gaddafi - arms trade libya

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pile? n enormous collection of military er. Much of it is now sitting afi met his savage and ke of his pride at the UK's role as he as proud of the almost n had sold to the dictator since potic regime in power?Lawyers for called the "planes defence" where no intention of selling any e could sell two old cargo had poked holes in the defence conversations in Bangkok between d were acting for the Farc. nitially repelled by a range of f cluster bombs in civilian ictator's massive stockpiles of rly maintained bunkers and h helped the rebels sweep through ing the weaponry that, at least s had supplied. Such blowback – s sales – is common to the global by a combination of geopolitics, , and a marked absence of t. ents, their intelligence urers, middlemen, dealers and inuum of legality and ethics from the grey and black markets, which ce, the boundaries between the ificant intertwining. They are, ch other. With bribery and Since taking power in 1969, Gaddafi had become a totemic figure for some, spouting the fire and rhetoric of anti-colonialism while, all the time, crushing opposition at home and abroad. Factions that became strategically threatening frequently disappeared into the darkness of military tribunals, torture and death. Gaddafi's monomaniacal desire to influence African affairs has left criss-crossing scars across the continent. Providing training, supplies and arms (many taken from stockpiles purchased from the west and Russia), Gaddafi contributed to horrors such as Charles Taylor's NPFL and the brutal RUF in Sierra Leone. By invading neighbouring Chad, Gaddafi escalated tensions between the north and south, fuelling a long-running battle for control of the country. Janjaweed forces that committed genocide in Darfur were frequently linked to Gaddafi: many had once been Islamic Legion members, the rag-tag mercenary army he had created to fulfil his vision of a pan-Arabic band across north Africa. Libya's involvement made weapons ubiquitous in the region. By 1990, it was possible to purchase an AK-47 in a Darfurian market for $40. A popular jingle at the time captured the spirit of the new weapons culture and its impact on politics in the region: "The Kalash brings cash," the jingle promised, before warning that "without a Kalash you're trash". Those looking for explanations for his ability to hold on to power for so long must examine the ease with which Gaddafi was able to purchase billions of dollars' worth of arms since 1969, fuelled by Libya's massive reserves of oil. From 1970 until 2009, and even with a long-term UN arms embargo in place between 1992 and 2003, Libya spent around $30bn on weapons. Most of this was sourced from the USSR (and, more recently, Russia): a total of $22bn. But equally important were sources of sophisticated Western weapons, which Gaddafi used as major force multipliers. France and Germany made the most hay while the arms trade sun shone, earning $3.2bn and $1.4bn respectively. The sheer quantity of weapons purchased is both absurd and frightening. From Russia alone, Libya imported more than 2,000 tanks, 2,000 armoured fighting vehicles, 350 artillery weapons, dozens of ships and fleets of aircraft. So many weapons were bought that there were doubts that the majority of them would ever be used. Anthony Cordesman, a military expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, reported that Libya's "imports vastly exceeded its ability to organise, man, train and support its forces. These imports reached farcical levels in the late 1970s and 1980s, and involved vast amounts of waste on equipment that could never be crewed and operated." Because of its ridiculous weapons- to-manpower ratio, Libya had been forced to keep most of its aircraft in

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Page 1: Gaddafi  - Arms trade Libya

Where is Gaddafi's vast arms stockpile?

The former Libyan leader amassed an enormous collection of military hardware during his decades in power. Much of it is now sitting virtually unguarded. Is it now destined to end up on the black market?

Soon after the brutal Muammar Gaddafi met his savage and ignominious end, David Cameron spoke of his pride at the UK's role in the dictator's overthrow. But was he as proud of the almost €120m-worth of weapons that Britain had sold to the dictator since 2005, which helped to keep his despotic regime in power?Lawyers for Bout had offered what prosecutors called the "planes defence" where they claimed that their client had no intention of selling any weapons but acted like he had so he could sell two old cargo aircraft for $5m. But prosecutors had poked holes in the defence with the use of secretly recorded conversations in Bangkok between Bout and the informants he

The uprising against Gaddafi was initially repelled by a range of heavy weapons, including the use of cluster bombs in civilian areas. These were drawn from the dictator's massive stockpiles of arms, many of which now sit in poorly maintained bunkers and buildings. The Nato bombings, which helped the rebels sweep through the country, were aimed at destroying the weaponry that, at least in part, many of the Nato countries had supplied. Such blowback – the unintended consequences of arms sales – is common to the global trade in weapons, which is driven by a combination of geopolitics, greed, a profound lack of morality, and a marked absence of meaningful regulation and oversight.

