing is discussed later in this chapter.
Labuan/Brunei Bay 7 5
Command Posts
The following command posts were in operation at the time:
* Headquarters Allied Air Forces - Manila (rear echelon at Brisbane).
* Headquarters Far East Air Forces (FEAF) - Manila.
* Headquarters FEAF Service Command - Hollandia (forward
echelon at Manila).
* Headquarters 5th AF - Clark Field.
* Headquarters 13th AF - Leyte (rear echelon at Morotai).
* Headquarters RAAF Command - Brisbane (advanced Headquarters at Morotai).
* Headquarters 1st TAF - Morotai (advanced Headquarters at Tarakan) .
CONDUCT OF AIR OPERATIONS
For the air campaign, General Kenney (Commander Allied Air
Forces) allocated three tasks to RAAF C~mmand.~~ First, to
neutralise enemy resources capable of interfering in Oboe Six;
second, to support 9th Division during the assault and
consolidation phases; and third, to establish air forces on
Labuan Island as soon as the airfield became available.
1st TAF, 13th AF, two bomber groups (Nos 90 and 380) of 5th AF,
and heavy bomber squadrons of NWA and Western Area constituted
George Odgers, A i r War A g a i n s t J a p a n 1943-1945, Australian War Memorial, 1957, p.466.
7 6 Oboe
the air forces. 5th AF bomber groups were to be used in pre-
assault bombardment of Brunei Bay, while Australian heavy bomber
squadrons were to neutralise enemy bases outside the range of
Australian and US bombers operating from Morotai and the
Philippines.
1st TAF was to establish at the airfield on Labuan, facilities
for one fighter wing (No 81 Wing, which comprised Nos 76, 77 and
82 Squadrons of Kittyhawks); one squadron of Spitfires (No 457
Squadron) ; one Army cooperation wing (No 83) ; one attack wing (No
86 - Beaufighters and Mosquitoes - as well as search aircraft of No 13 Squadron, and ASR air~raft).~'
The air campaign was conducted in three phases. Prior to 7 June,
air operations neutralised enemy airfields, blockaded enemy sea
lanes, destroyed targets of military importance in the OA, and
protected convoys en route to the OA. From 7-9 June inclusive,
air operations supported underwater demolition teams, protected
naval forces in the OA, protected convoys en route to the OA,
provided fighter defence of the OA, destroyed targets of military
importance in the OA, and provided air observation to locate
targets for Naval Gunfire Support (NGS). From 10 June, air
operations provided direct air support, convoy protection, and
fighter defence of the OA.
Phase One (Prior to 7 June)
During the pre-assault bombing phase, attacks were directed
against Jesselton, Sibu, Bintulu, Kuching, Keningau, Brunei,
Brooketon, Miri, Seria, and Pontianak in support of Oboe Six; and
against Balikpapan, Manggar, Sepinggan, Balan, Bandjermasin,
Sulawesi, Singapore, Java and the Flores Islands in support of
other operations."
ibid, pp.466-467.
" ibid, p.468.
Labuan/Brunei Bay 7 7
On 3 May, Victoria town on Labuan Island and Brooketon were
attacked by Lightnings, Venturas and Mit~hells.~' Targets
included buildings, barges and small shipping. Two days later
the first attack (with napalm) occurred in the Miri-Seria area
and on 12 May, the first attacks against targets on Muara Island
were conducted (also with napalm). On the 12th, the RDF station
on Labuan was destroyed by P.38 Lightnings.
On 15 May, Liberators of No 82 Wing bombed Manggar to support
Oboe Two and also dropped leaflets - their main task until then
had been to strike targets in Sulawesi, such as Kendari and
Menado. They were also to operate air observer aircraft from
Palawan in the Philippines. In early June, Nos 21 and 2 4
Squadrons moved to Morotai, followed later by No 23 Squadron."
A detachment of 21 Squadron was based at Palawan (which had been
captured by the Allies in February) to support the Labuan Island
and Brunei Bay operations."
Targets on the north-west and north-east coasts of Borneo were
attacked for 15 to 20 days prior to the landings. Priority was
afforded airfields throughout the Sulawesi-Borneo area from 7
June. For two nights prior to 10 June, nine aircraft patrolled
the areas.
NWA and Western Area squadrons attacked eastern Java and southern
Sulawesi to support Oboe Six. NWA aircraft also lay mines and
maintained an air blockade of Macassar Strait, Celebes, Arafura,
Timor, Banda and Flores sea^.'^ The Catalinas mined Surabaya
harbour and Banka Strait. Airfields at Malang (in Java) and many
32 ibid.
Michael V. Nelmes, Tocumwal to Tarakan: Australians and the Consolidated 8-24 Liberator, Banner Books, Canberra, 1 9 9 4 , p.110.
ibid, p.111.
35 Odgers, p.475.
7 8 Oboe
others on Sulawesi were attacked by Catalinas and Liberators.
No 20 Squadron Catalinas mined Hong Kong harbour on the night of
1 June.
No 25 squadron, which had supported the lead up to Oboe One, did
not fly at all in May due to spares and maintenance problems; not
the least problem being the remoteness of Cunderdin and Corunna
Downs from facilities on the east coast of A~stralia.~~ In June,
the squadron resumed flying in support of the Labuan and Brunei
Bay landings.
1st TAF Beaufighters and Kittyhawks, flying from Sanga Sanga
started operating over North Borneo. Sanga Sanga had to be used
because Tarakan airfield was still not operable. Parking areas
had to be extended prior to Nos 22, 30 and 31 Beaufighter
Squadrons deploying to Sanga Sanga, which delayed operations.
On 3 June, six Beaufighters of No 30 Squadron strafed oil tanks
at Bangsal, oil derricks and buildings, while six Beaufighters
of No 22 Squadron attacked Brunei town, scoring direct hits on
buildings. No 76 Squadron, operating Beaufighters and
Kittyhawks, attacked re-inforcement routes near Jesselton. The
effect of these attacks could not be determined due to the heavy
jungle.
There should be little doubt that the preliminary air bombardment
that started on 3 May was successful and contributed to the
unopposed nature of the landings. A total of 507 sorties was
flown in the OA.~' Due to the unavailability of Tarakan and
37 This total comprised 208 B.24 Liberator sorties, 115 8.25 Mitchell sorties, 121 P.38 Lightning sorties, 24 Ventura sorties and 39 Beaufighter sorties. The Liberator sorties were flown by 13th AF and 1st TAF from Morotai and Samar; the Beaufighter sorties by the 1st TAF from Sanga Sanga airfield (southern Philippines); and the remainder by 13th AF aircraft from Puerta Princessa airfield on Palawan Island. See Oboe Six report, p.5, in Labuan Box File, RAAF Historical Section.
Labuan/Brunei Bay 7 9
delays in establishing RAAF Beaufighters at Sanga Sanga, a
'material loss of effort' was ~uffered;~' indeed, the
Beaufighters were not able to begin operations until 3 June.
The accuracy of the air bombardment during this phase can be
attested by the fact that piers and docks, which were restricted
targets, were not damaged, despite the destruction of targets in
their immediate vicinity.
Bombing attacks extended to Pelong Rock, Brunei Town and Weston
throughout May and on the 30th, the Tagai sawmill was extensively
damaged. On 5 June, the runway at Timbalai was hit by Liberators
(49 bombs hit the runway). Coastal defences at Brunei Bluff were
attacked on 6 June.
In the Miri-Seria area, the Miri airfield was attacked several
times, as was the township. Barracks and defences at Seria and
Lutong were hit and oil fires started in the refinery. Buildings
at Beaufort and Kuala Belait were destroyed. Four Beaufighters
destroyed a bridge over the Padas River on 4 June.
Attacks against airfields were not confined to the airstrips, but
also included attacks on personnel, supply areas and other
airfield facilities in the vicinity. Radar installations and
nearby towns were also attacked. RAAF Liberators and 13th AF
Liberators, Mitchells and Lightnings flew 948 sorties against
airfield targets. jg
Another 216 sorties4' were flown between 15 May and 11 June, with
attacks conducted against ships, docks and waterfront areas. The
See Oboe Six report, p.5.
This total comprised 635 Liberator sorties, 142 Mitchell sorties and 171 Lightning sorties. See Oboe Six report, p.5.
This total consisted of 171 Liberator sorties, seven Mitchell sorties, 28 Lightning sorties, eight Beaufighter sorties and two P.40 sorties.
80 Oboe
RAAF flew the Beaufighter and P.40 Kittyhawk sorties from Sanga
Sanga and 13th AF flew the Liberator, Mitchell and Lightning
sorties from Morotai and Palawan (Puerta prrincessa airfield).
RAAF Catalinas from Darwin flew two mine-laying sorties in the straits around Laoet Island.
Despite the difficulty in ascertaining the direct effects of
bombing Japanese reinforcement areas and concentration points,
the OA was not reinforced and thus the missions were deemed a
suc~ess.'~ The area from Miri to Kudat and east to Tawao was
also attacked. In all, 1,414 sorties were flown against Japanese
reinforcement routes.42
Pre-assault bombardment had been running from 3 May to 5 June.
From 5 June, the intensity of bombing increased substantially.
At the end of phase one, a total of 3,088 sorties had been
flown.
Phase Two (7-9 June)
The amphibious assaults were preceded by minesweeping operations
and air and naval bombardment from 7 June. Spotting for NGS was
provided by a Kingfisher and six Mitchells of 13th AF over the
Brunei area, while Beaufighters carried out similar duties over
Labuan.
41 The concentration of Japanese forces in Jesselton was of concern as it was felt they could threaten the capture of Labuan- Brunei Bay.
" 223 sorties by RAAF and 13th AF Liberators, 70 by RAAF Beaufighters and Kittyhawks, 95 sorties by USN Venturas under operational control of 13th AF, and 497 Mitchell and 529 Lightning sorties by 13th AF. The aircraft operated from Puerta Princessa (Palawan), Sanga Sanga, Morotai and Samar.
4 3 1,240 Liberator sorties, 761 Mitchell sorties, 849 Lightning sorties, 119 Ventura sorties, 69 Beaufighter sorties and 50 P.40 sorties. See Oboe Six report, p.6.
Labuan/Brunei B a y 81
During phase two, air operations were well-executed, and correct
reporting procedures were followed on all but two occasions.
Aircraft were to be equipped with standard Target Designator Grid
maps. On 7 June, the Liberator crews did not carry the standard
maps and had to report to CSA in latitude and longitude, which made co-ordination with NGS difficult. On the next day, 13th AF
Liberators bombed targets in the immediate vicinity of underwater
demolition teams. The aircraft failed to indicate their presence
and did not obtain CSA's permission to prosecute the attacks.
This was in direct contravention of standing orders (referred to
earlier by AVM Bostock). The after-action report indicates
'appropriate action has been taken to prevent a reoccurrence'.44
No 77 Wing Beaufighters provided on-call support over the OA: one
task was to cover the underwater demolition teams that were
clearing obstacles prior to the landing. The teams were working
within 100 metres of Japanese forces who were attacked
successfully by the beau fighter^.^^ The procedures for CSA to
call in Beaufighter strikes to support the underwater demolition
teams were not fully understood aboard the Advanced Headquarters
ship which wasted some of the air effort. On 9 June, during a
four-ship attack on Beaufort, No 30 Squadron lost a
~eauf ighter. 46
Fighter defence of the OA by 13th AF Lightnings from Palawan was
very good. Once the aircraft had been relieved on-station, they
strafed specific targets just prior to their departure from the
OA. In particular, barges and installations were attacked in
this manner.
The success of the Support Air Observers was such that the after-
action report remarked on their accuracy and their reliable
4 4 Oboe Six report, p. 7
" Odgers, p.469.
" ibid.
82 Oboe
reports, and commented that 'their presence in the area.....was
fully justified'." Their main tasks were to search for enemy
ground movement and forces, reconnoitre reinforcement and
withdrawal routes, search for enemybarges and suicide craft, and
direct fighter and strike aircraft that had been diverted from
previously briefed targets.
Phase Three (From 10 June)
Simultaneous landings were made on 10 June in the Muara-Brooketon
area using 20th Brigade (White Beach on Muara Island at 0915 and
Green Beach on Brunei Bluff at 0918) and on Labuan Island using
24th Brigade (Brown Beach, at 0914) ." The landings were
unopposed. In one author's words: 'There was no anti-aircraft
fire and almost no resistance to the landing barges'." 2/17
Battalion crossed the peninsula from Green Beach and captured
Yellow Beach at 1230.
The first air bombardment on assault day involved six 13th AF and
two RAAF squadrons of Liberators (seven aircraft from No 23
Squadron and seven aircraft from Nos 21/24 Squadrons). The
aircraft dropped anti-personnel bombs immediately behind the
beach-heads. The RAAF Liberators bombed from 7,000 feet, just
before 0800, with all bombs except three hitting their targets.50
Due to mechanical problems with the leading bomb aimer's
bombsight, one squadron was unable to bomb; however, once the
problem had been rectified, the squadron bombed an alternative
target. Another Liberator conducted pre-assault reconnaissance
of Brown Beach to determine the extent of enemy resistance - there was none on the beach.
" Oboe Six report, p.7
Keogh, p.452.
4 9 Nelmes, p.111.
Odgers, p.470.
Labuan/Brunei Bay 8 3
1st TAF Beaufighters and 13th AF Mitchells provided direct air
support over the Australian soldiers after the landings.
Aircraft maintained Combat Air Patrol (CAP) between 0800 and 1600
hours daily, in flights of six. The Beaufighters were relieved
every 90 minutes and the Mitchells every two hours.
While these aircraft had been tasked to provide Close Air Support
(CAIRS), the light opposition on the ground allowed the aircraft
to be redirected on to secondary targets. They were used (in
similar fashion to the Lightnings in phase two) to attack staging
points along the reinforcement routes. For example, No 31
Squadron Beaufighters attacked barracks and roads and a railway
bridge at Papar.
At no time did any aircraft leave the OA with unexpended bombs
or ammunition that had been allocated for use within the OA, as
had happened at Tarakan. In particular, the use of Beaufighters
resultedinthe destruction of railway bridges between Weston and
Papar River.
The six Beaufighters of No 77 Wing that maintained standing
patrols over Labuan on 10 June eliminated many pockets of
resistance and were praised by the Army for 'the accuracy,
effectiveness and co-operation of their workp."
The first RAM member ashore at Labuan was a safehand courier
(just nine minutes after the assault) and at 1015, a detachment
of No 5 Bomb Disposal Unit arrived to assist Army bomb disposal
section in 'delousing' operations on mines, booby traps and
bombs.
'l See briefing notes entitled 'Joint Operation - Brunei, Labuan', held as folio 64 in Labuan Box File. A hand-written comment indicates that General MacArthur attended the briefing.
84 Oboe
Air Vice Marshal-Bostock and Air Commodore Scherger were aboard
the USS Rocky Mount. Scherger, Murdoch and Duncani2 established
their command post on 10 June; the airstrip was secured that day
and repair work began the next day. Weather conditions were
ideal. The light opposition led the historian George Odgers to
say that 'merit of the assault lay more in its excellent
organisation than on the achievement of results against enemy
forces ' . 5 3
From 10 June, increasing numbers of aircraft were used for direct
support as ground forces met resistance on their inland march.
Some attacks were conducted within 100 metres of forward
positions of friendly forces, yet there were no casualties from
air attack during this period. Beaufighters and Mitchells on air
alert demonstrated the value of air power when closely
coordinated with the ground commander's plan.
During the first three days of the landings and subsequent
operations, Army Air Liaison Officers, flying in RAAF Liberators,
provided a description of the battle and continual updates on
enemy and allied force dispositions. For naval and air
bombardment requests, an overlay (known as a target overprint)
was used. It identified numbered squares around the Lutong area.
In all, 186 squares appeared on the map, which was issued as
Appendix D Part I1 to the 9 Division Operation Order of 17 June.
Air co-operation with PT boats was provided by 13th AF, through
the provision of fighter cover over the boats as they departed
the convoy and moved separately to the OA (0700-1800 on 9 June) . Then, on 11 June at 0800, a B.25 Mitchell rendezvoused with PT
boats two miles west of the entrance to Padas Bay for operations
on the eastern side of Brunei Bay. On 12 June, two B.25~
rendezvoused with PT boats that were operating at Gaya Bay and
j2 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Group Captain Murdoch was the Senior Air Staff Officer and Group Captain Duncan was the Senior Administrative Officer.
j3 Odgers, p.471.
Labuan/Brunei Bay 85
Jesselton (0800-1000). Anti-submarine patrols and weather
reconnaissance were also carried out by 13th AF.
Brunei town was captured on the evening of 13 June. Just over
a week later, 2/13 Battalion landed unopposed at Lutong and
occupied Miri. Several beachheads were secured subsequently at
Mempakul, Sabang and Kibidang in the move towards ~eaufort.'~ By
27 June, Beaufort had been captured by the Australians. Japanese
counter attacks were repulsed and from 6 July, the Australians
advanced northward, capturing Papar on the 12th.
Just before Miriwas captured by 2/13 Battalion, over 100 Indian
POWs were killed at Kuala Belait. Despite the capture of Miri,
the Japanese were not far away and after the general surrender
by Japan, another 28 civilian hostages, who were held just
outside Miri, were shot.55 Reports indicate that there were
still others who were executed. In fact, the Japanese were
forced to exhume the bodies and take them to Miri. Subsequently,
a day of public mourning took place, involving an Australian
Christian, a Moslem Haji, an Indian and a Chinese - such had been
the diverse nature of the hostages who were executed.56
Naval and air opposition was always expected to be minimal to
negligible, and on the ground, only 650 troops were expected on
Labuan. In addition, 1,550 ground troops were expected around
Seria and Miri, and 6,600 around ~esselton. '' These estimates
and predictions proved to be highly accurate. For example,
during the landings on 10 June, only one Japanese aircraft
interfered - dropping one bomb which missed a landing craft. One grim tale to emerge from Jesselton was that local Chinese had
" Keogh, p.454. Athol Moffitt, Project Kingfisher, Angus & Robertson,
NSW, Australia, 1989, p.141.
5 6 i b i d , p.28.
Keogh, p.447.
86 Oboe
caused the death of 40 Japanese troops just outside Jesselton.
Some 1,000 local inhabitants, including women and children, were
subsequently massacred in retaliati~n.~'
From an air operation5 point of view, the assault on Brown Beach
was critical so that the nearby airfield could be captured, which
it was by the evening of the assault. Facilities were to be
established at the air£ ield by 16 June for two fighter squadrons.
By the time troops reached Seria on 19 June, the Japanese had
fired the oilfields. Thirty-one individual fires were counted.
Muara Island and Brooketon were captured on the 10th. On 11
June, six Beaufighters attacked enemy tunnels, while two others
collided and crashed just off Sanga Sanga - only one aiman was rescued from the sea. A Liberator of No 22 Squadron crashed on
take-off from Sanga Sanga and a Beaufort, tasked with DDT
spraying at Brunei Bay, also crashed. The DDT-spraying mission
was successfully carried out by three other Beauforts (of No 9
LASU) .
With the invasion of Balikpapan drawing near, 13th AF Lightnings
had to deploy to Sanga Sanga. Thus, three days into Oboe Six,
No 77 Wing Beaufighters and No 76 Squadron Kittyhawks had to move
to Morotai to make room for the Lightnings. The RAAF aircraft
were supposed to move to Tarakan, but it was still not ready.
As a consequence, CAIRS had to be provided by 13th AF aircraft
from Palawan Island during the fourth day. One aspect of the
13th AF provision of CAIRS was that the aircraft remained on
ground alert at Palawan until requested by CSA to prosecute a
strike. 59
On 17 June, No 76 Squadron aircraft landed at Labuan and began
Moffitt, p.22
Puerta Princessa airfield on Palawan Island was approximately 670 kilometres from Labuan.
Labuan/Brunei Bay 8 7
operations the next day. The two aircraft destroyed two enemy
aircraft on the ground at Keningau.=' Twelve Spitfires of No 457
Squadron left Morotai on 17 June, refuelled at Zamboanga and
landed at Palawan. They landed at Labuan the next day, with two
crashing on the rough strip. The remaining aircraft began
operations on 19 June, the same day that the Austers flew to
assist Army operations at Labuan, Weston and Beaufort.
Japanese aircraft approached Labuan on the nights of 13-14 and
14-15 June, and both were shot down, one in air-to-air combat (by
an American night fighter) and one by AA guns. On 20 June, two
Spitfires of No 457 Squadron engaged in the squadron's first air
combat since 1943, and shot down a Dinah, east of Labuan.=' The
Dinah was a Mitsubishi Ki-46 Type 100 Command Reconnaissance
aircraft. 62
A ground counter-attack on 20 June cost 20 Australian lives, but
the enemy lost 90 dead and one prisoner of war. The Japanese-
held defensive position was over-run on the next day and Labuan
Island was in Australian hands.63 Some 20 Japanese aircraft were
captured at ~abuan . 6 4
On Labuan, the Japanese occupied bunkers, trenches and tunnels
in a heavy jungle area and along a ridge. On 16 June, the
positions were attacked heavily by air, naval and artillery
bombardment. This continued on 17 and 18 June, until the 19th
when Mitchell bombers in low-level attacks dropped Napalm and
60 Odgers, p.472.
ibid.
John Bennett, Defeat to Victory: No 453 Squadron RAAF, RAAF Museum, Point Cook, Victoria, 1994, p.152.
63 The Japanese position had been heavily attacked from 16 June by artillery, naval gunfire, and Mitchell bombers operating from low-level.
64 PRO, Air 40/1761 - RAAF Command Intelligence Summary No 23 of July 7, 1945.
88 Oboe
500-lb High Explosive bombs. That night the enemy staged a
break-out from their defensive positions, and mounted several
suicide attacks. Before dawn on 21 June, 100 Japanese, each with
an already-fused aerial bomb, made their way towards the airfield
and beach areas. Several skirmishes resulted, but all Japanese
were either killed or captured by 0730, and by 1300 the remainder
of the Japanese in the defensive pocket were routed. In the
skirmishes at the airfield and on the beach, 14 allied personnel
were killed and 24 wounded. The enemy lost 49 killed and one
wounded. In the ensuing fight in the defensive pocket, another
90 Japanese were killed.
The landing at Lutong was made on the 23rd, and Miri field was
captured that day. No 4 Squadron Wirraways had deployed to
Labuan that same day and provided tactical reconnaissance, while
Labuan Kittyhawks and Spitfires covered the Lutong landing. No
82 Squadron began operations from Labuan on 26 June, providing
CAIRS; the same day that a Kittyhawk from No 76 Squadron was lost
during a successful attack against a fuel dump and camouflaged
huts at Keningau airfield. On 29 June, No 76 Squadron Kittyhawks
again atacked the airfield and destroyed a Dinah, with its crew
on-board.
In the attack on Lutong, certain targets were prohibited from
being attacked from the air. They included the Lutong oil
refinery, the bridge over Miri River, wharves, public utilities,
hospitals, churches and mosques. Additionally, the beaches were
not to be rater red.^^
From 21-30 June, No 76 Wing flew 40 sorties over eastern Java and
southern Sulawesi to neutralise the airfields within striking
distance of Balik~apan.~~ Five Catalinas from No 11 Squadron
were attached to the wing to assist. 'From 19 to 25 June, 82
65 See 9 Australian Division Operation Order 4 dated 17 June 45, held RAAF Historical Section.
Odgers, p.476.
Labuan/Brunei Bay 89
Wing [Liberators] dropped some 120 tonnes of bombs on Balikpapan
and environs, destroying oil facilities and anti-aircraft
emplacements. Then the attacks were stepped up even more,
heavily fortified coastal areas being hit particularly
No 25 Squadron prosecuted a daylight attack against Malang on 29 June. The nine Liberators flew from Corunna Downs, Western
Australia at 0800 hours and bombed the airfield at 1422. The
next night, six Liberators from the squadron attacked Tanjong
IPerak airfield near Surabaya. The squadron attacked again on 22
July - this time the shipbuilding and harbour installations at Semarang in Central Java were targeted. This attack involved
nine Liberators, flying from Learmonth, Western Australia. The
aircraft attacked in threes, with the first two formations
scoring excellent hits and two out of three aircraft of the
remaining formation hitting their targets.=' That evening, No 76
Wing Catalinas attacked Semarang. They flew from Darwin,
refuelled at Broome and bombed the Semarang dock area and
shipbuilding yards. Five aircraft found the target, and a sixth
attacked an alternati~e.~~
All aircraft of No 82 Wing joined 1st TAF by July, as did Nos 2
and 18 Squadron Mitchells of No 79 Wing. There was little left
of NWA Command and No 1 Wing Spitfire pilots flew infrequently
because of a scarcity of aircraft.
No 85 Wing was formed and was intended to replace No 82 Wing at
NWA. Nos 12 and 99 Liberator Squadrons were to be formed. These
squadrons and No 82 Wing were supposed to neutralise all Japanese
bases in NEI, with No 82 Wing eventually being based at
67 Nelmes, p.113.
Odgers, p.474.
ibid, p.476.
90 Oboe
Balikpapan."
No 77 Squadron aircraft arrived at Labuan on 30 June and began
operations on 3 July against Keningau. That day, Kittyhawks
(from Nos 77 and 82 Squadrons) and Spitfires (from No 457
Squadron) strafed and bombed Sapong. From 4-6 July, Kittyhawks,
Spitfires, Wirraways and Austers (of No 81 Wing) flew 230 sorties
in covering 9th Division. A succesful ASR was carried out by a
Catalina on 7 July, to rescue a downed Kittyhawk pilot who had
been shot down the day before." On 13 July, No 76 Squadron
Kittyhawks attacked the Riam road and Tengoa River areas - losing
their second pilot since arriving at Labuan.
No 86 (Attack) Wing was due to arrive at Labuan on 25 June, but
the first aircraft did not arrive until 23 July, when the
lengthening of the airstrip was completed, to cater for the
Wing's Mosquitoes. The Wing's two squadrons were to fly rocket,
bombing and strafing attacks. No 1 Squadron Mosquitoes had been
trained in low-level intruder work and only took part in one
operation before the war ended. No 93 Squadron Beaufighters took
part in only two operations. No 93 Squadron aircraft prosecuted
rocket attacks against craft at the mouth of the Tabuan River on
7 August; however, one aircraft was 10st.'~
The extensive nature of the air effort after 10 June can be
ascertained through the following statistics. On 11 June alone,
66 Lightnings, six Venturas, 14 Liberators, 18 Mitchells and 30
Beaufighters attacked Oboe Six targets. On the next day, 24
Mitchells and 36 Beaufighters prosecuted attacks. These attacks
'O These squadrons were promised by General Kenney to Lord Louis Mountbatten for the recapture of Singapore - see General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Paci f ic W a r , reprinted by Office of Air Force History, USAF, Washington, D.C., 1987, p.564.
'l Odgers, pp.473-474.
7z The two crew members found their way to safety on 20 August. For further comments on Beaufighter operations, see Chaz Bowyer, Beaufighter a t W a r , Ian Allan Ltd, UK, 1976.
LabuadBrunei Bay 9 1
continued until 20 June, with Kittyhawks being used from the 18th
and Spitfires from the 19th.'3
The bombing results contained within the Labuan files indicate
extensive attacks being prosecuted in the following areas:
Balikpapan, Manggar, Sepinggan, Oelin, Batavia (float plane
base), Balang (float plane base), North Borneo, North West
Borneo, Southern Borneo, Kotawaringin, Laoet Island,
13andjermasin, East Coast Borneo, Brunei Bay, Southern Sulawesi,
Mandai, Bingkalapa, Northern Sulawesi, Itu Aba, Kangean,
Xeningau, Pensingan, Kota Bardoe, Kuching, Kudat, Langkon, Lawas,
Limbung, Macassar, Macassar Strait, Miri, Seria, Muara,
Pontianak, Labuan Island, Ranau, Tenom, Singapore, Java, and
Flores Islands.
Many raids were highly successful. As an example, the raid
against Bingkalapa resulted in 88% of bombs on target - a
pleasing result considering the lack of bombing practice by the
crews involved, particularly as they had only recently moved to
Liberators."
No 79 Squadron flew 290 sortie^'^ during June over Halmahera against small watercraft, including barges, small ships, canoes
and prahus. RAAF and 13th AF Liberators, and Beaufighters joined
in these attacks in July and August. No 79 Squadron Spitfires
destroyed Japanese bombers on Lolobata airfield on 30 and 31
July. The squadron continued its attacks over Halmahera each day
until RARF Command terminated operations on 14 August.
