7/29/2019 Galido vs

1/11

Galido vs. COMELECPost undercase digests, Political Law at Tuesday, February 21, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates during the January 18, 1988 local elections for the position of Mayor in the municipalityof Garcia-Hernandez, Province of Bohol. Petitioner was proclaimed the duly-elected Mayor by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Private

respondent Saturnino Galeon filed an election protest before the RTC of Bohol, Tagbilaran City, wherein the court upheld the proclamation of

petitioner. Private respondent appealed the RTC decision to the COMELEC which reversed the trial courts decision through its First Divisionand declared private-respondent the duly-elected mayor. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC en banc,

affirming the decision of the First Division. COMELEC held that the 15ballots in the same precinct containing the initial C after the nameGalido were marked ballots, and, therefore, invalid. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and injunction before the Supreme Court, whoresolved to dismiss the said petition. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied with finality by the SC. Still, the petitioner

filed another petition for certiorari and injunction which contained the same allegations and legal issues. A TRO was issued by the SC and the

private respondent Galeon now seeks for the dismissal of the present petition for 3 main reasons: 1) Final decisions, orders or rulings of the

COMELEC in election contests involving elective municipal offices are final and executory, and not appealable. 2) The petition involves pure

questions of fact as they relate to appreciation of evidence which is beyond the power of review of the SC. 3) It is exactly the same petition which

was already dismissed with finality by the SC. These allegations were answered by the petitioner: 1) According to the Constitution, the presentpetition can still be brought to the SC by certiorari, not by an ordinary appeal. 2) The petition involves pure questions of law. 3) The dismissal

with finality of the first petition did not refer to the merits of the petition.

Issues:(1) Whether COMELEC has jurisdiction over the case

(2) May a COMELEC decision be brought to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari by the aggrieved party?

(3) Did the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in rendering the decision?

Held:(1) Yes. COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all e lective regional,

provincial, and city officials and has appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving municipal officials decided by trial courts of general

jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

(2) Yes. The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving municipal and barangay officials are final,

executory, and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to the SC by way of a special civil action of certiorari.

(3) No. COMELEC has the inherent power to decide an election contest and the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its discretion, the

exercise of which should not be controlled unless such discretion has been abused to the prejudice of either party. But this petition has become

moot and academic because private respondent has already assumed the position of Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez as the duly-elected Mayor of themunicipality by virtue of the COMELEC decision. Petition dismissed.

http://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/02/galido-vs-comelec.htmlhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/search/label/case%20digestshttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/02/galido-vs-comelec.htmlhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/02/galido-vs-comelec.htmlhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/search/label/case%20digestshttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/02/galido-vs-comelec.html

7/29/2019 Galido vs

2/11

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 135869. September 22, 1999]

RUSTICO H. ANTONIO, petiti oner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE T. MIRANDA, JR.,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

GONZAGA

_

REYES, J.:

Is the period to appeal a decision of a municipal trial court to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in an election protest involving

a barangay position five (5) days per COMELEC Rules of Procedure or ten (10) days as provided for in Republic Act 6679[1]and the Omnibus

Election Code? This is the sole issue posed in the instant petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to

annul the order dated August 3, 1998 of the Second Division of the COMELEC,[2]dismissing the appeal of petit ioner Rustico Antonio for having

been filed out of time pursuant to COMELEC Rules of Procedure, and the order promulgated on October 14, 1998 of the COMELEC en banc,

denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The antecedents as found by the COMELEC in the order dated October 14, 1998 are:

The parties in this case were rival candidates for the Punong Barangay of Barangay Ilaya, Las Pias City, Metro Manila. After the board ofcanvassers proclaimed protestee-appellant Rustico Antonio, protestant-appellee Vicente T. Miranda, Jr. filed an election protest docketed

asElection Protest Case No. 97-0017against Antonio before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Pias City (Branch LXXIX). The trial court

rendered aDecision dated 9 March 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Court declares the protestant Vicente Miranda as the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Ilaya, Las Pias City,Metro Manila.

Antonio admitted receipt of the above-quoted decision on 18 March 1998. Subsequently, Antonio filed aNotice of Appealwith the trial courton 27 March 1998 or nine (9) days after receipt thereof. Meanwhile, Miranda moved to execute the trial courts decision. Rustico, inhis Opposition to the Motion for Execution or ExecutionPending Appeal, argued against Mirandas motion for execution. After the trial court

denied the motion for execution, the records of this case was forwarded to the Commission (Second Division).

