Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 93252          August 5, 1991

RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, respondents.

 

G.R. No. 93746          August 5, 1991

MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner,

vs.

HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Local

Government, NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of the

Department of Local Government and SALVADOR CABALUNA JR., respondents.

 

G.R. No. 95245          August 5, 1991

RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his capacity as the

Secretary of the Department of Local Government, respondents.

Nicolas P. Sonalan for petitioner in 93252.

Romeo A. Gerochi for petitioner in 93746.

Eugenio Original for petitioner in 95245.

 

D E C I S I O N

SARMIENTO, J.:p

The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the

Secretary of Local Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials.

The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member of

the Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively.

The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in

number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges,

among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral

conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention. 1 The

personalities involved are Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health office; Salvador

Cabaluna, her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant City Health Officer; Mansueto

Malabor, Vice-Mayor; Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong, and

Eduardo Pefia Redondo members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a

barangay tanod. The complaints against the Mayor are set forth in the opinion of the

respondent Court of Appeals. 2 We quote:

xxx xxx xxx

In her verified complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk assigned to the City Health,

Office of Iloilo City charged that due to political reasons, having supported the rival

candidate, Mrs. Rosa 0. Caram, the petitioner City Mayor, using as an excuse the exigency

of the service and the interest of the public, pulled her out from rightful office where her

qualifications are best suited and assigned her to a work that should be the function of a

non-career service employee. To make matters worse, a utility worker in the office of the

Public Services, whose duties are alien to the complainant’s duties and functions, has been

detailed to take her place. The petitioner’s act are pure harassments aimed at luring her

away from her permanent position or force her to resign.

In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the petitioner handpicked her to

perform task not befitting her position as Assistant City Health Officer of Iloilo City; that her

office was padlocked without any explanation or justification; that her salary was withheld

without cause since April 1, 1988; that when she filed her vacation leave, she was given the

run-around treatment in the approval of her leave in connivance with Dr. Rodolfo Villegas

and that she was the object of a well-engineered trumped-up charge in an administrative

complaint filed by Dr. Rodolfo Villegas (Annex B).

On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Iloilo City and

complainants Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong and Eduardo

Pefia Pedondo are members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of Iloilo. Their

complaint arose out from the case where Councilor Larry Ong, whose key to his office was

unceremoniously and without previous notice, taken by petitioner. Without an office,

Councilor Ong had to hold office at Plaza Libertad, The Vice-Mayor and the other

complainants sympathized with him and decided to do the same. However, the petitioner,

together with its fully-armed security men, forcefully drove them away from Plaza Libertad.

Councilor Ong denounced the petitioner’s actuations the following day in the radio station

and decided to hold office at the Freedom Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so many

people who gathered to witness the incident. However, before the group could reach the

area, the petitioner, together with his security men, led the firemen using a firetruck in

dozing water to the people and the bystanders.

Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod, appointed by

former mayor Rosa O. Caram. On March 13, 1988, without the benefit of charges filed

against him and no warrant of arrest was issued, Erbite was arrested and detained at the

City Jail of Iloilo City upon orders of petitioner. In jail, he was allegedly mauled by other

detainees thereby causing injuries He was released only the following day. 3

The Mayor thereafter answered 4 and the cases were shortly set for hearing. The opinion of

the Court of Appeals also set forth the succeeding events:

xxx xxx xxx

The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for hearing on June 20-21,

1988 at the Regional Office of the Department of Local Government in Iloilo City. Notices,

through telegrams, were sent to the parties (Annex L) and the parties received them,

including the petitioner. The petitioner asked for a postponement before the scheduled date

of hearing and was represented by counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing officers, Atty.

Salvador Quebral and Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come all the way from Manila for the

two-day hearings but was actually held only on June 20,1988 in view of the inability and

unpreparedness of petitioner’s counsel.

The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27,1988 in the same venue-Iloilo City. Again,

the petitioner attempted to delay the proceedings and moved for a postponement under the

excuse that he had just hired his counsel. Nonetheless, the hearing officers denied the

motion to postpone, in view of the fact that the parties were notified by telegrams of the

scheduled hearings (Annex M).

In the said hearings, petitioner’s counsel cross-examined the complainants and their

witnesses.

Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive suspension

order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11,1988 for a period of sixty (60) days.

Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the petitioner again asked

for a postponement to September 26,1988. On September 26, 1988, the complainants and

petitioner were present, together with their respective counsel. The petitioner sought for a

postponement which was denied. In these hearings which were held in Mala the petitioner

testified in Adm. Case No. C-10298 and 10299.

The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case and the complainants testified

including their witnesses.

On October 10, 1988, petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Original moved for a postponement of the

October 24, 1988 hearing to November 7 to 11, 1988 which was granted. However, the

motion for change of venue as denied due to lack of funds. At the hearing on November 7,

1988, the parties and counsel were present. Petitioner reiterated his motion to change

venue and moved for postponement anew. The counsel discussed a proposal to take the

deposition of witnesses in Iloilo City so the hearing was indefinitely postponed. However,

the parties failed to come to terms and after the parties were notified of the hearing, the

investigation was set to December 13 to 15, 1988.

The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that his witnesses were sick

or cannot attend the investigation due to lack of transportation. The motion was denied and

the petitioner was given up to December 14, 1988 to present his evidence.

On December 14,1988, petitioner’s counsel insisted on his motion for postponement and

the hearing officers gave petitioner up to December 15, 1988 to present his evidence. On

December 15, 1988, the petitioner failed to present evidence and the cases were

considered submitted for resolution.

In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary detention case

filed by Pancho Erbite so the respondent ordered the petitioner’s second preventive

suspension dated October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days. The petitioner was able to

obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 33 of Iloilo City. The second preventive suspension was not enforced. 5

Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition

against the respondent Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial

Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently,

he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition, in the respondent Court of

Appeals.

Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively

suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and

designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor

Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court of Appeals, a petition for

prohibition, 6 (Malabor it is to be noted, is one of the complainants, and hence, he is

interested in seeing Mayor Ganzon ousted.)

On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-G.R. SP

No. 16417. On July 5, 1990, it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No.

20736. In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued a Resolution certifying the petition

of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been similarly charged by the respondent Secretary, to this

Court.

On June 26,1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent

Secretary from implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of the

Court of Appeals’ two decisions.

In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our

Resolutions of January 15, 1991, we gave due course thereto.

Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (GR No. 93252), that the Department of Local

Government in hearing the ten cases against him, had denied him due process of law and

that the respondent Secretary had been “biased, prejudicial and hostile” towards

him 7 arising from his (Mayor Ganzon’s) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng Demokratikong

Pilipino party 8 and the running political rivalry they maintained in the last congressional and

local elections;9 and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. 10 He also alleges

that he requested the Secretary to lift his suspension since it had come ninety days prior to

an election (the barangay elections of November 14, 1988), 11notwithstanding which, the

latter proceeded with the hearing and meted out two more suspension orders of the

aforementioned cases. 12 He likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo

City (they were held in Manila) in order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary

rejected his request. 13 He states that he asked for postponement on “valid and

justifiable” 14 grounds, among them, that he was suffering from a heart ailment which

required confinement; that his “vital” 15 witness was also hospitalized 16 but that the latter

unduly denied his request. 17

Mayor Ganzon’s primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary of

Local Government is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local

officials, an argument reiterated by the petitioner Mary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No.

93746).

As to Mayor Ganzon’s charges of denial of due process, the records do not show very

clearly in what manner the Mayor might have been deprived of his rights by the respondent

Secretary. His claims that he and Secretary Luis-Santos were (are) political rivals and that

his “persecution” was politically motivated are pure speculation and although the latter does

not appear to have denied these contentions (as he, Mayor Ganzon, claims), we cannot

take his word for it the way we would have under less political circumstances, considering

furthermore that “political feud” has often been a good excuse in contesting complaints.

The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say-so’s that Secretary Santos had

attempted to seduce him to join the administration party and to operate a lottery in Iloilo

City. Again, although the Secretary failed to rebut his allegations, we cannot accept them, at

face value, much more, as judicial admissions as he would have us accept them 18 for the

same reasons above-stated and furthermore, because his say so’s were never corroborated

by independent testimonies. As a responsible public official, Secretary Santos, in pursuing

an official function, is presumed to be performing his duties regularly and in the absence of

contrary evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed to him.

As to Mayor Ganzon’s contention that he had requested the respondent Secretary to defer

the hearing on account of the ninety-day ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas Blg. 337,

the Court finds the question to be moot and academic since we have in fact restrained the

Secretary from further hearing the complaints against the petitioners. 19

As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not given any

compelling reason why we should overturn the Court of Appeals, which found no convincing

reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying his requests. Besides, postponements are a

matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and based on Mayor Ganzon’s above

story, we are not convinced that the Secretary has been guilty of a grave abuse of

discretion.