On 8 August, No 82 Squadron Kittyhawks destroyed three O~cars'~
" Compiled from the Oboe Six report.
Nelmes, p. 109.
'5 Compiled from the Oboe Six report.
" The Oscar was a Mitsubishi Ki-43 Type 1 Fighter. See John Bennett, p.152.
9 2 Oboe
that were preparing to take-off from Kuching airfield. Kuching
was 750 kilometres from Labuan and the Kittyhawks were airborne
for four hours forty minutes, exceeding the accepted sortie
duration time." That day, No 1 Squadron Mosquitoes strafed
barges and barracks near Kuching, but lost an aircraft, with both
aircrew killed.
Air Observation
Six AusterS of No 16 AOP were with the main convoy - the
intention being to assemble them on the beach at Labuan, for
immediate operations. They were on the beach by 1800 that first
night. Work began on a temporary strip about 400 metres from the
beach and the aircraft were assembled by 1600 on 11 June.
Unfortunately, the 2/7th Field Company engineers were given a
higher priority task than making ready an airstrip. They had to
repair road surfaces that had been destroyed by retreating
Japanese troops. Yet, the Army engineers were still able to
prepare the strip rapidly and at 1440 on 12 June, the first
Auster took-off.
Three RAAF personnel accompanied the assault forces at Muara
Island to conduct a ground reconnaissance for an airstrip.
However, the overwhelming success of the Army in its advance to
Brooketon, negated that and a site was selected and prepared at
Brooketon instead. (It was ready on 11 June, after only 1 1/2
hours work). Austers began operations from Brooketon on the
13th.
On 17 June, the Brunei strip was ready and the two Labuan Austers
that were operating from Brooketon were moved to Brunei.
" Odgers, p.475.
Labuan/Brunei Bay 9 3
Photography
In terms of the photographic flying and production undertaken by
13th AF, some effort was wasted due to insufficient background
information for mission planning. Consequently, an Air Liaison
Officer was established at 13th AF to interpret Army
requirements; after this, the system proved most satisfactory.
In total, 42,672 basic prints and 10,628 reprints were produced
for Oboe Six.la
Detailed air support photographs were not used for simplicity
reasons. Maps to the scale 1 in 25,000 and 1 in 50,000 annotated
with the standard Target Designator Grid proved entirely
satisfactory.
No 2 Airfield Defence Squadron
All RAW units were responsible for their own internal security
and defence against enemy attack or sabotage, and to implement
passive defence measures. No 2 AFDS was responsible specifically
for: guarding RAAF aircraft and vital installations;
supplementary airstrip defence in co-ordination with Army
elements; close protection of radar stations in co-ordination
with Army elements; defence of ACS units employed on survey, soil
testing or road building; and defence of Headquarters 1st TAF.
No 200 Flight
No 200 Flight was formed on 20 February 1945 with Liberators, and
flew its first operations from Mindoro (the Philippines) on 18
March - a reconnaissance mission. Two attempts to carry out an
operational insertion were stalled due to bad weather, but on 24
March, two aircraft successfully dropped Z Special Unit forces
'' Oboe Six report, p.15.
94 Oboe
near Bario, north-east of Brunei Bay. One of the aircraft was
lost, presumably during an attack on an enemy ship. This, and
subsequent missions enabled Z Special forces to arm the local
Kelabit populace who proved successful in driving the Japanese
out. 'g
Army/air force coopexation was fundamental to the success of
these and resupply drop missions. Problems experienced were in
the poor quality maps used and in the level of support from 1st
TAF at ~orotai." Two other 200 Flight Liberators were lost - one on 17 May (over Timor) and the other about four days later
(over North Borneo).81
AIR SUPPORT ORGANISATION
The experience of Tarakan had demonstrated the lack of mobility
of ASPS to operate with Battalions. Hence, ALPS were formed, to
accompany the Battalions and to communicate with the Brigade ASP.
Each ALP comprised one NCO and two Other Ranks, with one VHF pack
set and one H/F pack set.
The ASS was allocated to the 1st TAF control post, two ASPS (Nos
1 and 2) were allocated to 24th and 20th Brigades respectively,
and four ALPS (Nos l to 4) were allocated to the infantry battalions - 2/28, 2/43, 2/17 and 2/15 respectively.
Officers-in-charge of ASPS would examine all requests for air
support to ensure the target description was clear, bomblines
were identified, and position of own troops, air-ground signals,
and time-on-target were included. The ASS controlled all direct
support, courier, photographic, air observer and ASR aircraft.
Nelmes, pp.131-132.
ibid, p. 132.
ibid.
L a b u a n / B r u n e i B a y 9 5
Air support requests followed the standard formatsZ and a target
I bombline was always included in the request. Fluorescent panels
were not used to indicate bomblines, but yellow fluorescent
panels were used to indicate the forward position of Australian
troops. This was to prevent any confusion previously associated
with complex marking arrangements.
For the Lutong landing, air support was organised differently.
One ASP was included in the order of battle of 2/13th Battalion.
Air alert aircraft reported to ASS Labuan when 50 miles (80
kilometres) from the OA and were handed over to the 2/13 ASP.
The ASP directed aircraft on to targets as ordered by the
Battalion Commander. Air alert aircraft which were not tasked
by the ASP during the specified air alert period reverted to
control of ASS Labuan. Any air alert aircraft that were not used
by the 2/13th during the air alert period were allotted secondary
targets by 9 Division. 2/13 Battalion had to be asked not to
request air support and NGS simultaneously.
Air Support Requests
Requests for air support were originated at Battalion level and
passed by the ALP to the Headquarters ship prior to the
establishment of ASPS ashore. Any requests that originated below
Battalion level were passed to Battalion headquarters through
Army signals channels. Once the ASPS were established, the
requests were directed through them, and they liaised with CSA
until the ASS was established within the 1st TAF Command Post
(CP). The plan was for the ASS and a Mobile Telecommunications
Unit (MTU) to be established quickly and to assume control for
all support requests. Although the ASS was established on time,
the MTU was not sufficiently mobile; consequently establishment
of control over the land-based air support net was delayed.
See Chapter 2.
9 6 Oboe
The ALPS proved to be a welcome addition; although calls were
still made for more mobility in the ASPS, to allow them to become
established more quickly. The ALPS kept the Headquarters ship
informed of progress of the land battle and passed, without
problem, requests for support and instructions for control.
System of Control
Labuan is 40 kilometres to the north of the Brunei area. Because
of distances involved, two sectors had to be established and
control had to be exercised separately until 1st TAF CP was
established on Labuan. Transfer of direct air support control
(afloat) to control (ashore) occurred as follows:
* RAAF formation leaders reported initially to CSA (Afloat,
Northern Sector - aboard USS Rocky Mount) and 13th AF
formation leaders reported to CSA (Afloat, Southern Sector
- aboard USS Nashville).
* CSA (Afloat, Northern Sector) could exercise control of all
direct air support formations in the OA if necessary for
co-ordination purposes.
* CSAs (Ashore) moved from the two Headquarters ships to the
two ASPS once the ASPS became operative within the two
Brigades.
* CSAs (Ashore) notified their respective ships that they
were ready and direct control then passed ashore; although
co-ordinating control still remained with CSA (Afloat,
Northern Sector).
* Once ready, AOC 1st TAF assumed control of all direct air
support aircraft in the OA, co-ordinating control passed to
CSA (Ashore), within 1st TAF CP; and the two CSAs
established within the ASPS were withdrawn.
Labuan/Brunei Bay 9 7
Advanced Headquarters RAAF Command (Morotai) allocated targets
to 13th AF and 1st TAF as necessary. The initial targets were
prescribed and included, on Labuan Island: Japanese defensive
positions, all buildings in the town area, enemy defences that
could enfilade the landing beaches, the airstrip, and radar sites
and coastal defence guns which could interfere with shipping.
In the Brunei-Brunei Bluff-Muara Island area, the following
targets were designated: naval stores and installations,
including all buildings and any underground storage facilities;
coastal defence installations and any high ground defences; and
all buildings in the Brooketon town area. In addition, napalm
and anti-personnel bomb attacks were prosecuted on the Brooketon
beach-head area.
Before 1st TAF CP was established, the two sectors still had a
dedicated communications channel (referred to as Inter-Commander
Support Aeroplanes) to provide co-ordination between the two
Headquarters ships. The channel malfunctioned and close co-
ordination was always difficult until the CP began operating.
After the assault landings, all ALPS established communications
within 22 minutes (with the first communicating within only seven
minutes). Notwithstanding the co-ordination problem mentioned
above, the Headquarters ships exercised satisfactory control of
all strikes until the ASPS took over. The ASP with 24th Brigade
landed at D+2 hours and established full communications just two
hours later.83
There was always going to be a delay with the ASP attached to
20th Brigade, due to the need to off-load vehicles on Muara
Island for transshipment to Brooketon. The ASP did not land
until 1700 on the loth, due to problems with the LST (first, the
anchor jammed in coral and second, the LST became grounded on a
sandbank). Consequently, the Air Support Officer established a
24th Brigade landed at Brown Beach on Labuan Island at 0914 hours.
98 Oboe
limited capability to link the ALPS with the USS Nashville
(Headquarters ship Southern Sector). The ASP finally reached
Brigade Headquarters at 1600 on 11 June, and was fully operable
by dawn on the following day.
Meanwhile, the ASS accompaniedthe Divisional Headquarters ashore
at 1730 on 10 June and became operable by 0730 hours the next day
- almost 24 hours ahead of the ASP in the southern sector. Due
to several relocations of the Divisional Headquarters and
consequent moves by the ASS, the ASS had to close down most of
its circuits and was not re-established until 1700 hours that
day. Consequently, control was not passed ashore until 1100
hours on 12 June.
Previous problems that had been encountered with cyphers occurred
again. Out of date publications were used in the USS Rocky Mount
and lack of familiarity of some personnel with the cyphers caused
considerable delays initially.
Due to the problems experienced by one ASP in becoming
established (as discussed above), the value of ALPS for immediate
operations was clearly demonstrated. The mobility of the ALPS
and indeed the redundancy that they afforded the overall system
was a valuable observation for the future.
The success of the Command Post notwithstanding, there was an
obvious lesson for future operations. Because frequent moves of
the CP may be a regular feature of operations, such as Labuan,
the ASS would need to adopt different procedures. The ASS,
having set up in the first location, should remain in operation
until the CP and air support communications could be re-
established in the new location. In other words, half of the ASS
could remain and maintain land line communications with the CP
and the other half of the ASS until they became re-established.
Then the first half of the ASS could join the CP. At Labuan, the
CP also established communications with Headquarters 1st TAF at
Morotai .
Labuan/Brunei Bay 99
There was an RAAF concern that not all personnel involved in air
support operations understoodthe necessity of ALPS, ASPS and the
ASS providing communications to ensure support. The concern was
summarised quite dramatically as: 'Those concerned should bear
in mind that a decision to delay movement of any part of the Air
Support organisation is tantamount to a decision to do without
Direct Air Support during the period that the Air Support
organisation is inoperativer."
Similar concerns arose over the delays experienced by No 111
MFCU, with the recommendation that 'The establishment of Fighter
Control facilities ashore is a matter of urgency and the
equipment of the Mobile Fighter Control Unit must be given
priority to permit rapid movement when ashore'."
One clear breakdown was in the indication of targets. Support
Air Observers (SAOs) were able to recognise targets nominated by
CSA, but attack aircraft sometimes had difficulty. The SAOs
complained that they should have been able to communicate with
the attack aircraft to relay more accurate instructions and
corrections for a second run. Procedurally, it was relatively
straightforward for the SAOs to do just that, but they did not
know that at the time. The SAOs simply needed to obtain approval
from CSA to change frequency to the Support Air Direction
frequency, and they would have been in direct R/T communication
with the attack aircraft.
Transmissionwith CSASouthexperienced considerable interference
at night, leading to the conclusion tha.t a separate night
frequency was needed for long-range transmission.
Oboe Six report, p.14.
ibid, p.15.
100 Oboe
Eighteen strikes were directed in four days (10-13 June) by the
Air Support ~rganisation.'~ The Beaufighters proved to be highly
accurate and exercised great care in identifying the target. The
Commander of 24 Brigade passed on his personal thanks to the CO
and pilots of No 22 Squadron for their CAIRS efforts."
TAF CP
Ten personnel made up the Command Post Party, and once ashore
moved several times until a site was allocated. As other units
moved in, the CP site became too congested for any expansion or
use of radio. Equipment had not arrived and the ASS was not
landed until 1730 on 10 June. Thus, communications with USS
Rocky Mount were not established until the next day. That same
day, the CP/ASS moved to a more suitable site; unfortunately the
site was approximately one and a half kilometres from 9 Division
Headquarters. This meant that delays were experienced in
obtaining divisional decisions on requests for air support and
advice to Division Headquarters was delayed by up to several
hours.
Senior staff officers of the CP were allocated personal call-
signs which improved the responsiveness of the command and
control system considerably. Lack of such call-signs had posed
problems during Oboe One.
Recommendations that flowed from the Labuan experience were:"
* A vehicle should accompany the CP team, so that the
The breakdown was four on 10 June, six on 11 June, six on 12 June and two on 13 June.
'' See Report from No 1 ASP, appended to the overall ASS Report on Labuan, held as folio 3 in Labuan Box File, RAAF Historical Section.
See 'Oboe Six Operations: TAF Command Post', folio 39 of Labuan Box File.
Labuan/Brunei Bay 101
reconnaissance party could establish a site immediately
after landing. l
* Additional organic transportation was required to move all l the necessary equipment.
* Non-immediate personal gear should be carried in follow-up
vehicles.
Army and RAAF Headquarters should be located adjacent to
one another.
FIGBTER CONTROL ORGANISATION
1st TAF Routine Order No 10 of 20 June 45 called for reports on
the move to Labuan." Confusion was experienced during loading,
caused by a lack of knowledge by Army loading authorities of the
nature of the MFCU equipment. While No 9 Transportation and
Movements Office (TMO) provided the loading orders as directed,
some instructions were changed by the loading officer, which
resulted in confusion and delays for the MFCU. For example, the
loading officer ordered some equipment, which he considered to
be non-essential, to be left at Morotai for a follow-up convoy.
His argument was that it exceeded the limit of tonnage; however,
the limit approved by No 9 TMO was sufficient to cover all of No
111 MFCU's equipment.
Some of the equipment left behind consisted of transit cases for
radar, transmitting and other technical gear. This gear had been
'mobile-loaded' for the beach assault. However, if necessary,
the gear could be packed in the transit cases and floated ashore;
thus, the gear could be protectively packed if necessary.
See Report entitled 'Oboe Six Operation', by CO No 111 MFCU to HQ 1st TAF Command Post at Labuan, on 1 July 45. Copy held as folio 74 in Labuan Box File, RAAF Historical Section.
102 Oboe
Similarly, the gear could be protected from the weather until it
became operational. As a consequence of the transit cases being
left at Morotai, some technical gear did deterioriate at Labuan
due to exposure to weather and contact with salt water.
Another annoying point: was that all equipment had been sorted and
forwarded for loading in a specific order. Not only did the
loading operation fail to maintain the order, but during the
offloading, further mixing occurred. Moreover, some of the
fragile equipment was damaged. The recommendation from No 111
MFCU was that unit personnel should be responsible for loading
and unloading their own equipment.
Despite equipment shortages and delays in setting up at the
allocated site (due to a battery of field guns temporarily
occupying the MFCU site), the MFCU became operational in 'what
was regarded as record time'." However, the unit was forced to
move several times before a permanent site was established.
No 111 MFCU used five lightweight air warning radar stations
(LW/AW) and two lightweight ground control intercept (LW/GCI)
radar stations and wireless observer posts (WOP). Initially, in
order to be operable 16 hours after the landings, one LW/AW was
set up at the Labuan beach-head and one at the Brooketon beach-
head, with one LW/GCI set up at Labuan for fighter control.
Different blocks of target numbers were allocated to each MFCU
to avoid confusion throughout the entire Oboe series. For
example, No 114 MFCU used 300-349; No 111 MFCU used 450-499.
No 4 Radio Installation and Maintenance Unit (RIMU) installed an
AN/APN-2 Interrogator in the control tower once Labuan airfield
became operational, and calibrated the LW/GCI station and the
LW/AW stations.
ibid, p.2.
Labuan/Brunei Bay 103
Deception
False plots were sent for all operational flights, to confuse the
enemy. They were identical to true plots except for the suffix
M ' . Pre-flight details of all operational flights were
contained in 'Frag' messages, sent to the relevant MFCU or
fighter control centre, and at the time of take-off, false plots
would be sent. A 'Frag' message is a partial or fragmentary
order from the 24-hour tasking schedule. The tasking schedule
itself provides all the details of one day's air operations.
Fighter Operations
The Plan for fighter operations was as follows:
* Fighter cover was to be provided by 1st TAF for convoys
between Morotai and 125 degrees East and between 123
degrees East and 117 degrees 30 minutes East.
* Fighter cover was to be provided by 13th AF for convoys
between 125 degrees East and 123 degrees East and between
117 degrees 30 minutes East and the OA. Four fighters were
to be on-station between 0730 and 1800 daily.
* Dawn and dusk cover was to be provided by two 1st TAF
nightfighters for convoys between Morotai and 127 degrees
East. Aircraft were to be on-station between 0600 and 0730
and between 1800 and 1900.
* Dawn and dusk cover was to be provided by 13th AF for
convoys between 127 degrees East and the OA. Aircraft
were to be on-station between 0600 and 0730 and between
1800 and 2000.
* Fighter cover was to be provided by four 13th AF fighters
on constant air alert over the OA from 0730 to 1730 daily
104 Oboe
from 7 June until relieved by 1st TAF (expected to be on 16
June ) .
* Dawn and dusk cover was to be provided over the OA by two
13th AF nightfighters during the periods 0600-0730 and
1730-2000 daily from 7 June until relieved by 1st TAF
(expected to be on the 16th).
* Fighter cover was to be provided by 13th AF for all P/T
boats operating in Brunei Bay from 9 June onwards.
Conduct of Fighter Operations
Convoy cover was good; although bad weather prevented fighters
from reaching the convoy on two days, but the 13th AF P.61 Black
Widow nightfighters were on-station according to plan. Fighter
cover over the OA was effective, but 13th AF had to provide more
than planned due to the airfield problems being experienced by
1st TAF (inoperability of Tarakan and forced move from Tawi Tawi
and Sanga Sanga to Morotai).
On the first day of convoy cover operations, 1st TAF
nightfighters left at 1835 without reason, despite the
requirement to provide cover until 1900. On the following
morning, dawn cover was provided 20 minutes late. One report
indicates that bad weather then prevented 1st TAF aircraft from
reaching the convoy to provide cover on subsequent occasions.
The after-action report indicates that the unit commander
considered that the operation would expose his Spitfires to
unwarranted operational hazards, and on his own initiative
disobeyed the Operations Instruction. The after-action report
stated that: 'This instance of ignorance of the fundamental
principles of discipline on the part of a senior officer is
inexcusable' . 91
Oboe Six report, p.13.
Labuan/Brunei Bay 105
The time available in the OA for 13th AF to neutralise enemy
defences was limited; yet, all specified targets were
neutralised.
No 81 Wing was allotted responsibility for the air defence of the
Brunei Bay area from 16 June. No 111 MFCU was responsible for
issuing airraidwarnings, allocating responsibilities to air and
ground defences, and controlling fighters until visual contact
with enemy aircraft (E/A) was made. The MFCU controller had the
responsibility of co-ordinating all air and ground defences
during daylight. At night, ground defences were permitted
unrestricted attack against E/A until 'mid-point' was reached,
after which RAAF night fighters could inter~ept.'~ If RAAF
aircraft were unable to reach E/A in time, they would advise No
111 MFCU which would then advise ground defences to maintain
their attack.
Navigation Radio Aids
?'he following navigation radio aids were used - a high frequency direction finding (H/F D/F) station was installed by 24 June; a
medium frequency homing beacon was installed by 16 June; a VHF
homer was installed and operated by No 111 MFCU, and was linked
to the Base Operations room; and an ASV Beacon was installed by
NO 4 RIMU at the radar station, and replaced later by a similar
beacon in the control tower.
'Mid-point' was a geographical position determined by 15 June which was used as a datum for co-ordinating air and ground defences.
" The RARF call was 'NO GO'. In cases where pilots suffered from the searchlights below, they used the call 'BLACKOUT' to cause the lights to be switched off.
106 Oboe
Identification Friend or Foe
As a matter of standard operating procedures, IFF had to be
switched on prior to take-off and left on continuously during
flight. For additional safety, aircrew had to physically check
that the IFF was on, when 250 kilometres from Labuan.
ADMINISTRATION
Communications for co-ordinating MTB and aircraft action against
enemy shipping, as well as communications and radar on
Headquarters ships and fighter director ships, had to be
established. Similarly, communications had to be established for
fighter control, air warning, navigation radio aids, CAIRS and
command purposes. Also, an interlinked system of communications
had to be established for air warning, weather, coastwatch,
intelligence and guerilla forces.g4
It was important for communications systems to provide adequate
warning of the approach of enemy aircraft, as well as any
movement of enemy surface forces. In addition, communications
systems allowed other intelligence on the enemy to be received
and distributed.
The Operations Order detailed the requirement for signals
security with strict guidelines on wireless silence, use of unit
address signs, and use of telephones and R/T channels. The enemy
was expected to jam radio circuits, transmit false and deceptive
messages, and to use electronic jammers and 'window' ."
9 ~ p e c i f i c details are contained in Appendix C to Operations Order 1/45.
95 Window or chaff are thin metal strips which, when deployed from an aircraft, scatter and produce radar returns which can obscure the aircraft's return and confuse the enemy.
Labuan/Brunei Bay 107
Authentication and cipher systems were used and a plan for
jamming and deception of the enemy was developed.
Personnel
The briefing of personnel prior to embarkation was much-improved
over previous operations. Personnel had a better understanding
of their functions ashore; although there were still several
written complaints.
By the end of June, 1st TAF included 21,893 personnel, with
another 3,134 (mostly from No 82 Wing) joining in July; although
4,381 were to leave the Command that month, some 700 on
completion of tours of duty.96
Medical
No 24 Medical Clearing Station (MCS) landed at Labuan on 12 June.
In this instance, all unit personnel and their equipment were on
the one ship. Some No 24 MCS equipment was stolen despite clear
markings, and on the night prior to embarkation, the unit had to
sleep in the open in mud.9'
No 22 MCS reported accepting patients within two hours of
landing, and receiving casualties who required surgery, within
24 hours (that is, they were fully operational within 24 hours).
Procedures for evacuating casualties involved backloading on
C.47~ to Morotai - usually evacuating sick and wounded within 24
hours of request.
96 Odgers, p.477.
'' See file 4/5/Air dated 27 June 45, held as folio 73 in Eabuan Box File, RAAF Historical Section.
108 Oboe
Logistics
Units deployed with sufficient breathing oxygen, technical and
non-technical equipment to last 30 days. Responsibility for
providing domestic stores such as rations, water, POL and
aviation fuel was clearly delineated in administrative
instructions accompanying all operations instructions. In
addition, 15 days' initial supply of aviation fuel and 30 days'
supply of aviation oils were shipped to Labuan in the assault
convoy. Similarly, 30 days' requirements of M/T POL, range fuel,
lighting and power kerosene were shipped to the OA. Thirty days'
requirements were also taken for bombs, ammunition, pyrotechnics,
and explosives. The RAAF carried non-common stores, operated
bulk fuel installations at airfields and stored and maintained
drummed aviation fuel. Furthermore, clear instructions were
given to the effect that units were to sort equipment for loading
and to follow directives from No 9 TMO."
Movements
As an indication of the numbers of RAAF units involved throughout
the Oboe operations, the following extract is provided for Oboe
Six - RAAF units that deployed to ~abuan:" Similar numbers
deployed to Tarakan and Balikpapan, but this level of detail is
not provided in the other chapters.
- Headquarters let TAF (less Advanced Headquarters at
Tarakan), with 237 personnel.
- No 13 General Reconnaissance Bomber Squadron (Ventura) from
Gove, with 333 personnel.
See 1st TAF Administrative Instruction No 9 dated 14 April 1945, p.7.
Taken from Appendix E to Operation Instruction 98/1945.
Labuan/Brunei Bay 109
No 113 ASR flight (less detachments at Tarakan and Morotai
for Oboe Two), with 109 personnel.
No 4 Radio Installation and Maintenance Unit (less
detachments at Tarakan and Morotai for Oboe Two), with 156
personnel.
1st TAF Teleconununications Unit (less detachments at
Tarakan and Morotai for Oboe Two), with 257 personnel.
No 2 Malaria Control Unit (less a detachment at Tarakan),
with 30 personnel.
No 11 Postal Unit detachment, with 14 personnel.
No 9 Transportation and Movements Office (detachment), with
62 personnel.
Service Police detachment with 11 personnel.
No 2 Airfield Defence Squadron (less detachments at
Morotai, and at Tarakan and Morotai for Oboe Two), with 356
personnel.
Air support group of one ASP and two ALPS, with 40
personnel.
A similar air support group from Brisbane, with 40
personnel.
No 1 Australian Air Formation Signals Unit (less a
detachment at Tarakan), with 189 personnel.
- No 10 Replenishing Centre (less a detachment at Tarakan),
with 76 personnel.
- No 47 Operational Base Unit with 259 personnel.
110 Oboe
- No 5 Medical Receiving Station with 80 personnel.
- No 81 Wing with the following:
-- a Wing Headquarters with 52 personnel,
-- No 76 Squadron (Kittyhawk) (272 personnel),
-- No 77 Squadron (Kittyhawk) (272),
-- No 82 Squadron (Kittyhawk) (272),
-- No 24 Medical Clearing Section (32),
-- No 22 Repair and Servicing Unit (384),
-- No 25 Air Stores Park (El),
-- No 457 Squadron (Spitfire) (261),
-- No 9 RSU detachment (30),
-- No 111 MFCU (290),
-- Nos 163 and 166 Radar Stations (each with 31
personnel) and
-- Nos 316, 323, 324, 325 and 342 Radar Stations (each
with 34 personnel).
No 86 (Attack) Wing with the following:
-- a Wing HQs (63),
-- No 1 Squadron (Mosquito) (374),
-- No 93 Squadron (Beaufighter) (302),
Labuan/Brunei Bay 111
-- No 84 OBU (171),
-- No 30 Air Stores Park (97),
-- No 29 MCS (34), and
-- No 1 RSU (400).
- No 83 (Army Cooperation) Wing with the following:
- - a headquarters (less detachment at Morotai for Oboe
Two) (48),
-- No 4 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron Wirraways (less
detachment at Morotai for Oboe Two) (340),
-- No 16 AOP Austers (less detachments at Tarakan and
Morotai for Oboe Two) (SE),
-- No 9 Local Air Supply Unit Beauforts (less detachment
at Morotai for Oboe Two) (log), end
-- No 32 Air Stores Park (81).
In addition, the airfield construction wing, its squadrons and
ancillary units, and No 4 Wireless Unit deployed.
Most reports indicated a lack of co-ordination, considerable
wasted effort and inadequate facilities at embarkation and
disembarkation points. Many lessons had been learnt from
Tarakan, but many failings were still in evidence. For example,
the move from Morotai to Labuan of No 4 Squadron is illustrative.
Three officers, 69 other ranks and 15 vehicles were spread over
three vessels. loo
loo See file 305/3/E of 6 July, held as folio 146 in Labuan Box File, RAAF Historical Section.
112 Oboe
Allocation of Sites
Allocation of sites posed a problem for several units. For
example, the advanced party of No 457 Squadron landed on 11 June
and moved to their allocated site. However, other 81 Wing
personnel had occupied the site and No 457 Squadron personnel had
to wait 18 days before an alternative site could be made
available. This led the CO of No 457 Squadron to recommend that
units retain their allotted camp sites so that they 'may make
plans accordingly to speedily set up camp and go into
operation' .l0'
No 82 Squadron personnel had to camp out in the open in pouring
rain on the night of 1 June, at the embarkation point at Morotai.