On 10 August 1998, protestee-appellant Rustico Antonio received from this Commission (Second Division) an Orderdated 3 August 1998

stating as follows:

In the light of the aforequoted rules, protestee RUSTICO ANTONIO, failed to perfect his appeal within the five (5) days period prescribed for

perfecting his appeal, as he filed his Notice of Appeal only on March 27, 1998 or nine (9) days after receipt of the decision sought to be appealed.

The Period aforestated is jurisdictional and failure of the protestee to perfect his appeal within the said period deprives the Commission of itsappellate jurisdiction.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

Hence, this motion for reconsideration.

The instant Motion for Reconsiderationis DENIED and We AFFIRM the Order dated 3 August 1998 of this Commission (Second Division).[3]

In the instant petition forcertiorari, petitioner argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of

jurisdiction when it dismissed the appeal for the following reasons:

(a) In barangay electoral protest cases, the period of appeal is ten (10) days from receipt of the decision of the Metropolitan

or Municipal Trial Court. This is provided for by Sec. 9 of R.A. 6679 and Sec. 252 of the Omnibus Election Code

(b) The provisions of Sec. 21, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure providing for a five-day period within which to appealfrom the decision of the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court could not prevail upon the express provisions of Rep. Act No.

6679 and Sec. 252 of the Omnibus Election Code;

(c) Moreover, the COMELEC committed an error of jurisdiction when it disregarded the provisions of Sections 5,6 & 7, Rule 22 ofthe COMELEC Rules of Procedure requiring the filing of briefs by the appellant and the appellee. The questioned resolution of

August 3, 1998 was issued motu propio and without prior notice and hearing. The petitioner was fast tracked;

(d) The alleged winning margin of the private respondent over the petitioner as found by the Metropolitan Trial Court of LasPias is only four (4) votes the results being MIRANDA1,171; ANTONIO1,167. The peoples will must not go on

procedural points. An election protest involves public interest, and technicalities should not be sanctioned when it will be an

obstacle in the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of its public officials. [Macasundig vs.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn1

7/29/2019 Galido vs

3/11

Macalanagan, 13 SCRA 577; Vda. De Mesa vs. Mensias, 18 SCRA 533; Juliano vs. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA 808; Genete vs.

Archangel, 21 SCRA 1178; Maliwanag vs. Herrera, 25 SCRA 175; De Castro vs. Genete, 27 SCRA 623]

(e) The questioned resolutions violated the above principle because the COMELEC did not appreciate the contested ballots.[4]

In dismissing the appeal, the COMELEC relied on Section 21, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which reads:

SEC. 21.AppealFrom any decision rendered by the court, the aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission on Elections within five (5)

days after the promulgation of the decision.

On the other hand, petitioner contends that the period of appeal from decisions of the Municipal Trial Courts or Metropolitan Trial Courts

involving barangay officials is governed by Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 reads:

SEC. 9. A sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay official may be filed with the proper municipal or metropolitan trial court by any

candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for a barangay office within ten (10) days after the proclamation of theresults of the election. The trial court shall decide the election protest within thirty (30) days after the filing thereof. The decision of the

municipal or metropolitan trial court may be appealed within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party to the regional

trial court which shall decide the issue within thirty (30) days from receipt of the appeal and whose decision on questions of fact shall be final andnon-appealable. For purposes of the barangay elections, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed.

Similarly, Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

SEC. 252.Election contest for barangay offices.A sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay officer shall be filed with the proper

municipal or metropolitan trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office withinten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. The trial court shall decide the election protest within fifteen days after the filing

thereof. The decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court may be appealed within ten days from receipt of a copy thereof by the

aggrieved party to the regional trial court which shall decide the case within thirty days from its submission, and whose decisions shall be final.

In applying Section 21 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure rather than Section 9 of Republic Act 6779 and Section 252 of the Omnibus

Election Code, the COMELEC rationalized thus:

Antonio asserts that Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code providing for a ten-day period to appeal

prevails over the provisions of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. According to Antonio, quasi-judicial bodies, including this Commission,

cannot amend an act of Congress and in case of discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the former

prevails. Generally, yes. But the situation herein does not fall within the generic situation contemplated therein.

No less than the 1987 Constitution (Article IX-A, Section 6 and Article IX-C, Section 3) grants and authorizes this Commission to promulgate itsown rules of procedure as long as such rules concerning pleadings and practice do not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Hence,

the COMELEC Rules of Procedure promulgated in 1993 as amended in 1994 is no ordinary interpretative or administrative ruling. It is

promulgated by this Commission pursuant to a constitutionally mandated authority which no legislative enactment can amend, revise or repeal.

