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The British National Party and the New Issue Agenda: Issue preference and policy

evaluation in Far Right support. Gareth Harris: Birkbeck College (g.harris @pol-

soc.bbk.ac.uk)

The Far Right in Britain has long been typified as ‘a case of conspicuous failure’

(Kitschelt, 1994) within the literature on the rise of the extreme right in continental

Europe. The rise in legitimacy of the British National Party (BNP), its

disproportionate media profile and the party’s slow but incremental electoral gains

have rendered this characterisation redundant. The party’s current total of 54

councillors has remained broadly consistent since their breakthrough year in 2006

with the election of 43 councillors. Although these gains within the local electoral

arena need to be put into context, there are over 20,000 elected councillors, the party’s

success has begun to translate across higher levels of electoral competition.

In the Greater London Authority (GLA) elections of 2008, their mayoral candidate,

Richard Barnbrook, won a sufficient share of the London –wide member vote (5.45%)

to pass the 5% threshold and be appointed to the London Assembly1. Until recently,

the narrative of the Far Right in Britain has predominantly has been entwined with

London2 and their win in the capital, with the ensuing legitimacy and media attention

signposted the possibility of further gains in the European elections.

The unprecedented run of electoral success for a Far Right party in Britain culminated

last year in the election of the party’s chairman, Nick Griffin, and Andrew Brons to

the European Parliament respectively for the North East, and Yorkshire and Humber

constituencies. Opponents of the BNP took solace in the fact that the BNP won their

seats with a smaller share of the vote than in 2004 and performed poorly across the

South- East, London, South-West and Scotland constituencies. This underplayed the

small increase of 1.3% in the BNP overall vote share from 2004, to a 2009 total of

6.2% (943,598 votes) and the stronger showing of the party across the East and West

Midlands (respectively 8.7% and 8.6%), the North East (8.9%) and considerable

variation within constituencies; in 52 Local Authorities the BNP polled over 10%3.

The rise in electoral support for the BNP has been matched by a growth in academic

interest. The quantitative study of BNP support has been severely limited by

methodological constraints; principally the lack of survey data containing sufficient

sample sizes of BNP voters or identifiers to allow robust analysis. Until recently this

has pushed research into the BNP in two directions; in-depth qualitative analysis of

1 Across the three contests in 2008, 329,033 Londoners expressed a preference for the Far Right, an

increase of 110,018 votes from 2004. The 2nd

Mayoral preference and London member votes saw

substantial growth for the BNP, 58,091 votes (6.42%) and 40,622 (5.42%) respectively.

2 The party retains a strong presence in outer East London; Barking & Dagenham (19.4%) was the top

performing local authority in the European elections followed by Havering with the sixth best result

(14.8%).

3 Despite the poor overall showing in London, the party retains a strong presence in outer East London;

Barking & Dagenham (19.4%) was the top performing local authority in the European elections

followed by Havering with the sixth best result (14.8%).

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party supporters (Rhodes, J: 2009) and activists (Goodwin, M: 2010), or the ecology

of the party vote employing aggregate data (Bowyer, B. 2008, Borisyulk, G et al:

2007, John, P et al: 2005). Ford and Goodwin’s innovative recent publication, Angry

White Men (2010) is the first to employ a representative dataset of individual Far

Right voters in Britain since Harrop’s (1980) analysis of National Front support in the

late seventies. Their use of a dataset from MORI allowed an examination of a range of

attitudinal traits and political orientations of BNP voters, the authors conclude that the

BNP has been able to build a ‘clearly defined support base’ of middle-aged, working

class, Northern, white men who are ‘profoundly dissatisfied, most negative about the

government’s performance and most dissatisfied with the major party’s leaders and

the economy.’ The use of an aggregated dataset from the Continuous Monitoring

survey (CMS) administered by the British Election Studies4 offers a similar

opportunity. Questions used by the CMS allow an examination of past voting

behaviour, and a wider range of policy evaluations of BNP supporters.

The research finds that BNP supporters are overwhelmingly male, working class with

lower levels of education. No positive relationship was found with age but

respondents aged 55 and above were significantly less likely to be BNP supporters.

Support for the party is spread between unskilled and skilled workers but significant

relationships were found with the later, and with mid rather than lower income

groups. It is suggested that the BNP’s social base is predominately composed of the

better off and more skilled sectors of the working class. BNP supporters share with

those of the UK Independence party, the most hostile attitudes towards the

Westminster parties and some socio-economic similarities. However, they are

distinguished from UKIP supporters by their negative assessment of David Cameron

and the perceived inability of the Conservatives to deliver in policy areas that matter

to them, principally the restriction of immigration. They are distinctive in their

dissatisfaction with the democratic process and display low levels of interpersonal

trust. BNP supporters can be characterised as having a unique focus on internal

security issues concerning asylum seekers, terrorism and crime beyond all other

issues. There is evidence to suggest that the preoccupation with immigration

displayed by BNP supporters is also distinctive in its emphasis on the adverse effects

of the cultural rather than economic impact of immigration.

