fyp patrick fitzgerald

NAME : PATRICK FITZGERALD

PROJECT TITLE: CONSENSUS AND RESISTANCE WITHIN THE THIRD REICH; WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO CLERICAL RESISTANCE AND BISHOP SPROLL IN WURTTEMBERG

DEGREE TITLE : BACHELOR OF ARTS IN EUROPEAN STUDIES

NAME : Patrick Fitzgerald

ID Number: 10117466

PROJECT TITLE: Consensus and Resistance within the Third Reich; with special reference clerical resistance and Bishop Sproll in Wurttemberg

INTERNAL SUPERVISOR: Professor Anthony McElligott

EXTERNAL SUPERVISOR: Dr Judith Devlin

DEGREE TITLE: Bachelor of Arts in European Studies

DATE: 5th March 2015

Contents

Acknowledgements

Authors declaration 4

Abstract 5

Introduction 6

Chapter 1 : State surveillance 9

Chapter 2 : Clerical defamation and religious instruction 15

Chapter 3 : Bishop Sproll Case Study 21

Conclusion 26

Bibliography 27

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my Professor McElligott, Patrick Lynch and my Mother for their

assistance , while I was writing this project.

Authors declaration

I hereby declare that this project is entirely my own work, in my own words, and that all sources used in researching it are fully acknowledged and all quotations properly identified. It has not been submitted, in whole or in part, by me or another person, for the purpose of obtaining any other credit / grade.

SIGNATURE:

DATE: 5.3.2015

Abstract

The project focuses on the manner that the Catholic Church in Wurttemberg successfully resisted against certain policies during the Nazi era. This analysis explores issues that the Catholic Church opposed in Wurttemberg. We examine the extent that the Church openly criticised and opposed Nazi policies such as ideological influence over the youth, anti-Christian teachings and violations of the Concordat. However, the primary focus is the extent that Bishop Sproll of Rottenburg continuously criticised increasing Nazi hostility towards the Church from 1934-38. Sproll’s opposition encapsulated the grievances held by the Church against the Nazi State. The project’s analysis assesses the degree that the Reich Foreign Secretary Weizsäcker and Stuttgart Reichstatthalter Mürr expressed concern about Bishop Sproll’s actions and what negative consequences his opinions it might have on the populace of Rottenburg.

The first chapter discusses how the Nazi surveillance state worked and how its shortcomings allowed the church to remain popular in certain communities. The second chapter discusses the severity of the regime’s defamation campaign against Sproll and the Churches opposition to policies that curbed religious education. The final chapter is a case study of Bishop Sproll and the Nazi-orchestrated protests that lead to his expulsion from Rottenburg.

Introduction

Throughout the reign of the Third Reich, the Catholic church and the Nazi State clashed regularly. This study focuses on the conflicts between the regime and the church in Wurttemberg. The Catholic Church in Wurttemberg greatly opposed a variety of Nazi policies throughout the entire regime. This dissertation analyses a variety of factors which allowed the Catholic Church to openly defy the regime, while the Nazi State eliminated other opposition groups. This dissertation focuses on Bishop Sproll of Rottenburg and his opposition against the State throughout the 1930’s. Bishop Sproll was a consistent critic of the regime and was expelled from his diocese by Nazi authorities in 1938.

This study explores the inner workings of the Nazi policing and surveillance state. Analysing the number of Gestapo officers and other policing agents working in Wurttemberg and seeing if they had the resources and the capability to carry out the objectives set out by Berlin. We pay close attention to the importance of public denunciations and how this tactic hindered the security forces ability to enforce Nazi policy in predominantly Catholic neighbourhoods. The discussion about denunciations is necessary to understand limitations of the Gestapo and an intelligence gathering organisation. It allows us to understand how an atmosphere and ideology that opposed National Socialism was allowed to developed .

The second chapter focuses on the defamation campaign that the Nazi State waged against the Catholic Church in Wurttemberg and the Regime’s encroachment on religious instruction. In particular, this chapter analyses the defamation campaign that was waged against Bishop Sproll by the Nazi State and examine what repercussions this had on their popularity among the local catholic community. This chapter also explores the importance of the Vatican’s influence and how that contributed to local parishioners viewing the regime in a negative light.

The final chapter of this dissertation is a case study of the Bishop and the events that led to his expulsion from Rottenburg. This case study primarily examines his boycott from the reunification plebiscite, the three Nazi orchestrated protests held against him and the attempts of Reich’s Foreign Secretary Weizsäcker and Stuttgart Reichstatthalter Mürr to defame him and isolate him from his diocese. The last chapter discusses the details of the events as they actually unfolded, in contrast with the version as seen by Mürr and Weizsäcker. An important feature of the case study is how the regime sought to expel Bishop Sproll but not risk enflaming local catholic populations that supported him. This research shows the Catholic Church possessed significant influence during the Nazi era that allowed them to oppose certain State polices, a lenience the regime did not afford to other opposition groups.

This project utilised a variety of both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources used in this study consist of official reports and memos between Foreign secretary Weizsäcker, Wurttemberg Reichstatthalter Wilhelm Mürr and other high ranking members of Nazi department from the Hauptstattarchiv (Central State Archive)Stuttgart. The documents also contain correspondence from the German ambassador to the Vatican, the SD chief and Reich department of Church affairs. The majority of the documents discussed are correspondence between Mürr and Weizsäcker surrounding; Sproll’s criticism of the Anschluss plebiscite; his return to Rottenburg; the protests against him orchestrated by the Nazi State; the regime’s interaction with Vatican officials and their desire to damage his reputation and isolate him from his parishioners. However, the authorities main source of

concern in the documents was that Sproll’s opinions would distort the local parishioners view of the regime. These sources give an insight into how much the regime feared the strong influence of the Catholic Church in certain communities and how that influence could hinder the aim to create a totalitarian Nazi State. This fear was obvious on a number of occasions when Foreign Secretary Weizsäcker insisted that the Vatican had to dismiss Sproll, in order to be defamed in the eyes of the local population. ‘Chronik der Start Stuttgart’ gives an account of all the major events that took place during the Nazi era both in the city of Stuttgart and in the larger province of Wurttemberg.

This study has also drawn from numerous secondary sources. I have used literature from John. S Conway and Jill Stephenson to assess the relationships between the regime and the Church and find the sources of conflict between them. This project referred regularly to Jill Stephenson’s literature because she gives a detailed insight into the conflicts that existed between church and state in Wurttemberg during the Nazi regime. Her study focuses on the general conflict between church in Wurttemberg in its entirety and particularly on what effect the regime had on people in the countryside. Stephenson’s literature provided a greater understanding of the impact of national socialism on a local level than other pieces of literature. Her analysis examines the actions of both Protestant and Catholic churches and their interaction with the regime. However, John S. Conway analyses clerical opposition to the regime on a national scale and assesses the tactics used by Nazi Authorities to diminish the influence of the Church. Conway’s main focus was clerical persecution on a national scale rather than any particular local study. His research shows that Sproll was a victim of a national defamation campaign and that his case was an example of the Nazi slander campaign being put into action.

Hubert Wolf’s Pope and the Devil: The Vatican archives and the Third Reich explores the relationship between the Vatican and the Third Reich and the impact it had on Church-State relations. Even though, Wolf’s literature only refers to Sproll occasionally, it does give a detailed account of the Vatican’s strained relationship with the Nazi State. Vatican Ambassador to Germany Diego Von Bergen described “Neopaganism” which indicated that senior Vatican officials supported Bishop Sproll’s criticism of the regime. However, he specified that only criticism that contradicted with Church doctrine should be condemned.1 Wolf’s literature shows that the Vatican viewed the Nazi regime as a political rival. Bishop Sproll’s beliefs reflected the Vatican’s views, alongside other clerical figures that feared the Nazi regime’s increasing hostility towards the Church. This book highlights the Vatican’s opposition and its un-cooperative stance towards the Nazi State which significantly contributed to dismantling the Nazi’s attempts to defame Sproll and discredit him amongst the Rottenburg populace.