The Court cannot say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos’ actuations

deprived Mayor Ganzon of due process of law.

We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the

President’s alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials.

It is the petitioners’ argument that the 1987 Constitution 20 no longer allows the President, as

the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal

over local officials. According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to

strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting the phrase 21 as may

be provided by law to strip the President of the power of control over local governments. It is

a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission.

The provision in question reads as follows:

Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local

governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and

municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their

component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. 22

It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we quote:

Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or

offices, exercise general supervision over all Local governments as may be provided by

law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 23

The petitioners submit that the deletion (of “as may be provided by law”) is significant, as

their argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is “provided by law” and (2)

hence, no law may provide for it any longer.

It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of Local

Government acted in consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the

Local Government Code, we quote:

Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. — Within seven days after the complaint is filed, the Minister of

local Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the

respondent to submit his verified answer within seven days from receipt of said complaint,

and commence the hearing and investigation of the case within ten days after receipt of

such answer of the respondent. No investigation shall be held within ninety days

immediately prior to an election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed with the

said period. If preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the

preventive suspension shall be lifted. 24

Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. — (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the

Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the

provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or

municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official.

(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when

there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts

complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense so

warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses

or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases,

preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.

(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in

office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until its

termination. However ‘ if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect

or request, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension. 25

The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987

Constitution, in deleting the phrase “as may be provided by law” intend to divest the

President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials? (2)

Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? (3) What

is the significance of the change in the constitutional language?

It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional

language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of

her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions

against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of “as may be provided by law”)

signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments’ autonomy from congress and

to break Congress’ “control” over local government affairs. The Constitution did not,

however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority

over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.

Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units,

as in the federal governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or Germany),

although Jefferson is said to have compared municipal corporations euphemistically to

“small republics.” 26 Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star,

though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the

Constitution and as the “supervision clause” itself suggest-is to wean local government units

from over-dependence on the central government.

It is noteworthy that under the Charter, “local autonomy” is not instantly self-executing, but

subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code, 27 a local tax

law, 28 income distribution legislation, 29 and a national representation law, 30 and

measures 31 designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in

spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general

supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to

include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest

that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code

has done, delegate its exercise to the President. Thus:

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more

responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of

decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate

among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and

provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and

functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and

operation of the local units. 32

As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of “as may be provided by law” was meant to

stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing

congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like the power of

local legislation. 33 The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing

legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed

against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition.

The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere

supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her

control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression

because legally, “supervision” is not incompatible with disciplinary authority as this Court

has held, 34 thus:

xxx xxx xxx

It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, this Court had

occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over

local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive

officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and

supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent.

Thus in that case the Court has made the following digression: “In administration law

supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate

officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take

such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the

other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a

subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment

of the former for that of the latter.” But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably

inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials does

not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so

requires, as postulated in Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code. … 35

xxx xxx xxx

“Control” has been defined as “the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set

aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute

the judgment of the former for test of the latter.”36 “Supervision” on the other hand means

“overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform

their duties. 37 As we held, 38 however, “investigating” is not inconsistent with “overseeing”,

although it is a lesser power than “altering”. The impression is apparently exacerbated by

the Court’s pronouncements in at least three cases, Lacson v. Roque, 39 Hebron v.

Reyes, 40 and Mondano v. Silvosa, 41 and possibly, a fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor

General.42 In Lacson, this Court said that the President enjoyed no control powers but only

supervision “as may be provided by law,”43 a rule we reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano.

