GiantDiscovery

Contents

The Prelude 9

The Discovery 19

Maiden Days aboard"Ocean Viking" 32

A Giant Oil Discovery 36

Development Plans Take Shape 45

A Long Way from Landing Sites 58

Ekofisk Becomes a "City" 64

Focusing on the Colossus 69

From Ekofisk to the Consumer 92

The Development ProjectIs Completed 108

Here's What Happensat the Ekofisk Complex 124

Costly Lessons 126

Organization under Rapid Expansion 156

Norway in Miniature

The Future of Ekofisk

Jack Up!

Ekofisk and Norway

172

195

208

212

ForewordA sea of shining, blinking lights appeared onthe horizon. The helicopter pilot must haveexperienced it as something special himself,and he made his only two passengers awareof what lay up ahead. The impression wasso strong that this, my first encounter withEkofisk, on that cold December morning in1981, has been fixed in my memory forever.After having vibrated in a Bell 212helicopter for nearly two hours, withnothing but blue sky all around, theencounter with the platforms at Ekofisk wasunforgettable.

My first close encounter with the Ekofiskenvironment also left its impression in mymemory: the people, the informal tone, theinternational atmosphere, the dimensions -and, of course, the smorgasbord. In additionthere were the natural elements, representedby the fog when we were to head for home.

Since 1981 there have been innumerablehelicopter trips between Forus in Stavangerand the Ekofisk platforms. I have visitedtwenty-three of the twenty-five platforms —only the two booster platforms along theTeesside pipeline remain.

The next overwhelming impression to befirmly fixed in my mind was the subsidence

of the seabed: both the discovery of thephenomenon and the jacking of theplatforms. Technology and people —together able to solve problems in such aningenious way. Ekofisk has always come upwith surprises; viewed from thatperspective, the subsidence is almost amatter of course.

When I was given the task of recordingthe history of Ekofisk on paper, in late 1984,I thought it would be finished in a year'stime. When I started digging in the archivesand talking with possible sources, the scopeof the task I had undertaken began to dawnon me. The oral sources had differentversions which often contradicted eachother; the little that others had written onthe history spread in all directions. Thedifficulties began with the early history —many books, articles and TV programs hadtold about the representatives from Phillipswho visited Oslo and Trygve Lie in 1962.They were the first representatives from anyoil company who wanted to discuss drillingon what would become the Norwegiancontinental shelf. A closer check revealedthat there were not two men, but three —nor were the names originally used the

correct ones. Therefore, the story thatPhillips wanted to buy the Norwegiancontinental shelf, for next to nothing, alsohad to be investigated further. Thecircumstances surrounding the drilling ofthe discovery well on Ekofisk, 2/4-2, areanother good example. In this instance theversion stating that the Phillips Group hadbeen threatened into drilling the well by theNorwegian authorities had found its wayinto historical accounts. This misconceptionhas been referred to so often that it hasalmost become historical fact.

We could go on referring, point afterpoint, to the way in which events aroundthe Ekofisk area have been misrepresented.It takes time to dig to the depths of history- and I soon found that this book needed tocontain, as far as possible, facts that could bedocumented. Therefore the work has takentime. At the same time the book does notcover everything. It represents a subjectiveselection. For the history of Ekofisk throughtwenty years has been eventful — for betterand for worse. Many things have been donefor the first time at Ekofisk, the first oil andgas field on the Norwegian continentalshelf. The oil activity has often beendescribed as the oil adventure. Adventure itis not — nor has it ever been. The oil activityhas been struggle and toil in the outerreaches of technology. No one had doneanything similar to what was done atEkofisk in the beginning of the 1970''s - apioneering effort that ushered Norway intothe oil age.

This book is by no means a one-maneffort. I have received support from anumber of persons within and outside of thePhillips Group — none of whom should beheld responsible for the final product. It ismy own.

An editorial committee assisted with thegathering of written material in the firstphase. Security Officer Ingvar Bjornevikcontributed stories from the first phase ofthe offshore activity — and later he workedfulltime for several months to providebackground material and pictures. Likewise,Boat Coordinator Baste Fanebust providedbackground material and wrote a portion ofChapter 8. Kjetil Holme and SveinAbrahamsen supplied the basis for Chapter9. Their material was supplemented by KjellRott, Leif Hauge and Per Magne Gil.Engineering Manager Rolf Wiborgcontributed greatly to the formation ofChapter lion the future of Ekofisk.

Thor Aresvik invested a lot of time andenergy in unearthing background materialfor Chapter 12.

A number of the persons who contributedto this book's development cannot bementioned here, due to spaceconsiderations. But I want to acknowledgeBill Wicker at Phillips headquarters inBartlesville who was helpful withinterviews, finding photos and providingaddresses of Ekofisk veterans. LikewiseOwen Thomas, who voluntarily placed hisprivate Ekofisk file at my disposal; Ward andMary Dunn, who opened their home andtheir file to me for several days to assist inmy search for the history; Carl Johnson, CarlC. Anderson, Gordon Goering, Leonard L.Meade, Bill Boyce, Anders O. Waale, PerBorten, and Arve Johnsen, who patientlyanswered questions and helped me to anunderstanding of the events. DeputyManaging Director Knut Am hascontributed comments and input along theway. A very special thank-you to Anders O.Waale, manager of the Oslo office. He hasbeen a very valuable consultant during thewriting. Without his comments andincredible knowledge, experience and file,this book would not have been written. Thesame applies to Director of Public AffairsBjorn S. Lasrdal, who has encouraged,commented, and made it possible for me tospend so much time on the book.

Torunn Mo, Evy Aase Ravndal, BjorgSandal, Liv Marit Baardsen, Ingrid Hyllandand Marit Svendsen in Public Affairs havealways been of service to me and lent theirassistance.

Arnulf Husmo's pictures are prominent inboth quality and number. Besides being atrue professional - he has also been a verygood travelling companion through fiveyears of Ekofisk travelling. Eirik Moe isresponsible for the layout, and he has alsobeen a fine and critical consultant. The bookwas translated into English by MindaLaerdal.

A few words to all those who havesupplied me with stories, pictures, etc., thathave not been included: The scope of theEkofisk story is such that we had to beselective. For this reason it was impossibleto include all the material submitted, but letme express my sincere thanks.

Tananger, 16 August 1988Stig S. Kvendseth

The Prelude

It came as a surprise to management atPhillips Petroleum Company when, at theclose of the 3 August 1962 meeting, thenVice Chairman Paul Endacott raised thequestion as to whether the company hadinvestigated the possibilities of oilexploration in the North Sea. Thebackground for the question, and PaulEndacott's interest, was a vacation in Europefrom which he had recently returned. Hehad coincidentally discovered a drillingderrick near Groningen in the Netherlands.Later investigations revealed that«something» had been discovered there.Even though the gas discovery had beenmade in 1959, it took a long time beforeinformation as to its size began to leak out.However, in 1962 various trade journalsmade several references to this discovery,and in August of that year it was alsopossible to read about drilling activity in thesea outside the discovery area. In addition,there was a certain amount of seismicactivity in the channel area on the Britishside. All of this pointed toward the fact thata new area had become of interest to the bigoil companies, with Shell, Esso and BPleading the way.

Paul Endacott's question triggeredactivity at Phillips headquarters inBartlesville. It was quickly established thatthe North Sea had not been appraised as apriority area for exploration. The reasonwas that, with the exception of Groningen,only small discoveries of gas and oil hadbeen made in Western Europe.

The newly-established internationaldepartment within Phillips recommendedthat geological data be obtainedimmediately from West Germany, the

Netherlands, Denmark, and Great Britain.That was accomplished partly throughPhillips' Paris office, under the leadership ofWard W. Dunn, which secured informationfrom sources in Europe — and partly throughthe systematic examination of records inWashington.

In Paris the initiative from B>artlesvillewas received with enthusiasm. For Ward W.Dunn, the North Sea held appeal in bothtechnical and economic terms. The energymarket in Europe was the world's fastestgrowing, as well as being overall the world'ssecond largest energy market. This meantthat any involvement in the North Seawould be important - and that put him in avery interesting position.

Round Trip through EuropeAt the beginning of October 1962, Owen

It was Shell'sgigantic gasdiscovery atGroningen, theNetherlands, in 1959that opened the eyesof oil companies toNorth Seapossibilities. Thereservoir rock couldreach northward andout into the sea. PaulEndacott drewPhillips' attention tothe North Sea in1962, inspiringstudies that led thecompany to theNorwegiancontinental shelf.Here, in his 86thyear, he is enjoyingretirement inBartlesville in thespring of1988.

9

Owen D. Thomasand Ward W. Dunn,

along with SilvioEha, took on the task

of investigatingpossibilities of North

Sea exploration.That led them to

Trygve Lie in Oslo -the first

representatives ofany oil company to

show interest inNorwegian waters.

10

Thomas was sent from Bartlesville toEurope.1 He was to accompany Ward W.Dunn and Silvio Eha on a round trip to thecountries of interest in order to gathergeological data and establish contacts. Theirpoint of departure was the fact that theGroningen field had been discovered insediments from the Permian andCarboniferous periods. There wereindications that these sediments extendedfrom land out into the North Sea. Availablegeological data showed that the mostinteresting area was off the northern coastof the Netherlands, the northwestern coastof Germany and Denmark. Great Britainwas ranked in third place.

Norway and Norwegian waters were notof interest at that point in time. The thoughthad not occurred to anyone that thesedimentary deposits might reach so farnorth that there could be oil or gas reservesthere.

The three geologists - Owen Thomas,second in command at Phillips' internationalexploration department, Ward W. Dunn,head of the Paris office, and his Europeanchief geologist, Silvio Eha — set course firstfor Karlsruhe. On October 10 the annualGerman conference on petroleum researchand petrochemistry got under way in thatcity, and the three men felt that usefulinformation could come out of it. Theyturned out to be right. Throughconversation with Alfred Bentz, head ofBundesanstalt fur Bodenforschung, theygained insight into the seismic tests whichhad been made. In addition to receivingconfirmation that the technique itself hadbeen successful — with good reproductionsof structures down to 5,000 meters, theyalso learned that the tests showedsedimentary deposits all the way out to

Doggerbank, the outermost point for theGerman testing.

This led to further conversation withWaldernar Zettel, head of PRAKLA, thecompany which had carried out the seismictests.

From Karlsruhe the journey continued toBonn. The three were now fairly convincedthat the North Sea area held potential withregard to oil and gas reserves. The questionremaining was: what were the possibilitiesof obtaining concessions in the individualcountries?

On October 15, in Bonn, the three menbegan with a meeting at the GermanMinistry of Finance. It became clear thatpossibilities of obtaining an explorationlicense existed, but they understood thatthere had been many interested companiesbefore them. Among others, the Americanfirm Panamerican had offered a seismicprogram valued at 2.5 million dollarstoward obtaining a concession for the entiresector of the North Sea which the Germansmight be allotted when boundary linenegotiations were concluded.

The next meeting on the agenda was atthe Norwegian embassy. The three men hadunderstood from the seismic results theyhad heard about in Karlsruhe that thesedimentary source rocks for oil and gascould extend much farther north than theyhad first assumed. Norway was thereforeabout to become interesting.

At the Norwegian embassy they werereceived by Commercial Attache Bue Brun.He was totally unprepared to deal with thematter. The visit was concluded with hishanding them a copy of the brochureInvestor's Guide to Norway» — apublication which told about investmentpossibilities and conditions in general inNorway. The brochure had been preparedby a committee chaired by Trygve Lie,former secretary general of the UnitedNations. Bue Brun asked them to contactTrygve Lie for further information, and feltthat Lie could put them in touch with theproper agencies in Oslo.

Following the meeting at the Americanembassy in Bonn, the three men traveled onto Kassel, Hannover and Klausthal. Througha series of meetings with German regionalauthorities and research institutions, itbecame clearer and clearer that possibilitiesin the German sector were small. Their

belief in Norway, however, wasstrengthened. Their daily reports,transmitted continually to Phillipsheadquarters, revealed that on October 18 -after a lunch meeting with Alfred Bent,Waldemar Zettel and Hans-Wilhelm Maass(deputy director of PRAKLA) - the fullsignificance of the principles of the GenevaConvention as they applied to the NorthSea became clear to them. Norway andGreat Britain would come out with thelargest continental shelves.

On October 19, the journey reachedDenmark. Through meetings inCopenhagen with the A.P. M011er concern,it became clear that all doors there wereclosed. The concern had signed a 50-yearcontract for all of Denmark including thecontinental shelf. Besides, the company wasalready associated with several larger oilcompanies through D.U.C. (DanskUndergrunds Consortium).

The conclusion the three Phillips envoysreached after the Copenhagen visit was thatNorway was the only country which hadnot previously been contacted by oilcompanies. They had already scheduledmeetings in the Netherlands, Belgium, andGreat Britain for the following week, but aletter was sent from Copenhagen to TrygveLie requesting a meeting for the week afterthat.

The conversations in The Hague,Haarlem, Brussels and London made it clearthat the British continental shelf was themost attractive — both geologically and witha view to concession possibilities. ThenEngland would hold a concession round inwhich all companies would have equalstanding.

Norway NextOn Monday, October 27, the three Phillipsgeologists met Trygve Lie in Oslo. Duringthe course of that first meeting, it becameclear that Norway had not at all consideredthe possibilities of oil and gas in the NorthSea. A company had begun operations onSvalbard, but the majority of Norwegiansregarded this as an adventure out of touchwith reality. During the meeting with thethree Phillips representatives, Trygve Lieand his colleagues expressed their gratitudefor Phillips' having pointed out the potentialin the continental shelf. However, TrygveLie wanted a concrete offer from Phillips.

Then he wanted to discuss the offer with theNorwegian authorities before a finaldecision would be reached.

The three Phillips representatives actedquickly and with enthusiasm. Thepossibilities of an early start would give thecompany a little edge on the competition,which was concentrating on the southernpart of the North Sea.

During the course of that day and thenext, a letter with an offer to the Norwegianauthorities was drafted, wired toheadquarters for approval, and sent onOctober 29. The main point in the letter wasan offer whereby Phillips would be awardedoil and gas concessions for those areaswhich lay outside territorial waters andwhich could, either then or in the future, beplaced under Norwegian jurisdiction. Inreturn Phillips would undertake to carry outseismic exploration of the area in the NorthSea which could come under Norwegiansupervision. The cost of such explorationwas calculated at approximately 160,000

This is the letterWard W. Dunn sentto Trygve Lie aftertheir 2 7 October1962 meeting. WardW. Dunn was thenhead of Phillips'office in France,which explains theletterhead used.

11

dollars per month and could amount to overone million dollars.

Later this offer from Phillips has beenviewed as an attempt to take the Norwegianauthorities by surprise and secure exclusiverights on the continental shelf. Ward W.Dunn says that they didn't expect the offerto be accepted without further ado. It wasintended as a starting point in thenegotiations. Furthermore, it should beremembered that at this point in time in1962, nothing was known about the wealththat lay hidden in the continental shelf. Norwas it known which area would be placedunder Norwegian jurisdiction. Furthermore,when considering the sum of money, oneshould also bear in mind the rate of inflationin the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's, as well asthe price of oil at the start of the 1960's —approximately two dollars per barrel.

On November 5 Trygve Lieacknowledged receipt of the letter by hisreference to the fact that it had beenforwarded to the Ministry of Industry forfurther handling.

Pause for ReflectionAs time went by, other oil companies cameto Norway, following in Phillips' footsteps.The Norwegian authorities allowedthemselves plenty of time for evaluating theoffer from Phillips. At the end of May 1963,Trygve Lie wrote a letter to Phillips' Parisoffice in which he pointed out that theMinistry of Foreign Affairs had granted anumber of applications for seismicexploration and that, if Phillips was stillinterested, the company ought to apply.Phillips replied immediately by sending anapplication, at the same time callingattention to the earlier offer.

While letters were being exchangedbetween Trygve Lie and Phillips' Parisoffice, preparations were being made inNorway for petroleum legislation. On 26April, Trygve Lie took up the legal aspectsof oil exploration in a letter to the Ministryof Foreign Affairs. And action was swift inthis area. As early as 31 May 1963,Norwegian national supremacy over thecontinental shelf was proclaimed — at thesame time as a draft was presented of thetemporary act on exploitation andexploration of subsea reserves.

On 6 June 1963 Phillips received12 permission to carry out seismic tests on the

Norwegian shelf — and four days later WardW. Dunn was able to inform Trygve Liethat, during the course of the summer, thecompany planned to shoot seismic at anapproximate cost of $ 300,000. The reasonfor maintaining the contact with Trygve Liewas that Phillips wanted to stand firm onthe company's first offer. However, theNorwegian authorities felt that more timewas needed and asked Phillips to bide theirtime.

Dividing Up the North SeaThe principles for dividing up the North Seacontinental shelf were established by aconvention in Geneva in 1958. The mainprinciple was the center line between twocountries, but with an important limitation:the continental shelf was to be defined as«the sea floor and subsurface in the subseaareas touching on the coast to a depth of200 meters or as far out as the ocean depthswill permit exploitation of natural reserves.*

Norway had opposed this principle fromthe start, because it would give coastalstates a disproportionately large area at theexpense of inland nations. But when thevote was taken it became clear that Norwaywould fall in the minority, and the countrydeclined to vote. However, private talkswith Great Britain were instigated byNorway at the conference. At thesemeetings it became clear that Great Britainwould support the Norwegian point of viewthat the Norwegian Trench should not cutNorway off from the rest of the North Seashelf. If the principles of the Genevaconvention were given a literalinterpretation, that is what the situationwould be.

After the convention was adopted,Norway was not in a hurry to sign — thefeeling being that there was no rush sincequestions on exploitation of subsea reserveshad no practical significance. There wereseveral things that contributed to thisattitude on the part of the Norwegianauthorities. One factor was the statementfrom Norges Geologiske Undersokelse in1958 which read, «The possibility of theexistence of coal, oil or sulfur on thecontinental shelf along the Norwegian coastshould be disregarded.* The second factorwas that experts in a number of large oilcompanies doubted the existence of oil/gasthat far north. Among the doubters, there

was the head geologist in a large oilcompany who, as late as the mid-'60's,claimed that he would drink whatever oilcould be found on the Norwegian shelf.

The meeting which the threerepresentatives held with Trygve Lie at theend of October 1962 changed the picture,however, and the act concerning Norwegiansupremacy over the continental shelf wasthe first effort in the work to draw up legalregulations for the shelf. The main principlein the temporary act on exploitation andexploration of subsea natural reserves givesthe State the right to said reserves, and theKing (the Government) can grantpermission to explore or to exploit reserves.With this backbone of legal regulations,Norway could initiate negotiations with theother North Sea countries as to the finalboundary line for the entire North Sea shelf.During the course of 1964-65, separatenegotiations were held with Denmark andGreat Britain — and in 1965 the boundarylines were basically clear as we know themtoday. In 1968 a similar agreement was alsoentered into with Sweden, concerningSkagerrak. But not until April 1971, after thesize of Ekofisk was known, did the

Government propose that Norway sign theGeneva convention of 1958.

Seismic ExplorationThe first seismic tests on what wouldbecome the Norwegian shelf were made inthe summer and fall of 1963. Severalcompanies were utilizing their own vessels,and the results were to some degree sharedamong the companies. Phillips carried outtheir own tests along with the Belgiancompany Petrofina. Due to weatherconditions, the program was not completedin 1963 — and the companies spent close to$ 600,000 dollars in 1964 to conclude theprogram.

The interpretation of the seismic testsconfirmed the assumptions of thegeologists. The sedimentary depositsextended northward in the North Sea - andthere were many interesting structureswhere they were itching to spud wells inorder to gain more knowledge about thearea.

With his interpretations in the back of hishead, Owen Thomas lay out the longseismic profiles in the Adams building'sgymnasium in Bartlesville. The profiles were

The presentation ofNorth Sea seismicmaps tomanagement atPhillips headquartersin Bartlesville wassurrounded bysecrecy. There aretherefore no picturesfrom the event. Theseismic profilesconvinced companymanagement thatexploration drillingin the North Sea wasa chance worthtaking.

13

Fred Terry wasresponsible for

Phillips' becomingestablished with its

own company inNorway on 22

October 1964. Hewas the company's

first employee in thecountry, and his task

was to pursuedevelopments toward

the first concessionround on the

Norwegiancontinental shelf.

14

nearly 100 meters long, and he invitedPhillips' chairman of the board, BootsAdams, along with a number of otherpersons from management to come take acloser look. One whole afternoon thesegentlemen spent crawling around on thefloor in order to become convinced that theNorth Sea was worth investing millions ofdollars — and that the Norwegian shelf wasvery interesting. What the geologists hadparticularly noticed was the area whichwould presumably become the center linebetween the Norwegian and British shelves.It appeared to go into a Tertiary basin — andbasins from younger geological periodswere especially interesting, since historyshowed that a great deal of the world's oiland gas reserves came from these structures.

Phillips' conclusion was clear — here theyhad an area where the time was definitelyripe for beginning exploration.

Becoming Established in NorwayThe next step on the road to acquiring anexploration license in Norway was toestablish the company here. It wasrecommended as early as the last half of1963 that a subsidiary be established inNorway which would continue to workwith the Norwegian authorities. On 4

September 1964, Fred Terry was on locationin Oslo, and one of his first tasks was toestablish a Norwegian company. On 22October the first company — PhillipsPetroleum Norsk A/S - was formallyfounded, and on 25 November it was dulyregistered with Oslo Handelsregister. FredTerry's tasks were then to followdevelopments within Norwegian oil politicsand see to it that Phillips was involved whenthe first blocks were open for bids.Moreover, Phillips was operating with ahandicap in relation to many other oilcompanies in Norway. The company had nomarketing organization inthe country as did, for example, Esso andShell. Therefore it was important for thecompany to make itself known. One of thetasks was to see that Phillips with two «l's»wasn't confused with the radio and TVmanufacturer with one «1» from theNetherlands.

The Phillips Norway Group2

Oil exploration in a totally new area of theworld involves a tremendously greatfinancial risk. The costs are high, and early inthe game Phillips had begun to look aroundfor partners who were interested inbecoming involved. The company alreadyhad a working relationship in refining andpetrochemistry with the Belgian Petrofinaconcern in Europe. It was natural that thatcompany be drawn in, and Petrofina wasvery interested. Cooperation with Finastarted as early as 1963. A French companywas also approached orally, but it declined.

In Nigeria Phillips was interested inparticipating in Agip's concessions. TheItalian state oil company was also on thelookout for partners, and an exchangeresulted. Phillips participated in Agip'sNigeria activity while Agip joined withPhillips in the North Sea.

Phillips' strategy with regard toexploration in Europe involved havingparticipants from the country in which theexploration was taking place. This workedwell in the British sector, and in 1964 effortswere under way to locate a Norwegianpartner. Agip and Petrofina were also incomplete agreement with this attempt.Through Hambros Bank in London thegroup came into contact with a coalition ofthe largest Norwegian industrial firms,

known as Norwegian Oil Consortium.During the course of 1964 and early 1965,negotiations were held with this coalition.However, the attempt failed in the spring of1965. There were several reasons for this,but two of the most important factors werethe coalition's requirement of 50 percentcarried interest — and signals from theNorwegian authorities indicating thatPhillips, Agip and Petrofina held a strongposition as applicants for productionlicenses without Norwegian participation.The Norwegian authorities were of theopinion that if carried interest — orparticipation only after the discovery wasmade and no financial participation duringthe exploration phase — were to enter into it,then the State should be the one to profit bythis arrangement, not private companies.

It can be noted in parentheses that thisrequirement on the part of the Norwegianauthorities came up in connection with thesecond concession round in 1969, andPhillips was the only American oil companyto accept this with 17 percent carriedinterest for the State in block 2/10.

But in the first concession round it wasPhillips, Agip and Petrofina who applied —with Phillips as operator. These threecompanies are popularly recognized as theoriginal Phillips Group.

First Concession RoundNorsk Lysningsblad's issue of 13 April 1965contained a one-column announcement tothe effect that 278 blocks in the Norwegiansector of the North Sea were available forproduction license applications. The modestadvertisement was supplemented by anEnglish translation which was sent to thelarger oil companies as well as to the tradepress.

When the June 15 application deadlinearrived, there were 11 applicants covering208 blocks in all. Because of the strongconcentration on the same blocks, therewere only 81 blocks on which it would bepossible to grant licenses.

The Phillips Group had applied for a totalof 28 blocks. Block 2/7 (Eldfisk and Edda)was given first priority, while block 2/4(Ekofisk, West Ekofisk, large portions of Torand half of Albuskjell) came in the number10 slot on the list.

The results of this first - and decidedlylargest — concession round were made

It was Minister ofIndustry Karl Trash'

who presented theawarding of the firstblocks on 18 August1965. We recognize

Jens Evensen to KarlTrash's right on therostrum. As deputy

secretary in theMinistry of

Industry, JensEvensen played a keyrole in the first phase

of Norwegian oilhistory.

Eight companypartnerships were

awarded productionlicenses covering 78

blocks in the firstconcession round.

The Phillips Groupreceived three licenses

over a total of IIblocks.

(Red color)

16

public at a press conference on 18 August1965 by Minister of Industry Karl Trasti.After the application deadline there hadbeen negotiations between the applicantsand the companies. Karl Trasti told the pressthat «the applicants' financial strength andpractical experience within oil explorationwere used as a point of departure.Consideration has also been given to theextent to which applicants have contributedor will contribute to strengtheningNorway's economy in general, throughmarketing in Norway, construction of

refineries in Norway, utilization ofNorwegian ships, or by other means.*Production licenses were awarded for a totalof 78 blocks in that first round. The PhillipsGroup (Phillips Petroleum Company,Norske Fina A/S, and Norsk Agip A/S) wasawarded three production licenses — 016,017, and 018. License 016 covers blocks7/8, 8/1, 16/11, and 17/12, license 017blocks 8/8, 8/10, and 8/11, while license018 covers 1/5, 2/4, 2/7, and 7/11.

Stavanger Becomes an Oil Town.Phillips' head office in Norway was set up inOslo, but it was logical that practicaloperations had to be situated on thesouthern or western coast. There were manyfactors to consider in the selection of a base.Phillips made several investigations in thearea between Kristiansand and Stavanger —and after some time chose Stavanger. Thecity had a favorable geographic location,good communications, and it welcomed theoil activity. Politicians in Stavanger saw inthe oil the possibility to compensate for thedecline in the fisheries which had previouslybeen the city's principal industry. They hadtherefore campaigned actively with the oilcompanies, and it soon became clear thatother companies besides Esso and Phillipswere also on their way into the city. Thiswould result long term in the establishmenthere of service companies within the

industry for the purpose of serving the oilcompanies.

Ed Crump was in Tripoli, Libya, when hereceived word that the next stop in hiscareer with Phillips would be Stavanger,Norway. He received this notice at the endof September, 1965. At that point in time,Jack Casto was working at the head office inOslo. Everett Thrall was named as head ofoperations in Norway, but he was stillstationed in Egypt.

On 6 November 1965, Ed Crump arrivedin Stavanger with his wife and four childrenand their belongings. Temporary lodgingswere in Hotel Atlantic — and Mayor ArneRettedal was already on hand the first dayto welcome them. The reason for thecelebrity reception was the fact that the sixmembers of the Crump family wereStavanger's first oil immigrants.

Selecting a BaseWork got under way immediately to find abase site. Several alternatives were

investigated, and finally Ed Crump was leftwith two possibilities — Dusavik inStavanger, or Tananger in the municipalityof Sola. Negotiations were held withThomas Ekeberg at Norsco in connectionwith the Tananger alternative, and withSmedvig Tankrederi about Dusavik. EdCrump says that both made good offers, andat one point it looked like it would go in thedirection of Tananger. But Ed Crumphimself preferred Dusavik. After some timehe managed to convince Everett Thrall inOslo to that effect. The proximity toStavanger was the decisive weight in thebalance. The contract included constructionof a base at Dusavik with a quay, office andwarehouse — and Smedvig would providetemporary facilities until the base was built.The temporary office on Verksgataconsisted of two rooms, with Ed Crump inone and Ed O. Seabourn in the other. Ed O.Seabourn had been transferred from Libyato Stavanger as drilling superintendent.

On 8 November1965 StavangerAftenblad informedits readers that thefirst oil explorer andhis family hadarrived in town.That was Alfred"Ed" Crump. Thearticle reportedoptimistically thatthe Phillips Groupwould be ready tostart drilling inSeptember 1966.

17

The Discovery

When the Phillips Group was awarded thethree production licenses, they committedthemselves to drilling five wells in differentstructures - at least one hole of which inblocks covered by the individual license —over a period of six years. In addition, aseismic program was to be carried outduring the same time frame. Naturally, inorder to carry out this drilling program, thegroup needed a drilling rig. During thecourse of 1965 a contract was entered intowith Ocean Drilling and Exploration Co.(ODECO) for the leasing of a drilling rigwhich was to be built for this purpose inNorway. The contract involved a leasingperiod of five years.

The desire to build the rig in Norway wasa result of the Phillips Group's position inthe country. Whereas the other largercompanies had marketing organizations andwere well known, the companies in thePhillips Group were starting out with thehandicap of being new to the territory. (Theexception to this was Fina, established witha sales operation.) Especially within Phillipsit was felt that this was a philosophy thepublic would appreciate. In addition,Norwegian yards were recognized ascapable shipbuilders, so the know-how wasavailable. From a cost standpoint, it wouldbe somewhat more expensive than buildingin other parts of the world, but this wascompensated for by the positive impact ofbuilding the first drilling rig in Norway.This was also a strategy Phillips chose touse in Great Britain, where the company hadthe drilling rig «North Star» built.

On 22 June 1966, half of the hull of thefirst Norwegian-built drilling rig - «OceanViking* — was launched at Rosenberg Verftin Stavanger. The building of the other half

of the hull was subcontracted to Burmeister& Wain in Copenhagen by Aker, who hadbeen awarded the building contract. Thesections were towed to Nylands Verksted inOslo where Aker assembled the rig. Thereit was christened in September 1966.Mary Dunn, wife of Phillips' explorationmanager, Ward W. Dunn, had the honor ofbeing «godmother».

The Phillips Group ExpandsDuring 1966, Phillips and Agip came to theconclusion that the blocks awarded in thisnew exploration area were tooconcentrated. The geologists in the twocompanies felt it would be an advantage tohave greater coverage. As a result ofnegotiations with the so-called PetronordGroup, a deal was made. The PetronordGroup, with Elf as operator, consisted ofseveral French companies and Norsk Hydro.The group had participated in the first

On 22 June 1966Rosenberg Verft(shipyard) inStavanger couldlaunch its firstoil-related product, asection of the hull forwhat would becomethe "Ocean Viking"drilling rig. Aker inOslo was awardedthe contract to buildthe rig, but part ofthe work wassubcontracted toothers.

19

The "Ocean Viking"drilling rig is towedout Oslofjord. "The

good luck rig" on theNorwegian shelf wasowned by ODECO.

Phillips chose tospecify that the rig be

built in Norway aspart of the strategy

to utilize Norwegiangoods and services.

"Ocean Traveler" atDusavik near

Stavanger. This wasthe rig that opened

the drilling for oil inthe North Sea for

Esso in 1966. The rigcame to Stavanger

directly from itsbuilding site in New

Orleans.

concession round and been awarded threelicenses for a total of 12 blocks. The twogroups reached an agreement which entailedthe Petronord Group's obtaining 20 percentof production licenses 016, 017, and 018 —while Phillips and Agip would receive a 20percent total share of the Petronord Group'slicenses.

Esso FirstEsso was the first oil company to startdrilling on the Norwegian continental shelf.The drilling rig «Ocean Traveler* spuddedon block 8/3 on 19 July 1966.

The rig made its maiden voyage from theyard in New Orleans to Stavanger in earlysummer. It attracted an enormous amount ofattention in the latter city - and from theNorwegian authorities. In spite of the factthat the rig was regarded as the mostadvanced one imaginable, Norwegianinspection officials found no fewer than 30

20

shortcomings which had to be remediedbefore the drilling could get under way.During 1966 the rig drilled two wells forEsso. After it finished on block 8/3, with adry well, it drilled on block 25/11. In thiswell traces of hydrocarbons were detected —the first sign that oil and gas might be foundon the Norwegian shelf.

That first drilling season was a toughencounter with the North Sea. It turned outthat the rig had weaknesses that had to becorrected through frequent visits to theyard; the North Sea weather was asinclement as expected. «Ocean Traveler*was the first North Sea rig to sustaindamage — resulting in a four-month halt indrilling. Experience was gained with «OceanTraveler» while «Ocean Viking» was in itscompletion phase at Aker-Nyland in Oslo.A number of the lessons learned led tomodifications on «Ocean Viking», resultingin some delays.

On 17 March 1967 everything was readyonboard «Ocean Viking*. The tow outOslofjord could begin. The first well to bedrilled by the rig would be in the U.K.sector. For a week the rig was enroute insome fairly rough weather - a real maidenvoyage which made the crew firm believersin the fact that drilling in the North Seawould be quite different from drillingonshore - or in the Gulf of Mexico. Thecrew onboard could be divided into twocategories: all technical drilling personnelwere Americans recruited by the rig owners,ODECO, while Norwegians served asroustabouts. And there was keen interestamong Norwegians in joining the oilindustry. When jobs were advertised inStavanger, close to 2,000 hopefuls applied.For both the Americans and the

Norwegians, the work onboard a floatingdrilling rig in the North Sea was a newexperience. Finding out how the varioussystems worked, and getting the job done,was pretty much a matter of trial and error.The drilling superintendent on board, FrankRedford, had never been on a semi-submersible rig.

The first well drilled by «Ocean Viking»provided valuable experience with the rig. Itbecame obvious that the wellhead and someof the tools on board would have to bemodified and made stronger. The equipmentthat functioned in the Gulf of Mexico wasnot suitable for the tough conditions in theNorth Sea. The modifications were carriedout in Stockport, England.

Ready for the Norwegian SectorManagement for the drilling operation on«Ocean Viking» in the U.K. sector waslocated in Stavanger. When the rig gotunder way with the well on block 16/11,Norwegian sector, on 14 July 1967, boththe onshore support functions and thedrilling crew were considerably moreexperienced. The drilling went steadilydown to a depth of 3,023 meters. On 31October the well was abandoned as a dryhole. From block 16/11 — where the riserplatform for the Statpipe line is locatedtoday, «Ocean Viking» moved on to block16/6 where the rig drilled a well forPetronord. That one was dry as well.

Cod Sparks HopeThe Phillips Group's drilling strategy on theNorwegian shelf was two-phased. Naturallythey sought interesting and potentiallycommercial structures, but they had alsorealized the necessity of gaining experiencewith North Sea conditions and drilling atsuch great water depths. Therefore it wasdecided to begin at relatively moderatedepths. On block 16/11 the depth was 72meters.

On 26 February 1968, «Ocean Viking*started drilling on the second well in theNorwegian sector for the Phillips Group —on block 7/11. This was the 10th well to bedrilled on the shelf, and so far only Esso inblock 25/11 had found traces ofhydrocarbons.

ODECO -Oljeboring i NordsjøenFor arbeid på oljeboreplattform trenges både faglærtog ikke faglært arbeidskraft.Arbeidsrytmen vil bli 7 døgn med 12 timers arbeids-dag ute på plattformen og etterfølgende 7 døgn fripå land. — Lønn kr. 32 000,— og oppover, avhengigav kvalifikasjoner.Av arbeidskraft trenges følgende kategorier:ELEKTRIKERE — SVEISEREMOTORMENN (Maskinist)RADIOTELEFONIOPERAT0RER med 2. kl. sertifikatHJELPEARBEIDERESøknad eller personlig henvendelse til ODECO, Gjen-sidiges Hus, Stavanger, Mr. Jastrey.

These twoadvertisements inStavanger Aftenbladin June 1966 inspiredabout 2,000 personsto state their interest.The lure of oilexploration wasgreat — and the rigowner had no troublemanning the "OceanTraveler".

Employmenton Odeco drilling bargeODECO has opportunities for skilled and unskilledpersonnel to work on the oil boring platform. Workschedule will be 7 days on the platform and 7 daysfree ashore. While on the platform employees willwork twelve out of every twenty-four hours. Pay willbe on an hourly basis. In exces of 32 000,— depencingon categorie. Specific categories of workers needed

ELECTRICIANS — WELDERS — MOTORMENLABORERS — SECOND CLASS RADIOMEN "Reply in person or by mail to ODECO, GjensidigesHus, Stavanger. Attention Mr. Jastrey.

21

Work on the drillfloor was hard and

demanding. Newequipment would betried out for the first

time as well.

The Americans onboard «Ocean Viking»felt that 7/11 were lucky numbers. Nowthey were sure to find something. And theywere actually right. The well, which wasdrilled to almost 4,000 meters - the deepestin the Norwegian sector at that time, foundgas and condensate. The condensateconsisted mostly of gas and contained littleoil.

When «Ocean Viking» went off locationin late June 1968, the discovery hadattracted an enormous amount of attention.It was impossible to keep it a secret, and themass media brought out page-one, bold-faceheadlines to let it be known that Norwayhad now become an oil nation.

In a press release dated 24 June, Phillipsattempted to put a damper on expectations.The release stated that traces ofhydrocarbons had been found in the well -traces that were confirmed in testing — butthat additional wells would have to bedrilled in the structure before the scope ofthe discovery could be determined.

The discovery on the structure, whichwas named Cod, generated numerousactivities both within the Phillips Group andon the part of the Norwegian authorities.The Government appointed a specialcommittee - the Cod Committee — whosejob it was to determine what was to be donewith the gas. On their part, Phillips initiateda preliminary study to investigatealternatives for transporting the gas toshore. Engineer Carl C. Anderson was

22. assigned to the task.

Since «Ocean Viking» was to be moved toblock 17/4 to drill a well for the PetronordGroup, «Ocean Traveler* was contracted todrill the second well on the Cod structure.The well, which was completed inmid-October, confirmed the first discovery.This well also contained condensate.

The test results were encouraging — bothwells tested approximately 40 million cubicfeet of gas along with 2,000 barrels ofcondensate per day. As soon as the tests onthe second well were concluded, «OceanTraveler* started drilling on the third Codwell. While this was under way, workcontinued to consider the consequences incase the field should be found commercial.

It was assumed that the daily gasproduction could reach 275 million cubicfeet. Pipeline destinations were England,Sweden/Denmark and Scotland. In addition,studies were begun on the feasibility oflaying a pipeline across the NorwegianTrench. Pipelines of the dimensions inquestion had not previously been laid atsuch great depths.

In late 1968/early 1969, the results from«Ocean Traveler* indicated that the thirdwell was a disappointment. The size of thediscovery was not as great as hoped. Thewell was side-tracked, but this also showedthat the structure was smaller thananticipated. Traces of hydrocarbons werefound, but production characteristics werenot good enough.

During the course of January andFebruary 1969, it became clear that Cod onits own could not be considered commercial.The cost of transportation to shore was toohigh in relation to the size of the discovery.

Despite the disappointments of the thirdCod well, the Government-appointed CodCommittee prepared a recommendation.The committee ascertained that theNorwegian Trench was a hindrance topiping hydrocarbons to Norway, but theyfelt that it was only a matter of years beforepipelaying technology would be able tomanage such ocean depths. The committeealso expected similar progress in the field ofdiving. In 1969 the greatest depth at whichdivers could carry out maintenance workwas 185 meters.

As a result of the committee'srecommendation, Phillips asked theMinistry of Industry to develop guidelinesin political quarters for transportation of

petroleum from the Norwegian shelf. Thiswould make it easier for the companies tomake plans in the case of a commercialdiscovery. The answer they receivedindicated that no advance approval wouldbe given for piping oil or gas from theNorwegian shelf to a foreign country.

Disappointing StatusWhile «Ocean Traveler* was busy withdelineation drilling on Cod, «Ocean Viking*drilled a dry well on block 7/8. After a repairstop in Stavanger, «Ocean Viking» was senton by the Phillips Group to block 8/10. Thiswas a structure which the geologistsconsidered very promising — but once againthe result was negative. It was then decidedto explore a new structure in block 7/11,northeast of the Cod discovery. A discoverythere could be viewed in close associationwith Cod. But in July 1969 it turned out thatthe structure did not contain any trace of oilor gas.

The Phillips Group then took a pause forreflection, while «Ocean Viking» was

subcontracted to Syracuse for drilling onblock 11/10. After 30 exploratory wells onthe Norwegian continental shelf, nocommercial reserves of oil or gas had beenfound. In addition to the discovery on Cod,traces of hydrocarbons had been found insome structures, but on the whole theresults were very disappointing. Several ofthe companies which had been most eagerto get under way with drilling in the virginNorwegian waters of the North Sea wereabout to reevaluate their plans. Only thedrilling obligations tied to the licensing heldthem back.

Three rigs were in activity early in the fallof 1969. Besides «Ocean Viking», Esso had«Glomar Grand Island* in action on block25/10, while Amoco was drilling with«Orion» on block 2/11. «Ocean Traveler* leftthe Norwegian sector for good after havingcompleted the second well for Murphy onblock 2/3. That company had foundhydrocarbons in their first well, but thesecond turned out to be dry.

A total of 32 wells had been drilled on the

This picture from thecontrol roomonboard "OceanTraveler" in manyways epitomizes theway in whichAmericanoil-explorers wereperceived.

23

Norwegian continental shelf by the fall of1969 — including the two about to becompleted by Esso and Amoco. The totalbill came to around 750 million kroner.There were no commercial discoveries there,in contrast to the U.K. sector wherecommercial gas discoveries had been made.As early as 1968, Phillips had signed a salescontract with a British gas company for gasfrom the Hewett field, and the developmentof the discovery and the terminal at Bactonwas under way.

It would appear that the chief geologistwho had said he would drink all the crudeoil found in Norwegian waters was going tosurvive after all.

A noteworthy action was taken in 1968.At that time, Phillips Petroleum CompanyNorway was registered as a U.S.corporation with a branch in Norway. Thenfollowing approval by the Norwegianauthorities, all the rights and obligations inconnection with operator responsibility andlicenses on the Norwegian continental shelfwere transferred from Phillips PetroleumCompany to the branch in Norway.

Slow StartThe mood within Phillips on the Europeanside of the Atlantic — in London, Oslo andStavanger — was still marked by optimism.But at headquarters in Bartlesville,Oklahoma, there were problems. It lookedlike 1969 would be a bad year for thecompany, and this would have to affect theexploration program. There was particularlyskepticism toward such a high-risk area asthe Norwegian sector of the North Sea. Atthe time, CJ. «Pete» Silas was head ofPhillips' Europe-Africa operationsheadquartered in London. He can recall thathe was in daily telephone contact withBartlesville, and the message was quite clear:Don't drill any more wells.

In their concession application in 1965,the geologists had given block 2/4 tenthpriority. Now they wanted to try their luckthere. The seismic data showed a largestructure which had been pressed upwardby salt. In the middle of it, however, thereappeared to be a collapsed area, but thestructure was large enough for a discoveryto be commercial. On 29 July 1969, OwenThomas had the task of presenting the

2.4 drilling program for 2/4-1 to Phillips

management. Cost estimates were set atapproximately 1.3 million dollars and hadbeen prepared by T.J. «Ed» Jobin, thenmanager of Phillips' operations in Norway.

Based on the company's economicoutlook and the poor exploration results inNorwegian waters, the well received athumbs-down vote. The Phillips group hadnot met its drilling obligation under theconcession license awarded in 1965 - onewell remained to be drilled, but there wasplenty of time before the six-year period ranout. The last well could be drilled later.

The message from Bartlesville was clear:Find interested companies who can sublease«Ocean Viking».

Efforts got under way immediately toaccomplish this goal, but it was easier saidthan done. It is true that Shell consideredusing «Ocean Viking» on a block 1/6 well,but in the end the company decided not todrill. Esso also considered the rig for apossible new attempt, but the results from«Glomar Grand Island*, drilling on 25/10,were not encouraging. A final negativereply came from Esso on 13 August.

It was not possible to sublease — nobodywas interested in making new tries. ThePhillips Group's contract with ODECO,owner of «Ocean Viking», was still in effect,so the companies had to pay daily chargeswhether it was drilling wells or not. Withthis as his trump card, Owen Thomas madeanother attempt to sway Phillipsmanagement toward approving the drillingprogram for 2/4-1.

As long as subleasing was impossible, therig had to be paid for. The only extraexpenses involved would be those of thedrilling operation itself.

This time the drilling program wasapproved — by the partners as well.

Well 2/4-1On 21 August 1969 «Ocean Viking*spudded on block 2/4. The first phase of thedrilling went very well. After eight days adepth of 1,335 meters had been reached.Some traces of gas were noted, buteverything was under control and thedrilling continued. Two days later the drillbit had reached 1,662 meters — thensuddenly things came to a halt. The drill bithad encountered a gas pocket, the weight ofthe drilling mud pumped down to counterthe gas pressure became too great, and the

The needle on the gasdetector moved outbeyond the scalewhen the drill bit from"Ocean Viking" hadreached a depth ofmore than 1,600meters. This was thefirst indication of theEkofisk field.However, drilling onthe first well had tobe interrupted, and"Ocean Viking" wasmoved about 1,000meters to make anew attempt in block2/4.

mud disappeared into the formation. Thenormal circulation of drilling mud had beenlost. Max F. Melli was Phillips' geologistduring the drilling. He recalls that it was justunder the 900-meter mark when heavyhydrocarbons and traces of oil were noticed,but what happened at 1,662 meters wastotally unexpected: «I was sitting by the gasdetector instruments. It must have been justafter midnight. All of a sudden I noticed thatthe gas detector needle was moving sharplyto the right, showing a sudden increase inthe gas which was dispersed in the mud. Theneedle continued beyond the measurementsshown on the scale. I couldn't believe myown eyes, so I went out of the office andover to the shale shaker for drilling mud tocheck it out. Eddie Seabourn, the platformsupervisor, was already there. He lookedpale and worried. A young Norwegianroustabout was there with him. Oil mixedwith gas and drilling mud came up. I wasactually supposed to have taken a samplefrom this interval to check out theformation. Instead I found a bucket which I

filled up with oil. I had never seen oil pourout of a shale shaker before!»

Ed Seabourn recalls the same episodevery well: The drilling went smoothly downto over 1200 meters. There the drill bit hitgas. Late at night on 30 August, DrillingSupervisor Jerry Winget on «Ocean Viking»called Ed Crump at home in Stavanger andtold him that gas was bubbling up on theoutside of the riser. The divers reported thatthe gas came up between the 13 3/8-inchand 20-inch casings.

When Ed Seabourn came out to the rigthe next day, he suggested that the couplingon the 20-inch casing be redone in order tobring the gas to the surface — and thus checkit. Cement was poured around and in thespace between the two casings, therebystopping the leakage. The drill string waspulled up, and on 3 September the drill bitwas out of the hole. Once again the drillstring was lowered into the well, anddrilling continued down to 1,686 meters.

On 7 September there was another kick.Heavier drilling mud took care of it, but 25

Exploration onboard"Ocean Viking" wasfollowed with greatattentiveness — not

least by theNorwegian political

authorities. HerePrime Minister PerBorten pays a visit

and is givenorientation as to the

work on the drillfloor.

The Phillips Group'sfirst well in

Norwegian waterswas in block 16/11.

It was followed bythree wells on block

7/11 (Cod), one welleach in blocks 7/8and 81"10, before a

second effort wasmade in 7117. Then

came block 2/4 —Ekofisk.

circulation of the drilling mud was lost. Thedrill string was pulled up to 1,037 metersbefore proper circulation was resumed.

Ed Seabourn felt that at that point hecould say there had to be something bigdown there, and he jotted down a report tothe office in Stavanger: «I can cover theNorth Sea from here to the North Pole withoil.*

He also called Ed Crump at home at 1:30in the morning and asked if he was awake.

«Yes!» came the reply.«OK, then sit down!»«I'm sitting.*«Crump, I have oil all over the North Sea,

but the well is under control. We're at theproblem depth of 5,530 feet, and I haveplenty of oil samples that I'm bringingonshore!*

But even though the well was undercontrol, there were problems to resolve.Time and time again the circulation of thedrilling mud was lost as attempts were madeto drill deeper. During the following daysaboard «Ocean Viking», mud was mixed at ahectic pace, but every time they thoughtthey had found the right mud weight forkeeping the gas under control, the muddisappeared into the formation again andcirculation was lost.

The bill for the drilling mud alone wasrapidly approaching one million Norwegiankroner (1969 value). The decision to

26

abandon the well was not made easily, but ithad to be done in the end.

Well 2/4-1 was cemented tight on 15September 1969. The results were prettylean since it had not been possible to runtests - or bring up core samples. Theobjective with this well had been threefold.First the Phillips Group wanted to explorethe Miocene layer where Murphy Oil hadfound traces of gas in well 2/3-1, Eocenewhere Shell had found traces of oil in well1/3, and Upper Paleocene where the gasdeposits on Cod had been found. Inaddition, there was interest in the Danianformation where there had also been tracesof hydrocarbons on Cod, and UpperCretaceous where Shell had found traces ofcondensate and gas in well 1/3-1.

Furthermore, gas condensate had beenfound in the Upper Cretaceous layer in theDutch sector.

Well 2/4-1 had been planned to a depthof 3,355 meters.

Ekofisk Well 2/4-2As early as 11 September, Ed Jobin, head ofPhillips in Norway, had flown to Brussels tomeet the head of the company'sinternational operation, Edwin Van denBark. Financing was on the agenda. A new

well would have to be drilled instead of thediscontinued 2/4-1. Ed Jobin took along toBrussels a bottle of the oil that Max Mellihad collected on «Ocean Viking». The oilsample convinced Van den Bark that a newwell was justified. The other companies inthe Phillips Group were convinced as well.

It was decided that the second wellshould be drilled only 1,000 meters awayfrom the first one. «Ocean Viking» wasmoved — and on 18 September the new wellwas spudded.

The first few days everything wentsmoothly. The 20-inch casing was set on22 September at a depth of 581 meters —deeper than usual. While this was going on,the wind picked up, and the rig was movingabout in the waves. The eighth anchor cameloose, and «Ocean Viking» came out ofposition. The weather finally calmed downon 30 September, and the work could be

resumed. The 20-inch coupling had to bedone over again before drilling could berestarted.

The next day they expected to reach theMiocene formation which had stopped thedrilling operation on the first well. The drillbit hit grey-blue clay instead, but testsshowed that there was 4-5% gas in theformations.

During the days that followed, thedrilling went well. Some kicks occurred,indicating gas pockets, but they were easilycontrolled. The drill bit reached 1,600meters without any sign of oil. Thus thedrilling had penetrated the same formationas in the first well, and no oil had beenfound. Disappointment was felt throughoutthe rig.

Nevertheless the work had to continue,and up until 25 October it went accordingto routine. The samples taken showed that

The drill floor crewis in the process ofcarrying out a"round-trip": thedrill bit will bedrawn up andlowered again andthe drill string hungup in the derrick.Over 3,000 meters ofdrill siring can bepulled and loweredon a "trip" like this.

27

The equipment usedin the drilling

operation is of properdimensions. Despitethe help of winches

and cranes, it was alot of work for the

28

the bit was moving through layers uponlayers of clay-shale and dolomite containingsand. Gas was found, and the weight of thedrilling mud was gradually increased tomaintain control.