Section 1 discusses how BNP support and the issue of opposition to immigration can

be located within the spatial, valence and expressive models of voting behaviour.

Section 2 introduces the models and the rationale guiding the selection of variables.

Section 3 examines the socio-economic profile (3.1), past voting affiliation (3.2) and

attitudes to immigration of BNP supporters (3.3). Section 4 reports the findings of the

binominal and multinomial regression models. Section 5 discusses the implications of

the analysis for interpretations of BNP support.

Section 1. Voting behaviour

As the BNP’s vote has grown, so has the need to place the Far Right vote within the

voting behaviour literature. Ford et al (2010) have taken up the challenge and

highlight the implications of three models of voting behaviour, identity (Butler &

Stokes. 1974), spatial (Downs, A. 1957) and valence models (Stokes, D. 1963 Clarke

4 The CMS survey data is accessible at http://bes.utdallas.edu/2009/cms-data.php

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et al. 2004, 2009) to the interpretation of BNP support. This section briefly outlines

how BNP support can be placed within this literature and finishes by relating BNP

support to the emergence of a new issue agenda as highlighted by Clarke et al (2009).

Within the identity model, voting behaviour is located in an individual’s socio-

economic context and social identity. In Britain this has taken its archetypal form in

the class-based voting that arguably dominated British politics up until the late

seventies (Clarke et al: 2004). The increasing fluidity and breakdown of rigid social

identities, the dissolution of organised labour that accompanied post-industrialisation,

has led to a process of class de-alignment that hastened the demise of class- based

voting. However, the connection of the BNP to the referent of the white working class

both within public and political discourse, suggests the continued relevance of a class-

based analysis of voting behaviour when applied to the Far Right. As much as the

embourgoisement thesis pre-occupied academics concerned with class in the seventies

(Goldthorpe,J et al.1971) , a thesis of the immiseration and residualisation of the

white working class has concerned academics seeking to explain Far Right support

(Ford et al. 2010, Goodwin, M. 2008, Husbands, C.1983). The literature has reached a

consensus over the attraction of the BNP to the white working class (Bowyer, B.

2008), yet uncertainty remains on whether this support is segmented (John, P. 2005)

or spread more broadly (Ford et al, 2010.). Previous research has also highlighted the

influence of low levels of education, age, gender and concentration of support within

Northern England.

BNP supporters are predominantly working class, middle-aged, Northern, male, with

low levels of educational achievement.

The classic model of spatial voting proposed by Downs (1957) implies a unilinear

dimension of political competition with clear oppositional positions, as represented on

the tax-spend scale. The individual voter places themselves in proximate ideological

space to the party that they perceive to maximise their utility. A necessary corollary is

that competition to capture the median voter leads to convergence towards the centre

of political competition. As Ford et al (2010) point out, convergence towards the

median voter displayed by both New Labour and the Conservatives allows the

potential for parties such as the BNP and UKIP to win supporters at the margins of

political competition. Consequently BNP support would be expected to be composed

of those who felt abandoned by New Labour’s attempt to woo the voters of middle

England (John et al. 2004, foreword) or equally working class Tories alienated by the

‘caring conservatism’ embraced by David Cameron.

BNP support is a consequence of Labour’s abandonment and alienation of its core

electorate.

Down’s conception of political space has been modified to account for the Far Right

vote by conceptualising political space as multi-dimensional (Iversflaten, E. 2005).

Agents make their decision to vote responsively to a party’s perceived position on a

variety of dimensions of political competition. Heath et al (1993) use of the

libertarian/ authoritarian axis of political competition has been employed to model

explanations of Far Right voting by co-opting the issue of anti-immigrant sentiment.

Opposition to immigration and by extension, BNP support represents a position issue

over which the BNP exert clear ownership in the absence of any unequivocal

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difference between the policy agendas of the Westminster parties. The issue of

immigration occupies a peculiar position within political space, analogous to the issue

of capital punishment. As is well documented (Saggar, D. 2003) within the British

electorate there is widespread agreement on the need to consider the possible negative

impact if not outright hostility to immigration. It is arguably the disjuncture between

the preferences of voters and the consensus of politicians that the BNP is able to

exploit.

BNP support is predominantly concerned with the issue of immigration beyond any

other issue.

Both the inability of the majority of voters to define their orientation and the position

of parties to clear policy preferences has led to the challenging of the Downs’ model

through the valence theory of voting (Clarke et al. 2004, Stokes, D. 1963). Valence

models question the assumption that there are clearly defined ideological positions on

issues but point to the acceptance of common goals in policy areas, economic growth

and the provision of public services for example. Politics and the decision to vote

becomes less a matter of ideological competition than managerial, an assessment of a

party’s competence to deliver a desired policy outcome.