Literature from Robert Gellately, Claire Hall, Gerhard Paul and Klaus Mallmann assessed the intricacies and short-comings of the surveillance state and the subsequent effect this had on clerical opposition to the Regime. Some of this information was particularly insightful because it showed how the Gestapo and policing agents could not enforce strict Nazi ideology in Catholic communities. Mallman and Paul’s literature describing the flaws of over-reliance on denunciations was a key factor that did not allow the authorities to quell clerical dissent as effectively as other political opposition. These works show that a Big Brother society could

1 Hubert Wolf, Pope and the Devil: The Vatican archives and the Third Reich (Cambridge 2010), p. 227.

only be imposed if support existed within the local population - and that support was not in existence in certain rural Catholic communities.2 The authorities had to rely on less effective methods such as informers as demonstrated by Claire Hall. Gellately focused on the aims of the Gestapo; in order to eradicate resistance and deter illegal activities, they created an environment of fear by shrouding themselves in mystery. Paul, Mallmann and Gellately demonstrate how this was partly done to mask the deficiencies of the Gestapo. These works are necessary to understand how the Catholic Church was not subject to the same level of persecution as other opposition groups. However, these sources do not specifically speak about how the Church was persecuted. I needed to consult other literature and use that information in conjunction with writing from Paul, Mallmann, Gellately and Hall to fully understand the nature of Nazi oppression of the Catholic Church.

Persecution of the Catholic Church in the Third Reich provided very detailed accounts of the demonstrations against Sproll that lead to his expulsion, as well as showing how the regime orchestrated the protests to make it seem that the citizens disapproved of Sproll. This source was particularly insightful because it gave a detailed account of the actual events that then allowed me to contrast them with the accounts according to the Nazi authorities. It provided sources such as a letter from an SA member who expressed deep apologies for being involved in the protests organised against Sproll. This source provided deep analysis on a local level that I did not encounter in my previous literature.

There are a number of key differences between my study and that of Stephenson and Conway. My study is solely focused on the Catholic Church’s relationship with the Nazi State, whereas both Conway and Stephenson research analyses the regime’s relationship with a multitude of Churches. This project examines the grievances that the Church held towards the regime and how Sproll reflected these frictions. Stephenson’s work examines the relationship between the churches and the State on a much broader scale. My study focuses on the actions of the Nazi State against the Catholic Church on a local level in Wurttemberg. It also examines how normal Gestapo tactics did not succeed in suppressing the Church’s resistance due to its extensive local support, Vatican support and their superior resources within the community to organise opposition.

2 Klaus Michael Mallmann and Gerhard Paul, ‘Omniscient, Omnipotent, Omnipresent? Gestapo, society and resistance’ in David Crew (eds), Nazism and German Society, 1933-1945, (London 1994), p.166.

Chapter 1: Regional Policing and Population Surveillance

This chapter discusses the Gestapo, the nature of policing in Stuttgart and Wurttemberg and the methods used by the Gestapo and other security forces to ensure conformity to Nazi ideology. Firstly, the number of Gestapo officers and other policing units present in Stuttgart and Wurttemberg did not possess the sufficient resources to enforce the aims of the regime. Instead, the Gestapo relied on cooperation from the population to police themselves rather than rely on insufficient policing agents to ensure conformity, as demonstrated by historians such as Gerhard Paul, Michael Mallmann, Robert Gellately and Eric Johnson .Secondly, this research discusses the importance of denunciations made by the public and the impact it had on political policing. The paper considers the potential pitfalls that political police encountered from unreliable evidence. Finally, it examines which offences the Gestapo and other policing units gave most attention to and what aspects of resistance or non-conformism Nazi authorities and policing agents pursued most aggressively. Once the importance of police presence, denunciations and the most illicit activities pursued by the Nazi authorities have been explored – we will assess their impact on Catholic communities and draw conclusions on how all these factors came together to help the local communities successfully resist certain Nazi policies.

Policing presence and denunciations

The Gestapo was charged with enforcing laws, regulations, ordinances and decrees that developed from the emergency legislation after the Reichstag fire in 1933. They prosecuted offences that related to the Nazi Party. They investigated offences relating to the defamation of the party name, the State, national symbols or engaged in economic sabotage and/or malicious gossip.3 During the years 1934-1937, there were approximately 200-250 Gestapo officers in Stuttgart rising to a peak of 302 in 1941, while the pre-war population of Stuttgart was 420,000 people.4 Any officers transferred out of Wurttemberg were not replaced. At a minimum, each Gestapo officer was responsible for around 1680 people in Stuttgart from 1934-37. It is also important to note that more than half of the rural communities in Wurttemberg didn’t have a local Nazi organisation.5 Thus significantly lessening Nazi influence in certain communities.

The State enacted harsher laws prohibiting attacks on the State, the Party and the Protection of Party Uniforms in December 1934. This “allowed the jurisdiction of the Special Courts to spread beyond their original remit of dealing with “politically motivated crime” and enhanced the power of the Police. Furthermore, a number emergency decree’s passed that allowed the Special Courts ‘almost unlimited jurisdiction’ in order to transform minor crimes into offenses against the State and the war effort.6 In June 1936, all the police forces united after Hitler appointed Himmler as the Chief of the German police and Reinhard Heydrich as his

3 Robert Gellately, ‘The Gestapo and German society’ : Political denunciation in the Gestapo Case’ in Journal of Modern History, Vol.60, (Dec 1988), pp 654-55.

4 Haus der Geschichte Baden Württemberg (2012) ‘Hotel Silber’ [online] , available: ), http://www.geschichtsort-hotel-silber.de/das-netz-der-gestapo/stuttgart/staatspolizeileitstelle-im-hotel-silber/ [accessed 14 Jan 2015].; Jill Stephenson, Hitler’s Home Front: Württemberg under the Nazis (London, 2006), p.815 Jill Stephenson, Hitler’s Home Front, pp.3466Anthony McElligott,’ ‘Sentencing towards the Führer’? The judiciary in the Third Reich ‘ In T. Kirk (eds), Working towards the Führer (Manchester 2003), pp 163.

http://www.geschichtsort-hotel-silber.de/das-netz-der-gestapo/stuttgart/staatspolizeileitstelle-im-hotel-silber/

deputy.7 The police was split into two branches: one which consisted of uniformed police known as the Ordnuungspolizei. This group were responsible for ordinary law and order duties. While the Sicherheitspolizei that contained the Gestapo and the Kriminalpolizei that supressed actions against the State.8 Other important policing agents included the provincial police, the Schutzpolizei, the municipal police and the Gendarmerie. They were responsible for policing communities in Wurttemberg. According to Stephenson, even though the Landräte was responsible for supervising the Gendarmerie and Schutzpolizei, ‘the ultimate responsibility in police matters rested with Himmler’. The Gendarmerie, it ‘had three main offices in Wurttemberg, at Stuttgart, Goppingen and Freudenstadt, as well as offices throughout the Land.’9 Like the Gestapo, the Gendarmerie and Schutzpolizei did not have sufficient staff and had been spread thinly across large rural areas. They had up to twenty understaffed offices and as many as 116 vacant positions by September 1939. Furthermore, some 280 officers went away on war-time duty and their positions remained unfilled. Despite these shortages, Gendarmerie units had to complete the same amount of policing work alongside extra local duties 10. The massive shortage of policing agents especially in rural communities was significant because it meant that the police forces couldn’t enforce Nazi law through a physical police presence alone.