The COMELEC Rules of Procedure (Rule 37 Section 21) provides that from the decision rendered by the court, the aggrieved party may appeal

to the Commission on Elections withi n f ive (5) days after the promul gation of th e decision. Rule 22 Section 9 (d) of Our Rules of Procedure

further provides that an appeal from decisions of courts in election protest cases may be dismissed at the in stance of the Commission f or f ail ureto fi le the required notice of appeal wi thi n the prescri bed peri od.

In case at bar, Antonio filed his notice of appeal before the trial court on the ninth (9) day from receipt of the decision appealed from or four (4)days after the five-day prescribed period to appeal lapsed. Therefore, the present appeal must be dismissed. For it is axiomatic that the perfection

of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not only mandatory but also

jurisdictional. As a consequence, the failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed period as required by the Rules has the effect of defeatingthe right of appeal of a party and precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. So the High Court rules in Villanueva

vs. Court of Appeals, et.al. (205 SCRA 537). And so, it should also be in the case at bar.

Worth noting is that Our Rules of Procedure may be amended, revised or repealed pursuant to the 1987 Constitution (Article VI II Section 5[5])

providing that rules of procedure ofquasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. But far from being

disapproved the COMELEC Rules of Procedure received approbation and has constantly been cited by the Supreme Court in a number ofdecisions such as in the case ofPahilan vs. Tabalba(230 SCRA 205, at211) andRodillas vs. Commission on Elections (245 SCRA 702, at

704). In the more recent case ofCalucag vs.Commission on Electionspromulgated on 19 June 1997 (G.R. N.o 123673), the Supreme Court

stated that:

Therefore, the COMELEC is the proper appellate court clothed with jurisdiction to hear the appealWHI CH APPEAL MUST BE

FI LED WITH IN FI VE DAYS AFTER THE PROMULGATION OF THE MTC DECISION(page 4-5).

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn4

7/29/2019 Galido vs

4/11

The repeated recognition given by the Supreme Court of this five-day rule within which to file the required notice of appeal will make

questionable the legislative enactment providing for a ten-day period.[5]

Without adopting the foregoing ratiocination of the COMELEC, we nonetheless find the instant petit ion devoid of merit.

It is beyond cavil that legislative enactments prevail over rules of procedure promulgated by administrative or quasi-judicial bodies andthat rules of procedure should be consistent with standing legislative enactments. In relation to the above-quoted Section 9 of Republic Act 6679

and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, petitioner points out that inFlores vs. Commission on Elections[6], this Court had declared that

decisions of the Metropolitan or Municipal Court in election protest cases involving barangay officials are no longer appealable to the RegionalTrial Court but to the COMELEC pursuant to Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.[7]Petitioner submits that the dispositive

portion in theFlores case only declared unconstitutional that portion of Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 providing for appeal to the Regional Trial

Court but not the ten (10) day period of appeal. The dispositive portion of theFlores case reads:

1. Declaring Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it provides that barangay election contests decided by the

municipal or metropolitan trial court shall be appealable to the regional trial court:

Petitioner admits that the provisions in Republic Act No. 6679 and for that matter the Omnibus Election Code providing for appellate jurisdiction

to the Regional Trial Court had been declared unconstitutional in the aforecitedFlores case. A verbatim comparison of both provisions reveals

that they provide the same remedy, that is, appeal from a decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court in barangay election cases to the

regional trial court. Both provisions provide that (1) results of a barangay election may be contested by filing a sworn petition with the municipal

trial court within ten days from proclamation; (2) the MTC shall decide within thirty days per Republic Act No. 6679 or fifteen days per OmnibusElection Code; and (3) the decision of the municipal trial court may be appealed to the regional trial court within ten days from receipt by the

aggrieved party, which decision is final and non-appealable. There is no appreciable basis to make a distinction between the two provisions,

except for their different numbers, to advance that they provide for two different remedies. It would be superfluous to insist on a categorical

declaration of the unconstitutionality of the appeal provided for in Sec. 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, as the same appeal in Sec. 9, Republic

Act No. 6679 had already been categorically declared unconstitutional. Further, Sec. 252 of the Omnibus Election Code[8]as amended by the

new law, Republic Act No. 6679[9], has in effect, been superseded by the latter. While the appellate procedure has been retained by theamendatory act, Republic Act No. 6679 nonetheless supersedes the verbatim provision in the Omnibus Election Code. Hence, it was not

necessary forFlores to mention Sec. 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, considering that as aforestated, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6679 was

a mere reenactment of the former law.