On 25 October the gas volume increasedsharply, and core samples taken showed thatthe bit had entered chalk. At a depth of3,081 meters, the chalk samples showed oilcontent. A reservoir had been penetrated.The drill bit moved carefully downwardwhile samples were taken all along the way:there continued to be oil in the chalk, andthe gas volume was increasing.

On 28 October the drill bit reached 3,169meters — and circulation of the drilling mudwas lost. The drill string was pulled whileevery effort was being made to recovercirculation. At that point the weatherentered into the picture, and the excitingdrilling had to be delayed for several days.Schlumberger, the well service company,started logging the well on 31 October, andthey were able to work a couple of dayswith just brief interruptions due to theweather.

On 6 November drilling could beresumed, and four days later — at a depth of3,192 meters - preparations were made for afirst production test. Initially it appeared togo smoothly, but then the equipment brokedown. Leakage in a valve could not bestopped. The second and third tries werealso unsuccessful. The equipmentbreakdown combined with constantinterruptions due to the weather made thework difficult, but finally on 18 and 19November the fourth test could be carriedout — but without perfectly clear results.

Drilling was resumed on 21 November,and seven days later samples showed thatthe drill bit had passed through thereservoir. New rounds of logging remainedto be carried out.

From 25 October to the time drillingthrough the reservoir had been completed,daily coded messages were sent from«Ocean Viking» to the Stavanger office —and Ed Crump. The message was: «We arestill in it.» Ed Crump's answer came loud andclear: «That's too bad!» The coded messageswere sent so that competing companieswould not understand what was going on.

Max F. Melli was the geologist on«Ocean Viking* during the drilling of thesecond well also. He summarizes the

situation like this: «Again we saw signs of oilwhen the drill bit went deeper than 900meters, but we did not find the oil reservesthat we had in the first well when we drilledcarefully through the same geological zone.The drill bit ate its way down — deeper anddeeper - and suddenly at about 3,050meters we hit a big gas pocket andexperienced a powerful kick. The gasdetector needle continued once more out tothe right past the instrument scale — and toour great surprise we started gettingsamples of chalk saturated with oil. The oilgave off a light golden sheen — almosttransparent, like gold. To me it looked as ifwe had discovered a huge treasure of gold.The American astronauts had just landed onthe moon, and I remember that Ed Seabournexclaimed: «What the astronauts have doneis great, but how about this?»

Storm Stops «Ocean Viking«While Schlumberger was working on thelogging, one of the North Sea's famouswinter storms struck. Attempts were madeto continue the logging. On the cellar deckroustabouts stood ready to bring up theriser for drilling mud as soon asSchlumberger was finished. Wave heightwas on the increase — getting close to 10meters, and the slip joint for the riser wasgoing up and down like a yo-yo. Two10-ton weights which were supposed tokeep the riser in the right position werebehaving similarly.

Wave height kept increasing and wasapproaching 15 meters. The logging was

The weather gods —represented here byKing Neptune — wereconstantly calling thedrilling operation toa halt. WOW is anexpression oftenfound on the pages ofthe rigs' logbooks:waiting on theweather.

stopped, and the equipment was pulled outof the bore hole. The task of bringing up theriser was about to get under way - but thenan anchor lost its hold in the sea floor. Thentwo other anchors came loose. «OceanViking» was drifting away from the borehole. The riser for drilling mud started toheel, but it continued to move up and down.The 10-ton weights were pulled up againsttwo big steel beams, the result being thatone of them was jammed into the beams —and became stuck. The wire was worn loose.The same thing happened with the otherweight — the only difference being that thisone disappeared into the sea. With it theriser also disappeared into the waves.

There was a howling and a whiningcoming from all the equipment on the cellardeck. The guide wire on the guide framealso went into the sea - and two big drumswhich had been welded to the deck weretorn loose with such a force that they flew8-10 meters through the air beforedisappearing.

The following night was even rougher.The sea beat against the underside of the rig,which had 140 tons of drill pipe hangingfrom the derrick. This combined with thefact that two of the three remaining anchorswere lying under the rig and pulling it

downward made the crew afraid that thewhole vessel would capsize. As a result, assoon as it was daylight several of the crewmembers were evacuated by helicopter.

But the weather began to calm, and laterin the day the rig was out of danger.Tugboats were used to reposition «OceanViking» over the well. That job took almosta week. Once back in position, the workcould begin to save the equipment whichhad fallen overboard. With the help ofdivers the outcome was successful. It turnedout that the riser had not been broken, butonly pressed together. Thus the drillingmud had not been washed out of the hole.

It was the 7th of December by the time«Ocean Viking» was back in position. Hecticdiver activity followed to get things back inworking order again. A rather dejectedcomment in the daily report on 12December stated that, up to that point, ithad taken 32 dives to carry out thesalvaging operation. It was 16 Decemberbefore work could be resumed on the well.After having circulated the drilling mud,Schlumberger was able to resume work onthe logging — before work to secure the wellgot under way.

It became clear that weather conditionswere such that further testing was not 29

At the end ofJanuary 1970, the

crew on "OceanViking" began

drilling the firstappraisal well on the

Ekofisk field. Well2/4-3 became thefirst that could beproperly tested —

with veryencouraging results.

30

justifiable - and even the job of securing thewell was greatly delayed because of theweather. Even so, by Christmas 1969everything was finished — and around noonon Christmas Day «Ocean Viking* wastowed toward calmer waters in the Britishsector.

How Large Was the Discovery?Since the weather had put a stop to furthertests, the information available was limited.In addition to the single test which had beencarried out, seven core samples had beenbrought up from the reservoir interval.These samples were sent onshore foranalysis.

One negative aspect in the whole picturewas that the discovery had been made in achalk reservoir. The larger discoveries of oil

and gas elsewhere in the world had hithertobeen made primarily in sandstone.

In Norway rumors began to circulate inthe fall of 1969. Both Stavanger Aftenbladand Aftenposten informed their readers thatPhillips had struck «something» whiledrilling on block 2/4. An article inAftenposten on 28 October stated that, atthat point in time, it was not possible to saywhether this «something» was large or small,whether it was gas or oil or both — orwhether it would prove to meet allexpectations or just be a passing dream.Phillips' spokesman Ward W. Dunncommented somewhat tersely to thenewspaper that it wasn't easy to tell whatmight be in a wellbore until the drilling hadbeen completed!

Somewhat wiser, the same Ward W.

Dunn reported on the well to Owen D.Thomas in Bartlesville on New Year's Eve1969. Results from the fourth test produced1,071 barrels of oil during a six-hour periodwith a choke opening of 34/64 inches. Thetest also showed a gas stream of 5.9 millionstandard cubic feet — without anyproduction of water. But since theequipment did not properly separate oil andgas, considerable amounts of oil were mixedwith the gas, thus yielding less than accurateresults.

In the report, reference was also made tothe fact that the reservoir was located inapproximately 153 meters of fractured chalkin two zones. The porosity of the two mainintervals of fractured oil-bearing chalk was30 percent on the average.

In addition to the results from the wellitself, there was also seismic with which tocompare the information. The seismic datashowed reflections of a structure which fromthe top of the Danian formation was about244 meters thick, and the delineated faultscaused the size of the area to be estimated at49 square kilometers. But the seismic dataalso indicated that at the top of the structurethere was an indentation or a big block ofthe structure which had collapsed. Thesecond well was drilled 1,006 meterssouth/southeast of the first one. Both wellswere drilled on the west side of thestructure, and it was clear that in order todetermine the exact size of the reservoir itwould be necessary to drill delineationwells.

Based on the limited data available — thesize of the structure, the extent andthickness of the oil-bearing layers, plus theresults from the core samples - Edwin Vanden Bark and Silvio Eha calculated that thefield could contain the enormous amount of2.7 billion barrels of oil, in terms ofrecoverable amounts, that is. The figureindicated a giant of a field.

EkofiskThe discovery had already been given aname — Ekofisk. The background for thisname, which is something of a linguisticanomaly, is this: Right from the start,Phillips had used letters to identify thevarious exploration areas on the Norwegianshelf. This was done in order to group theblocks geographically and make it easier toidentify them. It started with A-blocks,

B-blocks, etc. The idea was to call the fieldsby the names of types of fish. When thediscovery was made in exploration area «C»,it was easy to find the name of a fish tocorrespond — Cod. But what fish had a namethat began with E? Eel had already beenused on a structure on block 2/7. EarlWalters at Phillips' London office suggestedEkofisk, and no one objected. So Ekofisk itwas — even though it should have beenspelled Ekkofisk in Norwegian, or Echofishin English. Confusion as to the correct namesoon arose, and in reports, letters,newspaper articles — yes, even inparliamentary papers from the early days,the three different spellings were usedinterchangeably.

On 28 October 1969Stavanger Aftenbladtold its readers abouta new gas and oildiscovery by thePhillips Group, butPhillips' spokesmanWard W. Dunnpointed out that 2-3weeks of drillingremained before theresults would becertain.

31

Maiden Days aboard«Ocean Viking»

Ingvar Bj0rnevik lefta safe work site

onshore to give oilexploration a try in1967. Twenty-oneyears later he is a

security officer at theEkofisk Complex.

32

In 1988 Ingvar Bj0rnevik is working as a safetyofficer for Phillips at Ekofisk. He has been out onthe field since day one — at least. Here is anaccount of his impressions from his firstencounter with the oil business — and «OceanViking».

«It all began in November 1966. A friend ofmine, Egil Edvardsen, told me that he had beendown inquiring about a job with the oilcompany ODECO. Egil was a first mate. He hadsailed in international waters for a number ofyears and was beginning to tire of life at sea. Thetime was ripe for trying something new, and hehad already sent in his application to ODECO.

«He wasn't the only one. The day afterODECO had advertised in Stavangernewspapers to sign on a crew for 'OceanTraveler', the line of hopefuls outside the officein Ankerbygget reached almost all the wayaround the building. There was no question ofan interview at the outset; the office staff hadmore than enough to do with stencilingapplication forms for the horde. Whether it wasthe lure of adventure, the work routine, or theprospect of the 32,000 kroner annual salary thatattracted most is hard to say; but roughly twothousand applications came in!

«Egil was an optimist just the same, and hesuggested that I send in an application too. Wecould, of course, try to get on the same platform,as ODECO was now under way withconstruction of a new drilling rig in Oslo —'Ocean Viking'.

«At that time I was working at Kvernelands

Fabrikker in Klepp. It was a good place to work.The pay was good, and I was happy there. Ofcourse, I had read in the newspapers about'Ocean Viking' which would be drilling for oil inthe North Sea, and I also knew that there were acouple thousand applicants for the jobs onboard.

«'Well/1 thought, 'it doesn't cost anything tosend in an application.' So I did — well aware thatmy chances were slim.

«But then after I had sent in my application, Ibegan to develop an appetite for it. Landing thisjob became something of a sport. As often as Ihad opportunity, I would drop by the ODECOoffice to hear if there was any news.

«One day in December 19661 went by theoffice. While I was sitting there, all ears, Ihappened to overhear a conversation betweenJohn Jastry, office manager, and someone whohad already gotten a job aboard 'Ocean Viking'.The latter had come to let them know that hewas unfortunately unable to take the job afterall. Before he was out the door, I had alreadystepped forward. Couldn't I take over that job?

«One week later I was asked to report in tothe office again. There I was introduced to theplatform superintendent, Tom Rees. HisNorwegian was approximately on a level withmy English - and I honestly didn't know a singleword! John Jastry had a Norwegian wife, so hewas able to serve as our interpreter. I was askedthree questions:

'Can you work over Christmas?''Can you work over New Year's?''Can you work 12-24-36-48 hours without

sleep?'I answered in the affirmative: 'Yes.'The job was mine*.

To Oslo«The pay was the same as at Kverneland,NOKl2.50/hour. The twelve-hour workday for7 days, followed by 7 days off, was prettyattractive. My workday was already 12 hours, atleast if you include travel time to and from work.But the real reason? This thing that Egil hadgotten me into was something new and exciting.You can call it the lure of adventure.

«On the 2nd of February 1967, there were a

couple dozen of us spanking new oil workersboarding the morning plane to Oslo. Weweren't exactly bursting with confidence as westood down on the quay at Nylands Mek.Verksted and looked up at that giant towering40-50 meters over us. It didn't get any betterwhen we came on board and looked down. Thetraining ship 'Christian Radich' lay next to us,and when the boys climbed to the top of themasts we stood and looked down at them.

«Well now. We weren't given much time tophilosophize about such things. There it wassimply a matter of putting on your coverall; theywanted value for their money. My first jobconsisted of stacking drilling equipment alongthe wall of the mud room with Einar 'Oil Fever'Olsen, and after that it was one thing afteranother. We may have been lacking inexperience, but we weren't short on bosses: forall practical purposes, we regarded everyonewho spoke English as our boss. We could haveas many as twenty different jobs a day, andfinished none of them. As soon as we wereunder way with a new job, one of theseEnglish-speakers came and gave us a new one,and so we went back and forth between theAmericans. It should come as a surprise to noone that we were pretty frustrated by the end ofthe first week. But the job was not very secure —if you hoped to hold on to it you just had tokeep your mouth shut and do as you were told.Many times it was hard to keep it up — thegeneral impression was that everything was tobe done 'the hard way'.

«There is no getting around the fact that therewere language problems. At least 2/3 of the

crew had great difficulty understanding theAmericans and their various dialects. In addition,everything was new to us; every single littleitem had a name we had never heard before.One day when I was doing a job on the deck,one of the Americans came and asked me to geta 'chain tong'. To me it sounded as if we weregoing to have Chinese food for lunch — so I justsaid, 'Yes', and continued with what I was doing.'Run,' he yelled; and then I understood that wewouldn't be having Chinese food for lunch afterall Gradually we began to grasp the factthat many of the Americans were just as lost andfrustrated as we were — they didn't have anyexperience either when it came to drilling at sea.Thus the watchword for everyone became: Lookbusy! And there's no question but that thiswatchword sometimes led to a bit of comedy.One day when Egil and I were having troublelooking busy, an idea occurred to us. We found asuitable crate and nailed a couple of boards to itso that it functioned as a stretcher. Down on thecellar deck lay a big junk heap, arid we startedmoving it up to the pipe deck. It took us twobusy days to cart up all the trash. It took us justas long to return the junk to the cellar deck. Wegot a lot of praise for that job. . ..»

Out to Sea«But, of course, for the most part we worked onsensible things. In mid-March both the pipedecks were full of drill pipes and casing, andtowout day for 'Ocean Viking' was drawingnear. We were really to have gone home for ourtime off the day after towout, but it was decidedthat the crew on board at the time should comealong on the trip over to the U.K. side, where

The sailing ship"Christian Radich"became small next to"Ocean Viking" inOslo's harbor. Thedimensions were theNorwegian crew'sfirst overwhelmingencounter with theoil rig. In thebackground is Oslo'scity hall.

33

3 - Giant Discovery

Casings are hoistedfrom the pipe deck

and into the drillingderrick for setting in

the well.

Compared withdrilling rigs of the

1980's, "OceanViking" seems

extremely slight ofstature. But when it

started drilling forthe Phillips Group in

1967 it wasadvanced for thetechnology of the

day.

34

the first hole was to be drilled. That, of course,was not part of our plan.

«On March 17 towout began out Oslofjord,and at Oscarsborg we nearly ended up on therocks along the shore, thanks to the strong tide.'Blucher'3 and 'Ocean Viking' side by side - thatwould have been quite a sight!

«It took us a week to make the journey acrossto the U.K. side, without any problems worthmentioning along the way. The days were spentpainting and getting the rig ready for drilling.The Americans soon discovered that drilling foroil in the North Sea would be something quitedifferent from what they were used to on theTexas panhandle and thereabouts. A storm blewup, and we had to soak the tablecloths before weate. We saw only the smokestacks on thetugboats above the waves; they really shouldhave been paid divers' wages for that trip. So wecan safely say that 'Ocean Viking' had a goodwashing on her maiden voyage.

«Finally we arrived at the drilling site, andthen it was a matter of getting the anchor hauledin. I wouldn't try to hide the fact that we had anumber of problems, as could well be expected.This was the first time, both for 'Ocean Viking'and for the crew. But at last we were on location,and now we could get under way with what wehad all been itching to start doing: drilling foroil! This was to be a test well in the broadestsense of the term. All the equipment we had on

board was new, and finding out how it workedwas partly a matter of trial and error. The safetyvalve, for example, was a monster 6-7 metershigh and weighing about 40 tons. No one hadseen a safety valve of those dimensions before —and it really wasn't so strange that our bosseslay flat out on the deck and studied the drawings

to find out how it worked. But they had years ofexperience in drilling — and their job on the deck,that they could do. Of course, the problem wasthat quite a bit of the equipment had to go downto the sea floor, from a platform that almostnever lay still.

«We in the roustabout gang were pushedextremely hard at times, but they certainly had atough time up on the drill floor, too. To be sure,we cursed the roughnecks up there every sooften when they hosed down the drill floor andwe who were working below got the spill waterover us. But the job they did brought themrespect — especially, perhaps, when they wereinvolved with a so-called 'round trip'. That is,they pull up the drill string and send it downagain on one and the same shift; or, a length ofpipe of, for example, 3500 meters has to comeout of the well and go back again in 12 hours'time. It wasn't a rare occurrence that the sameshift could have three-four round trips, one afterthe other - with all the yelling and complainingthat went with it.

«After a trip like that, the roughnecks lookedlike walking clay men, on account of all thedrilling mud that had sprayed over them.Putting it mildly, it had to have been a nasty jobstanding there in all kinds of weather,particularly during winter, with their clothessoaked with drilling mud. Better equipment hasprobably made work on the drill floor somewhateasier today, but the weather, the pipes and thedrilling mud are still the same as before.

«One of the drillers, a giant of a Canadian, hadfour roughnecks on his shift. He was quite aslavedriver, and blew his top at them all the timefor not doing a good enough job. They went atit like wild animals, but all the same he wouldnormally fire his whole crew three-four timesduring the course of a good day. After the shift,when everything had calmed down a bit, one ofthose who had been 'fired' would ask:

'Elmer, don't we have our jobs anymore?''Yes, you do - just forget about it,' Elmer

would reply. And, to be perfectly fair, he did thework of four men himself. That's the way it wasacross the board — the Americans definitelydidn't go easy on themselves. One expressionthat recurred was, 'You can take the firstchopper in.' That was an expression theAmericans had brought with them from 'overthere', and it was synonymous with 'You'refired.' They didn't take it so seriously themselves— there were enough jobs for them on the Gulfof Mexico. For us it was a little different to get amessage like that; jobs didn't grow on trees atthat time in our homeland of Norway — eventhough a poor job performance wasn't alwaysthe reason for someone's being fired. A person's

face could just as easily be the determiningfactor.

«We can safely say that, for us roustabouts,the rest of that maiden voyage was spent for themost part on the cellar deck. From Fridaymorning to Monday noon we were allowed atotal of four hours' sleep. As Sunday drew to aclose, somebody tossed out a suggestion thatmaybe we could go to bed for a while. Theanswer was a slightly astonished: 'Why? You'regoing home tomorrow!' The next dayeventually dawned, and we were squeezeddown to the last second. You see, there was nochance of leaving work before your respectivereplacement had shown up, on deck and in hiscoverall! This style continued unchanged formany years — only a very few times, if the bosswas in an extra good mood, were we allowed togo and get washed 20 minutes before thehelicopter arrived.

«The first helicopter trip to Teesside was alsoa little adventure in itself. We flew with aBristow helicopter that had previously been inmilitary service. On the trip out to 'OceanViking' the door had fallen out, so when Iboarded the helicopter I said to myself onceagain, 'Good God, Ingvar, how is this going toturn out?'

«We were seated on benches running alongthe sides, and the baggage was placed just insidethe open doorway. Since I sat closest, I was toldby the pilot (there was only one pilot back then)to press hard with both my feet on the luggageso it wouldn't start flying on its own! Therewasn't any luggage compartment on thosemachines. It turned out to be an airy trip,literally speaking - even though much of thefresh air was replaced by exhaust from themotor. Finally we were able to blow off steamon board a chartered plane from Teesside, and inspite of everything it was a merry crew thatlanded at Sola after 24 'maiden' days on 'OceanViking'.»

Hats and coats werethe attire for thehelicopter trip toshore at the end ofthe 1960's. Todaythat attire would beconsidered"madness" for thetravel in question.

35

A Giant Oil Discovery

Testing of thediscovery is finally

under way onboard"Ocean Viking".

The flame announcesthat the test is goingwell, and the smoke

indicates what isdown in the

reservoir: whitesmoke (or gas andblack for crude oil.This picture, taken

by Leif Hauge from asupply boat, made asplash in the media,

illustrating thediscovery of the

Ekofisk reservoir.

36

While «Ocean Viking* was leaving thediscovery well at Ekofisk during Christmasweekend of 1969, Phillips and the PhillipsGroup were working on the many questionsraised by the discovery. Analyses weredone based on the tests and results whichthe discovery well provided. Seismic studieswere made — but it would take several wellson the Ekofisk structure to provide answersas to the size of the discovery. Eventualtests on these wells could then yield furtheranswers regarding the productioncharacteristics of the chalk reservoir.

The Phillips Group decided to drill thefirst delineation well on the east side of theEkofisk structure. «Ocean Viking» returnedfrom the British sector during the last half ofJanuary - and on January 27 the drilling gotunder way on 2/4-3.

With the experience gained from the firsttwo wells on the structure, the drilling wentquite smoothly, and on April 3 they had

reached total depth — 3,342 meters. On theway down, 18 core samples were taken fromvarying depths, and a comprehensivelogging program was carried out. FromApril until the well was abandoned at theend of May, 10 production tests werecarried out from various intervals in thereservoir. The results were veryencouraging, and the assurance of a giganticoil discovery began to grow. What madethe discovery unique was that, for the firsttime since the drilling began in the NorthSea, oil had been found — not just gas andcondensate as had been the case earlier inthe U.K. sector and on Cod.

The tests made during the drilling werecontinually sent off for analysis. In a reportdated June 8, Core Laboratories in Englandconcluded that Ekofisk contained between4,214 and 6,904 billion barrels of oil with arecovery percentage of between 15 and 22.Based on the test results from 2/4-3,

Corelab allowed for a daily oil productionrate from each well of between 8,000 and10,000 barrels. Another important item inthe report from Corelab was the question asto whether there might be oil in a westernextension of the Ekofisk structure. Thisextension could be connected to the mainstructure, and in that case the field would beeven larger. When the next delineationwell — 2/4-4 — was begun far south on thestructure on 2 June 1970, the Phillips Grouphad decided to explore the West Ekofiskstructure as well.

In a press release dated 2 June 1970,Phillips announced for the first timethat Ekofisk could be a giant oil field. Theterm giant is used for particularly largefields. Another confirmation of the size ofthe field was available when «Ocean Viking*was finished with 2/4-4 at the beginning ofAugust.

The well showed less reservoir thicknessthan the first three drillings, but this wasanticipated based on the far south location.The last delineation well - 2/4-5 — wasdrilled parallel with 2/4-4 by the French rig«Neptune 7», far north on Ekofisk. This well,too, became another confirmation.

«The Alaska of Europe»Ever since «Ocean Traveler* had droppedanchor in Stavanger's harbor in the summerof 1966, the drilling in the North Sea hadbeen followed closely by the Norwegianmass media.

The discovery of Cod in 1968 broughtabout even closer news coverage, andthrough the media the Norwegian peoplewere educated in the basic facts aboutdrilling for oil. The disappointment wasgreat when it turned out that Cod was notcommercial. Bold-type headlines had beenbrought out when reports of this discoverybegan to leak out. Having learned the hardway, the newspapers were more cautiouswhen in September 1969 rumors started tofly about another gas discovery. StavangerAflenblad was the first one out with thenews on September 5. Aftenposten and theother news media followed the next day,but they went along with the commentsfrom the companies and the authorities tothe effect that it was still too soon to sayanything, since drilling had only been underway for three weeks on block 2/4.

At the end of October rumors started tofly again, and Phillips' Ward W. Dunn wasspeaking in somewhat guarded terms whenhe told the journalists and other interestedparties that something was happening outthere in the ocean, in the middle of theNorth Sea.

In November the Oil and Gas Journalfollowed up with assumptions based on«Norwegian sources*. The article said thatthe Ekofisk discovery was the size of Cod,had been discovered in a sandstonereservoir at 5500 feet (1666 meters) andcontained 300 million barrels of heavy crudeoil. Pure guesswork, in other words. At theend of November Phillips was able toconfirm that they had struck oil, but thattesting remained. Only after that had beendone could anything more concrete be saidabout the discovery.

During the winter and spring of 1970, therumors increased about the discovery in theNorth Sea. Phillips, on their part, tried theirhand with a cautious press release on 24March in which they merely stated that Codand Ekofisk together indicated the existenceof a new petroleum province in thosewaters. One month later the company wasmore concrete, reporting that the test resultfrom 2/4-3 showed a production rate of asmuch as 2000 barrels of oil per day — oil

«They say that oilhas been found in theNorth Sea,» was thecaption for thiscaricature in theLondon Daily Mailon 29 April 1970.The Ekofiskdiscovery was thefirst oil find in theNorth Sea — and itssignificance wasequally preat for theactivity in the Britishand Norwegiansectors.

37

with a low sulphur content. The pressrelease was kept in an optimistic tonebecause reservoir thickness was great — andsince the seismic maps showed a largestructure.

The press release from Phillips was sentout the day before the company's annualmeeting — and it caused the Norwegianmass media to bring out those boldheadlines again. Aftenposten could tell itsreaders that «Norway's territory (is) best inthe North Sea.«

The Norwegian authorities continued tomaintain a low profile in relation to thediscovery and refrained from furthercomments. The fact that there wasuncertainty as to the consequences is shownin a note introduced by Minister of IndustrySverre Walther Rostoft during agovernmental conference on 14 May. Therethe cabinet minister wrote that neither theministry nor Phillips had the necessary basisfor forming any certain conclusion withregard to the size of the discovery, theamounts which could be recovered and thusthe discovery's significance in commercialterms. «However, the ministry views thediscovery optimistically and hopes theestimates as to its commercial nature willprove to be correct.*

At the same time as this officialNorwegian view came out, one of thecompanies in the Phillips Group — BelgianPetrofina — jumped the gun with a«declaration of commerciality». Thecompany's chairman of the board, L.B.Welters, announced at the annual meetingon 14 May that Ekofisk contained severalhundred million tons of crude oil of veryfine quality. Confronted with the officialNorwegian view, Wolters said toAftenposten that the preliminary resultsavailable from drilling on Ekofisk weresufficient for him to believe that the fieldcould be produced.

The statement caused stocks in NorskHydro, part of the Petronord group and

On 5 September7969, StavangerAftenblad could

inform its readersthat Phillips had

made anotherdiscovery — in block

2/4 in thesouthernmost part of

the North Sea.

therefore a shareholder in Ekofisk, to rise by15 kroner on the Oslo B0rs (stockexchange).

One newspaper stated in its headline that«Ekofisk (is) big as first Alaskan discovery*and concluded the article with: «One hardlydares to draw the parallels with Alaska anyfurther.*

Norway Prepares for the Oil Age«As a guideline for the amount of incomeNorway will receive in the eventuality of acommercial Ekofisk field, the ministry willmention that the calculations which havebeen made — based on the information theministry has at this writing — show thatincome will probably lie between 100 and500 million kroner per year over a 20-30year period. The sum is an average figure,and will be considerably lower to beginwith, in that from the time production getsunder way, a royalty of 10 percent on thegross value of the recovered products at theproduction site will be received until theoperation yields a profit. Thereafter acombined tax of about 45 percent on theoperator's profit will also come in.» Thisquote from Stortingsmelding (parliamentaryreport) no. 95 (1969-70) heralded the factthat the oil income's significance had a directimpact on the Storting and Norwegianpolitics.

The Storting report, which wascompleted 12 June 1970, was the first onewhich specified anticipated oil income. Theneed for reserve continued with regard tothe size and production level of the field,since drilling of the delineation wells hadnot been completed. But the awareness thatNorway was in the process of becoming anoil-producing nation kept growing.

The following year this became a reality,and in a more thorough and inclusiveStorting report from the Ministry ofIndustry it was pointed out that peakproduction from Ekofisk could presumablyreach approximately 15 million tons peryear over a period of 6-7 years - after whichproduction would gradually decline. Basedon these figures and current oil prices, thefantastic Ekofisk income figures emerged atbetween 2.5 and 3 billion kroner per year. Inrelation to Norwegian oil consumption atthat time, Ekofisk production would betwice the country's own consumption of oiland petroleum products.

Field Declared CommercialOn the 13th day of January 1971, thePhillips Group advised Norwegianauthorities that the Ekofisk field wascommercial and provided an estimate of thefield's potential. However, there was areservation to the effect that thiscommerciality would be confirmed througha test production phase. There were severalthings which made the companies take thisreservation. In the first place, the pressure inthe reservoir was abnormally high. Whilenormal pressure in a reservoir at 10,500 feetwould be 4500 psi4, the pressure at Ekofiskwas 7135 psi. That meant a longerproduction period was needed in order toobserve the pressure development. Ekofiskwas one of the world's largest oil fields withsuch high reservoir pressure. In addition, thefact that the reservoir lay in fractured chalkwas an element of uncertainty requiring aperiod of observation.

Just as important as experience with thehigh reservoir pressure and the chalk wasthe fact that the Phillips Group at Ekofiskhad to make use of new technology — newtechnology in a geographic area where noprevious experience had been gained in oilrecovery.

The Phillips Group had obtained advisoryopinions from various companies in order toestablish that the field was commercial. Thedeclaration of commerciality was based onfigures from the firm of De Golyer andMacNaugton. They recorded the followingkey figures for the reservoir at Ekofisk:

Productive area, acres 12,145Reservoir thickness, feet 391Reservoir volume, acre-feet 4,747,176Porosity percentage 31Water saturation percentage 21Reservoir volume factor 2.1

Oil content per acre-foot, barrels 905Total oil content, million barrels 4,296Dissolved gasCubic feet per barrel under standard

conditions 2,100Total in billions of cubic feet 9,022

Potential oil recovery in millions of barrels:15 percent degree of recovery 64420 percent degree of recovery 85925 percent degree of recovery 1,074

Potential recoverable gas in billions ofcubic feet:

With 15 percent oil recovery 6,000With 25 percent oil recovery 3,000

Not Only EkofiskThe extent of the Ekofisk discovery hadn'tbeen fully digested when the Phillips Grouppresented plans for new exploration wells inthe same area. The seismic mapping showedmany promising structures in the sameblock in which Ekofisk had been discovered- and in neighboring block 2/7 which was atthe top of the Phillips Group's concessionapplication in 1965. Furthermore, thediscovery of Ekofisk brought renewed faithin the Norwegian sector for thosecompanies holding neighboring blocks.Both Shell and the Amoco/Noco Groupwere in the planning phase for new wells inblocks 1/6, northwest of Ekofisk — and 2/5,east of the discovery.

The Phillips Group employed two rigs atthat time for further exploration of the area.In August 1970, «Neptune 7» started drillingon the exploration well on the so-calledWest Ekofisk structure which was partlyviewed in association with the Ekofiskdiscovery structure. At the same time,«Ocean Viking* got under way with the firstwell in block 2/7 on a structure that wasnamed Eldfisk.

TorIn addition, the Phillips Group was in on theAmoco/Noco Group's first well on astructure that Amoco christened Tor (thePhillips Group's name for it was Ergfisk), onthe boundary between blocks 2/5 and 2/4.The two groups agreed to split the costs50/50, since the seismic showed that thestructure was pretty equally dividedbetween the two blocks.

The jack up rig"Zapata Nordic"discovered theAlbuskjell field inFall 1972. Shell wasthe operator of therig, but the PhillipsGroup participatedwith 50 percent ofthe cost since itappeared that thestructure penetratedblocks 1/6 and 2/4.

39

License 018,awarded to the

Phillips NorwayGroup in 1965,

became a gilt-edgeddocument. In

addition to Ekofiskblock 2/4,

discoveries weremade in block 2/7 —

Eldfisk and Edda,7/11-Cod, and 1/5— Flyndre, The latter

was not big enoughfor production.

40

The agreement between the two groupswas signed 28 July 1970. In the beginningof August the «Orion» rig, with Amoco asoperator, spudded — just 150 meters fromthe dividing line between the two blocks,2/5 and 2/4, on Amoco's side (2/5-1).

On 22 November the well's total depthof 3945 meters was reached. On the waydown the bit had passed through a nearly90-meter thick reservoir in UpperCretaceous - the same geologic formationas at Ekofisk. The best test results showed aproduction rate of 4600 barrels of oil perday of the same fine quality as at Ekofisk.

A new discovery in the area had beenmade, and it was called Tor — the same namethe Amoco/Noco Group had originallygiven the structure.

Two more wells were drilled on Tor asdelineation wells, one by Amoco/Nocowithin block 2/5 and the other by Phillips inblock 2/4. Later tests showed that the Tor

reservoir lay mainly on the 2/4 side of thedividing line between the blocks, and it wasnatural that Phillips and the Phillips Groupshould develop and operate the field. Aunitization agreement to this effect wassigned by the Phillips Group andAmoco/Noco.

West Ekofisk«Neptune 7» started drilling on the west sideof Ekofisk on 28 August 1970. By 12November the bit had reached the totaldepth of 3388 meters, and had then passedthrough an oil and gas reservoir nearly 180meters thick.

Phillips Petroleum Company's president,John M. Houchin, was able to announce on1 December 1970 that the test result wasvery encouraging — 3600 barrels of oil wereproduced from the lower section of thereservoir through a one-inch choke opening.The test was limited by the equipment onthe rig, and Phillips believed that theproduction potential here was equal to thatof discoveries elsewhere in the Ekofiskarea - around 10,000 barrels per day.

A minor disappointment amid all thisPhillips success was the fact that the testlessened the possibility of a connectedreservoir between Ekofisk and West Ekofisk.The so-called API-gravity of the oil in WestEkofisk was eight degrees higher than in themain Ekofisk structure. Thus they were twoseparate fields.

Eldfisk«Ocean Viking* started drilling in block 2/7on 3 August 1970. By 17 November thewell's total depth had been reached — over4,546 meters, deeper than usual in theEkofisk area at that time. Four tests werecarried out, all with slim results. Onlyinsignificant amounts of oil were obtained —quantities so small they couldn't bemeasured. However, it was clear that therewas oil in the structure. The question waswhere — and how much? The well wasdrilled very far north on the structure, whichwas named Eldfisk — and its aim was toexamine both the Danian and UpperCretaceous formations, in which Ekofisk hadbeen discovered, and the sandstoneformations in the Jurassic period. Thetesting showed hydrocarbons in both, but

several wells were required to map thestructure.

In a press release from Phillips on 22December 1970, the company reported thatthere was uncertainty as to whether thepoor test results in the well were due topossible damage to the reservoir formationduring the drilling — or whether theformation had less permeability than theother structures in the area.

At the same time it was made clear thatthe well had been drilled on the far northernflank of Eldfisk, and that a new well wouldbe drilled higher up on this structure when«Ocean Viking» was finished with anexploration well on a different structuresouth in block 2/7.

Exploratory Drilling ContinuesWhile the West Ekofisk structure was so likethe main structure on Ekofisk that furtherdrilling was not necessary until thepermanent platform was in place, both Torand Eldfisk raised questions which couldonly be answered through more drilling.After «Orion» was finished with 2/5-1 inDecember 1970, in January of the followingyear «Maersk Explorer* was given the taskof examining a structure east of thediscovery well. When this assignment hadbeen completed, the same rig got the job ofmapping the western area with the 2/4-7well in July 1971. It also became necessaryto drill a fourth test well, 2/4-8, before Torwas sufficiently mapped. The drillingprogram was concluded in March 1972.

Amoco drilled three additionalexploratory wells in block 2/5 — on otherstructures than Ergfisk where the Torreservoir is located. None of these yieldedcommercial results. The Phillips Group, onthe other hand, drilled 2/4-10 at the end of1973 in a structure northwest of the Torreservoir and found traces of hydrocarbons,but not in large enough amounts to warrantdevelopment for the time being.

The geology in block 2/7 is somewhatdifferent from that otherwise found in theEkofisk area. This meant that it took timebefore the structure's potential could beestablished. When the second exploratorywell was to be drilled, it was placedsouthernmost on the block — on a structurewhich has been designated Eel. «OceanViking* drilled the well early in 1971, butthe result was negative. Only on the third

attempt on block 2/7 did the Phillips Groupand the «Orion» drilling rig get a bull's eye.When the well was completed in October1973, it was clear that the fifth - and secondlargest — reservoir in the Ekofisk area hadbeen confirmed.

EddaWhile «Orion» was drilling 2/7-3 on theEldfisk structure, «Ocean Viking* was underway on an exploratory well in thenorthwestern corner of block 2/7 — an areawhich was christened Southwest-Ekofisk.Here too there was a discovery, but thestructure was small compared with Eldfisk.A new well to delineate the structure in theeast was started on as soon as the discoverywell was completed. This hole, however,was dry. In October 1973 «Zapata Explorer*drilled a well in the far northwestern cornerof Southwest-Ekofisk. This time there was adiscovery, and later it became clear that thefield, which was christened Edda, wascommercial viewed in association with theother five fields in the Ekofisk area.

AlbuskjellAs early as 1969, Shell had stronglyevaluated whether the company should drillin block 1/6 — the neighboring blocknorthwest of block 2/4 where Ekofisk wasdiscovered that same year. The companywas, among other things, contacted byPhillips with an inquiry about subletting«Ocean Viking*. That time it was decidedthat the 1/6 block should wait.

After Ekofisk was discovered and theother reservoirs in the area were established- particularly West Ekofisk, which is locatedclosest to block 1/6, Shell was encouragedto resume plans for a well in 1/6. During thecourse of 1971, Shell and the Phillips Groupsettled on a 50/50 agreement for anexploratory well in the block — all the wayup to the area bordering on block 2/4. Shellhad christened the structure Albuskjell — andthe seismic tests showed that this structureappeared to be evenly apportioned betweenthe two neighboring blocks. In July 1972everything was finally ready tor drilling onwell 1/6-1. «Zapata Nordic* did the job.

There was evidence of four reservoirsunder each other, and tests were carried outin each zone. Only one of the zones testedcommercial quantities of gas andcondensate, but this was enough for Shell to 41

The Phillips Group'sexploration program

through 1973. Themap shows clearly

that the Groupconcentrated its

efforts in the 2/4 and2/7 blocks.

42

strike an optimistic note in a press release of22 November based on the test result —2,700 barrels per day.

Shell also drilled another exploratory wellon the block, but there the result wasnegative. Phillips then drilled well 2/4-9 onthe eastern section of the Albuskjellstructure in the autumn of 1973. The wellconfirmed Shell's discovery. Then in thesummer of 1974 Shell drilled one lastconfirmation well — 1/6-3.

Thus there were seven oil and gas fieldsin the Ekofisk area - and all seven lay totallyor partially in blocks which had beenawarded to the Phillips Group under license018 in the first concession round in 1965.

Knowledge and a Game of ChanceOil exploration will always be acombination of knowledge and a game ofchance. The outcome can never be known inadvance. During the period 1967-80, thePhillips Group drilled between 50 and 60exploratory and delineation wells in thesouthern section of the North Sea. Theresult was seven oil and gas fields whichcould be developed on a commercial basis —and participation in one field which it hasnow been resolved to develop in stages,Tommeliten. The level of success has beenhigh, based on the norm for this industrycharacterized by risk.

The Phillips Group's first exploratory

well on the Norwegian shelf was 16/11-1which was drilled in late summer of 1967.Here the result was negative, but already inthe next attempt in spring of 1968, Cod wasdiscovered on block 7/11. The second andthird wells on the Cod structure wereregarded as discoveries as well, but thesewells made it clear that the field was toosmall for separate development. Betweenthe second and third wells on Cod, a drywell was drilled on block 8/10 before thefourth well was drilled on Cod.

Then followed the 7th attempt - theinterrupted drilling on Ekofisk whichprovided the necessary encouragement forthe second attempt on the structure, andthus yielded the discovery of the field.

Three delineation wells weresubsequently drilled on the Ekofisk structureto determine the size of the reservoir. Inbetween these, West Ekofisk was discoveredand Eldfisk confirmed, but with manyquestion marks. Two more attempts werenecessary on block 2/7 before the third wellconfirmed the discovery in summer and fallof 1972. And before the Eldfisk discoverywas charted, Tor was then uncovered incooperation with Amoco. The fourthwellbore on Eldfisk block 2/7 then led to thediscovery of Edda — at the same time as thecooperative effort with Shell broughtAlbuskjell to light.

Between, and parallel with, the drilling inthe Ekofisk area, the Phillips Group drilled inblock 17/12 -just 90-100 km west ofStavanger. Here a smaller oil discovery wasmade which was designated Bream. Thefollowing year a new well was drilled in thisstructure, but it confirmed only that thediscovery was too small to be developed.

During the winter season of 1971—72, adry hole was drilled in block 8/1. Dry wasalso the conclusion on the new attempt inblocks 16/11 and 7/8 which were tested ini1974. In 1973/1974 block 1/5 was alsodrilled in the Flyndre structure, but theresult was that further tests were shelved.

During this period - and later throughoutthe 1970's - a number of wells were alsodrilled in potential structures in block 2/7where Eldfisk and Edda are located. Thewells examined the same geologicformations in which the discoveries hadbeen made, but also down to Jurassic Sandwhich lies at approximately 4000 meters'depth. Discoveries were not made there in

Cretaceous, in which Eldfisk and Edda hadbeen found, but there was evidence ofhydrocarbons in Jurassic. None of thesehave been examined more closely to date,but structures such as Eel and Ebba can betested again if the necessary conditionsprevail.

In 1975 «Ocean Viking* and other rigswere used for drilling in old and new blocks.Dry holes were drilled in blocks 8/11 and2/10, at the same time as a dry hole wasdrilled in block 2/4, southwest of Ekofisk.

During the period 1976-78, five wellswere drilled in block 1/9 — which laterbecame known as Tommeliten. The drillingwas carried out cooperatively between theoriginal Phillips Group (Fina, Agip and

On 21 July 1970, Dagbladet states that alldoubt has now been swept away — as a result ofthe Ekofisk discovery, Norway has become anoil nation. The newspaper claims that the fieldcan meet the country's own needs for 21 years tocome. On 17 November 1970, the samenewspaper uses bold headlines, referring to asecret report that is supposed to reveal that theEkofisk field contains enormous amounts of oil.

Phillips) - and Statoil as operator. The firstthree wells established the Alpha structure,while the last two found Gamma.Tommeliten is a gas-condensate field whichwas declared commercial by Statoil in 1985,to be developed in stages in the spring of1986. The development would be carriedout with subsea wellheads operated fromthe Edda platform.

In 1979 and 1980 new wells were thendrilled in blocks 17/12 and 8/10. Well threein 17/12 yielded a discovery (Brisling), butstill on such a modest scale thatdevelopment would not be profitable.In block 8/10 the second well also turnedout to be dry.

43

This is the way thegeological structuresappear on a seismicmap of the Ekofisk

reservoir. The greenline at the top marks

the top of thereservoir, the red inthe middle indicatesthe compact layer ofshale separating thetwo reservoirs — and

the yellow thebottom of the

reservoir. The linesat the center of the

map are not properlydrawn. The reasonfor this is that gasmakes the pictureunclear — even in

1987. It is notstrange that

geologists during theinitial phase believedthere was a collapsedarea at the middle ofthe Ekofisk reservoir.

44

Development PlansTake Shape

On 3 September 1970 the Phillips Groupdelivered its application to the Ministry ofIndustry for a test production license on theEkofisk field. The companies had spent theirtime usefully. During the course of springand summer in 1970, comprehensive studieshad been made of the discovery in block2/4, as well as a technical plan for a quickproduction start-up.

There were several reasons for theirdesire to get production under way as soonas possible. The companies wanted to gainexperience with both the reservoir and areaweather conditions before a comprehensiveand expensive development with permanentplatforms was implemented. Furthermore, itwas important to obtain income as quicklyas possible. Exploration costs were high.

When the first development plan for theEkofisk field was presented to theNorwegian authorities in the fall of 1970,only Ekofisk itself had been confirmed as acommercial field. In addition it wasanticipated that the Cod discovery, inassociation with a development of Ekofisk,would be economically profitable.

During the first years after thedevelopment plan had been presented,exploration in the area developed rapidlyand the new fields were discovered. Thismeant that the conditions for developmentchanged as time went by. This, of course,had to have an effect on the technicalsolutions chosen — and on the timetables.The timetables were constantly beingaltered as the development grew incomplexity.

Another important factor easilyoverlooked today was that Ekofisk, as thefirst commercial oil and gas field, confronted

the Norwegian authorities and politicianswith new challenges. They were to developan oil policy which would have to apply toeventual new oil fields as well. Thus duringthis phase the shaping of oil policy and theformation of legislation and rules foroperations on the shelf occurred often,parallel with the development of Ekofisk.

The ReservoirThe three confirmation wells, 2/4-3, -4 and-5, confirmed the dimensions of the reservoiron Ekofisk. Through comprehensive testprograms it also became clear that thereservoir had good productioncharacteristics. It appeared from the teststhat the fractured chalk would be able toproduce around 10,000 barrels of oil per dayfrom each well. Appeared — because thetests were limited by the surface equipmenton the drilling rigs. The analysis resultsreceived from various research laboratoriesconfirmed the encouraging tests. Thepermeability — and therefore the productioncapabilities — were good.

From the beginning of 1970 and up to thetime the application for a test productionlicense was delivered to the Norwegianauthorities in the fall of that year, Phillips'reservoir experts worked at full capacity touncover all the secrets in the reservoirapproximately 3000 meters below the seafloor. This was important in order that theymight determine as accurately as possiblehow much oil and gas there was in Ekofisk —and how it could be effectively recovered.There were two factors which made Ekofisksomewhat special as reservoirs go. First, thefield was the first larger oil discovery inchalk. Secondly — and a factor which gave 45

This is a cross sectionof a core sample

taken from the oiland gas reservoir at

Ekofisk. We canclearly see the

fractures in the chalk— and it is these that

make Ekofiskproduction as good

as it is.

46

additional cause for further studies, thepressure in the reservoir was abnormallyhigh. The chalk didn't create such difficultiesonce it was discovered that the porosity wasas great as it was. On the average, core testsshowed a porosity of slightly less than 30percent. On the other hand, the pressurewas measured at 7135 psi at a depth justover 3100 meters. Normal at this depthwould be 4500 psi.

The question asked was how reducedpressure in the reservoir through productionof oil and gas would affect the rockformations.

Michael J. Fetkovitch at Phillipsheadquarters in Bartlesville was drawn intoEkofisk-related work as early as the end of1969. He had some experience with gasreservoirs with abnormally high pressure.After having set up the test routines forconfirmation well 2/4-3, obtained the resultsand done the preliminary analyses, hestarted accumulating all available materialon reservoirs of this kind. The literature,which was limited, showed that abnormallyhigh pressure in reservoirs had always led toabnormal «behavior».

At the end of October 1970, the PhillipsGroup delivered to the Ministry ofIndustry's petroleum office a report in whichthis problem, among other items, was dealtwith. In addition to the written report, apresentation was made before the people inthe ministry. The purpose was to explainwhy it was so important to gain experiencewith Ekofisk through a test productionphase. One of the central questions onPhillips' part particularly concernedconditions surrounding the extremely highpressure - as seen in connection with theporosity in the rock formation. Michael J.Fetkovitch pointed out that it could beexpected that the high pressure would helpbear the weight of the layers above thereservoir. Upon reduction of pressure, moreof this weight would be transferred to theactual rock structure in the chalk. As thisweight on the chalk structure increased, itcould be expected that the structure —because of the great porosity - would becompressed vertically and expandedhorizontally. This could then lead to asqueezing of both the horizontal andvertical fissure structure. Laboratoryresearch could not provide answers as towhether these expectations would be

realized — or to what degree this wouldoccur. The only way it could be found outwould be through surveillance of producingwells — and through periodic tests onpressure development in the wells.

It was further pointed out in the reportthat such a compression in the reservoir as aresult of pressure reduction could have threeeffects: reduced permeability near the well,reduced permeability generally in thereservoir, and — subsidence on the surface orunder the surface.

Since there is a connection betweenpermeability and production capabilities,compression in the reservoir would benoted through a decrease in production.Therefore, as a countermove, the PhillipsGroup implied that some form of pressuremaintenance might be of interest - gasinjection in particular. In the report thispossibility was also taken into considerationin the calculation of Ekofisk productioncapacity.

The First Development PlanEarly in the spring of 1970 Bill Keeler, thenchairman of the board at Phillips, took theinitiative to attain a rapid development ofthe field. A task group chaired by Bill Boycewas formed and quickly got down to work.Bill Boyce, who was to head up Phillips'activity in Norway from 1978 to 1984,relates that their main task was to find asolution which could be put into effect asquickly as possible. The task groupconsisted of three engineers from theinternational department, the same numberfrom the engineering department, andrepresentatives of the transportation andsupply department.

In addition the group drew on the talentsof the various technical groups within thecompany, as they were needed. Within afew days the draft evolved into adevelopment plan - and it was so simple thatthe first question asked was: What's wrongwith it?

The key lay in finding a jackup rig whichcould quickly be rebuilt into a temporaryproduction unit for a short period of time —six to twelve months, relates Bill Boyce.

Otherwise the plan was based on knowntechnical solutions with which Phillips hadexperience from California, Egypt, and thePersian Gulf. The development draft fromBill Boyce's group sketched a four-phase

Bill M. Boyce wasgiven the task ofheading up the groupthai was to draft adevelopment plan forEkofisk. From 1970to 1984 he played akey role in Phillips'involvement in theEkofisk area.

development, in which the first phase was ashorter test production period and the lastphase involved transportation of oil and gasthrough pipelines to a landing terminals.

The Test PhaseThere were both economic and technicalfactors behind the desire to get productionunder way as quickly as possible. Theeconomic ones were obvious - a quickstart-up would bring income which could beused in financing the rest of thedevelopment. On the technical side therewere several things, in addition to the actualreservoir question, which made it importantto gain experience that could lead to thebest possible permanent development.

It was necessary to obtain operatingexperience from this area of the North Sea.How much of a stress factor would theclimate be - on the rig itself, the processingequipment, and for buoy loading of oil in asea environment such as this? There were noanswers to any of these questions, as thiswas the first time the attempt would bemade in such a rough weather area and atsuch great ocean depths. Furthermore it wasvery important to demonstrate to theNorwegian authorities and the Norwegianpopulace that production of oil and gas fromthe North Sea did not represent anypollution risk. This was a theme of greatinterest at the time. Almost daily the massmedia printed articles and letters to theeditor in favor of and opposed to oilproduction — the latter due to the pollution 4 7

The developmentplan for the test phase

shows "Gulftide" inthe middle with the

four production wellsconnected to the

platform viapipelines. Two

loading buoys aretied to the jack-up

platform.

Phase II of thedevelopment

included the centralEkofisk Complex

with the four steeljacket platforms

FTP, Q, C and P,one flare and the

Ekofisk Tank, plusthe two production

platforms, A and B.The plan was toconnect the four

production wellsfrom the test phase to

the permanentplatforms.