Nazi authorities used denunciations to counteract police shortages in the regime. Brozsat defines denunciations as an integral part of Nazi Germany and its role in a repressive police state.11 Nationally, it is assumed that between half and two-thirds of all information came directly from the public and up to 500,000 denunciations were listed at Hotel Silber (Stuttgart Gestapo HQ) 12. According to Robert Gellately, the Gestapo “became an information and law enforcement body”. Denunciations created an atmosphere of fear and paranoia which acted as a deterrent for unapproved behaviour. They did this in two ways. Firstly, the Gestapo did not require any legal evidence to convict somebody of a crime. They had extraordinary power to prosecute individuals based purely on rumours or suspicious activity and Gestapo interrogations often began from the simplest encounters and often forced victims they knew to be innocent to sign “confessions” through intimidation.13 They essentially could do what they wanted. Secondly, they did not need any form of evidence to prosecute. The only thing that was necessary to bring someone to the attention of the Gestapo was a rumour or suspicion of illicit activity. These two factors intertwined to create a “big-brother” type society that had eyes and ears everywhere.14 They used this fear to help create a self-policing State in which no one knew who to trust and citizens would denounce each other through fear. 15 Secrecy was an important factor for the Gestapo and the ambiguity of their policing methods enhanced their perceived effectiveness. According to Paul and Mallmann ‘the aura of a perfectly operating secret police was pre-eminently an image created by means of propaganda, which

7 Gerald Reitlinger, The SS, Alibi of a Nation, 1922-1945 (New York 1989), p.90.8 Max Williams, Reinhard Heydrich: The Biography, Volume 1 (Church Stretton 2001), p.77.9 Jill Stephenson, Hitler’s Home Front, pp.8110 Ibid11 Gellately, ‘The Gestapo and German society’ p. 657.12 (Haus der Geschichte 2012) ( http://www.geschichtsort-hotel-silber.de/polizei-im-silber/die-ns-zeit/organisation-aufbau-und-arbeitsalltag/)13 Gellately, ‘The Gestapo and German society’, p. 675.14 Claire M. Hall, ‘An Army of Spies? The Gestapo Spy Network 1933-45’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Apr., 2009),(http://www.jstor.org/stable/40543126) (14/12/2014)15 Gellately, ‘The Gestapo and German society’, p. 657.

http://www.jstor.org/stable/40543126

was meant to intimidate but also to conceal its own structural deficits”.16 This myth created an atmosphere that convinced both opposition groups and the general public that the resources and influence of the political police was far greater than it was in reality .17 William Allen Sheridan asserted that “the general feeling was that the Gestapo was everywhere”, even though there was only one known informer to the security police in that town in question.18

The myth was amplified – spreading the sentiment that everyone was constantly under surveillance and nowhere was safe, not even their own homes. This was purposefully done to further isolate the average citizen from the Gestapo and therefore give more credibility to the notion that they were an invisible force that was constantly observing its citizens. Friedrich Zipfel said that ‘one can evade a danger that one recognises, but a police working in the dark becomes uncanny. Nowhere does one feel safe from it. While not omnipresent it could appear, search, arrest. The worried citizen no longer knows whom he ought to trust.’19

Denunciations as an unreliable source of information

The next important question is whether public denunciations were a reliable source of intelligence and did the Gestapo encounter any problems with information that it had received from the public. A major problem with public denouncements was that many people used the Gestapo to settle personal scores and achieve commercial gains or personal benefits. 20Even though Mallmann and Paul recognised that the Gestapo would be virtually blind without the use of public denunciations, they also make clear that local Gestapo districts were completely ill-equipped to enact the big brother vision assigned to them by Berlin . Gestapo districts throughout the Reich did not possess the manpower to effectively handle the ‘flood of denunciations’ from the public. ‘Most denunciations were generated not by political or ideological conviction but by greed, hate and prejudice.’ These people aimed to settle private disputes, ‘rid themselves of inconvenient spouses and acquire Jewish property.’ 21 Following the Nuremberg laws in 1935, much false information was centred around “racial defilement” because the political police pursued this offence quite rigorously.22 The issue of racial defilement was of high priority for the Gestapo and other policing services but many members of the public gave highly inaccurate information purely for personal economic gain or personal revenge. This led to the Gestapo receiving many false claims.. According to Robert Gellately, there was an unspoken rule among Gestapo officers that they should look for any excuse to tie Jews to political crimes.23 If this is the sort of crime that is going to attract the most attention from policing services, then it would make sense that those who wished to illicit harm on others through the Gestapo would accuse them of perpetrating these political crimes. For example: in 1938, the Karlsruhe Gestapo received information on two race defilement charges, however one turned out to be false and the other was a “baseless suspicion of a sick, jealous married woman.”24 This callousness was described by Paul and 16 Mallmann and Paul (ed.), ‘Omniscient, Omnipotent, Omnipresent?’, pp 166-167.17 Ibid18 William Allen Sheridan, the Nazi Seizure of Power. The experience of a single German Town, 1930-35 (Chicago 1965), p.178 (Cited by Mallmann & Paul in David Crew); Mallmann and Paul (ed.), ‘Omniscient, Omnipotent, Omnipresent?’, pp 169.19 Friedrich Zipfel, Gestapo und Sicherheitsdienst (Berlin 1960) p.5 (cited by Robert Gellately)20 Mallmann and Paul (ed.), ‘Omniscient, Omnipotent, Omnipresent?’, p 166.21 Ibid22 Gellately, ‘The Gestapo and German society’, p. 669.23 Gellately, ‘The Gestapo and German society’, p. 674.24 Gellately, ‘The Gestapo and German society’, p. 673.

Mallmann as the ‘ ”plebiscitary” dimension of Nazi terror was by no means rational or predictable made the reality of the Gestapo even more frightening than the myth.’25

This meant that an already understaffed Gestapo had to investigate high volumes of false claims in order to see if there was any useful evidence hidden amongst them. In 1933, Hitler complained that “we are living at present in a sea of denunciations and human meanness” this highlights the massive problem that security forces faced. Denunciations with such malicious motives could have had disastrous effects on the economy and society as a whole.26 Despite, the significant problems that false denunciations caused it would be very difficult to curb the number of false denunciations . Even though the regime enacted laws punishing those who provided false information it proved problematic for a number of reasons. Anonymous citizens provided a lot of information to the State and if the government asked the public to provide less assistance, then it could have endangered ongoing investigations.27 The Regime did not want to risk supressing potentially vital material even though denunciations had significant flaws. The authorities also had no practical means of culling masses of irrelevant material. If the policing forces tackled and punished false denunciations, then it may deplete their already overstretched workforce.

There was a significant disconnect between what the offices in Berlin envisioned and what was realistically possible for local Gestapo agents in Stuttgart and in other offices to enforce. The Gestapo used informers as another information gathering source and Claire M. Hall discusses what role their spy network contributed to the implementation of terror. The concept of invisible Gestapo informers helped impose a self-policing society but they did not have necessary resources to actually enforce this idea.28 Her article asserts that denunciations did not work and intelligence from informers also proved ineffective. The regime used informers to uproot organised pockets of resistance like communists and social democrats.29 Informers used areas, where local populations did not voluntarily provide information to Nazi authorities. There are examples of this in rural communities in Wurttemberg that had strong religious support. The Gestapo and other policing agents like the SD ( Sicherheitdienst ) and NSDAP agents or informers to gather intelligence in these regions rather than rely on denunciations.30

Having observed the Gestapo’s reliance on public support , we can assume that if that support was not given, it greatly hindered the ability of the Gestapo to enforce Nazi ideology because they did not have as much information to counteract subversive actions or know that illegal activities took place. Paul and Mallmann assert, that ‘the Gestapo would have been virtually “blind” , had it not been able to draw upon the information produced by a “flood” of denunciations made by ordinary Germans”.31 Consequently, it shows that if a Nazi support base is not active enough in a community a big brother concept cannot be enforced. Rural catholic communities had an ‘unquestioning, unconditional’ alliance to the church and in 1933, more than half of rural communities in Wurttemberg did not have a local Nazi

25 Mallmann and Paul (ed.), ‘Omniscient, Omnipotent, Omnipresent?’, pp 166.26 Gellately, ‘The Gestapo and German society’, p. 679.27 Gellately, ‘The Gestapo and German society’, p. 681-3.28 Hall, ‘An Army of Spies? pp.247-24829 Hall, ‘An Army of Spies? pp.251-25230 Stephenson, ‘Hitler’s Home Front’, pp 24231 Mallmann and Paul, ‘Omniscient, Omnipotent, Omnipresent?’, p.166

organisation and therefore were not as influenced by denouncement paranoia or the self-policing policy as other members of society in Wurttemberg.32