Valence models would appear to have a problem in explaining the BNP vote as the

perception of a party’s ability to effectively deliver the desired policy outcome is

determined by heuristic devices such as past performance or qualities of the party

leader, neither of which are yardsticks by which the BNP are judged positively.

However, within the framework of valence voting, Clarke et al (2009) highlight the

emergence of a new cluster of policy issues as a critical factor in explaining the

outcome of the 2005 general election. The events of 9/11, the Iraq war and the

London terrorist bombing in 2005 provided the external shocks to hoist a new issue

agenda focused on internal and external security onto the electorate. Evaluations of a

party’s ability to deliver on policy preferences internally surrounding the nexus of

asylum seekers, crime and terrorism and externally on the Iraq war became influential

factors in explaining individual voting decisions. Crucially the new issue agenda was

seen to challenge the issue salience of the traditional concerns with the economy and

public services.

The centrality of this nexus of policy issues to BNP supporters is apparent given the

latter’s overwhelming preoccupation with immigration and traditional authoritarian

law and order concerns. However since 2005, the external shocks held to be

responsible for the change in the salience of issue prioritisation have now been

eclipsed by the financial crisis which has brought economic worries and the spectre of

severe cuts in public expenditure back to the fore-front of voters concerns.

Consequently the new issue agenda could be considered to be paramount with BNP

supporters whilst its salience was diminished for the supporters of other parties.

BNP supporters would be distinguished from the voters of other parties by a concern

with the evaluation of policies concerning internal security over the economy and

public services.

Finally, the interpretation of BNP support can be broadened beyond the literature

concerned with voting behaviour, to the decision not to vote and systemic

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disenchantment with the political process. This interpretation spans both valence and

position models of voting behaviour. On one hand, the decision to vote for an outsider

party such as the BNP might represent the lack of an ideological alternative between

the parties as stated with the issue of immigration. On the other, a vote for the BNP

might represent a lack of belief or credibility in the political will to effect change on

the issues that matter to their supporters. Subsequently a final model is developed to

capture levels of dissatisfaction with both the political process and quality of life.

BNP supporters are distinguished by low levels of interpersonal trust, dissatisfied

both in life and with the democratic process, less likely to participate in formal and

informal modes of political participation, pay less attention to politics and feel less

able to influence the political process.

Section 2. Methodology and models

1. Dependent variable

The research utilises a dataset from the monthly Continuous Monitoring Surveys run

by the BES. 17 months of CMS surveys are aggregated, dating from June 2008 until

November 2009. The merged dataset gives a weighted sample size of 434 respondents

who answered BNP to the question, which party did the respondent intend to vote for

in the next general election out of a sample size of 19,1865. First, the specified models

are regressed against BNP vote intention. These initial results are then compared to

those of other parties in a multinomial model to establish a distinctive profile of BNP

supporters; particular attention is paid to a comparison with the BNP’s closest

ideological competitor, the UK Independence party.

2. Model specification

Model 1. Socio-economic context

BNP Vote= α + Low level of education + Type of employment +Age Band + Region

+ Low income + Mid-income + Social Housing Tenant + Gender + e

Where low level of education is a dummy, coded 0-1 indicating whether an individual

had left school at 16; Type of employment approximates a measure for social class,

using higher managerial as a reference; Age band is a measure for a age using 20-25

as the reference. Region is a predictor for the region the respondent lives in, using E.

Anglia as the reference. Low income, Mid-income are dichotomous, coded 0-1,

respectively capturing whether an individual earned less than 20,000 per annum or

between 20,000 and 40,000; Social Housing tenant is a dummy coded 0-1, capturing

whether the respondent resided in social housing/ housing association.

5 Following convention (Bowyer, B. 2009, Whitely, P. 1979), the sample size was clipped to only

include ethnic groups, white British, white other, other ethnic group. This resulted in a loss of two

cases who identified as black African and Indian.

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Model 2. Policy clusters

BNP Vote = α + Economic evaluation + Service evaluation + Security evaluation +

Everyday security satisfaction + Everyday service satisfaction + e

Where economic evaluation, service evaluation, security satisfaction are factor scores

derived from 16 measures of cognitive and affective policy evaluations; service and

economic scores run negatively whilst satisfaction with internal security runs

positively6; Everyday security and service satisfaction are index scores composed of

the additive measures of a respondents levels of satisfaction with direct experience of

two clusters of policy, services and security7.

Model 3. Immigration and issue importance model

BNP Vote = α + Security Issue importance + Service Issue importance + Opposition

to EU + Migration issue importance + Government performance/asylum seekers +

Conservative performance/asylum seekers + Asylum seekers/reduction +

Contact/asylum seekers + Read anti-immigrant paper + e

Where Security and Service importance are factor scores derived from 5 questions in

which respondents were asked to rate the importance of an issue on a scale of 0-108;

Opposition to the EU is a dummy, coded from 0-1 composed of two questions

capturing opposition to joining the Euro and European Union membership;

Government and Conservative performance asylum seekers is a predictor with a 0-5

scale running from very well to very badly in answer to the question, how well do you

think the government/conservatives handle asylum seekers? Asylum

seekers/reduction is a dummy, coded 0-1, where 1 = reduction, in answer to the

question whether respondents favour a reduction in the number of asylum seekers;

Contact with asylum seekers is a dummy, coded 0-1, where 1=yes, in answer to the

question whether respondent had contact with asylum seekers. Anti-immigrant paper

is a dummy coded 0-1, where 1= yes, in answer to the question whether respondents

read an anti-immigrant paper, an anti-immigrant paper is considered to be the Sun,

Daily Mail and the Daily express.