A pipeline links thetwo loading buoys

with the processingplatform, FTP.

48

danger and the oil activity's effect on fishinginterests.

A last but at least as important point wasthe marketing possibilities. There was rapidgrowth within energy consumption inWestern Europe, but there was uncertaintywith regard to the price that Ekofisk oildelivered by tanker loads would bring. Inthe report to the Ministry of Industry it wasindicated that the Phillips Group expected aprice of $2.00-2.50 per barrel, dependingupon delivery method and site.

The technical plan for Phase I — the testphase — consisted of preparing wells 2/4-2,-3, -4 and -5 for production by installingtubing in the wells and equipping each wellwith subsea production valves — Christmastrees. These four wells were then to beconnected into one point by pipelines andcontrol cables — and then brought up on thejackup, temporary production platform

«Gulftide». Onboard «Gulftide» separators,manifolds, pipes and pumps would then beinstalled to process the oil and gasproduced.

From «Gulftide» the oil would then bepumped through two pipelines to largefloating loading buoys. Tankers could thenbe moored to the buoys and receive the oilthrough a floating hose system. The gaswould be conducted to a flare atop«Gulftide«'s drilling derrick and burned off.

Phillips estimated that approximately40,000 barrels of oil and 50 million cubicfeet of gas per day could be producedduring this test phase. The goal was to beable to start production on 1 March 1971.

Phase IIThe development model that Bill Boyce'stask group presented in late summer of 1970would be highly influential for thedevelopment of the Ekofisk area. TheNorwegian authorities were presented withthe draft in connection with the testproduction application. Phase II marked thestart of permanent platform construction onthe field. It was to include placement of aproduction platform, a flare installation, andtwo drilling platforms. Capacity on theproduction platform was estimated at350,000 barrels of oil per day and 450million cubic feet of gas.

Furthermore, during this period a studywas to be carried out to determine howprofitable it would be to return the gas tothe reservoir. At the beginning of Phase II,emphasis would be on buoy loading of theoil — but it also involved laying a 34-inch oilpipeline to shore. Where it would end hadnot been determined, but it was pointed outthat the alternatives being investigated wereLista (Norway), Wilhelmshaven (WestGermany), Rotterdam (Netherlands) andTeesside (England). An onshore receivingterminal would also be built for intermediatestorage of the oil. It was also pointed outthat the Phillips Group was already underway with studies on the utilization of asubsea storage tank for oil, as well as otheralternatives for storage at sea. In theorientation, the time frame for completion inthis construction period was set for1 January 1972 - and also included was anextension to the production platform tomake room for pipeline pumps for the

pipeline to shore, as well as an onshoreexport terminal.

Phases III and IVPhase III was more limited with only oneplatform and ten wells on West Ekofisk - ifthat structure should prove productive. Atthe same time it was necessary to anticipatean expansion of the production platform'sprocessing capacity, to be able to receive anadditional quantity of 50,000 barrels per day(estimated prior to completion of drilling onWest Ekofisk). The time frame forcompletion in this instance was 1 October1973.

Phase IV was outlined to include thelaying of a gas pipeline to shore,construction of a receiving terminal, as wellas the development of Cod and linking ofCod with Ekofisk. The time frame here wasdependent upon the sales contracts for gas,as was the question of where the pipelinewould go. Studies were being made ontransportation to shore in Norway,Denmark, southern Sweden, Germany andEngland. Along the 36-inch gas pipelinethere would also be a need for a boosterplatform enroute to shore.

The license for test production at Ekofiskwas awarded by the Norwegian authoritieson 2 April 1971. That same day a committee

was also appointed for the purpose ofnegotiating royalties to the NorwegianGovernment.

Draft Becomes PlanWhile the test production work went fromplan to realization, the permanentconstruction plan for the field was beingfurther developed. As early as August 1970the Norwegian authorities appointed acommittee whose tasks were, among otherthings, to look at possibilities fortransportation to shore and for increasedemployment opportunities in Norway. Thecommittee was soon dubbed «the EkofiskCommission* and consisted ofrepresentatives from both the authorities,politicians, Phillips and Norsk Hydro.

At the same time progress was beingmade in the sea, where exploratory drillingwas yielding new discoveries. Gradually itbecame clear that perhaps the mostimportant element in the development planwas flexibility - the flexibility to be able toadapt the development to the varyingquantities of oil and gas which were beingcharted through exploratory and delineationdrilling.

At Phillips work was going on at fullcapacity on the development plans for thepermanent solution. Both the company's

ULA OIL

AL1USKJELL

LEGENDPhase IIPhase III (4 fell)Phase III (3 fell)Water InjectionThird part

A 1988 map of theGreater EkofiskArea: 25 platformslinked by a numberof pipelines.

36/2 2 A

To Teesside To Emden

4 - Giant Discovery

own personnel resources as well as expertiseon loan were utilized.

In the first draft of the development planthat was prepared - and submitted to theNorwegian authorities, only twodrilling/production platforms were planned.One of the reasons for this was that theseismic tests indicated the probability of acollapsed area in the middle of the Ekofiskstructure where the existence of productioncharacteristics was very uncertain. The planswere revised, however, and the finalsolution with three drilling/productionplatforms was settled on. On the twooriginal platforms — known today as Ekofisk2/4A and 2/4B - there was only spaceallotted for the limited equipment necessaryfor drilling production wells, bringing up oiland gas and sending it on to the centralprocessing platform. On the thirddrilling/production platform (2/4C) whichwas located at the midpoint on thereservoir, in addition to these basic wellheadfunctions there were also injectioncompressors which would conduct the gasback to the reservoir. For a time the idea ofan injection platform was considered, butthis was abandoned. What would happenwith the gas produced along with the crudeoil was a big question. The Norwegianauthorities went along with the idea that thegas produced from «Gulftide» during the testphase could be burned off, but this wasregarded as a temporary solution. Valuableresources were going to waste here, and asolution had to be found which could alsoutilize these natural resources.

Processing PlatformThe processing — or terminal — platformwhere oil and gas from the three platformswould be processed was planned on thebasis of the production calculations for themain Ekofisk field itself — and with thepossibility of conjunction with WestEkofisk. The latter was uncertain, however,since they didn't have the complete picturewith regard to production volume from thatfield. The capacity on the oil side was set at350,000 barrels per day, while the gasvolume was limited to approximately onebillion standard cubic feet per day.

Processing was relatively simple on thisplatform (2/4 FTP). Via three levels ofseparation, the oil and gas were separated

50 from each other and the water removed.

The oil was then pumped to the two loadingbuoys that were included in «Gulftide»production, while the gas would betransported to the third wellhead platform,2/4 C, to be increased in pressure in thecompressors and from there be injected backinto the reservoir pending a permanentsolution. In addition to these platforms, aflare was needed as an emergency solutionin case it should be necessary to get rid ofthe production due to a processing failure.

Housing PlatformThe first two wellhead platforms had tohave their own quartering facilities for thecrew. However, quartering for the thirdwellhead and injection platform and theterminal platform could be handled jointlyby connecting the two platforms withbridges. These two platforms had to beconnected in any case, since the gas wouldbe conducted to the compressors on thewellhead platform for transfer back to the

50

This artistic drawingshows how oneimagined anartificial harbor andoil storage facilitiesat Ekofisk. Theillustration is takenfrom the report thatwas made on thesubject.

periods of bad weather which wouldprevent loading. Thus during these periodsproduction would have to be shut down —and that would result in a halt in gasproduction as well. In any case, the gaswould have to be transported to market viapipeline in order for it to bring an acceptableprice. The alternative of cooling the gasdown to liquid form on the field so as tosend it on to market was abandoned at anearly point. The price of the gas wasdependent upon continuous production.Regular pauses in production could not betolerated. Therefore a solution had to befound which would make it possible to keepproduction going without having to stopthe whole operation because of the weather.

An oil pipeline to shore was regarded earlyon as the only permanent solution, but withthe Phillips Group's operational timetable itwas necessary to find an alternative solutionuntil the pipeline could be built and put intooperation.

Weather-Resistant TankThe puzzle that remained was how to secureagainst the weather gods and maintaincontinuous operation. A number of officialcommittees were assigned the task, andwithin the Phillips Group there was apersistent effort to find solutions.Appropriately for the seafaring nation ofNorway, the idea of building an artificialharbor in the middle of the North Sea was 51

Norwegianconstruction

companies had longand solid experience

in the slip-formingtechnique proposed

for the constructionof the Ekofisk Tank.

Here is an examplein the form of a grain

elevator inStavanger.

52

one of the first initiatives. A committee wasformed through an agreement between theMinistry of Industry and Phillips in earlyDecember 1970. Its principal task was toconsider how such a harbor would have tobe built, and how tankers would be able tomaneuver into it in bad weather. Twosolutions were presented as to how theharbor should be designed — one in theshape of a horseshoe, opening toward theeast — the other in the shape of a cross,where ships could utilize whichever of thefour possiblities was least exposed at themoment to wind and waves. Built into thisartificial harbor - or island - would bestorage capacity for 1.7 million cubic metersof oil.

The committee's recommendation wassubmitted in March 1971. Thehorseshoe-shaped harbor was preferred, butit was clear at the same time that the costsinvolved with that kind of harbor, alongwith the uncertainty as to whether it couldbe done in the North Sea, made the solutionunrealistic. After this proposal was rejectedin the spring of 1971, Phillips decided toinvestigate the possibilities of building astorage tank at Ekofisk. The tank couldfunction as a buffer storehouse in badweather. When the weather preventedtankers from lying into the buoys andloading, the production could simply beredirected to the tank — and continuewithout any shutdown in production fromthe field. A similar tank had been built out ofsteel and put into service in the ArabianGulf.

Concrete or SteelIntense efforts were under way to findpotential builders of such a tank. By Spring1971, four alternatives had been found: twoin steel and two in concrete. The steel tankswere of American design, while the concretemodels were French. There was a certainamount of preference for the steel tanks, butfurther contact with the builders broughtsome problems to light. Chicago Bridge Co.,one of the suppliers in question, could notmeet the time requirements which had beenset. Another problem was locating a site forbuilding such a steel giant. It would have tobe done in the U.S.A., and towing across theAtlantic involved great risk in itself. Also aproblem was the fact that one of the steeldesigns involved the necessity of fastening

the tank to the sea floor. With the existingseabed conditions at Ekofisk, this wasregarded as a very problematic design in thedimensions here required. French design inconcrete was world renowned. TheFrenchmen had at an early date developedtechniques that commanded respect.Furthermore, there were builders in Norwaywith long experience in the use of slipformsin the construction of larger concretebuildings. Examples of this were grain silos— in Stavanger, among other places, and inconnection with the construction of waterstorage tanks for electricity purposes. Butthere were many misgivings. Among otherthings, there had been little or no experiencewith how a concrete structure of thesedimensions would react to the constantexposure to saltwater waves.

The two French concrete alternativeswere also different. One involved a subseatank on the sea floor, while the otherinvolved having the top of the tank extendabove sea level. The one design - the subseatank — was nearly square in shape, while theother was shaped like a cylinder withseparate storage cells. A model of the subseatank was being completed in France, andCarl C. Anderson was sent to the Frenchcoast on the Atlantic side to be present atthe launching. Due to postponements, Carl'strip was in vain, but a few weeks later thereport came from France that theconstruction had collapsed when positionedon the ocean floor. Only the remains in the

form of large concrete blocks were left onthe ocean floor. This unfortunate resultdidn't exactly give the skeptics a weaker legto stand on, but a decision had to be madesoon and the work begun.

Sales JobThere was no way back. Carl C. Andersonand three other Phillips engineers tookalong the four bids and shut themselves intoa room at the Esso Motor Hotel inStavanger. There they would stay until theysettled on a recommendation for analternative. We all know the result, butselling the solution to the partners in thePhillips Group, to the Norwegianauthorities and, not least, to Phillips topmanagement in the U.S. at that time wasviewed as a difficult task. But there was noalternative. It was necessary to get underway and have the Tank in place thefollowing summer - in 1972 — if the workwas to be kept on schedule.

A.G. Doris, the French company thatdesigned the Tank, had secured a buildingsite at Hinnavagen in Stavanger incooperation with the two Norwegian firmsof F. Selmer and Hoyer-Ellefsen. Both ofthese companies had experience withconcrete constructions. This Norwegiansolution also made it easier for theNorwegian authorities to approve theconcept. Edwin Van den Bark, then head ofPhillips International Group, relates that thecombination of French design experienceand Norwegian building experience inconcrete led him to support the choice at an

early stage, based on the criteria which thesolution would have to satisfy. It was C.J.«Pete» Silas, head of Phillips' Europe-AfricaDivision in London, who was given the taskof convincing the board that this was not a«crazy» idea, but a project which could bepractically carried out. Silas relates that hewas very well prepared when he met withthe board to present the plans. LeonardMead, Engineering Department, was withhim at the presentation to answer questions.Silas went in detail through the constructionand the criteria that were set. After thepresentation Silas expected a number ofdifficult questions and many objections, butthe gathering appeared to accept theproposal. One of the questions that came upwas: What would happen to the Tank if itcollided with a ship? Pete Silas says the onlyanswer he could give was that, in that case,the ship would sink pretty fast. Thus theboard approved the plans and the projectcould get under way that fall, after thepartners and the Norwegian authorities hadgiven their approval. The latter had a bigquestion about the plans for the Tank at thatpoint in time: «What would Phillips do withthe big deck space on top of the Tank?» Thereply was — according to Carl C. Anderson:an offshore supply base!

All Clear SignalIn March 1972 the Ministry of Industrygave its fundamental consent to the PhillipsGroup's technical plan for Phase IIdevelopment. By that time the work hadprogressed greatly. The first platformcontracts had already been signed on 29December 1970. Then contracts wereentered into for the jackets for 2/4 FTP, 2/4B, and 2/4 C.

Gas NegotiationsThe question as to what should be donewith the gas from eventual discoveries inthe North Sea became a real issue for thefirst time in 1968, when the reserves on Codbecame known. The NorwegianGovernment appointed a committee - theCod Committee - with the Ministry ofIndustry's undersecretary, Odd G0the aschairperson, for the purpose of studyingpossible solutions. When the thirddelineation well on Cod reduced thediscovery by half — and made it clear thatCod on its own was not commercial, the

Carl C. Andersonwas one of fourengineers who had tochoose one of the fouralternatives for astorage tank atEkofisk. From 1968until 1988 he was akey figure in Ekofiskoperations.

53

54

work was partially brought to a halt.But in August 1970 a new committee was

appointed - the Ekofisk Commission — withthe same chairperson as for the CodCommittee.

The questions of utilization andtransportation of the gas to shore were partof the committee's assignment. From thePhillips Group, Torvild Aakvaag of NorskHydro, Ed Jobin and Paul W. Tucker fromPhillips were appointed as members. Withregard to the dry gas, the committeereached the conclusion fairly soon thattransportation to shore in Norway was notan option. First and foremost since there wasno market for gas in this country — andbecause gas as a fuel in the production ofelectricity was not competitive withhydroelectric power.

The Phillips Group began putting outfeelers for gas customers already in the fallof 1970, parallel with the EkofiskCommission's studies on the matter. Theeffort was headed up by Paul W. Tucker,who was manager of Phillips' gas and gasliquids department at the Europe-AfricaDivision in London.

As the size of the gas reserves becamebetter charted, the marketing could alsobecome more active, relates Paul W. Tucker.Preliminary meetings were held withpotential gas customers all over Europe:England, Scotland, France, West Germany,Sweden, Denmark — yes, even interestedparties in Poland turned up and a meetingwas conducted in Warsaw. Many of the firstlikely customers dropped out after theyrealized that the Phillips Group wanted tosell all the gas in one package. Few of themwere large enough consumers of gas thatthey could take on such quantities. AfterTor and West Ekofisk were discovered, thetotal volume came to approximately onebillion cubic feet per day.

This meant that there were four seriouspurchasing groups left: Ruhrgas in WestGermany (already included here were Gazde France, France, and Distrigaz fromBelgium), Gazunie in the Netherlands,British Gas Corporation (BGC) in England,and a group consisting of chemical concernsin West Germany.

There gradually developed hardnegotiations and a lot of tug of war. Paul W.Tucker relates that at one point there was afifth customer, the British electric power

service, but they could no longer participatefor fear of competing with BGC.

The four possible buyer groups werereduced to three, in that Ruhrgas andGazunie — after a long night of negotiationsin London - agreed to join forces as onegroup. Thus this group strengthened itsposition, but negotiations continued a whilelonger with the other two interested parties.

However, it gradually became clear thatthe Ruhrgas group, which Paul W. Tuckercalls «the great alliance*, was willing toextend itself farthest to satisfy therequirements of the Phillips Group. This wasespecially true with regard to priceescalation. British Gas on its part was notwilling to come close to the Phillips Groupon this point. Neither were the chemicalcompanies willing to extend themselvesparticularly far on this point, so for a periodin 1972 negotiations were held almostexclusively with the Ruhrgas consortium.After some time, British Gas showedrenewed interest, but again it led nowhere.Therefore the negotiations were againconcentrated on the consortium.

Another point which now began to be apart of the Phillips Group's negotiationstrategy was the fact that there would haveto be an additional contract for the newfields - Eldfisk, Edda and Albuskjell.Exploratory drilling there showed greatpossibilities for three new commercial fields.A sales contract with British Gas wouldmean that the gas pipeline would go toEngland, and thus the British wouldpractically be able to dictate conditions forthe second contract, since there was little toindicate that the new discoveries couldjustify another pipeline — to the Continent,for example. Therefore the Phillips Grouppreferred the consortium on the Continentwhere there were other competitive buyergroups and where the same pipeline couldbe used - under otherwise equal termsbetween the consortium and British Gas.

The matter of full price escalation wasdecisive, and the Phillips Group was able toconclude negotiations and reach anagreement with the consortium.

Gas ContractThe first sales contract for gas was signed inOslo on 22 January 1973. The buyer groupconsisted of Gaz de France and Distrigazfrom Belgium, in addition to Ruhrgas from

On 22 January19 73, representativesof the companies inthe Phillips Croupcould sign the firstgas agreement alongwith the buyerconsortium on theContinent. This tookplace at NorskHydro in Oslo. Atfar left is Paul W.Tucker, who headedthe negotiationdelegation for thePhillips Group. In7974, the sameparties entered into anew agreement forthe natural gas fromAlhuskjell, Eldfiskand Edda.

West Germany and Gazunie, Netherlands.Ruhrgas purchased 50%, while the

remaining 50% was divided between theother three companies. The contract thatwas signed was contingent upon thenecessary approvals from the governmentsin the respective countries; but on theassumption that the approvals would beforthcoming, deliveries were to start inOctober 1975. Also included in the contractwas a condition that the gas pipeline fromEkofisk would go ashore at Emden in WestGermany.

This first gas contract from theNorwegian side of the North Sea has sincebecome a model for sales contracts tofollow. For the first time in history, a sellerobtained 100% price escalation. Theescalation could occur within a period of sixmonths. The price was linked to competingenergy forms - and not to crude oil as, forexample, Statoil's contracts would be lateron. This has meant that the Phillips Group'scontract has not reaped the enormousprofits during periods when the price ofcrude oil was high — nor low prices whenthe opposite has been true. It is alsointeresting to note that, according to PaulW. Tucker, the French company in theconsortium had tried during thenegotiations to bind the sales contract todeliveries of French goods and services for

the Ekofisk field development - a conditionwhich in 1986 almost upset a sales contractfor gas from Troll and Sleipner.

When the contract negotiations becamemore concrete, all the companies in thePhillips Group participated in the meetings.A gas committee had been formed in whichall the companies were represented, butwith Paul W. Tucker as chairman.

New ContractIn April 1974 the same companies signedanother gas contract for delivery of gasfrom Edda, Eldfisk and Albuskjell. In theprocess of reaching this agreement, seriousnegotiations with other buyer groups neverentered the picture, since the consortiumwas willing to go along with the sameprinciples as in the first contract. Thevolume in the second contract was 646million cubic feet per day with deliveries tostart in October 1976.

The two contracts taken jointly involveda total daily gas delivery of nearly twobillion cubic feet from the Ekofisk area.

Phase HI Is ExpandedAt the end of 1970, the scope of Phase IIIdevelopment was expanded in relation tothe original draft since the West Ekofisk andTor fields had been discovered. 55

All signs indicated that both fields werecommercial when viewed in connectionwith the total development of the Ekofiskfield. Eldfisk was also a possible commercialfield, but the first and second wells on thestructure were disappointing. Furtherexploratory drilling was necessary in orderto establish the size of the field.

The first development plans for the PhaseIII fields were based on full processing of oiland gas on Tor, while West Ekofisk and Codwere to have simple processing on smallerplatforms. The latter two fields were firstand foremost gas and condensate fields.From the three fields, oil and gas would thengo via pipelines to the Ekofisk Complex anddirectly into the pipelines to shore. Onesuch development plan required a separateprocessing platform on Tor — based onapproximately the same principle which weknow today from Eldfisk.

Then at the beginning of 1972, the beliefthat Eldfisk could be quite a largecommercial field was confirmed — while atthe same time Albuskjell and Edda indicatedthat those two structures also could bedeveloped. To confirm this, drilling went onat as fast a pace as the equipment wouldallow, but there was a limit to the number ofrigs the Phillips Group could have inoperation. And there were plenty of otherstructures in blocks 2/4 and 2/7 that couldcontain oil and gas. Since there were rigsfrom other companies in operation on theneighboring blocks, possibilities existed fora really gigantic development in this area,southernmost on the Norwegian continentalshelf.

With these new suppositions, a newdevelopment model began to take shape atPhillips. New cost analyses showed that thismodel was favorable — at the same time asflexibility became greater in the case of newdiscoveries. And the discoveries could besmaller and still profitable. This newdevelopment plan took as its starting pointthe available deck space on the Ekofisk Tankwhich was under construction in Stavanger.During the Tank's earliest planning stages,the Norwegian authorities had askedPhillips what this space would be used for.The answer revealed that Phillips at thatpoint in time were not quite sure themselves— but it could always be used as an offshoresupply base. Now there emerged the idea of

5O building a large processing facility for oil,

gas and NGL from the Phase III fields. Thealternative to this central facility turned outto be not decentralized processing on eachfield, but several steel platforms for this typeof central processing center. The latterwould apply in case the Tank could not bearthe weight of such a processing center. Twoor three steel platforms would be necessaryin that case. Another important factor whichpointed in the direction of centralizedprocessing had come up in connection withthe negotiations on the sale of the gas. Thevarious buyer groups were very concernedabout the stability of the gas production —and this kind of centralized processingwould increase the stability of the deliveriesconsiderably, as compared with severalsmall facilities on each field.

In May/June 1972, the go-ahead signalwas given by the necessary companies andpublic authorities to build a 20-meter deckover the entire Ekofisk Tank. This workedwell, since construction delays alreadyprevented its being towed to locationbefore the summer of 1973. Thus the deckcould be built inshore in Stavanger.

The scope of Phase III grewtremendously during this period. In additionto the pipeline projects and receivingterminals, which were gigantic projects inthemselves, the development of six fieldslay ahead. And on top of it all came theprocessing facility on the Tank. Thetimetables drawn up were scant, so it was aquestion of rolling up shirt sleeves andgetting the work under way as quickly aspossible. The plans for the first section ofthe development were completed during thecourse of 1972. West Ekofisk would bedeveloped with a very simple wellheadplatform like the Phase II platforms — with atwo-phase pipeline in which oil and gaswould be transported together to theprocessing facility at the Complex.

It was decided that Tor and Cod wouldbe constructed according to a new modelwith simple, first level separation on theplatforms. This meant that these platformswould have to have a flare installationconnected to the platform by a bridge, as asafety measure. The design contracts onthese two platforms were awarded to theKvcerner Group. It was the first commissionof this type to be awarded a Norwegiancompany. Work on these three platformsgot under way during the course of 1973.

At the end of that year the necessaryparameters for Eldfisk and Edda wereestablished, and Albuskjell followed shortlythereafter. Eldfisk was to be developed withthree platforms. On the southern structure adrilling and production platform would beconnected to a separate processing platform.On the northern structure a combinationplatform was sufficient. The Edda platformwas fairly similar to the northern Eldfiskplatform. These platforms also had first levelseparation before separate oil and gaspipelines transported the products to theEkofisk Complex.

Albuskjell, like Eldfisk, was divided intotwo structures, and two platforms werenecessary — one on Shell's block 1/6 and oneon the Phillips Group's block 2/4. Bothplatforms were built with first levelseparation before separate pipelines took oiland gas to the Ekofisk Complex.

Work on these last six platforms couldbegin during the last half of 1974.

It may well be said that there were twoparts to Phase III platform building: WestEkofisk, Cod and Tor represent the first part,

while Eldfisk, Edda and Albuskjell representthe second part.

The Processing Facilityon the TankThe capacity and scope of the Tank'sprocessing facility were established duringthe course of 1972 and 1973. After Eldfisk,Edda and Albuskjell came, there had to be anexpansion.

A 20-meter steel deck was built over theentire surface of the storage tank. This wasdone for the most part while the Tank layinshore in Stavanger during the winter andspring of 1972/73. After the Tank hadreached its Ekofisk destination, work gotunder way on the construction of a30-meter deck to cover 65 percent of thenorthern section. This was made of concreteand was largely prefabricated by Doris, thebuilder, before it was hoisted into place.

Together these two decks provided a10,700 square meter floor space - theequivalent of 2-3 steel platforms. Thebuilding of the processing facility on top ofwhat was initially to have been a subseastorage tank was thus quite a stroke ofgenius, viewed in economic terms.

The production parameters set were onemillion barrels of crude oil per day and twobillion standard cubic feet of gas. Explainedsimply, the processing facility consists of sixmain separators, three glycol dehydrationunits for gas, three gas dewpoint units, fourgas compressors to give the gas sufficientpressure to start the trip by pipeline toEmden, heat exchangers, coolers, and hot oilfurnaces — plus computer-controlledmetering systems which communicate viasatellite.

A space problem gradually developed onthe Tank, and it was decided to build aseparate riser platform for receiving thepipelines from the Phase III platforms — plusa separate flare stack for the processingfacility — north of the Tank.

The Ekofisk Tankwith both the 20 and30 meter decks inplace. The 30 meterdeck covers 65percent of thenorthern part of theTank. While thelower deck was builtin Stavanger beforethe towout of theTank, the 30 meterdeck was installed onthe field.

57

A Long Way from Landing Sites

Anders O. Waakfollowed at dose

range thenegotiations on the

landing of oil andgas from Ekofisk. He

was the firstNorwegian to be

appointed VicePresident of Phillips

Petroleum CompanyNorway. Waale's

experience in oilstarted in Venezuelawith Gulf Oil. That

company broughthim back to

Norway, and in1972 he began

working for Phillips.For a number of

years he has been themanager of the

company's office inOslo.

58

Selecting a location for bringing oil and gas fromEkofisk to shore involved somewhat more thansimply making a geographical choice. A numberof approaches to the problem were woven intoeach other in such a way that the geographicalchoice seemed to determine the other questions.

The Norwegian authorities and the PhillipsGroup had two different points of departure. Forthe Phillips Group the question was mainly of aneconomic nature. Where could the crude oil, theliquid gas and dry gas from Ekofisk betransported to shore in a technically justifiableand most economical way? Naturally theeconomic considerations were given highpriority by the Norwegian authorities as well,but at the same time, ensuring national controlof Norwegian natural resources was at least asimportant. Another vital factor was the ability tocreate new jobs on Norwegian soil. In otherwords — while the Phillips Group had practicaleconomics as a starting point, the NorwegianGovernment was thinking in terms of socialeconomics.

Negotiations in transportation questionsturned out to be a long process. The matter was

actually put on the agenda as early as 1968 withthe first discovery on Cod. When it turned outthat Cod was not found to be commercial, thequestions were put on ice until the Ekofiskdiscovery was confirmed in 1970.

Linguistic ComplicationsThe Phillips Group did not initially view asproblematic the decisions to be made inconnection with choosing a destination for thecrude oil. On the other hand, there was anotheraspect involved where gas was concerned, and itwas felt that the sales contract would determinewhere the pipeline would end. But with regardto the oil, Phillips took a stand fairly early infavor of Teesside in England. This decision wasbased on several conditions, with importantelements being the depth of the NorwegianTrench and pipelaying technology. But thePhillips Group did not foresee, early in 1970, theNorwegian political conflict which could arise.One reason for this was a linguisticmisunderstanding — or a translation problem,according to Anders O. Waale, long-time headof Phillips' Oslo office. At Phillips it was longbelieved that since the company had beenawarded a «production license* in the 1965concession round, that included - in addition toan exclusive exploration permit for a specificarea — a production permit for whatever mighteventually be found in that area. In other words,they were not aware that the question ofproduction and transportation of oil and gas toshore required a new political debate inparliament. The English language distinguishesbetween the words «license» and «permit». Thisdifference does not exist in Norwegian. It wasthought that since the «production license* hadbeen awarded, only a «permit» (consent) wasrequired by the Ministry for construction of thephysical installations and laying of the pipelines— not a new political discussion in parliament.Phillips' interpretation was soon altered, and formore than three years a debate roared on inNorway as to where the oil and gas from Ekofiskshould be brought to shore — and on what terms.To be sure, this debate was overshadowed bythe EEC (European Economic Community)debate going on at the same time, but the latter

In 1973 theNorwegian Trenchwas an obstacle inthe landing issue asit separated theNorwegianmainland from thecontinental shelf andEkofisk. To cross it,pipes would have tobe laid at a depth of3 72 meters — whilethe route to Teessidehad a maximumdepth of only 92meters. In 1973,pipelayingtechnology had notreached that fardown — nor coulddivers operate atsuch depths.

was also drawn into the transportation debatesince the terminal alternatives outside ofNorway were in EEC countries or countries thatwere in the process of joining the Europeancommunity.

The Ekofisk CommissionIn August 1970, the Government appointed acommittee which was designated the EkofiskCommission. Its task was to consider thequestion of transportation to shore. Thecomposition of the committee was similar tothat of the Cod Committee of 1968 - withdeputy secretary Odd G0the as chairman.

But before this committee was able to fulfillits commission, something happened whichinterfered with their work. In a Storting reportin April 1971, the Government proposed arule of principal for Norwegian oil operationswhich stated that petroleum extracted on theNorwegian shelf should be piped to shore inNorway. During discussion on this report in theIndustry Committee, the Storting report wasused as a starting point for the formation ofwhat would be called «the ten oilcommandments*. The seventh «commandment»stated that «petroleum from the Norwegiancontinental shelf shall as a rule be transported to

shore in Norway, with the exception of theparticular case where socio-politicalconsiderations provide a basis for anothersolution.* Ideally this was a fine«commandment», but two important facts thatneeded to be considered had been disregarded:the Norwegian Trench represented an oceandepth in which a pipeline of the dimensions inquestion had never before been laid - and, therewas no market for the dry gas in Norway.

When the Ekofisk Commission presented itsrecommendation in February 1972, theconclusion with regard to dry gas was clear:

fVVhere there's awill, there's a way,»is how the artistdescribed thissolution to theproblems of theNorwegian Trench.

59

In 1971, noteverybody wanted alanding terminal in

their own backyard,In Egersund, a

committee was set upto fight landing at

Eiger0y. In a letter tothe editor of the

Stavanger Aftenbladin late May 1971,

such a landingalternative was

described as a threatto the local

community.

Three locations onthe Norwegian coast

were evaluated inconnection with

landing fromEkofisk; Lista,

Eiger0y and Sola.Also considered were

Teesside in GreatBritain and Emdenin West Germany.

transporting gas to shore in Norway was not ofinterest, because it was not possible to establisha market in Norway large enough to take on theenormous quantities of gas from Ekofisk. TheContinent or Great Britain were logical terminalpoints for the dry gas, depending on which wasmost favorable economically.

The conclusion was not quite so clear wheretransportation of the crude oil and liquid gas wasconcerned, but the committee ended uprecommending a pipeline to Teesside. The mostsignificant argument against transporting oil toshore in Norway was the Norwegian Trench.Pipelines had never been laid at ocean depthssuch as those — and it was one thing to lay theline, but quite another to repair and maintain it.

The committee had considered two terminallocations for oil and liquid gas — Teesside, UK,and Eigeray near Egersund in Norway. Thedistance to Eigeray was the shortest — 270 km ascompared with 345 to Teesside. But the pipelinethoroughfare to Eigerey had the deepest pointat 3 72 meters, as compared with 92 meters onthe stretch to Teesside. Digressing a bit, it canbe noted that the local population in theEgersund area did not view the terminalquestion favorably, and a committee to protestthe action was quickly formed when it waslearned that the area was under consideration.

When the Ekofisk Committee'srecommendation was placed on the desk ofSecretary of Industry Finn Lied, the Governmentunder the leadership of Trygve Bratteli found itnecessary to spend more time going through theapproaches to the problem. It was vital that theybe certain in two areas before making a decision:•first, that it was in fact impossible to lay apipeline across the Norwegian Trench toNorway - or that this solution was totally out ofthe question economically when compared with

60

Teesside — and, in case of a terminal in England,that Norwegian control would be ensured andthat Norway would somehow be able to turnthe resources into concrete jobs. In order toprovide an answer as to the possibilities ofpipelaying in the Norwegian Trench, the PhillipsGroup was directed to obtain bids for laying aline to Norway and to England from possiblepipelaying firms. It was felt that this wouldprovide the final answer. Norwegian control ofthe pipeline could be ensured throughNorwegian participation in the pipelinecompany, while new jobs could be gained inseveral ways. For a time the alternative of usingthe gas for a gas power plant was of interest, butthis idea was dropped due to the high costsinvolved. What remained then was possibledevelopment of a Norwegian petrochemicalindustry with liquid gas components fromEkofisk as raw material.

The Time Pressure FactorImpatience began to be a factor within thePhillips Group. It was important for severalreasons that a final decision be reached. Acontract for sale of the gas had been signed inJanuary 1973, and it was based on a fixedstarting point for deliveries, in October 1975.The capacity for pipelaying at sea was likewisequite limited — and regardless of where the lineended up, barges would have to be contracted ifthey were to be available in 1973. There wasactually a danger of losing a year — maybe two —if contracts were not secured as soon as possible.Regardless of where the line would go, thisoperation would be so extensive that as much as70% of the existing capacity for pipelaying atdepths such as these would be involved.

In addition, there was a special situation in thesteel market. There was such a shortage thatsteel prices were rising from week to week anddelivery time became longer and longer. ThePhillips Group decided to make its purchases, tobe able to meet its time schedule before theprices went even higher. They also had to getunder way with production of the pipes and puton the protective coating, so that everythingwould be ready when the starting signal came.

To complicate the picture further, receivingterminals were to be built at the ends of thelines. Suitable sites had to be found and acquired,and preparations made for the construction ofthese large facilities. They would have to belarge after new fields were discovered in theEkofisk area and the reserve estimates increased.In 1972 the Ekofisk development was already onits way to becoming decidedly the largestindustrial project in Norwegian history.

The Phillips Group and the Norwegianauthorities were well aware that delays in theproject would mean big delays in the anticipatedflow of income. The development within oilprices was bright, as perceived by the industryitself — and by Norway, which was in theprocess of becoming an oil nation.

NegotiationsDuring the period from the latter half of 1972 toMay 1973, a number of negotiations were goingon between the various parties involved. TheNorwegian authorities negotiated with GreatBritain and West Germany as to what ruleswould apply if the terminal locations wereTeesside and Emden. Not least would thematters of jurisdiction and taxation have to beclarified with these countries. In addition, theauthorities and the Phillips Group negotiated onan agreement that would ensure liquid gas forthe development of a Norwegian petrochemicalindustry. And at the end of 1972 - after Statoilhad been established — negotiations wereinitiated directly between the Phillips Group andStatoil as to ownership of the pipeline. Thenegotiations between Norway and WestGermany went well, and a frameworkagreement was reached.

It was a slower process with Great Britain, butacceptable solutions were reached here as well.The fact that these agreements were going to benecessary soon became apparent. The round ofbidding for the laying of pipelines to Norway

and England clearly showed that the technologyfor laying pipes of the dimensions in question atsuch great depths as the Norwegian Trenchrepresented did not exist. And it wouldprobably take at least two or three years beforesuch a task could be completed. Many solutionswere also discussed as to how the NorwegianTrench could be traversed. One of the plansproposed but soon rejected was to lay aso-called spaghetti-line - that is, many narrowpipelines — across the trench itself. If a problemarose, it would simply be a matter of bringing upthe pipe that caused the problem and replacing itwith a new one. The basis for this idea was thefact that pipeline dimensions would have to bevery large in order to meet the capacityrequirements, but narrow pipes of 8 and 12inches could be laid at the depths in question.

Some of the toughest negotiations were totake place between the Phillips Group andStatoil/the Norwegian authorities. In the case ofliquid gas, the Phillips Group was prepared to goto great lengths to accommodate the Norwegianwishes — as a kind of compensation for the factthat the oil pipeline would go to Teesside andnot to Norway. When the final agreement was

The first tankercarrying NGL fromthe Teesside terminalis on its way toNoretyl's plant atRafnes in Bamble in7979. Ascompensation for theTeesside landing ofcrude oil and NGL,the Phillips Groupsigned an agreementthat ensureddevelopment of aNorwegianpetrochemicalindustry.

In 1971 it wasimportant forIngvald lllveseth,Minister of Industry,to stress that ifjxrenwere selected as alanding site, this partof the country wouldnot become aNorwegianRotterdam.

61

Another example ofthe vehement

newspaper discussionthat followed the

landing issue inNorway. On 31

January 1973,Arbeiderbladet refers

to Norwegiancompanies' demandsthat the landing site

be in Norway,

62

ready, Norway was ensured a sufficient amountof liquid gas components, delivered to Norwayat a price that provided a very favorable startingpoint for the development of a new, competitivepetrochemical industry. The agreement stated,among other things, that the Phillips Groupwould pay transportation charges on the liquidgas from Teesside to Norway. The result of thiscontract was the construction of thepetrochemical facilities at Rafnes in Bamble,Telemark.

NorpipeThe really tough and difficult negotiations werefought out over the ownership of the pipelinesand receiving terminals. These negotiationswere held directly between the Phillips Groupand Statoil, the latter represented by Jens Chr.Hauge, chairman of the board, and ArveJohnsen, managing director.

The Phillips Group had initially agreed thatthe State should be guaranteed influence andcontrol in the pipeline company throughparticipation. The Group also launched an offerof 10 percent ownership/participation. But theState wanted more.

From January 1973 to May of that year, anuninterrupted series of negotiations were held.Anders O. Waale relates that the members of thePhillips Group who were traveling to Norwayduring this period were regular guests at HotellBristol in Oslo, and negotiations were going onnight and day. In addition to negotiationmeetings, there were constantly deliberationswithin the Phillips Group at which all thecompanies were represented — companies fromfive different countries. The companies had highlevel representation: participating for Phillipswere present-day Chairman of the Board PeteSilas5, head of operations in Norway, J. T. Clark,

and his assistant, J. Fox Thomas, plus a numberof financial and legal experts — along with thecompany's experts on the sale of oil and gas.

Anders O. Waale was present during thenegotiations, and he offers these generalobservations:

«We (the Phillips Group) received in letterform a long list of demands from the ministry.So we sat down here in the office and found thatwe had many very good reasons for notaccepting the demands. We decided then to calla meeting with the ministry in order to presentthese good reasons, which we then did. Andwithout exception, within a short time aftermeetings such as these, we would receivewritten notice that all the demands listed had tobe accepted - and in addition, the ministry hadarrived at further requirements that had to bemet. It turned out as time went by that thesituation would repeat itself, that every time wehad been in the ministry new demands wereimposed.«In order to reach a solution, agreements wereentered into on all fronts. It was finally agreedthat the Phillips Group and Statoil would eachhave 50 percent shares in Norpipe. At the sametime, Statoil would only provide 50 percent ofthe capital stock — and the capital stock was tomake up 10 percent of the investments. In otherwords, Statoil would receive half ownership inNorpipe with only a 5 percent investment. Itwas further a condition that Statoil have thechairman of the board position. According toNorwegian stock legislation, the chairman of theboard has a double vote in case of a tie. Neitherthe Phillips Group nor the Group's lendinginstitutions were able to accept this. By thestandards of that day, very large sums of moneywere involved. (The first loan to finance thepipeline was for 600 million dollars.) One mustremember that the price of oil lay at $2.50-3.50per barrel.

«We found it totally unreasonable that Statoil,with a 5 percent investment in the pipelinecompany, should have the deciding vote overthe Group, which was responsible for 95percent. Therefore, it was decided early on thatthe chairman of the board should not have adouble vote. That was a clear condition in thenegotiations between the Phillips Group andStatoil,» relates Anders O. Waale.

DramaticsEarly in March 1973 agreement had beenreached on all points - or so the Phillips Grouprepresentatives thought. But on the afternoon ofMarch 1, the very day the Storting report wasdiscussed in governmental conference, prior tocabinet action at the palace the following day,the Phillips Group received word from Jens Chr.Hauge that the report would go to the cabinet

without the clause regarding the chairman of theboard's single vote. That was Thursday — and ahectic evening and night lay ahead. The PhillipsGroup could not accept the change in thiscentral element in the agreement, and a letter tothe Minister of Industry was composed. J. FoxThomas delivered the letter to the ministryFriday morning — just before cabinet ministerOla Sjak Brask was to go to the cabinet meetingat the palace. Then something unique happened:a Storting report that was on the cabinet agendawas withdrawn. What made this situation mostunusual was the fact that all the media peoplehad received, as was usual, an advance copy ofthe report in order to acquaint themselves withit, but with the right to make it public only aftera certain date. Thus the situation was such thatthe journalists had the report, while the ones ithad been intended for — the members ofparliament — did not.

The case really created waves — but throughsome quick and intense meetings during theweek that followed, the matter was cleared upand the report could pass through cabinet as itwas originally intended, with a Norpipechairman of the board from Statoil without thedouble vote.

It still had to be passed by the parliament, butin spite of the fact that the Government led byKorvald was a minority Government, everyoneexpected that it would be adopted. Theoptimism was due in part to the fact that theIndustry Committee had been on a fact-findingtour of Emden and Teesside, and the signalsfrom the committee members were positive.

But the tension was still there — in spite ofeverything. And the stakes were high. Out inthe North Sea, barges, supply boats, andtugboats lay ready to begin one of the world'slargest pipelaying operations, the oil line toTeesside. What could torpedo the project was a«no» vote from the parliament — with theeconomic consequences that would involve.

The representatives from the Phillips Groupgathered at Hotell Bristol on the afternoon of 26April, while Anders O. Waale had the task offollowing the debate in the Storting. During thecourse of the day he had reported back bytelephone as to what was going on, importantstandpoints taken by key persons and other suchthings. When the voting finally took place -very late that evening — he noted the results andhurried over to the Bristol.

It was a noisy gathering which suddenlybecame quite still - and attentive - when hecame into the room. Most of those present hadbeen in Oslo with few interruptions throughoutthe previous 3-4 months and had beenparticipating in an endless series of internal andexternal meetings. It was quiet while Anders O.Waale recounted the outcome of the voting.This, of course, brought on a very audibleexpression of joy and relief over the fact that thematter had been brought to a successful end.Then there were hurried departures. Everyonewanted to inform his headquarters of theoutcome.

During thenegotiations betweenthe companies in thePhillips Group andvarious Norwegianauthorities, HotelBristol in Oslobecame a permanentbase for thecompanies'representatives. ThePhillips Grouprepresents aninternational groupof companies —fromthe US, Belgium,France, Italy andNorway.

Voting 90-3, theStorting decided infavor of landingcrude oil and NGLat Teesside, while thegas would go toEmden in WestGermany.

Ekofisk Becomes a «Cih/»

The jack-up rig"Gulftide" turned

Norway into anoil-producing nation.

Its capacity wasapprox, 40,000

barrels of oil per dayfrom four subsea

wells. The gas wasflared.

64

«We are hoping that the results of the testproduction will be positive, and that thiswill incorporate Norway into the ranks ofoil-producing countries. The start-up of oilproduction at Ekofisk is therefore somethingthat can turn out to be a red-letter day forNorwegian economic history.* With thesewords, Prime Minister Trygve Bratteliperformed the unveiling of acommemorative plaque in the dining roomon «Gulftide», 9 June 1971 at Ekofisk. Today

it can be recorded that Trygve Bratteli wasright — and to a greater degree than mostpeople would have predicted in 1971.

Just a little over 17 months after Ekofiskwas discovered in December 1969, thetemporary production platform was readyto begin production. The official openingfor production took place on 9 June, and on16 June the first test production was underway.

In a very tight time schedule for start-uppreparations, everything had lookedpromising at the end of May, but during thelast week before the day of the opening,technical problems arose when ice formed insome of the subsea valves. That meant thatthe first Norwegian-produced oil had towait until 15 June before the taps wereopened. Up until 8 July there was only testproduction. On that date the taps could beopened for the real thing.

The «Gulftide» jackup rig was chosenbecause it was available on the market - andin Bartlesville Phillips went to work onfitting familiar processing equipment for oiland gas into the limited space on board. Oiland gas would flow to the platform fromfour wells through separate lines. On theplatform water would then be removedfrom the oil and gas. The gas would beburned off in a flare in «Gulftide's» drillingderrick, while the oil would go via pipelinesto two loading buoys connecting theplatform with tankers. The processing workon «Gulftide» was relatively simple. Theproblem was to tailor-make the equipmentfor the platform. In London and Stavanger,however, the tasks were more difficult.There it was a question of attending to thesubsea wellheads that were to be used,

fortifying the «Gulftide» to meet North Searequirements, and developing a buoyloading system for an ocean territory wherethis technology had never been tested.

In order to gain some time, it was decidedthat the three delineation wells which«Ocean Viking» had drilled in order to chartEkofisk, in addition to the discovery well,should be turned into production wells. Atthe top of these would be placedhydraulic-operated wellheads. The first testswith subsea wellheads had been madeearlier, but to a limited extent and not inareas so exposed to inclement weather or atdepths as great as at Ekofisk. The solutionwas to have these wellheads made and thenreinforce them at the Phillips Base inDusavik near Stavanger.Then oil pipelines and control cables wereto be laid from each of the four wells to«Gulftide». There they would rise togetherin one caisson to the platform. Theconstruction of this caisson or riser was initself a big job. No less challenging wasfinding a solution for securing it to the seafloor and to the platform in such a way thatit would hold under the worst weatherconditions imaginable out in the middle ofthe North Sea.

Weather conditions were also the biggestproblem in connection with the constructionof the loading buoys. Phillips had hadexperience with loading buoys, but that

concept had only been employed in harborareas. Now they were to be placed in themiddle of the North Sea at a depth of 70meters — while they had previously onlybeen used at 27 meters.

The RebuildingThe Am0yfjord near Stavanger was thesite for the rebuilding of «Gulftide» to equipit for conditions at Ekofisk. There theprocessing equipment was placed on boardand reinforcements were carried out on thedrilling derrick, helicopter deck, hangar, andplatform legs. One of the difficult points inthis rebuilding was simply determiningwhat requirements should be placed on aplatform that would be situated in the North

A solemn group ofindustrial leadersand politicians listento Prime MinisterTrygve Bratteli on"Gulftide," 9 June1971. His wordsabout this becominga red-letter day inNorway's economichistory came true.

A number ofreporters werepresent during thesolemn occasion on"Gulftide" — onlyone thing waslacking: crude oil.Technical problemsdelayed productionstart-up until 8 July.But Aftenposten stillstated that Norwayhad been inauguratedat Ekofisk as an oilnation.

5 - Giant Discovery

"Gulftide" afloat onAmeyfjord near

Stavanger. Here theplatform was

reinforced to face thestorms in the North

Sea — while at thesame time processingequipment for oil and

gas was installed.

66

Sea for the purpose of producing oil. In spiteof the fact that Norway is a typical seafaringnation, the most elementary data regardingwave conditions at Ekofisk was lacking.Other than the experience that had beengained since exploratory drilling began in1966, there were observations from weatherships and ships passing through the area togo by. What we today refer to as the100-year wave was at that time fixed — on arather shaky foundation - at 19.4 meters.The calculations on which this figure wasbased were made by the New Orleans firmof A.H. Glenn & Associates. This figure wasused as starting point in the rebuilding of«Gulftide». New problems were constantlyarising for which solutions had to be found.Det norske Veritas was authorized by theNorwegian Government to carry outinspections and officially approve the workon the platform. The contract would have

significant consequences for thiswell-known ship certification company,which thereby became actively involved inthe oil industry.

Not even within Phillips was there anygreat expertise in offshore oil production.The company had offshore operations, butunder totally different conditions than wereanticipated in the North Sea. ThereforeBrown & Root was used as principalconsulting firm. Minor discussions werecontinually going on between Phillips andthe authorities as to how things should bedone. One question that was discussed for awhile was whether the pipelines from thesubsea wellheads should be buried — orwhether they should lie on the sea floor andgradually become covered through naturalprocesses. Many of the discussions thatarose had their origin in a concern for theenvironment and the fishing industry. One

The pipelaying barge"Hugh W. Cordon"is ready to lay pipesat Ekofisk. In thebackground:"Gulftide" and thetugboat "ParisTeriot".

of the main problems confrontingNorwegian politicians was the probabilityof oil spills and hence the damage to sea lifewhich could result. Then as now, the variousbusiness interest groups took opposingstands.

A number of questions were also raised inconnection with the new regulations onworking hours which forged their way intothe North Sea arena. On the explorationrigs, the crew worked one week offshoreand had one week free. On «Gulftide» duringthe early period, from late fall of 1970 untilproduction was under way, it was requestedthat the commuting specialists work 14 daysonboard and then have one week off. Thiswas finally accepted by the Norwegianauthorities.

The construction work out at Ekofiskstarted at the end of 1970. At that time theokay came to begin laying the pipelinesbetween the wellheads and «Gulftide».Brown & Root was awarded that contract,and it was pipelaying barge «Hugh Gordon*which would become the first to lay oilpipes on the Norwegian shelf.

The really difficult task was positioningthe riser that would bring the pipes and thecontrol cables from the sea floor on up to«Gulftide». It weighed 200 tons, was 42inches in diameter and approximately 91meters long. It was a huge operationwith the equipment of that time - evenwithout the weather gods' adding to the

difficulty. But it turned out well in the end,and the riser was in place.

ProductionThe principle behind production on«Gulftide» was so simple that it must beregarded as almost ingenious. From thesubsea wellheads the oil and gas went to theplatform where it passed through twoseparation levels for removal of gas andwater with simultaneous reduction of theenormous pressure. The gas was burned off.The oil then passed on through pipes to theloading buoys where the tankers weremoored. A hose then conducted the oildirectly into the tanks on the ships.Production could only go on when there layships loading. As soon as a ship was loadedto capacity, the oil flow was directed to theother loading buoy where the oil wasconducted onboard the next ship in the

Onboard the Brown& Root barge "HughW. Gordon"everything is readiedfor the laying ofpipelines between"Gulftide" and thefour subseawellheads.

67

A Creek tanker loadscrude at the loading

buoy, followingprocessing on the

platform in whichoil, gas, and water

were separated, thecrude produced on

"Gulftide" waspumped to the

loading buoys andthen on into tankers.