Catholic Opposition to State Surveillance

The problems of police shortages and denunciation overreliance are significant factors that contribute to the inability of the NSDAP to break the stranglehold of clerical influence in Catholic communities. Religious communities in Wuttemberg were either predominantly Catholic or Evangelical, districts such as Rottenburg was approximately 60% catholic and other districts were almost exclusively Catholic such as Sigmaringen and Hechingen. 33 Immediately, we notice that a predominantly religious population who are loyal to the church are far less likely to provide information to the Gestapo especially if it conflicts with Christian ideology. In fact, throughout the 1930’s the Gestapo generally relied on information from spies or Nazi party officials who infiltrated church gatherings and reported on priest sermons rather than using public denunciations.34 Kreisleiter Kölle of Aalen (then Ellwangen) kept catholic meeting in his town under surveillance and used the SS to disrupt and prevent those meetings. He complained about mass rallies and property damage caused by Catholic protestors.35 Since the most popular form of intelligence gathering couldn’t work in these communities, it would be impossible for the Gestapo to enforce Nazi ideology because they were not provided information from within the community. This failure was confounded by police officer shortages and the absence of local Nazi organisations which would normally emphasise the Gestapo’s invisible and ever-present concept. Without these three components, people who offered views and opinions opposing Nazi ideology could go unpunished to a higher degree than other communities in Wurttemberg.

The churches could organise and meet regularly, which gave them a distinct advantage, in contrast to other Non-Nazi organisations.36 The Church’s ability to maintain the connection with local communities was essential in order to isolate Nazi beliefs and be able to successfully resist laws that sought to diminish their freedom and influence. The Church vigorously opposed the State on issues such as the protection of religious instruction in schools and this is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. The Church had a very close connection to local communities in Wurttemberg that the NSDAP did not. The church was a place to meet, interact and find a sense of fellowship within communities.37 In July 1938, the State Leadership in Wurttemberg expressed concern regarding newcomers when local clergymen visited at home and invited to local events. The party had concerns that the Church was having a greater effect and rapport with the community than the Party. 38 The Church’s greater contact with the community further undermined Nazi influence and support in these regions. This further isolated the Party from local residents that the Party needed to if they wanted to create strong grass root Nazi support within the town. Local support needed to

32 Stephenson, ‘Hitler’s Home Front’, pp 259, 346.33 Stephenson, ‘Hitler’s Home Front’, pp 243.34 Eric Johnson, ‘Nazi Terror: the Gestapo, Jews and ordinary Germans’, (London 1999), p. 364.35 Stephenson, ‘Hitler’s Home Front’, pp.235; Christine Arbogast, ‘Herrschaftsinstanzen der württembergischen NSDAP:Funktion, Sozialprofil und Lebenwege einer regionalen NS-Elite 1920-1960’, (Munich 1998), p. 68, 168-9.36John S. Conway, ‘ The Nazi persecution of the Churches’, (London 1968) pg.375-376.; Stephenson, ‘Hitler’s Home Front’, pp 242.37 Stephenson, ‘Hitler’s Home Front’, pp 243.38 Arbogast, ‘‘Herrschaftsinstanzen der württembergischen NSDAP’, pp 68-69.

provide intelligence to authorities, create a self-policing community and allow the authorities to thoroughly enforce Nazi ideology. However, the Church had resources like priests that interacted with parishioners and buildings like churches, it was the focal point of the community. In many cases the NSDAP did not have any equivalent resources to counter-act the Church in order to win over the hearts and minds of the people in these communities. Nazi authorities did not want their citizens and have young people exposed to ideas that ‘conflicted with the “moral feelings of the Germanic People”.39

The Church’s had monopoly control over certain practices such as death burials and marriage and exercised significant influence when comforting the bereaved, especially after the trauma of losing a family member in the war.40 Which, further emphasises the control that Church possessed in these communities. The war and its horrors gave the Church ample opportunity to connect with their communities and many Nazi officials believed that if this went unchecked it could undermine the war effort. The NSDAP only held commemorations in six of the thirty-six districts of Wurttemberg-Hohenzollern and this is an example of how the Church had a greater connection to communities than the NSDAP.41

The chapter highlighted how the Nazi policing apparatus worked and what factors contributed to the churches ability to successfully oppose the regime with much greater success than other anti-Nazi groups. The next chapter focuses on the regime’s defamation campaign against Bishop Sproll, the Catholic church’s response to encroachment on religious instruction by the Nazi State in Wurttemberg. It examines the extent that Sproll’s treatment and expulsion galvanised Catholic support in Wurttemberg and how it affected the campaign to remove religious instruction from schools.

39 Stephenson, ‘Hitler’s Home Front’, pp 248.40 Stephenson, ‘Hitler’s Home Front’, pp 243.41 Stephenson, ‘Hitler’s Home Front’, pp 261.

Chapter 2: Clerical Defamation and Encroachment on Religious Instruction

This chapter explores the main points of conflict between the Nazi Authorities and the Catholic Church in Wurttemberg. It examines what policies the Church did not oppose and others that they vigorously opposed. The main discussion centres around how the Catholic Church in Wurttemberg successfully and aggressively resisted certain Nazi policies, despite the regime’s slander campaign against them. The Church the Nazi state on a wide range of religious issues such as religious instruction, mistreatment of clergy members, violations of the 1st commandment, sterilisation, violations of church sovereignty and violations of the Concordat. This chapter analyses why the church did not object to the mistreatment and persecution of Jews and other races and ethnicities but heavily resisted policies encroaching on religious freedom. Another important focus is the defamation campaign waged against Bishop Sproll and how this contributed to the failure of the Nazi State to implement laws that curbed influence of religious organisations.

During the Nazi era, the Catholic Church was very selective about which policies it sought to oppose and the degree that it opposed them. Ideological competition, teaching contradicting Nazi propaganda, freedom of religion and freedom of Church affairs caused tensions between the Catholic Church and the regime. Although the Church worried about certain aspects of Nazism, it supported other elements of it policies. It supported the regime’s stance against communism and it’s opposition to the Weimar republic.42 In 1933, the Church took steps that protected it’s interests and beliefs. The regime offered them a guarantee of privileges in the form of the Concordat.43 The Catholic Church’s attitude towards the Nazi State is best explained by the Vatican ambassador to Germany Diego von Bergen. He distinguished between “Neopaganism” criticism by some Nazi’s that the Church could legitimately condemn but “political National Socialism” should not be condemned. The Vatican believed Nazism was a ‘political religion’ and an ideological rival.44 Opposition by the Catholic Church and by Bishop Sproll reflected von Bergen’s stance and even though Sproll criticised the Anschluss plebiscite, it was done purely to highlight the regime’s increasing encroachment on Catholic freedoms and ideology. This is important because it shows that Sproll is not a rogue operator and that the Vatican supported his actions because it reflected core Christian values.