Petitioner is of the opinion, though, that the unconstitutionality extended only as to which court has appellate jurisdiction without affecting

the period within which to appeal. According to petitioner, only the portion providing for the appellate jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court insaid cases should be deemed unconstitutional. The rest of the provisions, particularly on the period to appeal, free from the taint of

unconstitutionality, should remain in force and effect in view of the separability clauses contained in Republic Act 6779[10]and the Omnibus

Election Code.[11]

We do not agree.

First, petitioners argument raises the presumption that the period to appeal can be severed from the remedy or the appeal itself which is

provided in Section 9, Republic Act 6679 and survive on its own. The presumption cannot be sustained because the period to appeal is an

essential characteristic and wholly dependent on the remedy.

Aptly, the rules on statutory construction prescribe:

The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable

from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature

intended separability, rather than complete nullity, of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalidportion that it is fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionally enact the

other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. The void provisions must

be eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose of the act in a manner contrary to the intention of the legislature. The languageused in the invalid part of the statute can have no legal effect or efficacy for any purpose whatsoever, and what remains must express the

legislative will independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate.

The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations,

inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole the nullity of one part will

vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature intended the statute to becarried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions

thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.[12]

In the instant petition, the exception applies. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, without

the constitutionally infirm portion on the appellate jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in barangay election protest cases, does not remain

complete in itself, sensible, capable of being executed and wholly independent of the portion which was rejected. In other words, with theelimination of the forum, the period cannot stand on its own. Moreover, when this Court stated that Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679 is declared

unconstitutional insofar as it provides that barangay election contests decided by the municipal or metropolitan trial court shall be appealable to

the regional trial court, it meant to preserve the first two sentences on the original jurisdiction of municipal and metropolita n trial courts to trybarangay election protests cases but not, as advanced by the petitioner, the ten-day period to appeal to the Regional Trial Court. This is the

logical and sound interpretation of subject portion of theFlores case.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn5

7/29/2019 Galido vs

5/11

Second, what was invalidated by theFlores case was the whole appeal itself and not just the question of which court to file the petition. If

the remedy itself is declared unconstitutional how could the period to appeal possibly survive? How could the time limit exist if there is nothingto be done within such time?

Third, we cannot indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the said laws, to maintain the ten (10) day period to appeal

despite the declaration of unconstitutionality of the appellate jurisdiction of the regional trial court, Republic Act No. 7166[13]amending theOmnibus Election Code, evinces the intent of our lawmakers to expedite the remedial aspect of election controversies. The law was approved on

November 26, 1991, after theFlores case which was promulgated on April 20,1990, and presumably, the legislature in enacting the same was

cognizant of the ruling inFlores. Said law provides the same five (5) day period to appeal decisions of the trial court in election contests formunicipal officers to the COMELEC. Section 22 thereof reads:

Sec. 22. Election Contests for Municipal Officers.All election contests involving municipal offices filed with the Regional Trial Court shallbe decided expeditiously. The decision may be appealed to the Commission within five (5) days from promulgation or receipt of a copy thereof

by the aggrieved party. The Commission shall decide the appeal within sixty (60) days after it is submitted for decision, but not later than six (6)

months after the filing of the appeal, which decision shall be final, unappealable and executory.

There would be no logic nor reason in ruling that a longer period to appeal to the COMELEC should apply to election contests for

barangay officials.

Fourth, since the whole remedy was invalidated, a void was created. Thus, the COMELEC had to come in and provide for a new appeal in

accordance with the mandate of the Constitution. As correctly pointed out by the COMELEC, Section 6, Article IX-A[14]of the 1987

Constitution grants and authorizes the COMELEC to promulgate its own rules of procedure. The 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure haveprovided a uniform five (5) day period for taking an appeal[15]consistent with the expeditious resolution of election-related cases. It would be

absurd and therefore not clearly intended, to maintain the 10-day period for barangay election contests. Hence, Section 3, Rule 22 of the

COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not in conflict with any existing law. To adopt a contrary view would defeat the laudable objective ofproviding a uniform period of appeal and defy the COMELECs constitutional mandate to enact rules of procedure to expedite disposition of

election cases.

In view of theFlores case, jurisprudence has consistently recognized that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are controlling in election

protests heard by a regional trial court.[16]The Court en banc has held inRodillas vs. COMELEC[17]that the procedure for perfecting an appeal

from the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in a barangay election protest case is set forth in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Morerecently, in Calucag vs. Commission on Elections[18],the Court en banc had occasion to state that:

It follows that after the promulgation ofFlores, the same arguments propounded therein by the petitioner may no longer be employed. Article 8of the Civil Code states that (j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part of the legal system of the

Philippines. Said pronouncement of the Court, having formed part of the law of the land, ignorance thereof can no longer be

countenanced. Therefore, the COMELEC is the proper appellate court clothed with jurisdiction to hear the appeal, which appeal mustbe filed within five days after the promulgation of the MTCs decision. The erroneous filing of the appeal with the RTC did not toll the

running of the prescriptive period. xxx. The five-day period having expired without the aggrieved party filing the appropriate appeal before the

COMELEC, the statutory privilege of petitioner to appeal is deemed waived and the appealed decisions has become final and executory.