An oil sample isstudied on

"Gulftide". Theoperators onboardthe platform were

hired by contracts.Phillips later used theplatform for training

the company's ownoperators who were

to man thepermanentplatforms.

68

same manner. The problem with thisprinciple arose when weather conditionswere such that the tankers had to pull awayfrom the loading buoys because of highwinds or waves. When that happened,production had to be shut down from thewellheads immediately. That was done fromthe platform. With the prevailing weatherconditions at Ekofisk, production had to beshut down at regular intervals. During thefirst year production was shut down 25% ofthe time. About 20% was due to theweather, while the remaining down timehad other, technical causes. A number oftechnical problems arose necessarily duringthis gigantic test project, but they weresolved one by one and improvements weremade. It was particularly the experiencegained from technical problems connectedwith the loading buoys, oil hoses, andmooring lines that led to improvements.

Production started cautiously on 8 July1971, with only one well until September ofthat year. Then no. two started producing, amonth later the third one was ready, and inFebruary 1972 all four wells were inoperation.

But the most gratifying and encouragingresult throughout this first year ofoperations at Ekofisk was the fact that thereservoir did not show signs of collapsinglike the skeptics had believed it would.Production figures showed that each of the

four wells continued to produce to near themaximum amount of 10,000 barrels per day— as had been foreseen. Neither was thereany sign of the drastic reduction in pressurewhich some people thought would come asa result of the high pressure in the reservoir.Phillips carried out a number of tests, all ofwhich pointed in one direction: the reservoirat Ekofisk was as big as it had appeared tobe at the start, and production capacity wasas good as the optimists had predicted. Butthere was one problem to be dealt with inthe difficult chalk reservoir — the wells hadto be acidized before production could getunder way.

Focusing on the Colossus

On the 14th of May in 1971, the Phillips Groupsigned a contract with the French company C.G.Doris for construction of a concrete storage tankfor the Ekofisk field. The agreement marked theend of an intense decision-making process whichwent on during the first months of 1971. Therewere a number of questions in connection withthis pioneer project — the most fundamentalbeing whether such a tank would float, so that itcould be towed from the construction site to thefield.

Internally at Phillips and within the PhillipsGroup, all doubt was swept away. Good help inthis respect was provided by the tight timeschedule that had been set up — the storage tankhad to be out on the field during the course ofthe summer of 1972 if the development was tofollow the overall time schedule. This alsocontributed to the desire to begin constructionwork on the tank even though the Norwegianauthorities had not given their formal approval.

Building SiteEven before the contract with Phillips had beensigned, C.G. Doris had made contact withNorwegian building contractors Ing. F. Selmerto obtain a non-binding price estimate for theconcrete work on such a tank. Selmer hadfigured a quick price estimate and turned in theiroffer. In April/May 1971, Doris came back toSelmer and wanted a binding bid — the projectwould be realized. Ingeni0r F. Selmer A/S hadlong experience with concrete constructionsfrom water tanks, grain silos and supportcolumns for bridges. The company wasconsidered Norway's most experienced in theslip-forming technique — perhaps even on aworldwide basis. The firm had just completed alarger power project in Australia, thus adding tothe company's good reputation. But theAustralia project had also taught F. Selmer animportant lesson — that it was not wise to drainall the company's resources on a project with atime limit. Considering the building time withwhich Doris was operating in connection withthe storage tank, the company felt that theyneeded assistance. Hoyer-Ellefsen was amongthe three leading contracting firms (along with

Selmer) in this particular field in Norway, andthe two companies agreed to cooperate on theproject. The first problem that had to be solved- and quickly - was the selection of a buildingsite. The location would have to satisfy anumber of requirements, of which the mostimportant were: a large area that could be turnedinto a dry dock, an infrastructure that couldhandle such a large and intensely time-limitedproject, ocean depths nearby where the actualslip-forming could be carried out and, fortowout, depths of 60 meters or more out toopen waters.

The location that plant manager KnutTovshus and production manager GunnarVinnvik at F. Selmer took note of was Dirdal —a small village at the inner end of Hogsfjord inthe rural district of Gjesdal in Rogaland County.While they were awaiting the results of groundtesting, a contract was signed with thelandowners. This took place without theinvolvement of the district officials, and whenword of it reached Gjesdal district late in theevening on 17 May 1971, there was an uproar.Principal questions regarding Norwegian localdemocracy were raised, Stavanger Aftenbladraised questions about democracy in a featurearticle on 19 May, and the case ended up beforethe parliament. From district quarters a

The dimensions ofthe Ekofisk Tank areimpressive. Oslo'scity hall could easilyfit within the limitsof the Tank's outerwall. Comparing itwith familiarbuildings onshoremakes it easier foreveryone to-comprehend theTank's enormous

69

The tiny communityof Dirdal was

initially picked asfabrication site forthe Ekofisk Tank.The choice created

quite a stir since thelocal authorities were

not the first to beinformed. This

coverage inStavanger Aftenblad

from 3 June 197 T.refers to the

parliament'sdiscussion of the

principals involvedin this case of

deficientinformation.

comprehensive district hearing was indicatedbefore a stand could be taken in the matter — andin the meantime the responsible parties within F.Selmer began the search for alternatives.Jattavagen in Stavanger was then named as analternative — and new ground testing wascarried out. In contrast to Gjesdal, theywere met with open arms in Stavanger, and thecase was pushed through municipal procedures.Stavanger had learned that in the oil industrythings should happen fast — and as often as notthey did. «American tempo», it was called, andStavanger had already shown that the city wasable to meet the demands that were made.

While the discussion on Dirdal vs. Jattavagenwas going on, the results came in from theground tests in Dirdal. The conclusion wasrelatively clear — Dirdal was not suitable since itwould be necessary to go down to a depth of 40meters in the ground before a dry dock could besecured against water seepage. That left Jatta-vagen, and even Stavanger Aftenblad applaudedthe fact in an editorial on the 2nd of June.Gunnar Vinnvik says in retrospect thathe is glad Dirdal wasn't chosen. If that hadhappened, the construction work would havecompletely overburdened the infrastructure —roads, water works, etc., would not have beenable to carry the load, and the project wouldhave had to be moved in the midst of theconstruction work.

On 4 June the contract between Ing. F. Selmerand the City of Stavanger was signed. The citywas guaranteed a harbor for 550 pleasure boatsin return when the project was finished. Only inretrospect has the extent of this contract becomeclear, now that we have experienced thebuilding of one Condeep platform after anotherat Hinnavagen.

Construction Start-UpIt wasn't until 14 June 1971 that Stavanger's citycouncil formally approved the contract with Ing.F. Selmer. At that time work on the dry dock had

already begun, with leveling. The followingweek, work was under way on the wallwhich would keep the water out. Then it was fullsteam ahead with dredging and preparing the10 x 110 meter cavity behind the 300 meterlong dry dock wall.

The work went on all summer in Jattavagen,while local industry in the Stavanger areamanaged to secure subcontracts for the work.

The main contractor was C.G. Doris. The twoFrench firms Europe-Etudes and UIE were bigsuppliers, while Ing. F. Selmer andH0yer-Ellefsen were the largest suppliers ofparts with responsibility for the constructionand concrete work. Stavanger Spennbetong andO.C. 0straadt in Sandnes had prefabrications —including the breakwater elements(approximately 8,000), Singel & Grussenteretwas to deliver 120,000 cubic meters of sand,while Norsk Hammerverk was to supply the5,000 tons of reinforcement steel that wasneeded. There were also a number of smallersuppliers. Moreover, the work on the tank cameduring a period of low activity within thebuilding sector in the Stavanger area, and peakemployment on the building project would beclose to 800 people.

The activity continued almost day and nightso as to be finished by the middle of August,when the actual construction work was to start.Doris had a one-year delivery schedule, with thedate for completion set at 1 August 1972.

Delayed Start-UpThe Norwegian authorities had not yetapproved the drawings for the tank when, in thefirst half of August, everything was ready for theactual construction work to begin. Det norskeVeritas had been given approval responsibilityby the Ministry of Industry. The first problemsalready showed up the day after the work hadbegun. Veritas could not accept the calculationsthat Doris submitted for the base section.Veritas felt that the structural analyses wereinsufficient and that new figures had to besubmitted. This led first to the decision that thebottom should be built with a system ofconcrete ribs under the base slab, while theoriginal plans were based on a flat bottom.

Consequently, the dry dock had to be madeone meter deeper before the slip-forming couldbegin. While that work was going on, furtherobjections to the base construction came fromVeritas. The first foundation work had started upwhen Veritas' intervention brought it to a halton 23 August. Now the amount ofreinforcement and the thickness of the basesection were in question.

These difficulties stemmed, of course, fromthe fact that there was no experience fromsimilar constructions on which to build. This was

Jåttåvågen nearStavanger, beforeconstruction start onthe Ekofisk Tank.

The foundation ofthe Ekofisk Tank istaking shape. It isobvious that the areahas now been turnedMo one giantdrydock.

71

Whether or not theTank would floatbecame a favorite

discussion topic forStavanger's citizens.

Under the heading"Safety First", theartist's comments

ran as follows: "Asan added safety

precaution duringtowout of the Tank,one of our fishermen

has donated a goodold-fashioned

bailer."

the first time that concrete would be used inoil-related structures offshore. Norwegianstandards had not been established forconditions such as these, and questions wereraised as Veritas received documentation fromDoris. Another problem that soon showed upwas the fact that the French firm Doris wasunaccustomed to the close association with aState inspection agent. This resulted in Veritas'being treated in an almost stepmotherly fashionfor a while. By the time Veritas was able to seethe documentation for construction of thevarious parts, it was much too late, and the workwas either already under way or about to begin.Naturally, this had to lead to delays based on theNorwegian way of working. Fortunately actionwas taken at last, and the climate of cooperationimproved considerably.

It wasn't until 30 September that all areas ofdisagreement were cleared up and work couldresume. Comprehensive tests were then madeon the construction — at Norges TekniskeH0gskole in Trondheim, among other places —and the results led to an increase in the amountof reinforcement steel and in the thickness of thebase.

Construction MethodThe original plans involved completing the basesection for towout from the Jattavagen dry dockaround Christmas 1971. The delays andresulting extra work meant that the towoutcould not take place until 24 February 1972.The actual slip-forming was to be done atHillevag where water depths were satisfactoryfor the technique that had been developed. In

contrast to the Condeep platforms in which theconstruction work moves steadily upward untilthe full height is achieved, and submersiondoesn't take place until the superstructure isattached — the Ekofisk Tank was built by itsbeing gradually lowered into the sea as the workprogressed. Thus its height above sea level wasrather constant. The evening before towoutfrom dry dock was to take place, a hastydecision was made to hold a christeningceremony. Ann Doney, wife of Phillips'representative at Jattavagen, C.E. «Chuck»Doney, had the honor of being godmother. SoEkofisk I was christened with real champagne.

It FloatsThere were plenty of skeptics who believed thatEkofisk I would not be able to float. How can aconcrete colossus weighing 45,000 tons float?

But the Tank didactually float, and

was anchored atHillevag near

Stavanger. Theredip-forming could

get under way on thestorage cells deep

inside the structure.

72

The breakwaterelements in theTank's outer wallwere prefabricatedand hoisted Moplace. At one stage itwas necessary to fillin the holes in theelements to maintainbuoyancy.

The law of Archimedes was referred to innewspaper articles on the days prior to theevent. When the day arrived, there were a lot ofbinoculars aimed at the colossus for the purposeof following the development at close range.

And Ekofisk I floated! Its clearance marginabove the seabed, however, was only 30centimeters on account of the extra baseelements, but at high tide the operation wenteven more smoothly than had been expected. AtHillevag the Tank was moored with twohydraulic anchoring devices on land while twonewly-developed «mud anchors* were extendedout into the fjord. And Stavanger Aftenblad ranits third editorial on the Tank: with «Ekofisk I» asits title, it called the event an «oil adventure inour own swimming pool.» The editorial wasconcluded with the words, «May good fortunefollow you on the ocean floor.»

Slip-formingPreparations for slip-forming were begun as

soon as the Tank was moored. Selmer's slip-formtechnique was used on the nine storage cells atthe center of the construction.

The structure connecting these tanks with thebreakwater wall around them was alsoslip-formed, while the breakwater wall consistsof prefabricated rings that were cementedtogether. It was also this latter process thatpresented a bit of a problem, and during thework's start-up phase it became necessary toclose up the holes temporarily in order toincrease buoyancy. Veritas' decision, to theeffect that concrete to be lowered into the seahad to be of a certain age, slowed down theprogress. The result was that the structure grewupward at a rate of three centimeters per hour —60 centimeters per 24 hours.

Work continued around the clock — for themost part with a total of 750 men in activity,spread over three shifts.

As Easter 1972 approached, the work wasgoing well — while at the same time Veritas' 73

Inspection of thestructure is carried

out by divers using adiving bell.

The constructiontechnique involved

the Tank's beingsunk lower into the

water as workprogressed.

74

testing of the construction continued. Again thetesting was carried out at NTH in Trondheim -Norway's only harbor laboratory. There theTank was exposed to the 100-year-wave tomeasure its effect on the structure.

Additional Approval ProblemsEven though work on the Tank progressednormally throughout the spring and summer of1972 -until the structure reached its full heighton 21 June, there was a vigorous tug-of-wargoing on the whole time between Veritas andDoris, and between the Ministry of Industry andPhillips as builder. The problems that had arisenat construction start-up had been taken care of,but the unusual situation resulting from the factthat building work had begun prior to approvalof the drawings added to the difficulties.

At the end of March, the disagreement as toreinforcement calculations and stability was sogreat that the Ministry of Industryrecommended that Phillips stop the work. Therewas hectic meeting activity all that spring, andindependent experts from the University ofCalgary, Canada were called in.

With the exception of a strike and a few days'pause due to strong winds, the work went oncontinuously, and this approval process had noeffect on the daily activity. The problems weresolved as they went along, and the goal thenwas to be finished in October 1972.

OutfittingAs the concrete work approached completionthere were a number of other tasks in full swing.A lot of equipment was to be placed on board.The pumping capacity for receiving 350,000barrels of crude oil production per day was to beinstalled, and the capacity leaving the Tankwould be 720,000 barrels per day. Purificationequipment was also installed so that the waterdischarged into the sea would fall safely withinthe requirements of the Norwegian authorities.

The work was complex — and much moreextensive then had been anticipated at the start.Production manager on the Tank, Gunnar

Vinnvik, tells it like this: «I'm not sure we wouldhave taken on the project had we foreseen at thestart all that the task involved. But today, ofcourse, when we see the consequences, we'reglad it was done.»

Tourist AttractionThe daring efforts involved in the building ofthe Ekofisk Tank made it quite an attraction,during the construction period, for people in theoil business around the world. In August 1972those in charge of the concrete work couldreport that over 3,000 people had visited theTank. These were oil people who wanted to geta closer look at the giant and possibly use thebuilding principles in their own developmentprojects.

At the same time, there were a great manywho were interested in the Tank but not allowedto go on board. The structure became a part ofthe Stavanger skyline, and «visitors» viabinoculars and pleasure craft became part ofeveryday exprience for the people workingon board.

Modification of PlansDuring the course of 1972, the Ekofiskdevelopment became steadily more complex ascompared with the starting point. Six new fieldshad been added — in 1972 alone Edda andAlbuskjell were discovered, while the size ofEldfisk was established. And at this point in timein 1972, no one knew where it all would end.There were still plenty of potential structures fordiscoveries in the concession area. The need forprocessing of oil and gas greatly increased involume. 2/4 FTP had a 350,000 barrel capacity.But that was expected to be sufficient only forproduction from the main Ekofisk field. Greatercapacity was necessary for handling the sixsatellite fields which had now been discovered —plus extra capacity for eventual new discoveries.At the same time, it was made definitively clearthat the Phillips Group's intention was to laytwo pipelines from Ekofisk to shore — one oilline and one gas line. The technical solutions inthis instance required a central starting point forthe lines. That would provide the flexibility ofbeing able to link up new fields without anyproduction halt to speak of - as opposed tolink-ups on the pipeline itself on the ocean floor— and was on the whole a more economicalsolution.

Since the concentration of platforms wastaking shape with 2/4 C, 2/4 FTP, 2/4 Q and2/4 Tank, this was a sensible and logical startingpoint. Furthermore, the Tank had a large area ofabout 1.8 acres available, which could be utilizedalmost without additional cost.

That which had been planned at the start as astorage tank was designated to be the site where

After it was towedout of the dock, theEkofisk Tank becamea Stavangerlandmark. Theslip-forming tookplace near the city'scenter, and everyonecould follow theprogress.

all oil and gas from the satellite fields would beaccumulated and sent on toward onshoredestinations.

Extending the TimetablesThe increased complexity of the developmentproject resulted in the need to extend alltimetables. The first plans, aimed at being readyto start up permanent production from fixedplatforms on the Ekofisk field in early 1972,could not be realized.

Start-up time was constantly being movedforward, and the concession for the test phasefrom «Gulftide» was extended by the authorities.This meant that there was no need for the Tankout on the field during the summer/fall of 1972.The delays in completion work on the Tankfrom 1 August to October 1972 also madePhillips skeptical about undertaking a towingoperation during a season when the first fall andwinter storms might be encountered en route.

In late summer of 1972, the Phillips Groupdecided to build a deck over the whole Tank andanother deck above that one, covering 65percent of the structure. This could have beendone out on the field, but it would haveinvolved both increased expenses and greaterrisk. It was safer to do parts of the job insheltered waters near shore. At the end ofSeptember, casting began on the supportcolumns for the lower, 20-meter deck whichwould cover the whole Tank, including thebreakwater wall. And during the course of thewinter the deck was installed. The upper deck

was to be installed out on the field when theTank was in place.

After the 20-meter deck was finished, it wasequipped with the necessary conveniences sothat people could stay there and work on thefinal tasks - both en route to Ekofisk and whenthe Tank had reached its destination. Ahelicopter deck was part of this work, since theTank would not be connected to the otherplatforms by bridge until later.

Preparations for TowoutSpring 1973 was marked by tasks preparing fortowout. The route to be followed had alreadybeen decided back in May 1971 byrepresentatives of Doris and Selrner. Naturally,this was an important factor in the selection of abuilding site. The Tank's depth during the towwould be about 60 meters, and the most difficultand crucial part of the towing operation wouldbe the stretch from Hillevag to H0gsfjord.

Another important and critical point wascrossing the Norwegian Trench - while thesetting operation on the seabed out on the fieldwas decidedly the most risk-filled. This had to bedone carefully to avoid incurring damage, but itwas equally important to do it in such a way thatit would be as resistant as possible to waves,weather and wind.

Discussions in this connection began beforestart-up on the construction work and resultedin the casting of a ribbing system in concretebelow the bottom slab. Out on the field wherethe Tank was to be located, ground tests were 75

made by Norges Geotekniske Institutt. Theyshowed that the seabed consisted of a 26-meterthick layer of sand over harder clay. Computersimulations had predicted that the Tank wouldgradually work its way down into the oceanfloor until it stood so firmly that it would beaffected very little by weather conditions.

Towout day was set for 8 June 1973. Allpreparations had been completed, and six bigtugs with a total of 45,000 horsepower were inplace. The warning notice for ships in the areahad been published in the newspapers. Weatherforecasts during the tow period were good —and safe in the hands of a French meteorologistbrought by Doris from France. Just before 10:00a.m. on 7 June the all-clear signal came from theMinistry of Industry. But then a few hours laterthe Veritas bomb was dropped . . .. Less than 12hours before the towout was to begin, Veritassent word that documentation on themeasurements of the seabed where the Tankwas to stand were insufficient. Veritas wasnot satisfied with, or convinced by, themeasurements Doris had carried out. Veritas wasnot sure that the ocean floor was as flat as Dorisand Phillips had calculated it to be. The resultwas that the Ministry of Industry requiredmeasurements of the seabed — therefore, thetowout was postponed. On 12 June the tug«Simson» was on location at Ekofisk and in theprocess of taking new measurements, utilizingecho sounding. However, weather conditionswere not ideal, and doubt arose as to the qualityof the measurements. But the analysis workbegan at Veritas and continued around the clock.The question was whether the results of these

measurements would be the same as for the onesDoris had carried out. What Veritas feared wasgreat local unevenness in the seabed, indicatinga danger of cracks forming in the base of theTank.

Based on the measurements, the conclusionwas that concrete would be injected under thebase of the Tank after it was put into position -thus creating a kind of foundation. It waspossible to do this since pipes were molded intothe structure — initially intended for sendingthrough measuring instruments. With that camethe all-clear signal and the official okay to startthe tow - this time from the PetroleumDirectorate. That was June 19th. But then newproblems arose. Some of the anchor chains hadalready been cut in preparation for the start ofthe 8 June towout, but a couple were left. Thenew towout starting time was set for just aftermidnight on June 20th. People from theStavanger area went down to the fjord that finesummer night to witness the event. But theywere disappointed — and had given up theirnight's sleep for nothing. The job of burningthrough the anchor chains took longer thanplanned, and towout was again delayed.

Business at LastAt 2:15 a.m. on 21 June, the six tugs put their45,000 horsepower to work on the 215,000 tonEkofisk Tank. Two boats were out in front, twobehind and one at each side. One of the world'sgreatest maritime operations to date could getunder way. Stavanger Aftenblad devoted itsfourth editorial to the Ekofisk Tank that day:«A Local Event of Worldwide Significance* —

Many peoplesacrificed a night's

sleep between 19 and20]une 1973 in

order to watch thetowout of the Tank.

But new questionswere raised — and the

towout delayed.

76

In the eurly morninghours of 21 ]une1973, things finallybegin to happen. Sixtugs with a total of45,000 hp began the215,000 ton towfrom Stavanger toEkofisk.

stating that, «The monument to a newtechnological era is today journeying throughour district.*

The Tank followed the route which has sincebecome the established one in connection withCondeep construction by NorwegianContractors at Hinnavagen. The route wentfrom Hillevag past Usken and out intoHogsfjord and, from there, in a straight linenorthward between the islands of Talgje andFogn, Fogn and Finnoy, around Krabbeskjaer andout into Boknafjord.

The towout surpassed all expectations, andnone of the many emergency plans that hadbeen developed were needed.

Setting the TankDuring towout to the field, the Tank extended66 meters down into the water. In order to placeit at a depth of 70 meters, water was pumpedinto the tanks while it was towed into position.Right before it was to be lowered, one last checkof the exact position was made before it was setin place.

Phillips' plan was initially that the Tank wouldbe placed on a continuation of the straight lineformed by the southernmost flare, 2/4 FTP, 2/4Q, and 2/4 C. Because of the uncertaintysurrounding the seabed conditions, the Tankwas positioned a little farther to the west. Thuscame the characteristic break in the middle of theEkofisk Complex.

It turned out, however, that seabed conditionswere better than feared, and the job of injectingconcrete under the Tank could be omitted.

In order to secure the Tank, it was filled withwater and some sand as ballast. The sand camefrom Dirdal — the place originally designated asbuilding site for the Tank. Nearly 48,000 tons ofsand were shipped from there out to the field.

Instead of the concrete foundation which wasto have been cast under the Tank, a steel skirtwas built around it on the seabed. Steel plates

were pressed down into the seabed so that therewould be no danger of the ocean currents'forming any trenches which could then lead tounevenness in the seabed.

More WorkAfter most of the work of situating and securingthe Tank had been completed in late summer of1973, Doris went to work on building the30-meter deck. In this instance components wereshipped out and assembled on the field.

The work to finish the Tank in the manner inwhich the expanded plans for its use requiredwent on for a long time and was part of PhaseIII in the field development. It was not untilDecember 1974 that the work was completed.

The Ekofisk Tank has first and foremostbecome a nerve center and a junction for theproduction at Ekofisk. The need for bufferstorage in bad weather disappeared when thepipelines were put into service. But as reservestorage, in case of damage to the line, it has

The route of the towhad been decided in1971. The mostcritical phases werethe narrow passagesbetween the islandsoutside Stavanger,the crossing of theNorwegian Trench,and the actualpositioning atEkofisk. Waitingareas had beendefined, in case theweather causedtrouble.

77

The Ekofisk Tank istowed in towards theexisting platforms at

the Complex. Thelowering was doneby pumping watergradually into the

Tank — until it wasstanding on the

bottom.

The Tank is in placeand the 30 meter

deck installed. Thework on P platform

is under way, andthe Tank lies like a

separate islandwithout any

connection with thesouthern part of the

Ekofisk Complex.

meant extra security for production stability onthe field.

ConsequencesThe construction of the Ekofisk Tank was amilestone in the total Ekofisk development —and also became a great milestone withinNorwegian oil operations. It is difficult today toimagine the North Sea petroleum industrywithout the concrete platforms. But when thedecision was to be made as to whether toconstruct the Ekofisk Tank, there was noexperience on which to build. Knowledge andtechniques were taken from other areas andcombined to form a new product — with theconviction that it could be done.

There were many skeptics. The wholebuilding process was marked by boldness. Aconcrete tank had collapsed while beinglaunched in France. That cast a shadow over the

project and led to close supervision of theconstruction work. It also partly explains themany interventions by Veritas, the inspectionagency. Strength and stability calculations for aconcrete tank that would have to withstandpressures from the sea in one of the world'sroughest ocean territories were not to be viewedlightly. The fear of oil spills and resultingpollution overshadowed nearly every otherissue in the petroleum industry's first years inNorway.

For Norwegian building contractors Ing. F.Selmer and H0yer Ellefsen, who togetherformed the company Condeep Group, thebuilding of the Ekofisk Tank marked the start ofa new industry. The experience gained fromworking with concrete on the Tank formed thebasis for the platform concepts which were laterrealized. And they were realized because thebuilding of the Ekofisk Tank proved thatconcrete was a suitable material for platforms atsea. The fact that the French concept of thebreakwater wall was dropped in favor ofslimming down the structure as much as possiblein the vulnerable zone around sea level does notalter this. It just proves that the companies wereable to apply the knowledge and experience tofurther development.

In the very same year that the Ekofisk Tankwas towed out from Stavanger, the companies inthe Condeep Group signed contracts to buildthree more platforms. Since that time there havebeen countless more — the structure iscontinually being improved and modified. Butthe Ekofisk Tank was the first.

78

Permanent ProductionThere was hectic activity and tension in theair for the crew manning the control roomoh FTP platform that April evening. Theirbig «exam day» had finally arrived. Monthsof hard work on preparations and testing ofequipment were over. Tonight it washappening - the first crude oil from well 13on 2/4 Ekofisk Alpha was being processedon the platform. Water and gas wereseparated out and the crude oil sent on bypumps into the pipeline, which would lead itto loading buoy no. 1 where the tanker«Elisabeth Fernstrom* lay ready to receive it.Everything was functioning perfectly, and at10:00 p.m. they were able to record thearrival of the oil at the loading buoy, and itsfinal journey through lines down into thetanks on the ship.

Thus the first oil produced from fixedplatforms on the Norwegian continentalshelf became a fact late in the evening on 25April 1974. Phase II in the Ekofiskdevelopment was under way — and duringthe months that followed, severalproduction wells were drilled and tied intothe processing on FTP platform.

The road leading up to this April eveningin 1974 had been a long one — no reason todeny it. Nearly four and a half years hadgone by since the Ekofisk field had beenestablished — and the first timetable hadfixed production start-up from thepermanent platforms at first quarter 1972.

But in spite of the fact that the timetablehad missed its target by two years,production start-up was a huge triumph forthe Phillips Norway Group. With manyodds against them, they managed todevelop this gigantic oil field in the middleof the North Sea - in one of the world'sroughest bodies of water and at a depth of70 meters, deeper than oil platforms hadever been placed. A number of unknownproblems had turned up along the way asPhillips, the operator, set to work on thetasks. Problems which no one could haveforeseen — they had to be experiencedthrough practical problem-solving.

The Hundred Year WaveThe telephone conversation dropped like abomb on Phillips' construction departmentin London that day in February 1971. Arepresentative from the Glenn firm in NewOrleans had just told Project Manager

Leonard P. Meade that the size of the100-year wave the company had providedfor Phillips the previous fall appeared to betoo small. Glenn would shortly be sendingover new documents which showed that,based on the firm's latest calculations, the100-year wave for the Ekofisk area hadincreased from 64 to 78 feet. If the companymaintained this calculation, it would lead tolong delays for the entire Ekofiskdevelopment since the first platforms werealready under construction in New Orleansand Ravenna, Italy. Leonard P. Meade feltdownright taken in, and he decided tocontact the second largest and second mosthighly-regarded firm within this branch tocheck the new calculations from Glenn. Butfirst he had to halt construction on the twoplatforms which was already under way,and likewise stop preparations on the otherthree platforms and on the jackets for thesouth flare.

When that had been done, a check of thecalculations for the 100-year wave wasinitiated, with Phillips' maritime expert,Wayne Cannon, in charge. It turned out astime went by that new data from the winterof 1970-71 had forced Glenn to modifytheir calculations.

The data base was not good. Exact

Before start-up onthe Ekofiskdevelopment, the100-year wave wascalculated at 19.4meters. However, itturned out that thecalculation base wasinaccurate, and in1971 the waveincreased to 23.7meters. This hadgreat consequencesfor the development,since the Phase IIplatforms were underconstruction. Theresult was nearly ayear's delay.

79

measurements did not exist. The hard winterof 1970-71 upset all previous suppositions,and it became clear to all involved that thefirst calculations were not good enough: thenew 100-year wave for the North Sea was a78-footer. That meant almost a year'ssetback, but the «Gulftide», which was onlocation at Ekofisk and being readied for testproduction, was confirmed that the rigsatisfied the new requirements.

Planning Start-UpPlanning work on the permanentdevelopment of the Ekofisk field began inearly 1970, while drilling of confirmationwells on the field was still going on. Despitethe fact that the decision had been made tocomplete the test period with «Gulftide», thepermanent development plan was in theworks at the same time. The designing ofthe platforms in the first construction phase— Phase II - began as early as 1970.

Early that same year Phillips, as operator,associated with contractors Brown & Rootin Houston for the purpose of planning theplatform structures, while the company'sown Engineering and Construction sectionin Bartlesville would handle the processingequipment. Brown & Root had experiencewith platform design from the British sectorof the North Sea — and from the Gulf ofMexico. The firm was regarded as one ofthe leaders in the field.

During the first part of 1970, Phillipsbegan a moderate build-up of the company'sown project group at the London office.Leonard P. Meade was the first projectengineer, while in August 1970 E.G. «Carl»Johnson came from Bartlesville and becameengineer number two. Up to the spring of1972 the office kept growing steadily, to atotal of 8-10 engineers. Carl Johnson wasresponsible for the development at Ekofisk —an assignment he kept until 1978.

The reservoir calculations that had beenmade on the basis of the first two wells atEkofisk provided the criteria for thedevelopment plan that was launched earlyin 1970. No other field had been found yetin the area — drilling was under way on whatwould later become both West Ekofisk andTor, and a little later drilling would begin onwhat was to become Eldfisk. But for the timebeing, all criteria for design of platforms andequipment were based on Ekofisk alone.

80 The platforms developed for Phase II

were relatively simple platforms, the modelsfor which were obtained from previouslydeveloped fields in other locations aroundthe world. These plans were thentailor-made for conditions at Ekofisk. Theplatforms were simple in that there was noprocessing on board. Emphasis was onwellhead platforms which simply broughtup the oil and gas - then transported it tothe processing platform. The injectionplatform, on the other hand, was moreadvanced, because it would return to thereservoir the gas that came up with the oil.Since pressure in the Ekofisk reservoir wasso high, the compressors which were topropel the gas down into the reservoirwould have to be sufficiently powerful toexceed reservoir pressure. However, thefirm that produced the compressors felt thatit would not be a problem to buildcompressors such as these.

The first contracts for construction of theplatforms at Ekofisk were signed at the endof 1970. The others were signed in thebeginning of 1971, and the contract for theEkofisk Tank followed in May 1971.Everything was ready for implementing theplans.

Starting Signal at SeaThe crane barge «Choctaw» had had to putinto the Stavanger harbor involuntarily formore than month. Every day the weatherforecasts were checked carefully to see ifconditions out at Ekofisk were such that itcould weigh anchor and move into action,but the North Sea had obviously decided tobe difficult.

Since the beginning of October 1971,everything had been ready to startconstruction on what was to become theEkofisk city in the middle of the North Sea.The first three bridge supports to bepositioned on the seabed, together to makeup the south flare in Ekofisk city, wereplaced on barges. On board the «Choctaw»was the necessary equipment for piling thetripods to the seabed. The method to beused in the piling and foundationingoperation was developed by engineer BillBowles at Phillips. The plan chosen was likethe one the Americans used when they builttheir famous skyscrapers. The piles wouldbe bored down through the legs on thebridge support. Deep down in the seabed ahole was then made which would be

The derrick barge"Choctaw" is pilingthe bridge supportfor the south flare.This was the firststructure installed onwhat was to becomethe Ekofisk Complex— on I December1971.

The three bridgesupports and thebridges are in place —the flare itself is theonly thing lacking atthe south end.

cemented — and the cement would extendup into the steel pile itself. This kind ofstructure had never been tested in oiloperations, but the extreme weatherconditions in the North Sea demanded asolid foundation for platforms which had tobe able to withstand waves up to 23 metershigh.

At the end of November, the weatherfinally began to settle down and the all-clearsignal was given for the «Choctaw» to setcourse for Ekofisk. There was muchexcitement both on board the barge and atPhillips' offices in Oslo, at Dusavik nearStavanger, and in London. The theorieswould finally be given practical application.

Then on I December 1971, the time wasripe. A bridge support was launched, andthe «Choctaw» was able to maneuver it intoposition and get started on the foundationwork. Everything looked good. Even

though all the piling was not completed atthat time, the bridge support was properlysecured and everything was ready to moveon to number two. However, the weatherthreatened to interfere again, but it wasdecided to go ahead while conditions weremoderately good. The barge with supportnumber two was steered toward the«Choctaw» so that the latter could hoist thebridge support off the barge and launch it.That's when it happened. One of the legs onthe bridge support was struck against the«Choctaw» when a wave pitched the bargeagainst the crane barge.

A quick inspection of the bridge supportverified that it could not be launched beforerepairs were made. Its course had to be setfor Stavanger and the shop — before supportnumber two could be launched on 7February 1972. Fourteen days later the thirdsupport was launched, and the «Choctaw» 81

6 - Giant Discovery

Two of the platformjackets — FTP and C

- for Phase II of thedevelopment were

built in the US. Hereone of the jackets is

being towed fromsunny Texas to

rougher conditions inthe North Sea.

82

was able to concentrate on the foundationwork. That was no easy job either, and itwas the summer of 1972 before all threebridge supports were satisfactorily securedto the sea floor.

On the WayThe building of the Phase II platforms waswell distributed — both geographically andamong various companies. This wasabsolutely necessary in view of the tightschedule. If everything had beenconcentrated around a few building sites,the schedule would have been hopelessfrom the start. A good portion of FTP wasbuilt in Houston, Texas, by Brown & Root.There both the steel jacket and many otherparts of the platform were built. C platformwas also built in the USA — the jacket wasbuilt by McDermott in Morgan City, La.Ingram Saipem in Ravenna, Italy, built mostof Bravo platform, while Heerema/UIE builtthe jackets for Alpha and Q platforms inFrance. Several of these same companies hadother parts of the platforms, but at differentconstruction sites. In addition, the samecompanies would supply crane bargeswhich would handle the assembling of theplatforms out at sea.

The awarding of contracts was based onnormal bidding competition, but it has been

admitted in retrospect that the pattern onthe owners' part within the Phillips Groupwas well reflected in the choice of buildingsites for the various platforms. Carl Johnson,who had principal responsibility in thisprocess, says that he never felt any pressurein this area from the companies, but that theawarding of contracts occurred as a naturalconsequence of the criteria that had beenset. With regard to Norwegian shipyards,they were not involved in the competitionfor the simple reason that they were totallyoccupied with shipbuilding.

While the crane barge «Choctaw» wastaking advantage of the best days inFebruary 1972 to position and pile thebridge supports for the south flare, the firstplatform jacket embarked on its voyageacross the Atlantic from Houston. On 19February the tugboat set out with the FTPjacket. Nine days later the jacket for Qplatform embarked on a shorter voyagefrom St. Wanderville, France, to Ekofisk. Asit turned out, the shorter trip became thelonger one. A good distance out in theNorth Sea, the tugboats that were towingthe Q jacket encountered a proper winterstorm, and the barge carrying the jacketbroke loose. Attempts to bring new hawserson board had to be abandoned, and the tughad more than enough to handle just riding

out the storm. The barge with the jacket,which was to serve as the foundation for thefirst housing platform in the North Sea, wasdrifting on its own. For a while all was quiet— they weren't able to fix its location. CarlC. Anderson and Ken Ehlers in Stavangerchartered a jet plane from Braathens SAFEand made a search but without result. Thencame the report from Shetland that thebarge was heading toward the rockyshoreline there. A rescue was impossible,and both barge and jacket were tossedagainst the shore. Carl Johnson, Carl C.Anderson, and Ken Ehlers took a trip up toShetland from London to inspect thedamage, but it was a foregone conclusion.The jacket had to be declared a total loss.This was a tough blow for the developmentplans — but there was no time to lose, and anew jacket was ordered right away from thesame yard — without any bidding. Therewas a problem, however, with steel. At thattime in 1972 - and for several more years -there was a worldwide steel shortage crisis.However, Phillips had some steel on handwhich had been purchased in connectionwith the new hundred-year wave that wascalculated in 1971, and this supply was sentimmediately to France so that constructionon the replacement jacket could get underway as quickly as possible.

The jacket for FTP was more fortunate

with the weather - at least at the outset.Everything went according to plan until itwas launched at Ekofisk. Then the weathergods wanted to have their say, and thejacket had to be parked on the seabed forsome time during the month of March,before it could be situated in its properlocation.

While the piling and foundation work onFTP was going on, another tow set out fromthe USA. The jacket for C-platformembarked from New Orleans on 30 May,while the jacket for Bravo was being readiedfor towout from Ravenna, Italy. The first toarrive at Ekofisk was the jacket for C. Thecrane barge «Hercules» had just hoisted theflare tower and the two outer bridges into

The first platform tobe placed on theseabed as part of theEkofisk developmentwas the FTP jacket.Here the modulesupport frames arebeing lifted onto thejacket.

The construction ofthe FTP platformwent fast in 1972.At the same time the2/4 C jacket waspositioned and piledto the seabed.

83

Parallel with theinstallation of the

platforms at theEkofisk Complex, the

jackets forproduction platforms

A and B were set,and the construction

work began. Here themodule support

frame for B platformis being hoisted.

84

position before C-jacket was launched andset next to FTP.

It was a hectic summer out on the field —with a tendency toward traffic jams in thevicinity of the FTP-C-flare tower complex.«Choctaw» and «Hercules» were assisted bycrane barge «DB-16», «Challenger» and«Champion», while «Barge 2 79» didpipelaying. In addition, the combinationvessel «Hugh Gordon* was still on locationin the area. If we also include tugs, bargesand supply boats, the picture will becomplete. Between 7,000 and 8,000 peoplehad their employment out there.

On 16 August the Bravo jacket wasreported in place, and on 28 August theAlpha structure was in position. Toward theend of the month the two deck sections forFTP were hoisted onto the jacket.

The rest of the modules and equipmentpackages for FTP were hoisted as soon asthe deck was installed, and by the end ofSeptember only the compressors werelacking on FTP. Eumech, the Brown & Rootcompany, was working full steam onassembling the various sections on FTP,while on the three other jackets piling andfoundation work was going on.

The WeatherIn September the weather again became afactor in the work offshore. There had beensome summer storms, but no more thanmust be expected in the middle of the NorthSea. In October, on the other hand, thepicture changed and only half of the monthhad good working weather. November waseven worse — only 9 working days, whileDecember was somewhat better with 12

days. When conditions are like that, a lot oftime goes to rigging up and rigging downequipment — and to maneuvering theanchors. The piling and foundation work onA, B and C continued when the weatherpermitted, but on FTP the finishing touchescould be made regardless of the weather.There only the compressors were lacking.The most critical factor during this periodwas the shortage of beds. The wreck of theQ-jacket delayed progress, and so the crewshad to be quartered around on the cranebarges and in temporary containers on FTP.The replacement jacket for Q platform layready for towout in Rotterdam, but theweather prevented any movement there.

The 12 fair weather days in Decemberwere put to good use. The foundation workon C-jacket was completed, and the lastbridge connecting FTP with the south flarewas hoisted into position.

But on the last day of the year, theweather gods took revenge. While thevessel doing piling work on B-jacket wasmoving away from the jacket because of theweather, which was getting worse, itcollided with one of the legs. The damageturned out to be so serious that that wholeplatform leg had to be cut loose from therest of the jacket and replaced. This alsonecessitated inventing new techniques forcutting out the old leg and installing a newsection. It wasn't until April 1973 that theleg was in place and the foundation workcould be completed.

The Winter MonthsConditions at Ekofisk during the wintermonths were - and are - rough. Today

people talk about the weather windowbetween April and October when alloperations requiring the use of hoistingvessels are carried out. The experiencesfrom the winter of 1971/72 also stimulateddiscussion within Phillips as to whether itwas right to keep offshore work goingduring the winter. The conclusion was that,in spite of high costs due to a lot of waitingon the weather, the winter season providedsome workdays that were important forcompleting the construction phase andputting the field into production. CarlJohnson relates that, out of the year's 365days, Phillips' engineering section figured atthe start of the 1970's that a little over 160were working days. He admits, however,that the strain was great when week afterweek went by with as many as 30 differentvessels just lying out in the North Sea at theexpense of the Phillips Group. Even backthen, the daily expenses for a fleet like thatrepresented around a million dollars. Thecontracts were written, to be sure, in such away that there were two different rates —one for waiting on the weather and one forworking, but, with the cost increase duringthe development period, there were large

sums involved. An important factor, lookingback on that period, was the size of thevessels. In the «childhood» of this oil activityin the North Sea, the vessels were smallerthan those of today. This was true both intonnage and, not least, in engine power andnavigation/maneuvering capability. Thevessels were also of different types, in thatthe old ones were flat bottom barges andconverted ships, versus today's semi-submersible models which are much morestable.

1973At the start of the new year, the activity outon the field was at its peak. Nearly 1,000people were in action at Ekofisk. Now thefinal phase in the construction of theplatforms was to be completed, as well asthe pipelaying between the productionplatforms and FTP — and FTP and theloading buoys. In addition, a new platformhad appeared on the development scene.The original plans were such that C platformwould be connected to the storage tank viatwo bridges. The bridges were to besupported by a small jacket - a tripod.Phillips engineer Bill Fischer, who was the

The EkofiskComplex as per 23March 7973. Theflare is in place, mostof the FTP moduleshave been hoistedonto the platform,and the hook-upwork has begun. Thepiling of C jacket hasbeen completed,while piling work onthe replacementjacket for theaccommodationsplatform, Q, is inprocess.

85

Ekofisk in the fall of1973: "Gulftide"

was producing fullscale from the four

wells in the testphase: production

platforms 2/4 A (inthe foreground) and

2/4 B (behind theComplex) were being

commissioned. Atthe Ekofisk Complex

the deck moduleshave been installedon both!/4 Cand

2/4 Q.

86

company's representative at Brown & Rootin Houston, felt that instead of just a smallsupporting jacket there ought to be aplatform with pump modules which couldserve as the starting point for the oilpipeline to shore. He presented this ideabefore the engineering section in Londonlate in the fall of 1972 - and Carl Johnsonrelates that, «We received the idea, chewedon it a couple of days, and found theproposal sensible.* Within a short period oftime all the companies involved hadaccepted the idea - and in February 1973the platform was under construction inInverness, Scotland. The platform was giventhe designation 2/4 P.

2/4 AlphaThe foundation work/cementing of the pileswas completed during February 1973, andall preparations for hoisting the moduleswere completed. The crane barge«Challenger» lay ready by the jacket whenthe report came from Rotterdam that one ofthe deck sections had fallen down duringloading on the barge. The damages turnedout to be small, however, and could berepaired in one month's time. A strike at theyard in Rotterdam meant further delays, butin April the deck sections were en route toEkofisk. That marked the end of theweather's cooperation, and a spring stormforced the tow to turn back. It was Maybefore it finally succeeded, and during themonth of June the «Challenger» had hoistedall the modules into place - and the quarters

could begin to be used at the end of themonth. The installation and finishingtouches took two months before the drillingderrick could open its first well on the 2ndof September.

2/4 BravoThe collision damages to the one platformleg delayed the assembling of the platform.It was May before the foundation work wascompleted and the jacket was ready toreceive the deck modules. But then thingshappened fast. During the course of Juneand July 1973 all the modules were hoistedonto the platform. Then three months offinishing touches followed before the first ofthe two drilling derricks — rig 41 — couldstart on the first production well. The otherderrick required more work, and it was notoperational until December.

2/4 CharlieThe foundation work was completed asearly as December 1972, but because ofdelays with the deck modules — and the longtransportation distance across the Atlantic -it was July before «DB-22» could hoist thetop of the platform into position. Thecompressors which would return the gas tothe reservoir were still lacking — they werelifted onto the platform on 16 and 17August.Then on the 2nd of October, the drillingderrick could be put into use, whileinstallation of the powerful compressorswas in full swing. Viewed in the total

The bridge betweenthe Q and Cplatforms is beinghoisted into position.The jacket here is forC platform.

context, they were vital to productionstart-up, since the Norwegian authoritieshad set clear upper limits as to how muchgas could be burned off. And the gas cameup from the reservoir with the oil - so no

gas injection was synonymous with reducedoil production.

2/4 FTPThe hoisting on FTP was done in 1972 — 87

The Q jacket ismaneuvered into

position by a derrickbarge.

with the exception of the pumps whichwould take care of transporting the oil fromthe platform to the two loading buoys. Dueto weather conditions the tug with thepumps, which were manufactured in theU.S.A., was detained in Rotterdam forseveral months. It was 18 June before theywere lifted into place and installation couldbegin. The finishing work on the pumpswent on during the rest of the year,somewhat delayed because the bridgeconnection between C-platform and theTank was lacking. P-platform and the bridgesupport were under construction along with

the bridges, but it looked like it would be1974 before they were in position.

2/4 QuartersOn 10 March the jacket was set in its properposition between FTP and C-platform, and atemporary deck was made in theanticipation that foundation work would bedone. On 9 June the permanent deck was inplace, and the following week Q wasconnected by bridge with FTP. Temporaryliving quarters were also installed, since thepermanent quarters had been slightlydamaged in a fire during insulation work atthe construction site. But the delays in thesetting operation resulted in the installationof the permanent quarters as early as 22June. A short month of installation workwent by before 185 people could resumeresidence in «old Q» at the end of July.

PipelayingThe internal network of pipes on the Ekofiskfield has gradually become complex. TheBrown & Root barge «Hugh Gordon* laidthe first pipes between «Gulftide» and thefour subsea wellheads in 1970 and 1971. In1973 all the pipes between the twoproduction platforms, A and B, and FTPprocessing platform were laid. In addition,pipelines were laid from FTP out to theloading buoys. One of the loading buoyshad to be moved to provide a safety marginin relation to the new platforms. At the endof each line connecting platforms, a riserwas also installed which took the lines fromthe seabed on up to the platform. Tocomplete the picture, the plans at that time

A lot of pipelines hadto be laid between

the differentplatforms and

processing platformFTP. Here pipes are

being laid between2/4 B and the

Ekofisk Complex.

88

There was enormousinterest in what washappening atEkofisk. King Olavvisited the EkofiskTank. Next to theKing, who has hisarms on the railing,we see Phillips'Chairman of theBoard, Bill Martin,and NorwegianMinister of Industry,Ingvald Ulveseth.

were to let the four subsea wellheadsproduce to the permanent platforms, so thatnew lines had to be laid there as well. Andafter the lines had been tested and found inorder, they were buried.

Production Start-UpDuring the course of September andOctober 1973, drilling got under way onthe production wells from the four drillingderricks on 2/4 A, B and C. The first onstream was the derrick on A-platform at thebeginning of September.

The plans for Phase II - the Ekofisk fielditself - included, for the time being, about40 wells.

In April 1974, all the equipment and allthe necessary pipelines were tested andready to receive the first production. Andon 25 April, the crude oil flowed from thefirst production well, A-13, through thesystem. Up until June only A-platform wasin production along with the four subseawellheads which had produced to «Gulftide»during Phase I. When «Gulftide» haltedproduction in May, all the preparations hadbeen made so that the wells could graduallybe connected to the permanent platforms.

On 13 June the first well on Bravo - B7 —was put on stream, as was B-17 from thesame platform 14 days later. On the 4th ofJuly, C-13 on Charlie was able to join in thecrude oil production, and so all three of theproduction platforms in Phase II were onstream.

During the course of 1974 and 1975, welli

after well was drilled and put on stream, sothat in April 1976 a total of 31 wells on thethree platforms were producing - 11 onAlpha, 16 on Bravo, and 4 on Charlie. Inaddition to the 4 production wells, Charliehad 8 injection wells for gas.

Distressing CompressorsThe Norwegian authorities had imposedclear limitations on the Phillips Group as tothe amount of gas that could be burned off.This also formed a ceiling for oil production,since the gas is brought up with the oil from

2/4 B platform wasequipped with twoderricks to be able todrill as manyproduction wells aspossible within theshortest time frame.One of the derrickswas later removedfrom the platform.

89

The work of linkingthe Ekofisk Tank

with the rest of theComplex has begun.

At right the bridgebetween C platformand bridge supportno. 3 is being lifted

into position. As thethird bridge, between214 P and the Tank,is about to be lifted,

the accident happens- the crane topplesover. Derrick barge

«DB 22> incurred themost damage and

was put out of actionfor several months.

90

the reservoir. A solution was required forsaving the gas until a gas line from Ekofiskto shore could become operational. The planthat was built into Phase II involved twopowerful compressor modules on 2/4 Cwhich would pump the gas under highpressure back into the reservoir. With theabnormal pressure that was in the Ekofiskreservoir, this would be a great challenge.Until that time compressors had only beenbuilt to 6000 psi capacity. In order to exceedthe pressure in the Ekofisk reservoir, 9000psi would be necessary. The manufacturerfelt that this would not be a problem, butwhen the first compressor was started up on18 May 1974, it turned out that 2000 psiwas its maximum. A vibration problemprevented the compressor from reachingpeak capacity.

Good advice was in great demand, and itturned out to be a very hectic summer andfall working non-stop to solve the problems.The first attempts were unsuccessful. TheAmerican manufacturer and experts fromevery quarter were brought in. Thesituation, as it was, meant reduced oilproduction from the field. As Christmasneared, a temporary solution had beenfound which caused one of the compressorunits to function — and on 21 December thefirst gas could be injected back into thereservoir.

The compressor problems limitedproduction for six months - and almostanother year would go by before apermanent solution was found andimprovements made. It was 1975 before alleight injection wells were in use, and thedaily gas injection rate lay at 480 millionstandard cubic feet.

The Ekofisk Tank Is ReadiedWhen the Tank was set in place, work began

to make it operational. This work went onthroughout the fall of 1973, while at thesame time the preparations and constructionwork continued for its Phase III function as aprocessing facility.