From 1935, the regime engaged in an aggressive defamation campaign against the Catholic Church to diminish it’s influence. They attacked them the Church in three ways. Firstly, they sought to bring the Church under the administrative control of the State. Secondly, they wanted to capture the hearts and minds of the German population. Thirdly, they engaged in a campaign of terror and intimidation to get the Church scare them.45 Sproll was never an advocate of political resistance. His criticism always attacked ideological policies rather than the political policies of the regime.46 Historians such as Robert Krieg state that Sproll opposed

42 Mary Ethel, ‘Attitudes of the German Catholic Hierarchy towards the Nazi Regime :A Study in German Psycho-Political culture’, June 1969, The Western Political Quarterly, Vol.22, No.2, pp 334.43 John. S .Conway, ‘Die Vertreibung von Bischof Joannes Baptista Sproll von Rottenburg, 1938-1945. Dokumente zur Geschichte des kirchlichen Widerstands by Paul Kopf; Max Miller; Waldemar Gurian. Ein Zeuge der Krise unserer Welt in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts by Heinz Hürten’, July 1975, The Catholic University Press of America (http://www.jstor.org/stable/25019724) pp. 427-42844 Wolf, Pope and the Devil, pp.22845 Conway, Nazi Persecution of the Churches, pp.95-96


the regime from the outset and did not waver in his opposition.47 The only exception to this statement was his praise for the regime’s ‘national renewal’ following the signature of the Concordat in 1933. From 1934, Sproll was consistently critical of the NSDAP who in his view had a “fundamentally hostile attitude toward the Catholic Church”.48 Sproll highlighted Nazi anti-Christian dogma in a Hitler Youth song in a sermon at the Rottenburg Cathedral. Verses such as “we have no need for Christian virtue because of our Führer Adolf Hitler” , “we follow Horst Wessel, not Jesus Christ” and “I am neither Christian nor Catholic. I’m with the SA through thick and thin”. He believed that these openly hostile songs showed that the NSDAP saw Christianity and the Catholic Church as an ideological competitor and they had sought to replace Catholicism with their own religion. 49 The Vatican believed that ‘ It is impossible for National Socialism and Catholicism to exist side-by-side, let alone form a synthesis, because both make a totalistic claim on the whole person.’50 It is clear that Sproll reflected the Vatican’s belief that Nazi ideology fundamentally opposed Christian doctrine and his behaviour throughout the regime mirrored this belief. Between 1934-38, Sproll became highly critical of the Regime and held a series of meetings where tens of thousands of people and significant numbers of young people attended. During these meetings he heavily criticised the NSDAP and its threatening stance towards the Catholic Church.51

Stuttgart Reichstatthalter Wilhelm Mürr wanted to remove Sproll from his post and engaged in a vicious defamation campaign against him and the Catholic Church. They did this by exaggerated sexual abuse cases in the Rottenburg diocese to discredit Sproll amongst the Rottenburg populace.52 The biggest backlash from the authorities came after his boycott of the Anschluss referendum. However, on this occasion he faced opposition from the Foreign Secretary and local Nazi Authorities. 53Giles McDonagh stated that ‘It was not that he disapproved the merger; it was that he disliked the regime and did not wish to congratulate the Nazis.’54 Even though the Anschluss was political issue, Sproll protested against it to highlight his disdain for anti-clerical policies imposed by the Nazi State. Three months after the Anschluss, Bishop Sproll returned to his diocese and explained why he boycotted the vote on 10 April 1938. He stated in his pastoral letter ‘ I would have had to give my vote for, and express my confidence in, men whose fundamentally hostile attitude towards the Catholic Church and against all Christianity has become more and more clearly revealed from year to year’55. Also, when he was accused of disturbing the peace, he replied :‘No it is not I who have disturbed the peace, but those who have allowed themselves to be drawn into these unparalleled excesses.’56

46 Joachim Köhler, ‘Der deutsche Katholizismus zum Nationalsozialismus und zur nationalsozialistischen Staatautorität’ in Rainer Bendel (ed.s), Die katholische Schuld? Katholizismus im Dritten Reich-Zwischen Arrangement und Widersand, (Münster 2002) pp.166.; Conway, Die Vertreibung von Bischof Joannes Baptista Sproll, pp. 42847Robert Krieg, Catholic Theologians in Nazi Germany (New York 2004), p. 93.48Stephenson, Hitler’s Home Front, pp.230; Gordan C. Zahn, Vocation for Peace (Eugene OR 2010), p.429-30.49 Wolf, Pope and the Devil, pp 228.50 Wolf, Pope and the Devil, pp 230.51 Thiedfelder, ‘Die Kirchen’ , pp 83. (cited by Stephenson) ; Stephenson, Hitler’s Home Front, pp 241.52 Stephenson, Hitler’s Home Front, pp 60-61.53 Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart (hereafter HStAS), J40/7, Bü 93, pp 91-94.54 Giles McDonagh, ‘1938: Hitler’s gamble’,(New York , 2009), p. 106.55 Richard Bonney (ed.) , ‘Confronting the Nazi war on Christianity: The Kulturkampf newsletters, 1936-1939’ , (4 vols., Oxford, 2009) IV pp.429-43056 Bonney, ‘Confronting the Nazi war on Christianity, pp 430.

Foreign Secretary Weizsäcker said the Bishop’s failure to perform his duty as a good German was disgraceful (Vaterlandschlicht) especially since he was a man held in high esteem within the community. According to Weizsäcker , the legality of Sproll’s actions are irrelevant. He believed that such an important figure in the community was required to vote. The Foreign Secretary argued that the if he opposed the referendum he was within his rights to vote No. However, his boycott from the vote looked like a demonstration against the State. 57 When conferring with Mürr he made it clear that they must get the Vatican to dismiss Sproll.58 The regime insisted that Sproll must be discredited by the Vatican. This shows that the Nazi State could not use of violence against clergy members like other political opponents. Otherwise, catholic citizens in Rottenburg could revolt and they comprised of approximately 60% of the population .59 On 18 May 1938, Weizsäcker demanded that needed to disappear and also acknowledged that the authorities secretly removed the Swastika from his residency in an effort to defame him among the Rottenburg populace. However, Sproll was not in Rottenburg when it was taken down. He also admits this was orchestrated because he refused to vote in the referendum60 This shows that defamation was a key component of Nazi oppression of Catholic Church and that the regime engaged in high levels of sabotage to eliminate troublesome religious leaders like Sproll.

Reichstatthalter Mürr wrote to Foreign Secretary Weizsäcker describing Bishop Sproll’s return to Rottenburg following a three month absence after the Anschluss referendum and the subsequent riot outside his house after his pastoral letter speech. The authorities make their concerns regarding Bishop Sproll very clear indicating in the report that he was causing anxiety within the community. They reported that his first public appearance on 14 July 1938 cause public outcry and his return to the village on 15 July 1938 was greeted by a protest.61 A letter to the Undersecretary describes the events:

The demonstration took place on the evening of 18 July 1938. The protestors mainly, from Rottenburg protested outside the bishop’s residence for up to 2 hours. During the protest, a number of windows in the bishop’s residence were broken and it is estimated that four rocks were thrown through the windows.62

The populace of Rottenburg was shocked by the treatment of Bishop Sproll by the regime.63 Despite the ruthlessness nature that Bishop Sproll was removed. The Catholic church fought tenaciously and successfully maintained the allegiance of their parishioners especially in rural areas.64 A key element of this tenacious resistance against Nazi ideological instruction.

The most aggressive form of resistance made by the Catholic Church in Wurttemberg was against Nazi encroachment on religious teaching that was implemented by Reichstatthalter

57 HStAS, J40/7, Bü 93, bl.92-94 (Correspondence to the Reich ambassador to the Vatican from Foreign Secretary Weizsäcker)58 HStAS, J40/7, Bü 93, bl.98-99 (Correspondence to Reichstatthalter Mürr from Foreign Secretary Weizsäcker)59 Stephenson, Hitler’s Home Front, pp.24360 HStAS, J40/7, Bü 93, bl.100-101 (A memo written Reichstatthalter Mürr from Foreign Secretary Weizsäcker )61 HStAS, J40/7, Bü 93, bl.154 (Correspondence to Mürr and Weizsäcker from a local SS Obersturmführer)62 HStAS, J40/7, Bü 93, bl.119 (A memo written by the Undersecretary)63 John S Conway, The Nazi Persecution of the Churches (London 1967), p.22464 Stephenson, Hitler’s Home Front, pp 263.

Mürr, Christian Mergenthaler and Jonathan Schmidt. There was wide-spread resistance and non-compliance against ‘Weltanschuangsunterricht’ (Ideological instruction) or WAU and it’s implementation caused massive controversy in Wurttemberg.65 The Catholic and Evangelical churches had a major advantage over other non-NSDAP organisations because they could meet regularly.66. This gave Churches the platform and opportunity to criticise NSDAP authorities who believed that religious instruction ‘ conflicted with the moral feelings of the Germanic people’67.

