future challenges for competition enforcement in europe: a proposal for a multi-level approach...
TRANSCRIPT
Future challenges for competition enforcement in
Europe: a proposal for a multi-level approach
Conferência em Defesa da Concorrência e Defesa Comercial Brasília 21-22 de Maio de 2009
Aurelio La TorrePrime Minister OfficeDepartment for Legal and Juridical Affairs – RIA Office
Let me introduce myself…
► Director within the Presidency of the Italian Council of Ministers c/o the Department of legal affairs (Head of RIA Unit).
► Degrees cum laude in both Law and Political Sciences (with thesis in competition) and two postgraduate degrees in European affairs.
► Overall experience of almost 18 years in competition policy, legal drafting, European affairs and public administration.
► Competition official within the Italian Competition Authority for more than 4 years.
► Responsible for the competition component in three different PHARE Twinning Projects in Romania designed to help Romania`s accession to the UE (2006-2008, 2003-2005 and 2001-2002).
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Content of the presentation
1. Introduction2. Common difficulties in competition
enforcement 3. Conclusion: need for a multi-level
approach
1. Frequent lack of a well-defined priority strategy for enforcement with little use of ex officio investigations
2. Need to better design a strategy in order to foster competition in the area of public procurements
3. Need to deepen the synergies between competition policy and anti corruption strategies
4. Various problems in antitrust enforcement caused by legislation
5. Need to strengthen administrative capacity and/or internal organisation and/or adequate HR management within the National Competition Authorities
Common difficulties in enforcement of competition
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1. Frequent lack of a well-defined priority strategy for enforcement
with little use of ex officio investigations
Competition authorities around the world tend to be more “reactive” than “pro-active” in their fight against anticompetitive practices.
Indeed, investigations are normally opened following a complaint or where companies “blow the whistle” on a cartel to benefit from leniency.
The percentage of investigations opened ex-officio is generally low.
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What are the benefits of a pro-active investigative policy?
(1/2)A “reactive” investigative policy (as opposed to a “pro-active” investigative policy) may have several important shortfalls:
1. It may force the authority’s resources to focus on cases having a small impact on the national economy and fail to achieve tough competition in some economic sectors which are fundamental for the national economy
2. It may detect anticompetitive practices long after they have been in place, causing lasting damages to the structure of the market (e.g. RTE practices against Magill; Microsoft practices against Netscape);
3. It is unlikely to reach anticompetitive practices targeting consumers directly (e.g. excessive prices charged by a monopolist), who are not sufficiently organised to complain against such practices;
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What are the benefits of a pro-active investigative policy?
(2/2)4. It may receive scarce media coverage and reduce the
authority’s visibility and reputation – complaints, due also to their confidential character, are unlikely to attract the attention of the media;
5. It reduces the ability of the competition authority to gather evidence of the infringement, since in the majority of cases the alleged infringer has been warned of or is likely to guess the other party’s intention to lodge a complaint
6. It may have scarce deterrent effect, since a non-interventionist authority - especially in markets which are unlikely to be the object of a complaint - is unlikely to be perceived by companies as a threat to their ability to conclude anticompetitive practises;
7. It may fail to attract new entrants in the market(s) where anticompetitive practises (for instance, cartel agreements or exclusionary practises implemented by dominant companies) represent a disincentive for new entrants.
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What criteria for ex-officio investigations?
Decisions to open ex-officio investigations need to follow a pre-determined policy by drafting specific guidelines.
Priority should be given to investigations concerning “hardcore restrictions” of competition having an effect at national level (as opposed to local level) and relating to sectors essential for the national economy.
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Antitrust enforcement: overcome the spider-web
paradox
National
(or multinational) ٱRegional
ٱ
Local
ٱ
B) Scope of the relevant geographic market
High
ٱAverage
ٱLow
ٱOVERALL IMPACT ON COMPETITION (sum of A+B+C+D+E)
High
ٱModerate
ٱLow
ٱE) Barriers to entry
High
HHI 1800 and above
60%- 100%
ٱ
Moderate
HHI 1000-1800
30% - 60%
ٱ
Low
HHI below 1000
30% or less
ٱ
D) Concentration rate in the market
Very important
ٱ
Important
ٱ
Of minor
importance
ٱ
C) Product(s) or service(s) concerned
Very serious
ٱSerious
ٱMinor
ٱA) Type of infringement(s)
Very serious dangers for competition
Serious dangers for competition
Minor dangers for competition
CRITERIA
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Key sectors for enforcement (e. g. Romania 2005-7)
• Public ProcurementPublic Procurement• Media (* #)Media (* #) • Energy (* #)Energy (* #) • Communication and Information Technology (* #)Communication and Information Technology (* #)• Transport (* #)Transport (* #)• Banking (* #)Banking (* #)• Insurance (* #)Insurance (* #)• ConstructionConstruction• PharmaceuticalsPharmaceuticals• Steel IndustrySteel Industry• Postal services (* #)Postal services (* #) • Real Estate TransactionsReal Estate Transactions• Mechanical EngineeringMechanical Engineering• TourismTourism
# = Area including network industries # = Area including network industries
* = Area including sector(s) under competence of a Regulation Authority* = Area including sector(s) under competence of a Regulation Authority
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3. Need to better design a strategy in order to foster competition in the area of
public procurements
Advantages: ◦ ensuring transparency in Public
Administration◦ fighting corruption ◦ maintaining in place a functioning free
market economy
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The main competition problems in public procurement
procedures• Award directly a contract without organising a public tender
• Requirements tailored to the advantage of one specific bidder
• Discrimination among potential bidders (e.g.: unjustified high turnover thresholds
that can discriminate SMEs and/or many years of experience in the field of activity
to block the access of the newcomers)
• Lack of transparency
• Tight deadlines: insufficient visibility and inadequate time for submitting bids
• “Bid rigging” (i.e. illegal co-ordination between firms aimed at affect the outcome
of any sale or purchasing process in which bids are submitted)
• Corruption related practices - these are instances where a representative of the
contracting authority agrees with one or more bidders to false the tendering
process.