Model 4. Party partisanship and past affiliation

BNP Vote = α + Labour vote 2005 + Conservative vote 2005 + Feelings towards

Labour party + Feelings towards Brown + Feelings towards Conservatives +

Feelings towards Cameron + e

Where Labour/Conservative vote 2005 is a dummy, coded 0-1, in answer to the

question had the respondent voted for either party in the 2005 general election.

6 The 16 predictors load on 3 factors with an eigen scores of above 1, collectively they explain 54.69%

of the total variance, full tables available on request.

7 Reliability tests were applied to both scales yielding a Cronbach’s α of .684.

8 Two factors were extracted using varimix rotation with eigen values of above 1, the two factors

collectively explained 73.95% of the total variance.

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Feelings towards Labour/Conservatives are a predictor where respondents are asked

to rate their feelings towards either party on a scale of 0-10, ranging from strongly

dislike to strongly like. Feelings towards Gordon Brown/ David Cameron are

dummies, coded 0-1, where 1 is the sum of negative feelings towards either party

leader.

Model 5. Political and social dissatisfaction

BNP Vote = α + Life satisfaction + Democracy satisfaction + Interpersonal trust +

Political efficacy +Attention to Politics + Likelihood of formal political action +

Likelihood of informal political action + e

Where life/democracy satisfaction is a response to the questions how satisfied were

respondents in either respect, with scale of 0-4, ranging from very satisfied to very

dissatisfied; Interpersonal trust is a predictor scaled 0-10 where respondents are asked

how much can people be trusted, ranging from cannot to can be trusted. Attention to

politics and political efficacy are predictors scaled 0-10, where respondents are asked

respectively whether they paid attention to politics and could influence politics,

ranging from no influence to a great deal, and no attention to a great deal; Likelihood

of informal and formal political action are factor scores9.

Section 3. Demography, past affiliation and attitudes to immigration

In the following section the socio-economic composition, past voting affiliation and

attitudes towards immigration of BNP supporters are examined with reference to both

the base population and UKIP supporters.

1. Socio-economic composition

Table 1. Insert here.

First with reference to the overall sample population, BNP supporters are most clearly

imbalanced by gender, 66.4% of BNP supporters were male compared to 49.2% in the

general population. BNP supporters tend to be older and are over represented in the

44-55 and less so in the 55-64 age band; however, they are under represented in the

over 65 group. The geographical distribution is as expected with over-representation

in the Yorkshire and Humber, North West and East Midlands. This supports the

assertion that the BNP vote is predominantly Northern with the caveat that the East

and to a lesser extent, the West Midlands are potential strongholds of support.

Occupational structure runs as expected, with heavier representation in the skilled and

unskilled manual classes, 35% against 17.1% in the base population, and more

generally with those in paid employment. BNP supporters are characterised by higher

rates of social housing residency, almost double the sample average. This appears to

support the assertion that inter-group conflict over social housing allocation is a

possible driver in BNP support10

.

9 Two factors are extracted form five questions (q38-42) with eigen values of above 1, with an

explained variance of 69.64%.

10 Conflict over housing has been cited as a significant driver of BNP support in areas such as Barking

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BNP supporters had the largest proportion of respondents with low levels of

educational achievement, 65.8%, who had left school by 16 compared to an average

of 38.6% across all other parties. Levels of newspaper readership were marginally

above average, and although Far Right supporters showed a high level of respondents

who read an anti-immigrant paper, this was not the highest. Internet use amongst BNP

supporters was polarised with both the highest proportion of respondents who used

the internet very little and those who used it a great deal. This reflects the importance

of the internet as a tool for the BNP to circumvent a largely hostile mainstream media.

The categories in which the BNP are over-represented mark a distinct profile from

that of the Westminster parties. The party whose demographic profile most overlaps is

the UK Independence party. UKIP supporters tend to be over –represented in many of

the same categories as the BNP, but to a lesser degree, suggesting that both parties are

appealing to a similar demographic particularly with regards to occupational structure

and level of education. However the main distinction in the profile of the supporters

of the two parties, appears to be in age and regional strength, UKIP supporters are

disproportionately represented in the over 65 and retiree groups, both against the BNP

and supporters of other parties. Notably they also share the highest percentage

frequency of supporters who read an anti-immigrant paper. The following section

discusses whether the demographic similarities between the two parties extend to their

past political affiliation.