WAU was particularly ineffective in rural catholic regions of Wurttemberg because the Church had significant influence there and the NSDAP did not. Furthermore, educating the youth in the Christian faith was of exceptional importance to the Catholic Church. They invested significant effort to counter-act Nazi encroachment in this area.68 Mergenthaler closed a number of confessional schools and replaced them with non-denominational state schools. He also did this in Bavaria and through-out the rest of Germany. 69 Mergenthaler went out of his way to significantly reduce the amount of private church schools in Wurttemberg.70

The first major assault on catholic instruction came on 1 July 1937, where all members of the clergy that taught religious instruction needed to pledge allegiance to the Nazi Party. There was a major clerical response against the introduction of this programme. In Wurttemberg, some 200 catholic priests refused to pledge allegiance and many leading clergymen persuaded parents to remove their children from these classes and only send them to religious class outside of school hours. Priests often threatened catholic parents with excommunication and threatened to not allow them a Christian burial unless, they did not submit their children to WAU. 71 The SD feared the Church’s actions undermined Catholic peoples trust in the Party. The organisation of the Church and its impact at local level was essential to carrying out organised of resistance72. The effective campaign against WAU and the aggressive stance even forced Reichsstatthalter Murr to concede that enforcing WAU upon the Catholic population of Wurttemberg and Stuttgart only antagonised Catholics and cause unrest73. Kulterminister Christian Mergenthaler heavily opposed this and relentlessly pursued WAU instruction.

From that point onwards, WAU became a subject of significant controversy in Wurttemberg. Mergenthaler’s attempts eliminate religious instruction during school hours in favour of Hitler Youth activities coupled with his attempt to eliminate religious instruction entirely caused uproar outside Wurttemberg. These events led to the Bishop of Osnabrück protesting against the Stuttgart government.74 The failure of Mürr to control Mergenthaler’s policies did not reflect well on him or the party and this forced Mürr and interior minister Jonathan Schmid to

65 Stephenson, Hitler’s Home Front, pp 252.66 Stephenson, Hitler’s Home Front, pp 242.67 Stephenson, Hitler’s Home Front, pp 249.68 Ibid69 Conway, The Nazi persecution of Churches, pp 179.70 Karl Schneider , ‘Schule und Erziehung’, in Otto Borst (ed.), ‘Das Dritte Reich in Baden und Württemberg’, (Stuttgart, 1988) pp 130. (cited by Stephenson; Stephenson, Hitler’s Home Front, pp.24871 Stephenson, Hitler’s Home Front, pp 249.72 Ibid73 Conway, The Nazi persecution of Churches, pp 190. ; Gerhard Schäfer, Landesbischof D. Wurm und der nationalsozialistiche Staat 1940-1945’, (Stuttgart 1968) p. 44. (cited by Stephenson)74 Stephenson, Hitler’s Home Front, pp 251-3.

confront Mergenthaler. Mürr and Schmid agreed to allow the church to use classrooms on an ad hoc basis except when the party needed to use them for wartime purposes. During wartime, many WAU instructors sent their children to religious instruction after school. Clergy of both denominations prepared children to ask awkward questions during WAU instruction.75 Bishop Sproll’s deputy, Max Kottman described WAU as ‘a campaign against Christianity and in particular against the Catholic Church’.76 Max Kottman was particularly critical of the implementation of WAU in Wurttemberg and he also rebuked Nazi propaganda that irritated many Catholics including catholic soldiers . Nazi propaganda stated that many German soldiers drew strength from their WAU instructed faith on the front particularly distasteful.77

It is obvious to see that the Catholic Church chose to follow the Vatican’s advice and only criticise the regime’s anti-clerical rhetoric.78 It refused to use its powerful position in the community to assist persecuted groups. According to Ethel, prior to 1933, bishops wrote letters that criticised Nazi ideology but included praise for their attacks on socialism, godlessness and immorality and the party’s promotion of Christianity.79 She highlighted that the main goal of the Catholic hierarchy ensured their rights to educate Catholics and ensure a freedom for Catholics to practice their religion.80 Since, the Concordat addressed many of the churches fears, it shows that the Catholic Church was solely concerned with its own interests and they only began to openly criticise the regime after the Concordat was violated. The Catholic Church’s lack of response to the actions of Kristallnacht and the open hostility to persecuted groups, is a stark contrast to their vigorous rebellion, effective mobilisation against the implementation of WAU in schools and the elimination of religious instruction.

In contrast to other groups, clerical resistance worked because major Nazi figures like Reichsstatthalter Murr made the decision that forcing the implementation of WAU only antagonised Catholic populations and cause unrest. Despite facing opposition from Kulturminister Christian Mergenthaler who relentlessly pursued WAU instruction he agreed to allow the Church to teach religious instruction on an ad hoc basis.

The Church had very strong support in certain communities that may cause substantial unrest if the Nazi’s were to act violently against the Church. Reichstatthalter Murr’s decision to not implement further WAU instruction in Catholic regions of Wurttemberg is an example of the party conceding to the Church in order to avoid populist uprisings. The party’s inability to supress an organisation which fundamentally opposes certain elements of party ideology damaged the reputation of the party and diminished its importance within the community. When discussing the policing structures in the previous chapter, it was noted that there was a acceptance or support for repressive organisations like the Gestapo and the SS. Jeremy Noakes shows that when the regime loses the support of the local community, the trust of the state and police are undermined and they cannot enforce their beliefs without it leading to open rebellion.81 Reichstatthalter Murr was afraid that if Kulturminister Mergenthaler continued to push the implementation of WAU then it may inevitably lead to open revolt by

75 Paul Sauer, ‘Wilhelm Mur: Hitlers Statthalter in Württemberg, (Tübingen, 1998) (cited by Stephenson) . p. 112.; Stephenson, Hitler’s Home Front, pp 251-253.76 Stephenson, Hitler’s Home Front, pp 254.77 Stephenson, Hitler’s Home Front, pp253.78 Wolf, Pope and the Devil, pp.22879 Ethel, ‘Attitudes of the German Catholic Hierarchy towards the Nazi Regime’ , p. 338.80 Ethel, ‘Attitudes of the German Catholic Hierarchy towards the Nazi Regime’ , p. 338.

catholic communities and by extension may lead to seeds of discontent being spread to other communities. Sproll’s refusal to vote for the Anschluss in 1938 made him a symbol of popular demonstration. He was consequently exiled from Wurttemberg in August 1938 and didn’t return until June 1945.

In conclusion, the Church did have various advantages over other opposition groups in Germany during the Nazi regime. It’s ability to meet regularly, it’s connection and loyalty with its community, connection to sovereign Vatican superiors and institutional structures protected it from certain elements of Nazi suppression. However, the Church only used this influence and protection to defend rights that it deemed important and choose to ignore the many issues that did not relate to the Church or it’s members or it’s ideology.

81 Peter D. Stachura (ed.), The shaping of the Nazi State: Nazi Germany and the Holocaust (9 vols., London, 1978), 7, pp. 221-222

Chapter 3: A Case Study of Bishop Sproll

Our main focus in this chapter is Bishop Sproll who deliberately boycotted the Anschluss in an attempt to highlight his displeasure for anti-clerical Nazi policies. This chapter discusses the Bishop’s boycott and how this led to riots orchestrated by the NSDAP which culminated in his eventual expulsion from Rottenburg. The case study focuses on the NSDAP reaction to the Anschluss boycott, the three Nazi orchestrated riots against the Bishop’s residence in Rottenburg between 15-23 July 1938 and the regime’s inability to diminish the Bishop or the Vatican’s influence. The Case Study explores the concern from high level Nazi figures on the Land level and at national level. Bishop Sproll opposed national socialism solely because it’s teaching directly contradicted Christian teaching, church sovereignty and the freedom to practice Catholicism. This chapter examines what impact this policy had on Bishop Sproll and how Vatican authorities reacted to encroachment on their freedoms.

