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Game Theory and Conservation Class 11 Presentation 1

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Game Theory and Conservation. Class 11 Presentation 1. Outline. Introduction to game theory Prisoners’ dilemma activity Examples of successful conservation/poverty alleviation work Use of game theory to evaluate conservation work. History of Game theory. A beautiful mind: John Nash. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Game Theory and Conservation

Game Theory and Conservation

Class 11

Presentation 1

Page 2: Game Theory and Conservation

Outline Introduction to game theory Prisoners’ dilemma activity Examples of successful

conservation/poverty alleviation work Use of game theory to evaluate

conservation work

Page 3: Game Theory and Conservation

History of Game theory Fairly long history

von Neumann, J., and O. Morgenstern (1944), Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press

Qualitative opinion based analyses to quantification

Provides quantification of decisions and outcomes

Evaluation of simple rules that govern choice and complexity of outcomes

A beautiful mind: John Nash

Page 4: Game Theory and Conservation

What is “Game” Game = scientific metaphor for wide range

of human (today any interaction) interactions in which the outcome depends on interactive strategies (interactions) of 2 or more people (or items such as atoms, organisms, populations) who have different (properties or adaptations) motives.

Page 5: Game Theory and Conservation

Why game theory? Useful way to model interactions between

organisms and people Also used in many other disciplines and

endeavours: economy, computer science, sociology, international trade, negotiations, evolutionary biology, physics, etc.

Page 6: Game Theory and Conservation

Game theory Applies when:

2 or more players One player: decision

More than one outcome (e.g. someone wins while another loses)

Outcomes depend on the choices of all players

Players have choice, strategy matters

Page 7: Game Theory and Conservation

Where you cannot use game theory Games of chance (e.g. lotteries: no strategy

required) Games without interaction between players

(e.g. solitaire)

Page 8: Game Theory and Conservation

Elements of game theory Must know the number of players List and description of all possible actions

by individual player Information players have before decision Description of payoff consequences to each

player for every action Description of players preferences

Page 9: Game Theory and Conservation

Elements of game theory Players can have perfect information on

other players decisions (e.g. chess) Players can have imperfect information

(e.g. sealed bids, prisoners’ dilemma) Rules are known to all players Players seek to maximize their payoff Payoffs are known and fixed

Page 10: Game Theory and Conservation

Prisoners’ Dilemma Two prisoners, each in a different cell Must decide:

Confess Do not confess

Both confess: 6 months jail each Both do not confess: 1 month jail each 1st confess, 2nd not: 2nd gets 9 months 1st does not, 2nd does: 1st gets 9 months jail

Page 11: Game Theory and Conservation

Prisoners’ Dilemma Assume that you are one of the prisoners On a piece of paper write down if you

would confess or not confess

Page 12: Game Theory and Conservation

Prisoners’ dilemma matrixPrisoner 2

Confess

Prisoner 2

Do not confess

Prisoner 1

Confess

6,6 months 0,9 months

Prisoner 1

Do not confess

9,0 months 1,1

Page 13: Game Theory and Conservation

Note Note that you thought about the decision

the other person would make Game theory allows us to analyze not only

individual decisions within market conditions (for resource use) but also based on the strategies chosen by others

Page 14: Game Theory and Conservation

Prisoners’ dilemma Is very simplistic (unrealistic) but it can provide

insights into interactions Other games that can be modelled Applicable in: Tragedy of the commons Environmental pollution Population growth, consumerism Nuclear arms race Others?

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"The Tragedy of the Commons," Garrett Hardin, Science, 162(1968):1243-1248

To read Hardin’s classic paper click on: http://www.constitution.org/cmt/tragcomm.htm

Commons: property such as land owned collectively

Page 16: Game Theory and Conservation

History of International Aid Post WWII

Page 17: Game Theory and Conservation

Keynesian Developmentalism (1940-1960) Macro economics at global level Sought to reduce gap between developing and

developed nations Aim: increase economic development through

modernization, agro-exports, and primary exports of raw resources

Solutions: Donor countries Focus: industrial, large landowner, export E.g: agriculture and timber plantations,