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Role of competition Authority in public procurement
analyse PP legislation address recommendation to Government and Parliament (advocacy)
draft guidelines for all tenders organisers
draft internal instructions and checklist
internal training and referee bilateral cooperation with PP Agency
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4. Need to deepen the synergies between competition policy
and anti corruption strategies
The higher is the corruption, the higher is the alteration in the
business environment, especially in the „strategic” and
high remunerative markets
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Role of competition Authority
analyse anti-corruption legislation set up or increase cooperation with Anti-
corruption Authority identify field of inter-relation (e.g.
public procurement) promote studies on influence of non
ethical behaviours on the functioning of market economy (CFR. Current financial crisis)
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5. Problems in antitrust enforcement caused by legislation
Many competition distortions originate from legislation.
Competition agencies are generally entrusted with advocacy powers.
Nevertheless, these powers are not binding and are implemented ex post.
When did this become a crucial problem?
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Is legislation encouraging or distorting free competition?
”The Bosses of the Senate," Lithography, 1889
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”The Bosses of the Senate," Lithography, 1889
Huge figures stand behind rows of Senate desks. The four figures in top hats, with big bellies, are the Iron Trust, Standard Oil Trust, Copper Trust, Steel Beam Trust, all with dollar signs on their stomachs.
The sign at top reads: "This is a Senate for the Monopolists, By the Monopolists and of the Monopolists!" Some Senators look up at them.
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Examples of legislative measures that may have an anticompetitive
impact include:
public tenders applying unfair or discriminatory terms measures fixing prices or tariffs measures granting exclusive rights measures discouraging market entry by increasing standards or introducing new administrative barriers (licences, authorisations etc.) measures obstructing import or export of products/services measures granting state aid or otherwise favouring domestic over foreign companies
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The Structure of the Italian RIA model (2008)
1. Context and 1. Context and objectivesobjectives..2. Procedures of 2. Procedures of consultationconsultation..3. Assessment of the non-intervention option 3. Assessment of the non-intervention option («zero option»).(«zero option»).4. Assessment of the 4. Assessment of the alternative options alternative options of of
regulatory intervention.regulatory intervention.5. Justification of the proposed regulatory 5. Justification of the proposed regulatory
option.option.6. 6. Impact on the correct competitive market Impact on the correct competitive market
functioning and on the Country functioning and on the Country competitivenesscompetitiveness..
7. Implementing modalities of the regulatory 7. Implementing modalities of the regulatory intervention.intervention.
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Basic competition RIA filter test
(Italy 2008)
Does regulation:
◦Limit the number or type of providers?
◦Limit the competition possibilities of providers?
◦Reduce the incentives for providers to
compete?
◦ N.B. Italy is preparing specific guidelines and a more
detailed checklist
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To what regulation should we apply the competition filter test?
• Must be submitted to RIA legal provisions that have business or competition impacts.
• Business impacts arise in the case that proposed regulations: (1) govern the entry or exit into or out of market (2) control prices or production levels (3) restrict the quality, level, or location of goods and services
available (4) restrict advertising and promotional activities (5) restrict price or type of inputs used in the production process (6) are likely to confer significant costs on business, or may provide
advantages to some firms over others.
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6. Need to strengthen administrative capacity, internal organisation, HR management
within the National Competition Authorities
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Enhancing the administrative capacity of Competition Agencies: some issues
personnel selection procedures carrier and status internal promotion system training on:
◦ public speaking◦ lobbying and negotiating skills ◦ leadership◦ team building
Conclusions… 1. Adopt a well-defined priority strategy for
enforcement with adequate use of ex officio investigations
2. Verify your strategy in order to foster competition in the area of public procurements
3. Consider to study the synergies between competition policy and anti corruption strategies
4. Consider to adopt RIA in order to face competition distortions caused by legislation
5. Pay attention to the human factor
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Obrigado!
Aurelio La Torre
www.planejamento.gov.br/gestao/dialogos
Departamento de Cooperação Internacional Secretaria de Gestão – SEGES Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão Esplanada, Bloco K, 4° andar (61) 2020- 4906