Once the Catholic church’s priorities and the nature of the Nazi defamation campaign are discussed, this chapter shows the major weaknesses of the Nazi defamation campaign are exposed when they targeted Bishop Sproll. The regime’s inability to exact strong ideological connections with rural catholic populations allowed strong catholic support to prosper and had drastic effects on denunciations, which was their main source of information on dissident activity. Their attempt to defame Sproll but maintain the support of the population did not succeed. The Nazi State did not convince parishioners that Sproll no longer represented the views of the Vatican and by extension Catholicism. However, the Vatican’s approval to criticise “neo-paganism” expressed by Vatican ambassador to Germany Diego von Bergen nullified the regime’s efforts to portray Sproll as anti-Christian.82 This Case Study analyses the events that led to the Bishop’s expulsion from Rottenburg and the extensive difference between events that actually transpired and how Mürr and Weizsäcker described them.

Anschluss Absence and anti-Catholic Protests

On the 10 April 1938, Bishop Sproll of Rottenburg publicly refused to vote in the reunification plebiscite and this sparked significant anger and retalitory responses from Nazi authorities. The turnout for the vote in Stuttgart was 99.85%, 325,829 people voted Yes , 1587 voted No and 99 votes were spoiled. However, Bishop Sproll refused to participate in the vote.83 After the plebiscite Sproll left Wurttemberg for three months and bravely returned to Rottenburg on the 15 July under order from the Holy See.84 Bishop Sproll was subject to Nazi protests orchestrated against him from 15-23 July 1938. Here, we observe how Sproll defied the regime to a greater degree and allowed himself to be subjected to greater personal risk than other clergy members. This study analyses the extent to which the regime saw him as an ideological threat to the people of Wurttemberg.

Although the Anschluss was a political issue, Sproll used the plebiscite to highlight his discontent for the regime and their hostility towards Christianity, Nazi encroachment on Church liberties and outright violations of the Concordat. He said that he could not vote for the plebiscite because “I would have had to give my vote for, and express my confidence in, men whose fundamentally hostile view towards the Catholic Church and against all

82 Wolf, Pope and the Devil, pp 228.83Kurt Leipner, Chronik der Stadt Stuttgart; des archive der Stadt Stuttgart Band 30 (Stuttgart 1982), p.47684Anonymous, The persecution of the Catholic Church in the Third Reich; facts and documents (London 1940), p.254.

Christianity has become more and more revealing from year to year”.85 His act of defiance acted as a catalyst for his surveillance and persecution. A report sent to the German embassy in Rome described the bishop’s position as unacceptable and the Reich suggested that the bishop must be immediatly asked to resign from his position. The report was copied to the Reich department of Church affairs and to the security police.86 Foreign Secretary Weizsäcker expressed deep concern that even though voting in the referendum was not mandatory, Sproll was an esteemed member of the community and was expected to perform his duty as a good German (Vaterlandschlicht).The Foreign Secretary also argued that if the bishop did indeed have a conflict of interest, he was entitled to vote NO. However, his absence made it look as though he snubbed the State and in doing so subverted the views of the people of Rottenburg.87 This shows that the regime worried that influential religious figures such as Sproll could influence their parishioners. These correnspondences show the Foreign Secretary wanted the Vatican to dismiss the bishop in an attempt to quell opposition among Rottenburg’s parishioners.

Sproll returned to Rottenburg from exile on the 15 July 1938 under the instruction of the Holy See.88 The next evening, approximately 100 people protested outside the Bishop’s residence while he was involved in a sermon in the Cathedral. They shouted slurs and insults at the bishop and as the evening progressed the protestors broke into the Bishop’s residence. Protestors then entered the chapel where the bishop was praying and ordered him to leave. A second group barged into the chapel. One of the group, the editor of the Flammenzeichen newspaper in Stuttgart approached the bishop and asked him to leave but Sproll refused saying that he would rather die than do so.89 The other protestors ransacked the bishop’s offices and his private property. The rioters left when the Gestapo arrived and the officer began to question Bishop Sproll and strongly advised him to leave Rottenburg. However, the Bishop replied “I have strict orders from the Holy See to return to my diocese. I am the Bishop of Rottenburg and I shall remain in Rottenburg.” The Gestapo officer then repeated his wish for Sproll to leave and after he refused, the officer inspected the damage to the building and left.90

The second demonstration took place on the evening of 18 July at precisely 9pm. Approximately 1,500-2,000 demonstrated against Bishop Sproll but the majority of the protestors came from towns outside Wurttemberg. The protestors began chanting slurs against Sproll and demanded him to leave. Protestors made speeches denouncing Sproll as a traitor while clarifying that these demonstrations did not not an attack on the Catholic Church or Christianity. On this occasion they didn’t force their way into the residence. 91 However, Protestors threw four large stones through windows of the bishops office and the police did not intervene.92

85 Evan Burr Bukey, Hitler’s Austria: Popular Sentiment in the Nazi era 1938-45 (Chapel Hill N.C 2000), p.99 ; Bonney, ‘Confronting the Nazi war on Christianity, pp 429-30.86 HStAS, J40/7, Bü 93, bl.91 ( Correspondence to the Reich ambassador to the Vatican)87 HStAS, J40/7, Bü 93, bl.92-94 (Correspondence to the Reich ambassador to the Vatican from Foreign Secretary Weizsäcker)88 Anonymous, The persecution of the Catholic Church in the Third Reich, pp 254.89 Ibid90 Anonymous, The persecution of the Catholic Church in the Third Reich, pp 255.91 Ibid.92Ibid.; HStAS, J40/7, Bü 93, bl.119

The party organised a third demonstration against Bishop Sproll on the 23 July. The Nazi’s transported 2500-3000 protesters from localities outside Rottenburg and no members of the Rottenburg populace took part in the protest. The protest that was clearly orchestrated by the party greatly angered the residents. The Stuttgart Gestapo, District Attorney of Rottenburg and public prosecutor of Tübingen refused to accept the Bishop’s request for police protection. Consequently, Sproll did what he could to protect the residence but 150-200 protestors gaining access to the residence and disrupted him, Archbishop Grüber of Freiburg and the Vicar General while they were praying in the chapel. They refused to leave and the protestors remained in the chapel until the police arrived. While they were waiting the protestors in the chapel smoked and wore their hats so as to antagonise Sproll and his colleagues.93

The events as described by Mürr and Weizsäcker

However, there was a significant difference between how the events actually transpired and how Weizsäcker and Mürr describe them When addressing the Vatican, Weizsäcker says that Sproll’s actions have outraged the people of Rottenburg and he called for the Pope to remove him. He also stipulated that if Sproll was given a post in another parish then he could not cause disruptions there either.94 In late May, Mürr received intelligence that Sproll was in hospital in Stuttgart and the population of Rottenburg were not unaware of this. He reiterated to Weizsäcker that Sproll must be dismissed or transferred away from Rottenburg.95 A correspondence to Mürr and Weizsäcker from a local SS Obersturmführer suggested that the local population objected to Spoll’s on the night of the 13/14 July and that a massive protest was organised against Sproll on the 15 July when his return was known..96 Mürr made other fabricated claims such as, on Saturday the 23 July, thousands gathered together to voice their displeasure with Bishop Sproll and that despite the measures taken by police, demonstrators broke into the palace. There was suspicion of anti-state activity and that on Sunday morning Sproll was greeted by the “Heil Hitler” salute . He also said to prevent any more anti-state activity Sproll was put under guard.97

The contrasts between how the events transpired and how the authorities said they transpired is evident. One of the major reasons that the Rottenburg residents continued to support Sproll after his expulsion was that they never supported his expulsion from the beginning. The Party organised all three demonstrations against the Bishop and they transported almost all the participants to the demonstrations in the village and Rottenburg residents took a rather hostile attitude towards it.98 The regime tried to make it look as though the grounds for the bishop’s expulsion was solely based upon the notion that the villagers rejected his anti-Nazi beliefs. They used this argument to persuade Vatican authorities to dismiss Sproll because if the Vatican dismissed Sproll, they could say that he no longer reflected the Vatican’s opinion and consequently avoid opposition from the local catholic population. Mürr claims that the people violently protested against their bishop was entirely false and that the protest was entirely orchastrated by the regime. The demonstration comprised solely of people bussed in

93 Anonymous, The persecution of the Catholic Church in the Third Reich, pp 255-6.94 HStAS, J40/7, Bü 93, bl.94 (Correspondence to the Reich ambassador to the Vatican from Foreign Secretary Weizsäcker)95 HStAS, J40/7, Bü 93, bl.95 (Correspondence to Weizsäcker from Mürr)96 HStAS, J40/7, Bü 93, bl.154 (Correspondence to Weizsäcker and Mürr from an SS-Obersturmfuhrer)97 HStAS, J40/7, Bü 93, bl.131-132 (Correspondence to Ministry of Church Affairs from Mürr) 98 James G. Ryan and Leonard Schlup, Historical dictionary of the 1940’s (New York 2006), p.495.

from other towns and not the inhabitants of the village itself. In fact, the regime ordered SA members to take part in the parade and this SA member expressed his apologies for being involved in the process.