Significantly, Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution provides in part that [r]ules of procedure of special courts a nd quasi-judicial

bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

Equally devoid of merit is the contention that petitioner was fast tracked because the COMELEC did not require the parties to file their

appeal briefs; that the dismissal was issued motu proprio without prior notice and hearing; and that dismissal of the appeal defeats the peoples

will on procedural points. Suffice it to state that the period for filing an appeal is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is anessential requirement without which the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal was filed at all. The right of

appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of the

law.[19]Further, by virtue of Section 9 (d), Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that an appeal may be dismisse d uponmotion of either party or at the instance of the Commission for failure to file a notice of appeal within the prescribed period, the COMELEC is

precisely given the discretion, in a case where the appeal is not filed on time to dismiss the action or proceeding.

The COMELEC, therefore, did not commit an abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition forcertiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed orders of the Commission onElections dated August 3, 1998 and October 14, 1998 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/135869.htm#_edn13

7/29/2019 Galido vs

6/11

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILS. VS. COMELEC [289 SCRA 337; G.R. NO. 132922; 21APR 1998]Monday, February 02, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radioand television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to

show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the

requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected bythe enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.

Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:

Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and televisiontime to be known as the Comelec Time which shall be allocated equallyand impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, thefranchise of all

radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of

campaign.

Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines withpayment,

Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radioand television stations to provide free air time.

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several millionpesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the1992presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year.

Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio andtelevision stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these

stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 inproviding free air time for one hour each day and, in this years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs requirement

that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.

Issues:

(1) Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio andtelevision broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws.

(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of law and without just compensation.

Held:Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwavefrequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio

andtelevision broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which theytransmitbroadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may

reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcaststations

and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.

The argument that the subject law singles out radio and televisionstations to provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines which

require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is l ikewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcastindustry requires

spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC

is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.

As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to

the COMELEC.

http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/telecommunications-and-broadcast.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/telecommunications-and-broadcast.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/telecommunications-and-broadcast.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case%20Digestshttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case%20Digestshttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/telecommunications-and-broadcast.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/telecommunications-and-broadcast.html

7/29/2019 Galido vs

7/11

EN BANC

G.R. No. 110045 November 29, 1994

TOMAS R. OSMEA,petitioner,vs.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and Honorable COMMISSIONERS DOMINGO, ESPIRITU and ORSAL, respondents.

The City Attorney for petitioner.

NARVASA, C.J.:

In this special civil action ofcertiorari, petitioner Mayor of the City of Cebu seeks nullification of:

(a) the Decision of respondent Commission on Audit (No. 1364, dated June 15, 1990) DISALLOWING the amount ofP30,000.00 appropriated by the City of Cebu relative to a compromise agreement entered into in Civil Case No. 4275 of

the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (Branch 23)an action brought by the Spouses Benjamin and Evangeline de la

Cerna against the City and otherswhich compromise was in due course embodied in a judgment of the Court rendered

on August 1, 1989; and

(b) said Commission's Decision (No. 2773, dated March 30, 1993) "denying due course" to the city's motion forreconsideration of its Decision No. 1364 above mentioned.

The controversy had its origin in the stabbing by an unknown assailant of Reynaldo de la Cerna, the son of the aforementioned de la CernaSpouses, in the afternoon of September 6, 1985. He was rushed to the Cebu City Medical Center, but unfortunately expired in the evening of that

same day due to severe loss of blood. His parents claimed that Reynaldo would not have died were it not for the "ineptitude, gross negligence,

irresponsibility, stupidity and incompetence of the medical staff" of the Medical Center.

