game theory in business collaboration
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Game Theory in Business Collaboration. Gabriel Tsang Supervisor: Jian Yang. Agenda. Initial Problem Related Work Approach Outcome Conclusion Future Work. Agenda. Initial Problem Related Work Approach Outcome Conclusion Future Work. Background. Initial Problem. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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Game Theory in Business
CollaborationGabriel Tsang
Supervisor: Jian Yang
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Initial Problem Related Work Approach Outcome Conclusion Future Work
Agenda
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Initial Problem Related Work Approach Outcome Conclusion Future Work
Agenda
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Background
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business process involves multiple business partners
increasingly outsourcing key operations and interaction
often need to share resources to accomplish a common task
Negotiation of Access Control required Use Game theory to model obtain a better strategy
Initial Problem
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Initial Problem Related Work Approach Outcome Conclusion Future Work
Agenda
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Business Collaboration◦ Overview, Characteristics and Challenges
Game Theory ◦ Model Basic elements,Business Applications
Related Work
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Before seeking partners to cooperate with an enterprise will first need to capture its private behavior in the internal business process aspect.
Based on its internal behavior the enterprise can then specify its capabilities in its externally visible behavior in the participant public behavior aspect.
Enterprise negotiates with other parties to establish cooperation.
Business Collaboration Overveiw
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Long-time execution. Heterogeneous and autonomous business
process communication among multiple business participants.
cross-organisational asynchronous business interaction.
Complex business-oriented transactional semantics.
Cross-organisational policy coordination.
Business Collaboration Characteristics
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Trust Technologies
Business Collaboration Challenges
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Credential disclosure is governed by an access control policy ◦ Specifies credentials that must be received from
another party prior to disclosing the sensitive credential to that party
Access Control Policies
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Players: The decision makers in the game. Actions: Choices available to a player. Information: Knowledge that a player has
when making a decision. Strategies: Rules that tell a player which
action to take at each point of the game.
Game Theory elements – part 1
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Outcomes: The results that unfold, such as a price war, world peace, etc.
Payoffs: The utilities (or happiness) that each player realizes for a particular outcome.
Equilibria: An equilibrium is a stable result.
Game Theory elements – part 2
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Supply Chain Management Wireless Network Artificial Intelligent
Game Theory applications
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Initial Problem Related Work Approach Outcome Conclusion Future Work
Agenda
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Define Assumptions Analyse Game Model Using the Framework Analyse other Game types characteristics Analyse Critical Factors
◦ (business collaboration challenge situation) Map with the Game Model
Approach
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Each decision maker ("PLAYER“) has available to him two or more well-specified choices or sequences of choices.
Every possible combination of plays available to the players leads to a well-defined end-state that terminates the game.
A specified payoff for each player is associated with each end-state.
Each decision maker does not have perfect knowledge of the game and of his opposition; that is, he does not know in full detail the rules of the game as well as the payoffs of all other players.
All decision makers are rational; that is, each player, given two alternatives, will select the one that yields him the greater payoff.
Assumptions
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1. Define the problem.
2. Identify the critical factors. Examples of critical factors include differentiated products, first-mover advantage, entry and exit costs, variable costs, etc.
3. Build a model, such as a bimatrix game or an extensive form game.
4. Develop intuition by using the model.
5. Formulate a strategy - cover all possible scenarios.
Framework
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Bi-matrix Extensive Form Normal-Form (Strategic Form)
Models
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Players: How many players will be in this negotiation policy game?
Strategy: In a game each player chooses from a set of possible actions, known as strategies. In this situation would be accepting the policy or denying the policy.
Critical Factors – part 1
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Sequential: One player performs her/his actions after another is a sequential game.
Perfect Information: If it is a sequential game and every player knows the strategies chosen by the players who preceded them.
Zero Sum: One gain is the loss of the others.
Critical Factors – part 2
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Bi-matrix model
Row Player (RP)
Column Player (CP)
CP Option 1 CP Option 2
RP Option 1
(Payout to RP, Payout to CP) (Payout to RP, Payout to CP)
RP Option 2
(Payout to RP, Payout to CP) (Payout to RP, Payout to CP)
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Extensive Form Game
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Normal Form Game Player 1
If Player 1 does A, then
If Player 1 does B, then
If Player 1 does C, then A B C
Player 2 1) d d d (__,__) (__,__) (__,__)
2) d d e (__,__) (__,__) (__,__)
3) d e d (__,__) (__,__) (__,__)
4) d e e (__,__) (__,__) (__,__)
5) e d d (__,__) (__,__) (__,__)
6) e d e (__,__) (__,__) (__,__)
7) e e d (__,__) (__,__) (__,__)
8) e e e (__,__) (__,__) (__,__)
Payoffs
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Initial Problem Related Work Approach Outcome Conclusion Future Work
Agenda
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Negotiation of Access Control Policy
Similar to Coordination Game in Game theory
Outcome
Game Players Strategies per player
Sequential Perfect information
Zero sum
Coordination game N variable No No No
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2 person game ◦ have many requester to play this negotiation
game at the same time. Incomplete information.
◦ do not have full knowledge about the game non-cooperative
◦ all requests are sent as individual sequential game
◦ Negotiation again in the future. Non-zero Sum
Critical Factors
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Model
Bob Alice
Enough Credential Not enough Credential
Reject (Negative, Negative) (Positive, Negative)
Accept
(Positive, Positive) (Negative, Positive)
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Initial Problem Related Work Approach Outcome Conclusion Future Work
Agenda
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Introduced the problem Overview of business collaboration and
game theory Using game theory framework to model the
situation Successful modeled
Conclusion
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Testing ◦ Right game? Right attributes?
Formula Strategy Reuse the framework
Future Work
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Question ?
Thank You