2. Past voting and party affiliation.

Table 2. Insert here.

The vote in the 2005 general election of BNP/UKIP supporters is explored to

establish if there is a relationship towards past political affiliation with the

Westminster parties, as illustrated in table 2. Overall 82.2% (336) BNP and 88.4%

(549) vote intenders voted in the 2005 general election. For the former, 32% voted for

Labour in the 2005 general election over 15.4% for the Conservatives. For

respondents intending to vote for UKIP, there is a more even balance, 24.8% voted

for Labour and 22.2% for the Conservatives in 2005. The BNP vote appears to be

more likely to be drawn from ex- Labour voters. However it must be noted that

support both for UKIP and the BNP primarily draws from Labour with an excess of

16.6% for the BNP against 2.6% for UKIP of ex-Labour over ex-Conservative voters.

To examine this question in more detail, two sub-groups are defined within the

supporters of both parties. Using the variable for party identification, it is possible to

decompose supporters of both parties into two sub-groups; core supporters who

identify with the party and intend to vote for them, and protest voters; those who

identify with other parties but intend to vote for either UKIP or the BNP. For the

BNP, 51.4% both identified with the party and intended to vote for it, whilst 48.6% of

BNP voter intenders identified with other parties. For UKIP, 55.6 % both identified

with the party and intended to vote for it, whilst 45.4% intended to vote for the party

but identified with other parties. Table 3 examines the breakdown of these two sub-

groups past voting behaviour.

and Dagenham (John et al, 2006).

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Table 3. Insert here.

The majority of BNP core supporters came from the ranks of those who voted for

Labour in 2005 with an excess of 18.2% over Conservative voters. For UKIP core

supporters, this pattern is reversed but less polarised with an excess of 6.4% of

Conservative over Labour supporters. Core support for both parties is roughly

equivalent in the proportion of Liberal Democrat voters. For BNP protest voters there

is a significant increase in the proportion of Labour voters of 11.5% and a smaller

increase in the number of Conservative voters. However for UKIP protest voters there

is a smaller increase in the number of Conservative voters and a much larger increase

in the number of Labour voters, twice as many. It is suggested that the core support

for the BNP is predominantly composed of ex-Labour voters, whilst the core of UKIP

support is drawn predominantly from the Conservatives. However both parties appear

to attract a majority of protest voters from Labour.

3. Immigration

Survey evidence has highlighted the salience of immigration as an issue to the general

public and this was supported by the CMS data despite the context of the current

financial crisis. 10.2% of the general population considered immigration to be the

most important issue facing the UK, second only to the general economy at 38.5%. Of

those who thought immigration was the most important issue, 23% (443) thought that

the best party to deal with that issue was the BNP, only marginally second to the

Conservatives at 24%. Only the Conservatives and the BNP appear to exert clear

ownership of this issue. Unsurprisingly parties of the right were also the most hostile

to asylum seekers; 99.5% of BNP voters, 97.9% of UKIP and 92.8% of Conservative

voters wished to see a reduction in the number of asylum seekers11

. A concern with

immigration as an issue and negative feelings towards asylum seekers are clearly not

exclusive to BNP voters but spread evenly across the parties of the right.

To examine the possible sources of this concern with immigration, a subset of

questions are examined which tapped into feelings towards immigrants. These

questions unfortunately captured too small a sample size of BNP voters (102) to run

in logistic regression analysis. However, inspection of the responses of BNP

supporters does highlight some important differences to those of supporters of other

parties. Table 4 represents the sum of negative perceptions of immigrants minus the

positive by intention to vote for either of the parties of the right and the base

population.

Table 4. Insert here.

Within the base population, it is the assertion that immigrants strengthen the economy

that attracts the most negative responses, second to the response to whether

11 Voters of all parties including those of the left had a majority of voters who expressed a preference

for a reduction in the number of asylum seekers. The Green party had the lowest percentage at 59.7%.

Non and undecided voters all expressed strong preferences for a reduction in the number of asylum

seekers, 88.3 and 82.0% respectively.

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immigrants enrich the culture of a country, followed by the effect on taxes and

increase in security concerns12

. Surprisingly, given the connection with immigration

and crime within the media, the response to whether immigrants commit crime is

relatively small. The only responses that attract a favourable balance are to the

assertion that migrants do jobs that others do not wish to do, and are unfairly

victimised.

As expected this balance is negatively skewed for the BNP supporters. The highest

number of negative associations is in response to the question, whether immigrants

enrich culture (88.4), increase terrorism (87.5) and strengthen the economy (87.4) and

following a drop, the threat to the English language (79.4). This sensitivity to cultural

concerns is exclusive to BNP voters; UKIP and Conservative vote intenders both

share the concern with terrorism, pre-eminent for UKIP and the economy, ranked

highest for the Conservatives but the concern over culture and the threat to the

English language is significantly lower. Although concern with immigration is high

within the general population this is a reflection of economic imperatives; for BNP

supporters the source of this concern is the cultural threat posed by immigration.