The de la Cerna Spouses accordingly instituted in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City the above mentioned civil action, for recovery of

damages, based on paragraph 5, Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Named defendants were the city of Cebu, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, and fivephysicians of the Cebu City Medical Center. 1The City of Cebu which, according to the complaint, "operates, maintains, and manages the CebuCity Medical Center", was impleaded as defendant on the theory that as employer of the alleged negligent doctors, it was vicariously responsible

for the latter's negligence since it failed to exercise due care and vigilance over the doctors while acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,to prevent them from causing the death of Reynaldo. The Civil Code provision relied upon by plaintiffs, pertinently reads as follows:

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for

those persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of theirassigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

xxx xxx xxx

After the action had been pending for some time, negotiations for an amicable settlement were commenced, which culminated in an agreement

designed to put an end to the controversy in a manner acceptable to the parties. Since the compromise agreement included a provision for thepayment of the sum of P30,000.00 to the plaintiffs by defendant City of Cebu, the agreement was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlungsodof

the City, which ratified it on July 31, 1989. The sanggunian authorized "the City Budget Officer, Cebu City, to include in Supplemental BudgetNo. IV of the City . . . for the year 1989 the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS for financial assistance to the parents of thelate Reynaldo de la Cerna, all of Cebu City." 2The agreement was also submitted to the Regional Trial Court which, on August 1, 1989, rendereda judgment "(f)inding the same to be in conformity with law, morals and public policy" and enjoining the parties "to comply strictly with the

terms and conditions thereof." 3

The compromise agreement 4included the following stipulations and undertakings, viz.:

1. The plaintiffs after realizing that Defendants were not negligent in the performance of their respective duties as regards

the admission of their son Reynaldo de la Cerna at the Cebu City Medical Center, have agreed to enter into this

Compromise Agreement;

7/29/2019 Galido vs

8/11

2. The Defendants in order to buy peace and without admitting any liability for the death of Reynaldo de la Cerna hereby

agree to grant financial assistance to the Plaintiffs in the total amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)(which) shall be paid by the Defendants in the following proportion:

a) City of CebuP 30,000.00b) Dr. Francisco Dy, Jr.4,000.00

c) Dr. Ernesto Medalle4,000.00

d) Dr. Zaldy Buac4,000.00

e) Dr. Revey Nuico4,000.00f) Dr. Carmencita Momongan4,000.00

xxx xxx xxx

5. Plaintiffs hereby releases (sic) all the Defendants from any claims, causes of actions or cases whether present or futurewhich they may have in connection with the death of their son, Reynaldo de la Cerna;

xxx xxx xxx

7. Plaintiffs and Defendants agree to dismiss and drop all claims, counter-claims, and cross-claims which they have filed

against each other in the above-captioned case.

xxx xxx xxx

About eleven (11) months later, however (and as already stated in the opening paragraph of this opinion), respondent Commission on Audit

(COA) disallowed the "financial assistance" thus granted to the spouses de la Cerna, in its Decision No. 1364, contained in i ts 3rd Indorsement

dated 15 June 1990,supra. 5This decision reads in part as follows:

. . . [I]t is not within the powers of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu to provide, either under the general welfare clause

or even on humanitarian grounds, monetary assistance that would promote the economic condition and private interests ofcertain individuals only. The giving away of public funds to a bereaved family in the form of financial assistance has

definitely no casual relation to the general welfare of the inhabitants of the community. In fact, no real or substantial

relation to the public health, morals, or general welfare of the community can be perceived from the act of giving such

financial assistance.

Respondent further stressed that not being a party to the compromise agreement, it was not bound by it; and that any money claim arisingtherefrom was subject to its usual audit "in pursuance of the valid exercise and discharge of its constitutional power, authority and duty as an

independent body to audit all government accounts.

The City of Cebu filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated August 15, 1991, but as already stated, the same was "denied due course" by

respondent Commission in its Decision No. 2773. 6Respondent ruled that the motion was filed more than a year after receipt by the Citygovernment of notice of its Decision No. 364 dated June 15, 1990 and therefore, pursuant to Sections 50 and 51 of PD 1445, 7the decision hadalready become final and executory.

In behalf of the City of Cebu, Mayor Tomas R. Osmea has come to this Court ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COA and its Members

in so disallowing the city's appropriation of P30,000.00 made conformably with the compromise agreement in the civil suit against the City,

embodied in due course in the Trial Court's judgment. Mayor Osmea assails respondents' characterization of the city government's appropriation

as mere "financial assistance to private persons," pointing out that the City would have incurred a greater financial liability if it had not worked

out such an amicable settlement.

The Court believes that public respondents' disallowance of the appropriation is indeed tainted by grave abuse of discret ion and should be

correspondingly rectified.

There is to be sure no question that under the Constitution, respondent COA has the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all

accounts pertaining to revenue and receipts of, and expenditures, and uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to the

Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with originalcharters. 8In the exercise of its broad powers, particularly its auditing functions, the COA is guided by certain principles and state policies toassure that "government funds shall be managed, expended, utilized in accordance with law and regulations, and safeguarded against loss or

wastage . . . with a view to ensuring efficiency, economy and effectiveness in the operations of government." 9

There can thus be no question of the COA's competence to act on the supplemental budget for 1989 of the City of Cebu. Whether it acted in the

exercise of sound discretion in respect thereto is another matter.