There was neither cover nor stretchers, and personnel embarked
as a wet, tired and bedraggled lot (a formal redress was
subsequently submitted). The convoy arrived at Labuan on the
11th and disembarked on the 12th. Squadron personnel occupied
a temporary camp site until they had completed work on their own
site, to which they moved on 20 June, with squadron aircraft and
pilots arriving on the 25th. No 82 Squadron officers oversaw all
loading and unloading of squadron equipment and recommended this
as the only method of obviating losses of equipment.'''
Airfield Construction Squadrons
No 4 ACS left Biak on 8 May, arrived at Morotai on the 13th, left
again on 4 June to arrive at Labuan on the 10th. They arrived
at Labuan just on sunset. Despite the low tide, unloading was
delayed until the morning, by which time they had to contend with
''l See file 2/42/Air of 27 June 1945, 'Unit Move Morotai to Labuan Island', held as folio 146 in the Labuan Box File, RAAF Historical Section.
lo2 See file 1/2/10 of 1 July 1945, held as folio 148 in the Labuan Box File, RAM Historical Section.
Labuan/Brunei Bay 113
a four feet draught. Consequently, some equipment suffered water
damage and led to subsequent delays in operation^.'^^
No 5 ACS arrived at Labuan at 1800 hours on 10 June, onto a dry
beach. In this case too, off-loading was delayed, this time by
four hours, which resulted in some vehicles being unloaded in
almost four feet of water. Because the tide rose rapidly, off-
loading had to be delayed until the next day. Once work began
on the airstrip, ACS personnel had to be posted as guards to turn
back unauthorised traffic (referred to as sightseeing
tourists) .lo4
RESULTS
Ulse of Labuan Airfield
Craters on the Labuan airfield measured up to 35 feet in diameter
and 15-20 feet deep, and were filled with water. Compounding the
problem was the absence of suitable filling material nearby.
Work began on a temporary strip which would be unsurfaced and
would become inoperable after heavy rains. The main strip was
to be completed by 16 June, but estimates indicated that it would
not be ready until 22 July, unless pierced plank matting could
be provided (in which case the strip could be completed within
five days of the arrival of the matting).
The capture of Labuan airfield meant that RAAF Kittyhawks and
Spitfires could support the Australian Army within a radius of
500 kilometres, and could provide air cover for naval convoys in
the vicinity. The Labuan strip would not be suitable for heavy
bombers, however, and they would operate from Balikpapan,
lo3 See file 1/2/10, undated, held as folio 149 of the Labuan Box File, RAAF Historical Section.
'04 See file 2103/13/E of 30 June 45, held as folio 151 in Labuan Box File, RAAF Historical Section.
114 Oboe
provided the operation there was successful.
Bomb Damage
Inspection by the operational research section of 1st TAF allowed
specific observations to be made in relation to bomb damage.
Conclusions from the study included:'05
Delay-action bombs proved successful in a concentrated
built-up area.
* A near-miss by a delay-action bomb on scattered or isolated
buildings had a poor to negligible result. In these
situations, an instantaneously-fused bomb would be more
effective.
* Use of rod extensions, which allow a bomb to detonate above
the ground, near a target, inflicted considerably more
damage than neas-misses that impacted the ground.
* Blast and fragment damage did not destroy buildings. Use
of incendiaries would have added significantly to the
destruction.
* Near-misses achieve very little damage on gun positions
that are surrounded by earth revetments. Fragmentation
clusters would increase the likelihood of hitting inside
the revetments and hence achieve better results. If low-
level attack is possible, then use of napalm would be
highly successful.
* The soft sandy soil of Labuan reduced the damage.
lo5 Refer 'Bomb Damage: Some Observations at Labuan Island', Report TR20, dated 20 June 45, held in the Labuan Box File (folio 5 9 ) , RAAF Historical Section.
CHAPTER FOUR
OBOE TWO - BALIKPAPAN OVERVIEW
Japan was using Balikpapan as one of its main aviation fuel
sources,' hence Liberators had been bombing the area sporadically
since September 1944. The Dutch had partially destroyed the oil
installations in January 1942 but most of the infrastructure was
re-constituted by the Japanese during that year. There were
three refineries at Balikpapan - Pandansari, Edeleanu, and Dubbs Cracking Plant.
The Allied plan was to land at Balikpapan on 1 July 1945 (F-Day, with H-Hour being 0900 hours). 1st TAF was to support 1st
Australian Corps' 7th Australian Division, which would be the
assault force. Two brigades of 7th Division were to be used,
with one held in corps reserve. However, as planning continued,
lt became obvious that two brigades would be needed for the
assault and the third would be required as a divisional reserve.
This posed transportation problems and to accommodate the
additional brigade some 7,000 RAAF personnel (out of a total of
'10,500) did not proceed to the Objective Area (OA).'
The OA covered some 34 kilometres of south-eastern coastline
around Balikpapan' with Balikpapan Bay offering shelter, good
depth and an entrance more than one and a half kilometres wide.
Other than in the developed areas, the foreshores were tangled
mangrove swamps. Thus, the landing beach just east of Klandasan
was selected for its firm sandy surface and good seaward
approaches. In addition, the main coastal road was positioned
George Odgers, Air War A g a i n s t Japan 1943-1 945, Australian War Memorial, 1957, p.480.
E.G. Keogh, The S o u t h West P a c l f i c 1941-45, Grayflower Productions, Melbourne, 1965, p.459.
i b l d , p.455.
116 Oboe
not far from the beach.4
Other than excellent port facilities, Balikpapan also boastedtwo
suitable airfields, withManggar situated some 20 kilometres east
of Klandasan being the largest, and the smaller Sepinggan, just
10 kilometres east of Klandasan.
After the Tarakan operation, General ~lamey' had questioned the
need for Balikpapan to go ahead. He did not want 7th Division
committed to an operation from which it could not have been
extracted."fter all, the war in Europe was over and Australia
was looking at reducing its commitment against Japan, as the
strength of the United Nations was expected to be concentrated
against Japan.'
Additionally, as a result of the Tarakan operation, effective
Allied fighter control was assured past Balikpapan, thereby
affecting Japan's ability to operate shipping in the Samarinda-
Balikpapan area. It marked the first time that all land and sea
areas of the South-West Pacific could be covered by Allied
aircraft . a
Prime Minister Curtin asked MacArthur whether the Balikpapan
operation was necessary and was met with the response that the
plan had been prepared and the forces were ready to deploy; so
if Curtin wanted to withdraw 7th Division then he should advise
accordingly and immediately so that another division (American)
Keogh, p.456.
Blarney was Commander-in-Chief of all Australian forces in the SWPA.
John Robertson and John McCarthy, Australian War Strategy 1939-1945, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia Queensland, 1985, pp.422-424.
' ibid, p.425. PRO, Air 40/1761 - See RAM Command Intelligence Summary
No 14 of May 5, 1945, p.3.
Balikpapan 117
could be used.' Curtin supported MacArthur and 7th Division
carried out Oboe Two.
Curtin's support was not surprising as the Australian government
believed that the one Commander-in-Chief was essential for unity
in operations. That C-in-C was MacArthur, and despite General
Blamey's protests (and others) that Balikpapan was unnecessary,
and indeed that Blarney's headquarters was being used purely for
liaison and not command, Curtin adhered to MacArthurfs wishes on
all operational matters.
OBJECTIVE OF OBOE TWO
The General Headquarters order was issued on 23 May 1945 with 7th
Division's tasks to seize and occupy the Balikpapan/Borneo area;
establish naval, air and logistics facilities; and conserve
petroleum producing and processing installation^.'^
This essentially translated to securing the beach-head,
dominating Balikpapan Harbour, destroying the enemy in
Balikpapan, and securing Sepinggan and Manggar airstrips.
Planning expected air support to be provided from Tarakan and the
Labuan-Brunei Bay area, to support the amphibious assault on the
Balikpapan-Manggar area. Additionally, allied air power was to
neutralise all enemy anti-aircraft (AA) installations, gun
emplacements, oil storage and pumping stations, and enemy
airfields in the NE1 within range of the OA.
Amphibious landings were made at three beaches - Able Green (21 Brigade), Able Yellow and Able Red (18 Brigade), and 25 Brigade
was the divisional reserve.
Athol Moffitt, Project Kingfisher, Angus & Robertson, NSW, Australia, 1989, p.256.
' O Odgers, p.481.
118 Oboe
Task Group 78.2 was tasked with providing the naval force and Air
Vice-Marshal Bostock vith providing the air force. The
responsibility of naval support was to:"
* Transport land forces to Balikpapan and protect convoys.
t Bombard beaches, in support of the landings.
Intercept enemy attempts to reinforce Balikpapan by sea.
Escort and protect friendly shipping along Lines of
Communication (LOCa) to Balikpapan.
t Conduct Motor Torpedo Boat (MTB) operations in the
Balikpapan area.
* Establish naval forces in the OA to assist 7 Division.
Destruction of oil storage facilities and gravity flow pipelines
became primarily an air force responsibility due to the
limitation that Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) could only be used
in shallow water offshore.
INTELLIGENCE
Some 6,000 Japanese troops held Balikpapan (with 1,500 at
Samarinda and the remaining 4,500 in Balikpapan-Manggar). Of
these latter troops, 1,500 were infantry, 1,500 were artillery
and 1,500 were AA gunners. There were another 4,500 Japanese,
Indonesian and Formosian civilians still operating the oil wells
and refineries .l2
" See 21 AIF Administrative Order No 1, held RAAF Historical Section, Canberra.
Balikpapan 119
The guns represented a significant threat to the naval force, and
General Kenney estimated that 3,000 tons of bombs would be needed
to destroy them.13 The guns included 18 coast defence guns
(located mainly on Parramatta Ridge above Balikpapan), 26 heavy
dual-purpose guns, and 78 medium and light AA guns.I4
Enemy Airfields
Airfields in Balikpapan were at Manggar and Sepinggan.
Additionally, those that could be used as staging bases included
Samarinda, Oelin, Tabanio, Kotawaringin, Mandai and south-west
Bulawesi. Japanese aircraft were based primarily at Malang,
Tanjong Perak, Kalidjati, Kemajoran, Bandung and Den Pasar.
Enemy Aircraft
The early RAAF Operation Plan which indicated only 34 enemy
aircraft of different types in the Borneo-Sulawesiarea, with 400
others available from NEI, Malay Peninsular and Indo-China,I5
appears to have been the basis for George Odgers to state that
the Japanese air strength in NE1 was estimated as having been
reduced to 17 fighters, 17 bombers and some float planes.16
However, the Operation Order of 8 June 1945 was quite specific
in listing 23 enemy combat aircraft in Borneo and Sulawesi, with
an additional 54 in Java and the Lesser Sundas." In the area of
potential support, the strengths were as follows: 87 in Sumatra,
*' Odgers, p.481. l4 ~eogh, p.456.
See RAAF Operation Plan 6-45, Annex E.
l6 Odgers, p.481.
l' 1st TAF Operation Order No 2/45 dated 8 June 1945, Appendix B, p.2.
120 Oboe
68 in Malaya, 52 in Burma-Thailand, and 74 in French Indo-
China. "
While the Operation Order noted that the landing force at Tarakan
had suffered three enemy raids by three to five float planes at
night, it surmised that 'in the circumstances, it can be expected
that the enemy will not put forward in its defence any but a
minor air effort' .l9
While the main air threat was expected to be sporadic dawn and
dusk raids against shipping, enemy aircraft were also expected
to:
* be used to defend the OA,
* conduct suicide attacks and other offensive attacks,
* evacuate VIPs,
confine air attacks to the hours of darkness, and
* conduct reconnaissance flights during dawn and dusk
periods.
Japanese bombers were expected to be held in reserve for the
inevitable Allied assault on Singapore, and it is doubtful that
Balikpapan would have been considered to be of sufficient
importance to warrant suicide attacks. Furthermore, any attacks
against the convoy could be expected to come through the North
Sulawesi or Balikpapan area - hence, the Allied attacks on
military targets in these areas. Once the convoy was in the
Macassar Strait and thereafter, attacks could come from float
plane bases in the Macassar Strait or Bandjermasin areas. The
" ibid.
l9 1st TAF Operation Order 2/45 of 8 June 45, Appendix B, p.1.
Balikpapan 12 1
Oboe Six operation at Labuan-Brunei Bay was expected to
neutralise enemy aircraft on the west Borneo coast, thus removing
the threat from that area. Despite the assessment that enemy
bombers would probably not be used to defend Balikpapan, there
was still the concern that Balikpapan was within bombing range
of enemy aircraft based in Java. And nothing is sure in war.
It was doubtful that the Oboe Two task force could effect
surprise as the enemy would be expecting an attack on Balikpapan
and the first sighting of the Allied amphibious force approaching
East Borneo would be a clear indication that landings at
Balikpapan were imminent. However, the enemy would be uncertain
of the actual points selected for the landings.
Flying Conditions
Based on the meteorological information available, flyimg
conditions could be expected to be good. The most favourable
time over targets would be 0800-1100, when morning fogs had
dissipated. Daytime over-sea conditions would also be good, but
would be less-favourable at night. Heavy showers and high build-
up of cloud (above 25,000 feet) over the interior's higher
mountains would affect operations in mid-afternoon. A detailed
weather summary for air operations was provided in Operation
Instruction No 154/1945 of 26 May 1945, which was the same as for
the previous Oboe operations."
The Airfield
Immediately following the assault, and by 7 July, an all-weather
runway with dimensions of 5,000 feet by 100 feet, alert aprons
and undispersed parking for one fighter wing (three squadrons of
Kittyhawks and one of Spitfires), one ASR flight and one Army
20 See Chapter Two for specific assessments.
122 Oboe
Cooperation Wing2' had to be constructed. Intensive operations
would be required for one month. In addition, an MFCL
headquarters building, a base operations building and a control
tower had to be con~tructed.~~
By 16 July, increased undispersed parking for an additional twc
fighter squadrons (P.38~ staging through), and one attack bomber
wing of two squadrons (one of Mosquitoes and one of Beaufighters)
was required. An additional all-weather runway measuring 7,OOC
feet by 100 feet and undispersed parking for an additional twc
squadrons of heavy bombers were required by 31 July.
RAAF PLANNING
Connnand and Control
The General Officer Commanding Oboe Two was Major General
Milford, with Brigade Commanders being Brigadiers Chilton (18
Brigade), Dougherty (21 Brigade), and Eather (25 Brigade). Ail
Vice-Marshal Bostock was AOC-in-C RAAF Command and Air Commodore
Scherger was AOC 1st TAF, responsible for air support of Oboe Two
and for maintaining air garrisons at Labuan, Tarakan and Morotai.
As with the previous Oboe operations, aircraft were under commancl
of respective unit or base commands until reporting on station,
after which they were under the control of Commander Support
Aircraft (CSA), who was embarked in the headquarters ship.
The Army Cooperation Wing was to contain one tactical reconnaissance squadron (~oomerangs), one communications uni.. IBeaufortsI, one AOP flight (Austers), one troop carrier squadro~ (C. 47 Sky rains) , one search squadron (PV1 venturas ) , one-photo.. charting squadron (F~s), and one ASR flight (Catalinas).
22 Overruns, flight strips and approaches also had to bc prepared. Overruns would be at each end of the runway and hacl to be 500 feet in length, and flight strips had to be 100 feet on each side of the runway.
Balikpapan 123
Operation Instruction 154/45 of 26 May 45 carried the following
note: '13th Air Force US- will retain operational control of
all 13th Air Force units located within the area of
responsibility of RAW Command, A M ' .23
Air Tasks
The RAAF was to provide air cover over the convoy and OA for
Cruiser Support and Covering Group (CTG 74.2), and the Attack
Group; and convoy cover only for resupply convoys as requested
by Commander Oboe-Two Attack Group (CTG 78.2). Similarly, cover
and supporting aircraft were to be provided for MTB operations. Convoy air cover was to be provided by two fighters on station
from 0600 to 1900 daily. The cover was to be provided from
Morotai, Tawi Tawi, Zamboanga and Tarakan.
All OA air cover was to be provided by the RAAF. Four fighters
were to be on-station from 0730 to 1800 hours daily and one night
fighter from 1800 to 0730. Cover was to be provided from 15 June
until notified to stop. Air cover for MTB operations involved
two fighters on-station from 0730 to 1800 hours daily.
Fighter/bomber aircraft were to assist in the neutralisation of
enemy targets at the OA prior to FOX-Day (F-Day), and to provide
close support for ground forces during the assault and
consolidation phases. Aircraft were also to provide ASR, and in
conjunction with 13th AF, provide heavy air strikes prior to and
after F-Day. Three Austers were to operate from 1 July and an
additional three to operate from 2 July, for AOP duties. Smoke-
laying aircraft were also to be used. Courier services were to
be provided between Tarakan and Balikpapan from 1-7 July and
another service between Manila and Balikpapan from 1-4 July. ASW
was provided by the RAAF and air forces of the Seventh Fleet.
23 See Operation Instruction 154/45 of 26 May 45, p.6, paragraph 17.
124 Oboe
AOCs North Western Area (NWA) and Western Area (WA) supported
Oboe Two. NWA aircraft prosecuted attacks against air bases,
installations, LOCs, and troop concentrations; maintained an air
blockade; conducted mining operations; protected convoys;
provided tactical reconnaissance and photography as required:
provided a safe-hand courier service: and carried out search
plans. WA aircraft also provided air protection for convoys,
carried out tactical reconnaissance and photography, and
conducted long-range attacks against enemy targets."
Tasking for 13th AF was meant to be limited to:
* Long-range attacks against enemy airfields and
installations within staging range of Balikpapan-Manggar.
* Air photography as ordered by AOC-in-C RAAF Command.
* Night fighter cover, with one aircraft over the OA from
2000 until 0700 each day from 1 July until relieved by No
452 Squadron (expected to be 7 July).
* Daylight fighter cover for convoys proceeding to and from
Balikpapan between 122 degrees East and 125 degrees East.
* Anti Submarine cover for convoys between Morotai and the
OA .
* Night fighters on-station 0600-0730 and 1800-2000 daily for
convoy cover between 122 degrees East and 125 degrees East.
However, the non-operational status of Tarakan airfield meant
that 13th AF had to provide more support as the RAAF could not
undertake certain tasks which were to begin on 15 June.
Z 4 North Western Area and Western Area aircraft carried out these types of activities for all three Oboe operations, but they have been recorded in this chapter only, to eliminate unnecessary duplication.
Balikpapan 125
Specifically, 13th AF had to provide daylight air alert in the
OA, direct support of 7 Division, and convoy fighter cover
between 122 degrees East and the OA. 13th AF operated Lightnings
from Tawi Tawi to meet the air alert and convoy fighter cover
tasks. Two squadrons of Mitchells, operating from Zamboanga,
provided the direct support on six hours notice.25 Once RARF
aircraft began operating from Tarakan, the extra 13th AF tasking
ceased. Nos 77, 78, 81 and 86 Wings and No 452 Squadron were
relying on the availability of Tarakan airfield to allow them to
participate in the Balikpapan operation.
13th AF also had other tasks which included establishing an air
blockade of the South China and Sulu Seas to deny movement of
hostile naval forces and shipping, and to attack enemy air
forces, bases and installations along the French Indo-China coast
from the 13th AF boundary to Saigon.
5th AF was also allocated specific bombing tasksz6 along the
China and French Indo-China coasts (against military
installations), and along the Yangtze River (against LOCs). As
with the previous Oboe operations, 5th AF had to be prepared to
support 13th AF upon request, depending on the availability of
forces . RAAF planning appeared to be more comprehensive than for the
previous Oboe operations. For example, an air support plan was
prepared that listed details of enemy and friendly aircraft and
the procedures to be adopted. As an illustration, the following
areas were specifically covered in the air support plan:" enemy
aircraft, support aircraft available, the Air Support Plan prior
Six hours notice meant that from the time of origin of the request for direct air support at the ASS to the time that the strike was required had to be a minimum of six hours.
26 See Operation Instruction 154/45 of 26 May 45.
27 S,ee 21 AIF Operation Order of 11 June 1945, Appendix J, copy held RAAF Historical Section.
126 Oboe
to 1 July, the Air Support Plan for 1 July, the Air Support Plan
for 2-5 July, the Air Support Plan from 6 July, procedures during the assault and as soon as ASPS were operating ashore, and
procedures when control passed ashore. In addition, general
communications procedures were promulgated.
For the first time in the Oboe operations, there is evidence of
a requirement to follow doctrine p~blications.~' Specifically,
the following publications were to be used: Air Defence Battle
Orders, Radar Filter Instructions, RAAF System of Operational
Control, and Manual of 'Standing Operating Procedure for Attack
Aviation in Close Support'.
Restrictions on Operations
Instructions indicated that certain areas and installations were
to suffer only minimum damage, although damage was not to be
avoided at the expense of destroying the primary target. These
areas and installations were:29
* highways and rail systems;
oil producing facilities (except those targeted as capable
of being used in defence of enemy positions);
* docks and port facilities;
* public utilities, power houses, etc; and
* other areas so designated on target maps.
See 1st TAF Operation Order 2/45 of 8 June 45, held RAAF Historical Section.
29 See 1st TAF Operation Order 2/45 of 8 June 45.
Balikpapan 127
From 15 June, aircraft were ordered not to attack surface craft
in the area as friendly mine-sweeping was underway. As well,
naval observation aircraft were in the OA from 16 June and RAAF
aircraft were advised to exercise caution.
Courier Service
C!atalinas were to provide courier services between Tarakan and
Balikpapan until the Balikpapan strip was opened and C.47~ could
begin operations. No 76 Wing operated a courier service from 1
July between Manila and Balikpapan.
Line of Approach
All aircraft approaching the Oboe Two convoy from 1 July were to
Ely an approach from 10 nautical miles on a heading of 225
degrees, at a height of not more than 1,500 feet.
CONDUCT OF AIR OPERATIONS
RAAF Command*s objective prior to 1 ~uly" was to destroy hostile
ground forces in Balikpapan-Manggar and the oil installations
that could be used in defence against allied ground forces.
These operations constituted phase one. The other two phases
will also be examined in terms of those operations carried out
on 1 July, and those conducted after 1 July.
F-Day was initially planned as 22 May but eventually became 1 July.
128 Oboe
Phase One (Prior to 1 July)
The enemy AA positions had to be destroyed before 15 June, when
minesweeping operations were to begin. Bad weather during the
period 1-15 June meant that most Allied attacks had to be
switched to alternate targets." Thus, by 15 June the planning
staffs had become quite concerned. In the end, naval and air
bombardment was able to neutralise the Japanese defences in time.
The minesweeping operation was, at the time, the biggest
undertaken by the Allies in the SWPA.~~
AVM Bostock's plan was to use Liberator's of Nos 21, 23 and 24
Squadrons and from North Western and Western Areas for bombing;
as well as No 77 Wing Beaufighters and No 78 Wing Kittyhawks,
reinforced by squadrons from No 81 Wing. No 77 Wing was to
provide two aircraft each day to attack the area, while No 78
Wing was to be on air alert over the OA and provide air cover
over the convoy. All aircraft (except the Liberators) were meant
to operate from Tarakan from 8 Junes3 but that was not po~sible.~'
Thus, the RAAF missed an opportunity to provide comprehensive
support, and 13th AF Lightnings from Sanga Sanga provided the air
cover. In addition, three USN escort carriers with fighters were
allotted to the Task Force C~mmander.~~ Bostock also had to
change other plans and operate Liberators from Morotai, Samar and
31 This included a formation of RAAF Liberators on 12 June, which was unable to attack Balikpapan. Next day, however, American Liberators were able to get through and bomb the anti- aircraft defences at Balikpapan township and Sepinggan airfield. See Odgers, p.482.
33 Odgers, p.482.
34 As discussed in Chapter 2, the Tarakan airfield did not become operational until 28 June, with the first sortie being flown on 30 June.
35 The Navy was not prepared to risk the chance of bad weather keeping the 13th AF Lightnings grounded.
Palawan to provide direct support for the assault on Balikpapan.
So, although Bostock had 40 squadrons (including 25 squadrons of
heavy bombers), many had to operate from remote airfields up to
1,100 kilometres away.j6
On 15 June, RAAF Liberators were unsuccessful in their attack on
Balikpapan (with only six out of 12 reaching the target area and
many bombs falling into the sea).3' From 19-25 June, RAAF
LLberators were more successful, dropping 119 tons of bombs on
the Balikpapan area and destroying oil installations and one AA
position, as well as starting large fires." From 27 June, heavy
attacks were launched, including against the strong enemy coastal
dlefences. On this day, 123 Liberators (including six from No 82
Wing) and 73 Mitchells prosecuted the first raids.
From 26-28 June, RAAF aircraft attacked targets as a diversion
to allow underwater reconnaissance to be undertaken in advance
of underwater demolition.
On 27 and 29 June, from 0810 to 1000, high-level bombing attacks
were made near the landing beaches. Bombs were dropped on land,
not closer than 100 metres inland from the high water mark as
underwater demolition teams were present on the beaches.
No 25 Squadron Liberators attacked Malang on 29 June - attacking from 15,000 feet at night, they placed 90% of their bombs between
a hangar and barracks area at the southern end of the airstri~.~'
On 30 June, the squadron attacked an airfield near S~rabaya.~'
36 Odgers, p.482.
" ibid, p.483.
" ibid. Michael V. Nelmes, Tocumwal to Tarakan: Australians and
the Consolidated 8-24 Liberator, Banner Books, Canberra, 1994, pp.127-128.
" ibid, p.128.
130 Oboe
Beaufighters and Kittyhawks began deploying to Tarakan airstrip
once it became serviceable on 28 June. After the long wait to
use the strip, landings on that first day were not without
mishap. One Beaufighter ran out of fuel and crash-landed off the
runway, one Kittyhawk over-ran the airstrip, and another crashed
into the sea. In all, five Beaufighters and 18 Kittyhawks landed
successfully on that first day.41
From 30 June, No 78 Wing (comprising Nos 75, 78, 80 and 452
squadrons) flew fromTarakanto support the Balikpapan operation.
It was found that the Beaufighters could not operate from Tarakan
and they had to be withdrawn to Morotai. No 78 Wing's first
missionwas against Labuan and Mensalung (involving 16 Kittyhawks
and four Spitfires).
Phase Two (1 July)
On 1 July, a concerted 40-minute air bombardment of the landing
beaches was conducted by 10 squadrons of Liberators (from 5th AF,
13th AF and 1st TAF). Twenty-four 13th AF aircraft dropped 50
tons of bombs, then came the Australian Liberators between 0810
and 0824 hours, just before 7th Division landed. The RAAF
Liberators were from No 21 Squadron (seven aircraft), No 23
Squadron (six aircraft) and No 24 Squadron (seven aircraft).
They attacked from altitudes of 6,900 to 8,000 feet and dropped
approximately 200 500-lb bombs (almost 50 tons). Next, 38
Liberators from 5th AF dropped 70 tons of bombs on targets near
the beaches. Then, Mitchells laid smoke to cover the amphibious
craft as they landed on the beach.42 Pre-landing operations had
been conducted off Manggarto deceive the Japanese into believing
that the landing would occur there, rather than between Stalkoedo
and Klandasan.
" Odgers, p.483. Refer also to Air Chief Marshal McNamara's comments in Chapter 2.
42 ibid, p.484.
Bal ikpapan 131 i
As 7th Division was to move ashore near Balikpapan township,
buildings near the beach had to be destroyed to prevent the
Japanese using them for protection during the assault.
Similarly, all oil tanks were destroyed to prevent the enemy from
using burning oil against the assault forces.
There was also a continuous 14-feet wide anti-tank ditch along
the beach from Stalkoedo to Sepinggan. A similar ditch existed
in the Klandasan area. Off-shore there was another obstacle
which covered the Klandasan to Manggar area and exposed only a
Eew gaps - rows of stout poles had been pile-driven into the sea- bed, braced with timber and protected by barbed wire." These
all had to be overcome.
The Command ship USS Wasatch received progress reports over the
beach from an RAAF Liberator of No 24 Squadron, which came under
fire from AA guns. It appeared that some AA guns had been moved
to positions along the Samarinda road after the assault began.
Tragically, the relieving Liberator (also of No 24 Squadron) was
hit by AA fire and ditched in the sea, with some loss of life.
Twelve B.25 Mitchells with 100-lb General Purpose bombs
(instantaneously fused) bombed the landing beach to destroy beach
mines. Then, B.24 Liberators, armed with anti-personnel bombs,
attacked the beach defences immediately prior to the assault.
Throughout the day (from 0730 until 1630), Beaufighters attacked
Japanese targets every 90 minutes.