‘Your Excellency,

There is something for which I ask you pardon. I was one of those present last Saturday not,indeed,of my own free will, but there by order. I have always been proud of my country, but last Saturday I was, for the first time, ashamed to call myself a German. And a number of my comrades of my section think the same as I do. We were ashamed of ourselves for having without our knowledge allowed ourselves to be used for such a scandelous affair. When those who share my opinion were quite alone after the return from Rottenburg we gave free vent to our indignation. What we thought was; now we see why the Bishop abstained from voting. By staging this demonstration the Party has given us involuntary proof that you acted rightly on April 10th. The fact alone that the SA had to attend in civilan dress indicated that the Party itself had the feeling that what was happening was not the proper thing for the “dress of honour” of the SA. Anything with a spark of decency remaining in him ought to be ashamed of the things that happened last Saturday evening in Rottenburg. I come from ......... I am an SA man and, apart from that, I am also .............. so you will understand that under circumstances I do not sign my name for I cannot tell who might get hold of my letter. But I had to write to you to ease my conscience, and perhaps these lines will compensate you in some small way for the outrage comitted against you. You have proved by the courage you have shown that you are a German bishop to the core

Yours sincerely,

N.N.99

This letter shows that the protest was not just unacceptable to the villagers but to certain fully fledged SA and Nazi Party members. This letter is a prime example of the lack of support for the regime’s position in Rottenburg. Firstly, the Vatican asked Sproll to return to Rottenburg.100 Secondly, the Vatican fully supported the criticism of any aspect of Nazism that directly conflicted with Christianity. The Vatican supported Sproll because he only criticised “Neopaganism” which directly contradicted the teaching of the church, as outlined by Diego Von Bergen, the Vatican ambassador to Germany. 101 Sproll’s opposition to the plebiscite was entirely predicated on the premise of growing Nazi volatility towards Christian values and ways of life.102 We see this when Mürr is informed of the Cardinal’s reserved manner and even though the Cardinal says that he did not approve of the bishop’s actions. He says that what Sproll’s actions did break the law and also reiterated that they would not exercise the regime’s recomendation to dismiss Sproll.103.

The Regime attempted to discredit the Church in the minds of the people but it also sought to use the law in order to achieve its goals.104 According to the regime, Sproll was expelled based on the grounds that

99 Anonymous, The persecution of the Catholic Church in the Third Reich, pp 257.100 Guenter Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany (London 1964), p. 218.101 Wolf, Pope and the Devil, pp.227102 Bonney, ‘Confronting the Nazi war on Christianity, pp 430.103 HStAS, J40/7, Bü 93, bl.104-105 (Letters to Mürr and the SD chief regarding the Cardinal’s response to Sproll)

‘“the bishop was the only citizen of his locality who failed to participate in the election of April 10th,” and for that reason “demonstrations by the indignant population had been made against him” on several occasions. A bishop “who grossly neglects his State and political duties “would not be tolerated.’105

They tried to accuse him of causing the breakdown of law and order.106 Despite, the fact that the party organised the protests and the party transported it’s supporters from other towns and ordered them to take part in the parade. The party expelled the Bishop from his diocese because “he was the only citizen in his locality who failed to participate in the election of April 10th.”107 It is reported that on the afternoon of the 24 August, the secret police appeared outside the Bishop’s residence and said that he was a permanent risk to the people of Rottenburg and that he violated “the Protection of the People Act of February 1933”. He was given thirty minutes to pack his things and was then escorted out of Rottenburg by the secret police.108

There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from these events. The first major factor is that the regime did not approve of the Sproll’s opposition to the Anschluss and the party did not want his views to corrupt the people of Rottenburg.109 Secondly, Sproll was an influential and popular member of the community so he could not be handled in a ruthless violent matter because that would cause popular revolt among his constituents. Thirdly, the residents of Rottenburg fully opposed the actions taken against the bishop and refused to be involved in any protest against him. The bishop’s treatment, the regime’s inability to discredit his criticisms amongst the local population, the villager’s resentment towards the State and the Vatican’s refusal to dismiss Sproll all contributed to their hostile attitude towards the Nazi State after the bishop’s dismissal and only sought to strengthen support for Sproll and the Catholic Church. The staged demonstration further isolated the predominantly Catholic population of Rottenburg from the party and they continued to support the bishop throughout his exile. The parishioners held a weekly prayer for the bishop, his deputy Max Kottmann continued to criticise anti-Christian policies, while also leading and organising a campaign to stop the implementation of ideological instruction (WAU) in Wurttemberg. 110

104 Micheal C Thomsett, The german opposition to Hitler: the Resistance, the underground and the assassination plots, 1938-45 (Jefferson,1997), p.53.105 Anonymous, The persecution of the Catholic Church in the Third Reich, pp 42-43.106 Stephenson, Hitler’s Home Front, pp 60-1.107Leo Stein, Hitler came for Niemoller: The Nazi war against Religion (Gretna, Louisiana 2003), p.300.108Leipner, Chronik der Stadt Stuttgart , pp 506.109 HStAS, J40/7, Bü 93, bl.93-94 (Correspondence to the Reich ambassador to the Vatican from Foreign Secretary Weizsäcker)110 Stephenson, Hitler’s Home Front, pp 239.

Conclusion

This project examined how the suppression of the Catholic Church proved extensively more problematic than dealing with other political opponents. We saw that the regime took certain precautions when they dealt with clerical dissent that they did not take when silencing other critics of the regime. The Church possessed numerous resources that other political opponents did not have such as an ambassador to a foreign power, an influential workforce and extremely loyal followers. The church also possessed the ability to enforce organised opposition against the regime that other opposition groups could not.

Other important factors allowed the Catholic Church in Wurttemberg to successfully oppose certain Nazi policies during the Third Reich. The Gestapo’s limited manpower and overreliance on public denunciations proved ineffective when the Authorities sought to supress religious dissent. Local catholic population’s loyalty to the church inhibited the Gestapo’s primary source of intelligence and consequently effected their ability to punish dissident activity.

The regime sought to defame the Church and Bishop Sproll to lessen his influence and degrade his rhetoric. Therefore, preventing local catholic populations from engaging in thoughts or actions that were opposed to National Socialism. The defamation campaign against the churches failed to persuade Catholics to abandon their beliefs and their loyalty to the church. The hostility by the population of Rottenburg towards the regime after their expulsion of Bishop Sproll is a clear example of this failure. This failure is also compounded by the fact Sproll parishioners continued to show loyalty to him even after his expulsion. They continued to pray for him at a weekly sermon and that his Deputy and local Catholics continued to oppose measures that contradicted Christianity. The aggressive opposition to WAU implementation forced the regime to revaluate some of its policies in fear of a revolt from Catholics in Wurttemberg.

The Bishop Sproll case study highlighted the failures of the regime’s policing structures and anti-clerical defamation campaign in a local context. Sproll’s unwavering supporters showed the Gestapo’s inability to police areas that give them a steady stream of information from the public. The local support completely undermined the Nazi’s attempt to slander Sproll and not only vilified them in the eyes of the parishioners but it undermined their support among some of its own members. It also laid the foundation for other clergy figures to oppose the Nazi State after Bishop Sproll’s expulsion.

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