Arms deals – undertaken by governments, their intelligence agencies, large and small manufacturers, middlemen, dealers and financiers – stretch across a continuum of legality and ethics from the official, or formal trade, to the grey and black markets, which I call the shadow world. In practice, the boundaries between the three markets are fuzzy, with significant intertwining. They are, to a large degree, dependent on each other. With bribery and corruption de

there are very few arms transactions that are entirely above board. One study estimates that the trade accounts for almost 40% of all corruption in

Libya and Gaddafi's history reflects much of what is wrong with the global trade in arms. Its legacy in the recently liberated country is threefold. First, if Gaddafi's demise is not followed by democracy but, instead, by in-fighting, those who would wage war for control will have a seemingly limitless supply of weapons to do so. The experience of Iraq and Afghanistan illustrates, although

Since taking power in 1969, Gaddafi had become a totemic figure for some, spouting the fire and rhetoric of anti-colonialism while, all the time, crushing opposition at home and abroad. Factions that became strategically threatening frequently disappeared into the darkness of military tribunals, torture and death.

Gaddafi's monomaniacal desire to influence African affairs has left criss-crossing scars across the continent. Providing training, supplies and arms (many taken from stockpiles purchased from the west and Russia), Gaddafi contributed to horrors such as Charles Taylor's NPFL and the brutal RUF in Sierra Leone. By invading neighbouring Chad, Gaddafi escalated tensions between the north and south, fuelling a long-running battle for control of the country. Janjaweed forces that committed genocide in Darfur were frequently linked to Gaddafi: many had once been Islamic Legion members, the rag-tag mercenary army he had created to fulfil his vision of a pan-Arabic band across north Africa.

Libya's involvement made weapons ubiquitous in the region. By 1990, it was possible to purchase an AK-47 in a Darfurian market for $40. A popular jingle at the time captured the spirit of the new weapons culture and its impact on politics in the region: "The Kalash brings cash," the jingle promised, before warning that "without a Kalash you're trash".

Those looking for explanations for his ability to hold on to power for so long must examine the ease with which Gaddafi was able to purchase billions of dollars' worth of arms since 1969, fuelled by Libya's massive reserves of oil. From 1970 until 2009, and even with a long-term UN arms embargo in place between 1992 and 2003, Libya spent around $30bn on weapons. Most of this was sourced from the USSR (and, more recently, Russia): a total of $22bn. But equally important were sources of sophisticated Western weapons, which Gaddafi used as major force multipliers. France and Germany made the most hay while the arms trade sun shone, earning $3.2bn and $1.4bn respectively.

The sheer quantity of weapons purchased is both absurd and frightening. From Russia alone, Libya imported more than 2,000 tanks, 2,000 armoured fighting vehicles, 350 artillery weapons, dozens of ships and fleets of aircraft. So many weapons were bought that there were doubts that the majority of them would ever be used. Anthony Cordesman, a military expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, reported that Libya's "imports vastly exceeded its ability to organise, man, train and support its forces. These imports reached farcical levels in the late 1970s and 1980s, and involved vast amounts of waste on equipment that could never be crewed and operated." Because of its ridiculous weapons-to-manpower ratio, Libya had been forced to keep most of its aircraft in storage, along with more than 1,000 tanks.

All of this occurred despite long-running disputes with the west that threatened to derail Gaddafi's access to international arms markets: a tale of arms embargoes put in place only after the horse has bolted. In 1986, Gaddafi, powered by his commitment to anti-colonialism, focused his attention on the US, supplying weapons, funding and training to a range of anti-US entities. On 5 April 1986, Libyan terrorists planted a bomb that ripped through the La Belle discotheque in Berlin, killing US servicemen who were known to frequent the venue. The US responded by bombing Libya and imposing an arms embargo partnered by EU countries. Two years later, Libyan operatives planted explosives in the hold of a Pan Am flight between Germany and America. The plane exploded over Lockerbie in Scotland, killing 270 people. Only a few months later,