Australian Army soldiers securedthe beach-head within 15 minutes
of landing, and some hours later (by 1415) took Parramatta Ridge
(a 300-foot high ridge which allowed command of the entire
Klandasan beach) ."
4"eogh, pp. 456-458.
" Odgers, p.485.
132 Oboe
An air strike was requested for 1600 hours on 1 July. Despitc
protests from Air Vice-Marshal Bostock, USN dive-bombers werc
used, resulting in some bombs landing among the 2/10tl1
Battalion, causing casualties. It was the 2/10th that hac
captured Parramatta Ridge. Air Vice-Marshal Bostock had arguec
that there were differences between close support procedures for
armies and navies, and in addition, the USN pilots did not knob
the terrain. The Australians held the ridge that night despite
a Japanese counter-attack and the USN bombing.
It was important to provide heavy bombardment in advance of the
assault as the task force consisted of 200 American, Australian
and Dutch ships - the largest amphibious operation in the SWPA since January, when forces landed at Lingayen. Despite two hours
of this heavy bombardment, the assault forces still experienced
artillery, mortar and small arms fire. Nevertheless, 17 assault
waves landed without suffering any casualties." At 1900 hours
on 1 July, command of operations passed ashore to the General
Officer Commanding 7th Divi~ion.'~
Destruction was complete, with oil storage tanks, the refinery,
houses, shops and warehouses virtually razed. Those structures
still standing were burned out and railway tracks were torn up."
Japanese concrete bunkers were abandoned (as they were on
Tarakan) as the troops withdrew inland to escape the allied air
bombardment.
Brigadier Dougherty's 21 Brigade landed on Able Green beach in
the vicinity of Klandasan Besar River, consolidated the position
and captured Sepinggan airstrip. Brigadier Chilton's 18 Brigade
landed on Able Yellow and Able Red beaches and captured
Balikpapan town.
4 5 Odgers, p.484.
" Keogh, p.462. '' Odgers, p.484.
Balikpapan 133
The 23 Squadron diary on 1 July recorded the following in
relation to Balikpapan operations that day - 'A great day for Australia's fighting men. It was in fact a wholly Australian
showr
Phase T h r e e ( A f t e r 1 July)
Sepinggan airfield was secured on 2 July by the 2/14th Battalion
,and work began immediately to repair the extensive cratering of
tlhe strip.
Tlhe first 24 Squadron Liberator was lost on the first day.4g On
tlhe next day (2 July), a second Liberator was lost (hit by flak
at less than 1,000 feet), just inland of ~alikpapan." The third
aircraft was lost on 5 July, near Sepinggan airfield.5'
On the 2nd and 5th July, No 24 Squadron lost two Liberators at
1,~w-level to AA fire. They were employed on observation duties
and each carried an Army observation officer.
Auster aircraft had been taken ashore on 1 July but the proposed
temporary landing field proved unsuitable and they had to wait
for Sepinggan airfield to be repaired. By noon on 3 July, the
strip was ready and the first Auster was airborne an hour later.
By the end of 3 July, 7th Division had captured Balikpapan
township and the Klandasan peninsula.
" NelmeS, p.115. ibid, p.114.
ibid, p.115.
51 ibid.
134 Oboe
An immediate problem faced the Australian units trying to move
from the beach to the airfield. Bridges, gutters and culverts
along Vasey highway had been destroyed and had to be repaired
before heavy equipment could be moved. Hence, the full use of
the airfield was denied for several days. No 61 Airfield
Construction Wing was to begin work on 4 July but was delayed by
two days. Although the centre of the airfield was extensively
cratered, the ends were in reasonably good condition.
No 78 Wing, operating from Tarakan, had to divide its attention
between providing CAIRS for 7th Division and striking enemy
concentrations in Sandakan and elsewhere in north-east Borneo.
The 13th AF, using Liberators, Mitchells and Lightnings provided
constant strikes against the Japanese forces around Balikpapan.
No 75 Squadron Kittyhawks and No 452 Squadron Spitfires attacked
Kalabakan and Simalumong on 2 July and two Kittyhawks were lost.
Another was lost on 7 July. More Spitfires arrived at Tarakan
on 9 July to bring No 452 Squadron to full strength. On the
loth, Kittyhawks and Spitfires attacked Tawao in a coordinated
attack with USN PT boats. Two bridges and several huts were
destroyed, but one Spitfire was lost. Another was lost two days
later over the same target.
While the bombing of Balikpapan was claimed as excessive in some
circles, Allied commanders had called for heavy bombardment to
reduce Allied casualties. The RAAF Command Report summarised
that 'damage incidental to achieving this result [landing with
only slight casualties] can only be regarded as completely
j~stified'.~' Despite the heavy air bombardment, only 17 of the
26 heavy dual-purpose guns were destroyed. Direct hits by
aircraft proved difficult and naval bombardment was needed to
silence the remaining guns.
Odgers, p.484.
Balikpapan 135
The Sepinggan airfield was ready for use from 13 July, with its
operable 3,000-foot runway. No 452 Squadron Spitfires arrived
with USN Catalinas on 15 July, eight days later than originally
planned. Flying from Sepinggan, the Spitfires strafed dug-in
Japanese positions. Meanwhile, No 80 Squadron had arrived at
Tarakan (on 13 July) from Morotai and flew four Kittyhawk armed
reconnaissance missions against Redeb on 14 July.
On 19 July, eight Kittyhawks from No 75 Squadron, eight
1:ittyhawks from No 80 Squadron and 15 Spitfires from No 452
Ijquadron flew close support missions for Australian ground forces
around Balikpapan. The Spitfires sunk llbarges, some containing
Japanese soldiers, and the Kittyhawks of No 75 Squadron bombed
iin enemy barracks area. The Kittyhawks refuelled at Sepinggan
before returning to Tarakan. On 22 July, No 452 Squadron
destroyed four vehicles and damaged seven others.
A Japanese reconnaissance aircraft flew over Balikpapan on the night of 22 July, and two nights later, Japanese bombers dropped
25 bombs which damaged one RAAF Catalina. This raid represented
Japan's largest air attack since the beginning of the Borneo
(campaign. No 110 MFCU had detected the attacking aircraft and
two Spitfires were launched to intercept. One Spitfire achieved a kill but had to return to base out of fuel, while the second
was unable to contact the enemy aircraft.
Because the Allies believed that the Japanese aircraft had staged
through Bandjermasin airfields, an attack was launched on 23
July. Twelve Kittyhawks from Nos 75, 78 and 80 Squadrons (four
from each) flew from Tarakan to Sepinggan. From here they
attacked Ulin and Tabanio airfields. Kittyhawks returned again
on 24 July. For the same reasons, Limbung airfield was attacked
by No 82 Wing Liberators, flying from Morotai. On 22 July, No
25 Squadron Liberators, flying through Learmonth, attacked
Semarang . 53
136 Oboe
During July, 1st TAF Kittyhawks and Spitfires flew 877 sorties,
flying from Tarakan and Sepinggan. These aircraft continually
attacked enemy concentrations, preventing the Japanese from
consolidating their positions. This continued throughout August
until offensive air operations ceased. On 14 August, 1st TAF
sent out a message as follows: 'Offensive operations against
enemy cities, land communications and other land targets except
direct support for allied ground forces in contact with the enemy
will cease until further orders. Reconnaissance and photo
missions, anti-shipping strikes and fighter attacks against
airborne enemy aeroplanes will continue. Forces charged with air
defence will be especially alert'.54
Bostock, in a letter to the interim Prime Minister F.M. Forde on
12 July 1945, stated that at least 120 concrete gun emplacements
covered the beaches. Aircraft reduced these defences to less
than half a dozen effective units.55 In doing so, Bostock had
employed some 300 Liberators (or 25 squadrons), and 15 squadrons
of other less-capable aircraft.
On Balikpapan, conditions were better than elsewhere on Borneo
or at Morotai - electric lighting and showers were provided, although personnel still lived in tents.56 On 27 July, another
Liberator was lost, over the northern tip of ~ulawesi.~' Four
days later, another Liberator was lost over the ~almaheras.~'
Odgers, p.490. It was felt necessary to stress the need to stay alert because of the possibility of Kamikaze attacks; although none eventuated.
55 Australian War Memorial:54,81/3/9, as cited in Robertson and McCarthy, p.427.
56 Nelmes, p.116.
'' ibid, p.116. 58 ibid, p.118.
Balikpapan 137
Anti-Submarine Warfare
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) was provided by the RAAF and
Commander, Air Seventh Fleet and involved PBM and PBY type5'
aircraft based at Tawi Tawi and Morotai. Patrols started at
daylight each day from 15 June until notified to stop. Barrier
patrol covered an east/west line from the Borneo coast to the
Sulawesi coast (that is, from the east coast of Borneo to the
west coast of Sulawesi). After being relieved, aircraft would
return to base through Macassar Strait. Another RAAF ASW patrol
would fly the route west from Morotai (during daylight hours from
10 June).
A,ir Observation
From 1 July, air observation was provided over 7th Division in
t.he OA by RAAF B.24 Liberators, between 0730 and 1630 each day.
These aircraft were used to coordinate CAIRS or provide actual
direction to CAIRS aircraft.
Air Sea Rescue
Air Sea Rescue (ASR) in the OA was provided whenever aircraft
were airborne in the vicinity, but dedicated ASR missions were
not flown.
Photographic Services
On 26, 28, 29 and 30 June and 1 July, aerial photographs were
taken of the landing beaches and adjacent areas, and the
negatives were dropped to the Attack Group.
5 9 Both were Catalina variants.
138 Oboe
Routine Reconnaissance
Daily reconnaissance by Fleet Air Wing aircraft from bases in
Mindoro, Palawan and Morotai was flown to cover all sea areas in
north-eastern, northern and eastern Borneo and the Sulu
archipelago. Armed reconnaissance was conducted by the RAAF and
13th AF over Halmahera, Sulawesi and NEI.
Reconnaissance aircraft in the OA or over convoy routes reported
enemy sightings directly to CSA, otherwise results would appear
in the daily despatches via the normal communications circuits.
Smokelaying
Smokelaying aircraft were on standby to protect minesweeping
operations beginning on 15 June. Requests were generated by CTG
74.2 Commander Support and Covering Group to Advanced RAAF
Command at Morotai at least 24 hours in advance of the
requirement. From 27-29 June, one aircraft was used to provide
protection for the underwater demolition teams and was on-
station from 0800 to 1000 each day. Use of smokelaying aircraft
had to be coordinated with NGS. All smokelaying aircraft
received fighter protection fromthe aircraft affording local air
cover.
No 2 Airfield Defence Squadron
As with the previous Oboe operations, RAAF units were responsible
for their own internal security, ground defence, and passive
defence measures against air attack.@' No 2 Airfield Defence
Squadron was responsible for:61
Operation Order 2/45 of 8 June 45, Appendix F.
Listed in 1st TAF Operation Order 2/45 of 8 June 45, which differed slightly in wording only fromthe responsibilities at Labuan.
Balikpapan 139
* ground defence and guarding of RAAF aircraft and vital installations;
* supplementary defence of the airstrip in coordination with
the Army;
* defence of ACS units employed on road building, survey and
soil testing: and
* defence of Headquarters 1st TAF CP.
Aircraft Weapon Loads
The following attack aircraft were used:
-- B.24 Liberator bomber with 6,000 lbs weapon load;
.- B.25 Mitchell medium bomber with 3,000 lbs;
.- Beaufighter attack bomber with 1,000 lbs (or 8 rockets) and
4x20mm cannon;
- Mosquito attack bomber with 3,000 lbs and 6x20mm cannon;
- P.38 Lightning fighter with 4x.50 cal guns, lx20mm cannon
(could also carry drop tank filled with napalm); and
- P.40 Kittyhawk fighter with 6x.50 cal guns, (could also
carry 2x500 lb bombs).
The type of bombs carried included 1,000-lb, 500-lb and 100-lb.
140 Oboe
AIR SUPPORT ORGANISATION
As well as providing the ASS, ASPs and ALPs, 1st TAF provided a CSA and two officers for the Headquarters ship and a CSA for the
Advanced Headquarters ship. Specific call signs are listed in
RAAF Command Operation Instruction 154/1945, Appendix B,
Attachments B1 and B3.
ALPs were allocated as follows: No 5 ALP with 2/9 Battalion, No
6 ALP with 2/10 Battalion, No 7 ALP with 2/12 Battalion, No 8 ALP
with 2/14 Battalion, No 9 ALP with 2/16 Battalion, No 10 ALP with
2/27 Battalion, No 11 ALP with 2/31 Battalion, and No 12 ALP with
2/33 Battalion. The ALPs embarked with their respective
battalions, proceeded ashore with the battalion commander, and
opened communications with CSA (Afloat) as soon as the battalion
headquarters was sited. When brigade headquarters became
established ashore, they ceased transmitting to CSA and began
communicating with their respective ASPs.
Similarly, the ASPS embarked with their respective brigades,62
proceeded ashore with the advanced brigade headquarters and
opened communications with CSA and ALPs. They relayed all
messages between CSA, ALPS and the brigade commander and provided
specialist air advice to the brigade commander. Finally, they
examined all requests for air support and ensured that targets
were suitable, clearly defined and that pertinent information was
included on bombline, position of friendly troops, air-ground
signals, and time by which the support was required.
The ASS itself embarked with relevant elements of 1st TAF CP and
Headquarters 7 Division, and proceeded ashore with them.
Communications were established quickly and control was assumed
over all air support as quickly as possible. The ASS advised all
ASPs when CSApassed ashore, received all ASP communications, and
controlled all direct support aircraft, as well as courier,
62 NO 5 ASP with 18 Brigade, No 6 ASP with 21 Brigade, and No 7 ASP with 25 Brigade.
Balikpapan 14 1
photographic, ASR and Support Air Observer aircraft.
Ground forces marked their front-line positions by fluorescent
panels,63 while the targets to be attacked were marked by white
smoke. If the white smoke was to be provided by mortar, the Air
Support Party would receive its timing direct from the Battalion
Commander. However, if the smoke was to be provided by
artillery, then the ASP would have to use land wire or direct
radio communications with the artillery battery to receive its
t.iming .
All strike leaders had to establish communications with Commander
Support Aircraft and could be asked to make a dummy run before
t.he live run. CSA had responsibility to coordinate artillery and
NGS to ensure the safety of the strike group.
An air coordinator remained airborne over the OA, identifying
targets and guiding attacking aircraft. Additionally, Army Air
1,iaison Officers (ALOs), specially trained as airborne observers
flew in RAAF Liberators over the OA each day from 1 July, during
0730-1600 hours. They reported activities of friendly and enemy
ground forces, conducted ranging for NGS, and dropped messages.
NGS was provided from 16 June and had to be coordinated with
aircraft movements (through CSA) so that it could be suspended
if necessary or aircraft could be providedwithminimum altitudes
from which to prosecute their attacks. CSA could reduce, cancel
or place on ground alert, the direct support aircraft.
The AOP Austers (three on 1 July and three more on 2 July)
provided observation of artillery fire, limited short-range
reconnaissance, and emergency communication flights.
63 Red indicated 18th Brigade front-lines, yellow indicated 21st Brigade front-lines, and black and white panels with the relevant number indicated the specific unit headquarters.
142 Oboe
As for the other Oboe operations, the flight leader of aircraft
formations reported to CSA the number and type of aircraft in the
formation, position and altitude, time available on station, and
type of bombs carried. Aircraft orbited the east end of
Sepinggan airstrip until called onto targets. Radio aids such
as a H/F D/F station, medium-frequency homing beacon, VHF homer, and ASV beacon were installed at the airstrip to aid navigation.
Map references were given in Standard Target Designator Grid
(four figures and one letter). ASPS passed requests to CSA who
then briefed the pilots. Where possible and appropriate,
artillery or mortar smoke was used to indicate targets for direct
air support aircraft. CSA would advise when artillery or mortar
smoke was being used to indicate targets by using the words
'Splash ..... Seconds'. In the Operation Order,64 specific
targets were provided in six-digit map references (causing
confusion and necessitating time to convert) on bunker shelters,
pillboxes, barracks, stores areas, gun positions, AAA positions,
the anti-tank ditch, cunnel entrances, trenches, minefields,
searchlights, oil tanks, and radar sites. These were all noted
as targets of military imp~rtance.'~
Priorities for allied attacks were: firstly, all AA and coastal
defence guns in Balikpapan, Sepinggan and Manggar areas. Next
were major defence installations and positions, then oil
installations, then barracks and stores areas. Finally, at least
two breaks in the oil pipeline between Manggar and Stalkoeda were
required so that the pipeline could be kept unserviceable.
Action was also taken to keep Manggar and Sepinggan airstrips
non-operational until they were in Allied hands.
Operation Order 2/45 of 8 June 45.
This showed a clear concern for the laws of war, or as it is now termed, law of armed conflict.
Balikpapan 143
Reference point for fighter direction and warning was one degree
17 minutes South, 116 degrees 49 minutes East and was referred
to as Point Freida. All radar contacts in the OA were reported
by bearing and distance in nautical miles from Point Freida.
From 15 June, all aircraft approaching within 50 miles (80
kilometres) of the OA reported to CSA.
Air intents were exchanged between 1st TAF, 13th AF and 1st TAP
CP Balikpapan, specifying exact target area and times over
target .
FIGHTER OPERATIONS
Fighter Direction
The Fighter Director on CTG 78.2 was responsible to CSA for air
defence. Advance Group Fighter Director on CTG 74.2 handed over
ell responsibility on 1 July.
Fighter Director Destroyer teams were used to exercise tactical
c:ontrol of CAP aircraft assigned for defence of all forces in the
OA and were to: maintain a continuous plot of all information
affecting the defence of friendly forces; and maintain a plot of
all action against enemy forces, loss of friendly aircraft and
information on downed pilots.
CAP aircraft could be used on CAIRS strafing missions while
awaiting scheduled time of departure for CAP missions. CSA had
the responsibility for requesting such support.
The RAAF Mobile Fighter Control Unit (MFCU) assumed control
ashore once communications and radar facilities had been
established. To assist in coordinating air defence in the OA,
144 Oboe
a MFCU representative accompanied CSA. The operation order66
included the following: 'Should control of American aeroplanes
be passed to No 110 MFCU, American controllers may be made
available for duty at No 110 MFCu'.
No 110 MFCU employedthree LW/AirWarning (LW/AW) radar stations,
one LW/GCI, and wireless observer posts for air warning and
fighter control. The assault echelon of the MFCU landed within
four hours of the assault and set up two LW/AWs at Sepinggan
beach-head, and 12 hours later had the LW/GCI established. The
follow-up section landed on 3 July and was fully operational two
days later.
Radar stations were camouflaged and No 4 RIMU calibrated the
LW/AW and LW/GCI stations, as had been the case with the previous
Oboe operations.
Coordination of Air Defence
Coordination of air defence with land forces was described well
in the Operation Order.6' The Commanding Officer of No 54
Squadron had responsibility for air defence of the Balikpapan
area from 7 July. No 110 MFCU was responsible for issuing air
raid warnings, allocating responsibilities to air and ground
defences, and controlling fighter aircraft until visual contact
with enemy aircraft had been made. The MFCU had full
responsibility for coordinating air and ground defences during
daylight hours.
At night, ground forces had unrestricted scope for attack upon
enemy aircraft until mid-point, after which RAAF aircraft were
See Operation Order 2/45 dated 8 June 45, Appendix C, p.4.
See Operation Order 2/45 dated 8 June 45, Appendix G. l
Balikpapan 145
allowed to intercept unrestricted by ground defen~es.~' However,
aircraft could not begin interception until the last shell had
burst. If aircraft could not effect interception, they would
report 'NO GO' to the MFCU controller who then allowed
unrestricted scope for the ground defences.
Close Air Support
Starting from 15 June until 1 July, Beaufighters were armed to
bomb, fire rockets and strafe targets in the OA from 0930 to 1630
each day. Aircraft were assigned primary and secondary targets
prior to departure from base but could be instructed to attack
specific targets as designated by Advance Commander Support
Aircraft, embarked in the flagship of Commander Cruiser Support
and Covering Group (CTG 74.2). Upon arrival of CTG 78.2 in the
OA, this air commander handed over to Commander Support Aircraft
who was embarked in the flagship of Commander Oboe-Two Attack
(;roup (CTG 78.2). CSA handed over to RAAF Air Support Section
at a time agreed by Commander Oboe-Two Attack Group and GOC 7th
Iiustralian Division.
llestrictions for Aircraft
After 15 June, aircraft were not to attack surface craft in
Macassar Straits north of latitude two degrees south without
permission from CSA (or Advance CSA). Aircraft were not
purposely to destroy docks, piers, jetties, lighthouses or other
navigation aids unless specifically directed. Oil producing
facilities which could not be used by the enemy in tactically
defending the OA were not to be destroyed. After the 15th, no
air strikes were to be conducted without notifying CSA or Advance
Mid-point was a geographical position used as a datum. The Commanding Officer of No 54 Squadron determined the position after consultation with 7 Division.
146 Oboe
CSA as appropriate.
Aircraft had to maintain strict radio frequencies and approach
patterns into the OA, and had to identify themselves as friendly.
Coordination of NGS during the assault involved the Air Observer
dropping white flares in salvo over Balikpapan when the lead boat
was 500 yards from the beach. Flares ignited at some 1,200-1,500
feet above the level of smoke and dust.
ADMINISTRATION
Administrative Instruction No 11, issued in conjunction with 1st
TAF Operation Order 2/45, showed clearly that lessons had been
learned from Oboe One. For example, pre-embarkation instructions
covered the possibility of delays; traffic control at the landing
sites was explained; congestion at beach-heads was addressed; and
RAAF transit areas were provided. Instruction No 11 was very
detailed, and was broken into groupings for movement,
organisation, supplies, equipment, maintenance, accounting, and
medical and hygiene. The level of detail was substantially
greater than for previous operations, and a list of major
headings is provided to indicate the breadth of administrative
information.
PART I - MOVEMENT
A. Movement Organisation (covering division o f
responsibilities and provision of courier services).
B. Movement Program (which provided for embarkation, departure
and arrival, as well as an order of disembarkation).
C. Embarkation Arrangements (which covered logistical limits,
detailed instructions, manifests, nominal rolls,
intercomunication, traffic control, messing arrangements,
Balikpapan 147
etc) .
D. Disembarkation Arrangements (covering control of
disembarkation, beach group organisation, traffic control,
congestion of beach-head, transit areas, and directional
signposts).
PART I1 - ORGANISATION
A. General (covering command, subdivision of units into
echelons and lodger units).
3 Allocation of Areas (covering beach maintenance area, camp
sites and briefing of personnel).
C. Works and Buildings (covering works projects, building
material and water reticulation requirements).
U. Personnel Administration (covering labour, replacements,
discipline, relationship with civil population, security,
burials, and amenities).
IPART I11 - SUPPLIES
A. Supply Responsibilities.
B. Fuel and Explosives.
C. Breathing Oxygen.
D. Rations and Expense Stores.
E. water.
F. Canteen Supplies.
148 Oboe
PART IV - EQUIPMENT
A. Unit Holdings.
B. Resupply.
C. Anti-gas equipment.
D. Marking of Cases.
E. Size of Packages.
P. Allocation of Units to Air Stores Parks.
PART V - MAINTENANCE
A. Aircraft (including pools and unserviceabilities).
B. Mechanical Transport, Marine Craft and Fixed Plant
(including preparation for shipment, waterproofing, de-
waterproofing, etc).
PART V1 - ACCOUNTING
A. Pay.
B. Stores and Other Accounting.
PART V11 - MEDICAL AND HYGIENE
A. Medical (including hospitalisation, casualty evacuation,
first aid, medical rations).
B. Hygiene (including latrines, kitchens, inspections, camp
site evacuation, general equipment).
C. Protective and Precautionary Measures (covering protective
Balikpapan 149
clothing, anti-mite measures, anti-malarial precaut'ions,
swimming, washing of clothes, precautions against
diarrhoea1 diseases).
D. Dental.
In addition to this administrative detail, Operation Instruction
lL54/1945 of 26 May 45, Appendix F divided administrative
responsibilities between the Australian Services. RAAF
:responsibilities were as follows:69
3 i Provide RAW technical supplies in OA.
,k Provide non-common stores for aircraft in OA.
3 Control air evacuation of casualties when such evacuation
is practicable.
;'. Provide stripside medical services as required.
.t Provide aircraft for safehand courier service and
transportation of urgent stores and key personnel to and
from OA.
* Operate bulk aviation fuel installations at airfields.
* Store and maintain drummed aviation fuel.
* Account for aviation fuel and oil issued to Allied forces
through reserve lend-lease procedure.
6 9 See Operation Instruction 154/1945 of 26 May 45, Appendix P, pp.9-10.
150 Oboe
Furthermore, Far East Air Service Command was to make available
any technical supplies for 1st TAP that could not be provided by
the RAAF.''
" This was in accordance with War Department Circular No' 203.
CHAPTER FIVE
OBSERVATIONS
There was almost a casualness to FlAAF planning for Oboe One'
and in particular to detailed briefings on the contents of the
Operations Instruction. Without doubt, any notion of 'it will
be alright on the day', disappeared from subsequent planning
of Oboes Six and Two. The careful planning and close co-
ordination required of air operations testified to the need
for military Services, in this case the W, to ensure
professional mastery. The full potential of the air
environment can only be exploited through such mastery, which
must provide 'the depth of expertise necessary for planning,
directing and executing the application of air power'.? This
has become a doctrinal tenet of the W.
If Tarakan had been disappointing, MacArthur's observation
that the Labuan-Brunei Bay operation was executed flawlessly
must have afforded the Australians some consolation,
especially Bostock.
Because Tarakan airfield could not be used to support Oboe
X RAAF Beaufighters and Kittyhawks had to operate from
!;anga Sanga or Tawi Tawi, adding considerably to the distance
and hence, reducing time on-station. But before the
Beaufighters could operate, parking areas at Sanga Sanga had
to be extended. This delayed their operations until 3 June.
The problem of Tarakan airfield was to continue. Three days
into Oboe Six, FlAAF Beaufighters and Kittyhawks had to leave
Sanga Sanga and move to Morotai. The facilities at Sanga
Sanga were required by 13th AF Lightnings, in preparation for
As a reminder, the Oboe One (Tarakan) landing occurred on 1 May; Oboe Six (Labuan Island/Brunei Bay) on 10 June; and Oboe Two (Balikpapan) on 1 July 1945.
Air Power Studies Centre, AAP 1000, RAAF A i r Power Manual, 2nd E d i t i o n , RAAF Base Fairbairn, Canberra, 1994, 1p.45.
152 Oboe
the Balikpapan operation (only a little over two weeks away).
This move meant that the RAAF aircraft could not provide CAIRS
at Labuan-Brunei Bay, and from the 14th of June (four days
after the landing), 13th AF (flying from Palawan) assumed
responsibility for CAIRS. Fortunately for the RAAF, the
Labuan airstrip was readied quickly and the Kittyhawks
deployed there on 17 June and began operations on the
following day. Spitfires joined them one day later.
Beaufighters had not encountered enemy aircraft in the air for
18 months when they fired on and hit two enemy aircraft on 29
May, after the Tarakan landing. It seems significant that
although the Beaufighters hit the enemy aircraft, they did not
bring them down. This may add weight to the argument that it
was difficult to maintain a combat edge when not actually
engaged in combat.
Alert aircraft that had completed their missions over the
Objective Area (OA), would attack targets of opportunity just
prior to their departure from the OA. This demonstrated the
basic understanding that having risked an aircraft and crew on
a mission, it was not efficient for that aircraft to return
home with unexpended weapons. The lesson of Tarakan was well-
learnt and at Labuan, no aircraft departed the OA with
unexpended bombs or ammunition that had been allocated for use
within the OA.
RAAF Beaufighters provided Combat Air Patrol (CAP) over the
landings at Labuan Island and Brunei Bay on 10 June, but once
the light opposition on the ground had been ascertained, the
aircraft were directed on to secondary targets such as staging
points along known reinforcement routes. Again, this
demonstrated a flexibility of air power that saw more
effective operations being conducted than those that had been
planned initially. Later, small pockets of Japanese
resistance were eliminated by accurate and effective air
attacks.
Observations 153
This flexibility was demonstrated clearly, once again on 10
June over Labuan, where a RAAF Liberator could not bomb its
designated target due to a technical malfunction. Once the
malfunction had been rectified, the aircraft attacked an
alternate target.