Section 4. Analysis

Table 5 represents the results of the regression models using both BNP vote intention

as a dichotomous dependent variable against other party choice (binomial model) and

intention to vote for Labour, the Conservatives, Liberals or UKIP using BNP vote

intention as a referent (multinomial model).

Table 5. Insert here.

Within the demographic model, the two dominant socio-economic effects in

explanations of BNP support, gender and low levels of educational achievement

displayed the expected effects. BNP supporters were more likely to be male and have

left school at 16 or before, and this was robust across all alternative party choices. For

social class, the only significant positive relationship (using higher managerial as a

referent) was with respondents who identified as skilled manual workers who were

70% more likely to support the BNP. This was influential in the decision to vote for

the BNP over the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives but not against Labour or

UKIP. There are two notable surprises; the failure of the mid-range age group, 30-55,

and the unskilled workers to achieve statistical significance.

The assertion that the BNP vote might be segmented within the broad category of the

working class is supported by the positive direction of the coefficient for mid-income,

ranging from 20,000-40,000 and the lack of significant relationships for social

housing tenants and never worked. However those resident in social housing were

more likely to support the BNP over the Conservatives. Surprisingly, belonging to the

lower income group was found to be insignificant and the relationship with the middle

income group was also influential when it came to supporting the BNP over Labour or

the Conservatives, a pattern which is repeated for the unemployed. Finally the

12 This association of concern over immigration and its economic impact is reinforced by MORI

surveys http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/publications/publication.aspx?oItemId=1349

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negative relationship with both the older age groups found in the binominal model

were reinforced, respondents in the 55-64 and 65 plus groups were predicted to be

more likely to vote for the Liberal democrats and UKIP. Regionally, respondents in

the North West were less likely to support the Conservatives, as were those in the East

Midlands and Yorkshire and Humber of supporting UKIP rather than the BNP. This

pattern was reversed for respondents in the South East who were predicted to be

36.8% more likely to vote for UKIP.

Negative evaluations of the economy, public services and internal security,

satisfaction of everyday services and security all achieved significance when they

were initially entered into the model. However the only predictor that maintained a

relationship after the addition of predictors relating to immigration was the negative

evaluation of internal security. This disproportionate concern with internal security

issues appears to distinguish BNP supporters from those of other parties, negative

evaluations of security related policies set them apart from Labour and the Liberal

Democrats, whilst a higher priority attached to security issues distinguish them from

Conservative or UKIP supporters. Although a negative evaluation of public service

policy does seem to affect the intention to vote BNP against Labour or the Liberal

Democrats, BNP voters do not seem to attach greater importance to issues concerning

the provision of public services than voters of other parties. This brings into doubt the

assertion that competition with minority ethnic populations for public services is the

primary causal driver of BNP support.

Respondents who rated immigration as the most important issue and wished to reduce

the number of asylum seekers were more likely to support the BNP over alternative

party choices. Similarly, opposition to the EU increased the likelihood of supporting

UKIP, but also reduced the odds of supporting Labour or the Liberals. Both parties

appear to exert clear ownership of the issues with which they are predominantly

identified; with opposition to the EU favouring UKIP, and opposition to, and the

prioritisation of immigration favouring the BNP. A respondent’s negative assessment

of how well the Conservatives would handle the issue of asylum seekers made BNP

support more likely than all other party choices, as did a negative perception of

Labour’s ability (excepting UKIP). This supports the assumption that UKIP

supporters may be distinguished from BNP voters by a belief in the potential of the

Conservatives to deal effectively with the issue of asylum seekers and immigration

related issues.

That BNP support seems to be most strongly influenced by the feelings on the issue of

immigration is not surprising but two points should be noted. First, opposition to

immigration trumps that of opposition to Europe13

. Secondly, that this hostility does

not necessarily stem from direct experience of asylum seekers as suggested by the

negative coefficient for the dummy, contact with asylum seekers, a respondent who

had contact with asylum seekers was less likely to support the BNP14

. Thirdly, that

not only does this hostility stem from a perception of the government’s ability to deal

competently with the issue of immigration, but also the lack of credibility in the

13 This conflicts with the official view of the party as being predominantly concerned with opposition

to European integration and its consequences of which unconstrained immigration is one.

14 This variable was not included in the multinomial model.

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Conservatives to do so either. Finally, the failure of readership of an anti-immigrant

paper to achieve significance must be highlighted, in fact readership of the Daily

Mail, the Sun or Express raises the odds of supporting UKIP over the BNP.