The limitations on the Tank's usage wererelated to its lack of linkage with the rest ofthe Ekofisk Complex. The new platform -2/4 P — was to be positioned between theTank and 2/4 C. Three bridges, and onesupport jacket for the bridges, wouldestablish this linkage. But for the time being,the Ekofisk Tank lay by itself like an island.

In September support jacket BS3 for thebridges was set. While the foundation workwas going on, bad weather set in — stormsthat continued almost without let-up fromNovember until February. This wasprobably the worst winter experienced atEkofisk. The jacket for P-platform lay readyfor towout, but it was not until March 1974that the weather would allow the towingoperation to get under way. During thelaunching, it turned out that one of thebuoyancy tanks which would cause the steelgiant to float, as well as assist in the settingoperation, had a leak. The jacket sank.Inspection by divers revealed that damagewas minimal, and crane barge «DB 22»managed to lift it up from the sea floor anddeposit it in its proper location. It was Junebefore the foundation work had beencompleted and the deck sections could behoisted into place. The bridges between Pand C platforms were then hoisted intoposition — but when the third bridge,between P and the Tank, was to be lifted,the bridge fell down.

Fortunately, the damage to the bridgeitself turned out to be no greater than couldbe repaired, but it was worse for crane barge«DB 22» which was put out of function forthe remainder of the year.

On 23 July the bridge could finally behoisted into position, and the Tank wasconnected with the rest of the EkofiskComplex «mainland». The task of connectingthe various pipelines, which would runalong the roofs of the bridges, could getunder way.

The Ekofisk Tank Is InauguratedDuring November the coupling work wasfinished and Ekofisk I was ready for use. Justin the nick of time. Winter storms set in, andon 3 December the first oil was transferredto the Tank. Buoy loading had to bestopped on account of the weather. Beforethe Tank became operational, totalproduction had to be shut down wheneverthe weather hindered the tankers from lyingnear the loading buoys. Now it was simply amatter of diverting the crude oil from theloading buoys to the storage cells in theTank.

During the next 20 days, the Tank wasproperly tested in the area for which it wasconstructed. By 23 December there were900,000 barrels of oil in the storage cells.

The Ekofisk Tank stood the testbrilliantly. During the period fromDecember 1974 to October 1975, when theoil pipeline to Teesside was put intooperation, buoy loading was impracticable40 percent of the time. This was either dueto the weather or because some technicalfailure made it impossible. During only onepercent of this period did production haveto be shut down. Therein lay the Tank'smerit.

On 23 July 1974, theEkofisk Tank hasbeen connected withthe rest of the EkofiskComplex. Now thepipelines can bemade ready to allowfor use of the Tankshould the weatherstop buoy loading totankers.

The equipment usedon the derrick bargesis of considerabledimension. In thebackground, theEkofisk Tank.

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From Ekofiskto the Consumer

The pipelines fromEkofisk will go toTeesside in Great

Britain and Emdenin West Germany.

The Storting'sdecision was in

accordance with therecommendation ofthe Phillips Group.

Gas to Emden, crudeoil and NGL to

Teesside.

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When the Storting finally passed aresolution concerning transportation ofEkofisk oil and gas in the late part of April1973, it came as a confirmation of thesolution toward which Phillips had beenworking.

Early in 1972, advance investigation wascarried out in England and West Germanywith a view to finding suitable areas forreceiving terminals for crude oil/NGL anddry gas. The pipeline routes underconsideration were likewise studied inconnection with the work of the EkofiskCommission, and transportation systems toTeesside and Emden were among thealternatives given most thoroughevaluation.

The application to build a pipeline toTeesside with a receiving terminal was sentto the Norwegian authorities in the springof 1972. In the beginning of January 1973,after agreement had been reached on the

first sales contract for dry gas with thebuyer group on the Continent, theapplication to transport dry gas to Emdenwas also forwarded to the authorities.

For the Phillips Group it was important tohave a quick decision in the matter oftransportation. The field development plansrequired that the crude oil line becomeoperational during the course of 1974. Thiswas based on the fact that Ekofisk would beready to start full production. The gascontract called for deliveries to start in 1975,and then the gas line and the terminal atEmden needed to be ready. An equallyimportant argument from the Phillips Groupwas based on the practical problemsassociated with the building of the world'stwo longest subsea pipelines and twoterminals which were among the largestever built. The steel crisis meant that steelought to be ordered as soon as possible sothat valuable time would not be lost.Furthermore, the actual pipelayingoperation would require a large share ofthose pipelaying vessels capable of handlingpipes of the dimensions in question at theocean depths necessary in the North Sea.The contracting of vessels for the 1973season should already be done in 1972 to beon the safe side.

When Storting passed its resolution, thecompanies in the Phillips Group hadinvested in the very solution that waschosen. Steel had been secured, andproduction of the pipes was well under way.By the end of March 1973, 60% of the pipelengths to Teesside had been produced and18% had been given the necessaryprotective concrete coating.

On 22 May 1973 McDermott was able to

The laying of pipesfor the pipeline toTeesside started inearly fall of 1973and was completedin 1974, while the443 km Emdenpipeline was laid in1974. Threecompanies wereworkingsimultanously ondifferent sections inorder to complete thework as quickly aspossible.

begin the actual pipelaying on its stretch. Inaddition to McDermott, Santa Fe andBrown & Root had been contracted to laypipes, so that three vessels would beoperating simultaneously.

The goal was to complete the pipelayingby the end of 1973, finish building theterminal at Teesside by the end of 1974, andhave both the gas line and the Emdenterminal operational during the last half of1975.

Ownership TermsNorpipe A/S owns both the pipelines to

Teesside and Emden and the four boosterplatforms, 36/22 A, 37/4 A (Teesside), andH-7, B-ll (Emden). At Teesside, NorpipeUK Ltd. owns the crude oil section of theplant, while the Phillips Group owns theliquid gas facility. At Emden, the PhillipsGroup owns the whole plant. These werethe results of the negotiations between theNorwegian authorities and the PhillipsGroup in 1972 and early 1973, and thenegotiations between the Norwegianauthorities and their counterparts in Englandand West Germany, respectively.

93

In the early 7970s,great demand made

steel prices soar.Phillips had to begin

steel purchasing atan early stage.

The pipes were givena concrete protectivecoating before being

transported to thepipelaying vessels.

94

The Oil PipelineDesign work for the pipeline was in fullswing in 1972. The production estimatesfrom the Ekofisk area were compared withpipeline technology. In both of these areasthere was some uncertainty. Naturally theproduction estimates had to be based onanticipated peak production from the 7fields in the Ekofisk area — plus the fact thatthere had to be available capacity for futurenew discoveries in the region. The PhillipsGroup ended up with an estimate ofbetween 750,000 and 1.3 million barrels ofoil per day. This was then seen in relation topipeline know-how, with the final resultbeing a 34-inch line all the way from Ekofiskto Teesside (1 million barrels of oil per day).Under consideration during the processwere both a 36-inch line (approximately 1.3million barrels per day) and combinations ofdifferent dimensions on sections of thedistance. In order to attain the 1 millionbarrel capacity, powerful pumps would benecessary to provide sufficient startingpressure at Ekofisk — and, in the form of twobooster stations, maintain this pressurealong the way. This resulted in the buildingof two booster platforms (37/4A and36/22A) which divided the distance toTeesside into nearly equal lengths. Sincethat time the capacity of the oil pipeline hasturned out to be too great in relation to the

need. When the Ekofisk area was producingat peak levels in 1980, only about half thepipeline capacity was utilized. This meansthat one of the booster platforms has neverbeen needed, while the other one was onlynecessary during a short period whileproduction was at its highest. 36/22A wasde-manned in 1985, while 37/4A wasde-manned in 1987. Delay in productionstart-up on the fields was one of the reasonsthere was not greater utilization of thepipeline capacity. This meant that theanticipated peak production was notreached, but was spread out over severalyears instead. In retrospect it is easy to saythat the pipeline was constructed with anunrealistically high capacity. But it isimportant to remember that explorationactivity in the Ekofisk area was far fromconcluded when the design criteria wereestablished. Moreover, the Phillips Groupand the Norwegian authorities werecontemplating other fields on theNorwegian shelf which could utilize the line— as well as the fact that Phillips foresawtransportation contracts from the Britishsector. «Even if we were to make thedecision today, we would do the samething,» says Bill Boyce, who was a centralfigure in the decision-making process. «Theplan chosen was and is the ideal solutionwhen all related factors are considered.*

The Pipelaying OperationIt became obvious early on that the timegoal set for the pipelaying operation wastoo optimistic. In June there were threecontracted companies under way with theirvessels, but Santa Fe in particular washaving equipment problems. In addition,DnV came on the scene with new andstricter requirements for the technique to beused. The pipe lengths were weldedtogether manually on board the pipelayingvessel, the welding seam was inspected, andthe pipes were lowered into the sea.

By the end of August, 51% of the pipeshad been laid, but the effects of the weatherconditions had already been felt. During themonth of July, work had to be stopped all ofthree times — the last time due to a propersummer storm.

The stormy weather on 26 July causedtwo vessels to suffer line breakage, while thethird vessel was damaged. In spite of theweather, McDermott was finished with its

section as early as 25 September. Thepipelaying vessel was then directed to helpSanta Fe with its section, but that didn'thelp. After only a few working days inNovember, it was decided that the workshould be halted, not to be resumed untilFebruary. At that point there wereapproximately 42 km left of the stretch.Brown & Root was finished with its sectionin the beginning of November.

It would take until 22 May 1974 beforethe two pipelaying vessels «L.B. Meaders»and «LB-23» had finished the last part of thepipeline. That is, the final kilometers nearEkofisk were not laid until the month ofJune. But 40% of the line still remained to be

buried, and parts of this burying processwould prove to cause problems. A kind ofsled was used on the ocean floor to get theline sufficiently covered. But it was often thecase that the sled had to be pulled severaltimes over the same area in order to achievesatisfactory results. Reinforced equipmentand new methods became necessary onsome of the stretches — and when that didn'tprove sufficient in late summer of 1975, itwas necessary to level out with gravel andpebbles over the line so that everythingwould be ready for the opening.

The PlatformsIn March 1974 the jacket for booster

35,000 of these pipelengths were neededfor the gas pipelinefrom Ekofisk toEtnden alone. Totalweight of the pipeswas 209,000 tons -plus 275,000 tons ofanti-corrosioncompounds.

The pipe lengthswere welded togethermanually onboardthe pipelaying vesseland then lowered tothe seabed. This wasan operationrequiring thecooperation of theweather gods.Particularly duringthe laying of theTeesside pipeline in1973, the weathercaused extensiveproblems and thework had to bestopped for longperiods of time.

95

To attain a capacityof one million barrels

of oil per day, twobooster platforms

were installed on theTeesside pipeline.

37/4 A (photo)and36/22 A are locatedin the British sector.

The two platformsare almost identical.

The cleaning devicesthat are sent through

the pipelines arecalled tpigs». Thereare several different

types — both withand without

((intelligences.During the

commissioning of thepipeline, intelligentcleaning devices arepassed through the

line to registerdefects.

96

platform 37/4A was positioned andfoundation work was begun. This workwould run into difficulties because of bigrocks in the seabed, and extra powerfulequipment had to be used. In August36/22A was also positioned on the oceanfloor. Both the platforms were somewhatdelayed due to late steel deliveries andproblems at their building sites in Franceand Scotland, respectively. During thecourse of 1975 the two platforms wereassembled, while the pump modules werelifted onto the platforms and installed in theperiod from late 1976 to 1978. There wasno rush with this work since the delays inthe development of the fields at Ekofiskpostponed the anticipated peak production.

The pumps on P platform alone couldtransport 540,000 barrels of oil per day fromEkofisk to Teesside.

Final PreparationsDuring the period from June 1974 until thepipeline was put into operation in October1975, a number of tests were carried out inorder to get the line ready. Each stretch —from Ekofisk to 37/4, from 37/4 to 36/22,and from 36/22 to Teesside - was checkedseparately. Leaks were found and repairsmade.

In the beginning of August 1975, two«pigs» were sent into the pipeline fromTeesside. These two devices carried out afinal inspection of the line to find possibleirregularities, and in September it could besaid that the pipeline was mechanicallycomplete — ready to receive the first crudeoil.

Historic EventThe laying of the oil pipeline was ahistorical triumph for the Phillips Group and

Norpipe. It was an operation utilizing themost advanced technology of the day. Asmany as 3,000 people were involved inactivities connected with the actualpipelaying. Also historic were all the safetysystems built into the line to ensure againstleakage and external damage. A system ofremote-controlled safety valves makes itpossible to close off the line within a briefspan of time. Furthermore, the pressurevariance between the water at the oceandepth in question and the oil in the pipelinewould keep any leakage to a minimumamount of oil. The difference in pressurecauses the water to hold the oil inside theline. The safety system was put to the testwhen, in summer of 1977, a ship's anchordamaged the line outside Teesside. Therewas no leakage, but a section of the line wasreplaced the following summer.

Another safety system developed byPhillips was radar surveillance of the line, sothat it is possible to observe from Teessidewhenever ships approach the pipeline route.This system, which is a refinement of asystem Phillips developed at Ekofisk duringthe height of the hectic construction phase,has proven very effective, and since 1977there have been no accidents in connectionwith the pipeline.

Opening at TeessideOn 21 October 1975 the official opening ofthe first phase of the Teesside terminal tookplace. 780 guests from around the world

The TeessideTerminal is officiallyopened, and a toastof crude oil proposed.From left: Phillips'Managing Director,Wm. C. Douce,BritishUndersecretary ofState for Energy,John Smith andNorwegian Ministerof Industry, IngvaldUlveseth.

were on hand to witness the fact that thefirst crude oil from Ekofisk had completedthe 354 km trip and was secured in one ofthe storage tanks in Europe's largest tankfacility with a 7.5 million barrel crude oilcapacity.

The oil had begun the journey fromEkofisk on 15 October, but it was not untilfour days later that it reached thenortheastern coast of England. Just fillingthe line took a million barrels of oil. Threedays after the opening ceremony, the firsttanker was able to depart the jetty.

But there were a number of flies in theointment during those October days in1975. According to the plans, the wholeterminal should have been finished at thattime, but only a good 50% of theconstruction work had been completed.Ever since construction had begun in fall of1973, it had been plagued by unfortunateevents that on many occasions put gray hairon the head of Carl Post, Phillips' man incharge of construction at Teesside. The oilcrisis delayed steel deliveries. When thedeliveries finally came, it happened thatthey didn't meet the strict specifications that

were necessary for a plant of the Teessidetype.

Furthermore, there had been labordisputes and strikes along the way. This wasa very unsettled period for the labor marketin England. One trade group after anotherwent out on shorter or longer strikes andgo-slow protest actions. A strong set ofshoulders was required for tackling all theconflicts that arose.

And there was more to come. At the timeof the opening in October, much of thework on the terminal and the jettiesremained to be done. While the receivingsystem for crude oil was functioning, it wasnot yet possible to receive liquid gas. Thiswas quite a critical situation, since a lot ofliquid gas was being produced at Ekofisk.Temporary solutions had to be found on thefield while waiting for Teesside to be ready.

Finally in March 1979 the Teessidefacility was able to receive liquid gas, and bythe end of that month Noretyl's plant atRafnes in Bamble received the first shiploadof propane.

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7 — Giant Discovery

The land level atSeal Sands had to beraised five meters (15

fed) to secure theterminal against thesea. This is how thesite looked in 1974after the work had

been going on forabout a year.

A major dredgingand piling program

was necessary inorder to construct the

loading jetties atTeesside. 12 millioncubic meters of sand

and silt were pumpedup and dumped at

the terminalconstruction site.

98

TeessideBack in the beginning of 1972, Phillips madeits first surveys and held meetings with theauthorities in Teesside in connection withtransportation of Ekofisk oil, and possiblydry gas, to shore. Phillips was alreadyestablished in the area through jointownership with ICI in the P.I.P. refinery.Moreover, Teesside lies on the northeasterncoast of England, in the vicinity of the townof Middlesbrough, which is a strategiclocation in relation to a pipeline route fromEkofisk. There were available industrialareas suitable for the construction of areceiving terminal, and the authorities werefavorably inclined to the establishment ofnew industry. Unemployment in this area isextremely high, even by British standards,and has remained nearly constant at around20% since World War II.

An important factor was the possibility ofbuilding up a harbor for larger tankers. This

was necessary since the facility at Teessidewould function primarily as a receivingstation/transit storage center. Developing acomplete refinery was never in the plans.Through a stabilization process, the liquidgas components are separated from thecrude oil. After temporary storage, the oil isready for sale. Where liquid gas wasconcerned, it was necessary to build afacility which extracted the most importantcomponents: ethane, propane, isobutane,and normal butane. In addition, methanewould be extracted and used for fuel in theterminal plant.

During the summer of 1972, it becameclear that the terminal would be located atSeal Sands, while the oil storage facilitywould eventually be located in thebordering area of Greatham. Eventually,because Phillips — in cooperation with ICI —worked a couple of months on plans forstoring the crude oil in nearby shutdownmines. In October this alternative wasfinally abandoned, and efforts wereconcentrated on building storage tanks witha capacity of 750,000 barrels each atGreatham.

In November 1972 option agreements forthe Seal Sands area were signed, and duringthe winter and spring of 1973 allpreparations were made so as to be able tostart on the construction work as soon aspossible after Storting had passed its finalresolution — and the necessary approvalshad come from local British authorities.

In June 1973 the extensive dredgingwork required to make the loading berthsdeep enough could begin. While this workwas going on, 12 million cubic meters ofsand and stone were brought up anddeposited at Seal Sands where the terminalwould be built. This area had to be raisedapproximately 5 meters so as to withstandthe forces of the sea.

In the summer of 1972, the constructionschedule was based on completion inmid-1974. It became clear early on that thisgoal was unrealistic. The constructionproject involved an enormous amount ofwork - and the following year's goal wasthat the crude oil receiving facility befinished in April 1975, that the stabilizertrains for crude oil be operational inOctober 1975, and that all seven trains befunctioning one year later.

In October 1973 work was fully underway on the foundation for the first storagetank and the piling within the actualterminal area. The following month about900 people were at work on the facility.That was when the first effects of the oilcrisis began to be felt. Phillips had ordered50,000 tons of steel from British Steel.

Pipelaying in thelanding zonepresented problems.Sand had to beremoved and acorridor was madeutilizing steel plates.

The construction ofthe Teesside plantwas in itself a hugetask, followed withgreat interest. Thephoto shows, amongothers, PhillipsChairman of theBoard, Bill Martin(right) and managerof Phillips'Europe-AfricaDivision, Pete Silas(left) on an inspectionvisit in 1975.

99

The NCL plant atTeesside had most

delays in relation tothe orginal schedule.

Wlitle the crude oilfacilities were ready

in the fall of1975,the NGL plant

became operationalin 3979, The

processing andtanker loading

facilities cover a 500acre plot of land, the

tank farm atCreatham 3 75 acres.

The tanker loadingfacilities at Teessideconsist of four jettiesfor loading crude oilinto tankers of up to

150,000 dead weighttons. At full capacitythis part of the plant

can handle nearlyhalf of Great

Britain's dailyconsumption of oil.There are also fourjetties for loading

NGL products Mocarriers of varying

capacity up to60,000 cubic meters.

100

Because of the oil shortage, British Steel hadcut back to a three-day work week. This ledto delivery delays — in spite of the fact thatconstruction of the terminal had been givendispensation from the authorities'economizing measures. Steel from Francewas also greatly delayed — by 3 to 5months.

In the spring of 1974 the most criticallabor conflicts arose, and it became obviousthat the work progress schedule could notbe met. Every effort was made to reachagreements with the labor unions inquestion, but the agreements wereconstantly breached — or new groups wouldcome in and issue demands.

With approximately 1600 peopleinvolved in the construction work, spreadover a number of contractors andsubcontractors, the project was large by anystandards.

In December 1974, a 24-inch reserve linebetween the terminals and the P.I.P. refinerywas ready. The line was actually to functionin such a way that when the pipelinebetween Ekofisk and Teesside wasoperational, the incoming line could beconnected with the P.I.P. facility and use therefinery's jetty. Since the pipeline fromEkofisk was not ready, this line was not yetnecessary — but it was put into use rightafter the pipeline from Ekofisk became

operational in October 1975 for regulardeliveries to the refinery.

Finally FinishedIn May 1980 the last insulation workerfinally left the terminal area in Teesside andthe plant was completely finished. From thetime the reception of crude oil began at theend of October 1975 until 1980, theconstruction workers were constantlyplagued by delays due to labor conflicts. Butwhere the crude oil was concerned, theterminal was functioning and Ekofisk wasable to produce at full capacity. During thecourse of March 1979, the NGL plant alsobecame fully operational. Capacity at theterminal is 1 million barrels of crude oil perday — the same as for the pipeline. Inaddition, the NGL plant has a 50,000 barrelcapacity.

Since production start-up, a number ofmeasures have been carried out to increaseefficiency at Teesside. The 100% reserveequipment preparedness that was built inwas reduced without its affecting deliverystability. Since its start-up, the plant has shutdown operations no more than a few hoursdue to its own difficulties.

Gas with ComplicationsAn international gathering of about 600participated at the opening of the receiving

The opening of the443 km gas pipeline

from Ekofisk toEmden and the

terminal was a greatevent. Here we see

three key players inconnection with the

pipeline: from left,Phillips Petroleum

Company Norway'sManaging Director

in 3977, GordonGoering, Norwegian

Minister ofPetroleum and

Energy, BjartmarGjerde, and

Managing Directorof Statoil, Arve

Johnsen. The latterwas also Board

Chairman ofNorpipe, owner of

the Emden pipeline.The three are

standing where the36-inch pipeline

enters the Emdenplant.

102

terminal for gas at Emden and the 443-kmline from Ekofisk to 0stfrisland on 8September 1977. But one country had notsent its invited representatives: Denmark.And the Danes were the reason there wasno Ekofisk gas in the extensive andadvanced facility on opening day.

The pipeline from Ekofisk had to cross 48km of Danish sector in the North Sea on itsway to Emden. The essence of the disputewas the burying of the line. The PhillipsGroup and Norpipe had reached anagreement with the Norwegian authorities,and the Norwegian authorities had reached

an agreement with their West Germancounterparts — but the Danes adopted avery rigid stand in the matter. If the linewere not buried in the literal sense of theword, it could not be put into operation.A comprehensive burying program for thosekilometers where the line traverses theDanish sector had gotten underway in 1975.In October 1976 Phillips and the buryingcompanies responsible agreed that whatcould be done had been done — but theDanes were not satisfied. New attemptswere made in the spring of 1977 including,among other things, laying 625,000

sandbags over the pipeline - manually bydivers, but this was not accepted either.The pipeline was to lie in a two-meter widetrench with a one-meter covering. Period.

The Danish-Norwegian disputethreatened to delay considerably the wholestart-up of gas deliveries. That was whenNorway's Minister of Industry BjartmarGjerde went to Copenhagen.

The Danish minister, Ivar N0rgaard, whowas the government official withresponsibility in the matter, was away onvacation. Minister of Industry BjartmarGjerde talked with N0rgaard's vacationreplacement, Minister of Finance PerHadkkerrup. The two arrived at anagreement that received both governments'approvals.

The Danish conditions were that thework to cover the line should continue andbe completed by 1 July 1980. As atemporary solution, the Danes accepted

covering the line with sandbags, while thepermanent solution involved dumpinggravel over the pipeline.

All formalities were thereby taken care of,and on 14 September the first dry gas couldbe conducted into the system at the EkofiskComplex.

In the BeginningAreas in 0stfrisland had been regarded aspossible landfall locations ever since thepipeline plan for gas had been launched. Inthe summer of 1972, when the gasnegotiations began to lean more and moretoward the consortium headed by Ruhrgas,new surveys were made and discussionsheld with West German authorities aboutlandfall sites and pipeline routes. When thegas contract was secured in January 1973,

The Danes — heresymbolized byDanish Minister ofEconomic Affairs,Per Heekkerrup —were regarded bymany as the stopperresponsible for theabsence of gas in thepipeline at theopening of theEmden facilities. Theartist's comment:«/hereby have thehonour of openingthe world'sbest-plugged gaspipeline.*

625,000 bags werefilled with sand,largely by soldiers onleave, loadedonboard supplyboats and manuallylaid over the gaspipeline by divers onthe 48 km stretchacross Danishterritory in the NorthSea.

103

Extensive foundationwork was necessary

at the Emdenterminal. The choice

of the terminal site atthe mouth of the

river Ems, 7 7 kmoutside the town of

Emden, entailedspecial design

challenges. Here toothe land level had tobe raised because of

the highground-water level.

In the landing zone,the pipeline had to beburied in order to be

of minimaldisturbance to the

area's naturalenvironment.

104

agreement was reached as to the choice of asite at Rysumer Nacken, approximately 17km outside the town of Emden. The locationwas ideal based on the considerations thathad to be made regarding landfall sites forthe subsea line — and for the furtherdistribution of the gas to West Germany,the Netherlands, Belgium and France.

The formal application for thistransportation plan was sent to theNorwegian authorities on 2 January 1973.

During the spring and summer of 1973,necessary preparations were carried out, andconstruction work on the terminal could

begin in October/November of that year.Then the area where the terminal is locatedwas filled with sand and stone from the EmsRiver so that the terminal itself would lie ondry land. As in Teesside, the whole area hadto be raised so that the river would notflood it during storms. A number ofpreparations also had to be made on thepipeline route, and the German navy spentseveral months mine-sweeping. One minewas found right on the pipeline route.

On 5 April 1974, the pipelaying barge«Choctaw I» was in action, and little by littlethe work was under way. Most of it wasdone during 1974, and the pipelaying jobhad the weather gods on its side. Two of thebarges set new 24-hour records. InSeptember one of the barges managed,among other things, to lay 189 pipe lengthsfor a total of 2300 meters. With manualwelding of the lengths, that was animpressive performance.

Further Bounds Are ExtendedThe gas pipeline to Emden extended

technological bounds. From the very startthe Phillips Group had ambitious goals forthe line. Due to pipeline technology, itwas not possible to lay 42-inch pipes at thedepths to be found between Ekofisk and thesecond compressor platform, H-7. But in theoriginal application to the Norwegianauthorities, the plan was to try to lay a36-inch line to H-7, and from there lay a42-inch line to Emden. However, this planhad to be revised after consultation with thepipelaying companies - and the result was a36-inch line the whole distance. It was thefirst time a subsea gas line was built withtwo compressor platforms.

The 443-km line was the longest weldedsteel construction in the world - and it took35,000 pipe lengths having a total weight of209,000 tons, plus 275,000 tons ofanti-corrosion materials and concretecoating.

The motive power also was of impressivedimension. The four gas turbines on theEkofisk Tank, which power the centrifugalcompressors that give starting assistance to

the gas, have a total of 120,000 horsepower.In October 1974, only the last piece intoward the Ekofisk Complex and in theshoreline zone on the West German coastremained. This work was completed duringthe spring of 1976.

The work between the German islandsand in the muddy tidewater area involvedmany practical problems.

Consideration also had to be given to therich animal and bird wildlife in the area. Acatamaran type of pipelaying vessel wasdeveloped for this task. In addition, it wasnecessary to cross the island of Juist which isa conservation area. Among otherrestrictions, cars are prohibited from drivingthere. The pipeline route crossed right overthis island.

Compressor PlatformsThe two compressor platforms B-ll andH-7 on the gas pipeline are very similar tothe two equivalent booster platforms on theoil line to Teesside. The relatively simpleplatforms were set in position in the summer

An extensive pipesystem had to be laidin the terminal urea.The North Sea gas iscleaned and meteredbefore it is sent oninto new pipelines tothe buyers.

105

The pipeline fromEkofisk comes ashore

at the left corner ofthe plant. The gas

goes through acleaning process in

the pink heatertowers, then

advanced meteringequipment, before the

gas is distributed tothe buyers' pipelines

from the terminal.Half of it goes toWest Germany,while the rest isdivided between

France, Belgium andthe Netherlands.

106

of 1975 (H-7) and the spring of 1976 (B-ll).On these platforms too, foundation workwas made difficult due to seabed conditions,and the work took longer than planned.During the summer and fall of 1976, all themodules were hoisted into place, and theplatforms were finished in the spring of1977. However, a number of problems arosewith the risers, which turned out to bemoving toward the platform leg, but thistoo was resolved to satisfaction. In June1977 everything was ready for start-up onthe line — everything except the compressormodules for the two platforms. They werenot in place until 1978 — and operational in1979. Both platforms are equipped withthree turbines which provide a total of90,000 horsepower on each of theplatforms.

According to PlanWhen the first gas was received early in themorning on 17 September 1977 in Emden,the terminal had been ready for the gas foralmost two years. For once, in connectionwith the gigantic Ekofisk development, theconstruction work had gone according to

the time schedule. The Dusseldorf firm ofFluor GmbH was responsible for bothdesign and construction of the terminal.From the time the work began — with thenearly 3,000 piles to be pounded in — untilthe terminal stood finished, the work wenton every day. There were no serious labordisputes or delays that kept activity fromcontinuing.

Because of the location, building the plantwas a tough job. On a slightly windsweptexpanse way out toward the river's mouthand the North Sea, the construction processhad to combat the three greatest hindrances:wind, rain, and sand. During the buildingperiod, the weather was very bad. Due tothe high ground water level, the workbecame more difficult during periods of hardrain - while during dry spells, the constantwind made the sand roam all over, making itmiserable both for the workers and for theconstructions, which required greatcleanliness. Sand in the machinery, in otherwords.

Despite these hindrances, phase I of theterminal was finished in December 1975.But back in the summer of that year it hadbeen decided that the capacity should beincreased to as many as 9 parallel «treatertrains* for the gas. So, parallel with thecompletion of phase I of the plant,construction work on the second phasebegan. That section was finished in July1977. Thus the whole terminal was readyfor production when the first gas wasreceived in mid-September.

And production took a rapid incline fromthe start. After a gradual breaking-in periodof two days, production reached one billioncubic feet of gas on the third day — on 20September 1977.

One of the world's largest receivingterminals for dry gas was in operation, as alink in the development of the Ekofisk area.

Communication isan important factorin the transportationsystem. Emden isconnected withEkofisk via a satellitetelephone system.

The Emden pipelinewas the first subseapipeline in the worldto be equipped withcompressor stationsbetween the two endstations. Each of theplatforms has threeturbine compressorswhich help maintainthe pressure in thepipeline.B-U (top) is locatedat the end of the firstone-third of thepipeline, while H-7(bottom) is at thelocation closest toEmden.

107

The Development ProjectIs Completed

When the Eddaplatform was put onstream in December

7979, the Ekofiskdevelopment was

completed — anextensive and

complex pioneerproject that had

taken almost tenyears.

The EkofiskComplex is mirrored

by night lights, butbehind the lights

there is hecticactivity. Operations

go on day and night.

December 2, 1979. The first drops of crudeoil from 2/7C, the Edda platform, hadreached the Ekofisk Complex the nightbefore. During the day gas production alsogot under way.

Approximately 10 years after the drill bitfrom «Ocean Viking» had finished well 2/4-2and confirmed the enormous oil and gasfield, five other fields were discovered in thesame area, and six other fields (Cod wasdiscovered before Ekofisk) in addition to themain field were developed and on stream.The pipelines to Emden and Teessideprovided for transportation of the gas andoil to shore. Large receiving terminals

handled the final treatment of theproduction before the buyers could take itover.

Out on the field and along the pipelines,22 platforms were in operation. During1979, 139,764,409 barrels of crude oil,527,109,305 million standard cubic feet ofgas and 7,087,776 barrels of liquid gas wereproduced.

What had been deserted waters around asingle drilling rig 10 years earlier had turnedinto a luminous city of platforms and vesselswhere over 1,000 people had their regularplace of employment.

«Oil adventure», it has been called — but it

108

Activity is hedic onthe jacket of thebridge support that isto hold the flare onAlbuskjell 1/6A.

neither was nor had been an adventure.Rather an unending struggle against theforces of nature in the outer reaches oftechnology, where most of the work wasbeing done for the first time under just suchnatural conditions.

It had taken time — several years longerthan foreseen in the original plans. It hadcost more than the budgeted amount. Butoil and gas prices were also totally differentfrom what they had been when theexploration activity began. Oil prices hadrisen from about $2.00 per barrel to around$20.00. The Ekofisk area had become a goldmine for Norway — and for the companies inthe Phillips Group.

The Satellite FieldsWhile the first two construction phases inthe development of Ekofisk consisted of 10platforms, the last phase was even moreextensive. By the time it was completed,Phase III (development of West Ekofisk,Tor, Cod, Eldfisk, Albuskjell and Edda) hadcome to consist of 12 steel platforms, theprocessing plant atop the Ekofisk Tank, thenorth flare, and 7 flare structures inconnection with the isolated productionplatforms on the satellite fields.

The complexity of the developmentincreased in relation to the construction of

West Ekofisk - or2/4 D platform -was the first satellitefield on stream in theEkofisk area.

the main field, Ekofisk. Now developmentwas under way on 6 fields simultaneously,in addition to the processing facility on theTank.

It started with West Ekofisk. The buildingof the platform would go on for nearly fouryears. The jacket was set in October 1973,but it was the end of November 1977 beforethe platform was in regular production. Thedelays were essentially due to the fact thatthe fire in the riser on Ekofisk 2/4A in 1975had made it necessary during an extendedperiod to use West Ekofisk for quarteringthe crews doing repairs on 2/4 A. When 109

Cod was the firstfield found in the

Ekofisk area.However, it did notbecome commercialuntil the main field

was discovered. TheCod platform is

located approx. 75km north of the

Ekofisk Complex,and is the only

production platformin the area that

cannot he seen fromthe Complex. Codand Tor were the

first platformsdesigned by a

Norwegian company— Kvxrner.

110

West Ekofisk came on stream, the 11 otherplatforms in Phase III were in place andbeing assembled. West Ekofisk, Cod, andTor made up the first part of the thirddevelopment phase.

Furthermore, Cod and Tor were ofNorwegian design — Kvaerner, the firstNorwegian company so involved, wasawarded the job of creating these twoplatforms. The Cod platform was first onstream, on 26 December 1977 — while Torplatform followed suit a half-year later. Codrepresents a bold development in manyways. It began with a long discussion as towhether or not experience gained from theEkofisk Tank indicated that it would be bestto go with a concrete jacket. A time-consuming process was carried out in whichseveral bids on such a concrete jacket wereobtained, but in the end it was concludedthat the steel jacket was the least costlyalternative. Of the 6 fields around the mainfield, Cod is located farthest from theEkofisk Complex — approximately 75kilometers. Therefore the pipeline solutionwas an important element. While the othersatellite fields had separate oil and gas lines— with the exception of West Ekofisk whichis located near the Ekofisk Complex, it wasdecided early on to go with a single pipelinefrom Cod. This two-phase line would

transport both oil and gas/liquid gas. Thepipeline transportation from Cod to theEkofisk Complex has functioned well sinceproduction start-up, despite the fact thatresearchers have not yet solved the manyproblems connected with transporting oiland gas in the same pipeline.

Cod was the first platform in Phase III andbecame a model for the others. It is of bolderdesign with larger modules, compared withthe Phase II platforms. The principal of amodular support system instead of a modulesupport frame (MSF) was given practicalapplication for the first time on the Codplatform. It proved to be so successful that itwas later utilized on the other platforms.

One of the important reasons behindCod's representing a new generation ofplatforms is the fact that there was adevelopment at that time toward greatercapacity for crane barges. They were able tohoist heavier modules into place. The cranebarge «Champion», for example, had an1150-ton capacity and could lift quartersmodules weighing around 800 tons withoutgreat difficulty. Thus more advance workcould be done onshore before the modulesassumed their positions on the platform.

The development of Cod illustrates manyof the problems associated with platformbuilding in the North Sea during that period.

It started during towout of the jacket. Asurprisingly early fall storm caused atowline between the tug and the bargecarrying the jacket to break. Thus the bargeand jacket were left to drift on their own in achurning North Sea. This situationcontinued for 13 hours before a new towlinecould be brought on board the barge andthe voyage to Cod could be resumed. Thestorm wouldn't let up, however, and fornearly a month the tug lay waiting for theweather to change before the jacket couldbe set on the ocean floor.

The jacket on Cod didn't become a longdrawn-out affair simply because of theconcrete alternative and the weatherconditions. It began earlier — with the factthat the jacket for P platform on the EkofiskComplex had sunk during the settingoperation the year before. (It turned out thatone of the buoyancy tanks fastened to thejacket had sprung a leak due to a somewhathard launching.) Therefore no chances wereto be taken with the Cod jacket — it wasreinforced in every possible way so as toavoid a similar fate. These episodes wellemphasize the kind of factors that,unforeseen and beyond all time schedules,could complicate the building of oneplatform — thereby also causing problemsfor the others that were waiting in line.

There was a shortage of both crane bargesand tugboats, so they had to be used byturns for the various platforms. Thus delayson one platform meant the next one in linewould have to wait.

A strange episode took place after thedrilling had started on the production wellson Cod. As was usual at Ekofisk, Phillips hadaimed at using the permanent platform fordelineation drilling on the reservoir. When itturned out that both the first and secondwells drilled from the platform were dry, itwas widely rumored that the platform itselfhad been placed on the wrong site! Thisrumor also reached the newspapers, whichconsequently ran big headlines to thateffect. It was only after the third well struck

Tor platform is seenduring the final stageof the hook-up work.The derrick barge«Champion», withtugboats, is liftingthe last modules intoposition.

The Tor platform in1984. Comparedwith the photoabove, here we seethat the livingquarters have beenreplaced.

Ill

Albuskjell 2/4 Fduring installation.

In the foreground theflare jacket. At the

rear of the platformwe see that the

drilling module andderrick an amongthe units still to behoisted into place.

112

oil and gas-producing layers that thesespeculations died out.

Start-UpPhillips had the company's own crews whowere experts at starting up a new platform.The company brought from the USA itsforemost experts in this area when newplatforms were to be put on stream. Thenorm was that about 100 persons beengaged in the start-up work on a platform.Each platform consists of a great number ofseparate systems which are to function ontheir own — and along with all the others.The start-up crews traveled from platformto platform, as the construction work wasfinished, in order to make the systemsfunction and get the platforms on stream.There could be many surprises along theway. As examples of some of the unforeseenproblems that could turn up, we will

mention some of the episodes that tookplace during the start-up process on Torplatform. When the hot oil system on Torwas to be tested, one of the pumps refusedto pump anything at all. The machineryfunctioned according to the instructionbook, but not a drop came out of the pump.The only thing to do was take it apart tofind out what was wrong. When the supplypipe on the suction side was brought up, itturned out that the flange gasket on thepump casing lacked a hole in the center!A similar episode occurred when the glycolwas to be filled for the first time. As theglycol was filled, a terrible racket was heardfrom inside the tank itself. The fillingprocess was stopped and the glycol drainedout. The hatch in the side was opened, andwhat appeared? That's right — one whole,apparently forgotten scaffold with woodplank and all. It was the wood plank that

made the racket when the glycol waspoured in and the plank began to float.These episodes strike a humorous chordwhen retold today, and one wonders howthey could have happened. The answer liesin the fact that, with so many differentsystems - and crews — involved in thebuilding of a platform, communication is noteasy. Often one crew will leave the platformon the same helicopter that is bringing thenew one. Thus information as to the statuson a job cannot be passed on from crew tocrew. But, to be perfectly fair — the buildingof the platforms, and the start-up operations,took place for the most part without toogreat complications or too many episodeslike the ones described above.

Albuskjell, Eldf isk and EddaDuring the period from mid-19 75 to the endof 1979 six platforms on these three fieldswere assembled, production wells weredrilled, and production was started up.

First to come on stream were the twoAlbuskjell platforms,in the middle of 1979.These twin platforms are of a slightlydifferent construction from the other PhaseIII platforms, since they have water-filledmodule support frames which are to helphinder heat build-up in the event of a fire.Furthermore, Albuskjell 1/6A was the firstplatform at Ekofisk with a Norwegian-builtjacket. It was built by Aker — the first orderof this type placed with a Norwegianshipyard.

Fall of 1979 was perhaps the most hectic

period during the entire Ekofiskdevelopment. After the Albuskjell platformshad come on stream, the three Eldfiskplatforms and Edda remained. Work wenton at full capacity in order to get everythingready - and at Eldfisk 2/7A (also called«Devil's Island» during this period), theproduction wells were drilled with twoderricks operating at the same time.

On 7 August 1979, Eldfisk A came onstream, along with the attached processingplatform, Eldfisk FTP. On 28 October,Eldfisk B followed suit - as did Eddaplatform on the 1st of December.

The Ekofisk Complex GrowsOil and gas from the six satellite fieldswould be received at the Ekofisk Complex.The first phase in this development was theprocessing facility on the Ekofisk Tank.After the Tank was in place in the summerof 1973, Doris, the contracting firm, began

The two Albuskjellplatforms are almosttwin platforms —very similar indesign. They aresomewhat differentfrom the other PhaseIII platforms in thatthe module supportframe is jilted withwater to limitgeneration of heat incase of fire.AlbuskjellII6A (top) is the firstplatform at Ekofiskwith a Norwegian-built jacket — byAker. At bottom:Albuskjell 2/4F.

113

8 — Giant Discovery

Eldfisk B is situatednorthernmost on the

Eldfisk field.

Eldfisk A and FTPare the platforms

located furthest southin the Ekofisk area.

For a while the Aplatform was

equipped with twoderricks and wasdubbed "Devil's

Island" during theheight of activity.

The crane ship"Micoperi 26" doing

piling work on thejacket for Eldfisk

FTP. In thebackground: the

jacket for Eldfisk A.

114

to build a new deck 30 meters over waterlevel. The deck would cover 65% of theTank. The prefabricated concrete deck wasfinished during the spring of 1974. Parallelwith the building of the deck, a total of 72equipment modules for the actualprocessing facility were built at various sitesin Europe and the U.S.A. The firstequipment modules were hoisted onto theTank early in the fall of 1974, and until May1976 new modules were continually beingplaced on board. As soon as the firstmodules were in place, the installation

Edda2/7Casitlooked in 1985. Eddawas identical withEldfisk B, but thederrick and drillingmodule wereremoved. They weretotally rebuilt andplaced on waterinjection platform2/4-K. In 1988equipment forhandling productionfrom Tommelitenwas installed onEdda.

process could begin — and this workcontinued all the way up to May 1977. Agood portion of it was done by Brown &Root through their subsidiary Eumech. Thiscompany employed Spanish and Italianlabor to a great extent, and it was perhapsnot so surprising that the 6-story containerblock where those employees werequartered came to be known by the exoticname of «Chinatown».

Completion of the processing facility onthe Tank was made difficult by the fact thatthe liquid gas plant at Teesside had not beenfinished on schedule. This resulted in thenecessity to alter the processing system sothat the liquid gas produced along with thedry gas and oil could be injected back intothe reservoir by NGL pumps on 2/4Cplatform. This continued until the time theliquid gas could be received at Teesside —March/April 1979.

The processing facility on the EkofiskTank nearly doubled the capacity fortreating oil and gas at the Ekofisk Complex.This also led to the need for a new safetyvalve — flare no. 2 — which was situatednorth of the Tank.

The original plan was for all the pipelinesfrom the satellite fields to come directly into the Tank. But with 6 fields - and 2 linesfrom most of the fields — the number ofpipelines was too great. There was also thenecessity of having a starting point for the

gas line to Emden. Thus 2/4R was created atthe start of 1973, and the jacket was setnorth of the Tank during first quarter 1975.After it turned out that the oil line toTeesside required a new platform - 2/4 P —the number of platforms in the EkofiskComplex grew to 6, plus the two flares.

«The North Sea Hilton»When the activity at Ekofisk reached itspeak in February/March 1977, there were7,400 people at work on the installationsand the vessels commissioned In connectionwith the construction. Housing all of thesepeople was an enormous undertaking, andthe solutions chosen involved leasingquartering^rigs — so-called Hotels — and

In 1975 anewplatform was addedto the EkofiskComplex, 2/4R. It isa riser platform — thepoint at which thepipelines from allPhase lllfields comeinto the Complex.The gas pipeline toEmden also descendsto the seabed from2/4R. Generatorswere added later, sothat all the electricityfor the Complex isproduced on Rplatform. In theforeground we seethat the jacket for thenorth flare has beenset.

115

There is a differencebetween

accommodationsstandards on

exploration rig"Ocean Viking" and

2/4-H. Newregulations in the

late 1970's specifiedtwo beds per room,

and the new hotelplatform had to be

modified midway inthe building process.

Each room is alsooutfitted with a

private bathroom.

Peak activity in theEkofisk development

was reached in1976-77 when over13,000 people were

involved in the work.The chart has been

taken from the MoeCommittee's report

no. 2 concerning costanalyses on the

Norwegiancontinental shelf.

placing temporary quartering containers onthe permanent platforms. During this periodPhillips chartered the «Henrik Ibsen», the«Alexander L. Kielland», and the «DyviAlpha» rigs. In addition, crews werequartered on the many vessels located in thearea.

It was a difficult job anticipatingquartering needs. They varied from monthto month throughout the year, dependingupon completion of the modules at thevarious onshore building sites.

Looking at the development in thenumber of persons directly employed in theconstruction of the Ekofisk area out on thefield, there were approximately 800 in 1973,4,000 in 1975, 7,400 in 1977 - decreasinggradually then to just under 2,000 in 1979.These figures include only contractorsengaged directly in the construction of theplatforms and the laying of the pipelines. Inaddition come Phillips' own employees.

Compared with today's standards foraccommodations in the North Sea,conditions during that period weremiserable. But the requirements set werealso less strict, and the periods an individualspent out on the platform were shorter. Asthe labor unions grew stronger, thedemands related to quartering standardswere given higher priority, and theNorwegian authorities followed suit by

116

1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

setting stricter requirements. The transitionfrom the temporary housing containers with6 bunks per room to 2/4H's 2-man roomswith private bath is considerable. But it alsoreflects the transition from a hecticconstruction phase to a more stableproduction phase where it is possible toestimate quartering needs.

The decision to build a separate housingplatform in addition to 2/4Q on the Ekofisk

Complex was made in 1975. The jacket wasset in 1977, and occupancy could begin inearly September 1978. With all its recreationopportunities — in addition to the high roomstandards, the platform was soon dubbed«the North Sea Hilton*, after the well-knownluxury hotel chain. The cinema, exerciseroom with sauna, light and pleasant sittingrooms, chapel, etc., made 2/4Hrepresentative of a whole new generation ofplatforms. Later the standards were raisedeven higher on the new fields, but 2/4H wasthe first and set the course for the others.

It is important to be clear about the factthat housing standards at Ekofisk during theconstruction phase were no lower than onsimilar fields — or at onshore facilities. Butfrom the perspective of today's standardsthey seem primitive. There did occur achange for the better, however. Duringconstruction of the quarters on Cod, theNorwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD)took part in the designing for the first time.In cooperation with the operator and theemployee organizations, they managed toarrive at a set of regulations that everyonecould live with. In 1978 came the regulationthat there should only be 2 persons in aroom. In the temporary quarteringcontainers there were as many as 6 — that is,

Ekofisk 2/4H - as it looked in 1985. On the helideck we see a Boeing Chinook machine from Helikopter Service.The hotel platform has 268 beds (2 per room), offices, cinema, exercise room with sauna, chapel, and various other recreation rooms.

3 people could sleep in the room at onetime, since the bunks were assigned in sucha way that 3 were on the shift opposite theother 3. The regulation on 2-man rooms wasmade retroactive and resulted in the PhillipsGroup's having to implement a quartersreplacement program. Between 1.5 and 2billion kroner were spent on replacing someof the quarters and renovating others. Itbegan with new quarters modules on 2/4Q,and platform after platform followed suituntil 1983.

Project OrganizationThe overriding goal for the development ofthe Ekofisk area was forward progress —even though this might entail an increase incosts. This meant that planning, purchasing,and building activity had to be carried outwith a high level of overlapping. Bidinvitations were sent out even though detailplanning was only about 30% complete,while the normal requirement would havebeen closer to 70%. The same was true forconstruction work on the field, which wascarried out with great crew effort in order toachieve maximum progress.

The development was under thesupervision of the E & C (Engineering &Construction) project task force, which was

located in London but directed by theoperator in Oslo, then later moved toStavanger with reporting responsibilityback to Phillips' Europe/Africa Division inLondon. The latter reported to the NaturalResources Group (NRG) in Bartlesville.Project management in E & C, London, hadat their disposal a group of project engineerswho then had responsibility for therepresentatives at the varioussubcontractors, and at the building sites. Aconstruction manager in Stavanger was incharge of that portion of the work that tookplace on the field.

There was a steady increase inStavanger's share in the development. Moreand more of the work in field development,processing and project planning was turnedover to Norway. At the end of thedevelopment period, almost the entire E &C staff in London was also transferred toStavanger.

Phillips completed the project with a verysmall organization. However, during themost hectic periods this led to the need tohire service companies whose employeesfunctioned as Phillips' own.

In spite of this fact, Phillips has probablycarried out a greater portion of the technicalplanning than has any of the other operators

In 1976, four keyindividuals in

Phillips PetroleumCompany were

honored by beingdesignated

commanders of theorder of St. Olav.

Phillips' Chairmanof the Board, Bill

Martin (no. 2 fromthe left} was

decoratedcommander with

star, while Edwinvan den Bark, Pete

Silas and Ward W.Dunn were decorated

commander. Inconnection with the

ceremony of theexclusive Norwegian

orders, Minister ofPetroleum and

Energy BjartmarGjerde observed that,"when things go well

for the (Phillips)Group, things go

well for Norway too.'

118

on the Norwegian shelf.In addition to the varying levels within

Phillips' own organization, the partners andthe Norwegian authorities are also involvedwhen decisions have to be made. All capitalprojects exceeding 3 million dollars have tobe approved by a Phillips executivecommittee. The partners are brought intothe picture when costs will exceed 1 milliondollars.

Time and MoneyThe overriding emphasis on forwardprogress in the development necessitated(based on an isolated costs analysis) that itbe more expensive than the project ideal.For the companies involved, however, itwas important to start producing as soon aspossible. They were bound by contract forsale of the gas, and a very favorabledevelopment in oil and gas prices occurredwhich made the venture profitable on thewhole.

«One of the worst tasks I had inconnection with the development washaving to submit new and higher — often alot higher — cost estimates to managementat regular intervals.* This is Bill Boyce'scomment on the cost aspect of the project.He was located in Bartlesville during thefirst phases of the project and participated atthe same time in the important partner

committees which followed thedevelopment step by step. Every month,revised cost estimates were made whichwere attached to the progress reports.

When the original development of the 7fields, the pipelines, and the terminals atEmden and Teesside was completed, thefigure came close to 40 billion kroner.

There were many good reasons for thefact that neither cost estimates nor timeschedules were kept — the most important,of course, being the fact that it was verydifficult to foresee all the aspects of apioneer project such as this. In spite of thefact that the Phillips Group chose to go withwell-known and proven solutions whereverpossible, new avenues were not to beavoided. The members of the so-called MoeCommittee, who studied the developmentprojects on the shelf and presented theirreport in 1980, calculated that between 15%and 20% of the solutions in the Ekofiskdevelopment were pioneering efforts.