Reference points for fighter direction were set for each of
the Oboe operations, to provide more effective control over
aircraft as they entered the OA. At Tarakan, aircraft had to
report to Commander Support Aircraft (CSA) when they were
within 75 miles (120 kilometres) of the OA; this was reduced
b3 50 miles (80 kilometres) for the subsequent Oboe
operations, which would have reduced the load on CSA
significantly.
The failure of Liberator crews to carry standard maps on 7
June added to the workload of the two CSAs (Afloat) for Oboe
Six. It had been clearly articulated that standard Target
Designator Grid maps were to be carried. While the mistake
occurred on only one day, it certainly compounded the problem
that day in co-ordinating Liberator attacks and Naval Gunfire
Support (NGS).
Failure of 13th AF Liberators to obtain prior permission to
bomb at Labuan (on 8 June) showed that problems still existed
with aircrew not being aware of procedures promulgated in
Operations Instructions.
While the effects of bombing enemy forces in the jungle could
not be determined, the precision of attacks around the piers
and docks could be gauged. At Labuan and Brunei Bay, targets
in the vicinity of piers and docks were destroyed, yet the
restricted areas (piers and docks) remained unscathed. Even
though bombing effectiveness could not be measured directly in
jungle areas, Japanese positions, once bombed, tended not to
be reinforced; hence, the bombing was deemed to be successful.
154 Oboe
Bombing was, to a large extent, accurate, but not many
Japanese soldiers appear to have been hit from the air. They
were, however, driven from their fortified positions, which
simplified the task for the Australian troops on the ground.
Enemy resistance on Labuan Island was met by napalm and High
Explosive (HE) attacks by Mitchell bombers. While these air
attacks did not destroy the enemy's defensive position, they
did force the Japanese to stage a break-out, and enemy forces
were totally routed by Australian ground forces a little over
24-hours later.
The early bombardment (prior to the landings) was very
effective - at the Tarakan landing, no air opposition was met, although there were a few air attacks against the airfield.
At Labuan, only one enemy aircraft appeared over the landing
beaches and it did not cause any damage with its bomb. The
few instances of Japanese aircraft approaching after the
Labuan landings resulted in swift action. A US night fighter,
a RAAF Spitfire and AA guns claimed successes. The Spitfire
'kill' was No 457 Squadron's first air combat since 1943.
Although subsequent to the Oboe landings, during an RAAF
attack on 8 August, Kittyhawks destroyed three enemy aircraft
on Kuching airfield. The attack, while important, was
overshadowed by the fact that the Kittyhawks had been airborne
for four hours and forty minutes, which exceeded the accepted
sortie duration time. This underscores a point that aircrew
were sometimes called upon to take what they may have
construed as unnecessary risks. The issue that arises here is
that the risk of losing aircraft and crews must be balanced
against the operational value of the target.
Failure to provide convoy air cover on all occasions did not
endear the air forces, especially the W, to those onboard
the ships in the convoy. While lack of protection for the
Tarakan convoy might have been excusable, the lack of such
Observations 155
protection for the Labuan convoy certainly was not. In the
latter operation, a commanding officer decided not to conduct
a mission and did not advise higher authority, nor indeed, the
convoy. AVM Bostock was to comment on this scathingly later.
The precision obtained by Beaufighters, during Oboe Six, in
attacking Japanese forces on the beach, who were within 100
metres of Australian underwater demolition teams, is worth
noting. However, as with the Tarakan operation, a lack of
understanding by some on-board the Headquarters ships saw some
of the air effort wasted.
The presence of Air Sea Rescue (ASR) aircraft was welcomed by
one Kittyhawk pilot who was shot down on 6 July, and rescued
by a Catalina on the 7th. The importance of inspiring
confidence in aircrew by providing an ASR capability has been
a lesson of note from all conflicts, and one which should
attract more attention in peacetime.
command and control was interesting. Several analyses of the
Oboe operations indicate that Bostock had all air forces under
his operational control. This is simply not true. While the
arrangements for Tarakan are a little obscure, there can be no
misinterpretation for Oboe Six. Here it was clear that 13th
AF aircraft remained under operational control of 13th AF,
even when in the area of responsibility of RAAF Command.
Essentially, AVM Bostock was able to exercise direction over
USAAF aircraft, but not operational control. The confusion
probably arises because Kenney clearly delegated operational
control to Bostock for RAAF aircraft of 1st TAF, and by
implication, similar control of other RAAF aircraft that
entered his area of responsibility.
Communications were again proven to be essential in war.
Direct air support depended so much on communications and up-
to-date information. Communications between Air Liaison
Officers (ALOs) and Air Support Parties (ASPS) would have been
156 Oboe
beneficial, and while operations were effective and were co-
ordinated, both co-ordination and effectiveness could have
been improved had the Army airborne observer been in direct
contact with the ASPS. Another issue worth commenting on here
is that despite communications procedures and specific
frequencies being laid down in operations instructions, too
many mistakes occurred. It reflected a notion of 'we will fix
it on the day', which is not befitting a professional force.
There was great value in having the trained Army observer
airborne, as he understood the situation on the ground and was
able to provide up-to-the-minute information to CSA, to allow
the CSA to better co-ordinate direct air support and ground
force requirements. Similar value was derived from the RAAF
airborne co-ordinator who either co-ordinated strike details
by radio or led the strike aircraft to their targets. This is
indicative of how closely controlled Close Air Support (CAIRS)
and certain Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) missions need
to be, to ensure effort is not wasted and friendly lives not
endangered unnecessarily. The value of the Support Air
Observers (or co-ordinators) was more pronounced in Oboe Six,
which led to specific praise of their efforts in the after-
action report.
Complaints were voiced after Tarakan that the Support Air
Observers (SAOs) could not communicate directly with the
attack aircraft, which reduced responsiveness and
effectiveness. At Labuan, these same complaints were again
voiced. It is amazing that it was not until after Oboe Six
that the issue was clarified. Procedurally, the SAOs could
communicate with the attack aircraft - they simply had to
obtain approval from the CSA to change frequency to the direct
air support net.
It became apparent that information of ground situations,
bomblines and direct air support aircraft (formation size,
weapons and time-on-target) needed to be passed continually to
Observations 157
, CSA so that a current tactical air/land picture could be l maintained. This tended not to happen and CSA had to request
more information continually, with the effect that information
would be passed in relatively intense pulses, unnecessarily
adding time pressures and undoubtedly, confusion, as large
amounts of information - some routine and some priority - had to be processed in short time periods.
The RAAF's No 16 AOP flight accompanied troops ashore at the
Lingkas Beach landing (Tarakan Island). This showed how close
certain RAAF elements were to Army counterparts in the Oboe
operations from the very beginning, and continued throughout.
Despite problems with communications and information overload,
as the rate of advance on the ground increased, the air
support system was flexible enough for aircraft to be directed
to alternate targets and handed over to different ASPS.
However, some airborne alert aircraft effort was wasted.
When aircraft were available for tasking and there were
missions that needed to be conducted, it was inexcusable for
these aircraft not to be used. Tarakan provided salutary
lessons that procedures (especially communications procedures) had to be established in advance; indeed, they even needed to
be rehearsed in advance.
Communications posed problems at Labuan too, where the two
CSAs (Afloat) were unable to communicate effectively with one
another - the dedicated channel malfunctioned. Once the 1st
TAF Command Post (CP) had been established ashore and control
passed ashore to the ASPS with the two Brigades, close co-
ordination was afforded.
The issue of maintaining good communications was highlighted
when the Brigade Commander left the Headquarters ship on l May
(at Tarakan) and could not be contacted until he had
established his Brigade Headquarters ashore. The commander
158 Oboe
would have been better off maintaining communications afloat,
until his headquartezs had established itself and its
communications ashore.
Because communications posed several problems during Oboe One,
planners appeared to react decisively. By the time of Oboe
Six, communications orders reflected strict security
guidelines, plans for jamming and deception, and an
expectation that the enemy may do likewise. This did not, of
course, prevent equipment from malfunctioning and so forth,
but it did highlight a deliberate attempt to address the
possibility of enemy-induced problems (referred to later as
friction).
It seemed easier for tasks to be allocated to squadrons,
rather than to mix forces. For example, CAP over Tarakan was
provided by 78 Wing squadrons in the mornings and 77 Wing
squadrons in the afternoons. While this would have simplified
procedures, it may be indicative that planners expected
squadrons to have difficulty in operating too closely
together. This translates to combined operations as well,
where RAAF and US= units operated as discrete elements.
Again, while this would have simplified procedures, it may not
have been the most effective use of air assets.
While air forces had argued that it was preferable for troops
to withdraw from an engaged position so that aircraft could
attack the enemy positions, the lesson of Oboe was not so
clear-cut. Air attack did not necessarily destroy or rout the
enemy, and friendly ground forces had to re-take their
previous positions against an enemy who had been able to
consolidate his position.
As a general observation, ground forces beyond 100 metres of
enemy forces under air attack were unable to capitalise on the
gains from air attack. Moreover, their organic firepower
could not be used in a co-ordinated fashion with air strikes
Observations 159
because it was out of range. Thus, close co-ordination of air
attack was seen to be more critical as friendly forces
I realised that they needed to be within 100 metres of the enemy ' positions that were being attacked from the air. Perhaps, the
lesson from this was that if air attack was not likely to be
concentrated or lethal enough to destroy or rout an enemy, it
would have been more appropriate for ground forces to hold
their position and 'take on' the enemy. In other words, if
friendly ground forces were in a winning position, it was not
I advisable to call in an air attack. However, had they been in
danger of being overrun, it would have been sensible to
withdraw and call in concentrated air strikes.
The resistance of enemy forces inland of Brunei Bay was more
significant than had been encountered before and CAIRS
missions had to be conducted within 100 metres of friendly
troops. It is testament to the accuracy and overall success
of the air/land organisation that there were no friendly
casualties from air attack. Indeed, the whole Oboe Six
operation was testament to an improved air/land co-ordination
which had to be tied to the experience gleaned in taking
Tarakan the previous month and virtually minute-to-minute
experience from the current operation. There should be little
doubt that rehearsals are a significant force multiplier. In
this case, an earlier operation provided the ideal rehearsal.
Lessons were learned in terms of delay fuses for HE bombs for
better effect, and for improved air supply drops to cope with
the dense jungle canopy. For the former, experience was
gained that showed when delay fuses were superior to
instantaneous ones.' For the latter, longer cords were used to
This is covered in detail at the end of Chapter 3. Broadly, delay-action bombs proved successful in concentrated built-up areas, whereas instantaneously-fused bombs were more effective for near-misses on scattered buildings. In the case of near-misses, it was more effective to detonate the bomb above the ground: hence, rod extensions were fitted to some bombs.
160 Oboe
attach supplies to parachutes to cater for the likelihood that
parachutes would become entangled in tree tops.
In retrospect, it seems amazing that standardised map
references were not used. For example, ASPS used six-figure
co-ordinates, but the Headquarters ships used four figures and
one letter codes to accord with those used by the direct
support aircraft. Despite this being commented on in the
Tarakan post-action report, it was not acted upon for the
subsequent Oboe operations. It is also amazing that the 13th
AF and the Air Support Section (ASS) at Tarakan, for example,
had different codes and cyphers. Even more amazing is that
the situation had not improved one month later at Labuan-
Brunei Bay, nor would it appear to have improved another month
later at Balikpapan.
The reorganisation of air support parties after Tarakan did
show that the RAAF could respond at short notice to improved
organisational arrangements. Formation of Air Liaison Parties
(ALPS) allowed the RAAF to be more responsive to the fluidity
of the situation on the ground, and afforded greater mobility.
So successful was the Labuan-Brunei Bay operation on 10 June
that the 1st TAF CP was ashore and the airfield secured that
same day.
When problems were experienced at Brooketon (during Oboe Six),
when the second ASP was delayed in setting up, ingenuity came
to the fore. The Air Support Officer established a limited
capability between his ALPS and the USS Nashville, which
allowed operations to continue for the two days until the ASP
was fully operable.
One of the clear lessons of Tarakan was that the precipitate
establishment of a Ground Control Intercept (GCI) site on the
beach-head was inappropriate, as direction and control could
be afforded just as well from the Headquarters ship (for the
Observations 161
short-term) until the position ashore had stabilised and the
optimum site for the GC1 radar had been secured. There was
every indication that short-term goals were driving activities
at the expense of more effective longer-term solutions.
, The ingenuity of the Americans in terms of napalm attacks
could not be mirrored by the RAAF. While it is easy to be
critical in hindsight, it is difficult to understand why the
simple modification to 55-gallon drums could not have been
made.
The need for close liaison between air forces and armies has
been commented on already, but was reinforced in yet another
instance. A liaison officer had to be positioned at 13th AF
to interpret army requirements and assist with mission
planning for aerial photography. This was not realised at
first, and valuable time and photographs were wasted until the
liaison officer was established.
Poor tactical loading and the late arrival of units at points
of embarkation created problems subsequently at the landing
beaches. Embarkation, disembarkation, traffic movement, and
allocation and establishment of units' sites ashore, all added
to the friction of war. This was not enemy-induced friction,
and quite simply should have been minimised. The
administrative task seemed to be daunting for the Australians,
and yet, had they been under substantial fire, it is quite
likely that resolve would have hardened and problems would
have been rectified. But that simply should not have had to
happen. War is difficult enough without administrative
problems detracting from combat capability.
l The problem of units arriving late at Morotai, prior to
1 embarkation, was still evident after Tarakan. In particular
No 111 MFCU arrived only two days before the convoy sailed for
This is discussed in Chapter 2.
162 Oboe
Labuan. Admittedly, the unit was called in at short notice
because No 110 MFCU did not have sufficient equipment nor
personnel to deploy. Nevertheless, it would appear to be a
failing of No 110 MFCU in not advising of their predicament
sooner or of higher authority not responding quickly enough.
Loading did improve for Labuan-Brunei Bay over that for
Tarakan (although there were still reports of mistakes and
confusion), but the landing area still became congested with
vehicles, personnel and equipment.
Inadequate accommodation at Morotai and on-board convoy ships
indicated poor planning. In respect of the latter, tropical
storms were frequent at that time of the year, and to
accommodate personnel, who were about to go into action, on
open decks reflects a questionable commitment by
administrative planners to the morale of those troops.
Co-location of Advanced Headquarters 1st TAF and Divisional
Headquarters was a continual problem. Even after the obvious
lessons for co-location at Tarakan, the CP/ASS was separated
from Divisional Headquarters by one and a half kilometres at
Labuan-Brunei Bay, which delayed requests for air support from
the Divisional Headquarters, and delayed the passing of vital
advice from the CP/ASS to the Divisional Headquarters.
Allocation of individual call signs to CP senior staff
improved responsiveness - another lesson that had been learnt from Tarakan, but this one was applied.
Site locations also posed problems at Labuan-Brunei Bay.
Incredibly, the Divisional Headquarters relocated several
times which meant that the ASS had to close down, open again,
close down, etc. Control did not pass ashore until 1100 hours
on 12 June, despite the ASS being ashore by 1730 on the 10th
and fully operable by 0730 on the 11th. This provided a
valuable lesson for the future, such that the ASS, once set
up, should have remained in operation until new circuits could
have been established at a new location. While this would
Observations 163
have reduced capacity by one-half, it would have provided
access to an ASS all the time.
Even at Labuan-Brunei Bay, there was still confusion that the
MFCU, the ASS, ASPS and ALPS were all fundamental to the
effective provision of air support. It was still not
realised, even after Tarakan, that these units had to have
priority in setting-up their equipment - they required rapid movement to their sites. No 111 MFCU experienced several
moves during Oboe Six, and had cause to complain about loading
procedures at Morotai.
Administration, communications and logistics instructions
improved in Oboes Six and Two, so it was pleasing to note that
the support tail was able to react to external and self-
criticism after Tarakan.
The intelligence effort on Tarakan airfield can only be
regarded as appalling. The mis-match of heavy equipment to
the conditions, the unsuitability of the airfield itself, and
lack of suitable paving materials should have been known
through good technical intelligence. It would seem that
considerable effort was expended on tactical intelligence (for
combat operations, especially for ground force operations and
specific air operations) but not enough on intelligence for
support operations and technical purposes, such as for
airfield suitability.
This may be endemic to the time, for there have also been
complaints of lack of technical intelligence in other specific
instances, for example on Japanese Zeroes. At a RAAF history
conference in Canberra in 1993, Group Captain Herb Plenty
observed that the intelligence of the time indicated that
there was no Japanese aircraft that could overtake a Hudson.
Imagine Plenty's surprise when he first encountered a Zero and
it gained on him, while he was flying a Hudson. He escaped
unscathed that time, but the experience did have him wonder
164 Oboe
why intelligence on the Zero's capability was not more
comprehensive and accurate, especially as one had made a
forced landing in China and both the British and Americans
would have had accurate performance data.
Dr Chris Coulthard-Clark also made the observation at the same conference that an RAAF Reserve Officer was serving as an air
adviser to Jiang Kai Check at the time and would have observed
Japanese aircraft capability over China.6
Herb Plenty's experience has been described in the book Bloody
Shambles with the account concluding with 'Not a single bullet
hole was found in the Hudson'.' Subsequently, Plenty was shot
down by a pair of Zeroes; the crew managed to es~ape.~ There
is also an account of Buffalo crews being surprised by the
Zero's ability to out-pace, out-climb and out-manoeuvre the
Airfield Construction Squadron (ACS) personnel, having worked
all day on the Tarakan airfield, and having reached the limits
of physical endurance, were then posted as guards at night. While the use of 'support' personnel in base combatant roles
was fundamental for effective self-defence, there needed to be
some commonsense applied.
1st TAP was dispersed in Noemfoor Island, Morotai, Tarakan and
Labuan and its mobility suffered as long lines of
communication and additional administration became essential.
See RAAF History Conference 1993 - The RAAF in the SWPA 1942-1945, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1993, pp.15-16.
ibid, p.16.
' Christopher Shores and Brian Cull with Yasuho Izawa, Bloody Shambles - Volume One, The Drift to War to the Fall of Singapore, Grub Street, London, 1992, p.312.
ibid, p.343.
ibid, p.291.
Observations 165
The administrative tail and the garrisoning of newly-occupied
areas where the enemy still operated, demanded a new
organisation. Thus, No 11 Group was formed - using elements of Northern Command and 1st TAF - and assumed administrative control of all Morotai units on 30 July. Air Commodore
Brownell, the AOC Western Area, assumed command, with Group
Captain Lush as Senior Air Staff Officer and Group Captain
Curnow as Staff Officer ~dministration."
' No 11 Group was to cover all Dutch territory north of latitude
7 degrees south and east of longitude 108 degrees east,
British North Borneo and Sarawak. The air bases which had to
be garrisoned immediately included Hollandia, Biak,
Middleburg, Morotai, Labuan and Tarakan. No 11 Group had to
provide local air defence, protect sea lanes, support adjacent
formations, attack enemy targets within range, and provide
lines of communication."
The war ended before the group became fully functional - although it had operational control of No 79 Squadron
Spitfires and No 82 Wing Liberators.
Conduct of the air operations over Tarakan revealed that it
was possible to have an air force, yet not deliver effective
air power on every occasion. There were other examples of
this throughout the subsequent Oboe operations. The conduct
of effective air operations is predicated on a complete system
- not a collection of air power 'bits and pieces', but a complete, operable and functional system. Quite obviously,
such a system can only be as strong as its weakest link.
Vertical integration of the elements of air power was
'O Odgers, p.478.
166 Oboe
fundamental to success in the three Oboe operations.12
Following on from the previous point, administrative support
had to be tied to operations. In this, the identification of
operational logistics, communications, and infrastructure was
vital. The current RAAF organisation recognises these lessons
of the Oboe operations. A dedicated Air Defence (Radar) Wing
exists - No 41 Wing, based at Williamtown. Similarly, the
RAAF maintains an Air Transportable Telecommunications Unit
(ATTU) which provides tactical and temporary Communications
Electronics" facilities and services, and an Operational
Support Unit (No 1 OSU) which provides operational,
administrative and logistics support for deployments.
There was a need to bring together all operational planning
staffs for the Oboe operations. For example, it is apparent
that 1st TAF and 13th AF did not, in a combined sense, plan
convoy protection procedures, which would have compounded the
problems facing the Commanders of the amphibious Task Groups.
Commonality of procedures for both joint and combined
operations could have been improved. Tarakan underscored the
need to determine procedures, and to promulgate, teach,
understand and rehearse them. It underscored too that
rehearsal must be in realistic operational scenarios. Today,
the sophistication of simulation makes operational scenarios
easier and cheaper to achieve, although rehearsal is still a
costly business.
This truism that 'you can have an air force but exercise no air power' was developed conceptually in Air Marshal R.G. Funnell, A i r Power a n d S m a l l e r P a c i f i c N a t i o n s - An A u s t r a l i a n [ A i r m a n ' s ] P e r s p e c t i v e , an unpublished Chief of the Air Staff Paper to Asian Aerospace 90 held on 15 February 1990, pp.9-10.
" Communications Electronics facilities and services encompasses: ground-to-ground and ground-to-air communications; navigational aids; air traffic control facilities; communications security monitoring facilities; and data and interfacing facilities.
Observa tl ons 167
Finally, perhaps the most abiding lesson to emerge from an
analysis of the Oboe operations is that the observations are
related to doctrine. Doctrine is a body of fundamental
principles which guide military forces in their actions. It
is authoritative but requires judgment in its application.
Air power doctrine across the three levels of war - strategic, operational and tactical - provides fundamental and enduring principles; distinct objectives, force capabilities, broad
mission areas and operational environments; and specific
weapon systems and a clear articulation of roles and tasks.14
A clear and unambiguous doctrine for the RAAF would have
provided less chance for 'error' during the Oboe operations.
ITurthennore, an Australian joint doctrine would have provided
for the better integration and employment of the RAAF with
naval and land forces. Similarly, a combined air power
doctrine would have provided for better integration of the 1st
' PAF and 13th AF. Because doctrine is so important to
effective operations, the final chapter is devoted to relating
the foregoing analysis of the Oboe operations to doctrine.
Epilogue
W offensive air operations ceased from 15 August, after
which RRAF Liberators carried out many surveillance, leaflet
drop and food/medical drop missions. No 82 Wing moved its
headquarters from Balikpapan back to Morotai on 5 September,
although detachments still remained.15
'' An excellent encapsulation of these notions appears in Directorate of Defence Studies, AP 3000, RAF A i r Power Doctrine, 2nd Edition, London, 1993, pp.8-9.
Michael V. Nelmes, Tocumwal t o Tarakan: Austral ians and t h e Consolidated 8-24 Liberator , Banner Books, Canberra, 1994, p. 140.
168 Oboe
On 10 September, it was announced that Lord Louis Mountbatten
would accept the surrender of Field Marshal Count Teraguchi at
Singapore on 12 September. l6 Lieutenant General Baba (GOC
Japanese forces in Borneo) flew to Labuan on the 10th and
formally surrendered to GOC 9th Australian Division." On the
13th, Lieutenant General Roberts (Commander 34 Indian Corps)
accepted the surrender of Lieutenant General Ishiguro
(Commander of the Japanese 29th Army) who formally surrendered
the Malay Peninsula, at Kuala Lumpur." And on 25 October,
Major General Nakamura ordered all Japanese troops at Semarang
to surrender to the Indonesians. Nakamura was then taken to
Batavia (Jakarta) .l9
Liberators were used to repatriate thousands of Australian
POWs. Even though the war was over, the RAAF found itself
still flying missions at sustained high rates of effort.
Maintenance became a real problem yet again, as a 25 Squadron
diary entry for November 1945 shows: 'Maintenance is becoming
extremely complicated, the majority of personnel with the
requisite knowledge of Liberator aircraft maintenance having
been posted for discharge, and are being replaced by
inexperienced per~onnel'.~~vacuation of POWs and other
Service personnel was completed by early November.
" PRO, Air 40/1437 - Malaya Far East Daily Summary No 143 of 10.9.45.
l' PRO, Air 40/1417 - Malaya Far East Daily Summary No 145 of 12.9.45.
l8 PRO, Air 40/1437 - Malaya Far East Daily Summary No 149 of 17.9.45.
'' PRO, Air 40/1417 - Malaya Far East Daily Summary No 176 of 29.10.45.
20 Nelmes, p.143.
CHAPTER SIX
DOCTRINE
There does not appear to have been any record of the air power
doctrine used during the Oboe operations. It is likely that
the doctrine from earlier operations in the Pacific theatre
was continued, and that considerable carry-over would have
occurred from the European and Middle East theatres.
Accordingly, it would be prudent to look first at some broad
observations that can be drawn from the use of close air
support prior to 1945. Next, the thoughts of leading airmen
such as Lord Tedder, Air Vice Marshal Wrigley and General
Arnold need to be assessed for relevance to the Oboe
operations. Certain principles espoused by Tedder for
tactical air forces provide a useful framework to analyse the
Oboe operations for their adherence to 'doctrine'. Finally,
the emergence of post-war doctrine requires comment as it
succinctly summarises many of the observations discussed
throughout this book.
Air Operations and Existing 'Doctrine'
The campaign in France in 1940 and the Western Desert
campaigns of 1941 had highlighted the importance of one single
authority having responsibility for command and administration
of all Royal Air Force (RAF) formations in the theatre. An
extension of this was the observation that all air forces in a
theatre needed to be under the one supreme air commander.' The
importance of a discrete air support organisation led the
British to form Army Co-operation Command before the end of
1940.2
RAF AP3235, Air Support, Air Ministry, London, 1955, p.21.
170 Oboe
In 1941, certain enduring principles emerged from the close
cooperation between the 8th Army and the Desert Air Force.
The Tactical Air Force (TAF) grew out of the Desert Air Force
and formed on 18 February 1943 under Air Vice-Marshal
Coningham who was made responsible for North West African
tactical air operations.
Within the TAP concept, the air commander (who had centralised
control over all aircraft) enjoyed equal status to a land
force commander. Notwithstanding, the air forces had to
provide support to the ground commander during all phases of
the operation. The two critical elements of close cooperation
were mobility and close contact between Army and Air Force for
planning, training and the conduct of operations. Close
contact could only be achieved if the TAF and Army
Headquarters were co-located.'
Two earlier campaigns are worthy of study to determine the
principles that were adopted by the TAF. General O'Connor
advanced from Sidi Barrani to Beda Fomm in 1940-41, with such
powerful support from the RAF that John Terraine was moved to
comment that O'Connor's advance was planned and executed
'virtually without regard to the opposing air force - a rare luxury' .
General Cunningham could not advance through East Africa in
1941 until the Italians had been defeated in the air, after
which the air effort was directed to support the advance. The
Army commander of the leading troops and the air commander
(Air Commodore Sowrey) occupied the same command post. This
close co-operation allowed immediate air cover to be provided
which 'engendered the greatest confidence amongst both
ibid, p.44.
' ibid, p.69. John Terraine, T h e R i g h t of the L i n e , Hodder and
Stoughton, London, 1985, p.316.
Doctrine 171
commanders and men'.
Translating this across to the Oboe operations. The desire to
CO-locate Advanced Headquarters 1st TAF (RAAF) with the Army
Headquarters on Tarakan and observations from the Middle East
theatre were not sufficient. It took the control problems
experienced at Tarakan to reaffirm the need for CO-location,
yet the problem was still not rectified at Labuan, although by
the time of the Balikpapan operation, it was finally
recognised as absolutely essential.
The success of O'Connor's and Cunningham's campaigns resulted
in a set of operational imperatives being developed. Among
others, fighter support was fundamental to success, air
casualty evacuation was necessary, and precision bombing of
selected targets was vital. These issues were addressed in
detail in the planning of the Oboe operations.
While air superiority proved essential in the Middle East
theatre, close support still could not work unless forces were
adequately positioned' and communications were reliable. While
this was not so much a doctrinal point as commonsense, there
were examples of poor communications leading to problems on
]Borneo.
So important was close support to General Auchinleck in May-
June 1942, that he observed of the RAF: ' . . . it alone enables us to retain any semblance of the initiati~e'.~ Translating
Auchinleck's observation across to the South West Pacific Area
(SWPA), close support was instrumental in allowing the
initiative to be taken at all Oboe landings, and the pre-
Terraine, p.325.
. ' Where enemy land forces were concentrated prior to engagement, they became excellent targets for air attack.