In Pelaez, we stated that the President “may not . . . suspend an elective official of a regular

municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of

the corresponding provincial board.” 44 However,

neither Lacson nor Hebron nor Mondano categorically banned the Chief Executive from

exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but

because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority. Thus, according to Lacson:

The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal

officers is without doubt not well taken. Removal and suspension of public officers are

always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to

constitutional limitations. 45

In Hebron we stated:

Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the

same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence of express or

clear provision to the contrary-which does not exist with respect to municipal officers … 46

In Mondano, the Court held:

… The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over

municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to “receive and investigate

complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression,

corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of

any crime involving moral turpitude.” And if the charges are serious, “he shall submit written

charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to

the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the

officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the

charge by one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question.” Section 86 of the

Revised Administration Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by

the Department Head over the administration of … municipalities … . If it be construed that

it does and such additional power is the same authority as that vested in the Department

Head by section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power must

be deemed to have been abrogated by Section 110(l), Article VII of the Constitution. 47

xxx xxx xxx

In Pelaez, we stated that the President cannot impose disciplinary measures on local

officials except on appeal from the provincial board pursuant to the Administrative Code. 48

Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it

was not because we did not think that the President cannot exercise it on account of his

limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases ii which

the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in

sustaining him. 49

The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the

Constitutional Commission to defeat the President’s powers. The Court believes that the

deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose

Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the President,  50 Commissioner Blas Ople

would not. 51

The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local

Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, “supervision” and “removal” are not

incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger

expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite of

the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect. 52

As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means “a more responsive and

accountable local government structure instituted through a system of

decentralization.” 53 The Constitution as we observed, does nothing more than to break up

the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put

by political adherents, to “liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila.”

Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and inter-dependence

between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to user in a

regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments,

under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose

than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self- government.

As we observed in one case, 54 decentralization means devolution of national administration

but not power to the local levels. Thus:

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.

There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates

administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government

power and in the process to make local governments “more responsive and accountable,”

and “ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more

effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.” At the same

time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables

it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises “general supervision” over

them, but only to “ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.” He has no

control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the

favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous

government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention

from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power

amounts to “self-immolation,” since in that event, the autonomous government becomes

accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency. 55

The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another

matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the

Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600

days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie findings. The Court is

not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty

of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of

suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. As we held: 56

2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office

does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by

the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have

been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He was

elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. it is a basic

assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are

entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance,

any of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance,

criminally. In either case, Ms culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a

criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive

suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time

raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile

his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice

suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people

of Lianga They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as

mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this

preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A

denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional

application that the order of suspension should be lifted. 57

The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above

reasons, 58 and so also, because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local

government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held,59 is simply “to prevent the

accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and

authority over possible witnesses” 60 or to keep him off “the records and other evidence. 61

It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an

erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it cannot exceed sixty days, 62 which

is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient,

and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose

in a shorter span.

Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the accused

is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the respondent)

enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty.

Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be

imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held, 63 a longer suspension is unjust and

unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.

As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility

Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in

inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension permanent.

It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayor’s guilt has not

been proven. Worse, any absolution will be for naught because needless to say, the length

of his suspension would have, by the time he is reinstated, wiped out his tenure

considerably.

The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the respondent Secretary to

see that justice is done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict on Mayor Ganzon

successive suspensions when apparently, the respondent Secretary has had sufficient time

to gather the necessary evidence to build a case against the Mayor without suspending him

a day longer. What is intriguing is that the respondent Secretary has been cracking down,

so to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when

he, the respondent Secretary, could have pursued a consolidated effort.

We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from

exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising

that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.

The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under questions, and that any talk of

future suspensions is in fact premature. The fact remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon has

been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension and the possibility of sixty days more

is arguably around the corner (which amounts to a violation of the Local Government Code

which brings to light a pattern of suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor the rest of his

natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to us as a concerted effort of

the State to perpetuate an arbitrary act.

As we said, we cannot tolerate such a state of affairs.

We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third

suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued.

Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are urging the Department of

Local Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to undertake steps to expedite the

same, subject to Mayor Ganzon’s usual remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or

certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting out

further suspensions based on those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima

facie evidence.

In resume the Court is laying down the following rules:

1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of

administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central

government in the manner the law may provide;

2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;

3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant

but to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter from

legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of

autonomy;

4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by

law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials;

5. “Supervision” and “investigation” are not inconsistent terms; “investigation” does not

signify “control” (which the President does not have);

6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve the suspension so far ordered, but

may no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally; provided:

a) that delays in the investigation of those charges “due to his fault, neglect or request, (the

time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension. [Supra, sec.

63(3)]

b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the petitioner commits

another or other crimes and abuses for which proper charges are filed against him by the

aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension shall not be a bar to his being

preventively suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local

Government Code.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary

Restraining Order issued isLIFTED. The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED,

provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future

suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him

for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to

consolidate all such administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon.

The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.