Regarding partisanship, a vote for the Conservatives/Labour in the 2005 general

election were both negative predictors of BNP support, respondents who voted for the

Conservatives in 2005 were less likely to vote for the BNP than those who had voted

for Labour. In the initial model increased sympathy towards the Conservatives/

Labour was only negatively related to the former, however in the multinomial model,

respondents who had more positive feelings towards the Conservatives were more

likely to choose the BNP over Labour; this could be a result of an appeal to the

working class Tory vote. However a dislike of David Cameron made respondents

much more likely to support the BNP over UKIP, the Conservatives and the Liberals,

the inverse was true for those who had a more positive view of the Conservative party

performance. Failure of the evaluation of Labour’s performance to achieve

significance and the negative relationship with Conservative support in the initial

model suggests that BNP support is not simply informed by a negative assessment of

Labour and the government but also a lack of a credible alternative in the

Conservatives, and that this might specifically be a product of Cameron’s leadership.

The dislike of Cameron for the BNP and a positive view of the Conservatives for

UKIP distinguish their supporters.

Finally regarding the predictors capturing political disenchantment and

dissatisfaction, BNP supporters do appear to be more dissatisfied with the democratic

process. The coefficients for this predictor reduced the odds of supporting an

alternative party choice except for UKIP. Perhaps as a consequence, the likelihood of

participating in informal forms of politics also reduced the odds of voting

Conservative/Labour. However this is not an easy caricature of political

disenchantment, increased attention to politics, as in the binominal model, exerts a

positive influence on BNP support reducing the odds of supporting all three

Westminster parties. BNP supporters are distinguished by dissatisfaction with the

democratic process but this does not necessarily extend to life satisfaction or political

efficacy, both of which fail to achieve significance. Additionally none of these

predictors make a significant difference when compared to the odds of supporting

UKIP, only higher levels of social capital as marked by interpersonal trust positively

influence the odds of supporting UKIP.

Section 5. Conclusion

The socio-demographic profile of BNP voters supports the existing literature; BNP

supporters are likely to be male, poorly educated, working class and Northern.

However, this statement needs to be qualified. There is some evidence to suggest that

the generalisation of the BNP vote as working class needs to be refined, the decision

to vote BNP is strongly related to skilled manual workers and those who fall within

the mid- income brackets. The BNP does not seem to be appearing to the more

marginalised sectors of society in terms of income or social housing, although

unemployment does positively influence the decision to vote for the BNP over

Labour/Conservatives.

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UKIP and the BNP appear to be pitching at the same demographic with the latter

appealing to an older and more South Eastern section of the electorate. Both parties

are attracting disaffected Labour voters, though this is a stronger effect for the BNP in

the form of protest voters. However, a past affiliation for Labour seems to distinguish

BNP core supporters to those of UKIP. This is reinforced by the heightened hostility

to the Conservative party and notably its leader David Cameron.

The nexus of security concerns around asylum seekers, crime and terrorism also

appear to be distinctive for BNP supporters compared to those of other parties,

eclipsing economic worries. Unsurprisingly, BNP supporters consistently express the

most worry over asylum and immigration related issues, once all other predictors are

held at their mean. The concern over immigration is widely held within the general

population but BNP supporters are distinctive in their heightened hostility and

negative perception of immigrants. Surprisingly given the current focus on inter-

ethnic competition as the motor of Far Right support, BNP supporters do not appear

to prioritise issues around the provision of public services more than other party

supporters.

However a further factor in the decision to vote BNP appears not only to be a negative

perception of the governments’ handling of this issue but an equally damning

assessment of the Conservative’s potential performance. For BNP voters, immigration

is a valence issue, on which none of the major parties can be seen as credible. Not

only does this set them apart from the supporters of all parties, but may also feed into

a more general sense of political dissatisfaction. However the caricature of BNP

supporters as the most politically disenchanted simply does not hold true, BNP

supporters display high levels of dissatisfaction with the democratic process, but are

more likely to participate in informal forms of political participation and pay more

attention to politics. Not only do certain segments of society perceive immigration as

a threat to perhaps their way of life or status, but a critical factor in Far Right support,

as Harrop suggests in his analysis of the National Front is, ‘the sense that the political

structure is incapable of responding to the perceived threat’.

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Table 1: Demographic profile of BNP supporters compared to those of other

parties.