John Connell, Auchinleck: A Biography o f Field Marshal S i r Claude Auchinleck, Cassell, London, 1 9 5 9 , p.622.
172 Oboe
assault bombing in all cases ceded the initiative to the
Australians who undertook the landings.
While accolades were heaped upon the gallant aircrews in the
Middle East, after RouUnel had taken Tobruk it was the RAF
groundcrew who provided the foundation for success. They
moved from one base to another, prepared the new base while
another crew remained at the previous base, launching and
recovering aircraft until the base was overrun by the Germans.
Aircraft were actually able to conduct operations even while
their landing grounds were being captured.
In the SWPA, a similar philosophy in moving from base to base
(which entailed moving from island to island, or island-
hopping as it came to be known) was employed. In relation to
Oboe specifically, the inability to prepare Tarakan airfield
on time (7th May) led to significant operational problems
until 30 June, when Kittyhawks were able to operate from
there. Even so, the Beaufighters could not use the strip and
had to operate from Morotai. This affected RAAF support
operations for the subsequent Oboes Six and Two.
General Alexander, after the Allied invasion of Sicily,
commented to General ~paatz:~
'air attacks had not only heightened the morale of ground
and naval forces, but had seriously interfered with the
enemy's movements, disrupted his communications and
prevented the concentration of his forces to launch
large-scale counter attacks'.1°
Major General Spaatz was in command of the North-West African Strategic Air Force.
Marshal of the Royal Air Force The Lord Tedder, G.C.B., With Prejudice: The War Memoirs o f Marshal o f t h e Royal A i r Force, Lord Tedder, G.C.B. , Cassell, London, 1966, p.467.
Doctrine 173
The discussion in chapters 2,3 and 4 on each of the Oboe
operations showed that, due to air attacks against Japanese
ground forces, morale of the Australian troops was heightened,
that Japanese troop movements were significantly affected
(although there were not the concentrations about which
General Alexander was referring), and that enemy counter
attacks could not be launched.
Another campaign of relevance was the capture of Pantelleria
in June 1943. Situated in the narrows between Tunisia and
Sicily, Pantelleria offered another airfield to support those
on Malta. Concentrated air attacks were launched against the
island from 8 May to 11 June 1943. By the time Allied ground
forces arrived, the Italian garrison was ready to surrender.
While the Japanese on Borneo were not ready to surrender quite
so easily, air attack did force them out of their fortified
positions, set them on the run, and cede the initiative to the
advancing Australian troops.
l'he new TAF organisation in the Middle East was tested in
September 1943 in supporting the landings at Salerno, Italy.
The TAP had occupied Sicilian airfields which brought them
within range of the beachhead at Salerno. Once the airfield
at Montecorvino (near Salerno) was captured, airfield
construction engineers laid a 'prepared strip'. Although
under enemy fire, the task of laying the prepared strip was
relatively straightforward, which should be contrasted to the
experience of Tarakan. Allied bombers attacked airfields,
Lines of Communication (LOCs) and areas which the enemy could
use to oppose the Salerno landings in the lead-up to
September.
In May 1944, the lessons from tactical air support in the
European, North African and Mediterranean theatres to date
were integrated by Allied Force Headquarters and issued as an
174 Oboe
Operation Memorandum." The 'doctrine' reiterated the need for
close integration in air/land planning, and observed that land
operations may have to be adapted on certain occasions to
either assist or take full advantage of air operations.
Air support operations in Burma, especially by 1944, had
indicated certain fundamental requirements, which were
reflective of those on Borneo. First, good air-to-ground
communications were essential, and an air force liaison
officer was needed to be with the ground forces. Precise
target identification was often needed, through the use of
smoke mortar bombs, and complete photographic coverage of the
Objective Area (OA) was needed in advance.''
During 1944-45, advancing friendly ground forces in Burma
depended heavily on closely controlled air support. While
success of that air support was difficult to gauge, the low
incidence of friendly casualties during assaults has been
generally attributable to the efficiency of air support.'' Air
support tended to fail against entrenched enemy positions if
friendly ground forces could not advance rapidly and take
advantage of the bombing. The need for forward airstrips was
again evident, but in Burma, the monsoon rains conspired to
make some airfields unserviceable. These experiences in Burma
occurred again in Borneo some months later.
Air support over north-west Europe in 1944-45 also elicited
some important observations for the Borneo operations. First,
coordination of artillery and air support from aircraft based
over 200 kilometres away was exceedingly difficult in terms of
concentration of firepower and timing of coordinated attacks.
" Issued as Operation Memo. 54, 6 May 1944 - The Employment of Bombers and Fighter Bombers in Co-operation with the Army.
lZ Air Support, p. 139.
Doc t r ine 175
Second, air attacks did not become more accurate with
successive strikes, which was the case for artillery
bombardment. Third, precise location of the areas to be
attacked was difficult. The bottom-line was that air attacks
were more profitable in interdiction rather than against
targets near the frontline. Thus, the success of air support
was in interrupting enemy movements and helping to maintain
ithe momentum of advancing friendly land forces."
Often, the value of air attack lay in 'the ability of the
ground forces to exploit the confusion which followed
immediately after the air attacks'.15
,\part from the use of radio aids, the determination of a
bombline and use of ground marking panels were found to be
effective in ensuring friendly casualties did not eventuate
from any air attacks close to friendly positions. The advent
(of the mobile radar control post into the RAF in late 1944
simplified the process of air support. Similarly, the RAAF
Ibenefited from Mobile Fighter Control Units (MFCUs) during the
Borneo operations.
The obsemations discussed so far have all been positive, but
there were other more worrying lessons to emerge from the
European theatre. On 7 July 1944, Operation CHARNWOOD saw
2,000 tons of high explosive dropped in under 40 minutes on
,enemy rear areas on the outskirts of Caen.16 Carlo D'Este
recorded that 'not a single dead German or any enemy equipment
had been found in the area that had been bombedf."
l4 i b i d , p.181.
l5 i b i d .
l6 The operation is described in Terraine, p.651.
l' Carlo D'Este, Decis ion i n Normandy: The Unwri t t en S t o r y o f Montgomery and The A l l i e d Campaign, Collins, London, 1983, p.316.
176 Oboe
Continuing this observation - too much air-delivered firepower can be a hindrance. Destroyed villages actually slowed the
Allied advance through France. Asher Lee was to coment that
excessive aerial fire support became 'profligate and quite
useless' .ls
An obvious observation was that aerial reconnaissance was
needed to elicit the best targets to attack and the most
opportune time for the attack. The air attack on enemy troops
around Cassino (north-west of Naples) in February 1944 failed
to dislodge well dug-in ground forces. Success came only
after an air interdiction effort isolated the Cassino forces,
and Allied ground forces encircled and captured them on 18
May. l9
In terms of the operations on Borneo, there was not a lot of
dead bodies or destroyed enemy equipment, but the effect of
the bombing did drive the Japanese from their positions.
There was not the concentration of villages on Borneo that was
the case in France, and the Australian forces on Borneo were
much smaller in number and less encumbered with heavy
equipment than their counterparts in France and Italy.
Sufficient instances of air forces bombing friendly troops
occurred in the Middle East and European theatres to sound
alarm bells for the Pacific theatre. One example which
clearly showed the need for close co-ordination occurred on 14
August 1944 in Normandy. The British Army had marked its own
position with yellow flares and called in bombing support.
RAF Bomber Command also used the colour yellow, but in this
case, to indicate targets. 'The more the troops burnt yellow
flares to show their position the more the . . . . aircraft
lB Asher Lee, Air Power, Gerald Duckworth, London, 1955, pp.125-126.
l9 See Terraine, p.595.
Doctrine 177
bombed them'.20 On Borneo, co-ordination did appear to be
well-planned and executed, and while there were some close
calls, the problems experienced in Europe and the Middle East
were not replicated. Use of airborne Army observers and
airborne RAW co-ordinators (Support Air Observers) certainly
decreased the likelihood of 'fratricide'.
The Allies in the Middle East employed a 'cab rank' system, in
which aircraft arrived in an area at intervals of 30 minutes.
The crews were briefed to attack pre-selected targets, but 20
minutes before attacking, the aircraft would be in position
overhead to attack any higher priority targets that may have
arisen since the briefing. If a call was not received, the
aircraft would attack their pre-selected targets."
Similarly, in the Oboe operations, targets were pre-selected,
but if a target could not be attacked for any reason
(including if it had been destroyed already), aircraft could
be directed on to other targets. The use of Commander Support
Aircraft (CSA), Support Air Observers (SAOs), and airborne
Army observers has been described in detail in each of the
Oboe operations. Suffice it to say that provision of a CSA
ensured that air effort was not squandered and the SA0 was
able to co-ordinate the air support with ground force
requirements.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the lessons were well-
learnt by the time of the Labuan landing and no aircraft
departed the OA with unexpended bombs or ammunition that had
been allocated for use within the OA. Similarly, Beaufighters
that provided support for the landings were directed on to
targets further inland, once light opposition on the beaches
had been contained.
20 Terraine, p.661.
Terraine, p.596.
178 Oboe
Perhaps the greatest lessons for the Australians taking part
in the Oboe operations would have come from the invasions of
Sicily, Italy and Normandy. These amphibious assaults
required sound intelligence on the strength and disposition of
enemy forces and on the ability to capture nearby airfields.
The landings had to be covered by aircraft, as did the
subsequent break-out from the beach-heads. The air forces
also had to interrupt enemy communications, obtain air
superiority, and neutralise enemy air defences.
As well, the question of morale needs to be addressed.
Whether or not the enemy suffered significant material
destruction was a moot point. Many reports indicate that
concentrated aerial bombardment led to low morale in enemy
troops. These reports which originated from friendly Army
commanders were substantiated by diaries from captured enemy
forces. As well, bombing that was carried out in daylight and
within sight of friendly troops, led to a corresponding rise
in morale of those troops.22
In the SWPA, there were many instances of the RAAF flying
close support missions before the 1st TAF (RAAF) formed during
October 1944. RAAF Kittyhawk squadrons - Nos 75 and 76 -
contributed significantly to the Allied victory at Milne Bay
in August 1942. The RAAF was called upon in September to
contribute to the Allied victory on the Kokoda Track by
disrupting Japanese supply lines and air-dropping equipment.
Close support operations were flown by No 4 (Army Co-
operation) Squadron where Wirraway and Boomerang aircraft
contributed to the recapture of Lae, Salamaua and Finschhafen.
Other RAAF squadrons flew close support missions throughout
New Guinea.
22 Air Support, pp. 181-182.
23 Gary Waters, The Architect of Victory: Air Campaigns for Australia, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1991, pp.163-164.
D o c t r i n e 179
No 10 Operational Group formed at Nadzab in January 1944 and
provided close support to the 5th Division from Sio to Saidor,
and to the 7th Division in reaching Madang and Alexishafen.
RAAF squadrons supported Allied landings on New Britain in
December 1943 and during 1944 at Hollandia, Aitape, Biak,
Noemfoor and Morotai. They also contributed to the re-taking
of Bougainville in November 1943 by locating enemy positions,
directing artillery fire, conducting photographic
reconnaissance, operating a casualty evacuation service, and
air-dropping supplies and equipment.24
Even with the legacy of Tedder and Coningham and their
principles for close air support operations, many lessons
would have been forthcoming from this earlier RAAF experience
in the SWPA. Judging by the Operations Instructions issued
during the Oboe operations, and comparing them with several
aiir support directives that were issued in the Middle East in
particular, it seems a reasonable supposition that RAAF
planners were well-aware of the doctrine in-place in other
t.heatres . 2 5
A Manual o f D i r e c t A i r Support had been endorsed in June 1943,
and despite concerns over clarity and structure was used by
t.he Allies in the SWPA.26 They also used the US FM31-35,
A v i a t i o n i n Suppor t o f Ground Forces , which had been issued in
April 1942.27 The unsatisfactory nature of both documents led
in July 1943 to the promulgation of FM100-20, Command and
24 i b i d , p.164.
These directives include: Middle East (Army and RAF) Directive on Direct Air Support - September 1941; Air Support for the Eighth Army (from Elmhirst and Barratt Reports - August 1942); and Employment of Bombers and Fighter-Bombers in Co-operation with the Army - 6 May 1944.
Nicola Baker, More Than L i t t l e Heroes: A u s t r a l i a n Army A i r L i a i s o n O f f i c e r s i n t h e Second World War, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 106, SDSC, Australian National University, Canberra, 1994, p.43.
i b i d , pp.70-71.
180 Oboe
Employment of Air Power, which argued air superiority,
interdiction and close air support as priorities, flexibility
as air power's principal characteristic, and centralised
control as necessary to exploit the inherent fle~ibility.~'
And so it was that Kenney, in July 1943, issued his own Allied
Air Force SWPA Air Support Doctrir~e.~~ The RAAF followed
Kenney's doctrine, based on the beliefs in FM100-20, and
obtained valuable direct support experience throughout 1943
with its No 4 Army Cooperation Squadron (of Wirraways and
Boomerangs), No 22 Squadron (of Bostons), and No 30 Squadron
(of Beaufighters) over New Guinea; however, the squadrons were
withdrawn from direct support operations in July. From then
until the Oboe operations, the RAAF could only be said to have
been involved in direct support operations inte~mittently.~~
The landings and subsequent allied advances at Lae and Nadzab
in late 1943 allowed air liaison and direct support procedures
to be tested. From then on they were refined. These
refinements resulted in August 1944 in the compilation of
Army-Air Cooperation in New Guinea, produced by the Australian
Army's Advanced Land ~eadquarters.?' Similarly, experience in
amphibious operations had resulted in a well-honed system of
CAPS and CSAs (Afloat and Ash~re).~~
Then in September 1944, GHQ SWPA issued its Cooperative Action
of Land-Based and Carrier-Based Aircraft in Support of Landing
Operations, which codified procedures including the use of
Support Air Observers. It would appear that RAAF Air Support
ibid, p.71.
2 9 ibid, p.72.
'O ibid, pp.75-77.
ibid, p.111.
'' See Baker p.119, where she refers to Combat Air Patrol (CAP) as Air Alert and Commander Support Aircraft (CSA) as Support Air Controller (Afloat and Ashore).
Doctrine 181
Parties (ASPS) and an Air Support Section (ASS) were first
formed in February 1945 to establish the link between 6th Division and No 71 Wing at Tadji (just south of Aitape).)' The
RAAP and Australian Army began running their 'own show' at
Aitape-Wewak and Bougainville, and by the time Oboe started,
they were experienced in such operations.
Before examining those principles of Tedder's, which might
provide a reasonable guide to the doctrine employed during the
Oboe operations, it would be useful to discuss command and
clontrol .
C:onrmand and Control
Because the British forces in North Africa were outnumbered,
t.he overall theatre commander, General Alexander, centralised
t.he control of all air forces under Sir Arthur Coningham.
Ceneral Montgomery was the ground force commander, and he and
Cnningham operated from CO-located headquarters and were
afforded equal status.
1:t was the American defeat at Kasserine Pass in February 1943
that led to a reorganisation of American air power. The
decentralised organisation changed to a centralised one, where
General Spaatz had control of American air power in the North
West African theatre.
Subsequently, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Churchill, recognising the effect that centralised control of
air assets had within their respective national forces,
decided to centralise control of RAF and USAAF forces in
theatre. Air Marshal Tedder was appointed as the overall
Allied air commander for the Middle East theatre.
33 Baker, p. 127.
182 Oboe
This command and control doctrine also found its way into the
SWPA where General Douglas MacArthur used General George
Kenney as his air commander. Kenney:
'reorganised, reallocated resources, streamlined
logistics, sped weapons developments, and devised an air
campaign that would be the critical element in
MacArthur's island-hopping strategy'.34
To quote MacArthur's summation of Kenney's role after the
Allies captured Buna in New Guinea (in January 1943):
'The outstanding military lesson of this campaign was the
continuous calculated application of air power, inherent
in the potentialities of the Air Force, employed in the
most intimate tactical and logistical union with ground
troops ' . l5
While integrated planning and co-ordination worked well at
Kenney's level, the question must be posed as to why it failed
to work as well for the Oboe operations, where 1st TAF(RAAF)
and 13th AF (USAAF) did not appear to coordinate convoy
protection procedures so as to achieve commonality. An
interesting point develops from this - that there may have been a tendency to ignore the need for closer coordination
because the air elements tended to operate in their own
discrete units.
Air Marshal Tedder's Principles
The next step in analysing the doctrine of the time is to turn
to Air Marshal Tedder's principles of air power. Developed in
' Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, HQUSAF, JFACC Primer, Second Edition, February 1994, p.3.
35 AS quoted in JFACC Primer, p.4.
D o c t r i n e 183
North Africa, these principles related directly to a tactical
air force. Tedder's success in 1942, at El Alamein in
particular, saw a new awareness emerge of the value of a
tactical air force. Indeed, these principles formed the
foundation for Allied tactical air doctrine that emerged from
the Casablanca conference in January 1943.36 Tedder ' s principles encompassed:
1. Air power had to be independent of land and sea forces.
2. The Army Headquarters in the field and the Air
Headquarters had to be adjacent to one another. This
close proximity facilitated communication and co-
operation between the two services.
3. Every night the air and ground commanders needed to hold
a joint staff meeting to discuss problems and decide the
next day's program. The close air support and air
interdiction campaigns could then be integrated into the
ground commander's overall concept of operations.
4. Radar was very important to air and land forces. It had
to be located on airfields so that fighters would not be
caught on the ground and destroyed by a surprise enemy
attack.
5 . The fighter was the basic weapon of an air force. It
needed to be used for the following missions in this
Concentration on Tedder's principles in no way undersells the contribution made by Coningham; however, it was Tedder who penned the principles of tactical air operations. Tedder did say of Coningham, however, 'It was to him personally more than to anyone else that we owe the initiative and development of the joint land-air technique which became the doctrine and practice of the 8th Army and the Desert Air Force and subsequently of the Allied Armies and TAFs in North Africa and Europe'. From T h e T i m e s , 14 Feb 48, as cited in Vincent Orange, C o n i n g h a m : A B i o g r a p h y o f A i r M a r s h a l S i r A r t h u r C o n i n g h a m , KCB, KBE, DSO, MC, DFC, AFC, Center for Air Force History, Washington D.C., 1992, p.257.
184 Oboe
priority:
a. Fighter sweeps to clear the enemy from the sky.
b. Escort for light and medium bombers.
c. Interception of enemy aircraft.
d. As a fighter bomber to provide Close Air Support for
ground forces.
6. Rapid communications had to be assured between the Air
Headquarters and the Unit Commander. Effective air power
was based on being at the right spot at the proper time
to destroy the enemy air and land forces, and rapid
communications were essential to any flexible response by
aircraft.
7 . The entire air force had to be commanded from an Advanced
Headquarters located close to the front lines.
8. Air power needed to have a simplified chain of command.
Commanders had to restrict the number of people who
reported to them. These men had to be directly
responsible for air operations. During the North African
campaigns, Air Marshal Tedder had only six men report
directly to him. Thus, his mind was not bothered by
trivial matters. These responsibilities he delegated to
his key staff members.
9. Intelligence was very important to an air or ground
campaign. Tedder had to have the information coming in
constantly, right where he could see it. His
Intelligence and Operations officers sat at adjoining
desks and shared telephone lines to the units. Hence,
Air Marshal Tedder could walk in and get any information
he wanted immediately.
Doctrine 185
10. Mobility was the key to successful air operations.
Tedder believed units should be broken down, even to the
squadron level in a 50/50 ratio - each divided into two parts, with each part self-maintaining in all
departments. If independent operations were needed, he
employed a leapfrog technique. The first element would
deploy to the front; when the next deployment occurred
the second unit would leapfrog past the first unit to the
frontlines. The most forward element would then become
the command element to control the battle. Tedder also
believed that units should be able to move within four
hours and should deploy to support their operations in
isolation for three to four days.3'
These 10 principles provide a good framework by which to
evaluate air aspects of the Oboe operations; that is,
independence, adjacent headquarters, integration, radar
siting, fighter aircraft priorities, rapid communications,
advanced headquarters, simplified command chain, intelligence,
and mobility. But before assessing the Oboe operations along
these lines, there are two other airmen whose thoughts are
worth noting - the Australian Air Vice-Marshal Wrigley and the
American General 'Hapwnold.
Air Vice-Marshal Wrigley's Views
Air Vice Marshal H.N. Wrigley wrote that the objective of air
warfare was to bomb an enemy to achieve the most direct and
decisive effect." But Wrigley posed two questions in stating
this objective, which then allowed him to qualify it - must we
" Lt Col Charles M. Westenhoff, USAF, Military Air Power, Air University Press, Alabama, October 1990, pp.43-45.
See Alan Stephens and Brendan O'Loghlin (eds), The Decisive Factor: Air Power Doctrine by Air Vice-Marshal H.N. Wrigley, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1990, p.128.
186 Oboe
first destroy the enemy air forces? And should the first
objective therefore be to destroy enemy air forces?
This first objective, of destroying enemy air forces, was
clearly evident during all three Oboe operations, where the
airfields that could be used by Japan to project air power
were attacked well before the convoys departed for the OA.
Wrigley was astute in that he recognised that the objective of
air warfare should depend on the situation - that air power
should be used to contribute to success in the most direct and
decisive manner. 39
Wrigley's comments can be transposed directly to the Oboe
operations viz: in the passage of an expeditionary force (that
is, the convoys in the Oboe operations), temporary air
superiority should be achieved by attacking enemy airfields
and defensive CAPS should be flown over the expeditionary
forces. 40
Once the Army was ashore, Wrigley's views again reflect the
priorities for air operations - attack military objectives for immediate effect, protect Army co-operation aircraft, and
intervene in the land battle using direct support aircraft
(but only where such attack is the best option)."
There was a clear indication from Wrigley that suitable
airfields had to be selected carefully:
'Aerodromes and landing grounds should be selected by air
force personnel in consultation with the military staff
and full consideration given to questions of supply and
39 Stephens and O'Loghlin, p.129.
'O Stephens and O'Loghlin, p.130.
" That is, where artillery or Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) does not offer the best option. See Stephens and O'Loghlin, p. 130.
Doctrine 187
defence' . ''
He went on to say that the general effectiveness of air power
depended on mobility, and this was tied to suitably-sited
airfield^.'^ The failure at Tarakan in establishing a usable
airfield in time, affected the Labuan and Balikpapan
operations. Although in these cases, lack of the airfield was
not as critical as it could have been due to the relatively
weak Japanese defences.
The ability for aircraft to launch from geographically-
separated bases, yet still be concentrated over an area within
a matter of hours was stated by Wrigley as a fundamental issue for the use of air power.'Phis was to be a powerful
ingredient in the success of the Oboe operations in terms of
virtually unopposed amphibious landings. Another important
doctrinal point was that aircraft could be switched to
different targets as the situation on the ground developed" - that is, air power was wonderfully responsive to fluid
tactical situations on the ground. An important point here (and Wrigley recognised it) was that while targets could be
switched quickly and easily, the propensity to change the
essential objective had to be resisted. Selection and
maintenance of the aim was a fundamental principle of war
(recognised by many nations as the premier principle), which
could be negated if the flexibility of air power was not used
wisely.
4 2 ibid, p.139.
4 3 ibid, p.140.
" ibid, p.153.
4 5 ibid.
188 Oboe
As Dr Alan Stephens has observed with respect to the Bornec.
operations, the RAAF was 'exposed to the full range of ail
power concepts and ~perations'.'~ Policy for the employment oi
Australian air power in the SWPA extended to: air superiority,
air bombardment (heavy and medium), light bombardment
(including use of dive bombers), torpedo attacks,
reconnaissance, fleet co-operation, and army CO-~peration.~'
As Dr Stephens has also observed, 'the critical importance of
establishing air superiority was emphasised'." In fact, A ~ I
Vice-Marshal Bostock went further than Wrigley in stating that
fighter aircraft should not be diverted to ground attack while
enemy aircraft posed a threat to operation^.^^
Again, it was Dr stephens who viewed Air Marshal Richard
Williams' comments as significant, viz Williams' delight at
'the success of the Australian forces in Borneo' and that
Australian land and air forces 'are at last working together
in what might be termed "their own little show"'.50 Stephens
has argued that the successful planning and conduct of
operations at Balikpapan 'demonstrated a sound understanding
of the principles, determinants and nature of air power, at
least at the operational and tactical levels'.51
46 Alan Stephens, Power Plus Attitude: Ideas, Strategy ana Doctrine in the Royal Australian Air Force 1921-1991, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1992, p.69.
4' ibid, p.70, and footnote 93.
ibid, p.70.
ibid.
ibid, p.70, and see footnote 98.
Doctrine 189
General Arnold's Principles
Throughout the War, General Arnold, USAAF had tried to have
the air force operate under his 10 principles. While there
are similarities with Tedder's, the obvious differences make
for interesting analysis; after all their respective foci
differed. Arnold argued in more of a strategic sense,
addressing all the issues of air power.52
1. The main job of the Air Force was bombardment: large
formations of bombers had to strike the enemy before the
enemy could hit friendly forces. In short, the best
defence was attack.
2. Friendly aircraft had to be able to function under all
climatic conditions from the North Pole to the South
Pole.
3. Daylight operations, including daylight bombing, were
essential to success, for it was the only way to bomb
precisely. A precision bombsight was essential, and
bombing could only be effective in daylight as decisive
combat eventually had to be waged with the enemy Air
Fozce.
4. Highly developed, highly trained crews working together
as a team - on the ground for maintenance and in the air for combat - were essential.
5. In order to bring the war home to Germany and Japan, and
deprive them of the things that were essential for their
war operations, strategic precision bombing of key
targets, deep in the enemy territory, such as aircraft
factories, oil refineries, steel mills, aluminium plants,
submarine pens, Navy yards, and so on had to be carried
Westenhoff, pp.28-30.
190 Oboe
6. In addition to strategic bombing, tactical operations in
co-operation with ground troops had to be carried out.
For that purpose fighters, dive bombers, and light
bombers for attacking enemy airfields, communications
centres, motor convoys and troops, were essential.
7. All types of bombing operations had to be protected by
fighters. This was proved to be essential in the Battle
of Britain, and prior to that, American exercises with
bombers and fighters indicated that bombers alone could
not elude modern pursuit aircraft, no matter how fast the
bombers travelled.
8. Air Forces had to be ready for combined operations with
ground forces, and with the Navy.
9. Research and development programs had to be maintained so
as to have the latest equipment that it was possible to
get, as soon as it was possible to get it.
10. Air power was not made up of aircraft alone. It was a
composite of aeroplanes, aircrews, maintenance crews, air
bases, air supply, and sufficient replacements in both
aircraft and crews to maintain constant fighting
strength, regardless of the losses inflicted by the
enemy. In addition, the backing of a large aircraft
industry in the United States to provide all kinds of
equipment, and a large training establishment that could
furnish the personnel when called upon were essential.
While Arnold's principles provide a solid doctrinal
understanding of air power and air forces, and have relevance
to any national air force, the tactical nature of the Oboe
operations and the tactical focus of Tedder's principles, make
the latter more useful in any study of the air operations over
Doctrine 191
Tarakan, Labuan and Balikpapan. Amold's principles are
discussed more to indicate the strategic view of air power, as
a scene setter so that Tedder's principles at the operational
and tactical levels can be viewed in context.
Independence
Air support of the Oboe operations was provided by an
organisation independent of the Army. Air forces had long
argued for an organisation that could be structured
specifically and optimally for air operations, that would
necessarily involve an organisation separate from the Army and
Navy. The RAF was the first independent air force to form,
with the Royal assent being granted in 1918, followed by South
Africa in 1920, Australia in 1921, Canada in 1922 and New
Zealand in 1937.53
Independence, however, was not the end of the matter. In a
theatre of operations, all aspects of an air force needed to
be under the one commander. Similarly, all air forces in the
theatre needed to be directed by the one commander. And so it
was for Oboe, with all RAAF elements under command of AVM
I3ostock, and all 5th and 13th AF elements at least under
Bostock's direction. While Bostock coordinated all planning
effort, and in this respect would have acted as a true
operational commander, he was rarely any further forward than
Morotai, and the detailed coordination of actual operations in
support of the Army once ashore was left to Air Commodore
Scherger as AOC 1st TAF.
Thus, the Oboe operations observed the doctrinal tenet of
independence, with the concomitant requirement for all RAAF
elements to be under the one single authority, and the logical
extension that all air forces in-theatre would, at least, be
53 Hilary St George Saunders, Per Ardua: The Rise of British Air Power 1911-1939, Oxford University Press, 1944.
192 Oboe
directed by the one air commander.