In addition to being a period of newtechnical solutions and practical problemswith the environment and the weather, the1970's were also a decade of inflation. Theinflation quickly ate up the value of thekroner and the dollar, and necessitatedrevision of the original cost estimates. Forthe Eldfisk, Edda and Albuskjell fields alone,development costs increased by 470 million

This flow chartshows the mainstructure of theorganization incharge of thedevelopment of theEkofisk area. At topwe find PhillipsPetroleum CompanyNorway. The actualproject organizationis headed by theproject manager ofthe engineering unitin London. This unitwas again split intwo — a constructionsection in Stavangerand an engineeringsection in London.The Londonorganization wasresponsible for designand actualconstruction of thedifferent onshoreunits, whileStavanger wasresponsible for theactivities at Ekofisk.Over thisorganization werethe PhillipsEurope-AfricaDivision in Londonand the main officein Bartlesville, aswell as a number ofpartner committees.The partnercompanies, of course,have always playeda central role in thefinaldecision-makingprocess.

119

E & S SPECIALISTS(LONDON)

- LEGAL- INSURANCE-CONTRACT

AUDITING- FINANCE- PLANNING-COST ESTIMATING- PURCHASING-TECHNICAL

STRUCTURALELECTRICALOTHERS

TECHNICAL SERVICECONTRACTS

-DNV-HYDROTECH- MAPLE-OTHERS

DESIGN CONTRACTS

- BROWN a ROOT- MCDERMOTT- NORCONSULT- WORLEY-TECHNOMARE-KVÆRNER

DESIGN REPRESENTATIVELONDON/STAVANGER/AT SITE]

FABRICATION CONTRACTS

-AKER- BROWN & ROOT-C.G.DORIS-OIS-MCDERMOTT-OTHERS

MARINE CONSTRUCTIONCONTRACTS

- BROWN 4 ROOT- HEEREMA-MICOPERI- MCDERMOTT- OTHERS

OFFSHORE HOOKUP,MODIFICATIONS S MAINTENANCE

- BROWNAKER- DEGROOTHMV-OIS-OTHERS

INSPECTORS{AT SITE)

CONSTRUCTIONSUPERVISORS

(AT SITE)

CONSTRUCTIONSUPERVISORS

(AT SITE)

CONSTRUCTIONSUPERINTENDENT

(STAVANGER)

SITE REPRESENTATIVE(AT SITE}

CONSTRUCTIONSUPERINTENDENT

(STAVANGER)

PROJECT ENGINEER(LONDON)

P.P. CO NORWAY{STVANGER)

P.P. CO. ENGINEERING SERVICESPROJECT MANAGER

(LONDON)

CONSTRUCTION MANAGER(STAVANGER)

TECHNICAL SPECIALISTS(STAVANGER)

The rental costs forderrick barges

increased greatlyfrom 1972 to 1978,

and had aconsiderable impacton the total costs of

the development.While the daily rate

in 1972 was approx.USD 30,000, in

1978 it was close toUSD 95,000. Thetable is taken from

the MoeCommittee's report

no. 2.

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979

dollars as a result of inflation. An importantfactor was also the explosion in steel prices.The oil crisis, too, had a considerable effectat the beginning of the development.Delays due to reduced productivity by thesubcontractors because of the oil crisis werea part of everyday reality during this period.

Nor can the weather's influence beunderestimated in this connection. Duringthe winter months between September andApril, an entire fleet of crane barges, barges,supply boats, and tugs could simply lieinactive, waiting for some fair weather daysso the job could be done — at the PhillipsGroup's expense, of course. Despite twodifferent rates for working and waiting onthe weather, the final bill increased whenmonth after month went by with storms andbad weather offshore. And if big hoisting

jobs didn't get done in late summer of oneyear - due to delays at the onshore buildingsite, it could be necessary to wait nearly halfa year before the weather becamecooperative. That was the case for some ofthe larger modules to be hoisted on:o theEkofisk Tank. And since the modules werenot hoisted into place, it followed that theinstallation work could not get started. Thusdelay bred delay — and cost increase.Another important factor in this picture wasthe gradual cost increase on the vessels thatwere required. In the beginning of theconstruction period, a crane barge could beleased for between 10,000 and 15,000dollars per day. Because of the greatdemand toward the mid-1970's, the rateswent up to 75,000-80,000 dollars.Ekofisk was no longer the only region underdevelopment. Field development was goingon in both the British and Norwegiansectors. This situation was exploited tosome degree by the shipowners, so thatexisting contracts had to be renegotiated.

Another factor of significance on the costside was the new regulations concerningworking hours. Phillips believes that closeto 25% of the extra costs for offshoreinstallation work stemmed from the newregulations that led to shorter workinghours offshore and more free time onshore.

This chart of theentire Ekofisk

development —including Emden and

Teesside — indicatesvery clearly the

enormous scope andparallelism of the

project.The chart is taken

from the MoeCommittee's report

no. 2 on the costanalysis of the

development projecton the Norwegiancontinental shelf.

2/4 A

2/4 B

2/4 C

2/4 FTP

2/4 Q

2/4 P

2/4 T

Phase 3 Ekof. S. (2/4 T)

V. Ekof. 2/4 D

Cod 7/11A

Tor 2/4 E

Ekof. 2/4 R

Pipeline E.

Pipeline T.

mpietion Phase 3Edda 2/7 C

Eldfisk 2/7 A

2/7 B

2/7 FTP

Albuskjell 2/4 F

1/6 A

Hotelpl. 2/4 H

Emden, Gal

Teeside, Crude oil

Teeside, NGL

120

Phase 1

Phase I Eko

The scope of theEkofisk developmentwas extraordinary.At one point workwas under way in 4 7yards in 7 differentcountries — while atthe same time theEmden and Teessidefacilities were underconstruction,including the gas andoil pipelines. Add tothat the processingequipment on top ofthe Tank, picturedhere.

SummaryWhen the first phase of permanent facilitieswas planned in the Ekofisk development,not all the fields to be included in the projectwere known. This made it extremelydifficult to measure how large the costincreases were - or how much more timethe development took than planned. If wetake as a basis the Moe Committee'scomments regarding delays, then Phase IIwas delayed by approximately 6-9 months,the first part of Phase III by 15 months,while Eldfisk, Edda and Albuskjell weredelayed by approximately 2-3 years.

The committee concludes with thestatement that the Phillips Group had bettercontrol over the first phase of thedevelopment than the last part. This maywell contain a certain degree of truth, butthen the committee has chosen to ignore thefact that development complexity becamemuch greater with six fields under paralleldevelopment as opposed to one in the otherphase. In addition, the Phillips Group had to

carry out modifications on Phase II becausenew fields were constantly being tied intothe system. At one point, projects for theEkofisk development were under way at 47work sites in 7 different countries.Furthermore, construction of the EkofiskComplex, the pipelaying on the two lines,and, construction of the terminals in Emdenand Teesside were going on at about thesame time. All of this put together meansthat Phillips and the Phillips Group wereworking at that time with the largestdevelopment project to date in Norway.When new ground was being brokensimultaneously to that degree, it was notpossible for everything to progressaccording to plan.

One example of unforeseen events isfound in the building of the 2/4H platform.While the platform was under construction,along came the regulation to the effect thatthere could only be two people living in oneroom. The plans had to be altered from4-man to 2-man rooms — and the final billcame to 172 million dollars extra.

121

2/4 K

2/4 B

2/4 RRiser platform. The pipeline whichconnects the Cod, Albuskjell, West \Ekofisk, Edda, Eldfisk and Ula fields toEmden in West Germany startshere. The platform also suppliesthe entire Ekofisk Complex withelectricity.

2/4 SRiser platform whichconnects the Statpipepipeline with the Ekofisk ifComplex. >~""v-'"'i|j

2/4 GRiser platformwhich ties Valhallto Ekofisk.

2/4 TStorage tank for onemillion barrels of oil,processing facilities forseparation of oil, gas;NGL and water. Theproduction in theGreater Ekofisk Arpa iscontrolled from thecontrol room at the Tank.

2/4 HLiving quarters.Accommodationsplatform.

2/4 PThis is where the oilpipeline to Teessidestarts. Sufficientpressure is provided bystrong centrifugalpumps. Spare parts forthe entire field are alsostored on this platform.

2/4 CProduction platform.It produces from the^middle part of theEkofisk reservoir.Gas-is reinjecte^djintothe reservoir from fourof the wells.

Here's What Happensai ihe Ekofisk Complex

The Ekofisk Complex is the central point for the11 production platforms in the Ekofisk area. Alloil and gas lines from the 7 fields in the area leadto the Complex. Add to this the EkofiskComplex' significance as the meeting point foroil and gas lines from fields lying outside thearea. The Valhall field is tied into the Ekofisksystem via riser platform 2/4G, which isconnected by bridge with the Ekofisk Tank. Gasfrom the Statpipe system (Statfjord, Gullfaks andHeimdal) is conducted into the system via riserplatform 2/4S which lies to the east of 2/4R. Oilfrom the Ula field comes by pipeline to 2/4Rand is tied into the system. (The gas from Ula ispiped to Cod — and on into the system to theEkofisk Complex.)

What happens then to the oil and gas thatcomes to the Ekofisk Complex? The basis forunderstanding what happens lies in some centrallaws of physics. The processing will remain amystery unless we become familiar with theselaws. To aid our understanding, let's refreshsome of our knowledge of physics:

«A liquid will give off vapor until we achievea balance between the liquid and the gas/vaporphase over it.» If we heat it up or lower the totalpressure, more of the liquid will go over into thevapor phase. If we increase the pressure or lowerthe temperature, some of the gas/vapor will be«pressed» back into the liquid.

«Oil and gas consist of molecules built up ofhydrogen and carbon, and are therefore alsocalled hydrocarbons. Oil contains mostcompound and heavy hydrocarbons, while gasconsists of simpler and lighter hydrocarbons. Byvarying the pressure in an oil/gas mixture, wevary the relationship between oil and gas — andthe composition of the two.»

We utilize the above when we want toseparate oil and gas and treat the gas in theprocessing facility at the Complex.

There are five separators (large high-pressuretanks where oil, gas and water are separatedfrom each other) at the Ekofisk Complex. Thesetanks receive the oil and gas flow from the 7fields: Ekofisk, West Ekofisk, Tor, Cod,

124 Albuskjell, Eldfisk and Edda.

1. The West Ekofisk Separator receives oil, gasand water from West Ekofisk. It operates at apressure of approximately 34 bars. The gas goesfrom there to the intermediate compressors, theoil to the interstage separator (4) and the waterto the water treatment facility (11).

2. Dry Gas Separator I receives gas fromAlbuskjell and gas and liquid from Cod. (Coddoes not produce oil, but some liquid resemblingcondensed gas.) It operates at the same pressureas the West Ekofisk separator. The gas goes tothe pump compressor and the liquid to theinterstage separator (4).

3. Dry Gas Separator //receives the gas fromEldfisk. It operates at a pressure of about 60 bars.The gas goes from there to the dehydrationfacility (7). Any liquid goes to the interstageseparator.

4. The Interstage Separator receives oil and gasfrom Edda and Tor, oil from Eldfisk andAlbuskjell, and oil/liquid from the threeseparators mentioned above. It operates at apressure of about 14 bars. The gas goes via acompressor where the pressure is increased to34 bars and is sent on through the pumpcompressor to the dehydration facility (7). Theoil goes to the low stage separator (5), and thewater that is extracted goes to the watertreatment facility (11).

5. The Low Stage Separator receives oil andsome of the gas from 2/4FTP, a separationplatform for the Ekofisk field, plus all the oilfrom the interstage separator (4). It operates atabout 6 bars pressure. The gas goes via acompressor where the pressure is increased firstto 14 bars and then to 34 bars, on through theintermediate compressors to the dehydrationfacility (7). The oil goes through pumps formeasurement, and the water goes to the watertreatment facility (11).

6. Pumps and Metering. From the low stageseparator the oil is pumped toward the meteringstation. But first the liquid gas is mixed in. In themetering station tests are continually beingmade on the oil to determine the quality — andthe amount of oil being produced. After themetering station, the oil from the Valhall field

(Amoco) and the Ula field (BP) is added before itgoes on to P platform and its big pumps — andfrom there into the pipeline to Teesside,England.

7. The Dehydration Facility receives gas fromall the separators — either directly or via differentcompressors that bring the pressure up toapproximately 60 bars. The dehydration facilityconsists of 6 big towers (vertical tanks) wherethe gas comes into the lower section. On its wayup in the tanks, the gas meets a descending flowof glycol. The glycol absorbs water and watervapors in the gas so that a nearly waterless gasgoes on to the dew point unit (8). The water isevaporated from the glycol by heating it up.After the glycol is cooled, it is used again forextracting water from the gas. If the water is notproperly extracted in the dehydration facility,this may cause serious icing problems in the dewpoint unit.

8. In the Dew Point Unit, the gas is cooled toapproximately -20° C, the same temperature asin a home freezer. But the dimensions are totallydifferent, and the chilling capacity is equivalentto more than 100,000 home freezers. At thistemperature and the high pressure (60 bars),so-called wet gas is extracted in liquid form. Thisis principally ethane, propane, and butane. Thiswet gas, also called NGL (natural gas liquids), ismixed into the oil at the pump and meteringstation (6) and piped to Teesside. The «dry» gasfrom the dew point unit is injected back into thereservoir (9) or piped on to the pipeline

compressors (10) for transporting to Emden.9. Gas for Reinjection goes from the dew point

unit to 2/4C platform, where powerfulcompressors increase the pressure toapproximately 400 bars in order to be able toforce the gas back into the reservoir. Theamount of gas reinjected depends on how muchgas the buyers on the Continent want. Thereinjection of gas has a favorable effect on thereservoir and increases oil production levels.

10. Pipeline Compressors receive the gas fromthe dew point unit after it has gone through anaccurate metering station where amount andcomposition are registered. In the compressorsthe pressure is increased to approximately 600bars before the gas is conducted into the pipelineto Emden, West Germany. The Statpipe gas andgas from the Valhall field pass through the samecompressors.

11. Water Treatment: The water extracted inthe separators contains too much oil for it to bedischarged directly into the sea. The oil contentis not so high that it would lead to seriouspollution, but it can be improved. At the EkofiskComplex this is achieved by piping all waterproduced into the Ekofisk Tank. The Tank holdsa little oil (approximately 50,000 barrels) on topand the rest water (approximately 950,000barrels). Here the water is kept for a long time sothat all the oil has plenty of time to be extracted.Then nearly oil-free water can be dischargedinto the sea without endangering fish and otherliving organisms in the waters around Ekofisk. 125

Costly Lessons

Several campaignshave been carried out

to motivate theemployees to «think

safety* before a workoperation is started.

At Ekofisk it hasbeen proven that

much of the safetygain rests with the

individual in theform of safetyconsciousness.

126

The year 1987 was one of great challengeswithin the area of safety at Ekofisk. Thework on the jacking of the six steelplatforms at the Ekofisk Complex put bothpeople and equipment to tests which,according to the statistics, should haveresulted in accidents. More than 11 millionworking hours were logged by Phillips andcontractors during that year. The safetyrecord showed fantastic year-end results.Only minor injuries - and, for the first time,Phillips' own employees managed to work 3million hours without loss of on-the-jobtime due to injuries. A very impressiverecord, considering the type of work thatthe jacking operation entailed. Many of thejobs had to be done below the platformdecks - even throughout a winter season. Abig safety and security plan was designed tospot and minimize the risks involved.Attention was given both to the equipmentand to motivating the individual who wouldbe doing the job. Quite often, in situationssuch as these, thought is only given to theequipment: is it good enough? Experiencefrom Ekofisk shows that it is just as

important to work with the people.It is difficult to evaluate fully the

achievements on the field. The mainland ofNorway has very incomplete loss andaccident statistics, and an unambiguousbasis for comparison is lacking. However,SINTEF — in cooperation with Norsk Hydro— has worked up some statistical materialcomparing the offshore oil industry withland-based industry. Based on this material,after 11 million working hours in thebuilding and construction industry, forexample, a fatal accident can be expected.Within mining, the number of anticipatedfatal accidents would be five. On permanentoffshore installations, one death could beexpected during such a period.

The safety and security work is a goodinvestment, and it pays prompt dividends.The safety system is built into theinstallations at the same time as usageprocedures are drawn up with safety inmind. And, of no less importance is the factthat everyone is given instruction in usagebased on the safety aspect. It is not withoutreason that one of the safetysuperintendents out at Ekofisk, veteran EgilBerle, raises the question now and then as towhether the work in the area of safety isperhaps being overdone and theinformation aspect too intense? Safety reallyhas top priority in the work being done atEkofisk today.

But the good safety statistics have notbeen achieved without effort. Since thebeginning of offshore activity in 1967,accidents have occurred that have claimedmany lives. The offshore oil industry is ahigh risk industry where both theenvironment and the product itself havebuilt-in dangers.

It has cost a lot to reach the point wherewe are today.

In addition to pointing to the causes, theinvestigations and studies have alsobeen forward-looking, pointing to theimprovements that could be made. In acooperative effort on the part of thecompanies, the authorities, politicians, andthe individual employee, measures havebeen taken that have shown that theaccidents have led to changes in a positivedirection for the total safety picture on theoil installations.

The principles for safety in the oilindustry are based on the individuallicensee's internal supervision, while theauthorities' inspection via NPD is a check onthe company's own supervision. Phillips hasestablished a separate department forquality assurance and quality control(QA/QC). This group carries out regularinspections of all the installations — andperforms a sort of internal policing function.The main responsibility for qualityassurance and quality control lies with theindividual employee, so that the QA/QCgroup is complementary to thisresponsibility. Departmental managerMagne Ognedal in NPD's division forsafety and work environment says it isseldom that the Directorate gives praise tothe companies, but Phillips has actuallybeen praised for the company's preventive

safety work, in a press release issued by theNPD.

Unfortunately, no one can say thataccidents will not happen again — and noone can say that we have come so far nowthat there is no room for improvement.Working with safety is an ongoing processin which there is work to be done with bothequipment and people.

In this chapter we will be looking at someof the accidents that have befallen theEkofisk community - and thesafety/security program that has beendeveloped to provide the best possibleprotection for this special community. Wemake no pretensions about presenting any«correct» or «complete» account. But theseevents have their place in the history ofEkofisk and therefore belong in this book.Limitations on time and space preclude ourgiving the Bravo blowout and the«Alexander L. Kielland* catastrophecomplete coverage here. Books have alreadybeen written about these accidents, andmore will probably be written in the future.Instead, our account will be based onstatements from some of the peopleinvolved - and the lessons learned fromthese events. For as catastrophic as the«Kielland» accident was, it did lead tochanges that have had great significance forthe safety programs on our oil installations.

On all platformsthere are bulletinboards withinformation ondifferent aspects ofthe safety work. It isnecessary to try at alltimes to be on theoffensive withpreventive safetywork.

127

Safety statistics inthe North Sea have

shown steadyimprovement. Those

involved in theactual drilling

operation representone of the most

vulnerable groups.Here a derrickman

is at work on adrilling rig, in 1970.

The First YearsCompared with today's technology, boththe equipment and the training of crews waslimited during the first phase of activity inthe North Sea. Phillips had few of its ownemployees out on the rigs, and the workwas largely entrusted to the contractors.ODECO, owners of «Ocean Viking»,manned the rig. Norwegian regulations atthat time were limited. But the operatorshad guidelines by which the contractors hadto work.

The Norwegian regulations were basedto a great degree on things that applied toshipping and, in this connection, had to beinadequate in some areas.

As is the case within society in general, itwas difficult to make laws and rules beforethere was experience on which to basethem. In developing the first rules, StatensOljerad (the State petroleum board)cooperated with NSOC (North SeaOperators Committee) and the individual

128

operators. The Norwegian authoritiesestablished, by Royal Decree of 25 August1967, special safety regulations forexploration and drilling for subseapetroleum deposits. These regulations werelater superseded by a new Royal Decree of3 October 1975 covering the same area.These safety regulations only applied to theexploration phase. They were, however,modified for the development of Ekofisk byconditions which the Ministry of Industryplaced on the Phillips Group. Then specialsafety regulations were set down on 9 July1976 for the production phase. Theseregulations clearly place seniorresponsibility for the activity in the hands ofthe licensees, which responsibility is carriedout for practical purposes by the operators.The regulations have since been revisedseveral times.

Early StartThe first Norwegians with Phillips to workon the field were hired on 12 February 1973.One of the twenty recruited at that time wasEgil Berle. As early as February 1971, hestarted working as an operator for Canam,the company that owned the «Gulftide» rig.After a short career as operator on«Gulftide», he has since been with the Safetyand Security Department and followed thedevelopment there.

When he joined the department inDecember 1973, the company's ownAmerican employees were already therewith responsibility for what at Phillips iscalled «Safety». Andy Anderson was incharge of this area, and he was very active.One of his main tasks was to trainNorwegians so that they could graduallybecome actively involved in safety work.

During the early phase on «Gulftide»,safety meetings were already being heldwhere great emphasis was placed onpersonal safety. A handbook was developedin Norwegian and English on the subject —and this was also part of the training offeredto the first Norwegian employees withPhillips. This training was a combination ofonshore theory and practical training out on«Gulftide» — to teach the subject throughexperience.

Helicopter AccidentFrom the time the activity began, the

Crew change on"Gulftide", Duringthe first years, onecould travel to andfrom rigs andplatforms withoutany kind of personalsafety equipmentonboard thehelicopters.

helicopter has been the work bus carryingthe crews back and forth between the rigsand land. Until 9 July 1973, this traffic hadgone well without big problems oraccidents. On this date everyone connectedwith the offshore oil activity was given awarning to the effect that this too was avulnerable area.

Jarle Urke, currently seniorsuperintendent, Operations Support, atEkofisk, was busy that July day. A well-deserved vacation was at hand — he wouldbe going home to his «roots» in Alesund.Newly shaven, he boarded the Sikorskyhelicopter on «Gulftide» and promptly notedthat it was a clear, fine day.

On the trip out from Forus, the helicopterhad stopped off at «Ocean Viking», whichlay north of «Gulftide», to take on fuel. Onthe trip in, there were 15 passengers, twopilots, and — in addition to the baggage —one motor for a «Jet Ranger* helicopter.

Jarle Urke found a seat aft in thehelicopter, with his back to the direction offlight. He relaxed in the seat anddaydreamed about the cod-fishing he wouldsoon be doing on the coast of M0re. Thefear of flying was unknown to him, and henever considered the possibility ofsomething going wrong. The North Seahelicopter traffic had been flying for 7-8years without an accident.

There are twenty miles between everycheckpoint along the route in to Forus, and

the helicopter reported from the first pointat 1438 hours.

About halfway between Ekofisk andForus, Jarle Urke and the other passengerswere suddenly shaken out of theirdaydreams. The even drone of the motorwas drowned out by a powerful boom fromthe tail area, and the whole machine startedshaking and jolting from strong vibrations.Co-pilot Johannes Tveita immediately putthe machine over on auto rotation andchecked the RPM indicator. The helicopter'sspeed had dropped to 80 knots and wasfalling rapidly toward the 60 knot mark. ForTveita it felt like he still had some control,but in spite of his efforts to turn to the left,the machine pulled toward the right. After10-15 seconds, the noise from the tailsection disappeared, and at the same timethe strong vibrations ceased. Capt. SteinarFredriksen turned on the NO SMOKINGand FASTEN SEAT BELT signs, and thensent the «Mayday» signal three times on theradio. The signals were picked up byStavanger Radio at 1444 hours.

Back in the cabin there were two pilotsamong the passengers. They got hold oftheir lifevests, and the other passengersfollowed their example. A minute later thehelicopter had dropped to an altitude of 150feet, and the pilot started leveling out themachine. In that way he could put thehelicopter down on the water. But thewaves were around four meters, and a 129

9 — Giant Discovery

Three of thepassengers are sitting

on the helicopterwreckage when the

rescue helicopterarrives.

The three men are inrelatively goodshape, and are

hoisted onboard therescue helicopter in a

basket.

breaker immediately knocked off the leftpontoon while the machine lay over to theleft on the water.

Jarle Urke had managed to put on hislifevest, but when the helicopter hit thewater he must have lost consciousness for amoment. When he came to, the helicopterhad completely capsized, and he washanging upside down, belted into his seat.He released his seat belt and fell down intothe water. When he got up on his feet, heregistered that the water level aft in thecabin was above his knees and risingrapidly. Most of the water probably came inthrough the open baggage door at the front.It was difficult to get his bearings, but hesaw a bit of light from the nearest windowand, with a single blow from his left hand,he knocked the pane out. Along with amechanic from Helikopter Service, hemanaged to get out through the window.

130 Until that point he hadn't observed any

panic among the passengers to get out. But,once outside, it became hectic. Some peoplehad only managed to get their vests halfwayon, others were having trouble because onlyone of the vest's lungs had filled with air,and still others didn't know how to swim.Those in the best shape swam aroundhelping the others. It was blowing from thenorthwest at 25-30 knots, and the airtemperature was 1°C. The water was 1°warmer.

Jarle Urke knew that there was already ahelicopter on its way from Forus to Ekofisk,but he was also aware that it was probablyfull of passengers and that it most likely didnot have a rescue lift on board. Just thesame, it was an uplifting sight when theSikorsky machine appeared, and shortlyafterward lifevests and life rafts were thrownout. One of the rafts hit the water right nextto him, and along with five others hemanaged to climb on board. Four otherswere clinging to the pontoon that had beentorn off the helicopter.

Then the Scottish trawler «Cavalier»showed up. It had seen the helicopter'sstrange behavior and set its course for thesite of the accident. Young Scotsman InnesMcPherson tied a line around himself andjumped out into the high, cold waves. Whenthe first casualty was brought on board,McPherson had to jump out once again tohelp another of the four people on thepontoon. Two of these, however, were soseverely exhausted that they did not survivethe accident.

When the «Cavalier» had taken on board

all those who had been on the pontoon, itcontinued toward the raft — and, while JarleUrke and the four others were being helpedon board the trawler, two rescue helicopterscame on the scene. One was from themilitary rescue service, while the other was aHelikopter Service machine. Both wereequipped with rescue lifts. Two personswere picked up by the first helicopter, butone of these was too weak to survive. Threepeople were also lifted up from the wreckedhelicopter itself and were in relatively goodshape. One last casualty was found bydivers later that evening inside the wreckedmachine.

The wreckage was towed to shore and aninvestigative commission was appointed tofind the cause of the accident which claimedfour lives.

The commission concluded that theprobable cause of the accident was that a tailrotor blade was broken loose. This led to therotor's falling off the helicopter along withthe tail gearbox. It is the latter which runsthe tail rotor. Thus the helicopter went outof balance and had to make an emergencylanding.

As a result of this accident, severalreinforcements were made on the tail rotor,and the time intervals between inspectionsand overhauling of the gearbox wereshortened. Another important result of thisaccident was the requirement that a lifevestand survival suit be placed under each seatin every helicopter.

Fire on 2/4 AlphaUntil April 1974, production was only fromthe temporary facility on «Gulftide». Thenthe first production well on 2/4A came onstream — and gradually more and more wellson this platform and 2/4B and 2/4C werecompleted and put in production. The fact

that «childhood illnesses* were revealedduring that first period was only natural andpart of the process involved in putting newequipment to the test in earnest. Just howgreat the stresses would be that theequipment would have to endure had, quitenaturally, not been foreseen. The North Seaenvironment showed once again thattraditional solutions were not adequate.

Production Supervisor Ray Sligar was inthe drilling office at around 1600 hours onthat first day in November, 1975. The officewas in a container on the south side of thequarters on Ekofisk 2/4 Alpha - right belowthe helicopter deck. The first thing henoticed was a shaking in the platform, andhe thought it could have been caused by asupply boat that had collided with aplatform leg.

«I grabbed my helmet right away and setcourse for the east side of the platform. But Iwas stopped by a wall of flames. The onlything that could be done was to make myway back to the drilling office and activatethe yellow shutdown button to stopproduction — and, at the same time, start thefire pumps.» Along with two men from theMoran drilling firm, Ray Sligar set out forthe west side of the platform, but there toohe was halted by a sea of flames. The flamesrose above the helicopter deck, and thethree made their way across the pipe deckand into the second floor of the quarters.There the crew had gradually assembled,and Ray learned that probably everyonewas there - and in good shape. However, he

The wreckedhelicopter was towedto shore. Here theinvestigatingcommittee will checkit carefully to findout what caused theaccident that claimedfour lives.

2/4 A platform wasthe first to be putonstream at Ekofisk.The picture providesa good look at thetwo rescue capsulesonboard.

131

This is the riser thatcorroded and caused

the fire on Ekofisk2/4 Alpha. The riseris approi. 10 inches

thick.

132

wanted to check and went down onto thefirst floor. It was black with smoke downthere, and he had to crawl along the floor.He made his way on into the galley — but itwas already on fire, and he had to get outthe same way he had gone in. On the westside of the platform he saw that one of thelifeboat capsules was aflame - and that thepaint on the outside of the quarters was alsoburning. His tour continued to the controlroom to see whether everything was okay -then to the storage area and on to the firepump room. Everything looked in order.Then Ray came to think about a tank ofhelicopter fuel. It was standing on the pipedeck, and once up there he got a fire hoseaimed at the tank.

In the meantime the crew had managed tolower the lifeboat to the water. They hadleft the platform without his having noticedit. That is, the whole crew was not on boardthe lifeboat. In addition to Ray Sligar, aSpanish cook and an electrician from Moranwere still on the platform. At this point theyobserved that one of the rescue capsuleswas gone, but didn't know that it had fallendown in the attempt to lower it to thewater.

In the lifeboat there were 63 people. 59 ofthese were quickly taken on board a supplyboat, but the lifeboat went back to theplatform to pick up the three peopleremaining. Before Ray Sligar disembarked,he managed to direct a fire cannon towardthe tank containing the helicopter fuel onthe pipe deck.

The lifeboat circled the platform to checkwhether anyone was in the water. At thesame time, a supply boat had come on thescene to tow the rescue capsule to theEkofisk Complex.

While this was going on, the «SeawayFalcon* diving ship was lying by Alphaplatform, ready to turn its water cannons onthe platform. Because of the high waterpressure, the ship had to wait until everyonehad been evacuated. Ray Sligar had reflectedover why this had not happened sooner, butwhen he saw the damage that was done tothe quarters by the water, he was glad hewas safely away from the platform beforethe powerful jets of water were aimed inthat direction.

Three of the six crew members on Ekofisk2/4A who had tried to evacuate theplatform via the rescue capsule died as a

result of the injuries they incurred. Duringtheir attempt to release the capsule, correctprocedures had not been followed - theresult being that the capsule was releasedabout 26 meters over the water and fell intothe sea.

Since that time these rescue capsules havebeen secured in such a way that today it isimpossible to release them into a free fallwhile they are on their way down. Onlywhen they have reached the water can theybe released. Another result of this accident

was that Phillips immediately establishedthe rule whereby everyone coming onto aplatform where he/she hasn't been duringthe past year must go through a safetycourse on the platform. One of the mostimportant parts of this safety check is toensure that each person knows the wayfrom his cabin to his lifeboat - and how thelifeboat is to be handled. The fact that thereare lifeboat coxswain today appointed fromamong the crew on the platform makes itless likely that a visitor would have tohandle the lifeboat alone, but each personmust have learned how to operate it.

The cause of the fire on 2/4 Alpha wasthat the riser on the over 10-inch thick testpipeline from the platform to 2/4FTP at theEkofisk Complex had rusted through. Acement cap on the outside of the pipe in thewave zone, where the pipe goes up onto theplatform, had fallen off. Sea water and theheat from within had then caused thecorrosion to eat its way through the pipe,

and the fire started when the mixture of oiland gas at a pressure of 1050 psi met theoxygen in the air.

The built-in safety system functionedperfectly, so that it was only the oil and gasthat were in the pipe that were set afire.When the oil and gas had burned out, andthe flames were not fed anymore, the firestopped by itself. It was well A-13 on Alphathat was producing in the test pipe, and thesafety valve down in the well closed offproduction automatically.

At this point in 1975 the three productionplatforms 2/4A, 2/4B, and 2/4C on themain Ekofisk field were on stream. Totaldaily production lay at around 300,000barrels.

Comprehensive investigation went onduring the days following November 1. Theaccident with the capsule that claimed threelives was most important, but it was alsonecessary to find out what caused the fire. Itbecame clear at an early stage that thesolution chosen for the riser in the splashzone was not good. The question that wasimmediately raised, and which every effortwas made to answer, was: What conditionwere the other risers in, on the variousplatforms? On Wednesday, 5 November,production was shut down on 2/4B byorder of the Norwegian authorities. After

inspection of the risers on the platform wasfinished, permission to resume productionwas granted on 7 November. It was clear atthe same time that Phillips, in cooperationwith NPD and DnV, had to find a newsolution for the risers.

The result was that similar risers on thevarious platforms had to be replaced with amore robust and safer design in the splashzone. This would be an expensive task, butit proved once again that the solutions atEkofisk could not automatically be based onexperience from other oil installations inother environments.

The fire on 2/4A received wide coveragein the mass media and started a publicdebate on the subject of working conditionson North Sea oil installations. Only 14 daysafter the fire, the Government set up acommittee (the Halden Committee) whosejob it would be to consider the WorkEnvironment Act's application to petroleumoperations. The conclusion in thecommittee's first report, which came out inJuly 1976, was that the act, with someamendments, would be made applicable topermanent installations. The floating rigscame under maritime legislation. The secondreport came out a year later and was asupplement to the first.

The damage after the fire on 2/4A wasfairly extensive. It took close to 6 months torepair the platform, so it was not back inproduction until 5 March 1976. The crewsworking on Alpha during this period werequartered on West Ekofisk, which meantthat drilling of the production wells on thatfield — and preparation of the platform forstart-up — had to be postponed. There was ashortage of bed capacity at Ekofisk, and therepair work on 2/4A took first priority.

The Bravo BlowoutThe fire on 2/4 Alpha was the first largeraccident directly tied to the oil activity inthe North Sea. But while the Alpha fire wasa press event, the blowout on 2/4 Bravo on22 April 1977 exceeded it all. And theblowout from well no. 14 on Bravo hadgreat consequences, both for Phillips asoperator and for Norwegian oil activity ingeneral.

But first let's go back to the chronologicaldevelopment. After 2/4A went back onstream, production from the Ekofisk fieldwas stable. Construction on the satellite

We can clearly seehow the corrosion atethrough the pipeafter the protectiveconcrete coating hadfallen off. All risersof this type werereplaced after thefire.

133

The Ekofisk 2/4Bplatform is

producing from thenorthern part of the

Ekofisk reservoir,The blowout on 22

April 1977 occurredduring the

overhauling of wellB-U.

134

fields was in full swing, and start-up wasimminent on West Ekofisk, Cod and Tor.Work was also under way on the finalstretches of the pipeline to Emden, and gasdeliveries were anticipated during the latterhalf of 1977.

The 2/4 Bravo platform went on streamin early summer of 1974 and graduallybecame the major producer of oil and gas atEkofisk. In spring of 1977, production fromthe platform was around 150,000 barrels ofoil per day, and this made up about half ofthe total production from the Ekofisk field.

When a well has been in production for awhile — how long depends on many factors- it must undergo a workover in order tomaintain its production capability. At thebeginning of April, this overhauling wasunder way on well B-14 on Bravo. The wellhad been on stream for just under two yearsand needed to be overhauled. As with alldrilling jobs on Ekofisk, the task was carriedout by Moran - later called Morco and AkerNorcem Drilling.

We'll let acting production supervisor on2/4 Bravo, Olaf Bendiksen, tell about theevents on the platform that Friday evening,22 April 1977.

«The work was under way on the well,and from the top of the production valve(Christmas tree) on the cellar deck, a riserwas installed leading up to the next deckwhere the safety valve was to be connected.So the riser was open. I wondered why itwas taking so long to install the safetyvalve, but — as production supervisor at that

time -1 wasn't platform superintendent andso didn't have anything to do with theoverhauling.

«Several times on that Friday evening Ihad been over by B14, and like a number ofothers on the platform, I felt a certainamount of uneasiness as long as the safetyvalve was not in place. Before going to bed,I went by the office and asked AsbjornHansen, usually my shift partner in thecontrol room, to wake me right away ifanything happened.

«I hadn't been in bed long when thetelephone rang — and over by the riser Icould ascertain that the drilling mud wasnow trickling and running over the edge.The crew at work on the well tried to put astop to this by installing a riser pipe about15.5 meters long on top of the wellhead. Atthe top of the riser pipe there is a safetyvalve (BOP), and by installing the riser andBOP on the wellhead and closing the valve,the well is brought under control. But sincethe riser was filled with drilling mud, thisattempt did not succeed. The flow of drillingmud from the riser was increasing rapidly. Itflooded over the safety valve and sprayedout over the crew working there. From thewell a steadily increasing noise could beheard — and it became clear to all of us thereon the drill floor that the well was out ofcontrol.

«As production supervisor, I was alsoresponsible for the evacuation. Iimmediately sounded the general alarm onthe platform, and over the public addresssystem everyone was ordered to go to thelifeboat stations. From that moment on, allmy attention was concentrated on gettingeveryone on board to safety — withoutinjuries or accidents occurring in theprocess. The accident with the rescuecapsule on 2/4 Alpha came to mind.

«While the crew found their places in thelifeboats and rescue capsules, the stewardwent through all the cabins to be sure noone was left. While this was going on, theflow of drilling mud from the well hadincreased to a spray that rose up under thedrill floor. The operators had haltedproduction from the other wells byimplementing the yellow and red shutdowncontrols — and up on the drill floor some ofthe crew were occupied with trying tosecure the well.»

There were 112 people on Bravo that

Friday evening — and 16 minutes after thegeneral alarm sounded, Olaf Bendiksen wasable to press the button for the alarmsignaling evacuation of the platform. By thistime the drilling mud had become black andmixed with oil - and it started to smell likegas.

Arvid R. Omdal, the radio operator onduty, had maintained contact the wholetime with the transportation coordinator onthe Ekofisk Tank, and with the radio roomon 2/4Q. After the lifeboats and capsulesleft the platform, this information waspassed on to those receivers. Arvid and twoothers were the last people to leave Bravoplatform. They had to lower the lifeboatmanually before they went down the ladderto the spider deck, where they would bepicked up by a rubber boat from the«Seaway Falcon*.

Olaf Bendiksen went along in a rescuecapsule that was picked up by the supplyboat «Jakobiturm». From there, he and thedrilling supervisor were hoisted up onto Qplatform.

In the office on Q the mood was somber— reports that had come in from the vesselstaking part in the rescue work showed thattwo people were missing. «I knew this hadto be a mistake, and went through the lists. Isaw there that the report from the«Jakobiturm» could not be right. There were32 of us in the capsule that was picked up bythe boat, and after we were hoisted onto theplatform there should have been 30 left. Thereport showed 28. A quick count on thedeck of the supply boat proved me right,and our jubilation raised the roof in theoffice on Q platform. All 112 had beensafely evacuated from Bravo.»

In the meantime, well B-14 had run wild —and the first blowout in the North Sea was areality. Management at the EkofiskComplex and at the Phillips Base inTananger had started working on how thewell could be brought under control. Fromthe reports coming in, it soon became clearthat this task was one that had to be turnedover to experts. Just before midnight, theRed Adair Co. in Houston was contacted.The company was renowned for being thebest in the business. Saturday evening,«Boots» Hanson and Richard Hatteberg fromthat company were in Stavanger and wereflown out to the «Choctaw» barge, whichwould be their base for the rescue operation.

A dose-up of thecolumn of oil and gasthat shot up from thewell, completely outof control.

Sunday morning the two well-killers,along with three representatives fromPhillips, were put down on the helideck onBravo — the first people to board theplatform after the blowout. They were toget a closer look at the situation. After thistour of inspection, their work got under waywith preparing the equipment that wasnecessary for making the first attempt tostop the blowout. One element that hungover the crew the whole time was thedanger of the platform's catching fire. Thatwould make the job much more difficult.Therefore it was necessary to secure all theequipment against creating sparks.Wednesday, April 2 7th — five days after theblowout began — everything was ready formaking the first attempt at halting the oiland gas flow from well B-14. But theattempt failed. Another try was made thatsame day, but once again it turned out thatthe equipment could not withstand theenormous pressure in the well.

Again on Thursday, April 28th, anattempt was made, but this too was in vain.It was now obvious that more powerfulequipment would be required, and it wasordered from the U.S.A. However, the menon board the «Choctaw» did not want to 135

The first "well-killers" have come

onboard the platformto find out how to

attack the blowout.

The blowout made adeafening noise, andthe wellkillers had to

use ear protection.Here]erry Dupree,

«Boots» Hansen andPaul (Red» Adair are

onboard the"Choctaw", whichwas used as a base

for the rescue action.

A newspaper slatesthat Norway is

holding her breathwhile work is going

on to stop theblowout.

wait, and they worked at reinforcing theequipment on their own. In addition to thetwo men from the Red Adair Co., crewsfrom Moran and Phillips were also amongthe group working on Bravo platform.

Friday 29 April, Red Adair himself cameout to the platform to take part in the work— but again the attempt failed. It looked asthough it would be necessary to wait for thereinforced equipment. But once more theyworked at reinforcement on board the«Choctaw» - and on Saturday, April 30th,another attempt would be made.

At 1100 hours the crew on Bravo movedaway from the safety valve (BOP) to closeby remote control the reinforced shutoffmechanism they had made. It worked.Seconds passed — and after 5 minutes thecrews could go to the safety valve and finishthe job. At 1130 hours on 30 April, it was allover.

Media EventThe blowout on Bravo and the successfulfifth attempt to stop the runaway well couldhave been described just that simply. Thefact that working conditions for the«well-killers» under the rain of oil wereextremely difficult and danger-filled is partof the story.

But it isn't possible to describe the 7 1/2day Bravo blowout so simply. The blowout

"Choctaw" andBravo wereconnected by agangway. "Boots"Hansen is coming offBravo, virtuallycovered with thegreasy, brown oil.

137

Mass mediadesignated "Boots"Hansen as rescuer.

This is how the artistimagines the problem

solved, and in thecaption he says

laconically: "That'sthat."

was probably the biggest media event inNorwegian history up to that time.

Only hours after the blowout was madeknown, journalists from all over the worldpoured into Stavanger. At one point, closeto 300 journalists, photographers, andreporters were assembled to follow theevents out at Ekofisk.

For what was happening in the Bravoblowout was something that everyone hadspeculated was possible, but it had nothappened since the start-up of oil and gasproduction in the North Sea.

If we go back in time to the early days inNorth Sea oil activity, this very questionabout the risk of pollution and its

relationship to fishing interests and oceanecology was a main subject of debate. Thiswas particularly true in the Norwegiandebate, but it was also an important issue inother countries bordering on the North Seabasin.

The major TV broadcasters, newspapersand news magazines had theirrepresentatives in Stavanger, in addition toa very substantial Norwegian delegation.The Norwegian authorities organized anaction command in cooperation with therescue center for southern Norway at Sola.The director of Statens Forurensningstilsyn(the State pollution board), Hans Chr.Bugge, was appointed to head up the work,while then Minister of EnvironmentalAffairs Gro Harlem Brundtland was theGovernment's representative.

Out at Ekofisk very little happened thefirst five days of the blowout. Oil and gaswas pouring out of the well in greatquantities, while the «Seaway Falcon* wasconstantly spraying water over the platformto cool it off. The crews were preparing forthe attempt to stop the blowout, but forjournalists and reporters back in Stavanger,it was «dead time*. Two press conferenceswere arranged daily, but it cannot be deniedthat the press representatives weredissatisfied with the information they

An enormousnumber of pressrepresentatives

followed theattempts to end the

blowout. Theinternational

gathering of mediapeople was kept

updated throughregular press

conferences. Some ofthe key players are

seated at the table inthe right corner: with

his back to thephotographer, Hans

Chr. Bugge, theState Pollution

Control Authority:Dag Meier-Hansen,

the NorwegianPetroleum

Directorate (NPD);Gordon Goering,

Phillips, and HaakonBlaauw, Phillips.

138

received. The fact that they were kept faraway from the events at Ekofisk was nodoubt also a factor. However, plane tripsover the field were later arranged so thatphotographers could get their pictures. Butthey were not allowed to go on board the«Choctaw». For reasons of safety, and out ofconsideration for the «well-killers», it wasnot permitted.

The main issue for the media at this pointwas the poor state of emergencypreparedness — the equipment that wouldclean up oil that had spilled into the sea.And the fact that this was a weak point wasnot concealed by the Minister ofEnvironmental Affairs, in her manyinterviews during this period. It was hardlysurprising that Storting representativeAsbjorn Haugstvedt, during the Stortingdebate on 12 December 1978, said thatwhat he remembered best from the Bravoblowout was the Minister of EnvironmentalAffairs and Red Adair. Red Adair himselfappeared on the scene on Friday, 29 April.As head of Phillips' Exploration &Production group at headquarters, EdwinVan den Bark personally asked Red Adair tomake the trip to Stavanger. Rumors to thiseffect had naturally reached the press, andwhen the plane landed at Sola there was anenormous band of press representatives.Red Adair was almost frightened by the stir,according to Phillips' head man in Norway

at that time, Gordon Goering. He had comeout to Sola to meet Red Adair andaccompany him to Ekofisk. Red Adair was acolorful person, and a couple of rashstatements on his part to the effect that theywould take care of the situation in no timeled the mass media to make him out to be ahero before the job was done. When thesame Red Adair returned from Ekofisk afterthe task had been completed on Saturdayafternoon, he was given the same royalreception by the press. A press conference inAtlantic Hall in Stavanger almost made him

To reduce the dangerof fire and explosion,the Bravo platformwas kept under aconstant stream ofwater from thediving vessel"Seaway falcon".We can see clearlyhow the brown oilcovers the entireplatform.

Another unsuccessfulattempt to stop theblowout. The"block" that is beingis carried away hadburst because of thehigh pressure.

139

A happy Paul "Red"Adair is

congratulated byPhillips' Managing

Director, GordonGoering (left), after

the blowout hasfinally been stopped.

140

look like a saint where the blowout wasconcerned.

One of the great mysteries speculatedabout by the press was how much Phillipshad to pay Red Adair for the job. Figures inthe two-digited million amount wereregularly mentioned in print. We will unveilthe mystery here and now: the check cameto $257,000, according to Gordon Goering.And he ought to know - he signed it. Inaddition, round trip air fares for three peoplewere covered. In this connection, the eventsin the following story came to pass. Thethree men had already had their round triptickets paid for. But changes in their plansmeant that new tickets had to be purchased.Phillips demanded — and received — fullcompensation for the first tickets, recalls asmiling Gordon Goering.

The ConsequencesThe first concern to surface after theblowout was the effect of the crude oil onthe ocean environment. A comprehensiveeffort was initiated to clean up as much ofthe oil as possible, but the equipmentproved to have great limitations. As manyas 22 vessels participated at one time in thecleanup work. About 9,500 tons of crude oilwere discharged during those 71/2 daysthat the blowout lasted, according toPhillips' investigations based on studies ofthe well. The first official figure was overtwice that amount — approximately 20,000

tons. Only a very small part of that could becollected -just under 1,000 tons.

The question as to whether or not to usechemicals to break down the oil wasdebated hotly during those first days. TheMinister of Environmental Affairs gavePhillips permission to use some chemicals inareas closest to the platform — for safetyreasons — but otherwise chemicals were notused.

It turned out that the oil underwent anatural breakdown process in the sea — and,sometime after the blowout, oceanresearchers at the Havforskningsinstitutt(ocean research institute) in Bergen couldconfirm that no environmental damage as aresult of the Bravo blowout was found.Later it came to light that the time of year inwhich the blowout occurred and othernatural conditions, such as waves and wind,were favorable. No pollution was foundonshore, since the oil spill gradually brokeup and never reached the beaches aroundthe North Sea.

Nevertheless it was, naturally enough,the possible environmental effects of theblowout that had the greatest consequencesin Norway. When the blowout occurred,agreement had almost been reached onextending the oil activity northward alongthe coast — north of the 62nd parallel — thefollowing year. The Bravo blowout and thedebate surrounding it resulted in about atwo-year delay in starting exploration in thenorth.

Furthermore, the unsuccessful oil clean-upefforts gave impetus to the development ofemergency preparedness programs alongthe coast. Both the authorities, oilcompanies, and suppliers of clean-upequipment intensified their efforts in thisaspect of preparedness.

The Cause of the BlowoutFour days after the blowout, aninvestigative commission was appointed tofind the causes. The commission concludedthat «the blowout came as a result of a seriesof circumstances which contributed directlyor indirectly in varying degrees, namely:unfortunate practices in the documentationof the installations, marking of equipmentand instructions as to their use, weaknessesin the established and approved workprogram, unfortunate planning of the workon the platform, improvisations instead of

program revision, faulty judgement incritical situations, weak supervision andcontrol, and unreasonably long workperiods for some persons.* On the basis ofthis conclusion, it was then pointed out thatthe blowout to a great degree must beattributed to human error - and that thebackground cause was that organizationaland administrative systems in this case wereinsufficient to attend to safety in asatisfactory way.

This conclusion led necessarily tochanges - within Phillips, the operator, andon the part of the Norwegian authorities.The changes were also such that, as far aspossible, systems were developed thatwould make a recurrence unlikely. When thedebate on the Bravo blowout came up in theStorting on 12 December 1978, the politicalbodies had invested a lot of time getting tothe bottom of all the circumstances.Committee chairman Rolf Hellem also saidin his contribution to the debate that theIndustry Committee, which was discussingthe case, had held meetings with tendifferent ministries, institutions, associationsand Phillips, «and I must add that I can'trecall the committee's handling a case inrecent years with so many hearings alongthe way.»

A concrete result of Storting's handling of

the case was improvement in education andtraining within oil operations. The daybefore the report came up for debate, theStorting voted an additional sum of 14million kroner for improvements in thissector. However, there was politicalagreement that the blowout should not alterthe basic principle that those in charge ofoperations are also responsible for their ownsupervision — that is, that the operator shallestablish necessary inspection procedures.The authorities' control shall in every waybe regarded as additional to the licensee'sown inspections.

Phillips' head man in Norway in 1977,Gordon Goering, says almost ten years afterthe blowout that the 7-8 days it lasted werethe darkest days in his life. Before he wentto be interviewed by the author, he lookedthrough his scrapbook of news clippings onthe Bravo blowout - and found that he wasstill unable to view it objectively. Therewere too many emotions on his part tied tothe event.

But at the same time he emphasizes thatthe lessons that he, Phillips, and theNorwegian authorities learned wereenormously valuable. «After the blowout,and the report of the investigativecommission became available, everyone wasconcentrating on one thing: to do

The Bravo accident(is) the biggestcivilian action (inNorway) sinceWorld War II, statethe newspapers afterit is all over. Anothernewspaper reportsthat Bravo has beentamed, but that theloss in revenues forNorway is at leastNOK 300 million.The same newspaperalso writes that flagswere raised inStavanger when thenews came — andthat "SeawayFalcon" made a Vsign with its waterguns out on the fieldwhen the blowout

141

everything possible to ensure that it wouldnot happen again. Therefore positivemeasures were implemented which, forPhillips, have meant that similar things havenot happened since,» says Gordon Goering.He had to take pretty many rough «blows»himself from the mass media during the timeof the blowout. The damage to the actualplatform after the blowout proved to belimited. By the end of May 1977, theclean-up work had been completed and theplatform was back in production.