Page 18: Game Theory and Conservation

Neoliberalism (1950–1970) Similar to earlier programs Focus: development, western technology,

exports No recognition of local knowledge Replacement of indigenous flora and fauna

with exotics Some recognition of communal property

Page 19: Game Theory and Conservation

Popular Development (1970–present) Recognized complexity of development Started to involve local people Solutions: local area Use of local technology Short term targets

Page 20: Game Theory and Conservation

Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources Project (CAMPFIRE), Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe: in southern Africa Used to be a British colony Wildlife owned by state Wildlife important for tourism Direct worth: $250 million US/yr Most habitat and wildlife outside parks

Page 21: Game Theory and Conservation

Project (CAMPFIRE), Zimbabwe Agriculture most important economic

sector Cattle ranching subsidized Degraded arid lands Game killed to control tse-tse fly Law changed in 1961 Conservation Act

allowed ranchers to ranch, kill and sell game

Page 22: Game Theory and Conservation

Project (CAMPFIRE), Zimbabwe Game ranching not profitable (cost of transport) Safari-hunting profitable 1975 Parks and Wildlife Act delegated control of

safari hunting to large landowners This program proved successful CAMPFIRE sought to implement similar benefits

on communal lands

Page 23: Game Theory and Conservation

Project (CAMPFIRE), Zimbabwe Dept of National Parks and Wildlife Management

recognized that wildlife could be conserved only if communal and private landowners derived benefit

Project aim: transfer benefits to local communities

Caution: Recent decisions by Zim. Govt. not to protect property rights may undermine this programme

Page 24: Game Theory and Conservation

Project (CAMPFIRE), Zimbabwe Community membership defined with local

groups Defined household Revenue sharing procedures National office then devolved management

and revenue to local groups for safari hunting in community

Page 25: Game Theory and Conservation

Project (CAMPFIRE), Zimbabwe National govt benefited through higher tax

revenue Locals benefited: Z$ 200/household/yr New school, grinding mill

Page 26: Game Theory and Conservation

Project (CAMPFIRE), Zimbabwe Has not worked where benefits minimal to

locals E.g.:Nyaminyami District in the Zambezi

Valley Revenue sharing not satisfactory to all

Page 27: Game Theory and Conservation

Work of the Watershed Organization Trust (WOTR) in Ahmendnagar

Rural Development: WOTR

Jan 10-14’01

Page 28: Game Theory and Conservation

Housing before

Living quarters for 7 peopleFloor and walls: mud

Page 29: Game Theory and Conservation

Before

Landscape denuded

Local cattle

Page 30: Game Theory and Conservation

Before: Water & fuelCow dung for fuel

Wells run dry after January

Page 31: Game Theory and Conservation

Before Several attempts on improving the

conditions of these people E.g. introduced high production cattle New water pumps Free education for girls to university Free education for all in primary grades

Page 32: Game Theory and Conservation

What is done todayVillagers agree to work together

Experts provide advice and support

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Water conservationTrees planted on ridges (survival up: from 5% to 95%) Grazing stopped

Tree spp selected by villagers

Page 34: Game Theory and Conservation

Water conservationDams

Bunds

Terraces

5 Cents/day

Page 35: Game Theory and Conservation

New house

Old House

Page 36: Game Theory and Conservation

Fuel

Biogas generation

Page 37: Game Theory and Conservation

Milk production

Example: Kalamkarwadi:

Before: 705 litres

Today: 1969 litres

Page 38: Game Theory and Conservation

AgricultureE.g. Kalamkarwadi

Summer: 19%

Winter: 10%

Vegs: 0 ha to 23 ha

Sorghum

Wheat

Page 39: Game Theory and Conservation

Agriculture

Drip irrigationSweet lime

Castor

Page 40: Game Theory and Conservation

Income

One shed to brick house with biogas & store

Page 41: Game Theory and Conservation

EducationEqual number of boys and girls in school (Grade 1-4)

Page 42: Game Theory and Conservation

Social change

Micro loans

Self-help groups

Page 43: Game Theory and Conservation

Water

Drinking water all year round

Dry season crops

Page 44: Game Theory and Conservation

Discussion Use the elements of game theory to:

Identify the players in the central India case Describe the dominant strategy that led to the

problem Can you think of other solutions to the

problem(s)?