Adjacent Headquarters
The need for CO-location of Advanced Headquarters 1st TAF and
Divisional Headquarters was recognised from the very beginning
and siting plans reflected the need for the headquarters to be
adjacent. For this reason, planners had accepted that the one
ASS could service both headquarters. Once ashore at Tarakan
however, the headquarters were not located together, and the
ASS had to be scaled down to an ASP to operate within 26
Brigade Headquarters. This adversely affected the provision
of air support.
The lesson was well-learnt one month later at Labuan and the
1st TAF Command Post (CP) was located alongside 9 Division
Headquarters (HQ). Unfortunately the site was unsuitable due
to insufficient space and poor radio reception, and after
several moves, the CP was located one and a half kilometres
from the Divisional HQ. Thus, delays were experienced in
obtaining divisional decisions on requests for air support and
in passing specialist air operations advice to the Divisional
HQ. One of the observations after Labuan was that Army and
RAAF headquarters should be located adjacent to one another.
By the time of the Balikpapan operation, the lesson had been
learnt and the ASS and the 1st TAF CP moved ashore with HQ 7
Division and the CP set up adjacent to the Divisional
Headquarters.
Integration
Tedder's principle that a joint staff meeting should be held
each night to integrate the close air support and air
interdiction campaigns into the ground commander's overall
Doctrine 193
concept of operations is difficult to comment on in relation
to the Oboe operations.
It is unlikely that much joint nightly planning would have
occurred on Tarakan, since Air Commodore Cobby and his two
group captains were replaced not long after setting up their
CP. Air Commodore Scherger and his two group captains - Murdoch and Duncan - would likely have had their hands full just dealing with day-to-day issues, and coming to grips with
the unenviable situation in which they found themselves.
Additionally, with the difficulties associated with the
Tarakan airfield, and the problems of air support being
provided from distant bases, they would have been preoccupied
with predominantly air issues.
Fortunately, there was virtually no enemy air opposition at
'I'arakan, and 9 Division forces were able to prevail over their
opposing ground forces. However, had the situation on the
ground been more complex, there undoubtedly would have been
c:riticism of a lack of air/land coordination.
Even at Labuan, with the Headquarters situated one and a half
kilometres apart, it is hard to imagine nightly meetings
taking place since it appears that all decisions were being
delayed by several hours. Similarly, there is no evidence of
nightly meetings at Balikpapan, but the obvious improvement in
coordination would indicate that the staffs at least benefited
from being CO-located. They obviously met at sufficiently
frequent intervals to resolve any problems and it is
inconceivable to imagine that daily or nightly meetings would
not have occurred.
Radar Siting
The need to locate radar on airfields to ensure that the
airfield would not be surprised by enemy air attacks was
194 Oboe
certainly realised. Use of air warning and Ground Control
Intercept (GCI) radars and a Mobile Fighter Control Unit
(MFCU) was indicative of such a realisation. However, on
Tarakan, some radar equipment was late in arriving, and in
other cases, did not arrive at all. Additionally, the RAAF
could not site the MFCU and GC1 together. Another problem
arose on Tarakan - the RAAF was keen to establish the GC1 site as quickly as possible, which placed a strain on the movements
organisation at a critically early time, and also meant that
the site was probably not optimal and a new site would have to
be established later.
At Labuan, the radars were operable within 16 hours of the
landings. The principal observation would have to be that as
soon as the airfield and permanent radar sites could be
secured, the better would be the subsequent air support.
Similarly, at Balikpapan, the forward echelon of the MFCU had
the air warning and GC1 radars operating within 12 hours of
landing. The entire system at Balikpapan was fully
operational within four days of the landings.
By the time of Balikpapan, standard operating procedures for
air defence had been well-refined. The MFCU issued air raid
warnings, allocated responsibilities to air and ground
defences, and controlled fighter aircraft until they
established visual contact with any enemy intruder aircraft.
As well, the MFCU coordinated all air and ground defence
activities.
The fact that enemy aircraft were able to attack Tarakan
airfield (and escape), and that one month later they were
unable to reach Labuan airfield (with three aircraft being
shot down) indicates that the fighter control system was, by
then, very effective. Balikpapan airfields were not
threatened, but whether that was a product of effective air
defences or that Japan's offensive capability was severely
strained is difficult to say. Nevertheless, it would be
Doctrine 195
reasonable to assume that air defences and the fighter control
organisation would have been as effective at Balikpapan, had
it proved necessary, as they were at Labuan.
Fighter Operations
Comments on fighter operations are closely related to those on
radar siting, and the previous discussion on air defences and
the fighter control organisation applies equally here.
Tedder's doctrinal priorities were never an issue during the
Oboe operations, as the enemy did not contest the skies, and
while fighter escorts accompanied bombers in the lead-up to
all landings, after the landings, air alert fighters overhead
the respective OAs were considered sufficient protection for
any bombers in the OAs.
Air effort was dedicated exclusively to supporting the ground
forces, and there was never any argument about air effort not
being used to support ground force operations. Any problems
tended to be ones of inexperience or lack of coordination, and
by the time of Labuan and Balikpapan, problems experienced
earlier had been largely resolved.
Allocation of primary and secondary targets in the OA, use of
the cab rank system and the freedom to attack targets of
opportunity were all indicative of the importance that air
commanders placed on supporting the ground forces and not
squandering air effort. By the time of Labuan, air support
aircraft did not depart the OA with unexpended bombs or
ammunition that had been allocated for use within the OA.
Similarly, CAP aircraft tasked with supporting the landings
would be directed on to secondary targets if opposition on the
ground was sufficiently light that the Army commander felt he
could manage without the planned direct air support.
Instances of technical malfunction that meant primary targets
196 Oboe
could not be attacked, saw secondary targets attacked if the
malfunction had been rectified before the aircraft departed
the OA.
While aerial-delivered firepower may not have destroyed many
enemy defensive positions, or indeed killed many enemy troops,
it did force the Japanese to leave their defensive positions,
invariably in circumstances that favoured the advancing
Australians.
Air support over the landings was highly effective and little
enemy opposition was encountered on the beaches. Similarly,
precision attacks were prosecuted over the beaches and at
times on the inland advances, within 100 metres of friendly
forces. Other than one case of US aircraft attacking friendly
forces on Parramatta Ridge, the precision support was well
coordinated and well provided.
Precise air support was necessary because the most effective
close support occurred when friendly forces were within 100
metres of the enemy and could capitalise on the confusion and
damage caused by the bombing. If ground forces were just 200
metres away, they were generally unable to influence enemy
positions once bombing ceased.
Rapid Connnunications
While communications procedures with the attacking ground
forces appeared to be effective, problems were experienced
over the convoys. Incorrect frequencies, call signs and IFF
codes were evident during the convoy movement to Tarakan.
Once ashore, the Tarakan ASS had trouble communicating with
13th AF due to different cudes and cyphers, a problem which
was not rectified in the subsequent Oboe operations.
Doctrine 197
Landline communications were laid according to schedule, and
the respective MFCU and 1st TAF CP always had this particular
communications link established' on time in all three
operations. The ASPS experienced communications difficulties
in late afternoons which would have limited flexibility.
Perhaps the indicting observation to be made of communications
at Tarakan was that a considerable amount of direct air
support was prevented from being used during the first two
days due to indifferent communications - this was not a
problem at Labuan or Balikpapan.
While the communications links between CSA (Afloat) and direct
support aircraft worked well at Tarakan and Balikpapan,
communications between the two CSAs (Afloat) at Labuan were a
failure. Fortunately, the ASPS provided a solution until the
CP was established ashore.
~y the time of the Labuan operation, communications procedures
were well espoused in the Operations Instructions, even to the
extent of procedures for sending 'spoof' messages. A plan for
jamming and deception was implemented and procedures were
adopted to counter similar enemy moves at deception and
jamming .
There should be no doubt that the detailed coordination of all
activities depended on effective and rapid communications.
Coordination of ships, aircraft, and land forces once ashore
were fundamental to success, especially when joint operations
were involved. So too were communications for air warning,
fighter control, navigation, direct support, command purposes,
weather, coast watch and intelligence, fundamental to success.
Communications were also essential for coordinating NGS,
artillery fire and aerial fire support. Similarly,
communications were essential for coordinating air- and
ground-based air defences. Dedicated frequencies were used
more and more as the Oboe series proceeded, but there were
198 Oboe
instances where forces did not appreciate just what this
meant. For example, the Support Air Observers did not realise
that they could communicate directly with direct support
aircraft until after the Labuan operation.
One clear failing would appear to be the inability of Army
airborne observers to be in direct contact with the ASPS:
although the Army observer could communicate with CSA and the
ASS/CP. Another failing was the need foz CSA and the ASS/CP
to request additional information continually, which indicated
that many units did not realise that the changing air and
ground situations necessitated continual passing of relevant
information. What tended to happen was that units waited
until they were asked to pass the information. Not only did
this generate unnecessary communications (ie asking for the
information), but it also complicated matters as the
information would be communicated virtually at the time that
it needed to be acted upon (thus frustrating planners).
It would seem obvious that command communications needed to be
retained at all times; yet, at Tarakan, the Brigade Commander
was out of the communications link for a period, which meant
that air effort could not be applied in certain cirumstances
until communications were re-established with the Commander.
Advanced Headquarters
The doctrine for establishing advanced headquarters was
followed. From the RAAF's point of view, RAAF Command
established an advanced HQ at Morotai, while retaining its
main HQ at Brisbane. 1st TAF was headquartered at Morotai,
and established an advanced HQ at Tarakan for subsequent
operations at Labuan and Balikpapan. Although, the delays
experienced with the Tarakan airfield undoubtedly would have
complicated matters.
Doctrine 199
Similarly, Allied Air Forces (AAF), with its rear echelon at
Brisbane, established an advanced HQ at Manila, as did Far
East Air Forces (FEAF). 5th AF established an advanced HQ at
Clark Field in the Philippines, and 13th AF established its
advanced HQ at Leyte.
While one would expect the AAF HQ at Manila to control air
operations centrally, the execution of the actual operations
would have occurred at the other headquarters. For the Oboe
operations, AAF HQ would appear to have had little
involvement, with RAAF Command taking on the planning role of
an operational HQ.
Simplified C o m n d Chain
It is difficult to determine the precise span of command of
the key commanders, but air force doctrine to emerge after the
war indicated the need for commanders to allow subordinates
freedom to exercise initiative without delegating too much
responsibility .5'
From a 1st TAF perspective, the AOC (Scherger) delegated
responsibilities to his two key staff officers - operational matters to Murdoch and administrative matters to Duncan.
Intelligence
While it is relatively straightforward to comment on the
efficacy of intelligence prior to the landings, information on
intelligence activities during the subsequent air/land
operations is scant. Intelligence was quite reasonable on
geography, enemy strengths, airfields, anti-aircraft and
aircraft capabilities, likely Japanese target priorities and
5 4 ~ ~ 1 3 0 0 Operations, UK Air Ministry, March 1957, p.112.
200 Oboe
tactics, and weather for flying conditions and the conduct of
specific operations. Clearly, the intelligence on the
suitability of the airfield at Tarakan for prolonged
operations was flawed.
Effective tactical intelligence depended on rapid
communications, and would have improved as communications
improved; as the air support organisation and procedures were
refined; and once the 1st TAF CP and the divisional HQ were
CO-located, by the time of the Balikpapan operation.
Within the TAF, air intelligence had four principal functions.
First, it had to provide close liaison with Army as operations
were almost entirely devoted to direct support. Second, due
to the essential liaison requirement, effective communications
were essential. Third, the organisation had to be flexible
and responsive enough to cope with rapidly changing air and
ground situations. Finally, because the TAF could be cut-off
from the rest of the air force, the intelligence organisation
had to be able to continue operating.
To meet these requirements, the organisation was structured
around a chief intelligence officer with an operations
intelligence deputy and an administration and organisation
deputy. The latter had responsibility for administration
support of the intelligence organisation, intelligence
security, and escape and evasion procedures. The operations
intelligence deputy had responsibility for: current operations
reporting claims, enemy order of battle and airfields, target
planning and production, anti-aircraft weapons and radar,
communications intercept, POW intelligence, and technical
intelligence. The target planning cell provided the necessary
liaison with Army and included current reconnaissance
reporting.
Doctrine 201
Mobility
While Tedder's notion of mobility was more in terms of
leapfrogging forward on land (from airfield to airfield),
Scherger adopted a similar notion of leapfrogging airfields,
only he moved from one discrete OA to the next (which was not
necessarily forward). Scherger moved from Morotai to Tarakan
on Borneo's north east coast, then moved his CP to Labuan on
the north west coast, then back to the east coast, just south
of Tarakan, at Balikpapan. Once his advanced HQ had been
established at Tarakan, he was always able to maintain control
over his air operations in support of Labuan and Balikpapan.
As it turned out, the redundancy (afforded by his advanced HQ)
was never required, as the command posts were set up
effectively in each case.
As Tedder argued for effecting control from his most forward
element as it became established, with control being
relinquished from the immediate past control element, so it
was for the Oboe operations. Here we saw CSAs (Afloat)
controlling air support during the convoys and amphibious
landings. Once the streamlined air support organisation had
been introduced at Labuan, control passed ashore when the ASPS
became operational. This was only temporary, and once the 1st
TAF CP was established, control then passed to Scherger.
So, in a sense, Scherger did employ Tedder's leapfrogging
technique, although not quite along the symmetrical lines
enjoyed by Tedder; quite simply because the 'most forward
element' for Scherger was the particular landing at the time,
and the nearby airstrip.
Post-War Doctrine
While there was no universally endorsed operational doctrine
across all theatres, it is quite obvious that the refinement
202 Oboe
of air support procedures from the European and Mediterranean
theatres and Tedder's principles in particular, were not only
known by the RAAF planners for Oboe, but were also acted upon.
The tactical procedures used during the Oboe operations would
appear to have been well constructed, although there were
obvious breakdowns. However, the clear lack of doctrine at
the operational level must have adversely affected the
operational commanders - in particular, Bostock and Scherger. This apparent lack of operational doctrine also applied to the
RAF on the other side of the world, although the RAF had the
directives mentioned earlier and its basic doctrinal
publication for the conduct of air operations - the AP1300 - which devoted one chapter to air support. The third edition
of the AP1300 was released in 1950 and the fourth and final
edition in 1957. The AP1300 was a watershed for the RAF, and
the RAAF adopted the publication as an accurate reflection of
its own basic doctrine. It was not until 1955 that a
comprehensive doctrine for air support was issued as AP3235,
although this was largely an historical account of air support
throughout World War 11, as experienced by the RAF.
The post-War AP1300 does provide a good insight into the basic
doctrine (in a philosophical sense) that carried the air
forces through the war. It focused on the interdependence of
land and air operations, with three main principles. First,
the land and air staffs had to work as one team, from the
formulation of plans to their execution. Operations had to be
designed to exploit the combined potential of land and air
forces to the best advantage. Second, true flexibility of air
power would only be obtained through centralised command and
decentralised execution. Third, a land force commander should
have to deal with one air commander only.55
Doc t r ine 203
The doctrine argued that air forces could contribute to the
land battle in two ways - direct intervention (direct support) or indirect influence (indirect support). The former involved
close air support, air reconnaissance and tactical air
transport, and could be used offensively to support an advance
or defensively to counter an enemy attack. The latter
involved air operations outside the immediate battle area, to
paralyse enemy movements or simply to harass the enemy.
Tactical air operations involved five distinct roles - counter air (both offensive and defensive), interdiction, air
reconnaissance, close air support, and air transport support.56
The AP1300 also argued that close air support was not
appropriate when targets were within range of surface-to-
surface weapons organic to friendly ground forces. Although,
four caveats were articulated viz:
a. when surface-to-surface weapons were less suited than
air-delivered weapons,
b. when surface-to-surface weapons were incapable of
achieving the desired results,
c . when the urgency of the situation demanded support from
all weapons, and
d. when air-to-surface and surface-to-surface weapons, used
in conjunction, could produce decisive result^.^'
The doctrine argued that tactical air operations meant air
forces had to exhibit three fundamental characteristics - flexibility (to switch from one task to another), adaptability
(the ability to perform more than one role and to be equipped
56 ibid, pp.64-65. For the current Australian doctrinal definition of these roles, refer to the AAP 1000.
204 Oboe
to perform more than one role), and mobility (the ability to
deploy rapidly) . 5 @
The doctrine also described the necessary organisation for
controlling tactical air operations. A theatre commander
would have responsibility for overall policy direction of the
air/land battle. While control may be delegated, the theatre
commander would normally retain control over medium-range
transport aircraft, light bombers and medium-range
reconnaissance aircraft, as well as air defence aircraft
tasked with protecting the rear areas.59
At field force level, the doctrine argued for a Joint
Operations Centre which would determine the policy for the
conduct of the air/land battle, prepare plans for air action,
allot the air effort to particular roles, and coordinate all
air action. Specific cells would be required to coordinate
strike and reconnaissance, air defence (both air- and ground-
based) and air transport operations. The need for air support
and air liaison parties within brigade and battalion groups
was also highlighted.
Perhaps an appropriate point to close this discussion on
doctrine would be with final reference to the AP1300, with
respect to the future. The doctrine argued that while future
scientific and technological developments would abound, the
validity of well-proven principles for the conduct of tactical
air operations in joint warfare was unlikely to diminish. The
doctrine also cautioned that it was just as important not to
be so inflexible as not to formulate new operational and
tactical doctrines to fit new ~ircumstances.~'
5B ibid, pp.70a and 70b.
59 ibid, pp.70~ and 70d.
ibid, pp. 70e and 70f
Doctrine 205
It concluded:
'Finally, defence strategy is founded on the unity of
purpose of the three Services. To translate this unity
into effective action, common tactical doctrines,
standardised procedures, compatible equipment and a high
degree of inter-service understanding at all levels are
required so that the various elements of the air, land
and1 sea forces that are so inseparably linked in joint
operations can work effectively t~gether'.~'
This the Australians achieved as they prosecuted their most
comprehensive and successful joint operations ever - at
Tarakan Island, Labuan Island-Brunei Bay, and Balikpapan, in
1945.
CONCLUSION
Australia gained considerable national pride from planning and
conducting the Oboe operations. It was the first time that
substantial operations were conducted involving joint Australian
forces as the main force, with some support from Allies. Most
important of all, the Oboe operations were a success.
The three operations followed a well-planned sequence that was
refined after each operation. The fact that substantial changes
were not made during Balikpapan over the planning for Tarakan,
indicates that the original concept for air operations was sound.
This concept, firmly rooted in doctrine, saw a phased operation,
with enemy air capability and significant infrastructure attacked
first, followed by preparation of the battlefield, and then
finally, close air support.
Significantly, there were procedural and minor tactical lessons
to be progressively learnt as Tarakan, Labuan Island/Brunei Bay
and then Balikpapan were captured. The fact that many of these
lessons were adopted prior to the next operation is an indication
(of how responsive the doctrine was to actual operations. The
tabuan landing occurred less than six weeks after the Tarakan
landing, and there was only a three-week gap between Labuan and
Balikpapan.
The RAM carried with it the doctrine that had been developed in
other theatres and refined, to a limited degree, by it in the
South West Pacific Area. While RAAF doctrine was not
specifically written as such, many of the principles embodied in
effective air support operations were followed during the Oboe
operations. This probably should not come as a surprise, since
the R A A F was keenly aware of RAF doctrine in particular, and
readily adopted RAF doctrine (via the AP1300) as descriptive of
its own doctrine. What should come as a surprise, however, is
that the RAAF would cease to use the AP1300 in the 1970s and not
develop its own doctrine until the 1990s.
208 Oboe
Now that the RAAF has developed its own doctrine, with its first
edition of the AAP1000 appearing in 1990 and its second edition
in 1994, and now that, broadly speaking, the RAAF appears
comfortable with that doctrine, it is likely that further
refinements will come, in the main, from detailed historical
studies. While the fundamental issues raised in AAPlOOO are
unlikely to change, studies such as this one do indicate that
further refinement is possible, especially in relation to air
support doctrine.
As the Australian Defence Force focuses more and more on joint
operations and refines its joint procedures, there will be a need
to analyse both the history and concept of direct air support in
more detail. It is possible that such historical and conceptual
studies will lead to minor refinements of the RAAF's current
doctrine.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Unpublished Official Records
Public Record Office, Kew, UK
PRO, Air 40/1417 - Malaya Far East Daily Summary No 145 of 12 September 1945.
PRO, Air 40/1417 - Malaya Far East Daily Summary No 176 of 29 October 1945.
PRO, Air 40/1437 - Malaya Far East Daily Summary No 143 of 10 September 1945.
PRO, Air 40/1437 - Malaya Far East Daily Summary No 149 of 17 September 1945.
PRO, Air 40/1761 - RAAF Command Intelligence Summary No 9 of 31 March 1945.
IPRO, Air 40/1761 - RAAF Command Intelligence Summary No 14 of '5 May 1945.
PRO, Air 40/1761 - RAAF Command Intelligence Summary No 20 of 16 June 1945.
PRO, Air 40/1761 - RAAF Command Intelligence Summary No 23 of 7 July 1945.
PRO, Air 40/2201 - Report of Japanese Air Order of Battle Conference 5-23 February 1945, Washington DC.
PRO, Air 40/2208 - Japanese Air Forces Order of Battle Report No 76 of 15th April 1545.
PRO, Air 40/2208 - Japanese Air Forces Order of Battle Report No 77 of 22nd April 1945.
PRO, Air 40/2217 - Headquarters Allied Air Forces Intelligence Report 'Japanese Fighter Tactics', January 1945.
RAAF Historical Section, Canberra
Oboe One Box File
Air Observation Post Operations (Flight Lieutenant Drabsch).
Air Support Party Operations (Flight Lieutenant MC. Stewart).
No 1 Australian Corps Intelligence Review No 2, 10 April 1945.
Memorandum TR18, 25 April 1945.
210 Oboe
RAAF Command AAF, SWPA, Report of OBOE One Operations, May 1945.
RAAF Command Operations Instruction No 78/45.
RAAF File 1/2/9, 29 May 1945.
RAAF File 1/2/9 (Group Captain Rooney).
RAAF File 2/17/18, 11 May 1945.
RAAF File 24/5/Air (47A), 29 May 1945.
RAAF File 311.2373, 16 May 1945.
Oboe Two Box File
21 AIF Administrative Order No 1.
RAAF Command Operations Instruction No 154/1945.
R A M Operation Plan 6-45.
1st Tactical Air Force Operations Order 2/1945.
Oboe Six Box File
No 1 Air Support Party Report on Oboe Six operations.
No 1 Australian Corps Intelligence Review No 3, 8 May 1945.
No 9 Australian Division Operation Order No 4, 17 June 1945.
Joint Operation - Brunei, Labuan.
No 111 Mobile Fighter Control Unit Report on Oboe Six operations.
RAAF Command AAF, SWPA, Report of OBOE Six Operations, June 1945.
RAAF Command Operations Instruction No 98/1945
RAAF File 1/2/10, 1 July 1945.
RAAF File 2/42/Air, 27 June 1945.
RAAF File 4/5/Air, 27 June 1945.
RAAF File 305/3/E, 6 July 1945.
RAAF File 2103/13/E, 30 June 1945.
RAAF Report TR20, 20 June 1945.
Bibliography 211
1st Tactical Air Force Administrative Instruction 9/45.
1st Tactical Air Force Command Post Report on Oboe Six operations.
1st Tactical Air Force Operations Instruction 63/45.
1st Tactical Air Force Operations Order 1/1945.
RAF Eendon Archives
Air Ministry Intelligence Summary No 290 of 24 March 1945.
Monographs and Monograph Chapters
Nicola Baker, More Than L i t t l e Heroes: Australian Army A i r Liaison O f f i c e r s i n the Second World W a r , Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 106, SDSC, Australian National University, Canberra, 1994.
Jrohn Bennett, Defeat t o Vic tory: No 453 Squadron RAAF, RAAF Museum, Point Cook, Victoria, 1994.
C!haz Bowyer, Beaufighter a t War , Ian Allan Ltd, UK, 1976.
John Connell, Auchinleck: A Biography o f Field Marshal S i r Claude Auchinleck, Cassell, London, 1959.
(:.D. Coulthard-Clark, 'An Extraordinary Group of People: I'ersonalities from the 1920s to the 1970s', in Aus tra l ia ' s A i r Chiefs: RAAF History Conference 1992, Air Power Studies C:entre, Canberra, 1992.
Carlo D'Este, Decision i n Normandy: The Unwritten Story o f Montgomery and The Al l ied Campaign, Collins, London, 1983.
General Kenney Reports: A Personal History o f the Pac i f i c War, reprinted by Office of Air Force History, USAF, Washington, D.C., 1987.
E.G. Keogh, The South West Pac i f i c 1941-45, Grayflower Productions, Melbourne, 1965.
Asher Lee, A i r Power, Gerald Duckworth, London, 1955.
Stephen J. McNamara (Lt Col, USAF), A i r Power's Gordian Knot: Centralized Versus Organic Control, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Base, Alabama, 1994.
Athol Moffitt, Project Kingfisher, Angus & Robertson, NSW, Australia, 1989.
Michael V. Nelmes, Tocumwal t o Tarakan: Australians and the
212 Oboe
C o n s o l i d a t e d B-24 L i b e r a t o r , Banner Books, Canberra, 1994.
George Odgers, A i r War A g a i n s t Japan 1943-1 945, Australian War Memorial, 1957.
Masatake Okumiya and Jiro Horikoshi, with Martin Caidin, Zero! The S t o r y o f t h e Japanese Navy Air Force 1937-1945, Cassell and Company Limited, London, 1957.
Vincent Orange, Coningham: A Biography o f A i r Marshal S i r A r t h u r Coningham, KCB, KBE, DSO, MC, DFC, AFC, Center for Air Force History, Washington D.C., 1992.
Sky Phillips, S e c r e t M i s s i o n t o Melbourne, November 1941, Sunflower University Press, Kansas, 1992.
John Robertson and John McCarthy, A u s t r a l i a n War S t r a t e g y 1939-1 945, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia Queensland, 1985.
Hilary St George Saunders, Per Ardua: The R i s e o f B r i t i s h A i r Power 1911-1939, Oxford University Press, 1944.
Christopher Shores and Brian Cull with Yasuho Izawa, Bloody Shambles - Volume One, The D r i f t t o War t o t h e F a l l o f S i n g a p o r e , Grub Street, London, 1992.
Alan Stephens and Brendan O'Loghlin (eds), The D e c i s i v e F a c t o r : A i r Power D o c t r i n e b y A i r Vice-Marshal H . N . W r i g l e y , Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1990.
Alan Stephens, 'The Office of the Chief of the Air Staff', in A u s t r a l i a ' S A i r C h i e f s : RAAF H i s t o r y Conference 1992 , Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1992.
Alan Stephens, Power P l u s A t t i t u d e : I d e a s , S t r a t e g y and D o c t r i n e i n t h e Royal A u s t r a l i a n A i r Force 1921-1991, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1992.
Alan Stephens, RAAF H i s t o r y Conference 1993 - The RAAF i n t h e SWPA 1942-1945, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1993.
Air Commodore C.R. Taylor, CBE, I S u s t a i n t h e Wings: A H i s t o r y o f No.11 R e p a i r and S e r v i c i n g U n i t , RAAF 1942-1945, published by the author, 1992.
Marshal of the Royal Air Force The Lord Tedder, G .C. B. , W i t h P r e j u d i c e : The War Memoirs o f Marshal o f t h e Royal A i r Force , Lord Tedder , G. C.B., Cassell, London, 1966.
John Terraine, The R i g h t L i n e o f t h e L i n e , Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1985.
Bib1 i ography 213
Gary Waters, 'Air Power Doctrine', in Waters and Dr John Mordike, Regional A i r Power Workshop 1993, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1993.
Gary Waters, The Archi tec t o f V i c t o r y : A i r Campaigns for Aus t ra l ia , Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1991.
Gary Waters, 'The Tarakan Operation - Air Power Lessons', in The RAAF i n t h e SWPA 1942-1945: RAAF His tory Conference 1993, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1993.
Lt Col Charles M. Westenhoff, USAF, M i l i t a r y A i r Power, Air University Press, Alabama, October 1990.