Ekofisk 2/4 Bravo continued to be a busyand very central platform in the Ekofisk area.In addition to being the production platformwhere a good deal of the oil and gas fromthe Ekofisk field was brought up, attempts atwater injection from the platform were inprogress from 1981 to 1983. On this busyplatform, a six-year record of no accidentsresulting in lost time on the job wasachieved in 1987. A fantastic performanceby the crew, which goes to show that itpays off when everyone works together andpulls in the same direction. No otherplatform in the Ekofisk area had managedsuch a record before that time.

Tragic Helicopter AccidentOn 23 November 1977, at 0909 hours, aSikorsky helicopter took off from Forus onits course to booster platform B-11. En routeto that platform, which is located on theGerman continental shelf along the gaspipeline to Emden, the helicopter was toland at the Ekofisk Complex.

Along the route to Ekofisk there areseveral checkpoints where the helicoptersare to report in to Stavanger Radio. At 0931hours, it reported in from the firstcheckpoint - «Alpha». After that, nothing

was heard from the machine. Tenpassengers and a crew of two were onboard.Another helicopter that took off an hourlater discovered wreckage and people in thewater about 30 nautical miles southwest ofVarhaug radio lighthouse. An attempt tobring up a survivor failed. A rescueoperation was carried out, but no survivorscould be found.

The helicopter flew in the lowest aircorridor to Ekofisk - 500 feet - on accountof the weather. The investigativecommission that was set up never managedto establish the cause of the crash.However, it was established in the reportthat it appeared that the helicopter had hitthe water at high speed — and a possiblecause was that they were not aware of howclose they were to the sea, thus collidingwith the water through no fault of themachine itself. The wreckage was found at adepth of 300 meters and brought up, butneither could it provide clues as to the causeof the accident.

In the investigative report, it was pointedout that there ought to be warning signalsinstalled on the radar altimeter in allhelicopters — as well as crash positionindicators. This was also done on all thehelicopters trafficking in the North Sea.

Another consequence of this accident wasthat survival suits or lifevests were requiredduring flights on helicopters flying over thesea. Up until that time, neither suits norvests had been required. Recordingequipment was also installed so that, in theevent of an accident, it would be possible toplay back the conversation in the cockpitand thus be better able to reconstruct whathad happened.

142

Very many peoplehad found their wayto Smiodden nearStavanger whenCrown PrinceHarald unveiled themonument to the"Alexander L.Kielland" accident.The monumentconsists of a brokenchain placed on aslope of naked rockby the sea. Below themonument itselfthere are plaqueswith the names ofthose who lost theirlives in the accident.

The CatastropheGale winds from the southwest andshowers. This weather formed the framearound the very solemn ceremony that tookplace at Smiodden near Stavanger on 20March 1986. Crown Prince Harald unveileda monument over the «Alexander L.Kielland* accident in the presence of a greatnumber of the surviving relatives, survivorsof the accident, and others who wanted toshow their concern. «A monument for hopeand the future» can serve as the motto forthe sculpture as it stands there on a slope ofnaked rock looking out to the North Sea.

In his speech, Crown Prince Harald said,among other things, that this was the worstindustrial accident ever to befall Norway.He touched on the fact that Norway, as afishing and shipping nation, hadexperienced many ill tidings from the sea,but that what made the «Kielland»exceptional was its scope; the fact that ithappened in a totally new industry; and thatthere was immediate coverage in everyhome, via television, radio and newspapers,of everything that took place.

He concluded by emphasizing thesculpture's significance as a monument tothose who died, a symbol of our sympathyfor their surviving loved ones, a sign ofgratitude for those who survived thecatastrophe, and a lasting reminder to us all.

Aud Iversen from F0rre in Tysvasr, a ruraldistrict which lost many in the accident,concluded her speech on behalf of the nextof kin and the survivors with these words:«A monument such as this shall also be anexpression of hope and the future for all ofus: hope that the time will come whenwomen and men can feel safer both on thejob and in society in general.*

History of the RigThe «Alexander L. Kielland* was built at theCFEM French shipyard for StavangerDrilling and was delivered in 1976. It wasoriginally built as a drilling rig, but alreadyon its first mission for Phillips in July 1976 itwas used as a quarters rig on H-7, thecompressor platform. The rig was built onthe so-called «pentagon» principle, with fivelegs or columns bound together bybracings.

Between 15 July 1976 and 1 August1979, the «Alexander L. Kielland» was usedas a quarters rig, along with the «HenrikIbsen» and the «Dy vi Alpha», here and therein the Ekofisk area. From the time it left theshipyard, the «Kielland» was equipped withtemporary quarters so that it had 348 bedson the day of the accident.

On 1 August 1979, it was moved fromAlbuskjell 2/4 F to the Edda platform.

On the day of the accident, the «Kielland» 143

"Alexander L.Kielland" was

used as anaccommodations rig

during thedevelopment of theEkofisk area. Here

(lie rig is connectedwith Albuskjell

2/4F.

. SB s

This is how theaccommodations rigwas connected with

the platform, bymeans of a bridge.When the accident

happened on 27March 1980, the

weather had made itnecessary to pull the

rig away from theEdda platform.

144

had been lying with a bridge over to Edda,but because of the bad weather the rig hadto pull away from the platform.

Ekofisk, 27 March 1980Baste Fanebust has been working for manyyears as boat coordinator at the EkofiskComplex. He was on duty that evening inMarch 1980, and he has prepared thisaccount of what happened:

«I had just downed a solid «komle»(dumpling) dinner on the hotel platform andwas preparing to return to the watchtoweron the top of the Ekofisk Tank. Before I setout over the bridge from the hotel, Ifastened my helmet on tight and zipped myjacket, because the nasty wind had pickedup considerably. I turned up the volume onmy walkie-talkie and looked at my watch —precisely 1830 hours, and I walked faster soas to catch the evening news. It was likely tobe a quiet night on duty, with newspaperreading and maybe a little letter writing; thesupply boats had long since been riding outthe weather.

«I had only gone a few meters out on thebridge when there came a sputtering soundover the walkie-talkie, and my heart did aflip-flop when I picked up the message:'Mayday, mayday, Alexander Kie 'Then it was quiet. I stopped and listened.Nothing. A few seconds later I heard the

supply boat 'Normand Engineer' calling the'Kielland' — but with no response. Then hecalled me: 'Charlie Transport. NormandEngineer, channel 9. Did you hear that?'

'Yes, 'Engineer' — it sounded like aMayday call from the 'Kielland': are younear there?'

'Yes, I'm less than two nautical milesnorth of Edda.'

'Okay, you move full speed down thereand see.'

Immediately after that I told DidrikStonghaug on the 'Normand Skipper', whichwas in the same area, to do the same - andwhile I was jogging toward the Tank Imanaged to give orders to most of the othervessels on the field to head toward Edda andthe 'Kielland'. As I reached the elevator onthe Tank, Christian Naess on the 'NormandEngineer' called me again, and with audibledoubt in his voice told me that the craneoperator on Edda claimed that the'Alexander L. Kielland' was about to capsize!

«Inside the elevator I met a couple ofoperators; one of them chuckled my way:'You look pale, Baste. . .too manydumplings?' I just shrugged my shoulders,and when he noted how intensely I waslistening to the walkie-talkie, he becameserious:

'Has something gone wrong?'The 'Kielland' has put out a Mayday, but

we can't make contact — it's apparentlyabout to capsize. . .'

«They stared at me unbelieving, but wesaid no more while the elevator crawled upbetween stories. I had to bend over to brace

myself against the wind across the openhelideck; it was getting dark, and throughthe patches of fog I saw that the sea wasgoing big and black with gray-white crestsof foam. The whole situation was unreal,and several times during that evening I hadthe sensation of observing myself from theoutside — as in a very realistic nightmarefrom which you expect to wake up at anymoment. For this just couldn't be true -could it?!»

Let's go a few minutes back in time andlet the two captains, Christian Naess on the'Normand Engineer' and Didrik Stonghaugon the 'Normand Skipper' tell their stories.

First, Christian Naess:«I was standing forward in the wheel

house when I heard the 'Mayday' call, andwhen I went over to the VHF to answer, Iguess I wasn't taking it too seriously. Butwhen I didn't get any reply, I called upCharlie Transport and was told to head out

Boat CoordinatorBaste Fanebustrelates how heexperienced the"Alexander L.Kielland" accident.

Christian Ncess (left)and DidrikStonghaug werecaptains onboard"NormandEngineer" and"Normand Skipper"when the accidentoccurred. The twosupply boats weredirected into theaccident area wherethey participated inthe difficult rescueaction.

145

10 - Giant Discovery

Words can scarcelydescribe a picture likethis. We see the fourpontoons which are

all that can be seen ofthe "Kielland". In the

foreground, Edda,and behind, the

"Seaway falcon".

146

at full speed to see what was actually goingon. I turned the ship around and tuned theVHP over to Edda's work channel. There Imade contact with the crane operator:

'What's actually going on over there?' Iasked.

The 'Kielland' is capsizing/ was theanswer I received. I still didn't grasp theseriousness of the situation. It struck me thatthe crane operator must have been alandlubber who wasn't quite able to expresshimself if the 'Kielland' was tilting over andlisting on account of the rolling. We wererolling hard ourselves in the heavy sea, and Ithought that for him in the crane it mightlook as if the 'Kielland' would capsize, whileit really was only in a 'hard roll' and wouldcome back again.

«We were moving at top speed in a

southerly direction toward the 'Alexander L.Kielland', and we were getting pretty close.While I was talking with the crane operator,he suddenly cried out: 'Now it's going over— now its legs are in the air!' We had alreadyunderstood that something serious was inthe works, but now it became clear to usthat the situation was quite precarious. Thecrew put on their survival suits, hung therescue net over the side of the ship, andmade ready for the rescue operation. At thispoint in time, the crane operator on Edda,Arne J0rgensen, had already begun to fishpeople up from the rough sea with thepersonnel basket.

«About 12-15 minutes had now gone bysince the 'Mayday', and the first thing I sawinside the accident area was a big, grayshadow on our starboard side. It struck me

that the shadow had to be the quarters —which had sort of been knocked off as therig tipped over. In the mist it became soenormously big — but it turned out to be thetorn off D-leg I was passing. And then. . .then we were suddenly in the thick of it!»

Didrik Stonghaug:«We were crossing with the 'Normand

Skipper' between Edda and the EkofiskComplex, and a few minutes before 1830hours we passed the 'Normand Engineer'. Iwas sitting and listening with half an ear toFarsund Radio; there was someone on boardthe 'Alexander L. Kielland' talking with hiswife at home. The reason I was listening wasthat we were waiting in line and were tohave the next call. Suddenly I heard,'Mayday, mayday, Alexander Kielland' on

VHP channel 9, and at the same time theconversation between the 'Kielland' andFarsund Radio was suddenly cut off. FarsundRadio — not aware of the reason for thecut-off at that point, of course — called meup and asked if I wanted the call now that Ihad ordered.

'No, forget it,' I answered, and rushedover to the radar. There I could actually seethat the 'Alexander L. Kielland' simply'disappeared' from the screen. When Iturned the 'Normand Skipper' around, therewas a terrible reeling and bucking, and thecrew came running up onto the bridge tofind out what was happening. Just an hourearlier, before supper, we had had a rescuedrill on board. Among other things, we hadtested the survival suits, and somebody hadmade a remark like, 'Oh, well — let's justhope we'll never have to use these. . .' Butnow they were all suiting up — suddenly itwas the real thing!»

Christian Naess:«As we passed the leg, we met a raft and a

lifeboat. We saw that there were people inthe raft, but decided that both they andwhoever might be in the lifeboat wererelatively safe. The crane operator on Eddahad reported that there were a lot of peoplein the water, and so we moved on towardEdda and the 'Kielland'. And sure enough,there were a lot of people in the sea; a wholelot of them were already lifeless. I can seethe picture before my eyes — but I can'tcount them anymore. I figure there were 7-8floating on their stomachs or backs, most ofwhom had survival suits on. There were 3-4men struggling for their lives around awooden crate, and one of them hadmanaged to crawl up on it. He was paddlingfuriously now — surely out of fear of beingsmashed against us. We had the rescue netout on our starboard side; there were twomen who managed to hang onto it, and wegot them pulled on board. A little furtherastern, we got hold of a fellow in a survivalsuit — but the suit was so slippery that wecouldn't hold onto him. The dejection afteran experience like that cannot bedescribed. . .. The same thing happenedagain with another person somewhat later —if only there had been a loop on the suit,maybe we could have. . . On and around thewreck of a lifeboat we saw 5-6 people whowere holding on for dear life, and we set our 147

Survivors weretransported by

helicopter toStavanger where

they were received byhealth personnel.

148

course in that direction. While we weremoving toward it, several men fell off it, andwe managed to pull up two of them. The'Alexander L. Kielland' had now completelycapsized, and we were up close to the fourpontoons. They remained visible until it wasso dark that we could no longer seeanymore people in the water.»

Didrik Stonghaug:«We came on the heels of the 'Normand

Engineer', and the scene that met us whenwe caught sight of the 'Alexander L.Kielland' will remain with me as long as Ilive. One time I saw a painting of thesinking of the Titanic', and that came backto me when I saw this inferno of broken uplifeboats, torn rafts, and people in the sea. Isaid to those who were standing around methat if as many as 10 men could be savedfrom this, it would be a miracle of God

«First a raft came toward us. It was full ofpeople, but the raft was in one piece, andwhen we confirmed that the people onboard were not in any immediate danger,we let it go by. Soon afterward another raftcame: it was all torn up, and the two whowere hanging onto the remains were reallyin bad shape. But, fortunately, we managedto get them on board. When we were

finished with that operation, so many boatshad come into the accident area that therewas actually a danger of collision. But as wewere about to pull out and continue oursearch toward the northwest with the windbehind us, a lifeboat came up alongside us.From it we managed to pull onboard the'Normand Skipper' those who were mostexhausted, plus some others who took thechance of jumping over — 12 peoplealtogether. The same number chose to stayin the lifeboat and wait for better weatherconditions.»

Christian Naess:«As I mentioned, more boats had arrived

on the scene, and it was pretty crowded inby the 'Kielland'. 'Safe Truck' was lyingthere and rescued 5 men, and TenderPower' managed to wrest 2 people from thesea. In that connection, we mustn't fail tomention First Mate Sven Erik Pedersen who,with a line around his waist, jumpedoverboard and, after much struggling in theviolent weather, managed to rescue a manwho — totally exhausted - was clinging to awooden crate. In addition to the darkness,fog now set inn — it was thick as soup, andwe weren't able to see anymore survivors inthe water. Neither could we see anymore

rafts or lifeboats, even if we kept on lookingwith radar and searchlights.

«Everything was as unfavorable as itcould be: the southeasterly winds churnedup a sea of mighty swells, then came the fogand the darkness, with an air temperature of+ 7°C (40°F) and + 4° in the water. . .Wekept on searching in a northwesterly sector,but the current was apparently strongerthan the wind — for one lifeboat that driftedoff was located later that night southwest ofEdda. On board the lifeboat they had aportable radio transmitter; we could barelyhear them over medium wave — and, basedon the information we were able to pick up,they should have been in the vicinity of theAlbuskjell platforms. In reality, they haddrifted in the opposite direction.*

Didrik Stonghaug:«We knew very many of the people

working on the 'Kielland' personally, butsince the stormy weather had created somecomplications in connection with crew shiftsthat day, we didn't know exactly who wason the rig when the accident happened. OurMate, Reidar Vermundsen, wasundoubtedly the most anxious, for hisbrother, Vegar, worked on the 'Kielland'. Iwas happy when I could call up Baste onCharlie Transport and tell him that his friend

and fellow mate Eivind Egeli was amongthose who had jumped over to us from thelifeboat.

«While I was standing there maneuvering,someone suddenly slapped me on theshoulder and said, 'Hi!' I turned around andfroze — felt goose bumps all over my body.There stood Vegar as large as life in thewheel house, , ,

«All of us who in one way or anotherwere involved in the catastrophe and therescue operation have relived that eveningand night many times since. The feelings wehave are difficult to describe, and I won'tattempt to do so either. The numbers tell thestory: it is deeply tragic that 123 peopledied, and it is more than fantastic that 89survived. Here we have mentioned but fewof the people who took part in what theEnglish newspaper Daily Express describedon 29 March 1980 as . . .an honorable resultin a rescue operation that must becharacterized as unique in history. But thereare so many, many more who deserve theirown place in the history of the worstaccident and the greatest rescue operation inliving memory. We could have told aboutrescuer Mike Yarwood, who loweredhimself from the British helicopter into thewind-lashed sea and managed to winch 36survivors up from a raft and a lifeboat. We

At first it wasdifficult to get ahandle on how manypeople had actuallybeen onboard theaccommodations rig.Those who came onshore were registeredimmediately.

149

Olav Skotheim,Phillips engineer,

was in the cinema onthe "Kielland" when

the accidenthappened. He

managed to put on asurvival suit, jumpedinto the sea and wassoon picked up by a

crane on the Eddaplatform. He was in

such good shape thathe was able to attend

a press conferenceshortly after he cameonshore — along withPhillips' Information

Officer, Per ErikBj0rklund.

The Britishnewspaper "Daily

Express" may well beused as an example

of newspapercoverage on the day

after the accident.123 persons lost theirlives in the accident.

150

could have told about more than two dozensmall fishing boats that defied the elementsand came to the rescue. We could have toldabout the crew on 'Active Rey' who had totake on 30 dead from the other boats on 30March. We could have told. . ..

«Altogether there were 7 planes and 19helicopters from Norway, Denmark, WestGermany and England that participated,along with 9 naval vessels and 71 civilianvessels from the whole North Sea basin.Only a few have been mentioned — nonewill be forgotten.*

EpilogueIt is natural that an accident of such scopeand consequence as the wreck of the«Alexander L. Kielland» should receive muchattention during the time following. Thedebate surrounding the accident stillemerges from time to time, and it willprobably do so for many years. It was and isthe worst accident in modern times inNorway.

We do not intend to go through theaccident's many aspects and the questionsthat it posed. A comprehensiveinvestigative report is available, and severalbooks and research reports have been

written on the causes and events. Courtcases are still going on in connection withthe accident and who was at fault.

We will only give a brief account of themain conclusions of the investigativecommission's report, and look at some ofthe steps taken to prevent similar accidents.

The investigative commission ascertainsthat the direct cause of the rig's capsizingwas a fracture in D-6 bracing. Thereafterseveral bracings were broken loose, andD-leg was torn loose — resulting in the rig'slisting and then turning completely over. Inthe report, the cause of the break in the D-6bracing was ascertained to have been abreak due to material fatigue, as a result ofexcessive material stress. In this bracing anopening had been cut and a small supporttube welded in place to hold a hydrophone,an instrument to help control the rig'sposition (in relation to the wellhead).Inspections after the accident show that thefillet weld had been given a somewhatunfortunate shape, and at the same time theweld penetration in the hydrophone supporttube was too small. Properties in the steel inthe hydrophone stand - low strength andtoughness in the through-thicknessdirection — combined with the unfortunatefillet weld, plus the high level of stress, led tothe fracture in the weld connection betweenthe hydrophone and the bracing, and in thehydrophone stand as well. Some of thefractures must have occurred before theplatform was assembled.

Moreover, the designed failed to performa fatigue study on the platform, and the D-6

brace had a low fatigue life. The designeralso treated the hydrophone support tube asa detail of equipment rather than as astructural element.

After the fall of D-leg, the «Alexander L.Kielland* heeled over right away until theangle of the tilt reached 30-35°. Then theplatform assumed a stable position on itsside in the sea. From this position itcontinued to tilt slowly over and sink, until20 minutes later it went completely over.

In its recommendations, the investigativecommission says that the safety level formovable drilling rigs should and can beimproved. A number of conditions on theconstruction and inspection side arementioned which should be followed up.The commission was particularly occupiedwith the fact that control duringconstruction should start already in thedrawing stage and be followed upthroughout the whole process and continueafter a rig is in operation.

In the case of preparedness and rescueequipment, the commission'srecommendations aim at strengthening thedegree of readiness both on the platformitself and outside the platform. In categoricalterms, we can mention coordination of thevarious licensees' readiness programs,auxiliary vessel coverage, rescue equipmentfor regular supply boats and division of thecontinental shelf with rescue helicopter(s) ineach zone.

Most of the investigative commission'srecommendations have today beenaccepted, and have become a part of

The broken D-6bracing from"Alexander L. Kielland"was towed to Stavangerand examined by theinvestigativecommission. Here wesee the break at thehydrophone supporttube which theinvestigativecommission found to bea key cause of theaccident. The rig wasalso towed toStavanger, and afterseveral attempts it wasfinally turned right sideup in September 1983.The rig was sunk to adepth of 700 meters inNedstrandsfjord inRogaland.

151

As part of theemergency

preparednessprogram, several

courses have beendeveloped to prepare

employees in theNorth Sea for the

worst. Under wayhere is a drill in how

to extinguish ahelicopter fire.

Phillips employees ata work environment

course at theNorwegian

Maritime Academyof Damage Control

and Sea Rescue inHaugesund.

Instruction in how touse a life raft is part

of the basic safetycourse for employeeson oil installations.

One of the tasks is toturn the raft over.

152

everyday reality on oil installations in theNorwegian sector of the North Sea.

PreparednessGreat advancement has been made in thelevel of safety on the installations in theEkofisk area since operations began. Safetytoo is a result of a learning process both forthe organization and for the individualemployee. Mishaps and accidents seem

meaningless. But when the ability to learnfrom mistakes is intact, a positivedevelopment toward a safer place of workoccurs. One often has the impression thatsafety is a question of economics for thecompanies involved. It costs to provide ahigh level of safety. In reality, accidents costmore than do provisions to ensure safety.Phillips' manager of Safety and Security,Torger Lode, says the company has savedmany times over what it has invested inincreased safety. Today he has become moreoccupied with the fact that society ingeneral must become more aware of thegreat savings that result when the mishapand accident frequency goes down. The oilindustry today is probably the industrywhere the safety requirements are greatest.But the Norwegian society could earn moreby reducing accident levels than on what itgets back from the oil industry in the formof taxes and duties.

Basic to the safety philosophy as it isfound in 1988 at Ekofisk is prevention. Anintense preventive effort is taking place onthe technical side with frequent and regularinspections and replacement programs.There are many years of experience onwhich to build, and it is to a great degreepossible to foresee the need to replaceequipment. Thus it is possible with a highdegree of certainty to say where thebottlenecks are.

Intensive programs in training and

motivation for the individual employee arealso going on. If employees are notsafety-conscious and able to «think safety*before they carry out an operation, soundtechnical systems are to little avail. Duringthe 1980's a number of safety campaignsand programs have been implemented toinspire absolutely everyone working atEkofisk, the base in Tananger, in Oslo,Emden and Teesside to «think safety*. Theseapply both to the work situation and to thehome.

The home, moreover, is the place wheremost accidents occur. The motivationprogram has borne fruit — both amongPhillips' own employees and among themany contractors and their employees whoare an important part of Ekofisk operations.

Various types of safety meetings,recording of near-accidents and minorinjuries, and awards for working withoutinjury over longer periods have beenintroduced. One of the systems for Phillips'own employees is an award for every timeall the employees have worked 1 millionworking hours without injury leading toa lost work day. The award takes the formof a gift to every employee - preferablysafety-related gifts, often aimed at theemployee's family. One example ismembership in Norsk Luftambulanse

D E I E R D I N S I K K E R H E T V I S N A K K E R O MI T ' S Y O U R S A F E T Y W E ' R E T A L K I N G A B O U T

Posters are utilized insafety campaigns atEkofisk.

(Norwegian air ambulance service). Inaddition to being a fine award for theindividual, this gift helps maintain theimportant medical preparedness for whichthat institution stands.

Since 1985, all Phillips employees havebeen members, and in 1987 the company

The safety programat Phillips not onlyconcerns people atEkofisk butemployees at theTananger Base aswell. Here a digitalboard in thereception area at themain office showshow many workinghours have passedwithout an accidentleading to a lost dayon the job. When theemployees completeone million hours,each one receives asafety award fromthe company.

153

All platforms withliving quarters have

a sick bay and amedic. The medicsoften have specialtraining in acute

medicine, in order tohandle the

emergencies. Themedics can always

contact an "oilphysician" on duty

onshore who canadvise as to

treatment until thepatient is sent ashore.

154

could hand over to the institution a checkfor close to a half-million kroner formembership in 1988.

Out on the platforms an organization hasbeen built up of Safety and Securityrepresentatives, whose job it is to preventmishaps and accidents. They must approveall work assignments that contain anelement of danger.

They shall also, on their own initiative,see to it that the preparedness of the built-insafety systems and routines is always firstclass. Thanks to this organization, todaythere is a Safety and Security representativefor every 11 employees out on the field.

On each platform there is also a medicand a sick bay equipped to provide acutemedical aid. The medics are often speciallytrained in acute medicine and are wellprepared to handle crisis situations. In theireveryday work, they are assigned tasksrelated to preventive hygiene among thosewho are working offshore. This work, plusthe work environment in general, hasbecome of steadily increasing importancefor the medics. Both the medics and theSafety & Security representatives have beena part of the crew at Ekofisk since early inthe 1970's, but the scope and quality of theservices have improved, based on theexperience gained since production start-up.Both of these groups have support sectionswithin onshore operations which assist withtechnical guidance.

Helicopter PreparednessSince 1981 special helicopters have beenincluded in the permanent readinessprogram at Ekofisk. The Search & Rescue(SAR) service has become an importantcornerstone in the total preparednessprogram. Up until the end of 1985/early1986, a Bell 212 helicopter was equipped forthis special service, but then it was decidedthat two machines should be part of thereadiness program. The helicopters arespecially equipped with technical aids and alift, which allow them to carry out rescueoperations in the area very effectively. It hasbeen proven on several occasions that the24-hour preparedness has also been veryvaluable for shipping in the area. In the caseof shipwrecks, the helicopters have beenable to haul up the crew soon after theemergency signals have been received.Along with the standing readiness of themilitary, with helicopters onshore, the SARservice is among the most effective that canbe utilized today. With the long travel timefrom onshore bases to the Ekofisk area,having the special Search & Rescue servicehelicopters reduces waiting time from hoursto only a few minutes when assistance isneeded.

An advanced searchsystem has beeninstalled in thehelicopters tofacilitate the searchfor people in the seaunder difficultweather conditions.

Rescue helicoptersare a vital part of thecontingency atEkofisk. In 1988,there are two suchhelicopters at thefield.

155

Organization underRapid Expansion

156

Since 1964 when Fred Terry came to live inOslo as Phillips' only employee in Norway,there has been a fantastic developmentwithin the company's organization. Thediscovery of Ekofisk in December 1969 —and the decision to develop the field —transformed Phillips from an explorationteam to an operating organization.

The company's organizational position inrelation to the parent company inBartlesville, Oklahoma has also changedsignificantly. From being a small section ofthe company's Europe-Africa Division,directed from London, the organization inNorway has become a division in its ownright and one of the most importantcornerstones in the concern.

The transformation from being a smallexploration department to becoming one ofthe largest operators on the Norwegiancontinental shelf is reflected in all areas ofthe organization: size, depth, complexity,physical need for office and base space, etc.In this chapter we will be looking at theorganizational development up to 1988 —and some of its most important functions inrelation to the platforms at Ekofisk.

The Organizational DevelopmentPhillips' head office in Norway was locatedin Oslo until September 1976. That waswhen the head office was moved toTananger. The «main event» in the activityin Norway as a whole, the development ofEkofisk, dominated to the extent that themove was a natural one. Up until 1976 theformal responsibility for Phillips'exploration activity in Sweden andDenmark was also in the hands of themanaging director at the Oslo office.

It was also natural that, when Phillips wassetting up operations in Norway, thenation's capital was chosen to house thehead office. The need for close contact withthe central Norwegian authorities inconnection with the application for andawarding of production licenses, and theresulting start-up and breaking-in period, ledto Oslo's being the logical choice. FromFred Terry's one-man office in 1964, thestaff grew steadily. Three times it becamenecessary to move into larger office facilitiesso as to have room for everyone. As one ofthe first companies to become an operator,Phillips had its own geology, geophysicsand engineering departments located inOslo to direct the exploration on theNorwegian shelf. Up until late 1973/early1974, there was only a base operation inStavanger, related to the explorationactivity and the Ekofisk development.

In 1973/74 the «Ekofisk Region» wasformed. This organizational unit had theresponsibility for production license 018 —exploration and development tasks in thatwhich is known as the Ekofisk area.The head office in Oslo directlyadministered all the activity outside of 018.

Even though the Ekofisk Region wasformally under the auspices of the headoffice in Oslo, the manager of the EkofiskRegion reported directly to the head ofPhillips' Europe/Africa Division in London.This was a result of the great dimensionsinvolved in the development of the Ekofiskarea. The head office for the activities inNorway, and for Sweden and Denmark aswell, was directly responsible toEurope/Africa Exploration in London.

The responsibility for activities in

In 1981 theemployees atPhillips' main officeat Tananger movedinto a new, modern,14,000 square meteroffice building. Thebuilding housesaround 700 persons.In addition to offices,there is also a largecafeteria with anoutdoor area.

Norway actually continued to be sharedbetween Oslo and Stavanger all the way uptill 1981 when the Norwegian division wasestablished.

The Ekofisk RegionThe growth in the Phillips organization inStavanger occurred, naturally enough,simultaneously with the phases in thedevelopment of the Ekofisk area. During thefirst years, from 1965 to 1969, the job wasstrictly one of exploration. In addition toadministration, involving a few peopleonshore, Phillips representatives wereneeded out on the rig. There was also awarehouse function at the onshore base inDusavik near Stavanger.

This organization functioned until theresolution came regarding development.Then the situation was totally changed, andthe company had to start building up anorganization to cover all aspects of theoperation. Momentum was gained in 1973when the company began to recruit its own

employees to run the platforms at Ekofisk.Up to that point, the work during theconstruction period had been carried out forthe most part by hired contractors. Thefurther development of the organizationoccurred mostly then in connection with thepreparation of new platforms for productionstart-up. This was a continuing characteristicuntil 1981.

Within the onshore organization thesame thing occurred — greater activityoffshore meant more support and follow-upwork at the Tananger base. As time wentby, the administrative work previouslyhandled in London and Bartlesville was alsotransferred to Norway — and in September1976 the head office function that had beenlocated in Oslo during the early years wasmoved to Tananger. Remaining in Oslo wasa small but important group whose job it isto maintain contact with the centralNorwegian authorities.

Within the onshore organization it alsobecame necessary to increase the number of 157

The chart shows thehistorical

development withinhiring for Phillips asoperator. From 1973

numbers increasedrapidly until 1980,

when growth leveledoff. The percentage ofAmerican employees

fell drasticallyduring the period

1973-1987.

It was particularly inconnection with

production start-upfor Phase III

platforms that theincrease in manning

occurred.

departments because of the scope ofoperations at Ekofisk. One example was theestablishment of a Public Affairsdepartment.

The developmental characteristic of theorganization can best be described as one ofcontinual growth - interspersed with greatleaps in the number of employees as a resultof new fields coming on stream. In additionthere has been a steady Norwegianization ofthe staff throughout the period. The needfor American expertise decreased graduallyas the Norwegian employees gainedsufficient experience. The same is true onthe manager levels — an ongoingNorwegianization, greatest offshore.

The Personnel DevelopmentIn 1966, Phillips in Norway had 12employees, 8 in Oslo and 4 in Stavanger. Inthe years that followed, there wassomewhat of an increase in the numbers, butit was not until 1973 that there was any realrecruiting program. That occurred inpreparation for production start-up onplatforms 2/4A, 2/4B, 2/4FTP, 2/4Q, 2/4Cand 2/4T (the Tank). In 1973 manpower

3000

I Expatriates

73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87

numbers increased to 315, 2/3 of whomwere Norwegian employees. The number ofemployees that year was distributed equallybetween on- and offshore. The basedevelopment was under way.

The following year Phillips grew by 212employees — mostly offshore. Thepercentage of Norwegians in theorganization rose from 58 to 70 during thecourse of 1974. The problems experiencedby the Norwegian merchant marine as aresult of the oil crisis during the winter of1973-74 were now beginning to leave theirmark on the bulk of applicants. Eight dayson the job and eight days at home with a lotof leisure time were welcome changes forseamen not accustomed to seeing theirfamilies for three to six months at a time.Experienced machinists and first mateswould prove to be the stock of theproduction operators at Ekofisk during theyears to come. That skilled seamen withdeck experience were hired is an importantfactor.

In March 1974 the first known manpowerprognosis for the company was made. Itstates rather categorically that: «Themanpower total in all areas of operation willbe lower than today's 527 employees whenthe construction phase is over.»By the end of 1975 Phillips had begun to berecognized as a strong employer — the tenthlargest in Rogaland County.

The preparations for start-up in Phase III— the satellite fields — led Phillips into a veryactive recruiting phase in 1976. During thecourse of a two-year period, the number ofemployees doubled, and the prognosis saidthat «an evaluation of future growth

In late 1977/early1978, Phillipslaunched a bigrecruiting campaignto increase the staffof engineers. Thecampaign wassuccessful, and manyof the company's keypersonnel on thetechnical side wereemployed at thattime.

indicates that we will total 1100 employeesin the spring of 1977 — and we will reach apeak of 1400 employees in 1980.» Six yearsprior to the company's peak year, theprognoses missed their mark by over 80%.

The employee count reached the 1000mark in 1976, and it was the Maintenancesection that showed the greatest growth.Advertisements for mechanics, electricians,roustabouts and painters brought in over100 applicants per day at the highest point —and the hiring process began to take on thecharacteristics of an «assembly line»,according to Svein E. Abrahamsen, thenIndustrial Relations representative in chargeof recruiting. «We hired 425 on theNorwegian payroll in 1976 - and had thefeeling we had just begun,* he says.

The pressure on the recruiting groupcontinued. In 1977, 493 new employeeswere hired after 967 had been in forinterviews. Ninety percent of those whowere offered jobs accepted. The number ofapplicants for each position varied from 10to nearly 100.

Phillips had difficulty recruitingNorwegian civil engineers in themid-1970's. Company management began

to wonder whether it was even possible tohire the number of experienced civilengineers required for the immediate future.An effort had to be made — and in late1977/early 1978 Phillips started anaggressive recruiting campaign. Big adsannounced that the company neededthirty-two civil and other engineers withexperience. The campaign broughtsurprisingly positive results as around twohundred qualified applicants turned up.

If we look at the manager level on thetechnical side of the organization, we willfind many who were employed after thatlarge-scale recruiting program: HelgeVolland and Trond Rese — offshoremanagers at Ekofisk in 1988, Rolf Wiborg —engineering manager, Kjell J0rgensen andHans Anvik — section managers.

The company's biggest year in the area ofpersonnel growth was 1978. As many as563 new people were employed that year.In each of the months of April and June,over 70 people were hired. The majority ofthese were hired for the Maintenancesection, but both Engineering andAdministration onshore were nowexperiencing strong growth - with 40 and 159

36, respectively, during the year.On I January 1979, only 22% of the

Norwegians in the company were employedonshore. A new recruiting campaign wasinitiated, and Phillips sought sixty newpeople for the Engineering andManagement Information Services (dataprocessing) departments. During 1979, fivehundred new employees were received intothe organization — and during the three-yearperiod from 1979 through 1981, the numberof Norwegians employed onshore wasdoubled. In January 1982 there were 2566permanent employees at Phillips PetroleumCompany Norway. The offshoreorganization was then about to culminate,since all the fields had been developed — andthe next increase in this area occurred inconnection with startup on 2/4K, the waterinjection platform. Similarly, the regulationsconcerning working hours which becameeffective on 1 January 1987 required that afew new positions be filled, but the point ofsaturation appeared to have been reached.

The Norwegianization Process«Norwegianization» was neither a conceptof interest nor a defined goal in connectionwith the oil activity in Norway during theearliest period. There were very fewNorwegians with experience in oilexploration and production, and theinternational oil companies brought in theirown people to fill the expert and managerialfunctions.

Phillips brought in their employees fromthe U.S.A. or from other areas ofinternational activity. For all practicalpurposes there were Americans in all themanagerial functions those first years. Oneexception was Anders O. Waale at the Oslooffice who, as the first Norwegian on board,was made vice president of the companyback in 1973.

But the process was under way. TheNorwegian employees represented asteadily growing portion of the totalmanpower. By the end of 1987, theNorwegianization process in the offshoreorganization was nearly complete. 99.48percent of all whose place of work wasEkofisk were on the Norwegian payroll. Inthe total organization at that time, 96percent were Norwegian. It is at least aspleasant to note that the Norwegianization

lOO has also been strong at the manager level —

72 percent of these positions were held byNorwegians at the close of 1987.

There was a total of 2489 permanentemployees at Phillips by the end of 1987. Inaddition, there was the all-German staffnumbering 76 at the Emden terminalreporting to Tananger. In Teesside therewere 277 employees in the all-British staffalso reporting to Norway.

The development in theNorwegianization process has been due to acombination of natural development and astrong desire on the part of the Norwegianauthorities. In 1980 the authorities gaveclear signals to the effect that aNorwegianization process was desirable. Itsaim would be to build up Norwegianexpertise within the oil industry, and helpthe foreign operators become betteradapted to a Norwegian industrial andeconomic environment. However, thiswould take time. If we go back to the end ofthe 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's,the market for Norwegian petroleumexperts was very tight. There were manycompanies in the same situation, competingfor the qualified employees. The limitedaccess to this expertise was also combinedwith increased activity on the explorationfront, with the opening of the shelf north ofthe 62nd parallel.

Phillips has never wanted to force theNorwegianization process to the degreethat the company might have themisfortune of promoting employees on thebasis of their nationality — and not on thebasis of their knowledge and experience.That would profit neither the individual, thecompany nor the authorities. Thus it takestime to develop employees who can stepinto leadership positions - both technicallyand administratively.

The big breakthrough in the process onthe technical side occurred in 1984 whenKnut Am was appointed the firstNorwegian offshore manager withresponsibility for production andmaintenance on the 24 platforms in theEkofisk area. As a result of this appointment,the starting signal was fired for the reallybig Norwegianization process at Phillips.Since then Knut Am has become vicepresident and managing director, while RolfWiborg took over the importantEngineering Department as its manager.Contributing to the fact that the

From an almostall-American startwithin Phillips'activities in Norway,Norwegianemployees nowdominate on alllevels of theorganization. This isespecially true atEkofisk where in1988 theNorwegianizationprocess can be said tobe complete.

Norwegianization process gatheredheadway in 1984-85 was a large-scale earlyretirement program which Phillipsimplemented worldwide. At the same timeas many expatriates in leading positionswere taking retirement, many Norwegianswere ready with experience and ability tostep into the top jobs.

Base ExpansionWhen telling the story about Phillips'establishment in Stavanger, it is tempting todraw a comparison with the company'sfounder, Frank Phillips. He started his careeras a barber. And Phillips' first offices inStavanger were in what had previously been

a barber shop. The facilities were taken overin December 1965 and consisted of an oldhouse that was situated in the backyard ofSmedvig Tankrederi A/S at Verksgaten 13.The offices were quite simple, but met theneeds of up to four employees until newfacilities could be moved into in October1966. The house has now been torn down.

From this starting point, it is possible todivide the further development into threemain phases. Typical for each phase was thefact that the newly acquired facilitiesgradually proved to be too small, resultingin the need to set up «satellite offices* ofvarious types and in various locations in thelocal district. 161

11 — Giant Discovery

The first dynamiteblast at what was to

become the supplybase in Dusavik wasduly photographed.

This u>as the startingsignal for the oil

activity onshore inStavanger.

Until 1973, Dusavikwas the main base

for the activity thatsupported theoperations atEkofisk. This

combined warehouseand office building

then became toosmall, and the mainoffice was moved to

Tananger.

162

The Dusavik Base - 1966-1973The contract for Phillips' first base ofoperations in Norway was signed withSmedvig Tankrederi on 25 April 1966. Thecontract included the leasing of outdoorstorage and quay areas plus a newlyconstructed combination warehouse - and -office building of relatively modestdimensions, compared with the standards ofthat time. The area leased was located atDusavik, near Stavanger, and was the firstestablishment on what would become oneof the district's two large supply bases forthe oil activity. It was from this base that thedrilling operations resulting in the discoveryof Ekofisk were served.

The contract for the area at Dusavikwould expire in 1981, but Dusavikfunctioned as the main base for the activitiesin the Stavanger area only until 1973.

When growth within the organizationpicked up momentum in 1973, the facilitiesat Dusavik became too small, and additionalspace was leased. There was obviously agreat deal of creativity involved, as facilitieswere utilized in a soap factory and a Chineserestaurant, as well as in the bar and otherparts of the Alstor Hotell in Stavanger.Many of the people who were hired in 1973probably remember that their interviewswere held at Atlantic Hotel.

The Phillips Base - 1973-1981An establishment of sorts occurred in 1972at Aker Norsco's base at Risavika nearTananger, but it was not until 1973 that themain base for Ekofisk operations movedfrom Dusavik and the so-called H-buildingbegan to be used. The contract with AkerNorsco, which was signed in the summer of1972, included rental of an outdoor storagearea, quay, warehouse, canteen and officebuilding — in other words, a complete base.Each of the buildings was speciallyconstructed for its use. The contract gavePhillips the opportunity to buy the base at alater point, and this was done in the summerof 1979.

Between 1973 and the present, there hasalso been the need, in varying degrees, forPhillips to lease both warehouse and office

facilities from Aker Norsco. This has eitherbeen in the form of temporary officebarracks or permanent buildings.

From 1973 to 1976, the explorationactivity with «Ocean Viking» continued tobe handled from the Dusavik base. Then thecontract with the rig expired, and theactivities that were still necessary weremoved to Tananger. Due to the shortage ofspace in Tananger, the Training Departmentwas moved to Dusavik. Thus the Dusavikbase was the Training Center until 1981.

The space shortage also made itnecessary for a long time to lease facilitiesall around the Stavanger area. This became asteadily growing problem, so in 1978planning got under way for a considerableexpansion of the base in Tananger.

The Phillips Base from 1981The new building was formally dedicated inAugust 1981. It had gradually begun to beused as of December 1980. After the newbuilding was finished, a complete rebuildingof the old H-building was undertaken, sothat it would be of the same standard as thenew one.

The new building represented a

significant improvement in workingconditions for many employees, and itcontributed to increased efficiency bybringing large sections of the organizationtogether under one roof.

It was intended that these buildingsshould cover Phillips' needs for office space- with the exception of the E & C branch.However, it was clear before the buildingwas occupied that this would not be thecase. For the most part, though, they didmanage to get along without leasingfacilities outside of Tananger.

At the end of 1981, in order to handle the

In 1973, Phillips'onshore organizationmoved into the Hbuilding inTananger. The basewas part of the AkerNorsco base, but thelease gave Phillipsthe option topurchase the area.This was done in1979.

The H building inTanangersoonbecame too small,and a new officebuilding wasinaugurated in 1981.The old H buildingwas then modernizedand built into thenew one. In 1988 thecompany has at itsdisposal approx.20,000 square metersof office space,10,000 square metersof storage facilities,and an 850 squaremeter workshop inTananger..

163

development within the supply services toEkofisk, Phillips signed an agreement withAker Norsco for the construction of a largerand more modern warehouse. This building- plus connecting offices — was occupied inlate 1982/early 1983, and it is regarded as amodel construction within its area of usage.

In 1983 the green light was given for thewater injection project at Ekofisk. As a resultof this, there was a need for more officespace for the E & C division. It wasimportant to get started as soon as possible,and three months after the contract withAker Norsco was signed, the new buildingon «the hill» in Tananger was finished.

In 1988 Phillips has at their disposal inthe Stavanger area 20,000 m2 of officespace, 10,000 m2 of warehouse space, and850 m2 of workshop space in Tananger. Inaddition there is the Oslo office onMunkedamsveien.

The Base FunctionIn 1988 the Phillips base in Tanangerfunctions both as head office for thecompany's activities in Norway and assupply base for the 25 platforms in theEkofisk area.

The activities in Tananger can be dividedinto two main functions: base and supplyoperations and the administrative andorganizational management of the Ekofiskarea.

There are approximately 750 employeesin Tananger — around 150 of whom areinvolved in the base and supply aspect ofthe activities. The other 600 are workingwith tasks that support the operations atEkofisk in other ways. We find technicalsections that function as developmentaldepartments for corresponding sections outon the various platforms - and we findindependent departments involved withother tasks that an operator is obligated tocarry out. The largest departments todayare Engineering and ManagementInformation Services, both of which havewell over 100 employees. ManagementInformation Services is, moreover, a part ofthe Financial Branch, which is also a veryimportant and central part of theorganization. E & C also makes a goodshowing, but the organization varies in sizeaccording to the projects on which they are

lO4 working at a given time. This branch is its

own independent organizational unit,reporting directly to headquarters inBartlesville. The branch functions as adetached consultant for the operator onlarger projects.

When an organization grows to the sizeof Phillips, it is impossible to keep frombuilding up a rather extensiveadministration. Not only does theoperational support for the around 1600persons working out on the field requireadministration; there are also the constantlyincreasing requirements from the authoritiesfor the company to report on and discussvarious tasks.

Supply and TransportationServicesThe platforms out in the North Sea are smallcommunities where a lot of differentsupplies are needed in order for everythingto function on an everyday basis. Oneaspect of this service is that which canbriefly be categorized as food and drink.The other aspect is the whole spectrum ofmaterial needed in order for the productiontechnology to function as it must.

At the base there is an organization ofabout 150 persons engaged in seeing to itthat the platforms have what they need -and organizing the transportation back andforth between Ekofisk and the base. Thisorganization can roughly be divided intotwo sections: the purchasing and contractsection and the warehouse section. Thesetwo sections complement each other, andthe purchasing and contract section steps inwhen the items or spare parts requested arenot available in the warehouse. The onshorestock of spare parts contains approximately23,000 different articles, at a total value of140 million kroner. Today all the steps inthis process are set up for automation andextensive use of data processing systems.The platforms can order parts from the basevia computer terminals.

About 100 purchase orders, on theaverage, are handled every day — whichsays something about the extent of this partof the operation. In addition there is aspecial mechanical shop which is part of thisorganization. Equipment that comes in forrepairs is checked out here first, to see if itcan be fixed locally - before the equipmentis eventually sent on. Furthermore, equipment164

that has been purchased is inspected in theshop to ensure that it is in working orderbefore it is sent out to the platforms.

Almost every day there is a supply boatleaving the base in Tananger, setting out onthe 12-hour trip to the Ekofisk area. Theboats are loaded with containers, and thetanks on board are filled up with water andfuel. In 1988 there are three supply boats inthe shuttle traffic back and forth betweenTananger and Ekofisk - and between thevarious platforms out on the field.

The development has consistently gonein the direction of fewer and larger boats,and the three trafficking the stretch todayhave a dead weight of from 2500 to 3200tons. They are equipped with four sidepropellers, which makes them easy tomaneuver when they are being positionedfor loading and unloading next to theplatforms. They have 5000-6000horsepower engines and can do 14-15knots. The crew of 11 work shifts of fourweeks on board and four weeks onshore.

In 1985 a total of 322,000 tons of goodswere transported to Ekofisk, while the totalfor the previous year was 277,000 tons. In1985 the supply boats had to make 330 tripsbetween Tananger and Ekofisk to keep theplatforms supplied.

Small Boats in TroubleThere were no Norwegian supply boatswhen the activity started at Ekofisk. Thefirst ships to be put into the traffic were builton the basis of experience from the Gulf ofMexico and sailed under British, German,and Dutch flags. Danish boats were alsoinvolved early on.

The first two supply boats Phillips leasedwere the «West Shore* and the «Kent Shore*,both flying the British flag. These two weretypical of that first generation of supplyboats, and compared with today's boatsthey were small craft. The dead weight wasless than 700 tons, and the horsepower wasnot particularly impressive either. Theengine power was 1700 and the sidepropeller had 150 horsepower. Alsocharacteristic was the fact that the deckspace was quite small, and the boats wereoften built with a freeboard of one-halfmeter. All the sacks of supplies were stackedon the deck on loose pallets, and the crewoften had a tough job of it when all that hadto be transferred to rigs and platforms out

An ultramodernwarehouse buildingprovides for aneffective supplyservice to theplatforms at Ekofisk,The stock of spareparts consists ofapprox. 23,000different articles at avalue of NOK 140million.

Before being shippedto Ekofisk, thedeliveries are checkedthoroughly at thebase. Computersystems ensure thatthe orders from theplatforms are quicklyfilled.

A large andcomprehensive stockof casing andproduction pipes isnecessary at the base.

165

"West Shore" wasone of the first

supply boats inEkofisk traffic. Itwas registered in

England, and was alittle less than 700

tons. "West Shore"was shipwrecked

near "Gulftide" on 6January 1971. All

onboard wererescued.

The job onboard thesupply boats could bevery rough when the

weather acted up.This photo from

1974 shows clearlythat working on deck

under suchconditions is no

laughing matter.

"Safe Truck" loadscontainers at P

platform in 1984.Compared with

"West Shore", "SafeTruck" has, among

other things, a biggerengine and bettermaneuverability.

166

on the field. The fact that the boats wereequipped with only one side propeller alsomade it very difficult to keep the boat at allsteady. When the weather was at its worstduring the fall and winter storms, there wasa great risk of being washed overboard. Thecrew could be standing in water up to theirwaists while attempting to get the boatunloaded, and more than once the load wasruined by the volumes of water washingover the deck.

There was remarkably little interest insupply boats on the part of Norwegianshipowners during those first years. Theprobable reason for this was that the oilactivity was regarded as uncertain, andtimes were good within traditionalNorwegian shipping. When discoverieswere made in the North Sea, and at the sametime there was a period of depression withintraditional shipping, the interest picked up.With Norwegian experience from fishingand shipping, it was natural that newconstructions intended for the supply boattrade were developed with North Seaconditions in mind. New, modern boats —second generation boats — came on themarket in the 1970's, and Phillips leasedtheir first Norwegian supply boat in 1972.That was the «West Eagle». After that time,

there occurred a gradual replacement of theold, smaller vessels with larger and moremodern ones. Greater engine power, moreside propellers, and higher freeboard wereamong the features that came onto themarket with the Norwegian boats.

Peak ActivityDuring the most hectic phase toward theend of the 1970's, Phillips had as many as 29supply boats under charter at the same time.The boat market was overflooded.Therefore the pattern was to operate with apermanent minimum tonnage underlong-term contract — usually one to twoyears — and go out on the market whenthere was a need for extra tonnage.

In order to be able to handle the supplyservice, two supply boats were usuallyleased for each rig. One of the vessels wasused as a kind of stand-by vessel for the rigwhile the other one went in to pick upsupplies. Then the returning boat took overthe readiness service after having beenunloaded. With this arrangement the boatswere out at sea for long periods and in atshore for short periods. (As a rule, thevessels were loaded/unloaded onshoreregardless of the time of night or day thatthey arrived, then sent right out to the fieldagain. The crew remained on board for sixweeks, then had three weeks off.)

In 1979 and 1980 the supply servicereached its peak with 421,000 and 427,000tons, respectively, of total goods. This was aculmination of the steady increase since thestart of construction on the permanentplatforms.