7/29/2019 Galido vs

9/11

It appears to the Court that respondent COA grievously misconstrued the undertaking of Cebu City to pay P30,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased

Reynaldo de la Cerna. For some reason, perhaps partly because of the imprecise phraseology of the SangguniangPanlungsod's resolution, 10 respondent considered that undertaking as simply furnishing "monetary assistance that would promote the economic

condition and private interests of certain individuals only, . . . said financial assistance . . . definitely (having) no causal relation to the general

welfare of the inhabitants of the community."

The appropriation of P30,000.00 by the Sangguniang Panlungsodof Cebu City was considered by respondent out of context; it was construed as

intended only to promote the private interests of the de la Cerna family, as merely a form of financial assistance to a bereaved family without

causal relation to the general welfare of the community. In truth, as respondent was well aware, the appropriation was a part of the packageagreed upon by all the parties in Civil Case No. 4275 of the Cebu RTC for the amicable settlement of the controversy; it may not be considered

independently of said amicable settlement; it would be meaningless unless considered in the context of the compromise of the case.

The participation by the City in negotiations for an amicable settlement of a pending litigation and its eventual execution of a compromise

relative thereto, are indubitably within its authority and capacity as a public corporation; and a compromise of a civil suit in which it is involvedas a party, is a perfectly legitimate transaction, not only recognized but even encouraged by law.

A compromise is a bilateral act or transaction that it expressly acknowledged as a juridical agreement by the Civil Code and is therein dealt with

in some detail. "A compromise," declares Article 2208 of said Code, "is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a

litigation or put an end to one already commenced."

The definition is reflective of the general concept of a compromise in other jurisdictions, as "an agreement between two or more persons, who, for

preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their difficulties by mutual consent in the same manner which they agree on, and which everyone

of them prefers in the hope of gaining, balanced by the danger of losing." 11

The Civil Code not only defines and authorizes compromises, it in fact encourages them in civil actions. Article 2029 states that "The Court shall

endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair compromise." And in line with this policy, the Code directs (a) the

suspension, pursuant to the Rules of Court, of every civil action or proceeding "(1) if willingness to discuss a possible compromise is expressed

by one or both parties, or (2) if it appears that one of the parties, before the commencement of the action or proceeding, offered to discuss a

possible compromise but the other party refused the offer," 12as well as (b) the mitigation of "the damages to be paid by the losing party who hasshown a sincere desire for a compromise." 13The law regards compromises as standing on a higher plane than ordinary agreements, for it declaresthem, once entered into, to constitute res judicata, although judicial execution thereof is permitted only with respect to judicial compromises. 14

The Code also affirms the capacity of juridical persons to compromise, "in the form and with the requisites which may be necessary to alienate

their property." 15As early as 1917, the Court, applying substantially similar provisions in the (Spanish) Civil Code of 1889, made the followingpronouncements in the case ofMunicipality of San Joaquin v. Bishop of Jaro: 16

As a juridic person, the municipality of Miagao was authorized to execute a contract of compromise in the manner andwith the requisites necessary to alienate its property (Civ. Code, art. 1812), and such requisites and formalities were

fulfilled in accordance with the provisions of Section 40, subsection (c) of the Municipal Code. The provincial governorwas of that opinion when he gave his approval to the contract of compromise, which was deemed to benefit the contractingmunicipality for the reason that it thereby avoided a lawsuit and got the Church to renounce other claims and to recognize

the municipality's right in the other real properties sought to be registered. Furthermore, the record does not show that the

Church, on its part, failed to comply with the condition imposed in the compromise, and it is presumed that the latter wasexecuted in accordance with law and that the formalities established by law have been complied wi th (Code of Civ. Proc.,

sec. 334, Nos. 14, 18 and 310). There is no proof contrary to these presumptions.

That the City of Cebu complied with the relevant formalities contemplated by law can hardly be doubted. The compromise agreement was

submitted to its legislative council, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which approved it conformably with its established rules and procedure,

particularly the stipulation for the payment of P30,000.00 to the de la Cerna family. Neither may it be disputed that since, as a municipalcorporation, Cebu City has the power to sue and be sued, 17it has the authority to settle or compromise suits, 18as well as the obligation to pay

just and valid claims against it.