Published Doctrine
Air Power Studies Centre, AAP 1000, RAAF A i r Power Manual, 2nd Edi t ion , RAAF Base Fairbairn, Canberra, 1994.
Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, HQUSAF, JFACC .Primer, Second Edition, February 1994.
Llirectorate of Defence Studies, AP 3000, RAF A i r Power Doctrine, London, 1991.
Royal Air Force AP1300 Operations, UK Air Ministry, March 1957.
Royal Air Force AP3235, A i r Support, Air Ministry, London, 1955.
Journal Articles, Reports and Theses
T. Dodson Stamps and Vincent J. Esposito, eds., Combat A i r Forces o f World War 11, vo1.2, Operations i n t h e Mediterranean and P a c i f i c Theaters, US Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., 1956, as cited in Timothy D. Gann, Lt Col, USAF, F i f t h A i r Force Light and Medium Bomber Operations during 1942 and 1943: Building the Doctrine and Force t h a t Triumphed i n t h e B a t t l e o f t h e Bismarck Sea and the Wewak Raid, Air University Press, Alabama, November 1993.
Unpublished Papers
Air Marshal R.G. Funnell, A i r Power and Smaller P a c i f i c Nations - An Austral ian [Airman ' S ] Perspect ive , an unpublished Chief of the Air Staff Paper to Asian Aerospace 90 held on 15 February 1990.
INDEX
W 1 0 0 0 (RAAF Air Power Manual), 203. Able Green Beach, 117,132. Able Red Beach, 117,132. Able Yellow Beach, 117,132. Accommodation, 162. Adaptability, 203. Administration, 50-53,106-113,146-150,163,164,165,166.
- Weaknesses, 51. Admiralty Islands, Mapl. Advanced Headquarters, 198,199. Air Bases - Forward, 174. Air Base Garrisoning, 165. Air Blockade, 28,77. Airborne Coordinator, 41,141,156,
(see also Support Air Observer). Airborne Observer, (see Air Liaison Officer). Aircrew, 189. Air Defence, 29,81,84.
- Coordination, 144. Air Distances, 58. Air DroDs. 46.159. ~ i r ~ffort - Waste, 155,157. Airfield, 186,187, (see also Japanese Airfields, specific
airfield names). Airfield Attacks, 35. Airfield Construction Squadron (ACS), 53,54,112,113,164.
- 4ACS. 112. - 5 ~ ~ s ; 113.
61 Airfield Construction Wing, 134. Airfield Defence - ZAFDS, 93,138,139. 5th Air Force (USAAF), 75,76,125,199. 13th Air Force (USAAF), 9,18,21,31,40,74,75,128,182,196.
- Responsibility, 28,65,66,124,125. Air/Land Battle Doctrine, 204. Air Liaison Officer (BLO), 38,39,41,84,141,155,156,177,198 Air Liaison Party (ALP), 47,94,96,155,160,163. Air Missions, 179. Air Observation Post, (see AOP). Air Operations Restrictions, 68,126,
(See also Bombing Restrictions). Air Power Svstem. 165.190. Air Sea Rescue, jsee ASR) . Air Superiority, 171,178,180,186,188,195. Air Support Doctrine
- Allied Air Force SWPA Manual. 180. - G3235 (RAF), 202. - Landing Operations Manual, 180.
Air Support Organisation, 41-48,94-101,140-143,169. - Reorganisation, 47. - System of Control, 96,97.
Air Support Party (ASP), 39,41,42,46,47,94,98,160,163,181, 192.197.
Air support Plan, 125,126. Air SuDDort Problems. 99. Air support Requests; 42,43,95. Air Support Section (ASS), 41,42,46,47,94,98,160,162,163,181,
216 Oboe
192. Air Support Statistics, 100. Air-to-Air, 36,87,152. Air Transportation, 29,203. Air Warning Station, 48. Aitape, 179,181. Alert Aircraft, 44,152,195, (see also CAP). Alexander, General, 172,173,181. Alexishafen, 179. Allied Air Forces, 199, (see also specific air forces). Alternate Targets, 44. Ambesia, Map2. W o n , Mapl, Map2. Amphibious Operations, 180,195,196,
(see also Assault, individual Oboe Operations). Anti-Personnel Bombs, 70. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), 35,85,137. Anzac Highway, Map4. AOC North Western Area, 28. AOP Operations, 39,40,$2,141.
- 16 AOP Fliaht. 26,39.92.157. AP1300 (RAF Air ~owe; ~anuai),~202,~03,~04. -3235 (RAF Air SuDDort Doctrine). 202. - - , . Api, ~ = ~ 2 , 2 1 . Arafura Sea, Mapl. Arnold, General - Principles, 189-191. 8th Army, 170. Army/Air Co-operation in New Guinea - Manual, 180. Army Cooperation Wing, 122. Arthur, Group Captain, 18,29. Artillery, 21,141,174,197. Artillery Smoke, 69. Asa. 62. ASR. (Air Sea Rescue), 29,73,90,137,155. 113 ASR Flight, 26,72,73. Assault, 80,178. ATTU, 166. ~uchinleck, General, 171. Austers, 26,39,54,72.
Baba, Lieutenant General, 168. ~alan, 76. Bali, Map2,3,57. Balikpapan, Map2,Map3,Map6,3,7,35,76,115,193,194,195,197,198,
201. -. - - Bombing of, 134. - Enemy aircraft over, 135.
Balik~a~an Town, Ma~6.132~133. - . ~anda- Mapl ; Bandiermasin, Map3.3.7.76.120.135.
~ a n 6 a strait, 77. Barnr Commission. 12. -
~asiiai, 7. Batavia (Jakarta), Map1,8,168.
Index 217
2/13 Battalion (Australian), 85,95. 2/17 Battalion (Australian), 82. 2/24 Battalion (Australian), 133. Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI), 156. Beach Movement, 49. Beaufiahters. 26.54.139. - . .
- Loss, 86. Beaufort. Ma~5.85.87. - . . Beauf0rt'~ircraft Loss, 86. Beda Fomm, 170. Biak, Mapl, 165,179. Bingkalapa, 91. Bintulu, Map3,21,62,76. 'Blackout', 105. Blamev, General, 116,117. ~oelii- Island, 62. Bombina, 46,153,154,189,196, (see also Strategic Bombing). -
- Accuracy, 79. - Balikpapan, 134. - Damage, 114. - Mistake, 81. - Restrictions, 32. - Tactics, 82.
Bombline, 44,95,175. ~ooby Traps, 54,83. Borneo, Mapl,MapZ,Map3,6,165, (see also specific place names). Borneo - history, 1,3. Bostock, Air Vice-Marshal, 7,9,11,19,20,29,58,59,65,74,84,118,
122,128,132,136,151,155,188,191,202. - AS AOC-ink, is. .
Bougainville, 179,181. Brett, General, 9. 18 Briaade (Australian). 117,122.132. 20 ~riGade i~ustralianj ; 82. 21 Brigade (Australiar,), 117,122,132. 24 Brigade (Australian), 82. 25 Brigade (Australian), 117,122. 26 Brigade (Australian), 17,20,44. Brigade Commander, 45. Brisbane, 75,199. British Borneo, 8. Brooketon, Map5,60,61,76,77,82,86,160. Brown Beach, 60,82,86. Brownell, Air Commodore, 165. Brunei, MapZ,Map3,62,76. Brunei Bay, Map5,8,57.
- Description, 58. Brunei Bluff, 82. Brunei - history, 1. Brunei - Sultan of, 1. Brunei Town, Map5,79. Brutality, 14,15, (see also POWs). Buna, 182. Burma, 174.
Cab Rank, 177,195, (see also CAP).
218 Oboe
Caen, 175. Call Signs, 52,196. Cape Pasir, Map4,48. Cape Sapo, 61. Casablanca Conference, 183. Cassino, 176. Casualties, Friendly, 132,159,174,176,177,196. Casualty Evacuation, 171. Catalinas, 40. Cebu, Map2,7. Celebes Sea, Map2. Chaff, 106. Charnwood (Operation), 175. Chilton, Brigadier, 122,132. China, Mapl,Map2,164. Churchill, Prime Minister, 181. Civilians - Killed, 86. Clark Air Base, 75,199. Close Air support (CAIRS), 19,36,83,86,134,135,143,145,152,
156,158,159,171,172,175,178,179,180,184,190,195,203. - Tactics, 45.
Cobby, Air Commodore. 9.11.18.29.193. CO-location, 170,171; 183,192,200; (see also Siting). Combat Air Patrol (CAP), 40,83,84,143,152,158,180,186,195.
- CAP Point 'Baker', 69. - CAP Point 'Easv'. 69.
Combined Doctrine, 16?. . Combined O~erations. 158.166. Command an2 control; 29-30,74-75,1~2,155,181,182.
- Chain of Command. 184.199. - Command Posts, 75,98,i62,192,197,198,201. - Unity, 169,181,184,191,202.
Commander ~ i ~ ~ o r t ~ i r c r a f t (CSA), 35,36,41,42,43,69,122,141, 142,143,144,153,156,157,177,180,197,198,201.
~ommonalit~, 166. Communications, 34,52,106,155,156,163,166,171,184,196-198,200.
- Failures/Problems, 36,45,157,158,198. Concentration. 174.187. Congestion, ~raffic, 50,162. Coningham, Air Marshal, 170,179,181,182. Convoy, 162. Convov Cover. 34.154.155. coope;ation,. 170: Coordination. 156.158.159.161.174.177.182.193.197. Coral Sea, 4 1st Corps (Australian), 9,17,60.
- Headquarters, 29. . Cotabato, 7. Counter Air, 203. Courier Services, 40,68,127. Cunderdin, 11. Cunningham, General, 170,171. Curnow, Group Captain, 165. Curtin, Prime Minister, 116,117. Cyphers, 49,98,160,196.
Index 219
Dajoe, 62. Darwin, 80. DDT ~ ~ ; a ~ i n ~ , 41,72 Deception, 103,130,158,197. Delay Fuses, 159. Delousina O~erations, 83, (see also mines, booby traps). Den ~asa;, Map2, 119. Depth Charges, 54. Desert Air Force, 170. D-Hour (Oboe Six). 65. Dinah - '~estro~ed; 87,88. Direct SuD~ort, 36.69,lsee also CAIRS, Air Support). ~isembarkzion; 50; 161:
- Problems. 97.101. Distances by ai;, 58. 5th Division (Australian), 179. 6th Division (Australian), 181. 7th Division (Australian), 115,140,179,192. 9th Division (Australian), 17,29,60,98,168,192,193. Djoeta, ~a~4,3l. Doctrine, 13,126,167,169-205.
- AAPlOOO, 203. - Air/Land Battle, 204. - -1300, 202,203,204. - -3235, 202. - FM31-35, 179. - FM100-20, 179. - Landing Operations - Air Support, 180. - Operational, 202. - Post-War, 201-205.
Dougherty, Brigadier, 122,132. Drabsch, Flight Lieutenant, 39. Duncan, Group Captain, 30,84,193,199.
East Africa, 170. Eather, Brigadier, 122. El Alamein, 183. Embarkation, 50,161.
- Problems, 102. Epilogue, 167. Escort - Fighter, 184,190. Experience, 14.
F-Day (Oboe Two), 115. FEAF, 199. Fighter Control Organisation, 48-50,101-106. Fiahter Cover, 84, (see also CAP). ~ighter ~efence, 81; (see also ~ i r Defence) . Fighter Direction, 143,144. Fighter Escort, 184,190. Fighter Interceptor, 184. Fighter Operations, 103-105,143-146,183,184,195,196,
(see also Air Defence). Fighter Sweep, 184. Finschhafen, 178. Flexibility, 152,153,157,180,187,202,203.
220 Oboe
200 Flight, 93,94. Flores Island, 76. Flores Sea, Mapl,Map2. FM31-35 (Manual), 179. FM100-20 (Manual), 179. Forde, Prime Minister, 136. Formosa, Mapl. Forward Airstrips, 174. France, 169,176. Friction, 161.
Gairns, Len, 31. Gaya Bay, 84. GC1 Station, 48,160,161,194. Gibson, Group Captain, 11. Gorontalo, Map2,35. Green Beach, 61,82. Grew, Joseph, 2. Ground Attacks, 87. Ground Crew, 172. Ground Fire Support, 45. Ground Marking, 95,141,175. No10 Group, 179. No11 Group, 165. Guadalcanal, 4.
Halmaheras, Map2. Hamilton Point, 60. Headquarters Locations, 43,162, (see also Command Posts) Hemingway, Ernest, 2. H-Hour (Oboe Six), 65. Hollandia, Map1,75,165,179. Hong Kong, Mapl,Map2. Hull, Cordell, 2.
IFF Codes, 34,52,106,196. Independence, 183,191. Indo-China, Map1,5,58. Information, 156,157, (see also Intelligence). Infrastructure, 166. Ingenuity, 161. Integration, 192,193. Intelligence, 4,163,178,184,199,200,
(see also individual Oboe Operations). Interceptor - Fighter, 184, (see also Air Defence). Interdiction, 175,176,203, (see also Bombing, BAI). Ishiguro, Lieutenant General, 168. Isitt, Air Vice-Marshal, 9. Island Hopping, 172. Italy, 178. Iwahig Airfield (Palawan), 19.
Jakarta, Map1,8,168, (see also Batavia). Jamming, 158,197. Japan, Mapl.
Index 221
L
- Air Corps, 3. - Aircraft. 22.63.119. - ~irfields, 62,119. - Air Strength, 22,63. - Anti-Aircraft Strength, 21,61,119,128. - Bases, 5. - Break-Out, 88. - Fighter Tactics, 4,5,6. - Infiltration, 54. - Losses, 5. - Reaction, 62. - Tactics, 120. - Withdrawal, 33.
Java, Mapl,Map2,7,57,76. Java Sea, Map2. Jesselton, Map3,Map5,57,62,76,78,80,85. J-Hour (Oboe Six), 65. Jiang ~ a i Check, ' 164. Joint Doctrine, 167. Joint Operations, 166,190,202, (see also Coordination,
and individual Oboe Operations). Joint Planning, 183,193. Jolo, Map2,3,7. Jones, Air Vice-Marshal, 11. Jones-Bostock Feud, 10.
Kalabakan, Map3,134. Kalidjati, 119. Kangean, Map2. Karis Island, Map4. Kasserine Pass, 181. Kemajoran, 119. Kendari, Map2,77. Keningau, Map5,62,76,81,90. Kenney, General, 7,9,29,75,180,182. Kibidang, 85. Kitau, Map5. Kittyhawks, 24,26,54,139.
- Sortie Duration, 92,154. Klandasan, Map6,131,133. Kokoda Track, 178. Korea, Mapl. Kota Kinabulu, (see Jesselton). Kotawaringin, Map3,62,119. Kuala Belait, Map5,62,85. Kuala Lumpur, 168. Kuching, MapZ,Map3,21,35,62,76,92,154. Kudat, Map3,21,35,40,62,80. Kuraman Island, 70.
Labuan, Map2,Map3,Map5,3,8,21,35,61,62,77,82,87,130,164,165, 193.194.195.197.198.201. - ~escri~tibn, 58. - Use of, 88,113.
Eabuan Airfield, Map5,58,64,88,113,152.
222 Oboe
Labuan Town, Map5. Lae, 178,180. Lahad Datu, 62. Landing Operations - Manual for Air Support, 180. Laoet Island, 80. 9 LASU, 72,86. Lawas, Map5. Lead-up to Oboe, 1-15. Leaflet Drops, 77. Leap Frog Technique, 201. Leyte, Mapl,Map2,44,75,199. Liberators, 32,139.
- Losses, 136. Lightnings, 139. Limbang, Maps. Limbung, Map5,135. Line of Approach, 69,127. Lines of Communication, 57,80,164. Lingkas, Map4,20,31,32,36,157. Loading Priorities, 163. Logistics, 53,108,163,166. Lush, Group Captain, 165. Lutong, Map5,3,57,74,85,88.
- Landing, 95. Luzon, Mapl, Map2.
MacArthur, General, 7,8,83,116,117,151,182. Macassar Strait, Map2,120. Madang, 179. Maintenance, 168,189. Malang, Map2,77,89,119,129. Malaya, 5,58. Malta, 173. Mandai, 119. Mandate Campaigns, 8. Manggar, Map3,Map6,21,76,77,116,118,119,131. Manggar Airfield, Map6. Manggar Town, Map6. Manila, Mapl,Map2,75,199. Manoora, 50. Manual of Direct Air Support, 179. Maps/Map References, 46,69,81,142,153,160. McNamara, Air Chief Marshal, 55.
~edical Evacuation, 29. Melak, 62. Mempakul, 85. Menado, Map2,77. Mensalung, Map3,130. MFCU, 194,197. 110 MFCU, 59,135,143,144,162. 111 MFCU, 59,101,102,105,161,163. 114 MFCU, 26,43,44,48. Middleburg, 165. Mid-Point, 105,145.
Index 223
Midway, 4. Milford, General, 122. Milne Bay, 178. Mindanao, Map2. Mindoro, Map2. Minelaying, 28,77,80. Mines, 54.83. ~inesweeping, 80. Miri, Map2,Map3,Map5,3,21,35,57,61,62,76,77,79,85,88. Mission Types/Priorities, 31,180,186,188,203. Mitchell Aircraft, 139. Mitchell, General- 'Billy', 2. Mobilitv. 160,185,187,201,204. Moluccas; 6. ' Montclair Plan, 1,6. Montecorvino, 173. Montaomerv. General. 181. Moraie, 1;2,172,173;178. Morotai, Map2,9,19,31,43,44,75,77,80,128,151,162,164,165,167,
179,191,198,201. - conditions. 10.11. - Mutiny, 11;
Morshead, General, Mortar Smoke, 69. Mosquito Aircraft, Mountbatten, Lord, Movements. 108-111 .-- - MTU, 44,95. Muara Island, Map5,61,77,82,86. Mukah, Map3,62. Murdoch, Group Captain, 30,52,84,193,199
Nadzab, 179,180. Nakamura, Major General, 168. Napalm, 37,38,46,77,87,154,161. Naval Gunfire Support (NGS), 21,36,70,118,141,153,197.
- Spotting for, 80. Naval Support, 118. Naviaation. 105. Negros, Map2,7. Netherlands East Indies (NEII. 8. , . New Britain, Map1,8,179. New Guinea, Map1,8,178,180. Noemfoor, 19,164,179. 'No Go', 105. Normandy, 176,178. North Borneo, Map3. Northern Area, 74. North Western Area, 18,74,75,77.
Oboe Lead-up, 1-15. Oboe Observations, 151-168, 191-201. Oboe One, 12, 17-56.
- Air Operations, 30-41. - Air Support, 41-48. - Intelligence, 21-24.
224 Oboe
- Objective, 20-21. - Overview, 17-20. - Phase One, 30-33. - Phase Three, 35-37. - Phase Two, 33-35. - RAAF Planning, 24-29.
Oboe Phase (Montclair), 6,7. Oboe Six, 12,57-114.
- Air Operations, 75-94. - Air Support, 94-101. - Intelligence, 61-64. - Objective, 60,61. - Overview, 57-59. - Phase One, 76-80. - Phase Three, 82-92. - Phase Two, 80-82. - RAAF Planning, 65-74.
Oboe Two, 12,115-150. - Air Operations, 127-139. - Air Support, 140-143. - Intelligence, 118-122. - Objective, 117-118. - Overview, 115-117. - Phase One, 128-130. - Phase Three, 133-136. - Phase Two, 130-133. - RAAF Planning, 122-127.
Observations on Oboe, 151-168. Obstacles, 21. 38 OBU, 26. O'Connor, General, 170,171. Oelin, ~a~3,21,62;119. Oil, 3.8.31. - - - - -
Okinawa , &;l. o~erational Control. 9.29.41.:.55.204 . . Gerational ~octrine, 202, (see also Doctrine) . O~erational Policv. 11. a.
~;erations, pattern of, 20. Oscar - Destroyed, 91. No1 OSU, 166.
Padas Bay, 84. Padas River, Map5. Pajau Island, Map4. Palawan, Map2,19,44,77,81,129. Palembang, 5. Pamoesian, Map4,31,32. Panay, Map2,7. Pantelleria, 173. Papar, ~ap5,83. Parramatta Ridqe, Map6,131,132,196. P-Day (Oboe one), 191 Pearl Harbor, 2. Pelong Rock, 79. Pensingan, Map3.
Index 225
Personnel, 107. Philippines, Mapl,Map2,6. Photography, 33,93,137,161. Pioneer Battalions, 36. Pitoe. 9. planning, 151,166,182,
(see also specific Oboe Operations - RA?@ Planning). - Joint, 183,193.
Plentv. Grow Ca~tain. 163,164. ~ontianak, ~>~3,?6. . Porter. Briaadier. 65. POWS, i4,15;85,168. Precision, 153,155,171,175,189,196. Puerta Princessa Airfield, 19,80, (see also Palawan).
RA?@ - Formation, 191. RAAF Command, 9,75,198.
- Advanced Headquarters, 29. - Responsibility, 26-28. - Tasks Oboe One, 17,18. - Tasks Oboe Six, 67. - Tasks Oboe Two, 123.
Radar/Radar Stations, 26,183,193-195. Radio Aids, 105,175. RAF, 169,172,202.
- Formation, 191. RAN ASR, 73. Ranau, Map3,62. RCAF (Canada) - Formation, 191. Reconnaissance, 38,138,176,203. Red Beach, 61. Redundancy, 201. Reference Point 'Freida', 143. Reference Point 'John', 34,35. Reference Point 'Sarah', 70. Rehearsal, 49,159,166. Repatriation of POWs, 168. Research and Development, 190. Responsiveness, 187. Restrictions on Air Operations, 68,145,146,153,
(see also bombing restrictions). Riam Road, 90. 4 RIMU, 102,105,144. RNZAF (New Zealand) - Formation, 191. ~oberts, ~ieutenant General, 168. Rommel, 172. Rooney, Group Captain, 53. Roosevelt, President, 181. RSAF (South Africa) - Formation, 191.
Sadau Island, Map4,20,48. Saidor, 179. Salamaua, 178. Salerno, 173. Samar, Map2,19,31,80,128. Samarinda, Map3,35,118,119.
226 Oboe
Sandakan, Map3,15,21,40,62. Sanga Sanga, Map2,19,78,80,128,151. Sangkoeliqang, Map3. Sapong, 90. Sarawak, Map3.165.
- history, 1. Scheraer, Air Commodore, 3 0 ~ 6 5 ~ 8 4 ~ 1 2 2 ~ 1 9 1 ~ 1 9 3 ~ 1 9 9 ~ 2 0 1 ~ 2 0 2 . - . . . . Semarang, Map2,89,135,168. Sepinggan, Map3,Map6,21,62,76,116,119,131 Sepinggan Airfield, Map6,133,135. Sepinggan Town, Map6. Seria, Map5,3,57,62,76,77,79. Sesajap ~iver, 17. Sesanip, 31. Setting-up Problems, 49. Sibu, Map3,62,76. Sicily, 172,178. Sidi Barrani, 170. Simalumong, 134. Simms, Group Captain, 11. Simulation, 166. Singapore, Map1,76,120. Singkawang, Map3,62. Sio, 179. Siting Problems, 49,112,160,162. Smoke Laying, 33,138. Smoke Screens, 21. Soebi Ketjil, 62. Solomon Islands, Mapl,8. Sortie Numbers, 78,79,80.
- from Sepinggan, 136. - from Tarakan, 136.
Sowrey, Air Commodore, 170. Spaatz, General, 172,181. Spitfires, 24,26.
- Kill, 135. - Loss, 134.
No1 Squadron, 90,92. - Loss, 92.
No4 Squadron, 72,88,178,180. No11 Squadron, 88. No13 Squadron, 74,76. No21 Squadron, 18,31,32,33,77,128. No22 Squadron, 26,78,86,180. No23 Squadron, 18,31,77,128.
- Diary, 133. No24 Squadron, 18,31,32,33,77,128,131. No25 Squadron, 11,18,31,78,89,129,135,168.
- Loss, 133. No30 Squadron, 26,78,180.
- Loss, 81. No31 Squadron, 26,33,78,83. No54 Sauadron C.O.. 144. No75 squadron, 24,55,130,134,135,178. No76 Squadron, 24,40,71,76,78,86,90,178.
- Loss, 88,90.
l . l. . ~. . . . ~ , . ~ ~, . ~ . . . . ,~ ~~. ,
l
Index 227
No77 Squadron, 76,90. No78 Suuadron, 50,130,135. No79 squadron, 72,91,165. No80 Squadron, 24,130,135. No82 Squadron, 76,88,90,91,112,135. No93 Squadron, 90.
- LOSS, 90. No452 Squadron, 24,26,71,72,130,134,135. No457 Squadron, 72,76,87,90,112.
- Kill, 154. Stalkoedo, Map6,131. Standard Operating Procedures, 194. Stewart, Flight Lieutenant, 44. Strategic Bombing, 3, (see also Bombing). Subang, 85. Sulawesi, Mapl,Map2,57,76,120. Sulu Archipelago, Map2. Sumatra, Map1,57. Support Air Observer (SAO), 41,70,81,137,156,177,198,
(see also Airborne Coordinator). Surabaya, Map2,7,129.
- Harbour, 77. Surprise - Allied, 121. Sweep - Fighter, 184. System - Air Power, 165,190.
Tabanio, Map3,62,119,135. Tabuan River, 90. Tactical Loading, 43,161. Tactical Procedures, 202. Tadji, 181. TAF (RAF), 170,173. 1st TAF, 1,9,17,18,29,44,48,67,76,164,171,178,182,198.
- Command Post, 98,100, (see also ASS, Command and Control). - ~ntelii~ence Organisation, 200.
Tagai, 79. Taiwan. Ma~2. ~anjonb ~e>ak, 89,119. Tarakan, Map2,Map3,Map4,3,7,35,75,134,164,165,194,196,197,
198,201. Tarakan Airfield, Map4,19,23,24,37,53-56,151,172,193,200.
- Use of, 130. Tarakan Island - descri~tion. 17. Tarakan Oilfields, 31. Tarakan Town, Map4. Target Priorities, 142,189. Tawao, Map3,21,32,33,80,134. Tawi Tawi, Map2,7,19,40. Taytay Airfield (Palawan), 19. Technology, 13. Tedder, Air Marshal, 179,181,201,202.
- Principles, 182-185. - Relevance of Principles to Oboe, 191-201.
Tengoa River, 90. Tenom, Map5.
228 Oboe
Teraguchi, Field Marshal, 168. Thailand. MaD1. Theory, i3. L
Timbalai Airfield, Map5,58,62,79. TimOr Sea, Mapl,Map2. Tjangkol, 31. 9 TMO, 101. Tobruk, 172. Toli Toli, Map2,35. Townsville, 19. Traffic Congestion, 50. Tiaining, 189. Tunnels, 54.
Ulin Airfield, 135. Unity of Command, 169,181,184,191,202. US Navy Dive Bombers, 132. USS Nashville, 98,160. USS Rocky Mount, 29,36,41,43,84. USS Wasatch, 131.
Vasey Highway, Map6. Victoria Harbour, Map5,58,60. Victoria Town, 77. Victor Phase (Montclair), 6,7. Visayan Island, Map2.
Wama, 9. Weapon Loads, 139. Weather, 23,35,63,121. Western Area, 18,74,75,77. Western Desert, 169. Weston, Map5,79,87. Westralia, 50. Wewak, 181. White Beach, 61,82. Whitehead, Brigadier, 20. Williams, Air Marshal, 188. Williamtown, 166. Windeyer, Brigadier, 65. 'Window', 106. No1 Wing, 89. No41 wing, 166. No71 Winq, 181. No76 wing; 88,89,127. No77 Wina. 25,40,50,71,73,83,86,128,1588 . . . . . No78 wing; 19,24,25,40,73,128,130,1j4,1~8. No79 Wina. 89. N&O wing; 71. No81 Wina. 19.71.76.90.128. . . . No82 wing; 70,71,89,165. No83 Wing, 72,76. No85 Wing, 89. No86 Wing, 74,76,90. Wootten, General, 29,65. Wrigley, Air Vice-Marshal, 185-188.
l1 A ~ I I ~ L I ~ - ~ - ~ ~ ~ - - - ---- ~ ~~ ~ ~- ~~
l
Index 229
Yellow Beach, 60,61,82. l
'~amboanga, Map2,19,44. 2-Day (Oboe Six), 65.