Base BNP UKIP

Male 49.2 66.4 60.0

Female 50.8 33.6 40.0

Age Band

20-25 5.9 5.3 2.1

26-35 14.6 9.2 4.8

36-44 15.0 17.1 10.4

45-54 17.3 24.6 17.2

55-64 29.7 31.2 38.3

65+ 16.8 12.1 27.1

Region

E.Midlands 7.3 11.4 6.1

London 10 7.0 6.3

North 4.7 4.8 2.9

North West 11.8 15.2 13.0

S. East 17.4 14.3 19.9

S. West 10.3 7.5 16.1

W.Midlands 8.0 9.9 10.4

Yorkshire 9.0 15.0 8.3

Type of work

Prof, high tech 23.9 11.6 14.6

Manager 18.6 15.5 18.1

Skilled 7.6 18.6 13.2

Semi-skilled 9.5 16.2 12.2

Retired 25.1 21.0 37.7

Income

10-20,000 17.5 18.6 22.9

20-24 999 9.7 11.4 8.5

25-29 999 8.7 9.7 11.4

30-39 999 12.8 13.3 10.4

40,000 + 24.1 15.4 13.6

Tenure

Ownership 77.0 66.9 75.4

Social Housing 10.3 20.0 14.1

Age completed education

16 37.6 65.8 56.5

21 or over 32.9 13.8 14.0

Media use

Newspaper/every day 37.0 37.9 36.4

Newspaper/not at all 25.7 26.6 19.9

Anti-immigrant paper 48.8 63.6 74.9

Internet Usage Not much 4.9 8.0 6.9

A Great deal 58.0

60.9 53.8

N= 19816

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Table 2. BNP/UKIP vote intention by 2005 vote.

Conservative Labour Liberal Minor

Party

Non/Don’t

Know

N/a Total

BNP 15.4 32.0 5.1 28.1 1.5 17.8 100

UKIP 22.2 24.8 6.4 34.0 1.0 11.6 100

a) All figures significant at 0.001 level.

N= 19186

Source CMS. June 2008-November 2009. British election studies.

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Table 3. 2005 percentage vote breakdown for core supporters and protest voters

BNP UKIP

Core Protest Core Protest

Conservatives 15.9 22.5 24.5 26.5

Labour 34.1 45.6 18.1 40.8

Liberal Party 4.7 8.1 4.0 11.4

Minor Party 45.3 23.8 53.4 21.2

Total % 100 100 100 100

n 170 160 298 245

a) All figures significant at 0.001 level.

N = 15833

Source CMS. June 2008-November 2009. British election studies.

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Table 6. The sum of negative perceptions of immigrants minus positive by party.

Base BNP UKIP CON.

Enrich culture. 20.9 88.4 58.0 40.0

Strengthen economy. 29.4 87.2 67.4 49.5

Do jobs that others don’t… +21.9 54.6 13.2 +17.5

NHS, too many immigrants 12.8 64.8 46.2 25.1

Blame immigrants too much… +7.4 72.5 39.3 11.4

Raise taxes. 16.1 71.5 61.4 32.6

Take jobs 9.5 67.6 49.1 20.5

Threaten English language 12.4 79.4 55.9 31.9

Commit crime. 2.1 65.3 39.7 27.9

Terrorism, increase. 14.2 87.5 77.4 45.1

Result of glob. 25.0 44.2 26.4 4.8

N 4818 102 106 1757

Source CMS. June 2008-November 2009. British election studies.

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Table 5. Multinomial model with BNP vote as reference category

BNP Labour Conservati

ve

Liberal

Party

UKIP

Constant -10.661*** 8.825*** 7.726*** 11.223*** 1.481***

Unemployed -.735* -.633***

Skilled .532** -.613*** -.450*

Gender .359** -.327* -.475** -.476***

Social housing -.651

Low education .819** -.882*** -.863*** -.979*** -.922***

Mid-income .395*** -.474** -.341*

North West -.727

East Midlands -1.011***

Yorkshire .644* -.965***

South East 1.445***

Age 55-64 -.751** 1.292*** 1.562***

Age 65+ -.999** 1.040*** 1.233***

Anti/immigrant. paper .596***

Economic factor -.275***

Security Factor -.208** .252* .301**

Service factor -.239* -.197***

Security issue -.444*** -.288** -.279*

Service issue

Opposition EU -.384* -.497** 1.452***

Migration issue 1.191*** -1.357*** -1.209*** -1.415*** -.713***

Reduce asylum seekers 2.622*** -2.44*** -2.169** -2.721**

Govt/asylum seekers .713*** -.772*** -.665*** -653***

Con/asylum seekers .465*** -.340*** -.646*** -.404*** -.225**

Contact asylum seekers -.527**

Con/like -.095* -.220*** .759***

Labour/like .682*** .083*

Labour vote 2005 -.374** 1.704*** .791*** -.773***

Conservative vote -.975*** 1.497*** -1.370***

Brown negative .519** -1.400***

Cameron negative .638*** -1.145*** -.512** -.585***

Con. performance -.095** .784*** .645** .517**

Govt. performance .714* .671**

Attention to politics .111*** -.205*** -.135*** -.176***

Political influence

Interpersonal trust -.089** .082* .086* .077**

Democracy satisfied .310** -.632*** -.310** -.444***

Life satisfied .217*

Formal politics -.271***

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Informal politics .255** -.268*** -.201***

McFadden R2 .348 .511

a) Age band 55-64, 65+ uses Age 20-25 as the reference category. Region uses E.Anglia

as the reference category. Skilled manual worker uses higher managerial as the

reference category.

b) p * < 0.05, p** < 0.01, p*** < 0.001

c) All coefficents displayed are betas.

d) BNP vote is the referent

e) Variables that failed to achieve significance across all parties are excluded.

Source CMS. June 2008-November 2009. British election studies.

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