Obviously, respondent refused to take account of the foregoing legal principles in relation to the antecedents of the provision in the supplemental

budget of the City for payment of P30,000.00. It failed to realize that payment thereof was part of the consideration, not merely for the settlementof a claim, but for the settlement of an actual controversy, 19and constituted one of the "reciprocal concessions" which the law considers "the veryheart and life of every compromise." 20By making reciprocal concessions, the parties in Civil Case No. 4275 of the Regional Trial Court of CebuCity (Branch 23) put an end to the action in a manner acceptable to all of them. The City thus eliminated the contingency of being made to

assume heavier liability in said suit for damages instituted against it in connection with its operation and management of the Cebu City MedicalCenter, activities being undertaken by it in its proprietary (as distinguished from its government) functions and in accordance with which it may

be held liableex contractu orex delito, 21for the negligent performance of its corporate, proprietary or business functions. 22

It is noteworthy that the compromise in question was approved by, and embodied in the judgment of, the Court, which pronounced it "to be in

conformity with law, morals and public policy" and enjoined the parties "to comply strictly with the terms and conditions thereof." 23

7/29/2019 Galido vs

10/11

This judicial compromise is conclusive and binding on all the parties, including the City of Cebu. It is enforceable by execution, as above

stressed. There was no reason whatever to object to it, much less disallow any disbursement therein stipulated. It should have been approved as amatter of course.

One last word. COA avers 24that its Decision dated June 15, 1990(No. 1364) became final and executory by reason of the City's failure to appeal the same to this Court within thirty (30) days from notice thereof,

pursuant to the Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution, and Sections 50 and 51 of PD 1445. 25This is not indubitable on the record. For againstthis contention, there is the allegation in the motion (letter) for reconsideration dated August 15, 1991 of the City, thru its City Attorney, 26thatnotice of the decision was "received on July 26, 1991;" and there was at the time the far from sett led question as to whether or not the CityAuditor, on whom said COA Decision No. 1364 dated June 15, 1990, is not merely an extension (and transmitter of communications) of the

Commission on Audit, or may be deemed a proper officer (in lieu of or in addition to the Mayor) on whom such notice should be given toeffectively bind the City and to commence computation of the appeal period prescribed by the Constitution and implementing rules. In view

thereof, and in the interest of justice, the Court declines to sustain the contention that the City's right of appeal had lapsed and thus resolve the

controversy at bar on the basis of the postulated procedural default on the part of the City.

WHEREFORE, the writ ofcertiorari prayed for is issued and the COA decisions dated 15 June 1990 (No. 1364) and 30 March 1993 (No. 2773)

are hereby nullified and set aside. The respondent Commission on Audit is ORDERED to approve and allow in audit the appropriation ofP30,000.00 of Cebu City approved in connection with the judicial compromise executed by it in Civil Case No. 4275 of the Regional Trial Court

of Cebu City (Branch 23).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

7/29/2019 Galido vs

11/11

Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan and Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul Gonzalez, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution

Na tur e: Pet i t ion fo r cer t ior ar i , pr oh ib it ion , an d ma nd am us to re vi ew the de cisi on of the Sandiganbayan

Facts:Enrique Zaldivar, governor of the province of Antique

Sought to restrain the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Raul Gonzalez

From proceeding with the prosecution and hearing of criminal cases filed against him

On the ground that said cases were filed by the Tanodbayan.The 1987 Consti provided that it is only the Ombudsman who has the authority to file cases with the Sandiganbayan.

Issue: WON Tanodbayan had authority to file those cases for Sandiganbayan to prosecute and hear.

Held: NORatio:

1.Und er the 1987 Const i, the Ombud sman (dist ingui shed from Tanodb ayan) is char ged with the duty to:

Section 13, par 1: Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer,em ploy ee, of fi ce or age nc y, wh en su ch act or om iss ion appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

2.The Tanodbayan of the 1973 Consti became the Office of the Special prosecutor that shall continue to function and exercise it powers as now or

hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under the Consti. (article11, section 7)

3 . T h u s , b e g i n n i n g o n F e b r u a r y 2 , 1 9 8 7 , t h e a u t h o r i t y t o c o n d u c t p r e l i m i n a r

y inv est iga ti ons and dir ect th e fi lin g of cri min al ca ses wit h t he San di gan bay an was vested on the Ombudsman.4. Th e T an od ba yan is no w t he su bo rd in at e o f t he Sa nd ig an ba ya n a nd it ca n i nve st ig at eand prosecute cases only upon thelattersauthority

or orders.

Office of the Tanodbayan: created by PB 1607

GRANTED; GONZALEZ ORDERED TO CEASE AND DESIST FROM CONDUCTING INVESTIGATIONSAND FI LI NG CR IM NI AL

CA SE S WI TH TH E SA ND IG AN BA YA N OR OT HE RW IS E EXE RC IS NG TH EPOWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE OMBUDSMAN