Being on a supplyboat at Ekofisk canbe tough even in "ourtime". "NormandSkipper" strugglesagainst the weather— with the Eddaplatform in thebackground.

During the early period the traffic wasnot only between Ekofisk and Stavanger,but also between Ekofisk and Englishharbors — Great Yarmouth in particular.Phillips had a collection area there for muchof the equipment that would be transportedout to the new platforms at Ekofisk.

HelicoptersThe transporting of people to and from theplatforms in the Ekofisk area has since dayone primarily been via helicopter. We recallIngvar Bjornevik's narrative on the first tripfrom «Ocean Viking* to Teesside, with anopen helicopter doorway that resulted in hishaving to sit and keep the baggage fromfalling out. That was when the rig waslocated on the British continental shelf. Assoon as the «Ocean Viking» came over onthe Norwegian side of the North Seaboundary line, Helikopter Service took overthe transportation to and from the rig.When the «Gulftide» was on location towardthe end of 1970, Helikopter Service had fourSikorsky S61's in the North Sea personneltraffic. There wasn't much traffic, comparedwith later years — four/five trips per week,according to Kjell Rott. He heads up thegroup in the Transportation section withresponsibility for helicopters in 1988. In1970 he was part of the crew on the

«Gulftide» when it came on the scene.During that first period, transportation ofpersonnel between the various rigs andwork barges out on the field was by supplyboat - and with personnel baskets aselevators. At the beginning of 1971, a Bell204 machine was leased by Phillips, so ittook over the job. Since then it has primarilybeen in fog situations that the supply boatsout on the field have had to take over forthe helicopters as «local buses*. Helicoptertransportation increased on a level with theactivity out on the field. The Sikorskymachines were the work horses to and fromEkofisk, while the Bell 204 was replaced bythe «Jet Ranger* and supplemented by theBell 212 in internal (shuttle) traffic atEkofisk.

After the helicopter accident in 1973,

During the earlyyears at Ekofisk thecargo was placed onpallets on deck -very vulnerable todamage. This is nowavoided by the use ofcontainers.

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A Sikorsky 56 INunloads passengerson 2/4H platform.

This type ofhelicopter used to be

the work horse in theNorth Sea traffic.

However, accidentsin the 1970s

prompted a searchfor alternatives — the

results being theBoeing 234 Chinook

and Super Pumahelicopters.

The chart shows thehelicopter traffic

between ForusHeliport and Ekofisk

— and internalshuttling on the field,

in terms of numbersof passengers. The

peak was reached in1978-79. In 1978

approx. 500,000passengers were

transported.

Until 1983, theSikorsky S61N

dominated Ekofisktraffic. In 1983 the

Boeing Chinook wasput into service —

and as of 1984 thistwo rotor helicopter

took over most of thetraffic. In 1984 the

French Super Pumawas also introduced.After a close call on

1 May 1987, theChinook was

grounded, but wasback in traffic again

toward the end of theyear. In 1987, the

Ekofisk trafficconstituted 43

percent of HelikopterService's total

offshore activity.

75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87

IS61• Boeingei Super Puma

6000

5000

4000

168

75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87

Helikopter Service had only three Sikorskysleft. The traffic was so heavy by then thatthey couldn't handle it. In addition toEkofisk, Frigg was in the midst of itsconstruction phase, and there was extensiveexploration activity on the Norwegian shelf.Therefore the offshore working period forthe crews was increased by one day, fromseven to eight days, to lessen the need for

transportation. Helikopter Service hasgradually invested in more Sikorskymachines, and in 1988 the company has 19at its disposal.

When transportation needs were at peaklevels in 1979, Phillips had 17 departuresdaily from Forus Heliport to Ekofisk. Duringmorning hours, these machines went likebuses at 15-minute intervals.

Normally a Sikorsky S61 can take 13passengers to Ekofisk, but weatherconditions make it necessary to calculate thenumber of passengers and load size prior toeach departure on the basis of fuel reserves,temperature and wind conditions. In theworst instance, it was only possible to carrythree passengers on the 11/2 hour trip outto the Ekofisk Complex.

The great amount of traffic to and fromEkofisk causes big problems when the fogsets in — and it particularly makes itself feltin the spring and fall seasons. For as many asthree days the fog can lie and make all trafficimpossible. Then the crews waiting to goout have to be put up in hotels and boardinghouses in the Stavanger area. If it happens inthe middle of the week, it can be a problem,and Kjell Rott recalls that it was necessary togo all the way to Moi (nearly halfway toKristiansand) to find a vacancy.

When the fog lifts again, it becomesnecessary to fly at full capacity in order tobring the situation back into balance. Thegreatest number of flights required after justsuch a fog situation was 47 by Sikorskysfrom Forus to Ekofisk.

New HelicoptersAfter the helicopter accidents in 1977 and1978, Helikopter Service began to

500.000

400.000

300.000

200.000

Forus — EkofiskShuttle

cooperate with a number of operators,including Phillips, to find types ofhelicopters that could replace the Sikorsky.It was concluded that the Boeing BV234Chinook and the French Super Puma couldbe used. Helikopter Service has purchasedboth of these models. The choice for Ekofiskuse was the Boeing Chinook. Thishelicopter, which has been used by themilitary for over 20 years, had in its civilianmodel a seating capacity of 44 — latermodified to 40 — and great fuel capacity.This has made the scheduling of traffic toEkofisk easier and more flexible. Fewerflights mean fewer flying hours and thusincreased safety. In addition, the threehelicopters of this type owned byHelikopter Service have such a greatcapacity that it is possible to catch upquickly after a fog situation.

RecordsThe record year for traffic to and fromEkofisk was 1979. That year 75,510passengers were flown the distance. Out onthe field 365,560 persons were transportedbetween the platforms. The figures cancompare with any medium-sized Norwegianairport. The year 1987 was also a busy one.The jack-up project and the construction of

2/4K platform almost brought about areturn to the conditions of the «old days*. Atotal of 68,235 passengers were flown outduring that year, while 175,978 were movedbetween the platforms. With these figures inmind, it is easy to understand that the trafficcoordinators in the tower on 2/4H havemore then enough to keep themselvesoccupied. It is not unusual for one helicopterto be on the platform's helideck while twoothers wait in line in the air for opportunityto land. The helicopters hover in a steadystream — especially in the morning, atmidday, and in the evening, in connectionwith the three regular shuttle periods. Thenthere are two Bell 212's in flight in order to

Flying in a helicopterover the North Seaduring the summercan be a hotexperience. Thesurvival suit, whichall passengers haveto wear, isuncomfortablywarm. Particularlyin the olderhelicopters withoutair conditioning,passengers can beginto feel "cooked".

The tower on 2/4His a busy work site.In 1987 alone,68,235 passengerswere flown to andfrom Ekofisk. On thespecially designedhelideck is a BoeingBV234 Chinookwhich can take 40(44) passengers.

169

The Ekofiskcommunications

center is located onthe Tank. At rightwe see the satellite

antenna — while thetwo antennae at

left aretroposcatters that

handle thecommunication

to Cod, B-U.H-7,Emden and Teesside.

The communicationflow between Ekofisk

and Tananger ishandled by a satellite

in orbit more than36,000 km over the

Equator. The signalsto and from the basein Tananger go via

Ihe ground station atEik.

handle the traffic. Sometimes a Sikorskymachine also comes out from Forus to lendassistance. This flight is called the«champagne flighb, since it leaves Forus at4:30 a.m in order to be at Ekofisk in time forthe morning shuttle to begin.

CommunicationBoth at Ekofisk and at the base in Tanangerthere is a group of highly qualified workerswho are involved with anything but oil andgas. Computer technology and electronicsare their main occupation. At Ekofisk there

170

is a satellite station, equipment for dataprocessing control, over-horizon radio(otherwise normally found in militarysystems), radar, electronic telephoneexchanges, video systems, laser beam radar,etc. In other words, Ekofisk conceals one ofthe world's greatest offshorecommunication systems.

Parallel with the flood of oil and gasthrough the pipe systems between theplatforms, to Teesside, and to Emden, thereis an invisible «pipe system» with a «flood»:of talking via telephones, of data betweencomputers, of words from word processorsand telex machines. Around the clock thereports go between the platforms, Emden,Tananger, and Teesside - whether «riding»on radio waves directed toward the satelliteplatforms from the Ekofisk Complex, or«shot» out from Ekofisk toward a target nolarger than a car, located 36,000 kilometersabove the Equator. This point is a so-calledgeostationary satellite which sendsmessages back down to the ground stationnear Moi and on to Tananger, or to the towerat Sola airport, for example.

When a helicopter lands and takes offfrom Ekofisk, Sola is notified by satellite.Flight control at Ekofisk maintains radiocontact with the helicopter and suppliesweather data provided by, among otherthings, computers, and laser beam radar on2/4H which measures cloud altitudes, etc.

The helicopter is navigated by means ofelectronic eyes that see small flares, where inthe light is long radio waves. These radioflares, as they are called, are found on most

of the platforms. When the passengersdisembark at Ekofisk, a report is sent via thecomputer screen and satellite network to thecomputer center in Tananger. Boats arefollowed by radar located on the EkofiskTank. Radar waves follow the horizon andregister all movements on the sea within thehorizon, both day and night, in foggy or fairweather.

Boats can be called up over the radio bythe «harbor captain* - or the boatcoordinator at Ekofisk.

On the outlying platforms, it is the radiooperators who follow the helicopter traffic —and boat traffic, if necessary. They havetheir radio systems available forconversations with sea and air traffic, theEkofisk Complex, coastal radio stations, etc.In the case of an accident, when importantmessages arid alarms have to be sent, anelectronic alarm system functions and sendsout pre-determined alarm signals.

«The world's largest and most advancedcommunication system,* was the way manypeople described the satellite system forEkofisk when it was opened for use. Sincethen, new fields have been developed andnew systems put into operation — butEkofisk was the first.

Nevertheless, probably the greatestimprovement that has taken place for theemployees out at Ekofisk was when theywere able to get Norwegian TV coverage ofthe 1986 world championship in soccer.Before that time they had not been able toreceive television signals from theNorwegian mainland, but during thesummer of 1986 a new satellite wasemployed. Thus it became possible at Ekofiskto receive news and programs simultaneouslywith the family back home.

Norwegian televisionmade its debut atEkofisk in 1986, justbefore the worldchampionship insoccer. Thus endedthe day-old newsreports on videocassettes. A minorrevolution in thechoice of leisureactivities on theplatform.At the same limeEkofisk also got itsown licensed localTV, making possiblethe localtransmission of itsown programs — aswas done during thejack-up operation in1987.

171

Norway in Miniature

29 February 1988: The alarm has beensounded at the Ekofisk Complex. A Britishdrilling rig, the «Santa Fe 135», has brokenloose in the hurricane that is harrying, and itis drifting from the British sector toward theCod platform. Calculations show that it isdrifting right toward the platform and willbe in collision position at about 3:00 in theafternoon. In the Danish sector, south in theNorth Sea, a barge and several fishing boatsare in distress and can be a threat to Danishoil installations. Compressor platformB-11 on the gas pipeline is within the rangeof visibility from the threatened platformsand may itself be vulnerable.

Helicopter traffic between Forus andEkofisk has been halted on account of the

wind. A wind velocity of 60 knots ismaximum for movement to be allowed onthe helidecks.

At Forus, three Sikorsky helicopters arebeing readied for evacuation of the Codplatform. During the morning hours, 19people are evacuated to the Ula field.

Later that afternoon it becomes clear thatthe runaway rig will pass Cod with a 3,000meter clearance. At the same time, controlhas been recovered over the situation in theDanish sector. In addition to a wind velocityof up to 78 knots, waves between 40 and 60feet (12-18 meters) high have been reported.

The emergency center at Sola can beginto demobilize — the crisis situation is overwithout any loss of human life. Out at

172

Ekofisk the crews can relax — after weatherconditions have once again created tensionand uncertainty. But since the majority ofcrew members have many years ofexperience out here, the fact that MotherNature wants to have her say has becomepart of their everyday reality. With theexception of on Cod, where production wasshut down while the crisis was a possibility,oil and gas continued to flow up from thedepths despite the weather. That is why thecrews are there - to try to keep productiongoing around the clock as long as there is nothreat to safety.

The regular workday for everyone out atEkofisk is a matter of routines, as at anyother work site. The difference lies in theenvironment in which the work assignmentsare carried out. The Ekofisk Complex waschristened Ekofisk City early on. At thattime there were only three platforms and aflare structure that were interconnected.Today there are nine platforms connectedby bridges. Nearly 1400 meters from flareto flare. One of the world's largestconcentrations of connected offshore oilinstallations. A work site where close to 400people reside and work around the clock.12-hour shifts for everyone. There's not somuch to do those 14 days out there — otherthan work, eat and sleep. A comprehensiverecreation program has been developed, andthere is a good deal of ingenuity in creating

changes of pace in the everyday activity -but what the individual looks forward to is,of course, going home. For 14 days you arecut off from the outside world, then youhave 3 weeks of free time. Then another tripout by helicopter and 14 more daysoffshore, followed by 4 weeks of free time.The concentration of working time yieldsgood returns in the form of leisure time andtogetherness with family and friends, but itcan be plenty hard from time to time beingaway from loved ones for 14 days.

Newspapers and television are links withthe Norwegian mainland. In that way it ispossible to keep up with events, so that youdon't have to feel like the world has passedyou by while you were standing still for atwo-week period.

But most of the people thrive at Ekofisk —yes, very much so. It seems that if you makeit through the first year you're likely to stay

The control roomoperators on theEkofisk Tank controlthe most importantoil and gas processesin the Ekofisksystem. The controlroom is the "brain"of the Ekofiskcommunity.

In the middle of theNorth Sea - betweenNorway and GreatBritain — is Ekofisk.The endless ocean isinterrupted only byplatforms. EkofiskCity was the namejournalists gave theComplex —indicating acommunity with allthe functionsnecessary for peopleto live and workhere. Almost 1,400meters from flare toflare — 9 platformsinterconnected bybridges.

173

Catering isimportant in an

isolated community.Oil and gas

platforms are knownfor their excellentfood. Chef Willy

Osuldsen andcolleague, Leif

Andreassen serveddelicious and

substantial food onCad in 1983.

Catering services atEkofisk have always

been handled bycontractors.

The cabins are lightand pleasant-like

this one on 2/4K.Two persons share acabin and bathroom.

174

on. The turnover percentage is extremelylow - so low that it can be a cause forconcern. When you talk with people aboutit, there are few who can imagine goingonshore to a regular 8:00 to 4:00 job. «We'retoo used to it,» they say.

Furthermore, the salary level is generallyhigher than for the same jobs onshore.Offshore bonus, it's called, and it amountsto about 47%6 over base pay. A standard of

living is established that is not easy to giveup.

DevelopmentTo compare conditions on the platforms oftoday with the early period would not bequite fair. It's so easy to say that the way itis today is the way it always should havebeen. It's important to be aware that there is,at all times and in all places, an ongoing

Fishing is a naturalleisure activity on theplatforms. Theplatforms seem tohave a reef effectwhich attracts fish.Kare Pedersen was inthe habit of fishingfor his dog — anddrying the fish at asuitable place onEkofisk 2/4/1,

Medic ReidunThompson on Eddahad great fishingluck. At thephotographer'sbidding she pulled ina fish in a matter ofminutes.

Magnus Refslandand Werner Heinhad no luck thistime. The crab potthey put out fromB-n, on the gaspipeline to Emden,only attractedstarfish - whereasboth crab and lobsterhad previously foundtheir way into thetrap.

175

Tin's is the way the"driller" works on

2/4K. There isplenty to attend to

while the drillbit eatsits way down, foot

by fool through theformations, toward

I he reservoir. Thedrilling at Ekojisk

has always beencarried out by

contractors — and forseveral years Aker

has been responsible,for the activity on

the drill floor.

This is how the drillfloor looks from the

derrick. It's a longway down — and the

derrickman has anairy work site. There

have beenimprovements in the

equipment used fordrilling — one

example being theautomatic

pipehandling systemnow in use on 2/4K.

The fact that theequipment is of

Norwegian originshows thatNorwegian

companies havesomething to

contribute in thisfield.

176

The drill bit is on itsway down from2/4C platform at theEkofisk Complex.On the drill floor thecrew is working fullsteam. Length bylength is added to thedrill string — theformationscontaining oil andgas are approx. 3000meters down.

177

12 - Giant Discovery

Technology hasmade enormous

progress since thefirst platforms were

built. 2/4K, which isthe latest addition atEkofisk, is equippedwith ultra-modern

digital controlsystems.

OddbjernStangeland had as

his place of workbooster platform

37/4A until it wasdemanned in 1986.

The platform, whichwas to ensure thatthe pressure in the

pipeline enabledtransportation of

more than 540,000barrels of oil per day,

was nowsuperfluous. This

was already the casewith the other

booster platform —36/22. No one was

let go — everyonewas given new jobsin the Ekofisk area.

178

development. It is up to us to ensure thatthe development is for the better.

At Ekofisk, as at other work locations,there is the tendency to recall «the good olddays». Working conditions, housingconditions, safety, shift schedules have allseen an enormous development since theearly 1970's. This is related not only to ageneral development but also to the naturallife process that an oil and gas field goesthrough. First there is a hectic constructionphase where most emphasis is on gettingeverything in place, the equipment tofunction, and the platform on stream. Thencomes the more stable operations phase —before the unavoidable reduction phasecomes along. One day the resources in theearth begin to diminish; they are notinexhaustible.

The Ekofisk community will live on formany decades to come, but it has beenthrough the first phase — development — andis currently in the operations phase. Thiswill last a good way into the next century,but production has been on the decline since1980.

During its life's course thus far there hasbeen a tremendous development. Into whatwas a rather simple production technologythe world of data processing has made itsentry, and improvements have been made

and efficiency increased wherever profitable.The housing conditions in the temporaryquarters cannot be compared with today'stwo-man rooms with private bath. Since thetwo roommates usually work on oppositeshifts, each person has what amounts to hisown room during his time off. The shiftrotation began with 7 days on the job, 7

Platform ManagerJan Aasend watcheswhile heavy lifts arecarried out on 2/4/4.At age 21 he joinedPhillips as emoperator - and hasmade a career withthe company. Asplatform manager onEkofisk Alpha in7985, he was incharge of one of thebiggest producers ofoil and gas in theEkofisk area.

A cleaning unit, apig, has done Us jobin the pipeline andhas reached theEkofisk Complex.I he pipelines have tobe cleaned regularlyin order for oil or gasto pass as smoothlyas possible throughthe lines. This "pig"has come to 2/4Gfrom the Valhallfield - and is takenout of the receiver byOperator HelgeVestad.

179

The Ekofiskcommunity has its

own pastor. Here wesee Trygve Hestnesleading a gathering

in the chapel on2/4H. However,much of the "oil

pastor's" workdayconsists of meeting

the crews at their jobstations on the

platform.

In the Cinemu on2/4H films were

shown three times aday until Norwegian

television found itsway to Ekofisk m1986. Before TV,

films were animportant leisureactivity on all the

platforms. The filmscreen has now beenreplaced by a "wide

screen" andNorwegian

broadcasting'sprograms,

The lounge is themeeting place beforeand after work ~ lor

a cup of coffee andthe latest

newspapers.Newspapers are acornerstone of the

recreation program -and newspapers fromall over Norway find

their way to theplatforms. Albuskjell1/6A is no exception.

days at home. Then it went to 8 daysoffshore, 8 days free, and now 14 daysoffshore, three weeks free — 14 daysoffshore, four weeks free. The recreationprograms have kept pace: radio, TV,newspapers, movies, exercise rooms withsauna, and live entertainment featuring

well-known artists. Most of the foregoingwere non-existent during the first years. Thetelephone automat that makes it possible tostay in touch with home mustn't beforgotten. Great improvement. The entry ofwomen into the male community wasperhaps one of the biggest changes. First thegals came out as medics and in catering —later on they moved into almost all thefunctions. «Bastion» after «bastion» has fallen.Despite a certain amount of passiveresistance in the beginning, most peoplenow agree that this has led toenvironmental improvements.

The environment has also gone through anoticeable change as a result of theNorwegianization process. From havingbeen an almost totally Americanenvironment with infusions of othernationalities, where the language wasEnglish — it is now a Norwegian milieu.Many have come to the conclusion that thishas made the environment tooone-dimensional, less rich in diversity. But atthe same time it has meant new challengesfor Norwegians.

In spite of the Norwegianization, thelanguage at Ekofisk will never be onlyNorwegian. Oil-related terminology is inEnglish, and the English expressions havestuck - but now with a more Norwegiandiction. When mixed into a Norwegiansentence, for outsiders it would soundcompletely foreign, but for those who work

180

The females' entryinto the male societywas met with someskepticism, but hasbeen a very positiveexperience. Today itis inconceivable notto have womenonboard theplatforms. Andbastion after bastionhas fallen. Initially,women wereemployed as medicsand cateringpersonnel Now theyare found in anyprofession. Margaret"Maggi" Knudsenwent offshore in1982. PhotographerArnulf Husmo'spicture of her wasone of four motifs byhim from the oilactivity made intostamps by the postalservice in 1986.

181

Coffee breaks areimportant when

work is spread outaround the platform

where smoking isstrictly prohibited.

The electricians'shop, as it is called

on Edda, is a regularmeeting place for

coffee breaks at nineand three o'clock.

Fresh cakes from thekitchen are standard

fare.

The radio operatorsare also

entertainmentmanagers. They are

in charge of radioand music channelsplus video and TV

transmittal. BothMindor 1 Hellevik

and Ulf Andreassenon Albuskjell 2/4F

came to Ekofisk fromthe merchant marine.

182

Welcome to Torheliport. The deck isclear for landing.This is how ArvidHansen - popularlycalled Htii-Hansen —greeted us when wearrived at the Torplatform.Incidentally, herepresents theveterans on the field— having worked on"Ocean Viking" asnight cook.

with it every day it is just as natural aseating. It takes time for newcomers toacquire full language proficiency.

The Outlying PlatformsThe Ekofisk Complex is large and can seemalienating. There are so many people thereat one time that it is impossible to get toknow them all. The situation is totallydifferent on the outlying platforms. Therethe crews can vary from 15 (on compressorplatforms B-ll and H-7) to over 100 (on2/4K). 2/4K probably tends more towardthe Ekofisk Complex than toward therepresentative outlying platforms like Codand Albuskjell A. On these platforms theregular crew numbers around 40, but withgreat variations over this number duringwell workovers or other larger maintenanceoperations.

But the number is small enough thateveryone knows everyone and caninterrelate in an informal manner. The ruleson the platform are made accordingly, andduring coffee breaks and in the evenings thecatering personnel can serve up somethingextra — which cannot practically be done atthe Ekofisk Complex.

The coffee breaks, moreover, areinstitutions at Ekofisk. It doesn't have

anything to do with less work being donethan at other work locations — rather thatpeople are spread out when they're workingand it is good to get together over a cup ofcoffee and cakes. The 9:00 coffee break andthe 3:00 coffee break are important toremember. They don't take place in thedining room — but in some workshopinstead, or in the electrician shop as it'scalled on Edda.

It is often said that all the platforms atEkofisk are alike. From the outside they lookpretty much alike — and the organization isalso similar. But it is the people who makethe milieu, and the milieu varies a lot fromplatform to platform. After visits to all theplatforms, the conclusion drawn is that eachone has its distinctive character. This is dueto the crew, and to their ability to create and

The heliguards on2/4H enjoy somerays of sunshinebefore servicing thenext helicopter.

183

It is necessary to puton a survival suit

before boarding thehelicopter. Phillips

requires all Ekofiskpassengers to wear

such a suit.

The Super Puma haslanded on 2/4K. The

heliguards see to itthat the rules for

conduct on the deckare observed.

184

shape the milieu around them. There is,however, one common trait — the informaltone that is found on all the platforms. Atwhat work sites do we experience even theboss going around dressed in jeans and aflannel shirt during working hours? That'sright, at Ekofisk they do. The jeans societymay be one characteristic that immediatelycalls up associations of an informalenvironment.

the platform, the same code is registered,and if you will be moving on to anotherplatform the same routine is followed. Inthat way it is possible to keep track at alltimes of the whereabouts of everyone onthe field. With 25 platforms, this isnecessary in the event of an emergencysituation.

The data-based MTS system replaced amanual register in 1981. As time went by,the extent and number of moves became sogreat that it had to be computerized. Inaddition to containing data as to where eachindividual is located, the system also tellswhether his/her health certificate is in orderand that the safety training has beencompleted.

After the code has been stated duringcheck-in at the heliport, the next safetycheck awaits — Security. It is prohibited tocarry alcohol or medicaments to theplatforms. Furthermore, no one is to beunder the influence of alcohol or narcoticsupon departure. This check is made beforepermission is given to go on board thehelicopter - and it also includes a routineinspection of all the passengers to ensurethat no one is carrying weapons, bombs orexplosives.

When the inspection has been passed, it'son with the survival suit. It is not exactlycomfortable, but Phillips has decided thateveryone traveling out to Ekofisk must wearone during the flight.

Once aboard the helicopter, there isanother safety orientation — before themachine can take off.

Upon arrival at the platform the code isregistered with the radio operator — or atthe reception desk, at the same time as bedassignments are made. But before a personcan do anything at all, there is anothersafety orientation - this time concerningsafety on the platform. The regular crew isspared this orientation, but all newcomers orpersons who haven't been on board duringthe last 12 months have to go through it.Emphasis here is on escape routes, alarmsignals and the platform's safety systems.Special lifeboats, capsules and rafts areincluded. Each person must be able to helphimself in the case of an accident — in spiteof the fact that regular crew members on theplatform have their assigned tasks in suchinstances. Some are lifeboat coxswains andothers are on the fire brigade. Everyone is

given special training in his/her emergencyfunction.

When the necessary form has been signed— then you are ready to do the work youwere sent out to do.

The fact that this safety orientation onthe platform is important to have isconfirmed when the regular drills are carriedout. Once every 14 days there is a drill -and then it is important to know what youare supposed to do.

Even in connection with daily workassignments, the routines are permeatedwith the fact that safety is the number onepriority. All work that contains an elementof danger requires the approval of severalpersons. Just taking a photograph with aflash requires permission to do «hot» work.The place where the picture is to be takenmust first be approved as being free of gasbefore permission will be given.

From All Over NorwayToday there are residing in each ofNorway's 19 counties — or, if you will, in223 of the nation's municipalities — one ormore Phillips employees whose worklocation is either offshore at Ekofisk, in theOslo office, or at the main Tananger base.But the majority of the employees live, of

course, in Rogaland county, in which thecity with the most Phillips people isStavanger, with Sandnes and Sola following.It is also in these towns, plus Gjesdal, Timeand Randaberg municipalities, that themajority of people working at the mainoffice reside.

Phillips' policy with regard to recruitingto fill vacant positions at Ekofisk and at theTananger base is that, as far as possible,employees should be recruited fromRogaland - or from neighboring counties ifthe applicants are qualified. And qualifiedapplicants for 90% of the jobs within thecompany's offshore organization have beenfound in Phillips' own district. The type of

Hdiguard VigdisSteylen receives theboarding card from apassenger departingfrom the Hotelplatform.

New personnel - orpersons who havenot been onboardduring the past 12months - are given asafety briefing whenthey arrive on theplatform. Specialattention is paid toevacuationpossibilities, withemphasis on use ofthe lifeboat. GunnarLikvern on Eldfisk2/7B demonstrateshow to use aemergency beacon.

135

Much electricalequipment must be

inspected on theplatforms, and the

electricians haveplenty to do. AH of

the satelliteplatforms, for

example, have theirown generators

supplying electricity.

Materials manHarald Sivertsen on

P platform is incharge of 5500 parts.

This warehousesupplies all theplatforms with

articles and spareparts.

186

Maintenance is anongoing process onthe platforms, andpaint in particular isa big item ofconsumption. BjørnAndreasen andArvid Kval areseeing to it that thelifeboat platform onAlbuskjell 2/4F isgiven a facelift.One of the operators'tasks is to check thewellhead area (right).

There are manydifferent turbines onthe platforms, and agroup of specialiststravels around doingoverhauls at regularintervals. Here theturbine on Eldfisk2! 7A is beingchecked.

187

One of the radiooperators' tasks is to

update theManpower Tracking

System wheneverpersonnel arrive orleave the platform.Hans Olav Rudi is

seated at thecomputer terminal

on Cod.

Only when oilsamples are taken

can one actually seethe oil brought up

from the reservoir.Operator Bj0rn

Skrede procures anoil sample on Edda.

The samples areanalyzed in the

laboratory on theEkofisk Tank.

188

personnel most difficult to find are workersin the more specialized fields, such asinstrument technicians, automationtechnicians, processing technicians, andspecialists within data processing andtelecommunication services. These arepersonnel whom the labor market hastraditionally seldom seen, and for whomthere has been much competition.Therefore, it is necessary to reach out acrossthe entire country to find qualifiedapplicants.

The fact that there are today relativelylarge number of employees living in botheastern and northern Norway goes back tothe four-year period between 1976 and1979 when as many as 1,981 workers wererecruited. At that time the labor market wasso tight that it was necessary to obtainqualified people from other areas — and thisalso resulted in a rather wide distribution ofemployees. The fact that Phillips foundpeople then who liked working at Ekofiskshows up in the fact that over 90% of thoseemployees are still working for thecompany.

The onshore organization also mustrecruit people from other sections of thecountry. Particularly in the data processingand engineering departments it has beennecessary for Phillips to recruit from all over

Norway. But unlike the offshore employees,these people have to move to Rogaland. Inother words, working at Ekofisk allowspeople a great deal of freedom to live wherethey want. Thus Phillips has an instrumenttechnician who works a small farm in upperJostedalen, in Sogn & Fjordane, and onewho lives in Troms0.

A chat on the stairsat informal Ekofisk.

In connection withthe seabed subsidenceat the EkofiskComplex, wavemeasuring laserinstruments wereinstalled. Advancedtechnical equipmentbecomes part ofeveryday routines.

189

Much is required ofthe extensive cable

network on theplatforms. Outdoor

cables are constantlyexposed to rough

weather. Herereplacement work is

under way onbooster platform

37/4/1.

190

The leisure activitiesavailable on theplatforms are manyand well-organized.Exercise rooms withsaunas have becomestandard. Theequipment in theexercise rooms, atleast, should leave noexcuse for notkeeping f i t . Someprefer a lessphysicallydemanding game ofbilliards. The EkofiskMarch has becomean annual event onall platforms. Aspecific track iswalked as manytimes as will total 10km. The march isregistered by NorgesTurmarsjforbundand included in themarch calendar, butparticipation islimited to theemployees on thefield.TV is probably themost popular leisureactivity — often incombination withsome newspaperreading and friendlygathering in therecreation rooms.Many have beenbitten by the"darts-bug" onEkofisk 2/4B, andthe target is apopular gatheringplace.

191

Phillips' team onEldfish2/7Bin

1985: 21 personsgathered on the

pipedeck. This iseverybody — with the

exception of a radiooperator and an

operator who are onduty. The total crew

consists of 23persons. Personnel

from variouscontractors, for

example, catering,are always present as

192

The Offshore OrganizationDespite the informal social atmosphere atEkofisk, there is, of course, a well-definedorganization. The offshore or regionalmanagement is located at the EkofiskComplex with an offshore manager havingsenior responsibility. Reporting to him/herare the administration, engineering,production, safety, and drilling departments,as well as departments for support functionsand the head safety delegate.

The production, or operations,department is the largest (1,180 persons), towhich operations on the Ekofisk Complexand the other platforms report.

Traditionally there were nosuperintendents on the various platformsthrough whom all reporting was carried out.Each individual department reportedindependently to offshore management atthe Ekofisk Complex. The productionsupervisor had senior responsibility in caseof an evacuation, but otherwise thereporting from the platforms was not donethrough one particular office. This waschanged in 1983, when each platformbecame an organizational unit with aplatform superintendent. This createdclearer reporting channels — and the modelwas so successful that the same principlewas also applied to the Ekofisk Complex.

But in spite of this there is extensivecommunication between the departmentalstaff within offshore management at theEkofisk Complex and the variousdepartments on the outlying platforms. Ithas to be that way. In the same way there isa great deal of communicating between thevarious groups at Ekofisk and theircorresponding departments in the onshoreorganization. The formal reporting routines

go via offshore management, but in aneffective organization there must necessarilybe direct communication outside of theformal channels.

Every position in the offshoreorganization is shared by up to threepersons. The rotation system makes thisnecessary. Thus there are three people whohave the job of offshore manager. In someof the supervisory positions, the shifts alsoinclude onshore office hours, so that therewill be good communication betweenonshore and offshore management. Andcommunication is a key to effectiveness inan organization where several people sharea position. This situation puts everyone inthe offshore organization to special tests.

Head Safety DelegateThe Ekofisk Committee organizes most ofPhillips' employees at Ekofisk. This unionalso has an arrangement for a full-timeposition as head safety delegate with acoordinating function. This is anarrangement which goes a long way back intime and which is intended to function as asafety valve. The head safety delegatereports directly to the offshore manager.Since 1981 the Norwegian national union(LO) has also had a full-time positionoffshore as an «ombudsman».

The safety delegate system allows theemployees who are not in agreement withmanagement's evaluation of issues relatingto safety and security to bypass the formalorganization and take their views to topmanagement. There is a safety delegate oneach of the platforms in the Ekofisk area.

193

13 - Giant Discovery

The Future of Ekofisk

194

As of today, 1988, of the discovered fieldson the Norwegian shelf only the giganticTroll field will outlive Ekofisk. Troll will goon stream around 1995. Ekofisk, the firstcommercial oil and gas field on theNorwegian shelf, can also be among the last.If we consider the fundamental significanceof the Ekofisk Complex for transportation ofoil and gas from Norway, we can foreseeactivity at Ekofisk up to the year 2100. It isnoteworthy that most of the new fields thathave been and are being tied into thetransportation system of which Ekofisk is apart have shorter lifetimes than the mainEkofisk field and Eldfisk. The reservationsthat must be taken in a time perspectivesuch as this are the development of the priceof oil and gas, and the costs of operatingand maintaining the installations. But basedon the knowledge and experience availabletoday, the activity at Ekofisk will extendwell into the next century - and well pastthe expiration date for the Phillips Group'slicense, 31 August 2011.

In other words, Ekofisk will be importantin the future as well. With current methodsfor production of oil and gas, between 70and 80 percent of the resources will still beleft in the reservoirs. Thus it is importantthat these resources be given optimumutilization. In this connection the PhillipsGroup has a great social obligation. It wason the basis of just such a perspective thatthe water injection projects have beeninitiated; it was the reason behind the6-meter elevation of the six steel platformsat the Ekofisk Complex during the summerof 1987; it was the background on which thechoice was made for a lasting protectivebarrier around the Ekofisk Tank, instead of

temporary solutions; and it was the point ofdeparture for the studies on nitrogeninjection into the top of the Ekofiskreservoir.

How long it will be profitable to producefrom the fields in the Ekofisk area depends,of course, on the price of the products andon whether a market exists — but also onhow competent Phillips, as operator, is atfinding solutions that reduce costs.

In this chapter we will be looking at theunique projects that have been carried out toensure the future of Ekofisk: water injectionand the jacking project. In addition, we willtake up the matter of the lifetime of theseven fields in the Ekofisk area.

Water InjectionFor a long time water injection has been acentral element in increasing the level ofproduction for oil and gas fields producingfrom sandstone reservoirs. For Ekofisk,which produces from a fractured chalkreservoir, this is far from a matter of course.It has never been done before.

The work to find solutions which couldmaximize the degree of recovery for thefield began right after the discovery hadbeen made. Many raised the question as towhether it was at all possible to produce oiland gas from the field over a long period.The test production phase provided a goodanswer to this — and throughout the 1970'sresearchers worked with the problemssurrounding increased recovery and waterinjection — along with gas injection. Thedegree of recovery was originally estimatedto lie at between 15 and 19 percent of theoil reserves. Even this was a great quantityfrom such a gigantic reservoir as Ekofisk, but

Water injectionplatform 2/4K is animportant element inthe future prospectsfor Ekofisk. Water isinjected into thereservoirs under highpressure to enhanceproduction of oil andgas. 2/4-K is locatednext to Ekofisk 2/4B;at right, we see derrickbarge "DB 102"which was usedduring theconstruction of theplatform.

every percentage point in increasedrecovery would yield large profits —provided they could be attained withouthuge extra investments. The main problemswere concerned with whether the water inthe reservoir would damage the productionwells — and to what degree the chalk wouldmanage to absorb the water so that more oilcould find its way to the production wells.

After a period of laboratory research,equipment for a test phase was installed onthe 2/4 Bravo platform early in 1981. InApril 1981 injection of water into thereservoir's lower section — the chalk or Torformation — was under way to measure itseffect. At the same time a preliminary designstudy was begun so that realistic figures forthe project's economics could be drawn up.By the fall of 1982, there were sufficientdata and prognoses to ascertain that withthe necessary investments the project wasonly marginally profitable. The drop in oilprices and the uncertainty in that area whichbegan in January 1983 reduced theeconomic outlook for the project to anunacceptable level, from the point of viewof practical economics.

Even at an earlier point in time theambition level for the project was reduced.The point of departure had been two waterinjection platforms, one by 2/4A and one by2/4B, so that the whole reservoir could becovered. The economics in this plan proved

to be too weak, and the result was oneplatform by 2/4B which would be able tohandle injection into two-thirds of the lowerreservoir. Furthermore, there was still adegree of uncertainty — despite the resultsfrom the test project on 2/4B. It neither wasnor is now possible to see whether it willfunction over the whole field. This will notbe clear until sometime during the 1990's, inthe form of the production from thereservoir. This means that, among otherthings, the 15 percent lower limit forrecovery remains the same with waterinjection into chalk, while the upper limit isincreased from 19 to 22 percent. In terms ofoil quantities, expectations for the projectcome to about 170 million barrels.

NegotiationsIn order that the water injection might haveoptimum effect, Phillips had arrived at atime schedule in 1982 that presupposed apositive decision during the summer of1983. Then the onshore construction workcould begin in 1984, installation of theplatform by 2/4B in 1986, and start-up ofinjection at the end of 1987. Advancedrilling of wells during the two years theplatform was under construction was part ofthe plans, so that the platform could becomeoperational for injection as soon as possible.Based on the Phillips Group's conclusionthat water injection into the lower reservoir 195

Kåre Kristiansentook over asMinister of

Petroleum andEnergy in the midstof the negotiations

between the PhillipsGroup and the

Ministry on thetaxation of 'the 2/4-K

project. Under theheadline "Injection

Anyway at Ekofisk"in Stavanger

Aftenblad on 9August 1983, the

artist makes thefollowing comment

on the situation:"New oil ministersare not to be trifled

with."

- chalk - was not a profitable businessventure, negotiations between the Groupand the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate(NPD)/the Ministry of Petroleum andEnergy were begun in the spring of 1983.NPD had for some time been interested in,and had worked to promote, water injectionas a means of reservoir conservation. Fromthe point of view of the NorwegianGovernment, it was good nationalutilization of resources to implement theproject - plus the fact that the job ofbuilding the platform would giveNorwegian industry welcome work during adifficult period. At this point there beganwhat would develop into quite a tug of warbetween the companies in the PhillipsGroup and the Ministry. Bill M. Boyce,managing director of Phillips in Norway atthat time, characterized the negotiations assome of the most difficult and mostimportant in his career. Not only because apositive result was reached in which boththe Ministry and the Phillips Groupachieved what they wanted by means ofcompromise, but also because thenegotiations maintained their tensionthroughout, until agreement was reached on9 August 1983.

The Phillips Group needed changes in thetax conditions for the project - as comparedwith what was standard for thedevelopment projects in the North Sea.Down through the years the Ministry hadrefused similar requests from the companies,and was initially of the opinion that thisproject was no exception.

During the most difficult phase, the196 Government changed hands, and Minister

of Petroleum and Energy Vidkun Hvedingwas replaced by Kare Kristiansen. Norwaywent from being led by a purelyconservative government to a non-socialistcoalition government.

The agreement reached modifies the taxterms so as to make them better suited tothe nature of the project. Taken intoconsideration is the fact that eventualincome from increased production as a resultof water injection into the chalk reservoirwill not be forthcoming until a later point intime - sometime after the beginning of the1990's. In addition, the project was classifiedas research. Cost estimates showed that theagreement gave the starting signal for aproject of between 12 and 15 billionNorwegian 1983-kroner - at leasttwo-thirds of which would go toNorwegian industry in the form ofcontracts.

The Starting SignalDuring 1982 and 1983 a number ofpreparations were made for the newplatform, which was designated 2/4K.When the special legislation was passedconcerning the tax conditions for the waterinjection project at Ekofisk, the processcould gain momentum - and during the fallof 1983 and spring of 1984, the constructioncontracts were awarded. A good portion ofthese contracts were landed by Norwegianshipyards - the two largest being for thejacket, which was built by Aker-Verdal, andthe module support frame, which went toHaugesund Mekaniske Verksted.

On 6 August 1986 the quarters modulewas hoisted onto 2/4K platform, and thiswas the last lift to be carried out. Theinstallation work could then get fully underway, and it went on until the end of 1987.The 2/4K platform is the largest steelplatform in the Ekofisk area, and it looksimpressive next to 2/4B, with which it isconnected by bridge. Furthermore, theplatform is a new generation in the Ekofiskscheme of things - data processing and newtechnology have been utilized asextensively as possible.

On 28 December 1987 purified seawatercould be injected into well K-30, and waterinjection into the Lower Cretaceousreservoir was under way. A few days laterwell K-4 was also ready, and by the end of

1991 a total of 20 wells will have beenprepared and utilized as water injectors.

Phase II2/4K platform can produce approximately350,000 barrels of purified water per day.This is far more than needed in the originalwater injection project. And parallel withthe building of K platform, a test project wascarried out in the upper section of thereservoir — Danian, or the Ekofisk formation.Laboratory research was also carried out to

The "DB 102"derrick barge set the2/4K jacket in 1986.

The 2/4K livingquarters are hoistedinto position on theplatform by "DB102". In 1986, thisderrick barge was theworld's largest witha maximum capacityof 12,000 metrictons.

Water injection from2/4K started in lateDecember 1987. Theplatform's dailycapacity is 350,000barrels of purifiedseawater.

197

The illustrationshows the methodswhich the Phillips

Group sees in 1988as being the most

important ways ofincreasing

production from themain field at Ekofisk.

Water is injectedinto the lower

reservoir — and Mothe lower part of the

upper reservoir.Nitrogen would be

injected into the topof the reservoir, andif implemented, theproject will mainly

increase Ekofisk's gasproduction.

Water Water Nitrogen Water Waterinjection Production injection injection Production injection Production injection

198

find out whether water in that section of thereservoir would cause the chalk structure tocollapse. Both the research project and thelaboratory tests were positive.

The Phillips Group tried first to reach anagreement with the Norwegian authoritiesto extend the water injection toward thesouth by means of a new platform, 2/4W.The idea was to improve the economics ofthe 2/4K project. (The price of oil haddropped drastically since the project wasapproved.) However, the proposal wasturned down by the Ministry. Theauthorities were not willing to allow thesame tax settlement for the new platform asfor 2/4K — without going through the wholeprocess again with a new Stortingreport, and all that it would entail. Withthat, a process was initiated within thePhillips Group to find other solutions —solutions that were cheaper but did notoffer the same long-term flexibility.

The result is that the Ekofisk Complexhas to manage without the south flare indaily operations. The eight injection wellswill be placed on the bridge support north ofthe flare. The wells must be drilled from ajack-up rig, and a pipeline has to be laid to

convey high pressure water from 2/4K tothe Ekofisk Complex. It is also necessary todrill six new production wells from 2/4Aplatform and eight new production wellsfrom 2/4C. This means that both theseplatforms must be somewhat modified.

Calculations show that the expandedwater injection project can yield additionalvolume of approximately 190 millionbarrels of oil equivalents.

On this basis the Phillips Group decidedin late 1987/early 1988 to go ahead withthe project, and the authorities gave theirapproval in the spring of 1988.

NitrogenThe search for other methods besides waterinjection for increasing production levelsfrom the main Ekofisk field has been goingon for many years. After the subsidence ofthe sea bed was discovered came thealternative of injecting nitrogen in order tokeep the reservoir pressure up, therebycounteracting the subsidence.

During the discussion that began in thesummer of 1985, the amount of 600 millioncubic feet per day was mentioned - which

would require a special facility for removalof nitrogen from the natural gas produced.

After the subsidence problem was solvedin another way, Phillips and the PhillipsGroup started taking a look at nitrogeninjection into the top of the reservoir toincrease production of oil and gas. Despitethe fact that the studies are not yetcomplete, they look very promising. Thework will be carried out with a smallerfacility for injection of around 200 millioncubic feet of nitrogen per day as theoptimum.

The preliminary analyses seem to indicatethat the extra quantities of oil and gasrecovered through the nitrogen programwill be as great as through the 2/4K project.The formal decision as to whether thisproject will be realized may be made in thespring of 1989.

Ekofisk Is SinkingThere had been talk among some of thepeople working on the Central EkofiskComplex as to the fact that the platforms laydeeper in the water than before. Aboat-landing on the east side of the EkofiskTank was more or less under water, while ithad previously been visible in the 1970's.The same was true for a landing on ahorizontal bracing on the jacket below2/4C. But no one had started investigatingin earnest to see if the platforms really laydeeper in the water than previously. Thereare an unbelievable number of factorsinvolved in the ocean's water level. , . as

many as 87 different natural conditions, tobe exact.

Late in the fall of 1984 the matter wasgiven serious attention. It started withsounding measurements on the bridges tocheck clearance margins for anchor-handlingboats. These results were compared withdata from 1974 and 1976. Then thereservoir engineering section was asked toexplain a difference of 2-2.5 meters. Afterthat, photographs taken in the early andmid-1970's were gone through andcompared with recent ones. Yes indeed, theplatforms and the Ekofisk Tank lay distinctlydeeper. Fewer rings could be seen abovewater level on the breakwater wall aroundthe Ekofisk Tank.

The alarm was sounded — subsidence ofthe ocean floor below the platforms of theEkofisk Complex was a fact. What the PhillipsGroup had discussed as a possibility in theirapplication for test production in 1970 hadbecome reality, but none of the phenomenathat would have been clear signs of itshappening had turned up in connection withproduction. The fact that it had not beendiscovered out on the field may seemstrange for outside parties, but people growaccustomed to sights that they see on aneveryday basis. Since the subsidence hadhappened millimeter by millimeter over theyears, it is natural for it not to have beennoticed. Once again Ekofisk had come upwith big surprises — the field seemed neverto cease offering new challenges.

Phillips set about a number of activities toobserve and chart the subsidence

These two photos ofthe Ekofisk Tank,from 1975 and1986, respectively,dearly show that itlay deeper in the seain 1986 due to thesubsidence of theseabed.

199

Several measuringmethods were used tomap the extent of the

subsidence — andcheck the subsidence

rate. A satellitesystem took

measurements fromabove, wave radar

measured thedistance to the sea

surface from thebridge between 2/4H

and 2/4C - and,finally, pressure

gauges were placed

200

phenomenon. Several systems of measurewere utilized to determine the rate ofsubsidence — among others, satellitemeasurements of several of the platforms inthe Ekofisk area. After some months, itbecame clear that the seabed was sinking ata rate of between 40 and 50 centimeters peryear. In April/May of 1985, there wassufficient data to be able to say that theplatforms lay about 2.5 meters deeper in thewater than when they were installed. Thesubsidence had occurred over an area thatwas approximately 6,000 meters in diameterand bowl-shaped. The greatest subsidencewas under the Ekofisk Center. From thatarea it diminished so that the subsidencebelow 2/4A and 2/4B was approximately 1meter. In addition to the subsidence on themain Ekofisk field, a lesser subsidence ofabout 60 centimeters was revealed at WestEkofisk.

The Safety FactorThe first question that was asked when thesubsidence phenomenon was brought to

light was whether it was still safe for crewsto stay on the platforms. The question wasquickly answered in the affirmative. Thenthe measurement results were considered inrelation to the hundred year wave, and tohow vulnerable the platforms had becometo it. It soon turned out that there was stillclearance, but that solutions would have tobe found quickly if the safety level for boththe crews and the platforms was to bemaintained, in case the rate of subsidencecontinued at the same speed.

How Does It Happen?Subsidence of oil-, gas- or evenwater-producing reservoirs is a knownphenomenon. As the liquid or the gas istaken out of the reservoir, the pressuredrops. As a result, the structure in the layerof rock where the oil and gas — or water — islocated has to bear the greater part of theweight of the rock layers above it. In theEkofisk reservoirs, the pressure atproduction start-up in 1971 was about 7200psi. In 1988 it was down at 3800 psi. Chalk

is a soft material, compared with sandstone,for example, from which most of the otheroil and gas fields on the Norwegian shelf areproducing. In the reservoir, compression ofthe chalk occurs as a result of the pressurereduction. This does not need to result insubsidence of the seabed — if the rock layersabove the reservoir are strong enough towithstand the weight of the 3,000 meters ofoverburden. On the Ekofisk field this areabetween the seabed and the reservoir doesnot have this strength to a sufficient degree.Therefore the compression traveledupwards, all the way to the ocean floor. Thesame phenomenon exists in connection withthe production of ground water in MexicoCity and London.

CountermovesPhillips worked at full capacity in early 1985to find effective countermoves. Ever sincethe permanent platforms had come onstream, gas had been injected back into thereservoir from 2/4C. This also served as abrake on the fall of pressure in the reservoir.The Phillips Group was committed todeliveries of gas to the buyer group on theContinent, and negotiations were underway to be able to free up larger quantities ofgas for injection into the reservoir. InAugust 1985 the agreement was ready —and on 22 August the volume of gas forinjection could be increased by 25%. This

was the equivalent of around 350 millionstandard cubic feet per day. Then the 2/4Cplatform had to be protected before thewinter season of 1985-86. It was the onehardest hit by the subsidence, along withthe south flare.

On 2/4C it was determined, throughmodel testing, that streamlining the deckbeams would reduce possible wave stress onthe platform structure by more than 40%.The work on rounding off the beams wastherefore begun during the summer of 1985.

Permanent SolutionsA number of alternatives were graduallyidentified and reviewed with a view tofinding solutions that would secure Ekofiskfor the future. The significance of theproduction from the Ekofisk area as a sourceof income for Norway and the companies inthe Phillips Group — as well as thesignificance of the transportation junctionfor exporting oil and gas from theNorwegian shelf — made it necessary to finda solution. In 1984 alone, the Ekofisk areacontributed about 20 billion kroner to theNorwegian national treasury.

Three main alternatives werenoteworthy. Norsk Hydro proposed asolution involving wave-suppressorsaround the Ekofisk Complex. Enormouscement blocks — or even sunken supertankers — could reduce the effect of the

Seabed surveys fromthe early 197O's werecompared with newsurveys to determinethe exact subsidence.The result indicateda saucer-shapedsubsidence area witha diameter of 6,000meters, with theEkofisk Complex inthe center.

201

hundred year wave to the extent that theplatforms would be safe. Research was donein the ocean laboratory in Trondheim. Butthe solution was a very expensive one — andthe results and the effect were uncertain.

The second alternative was ribbing — ormoving all the equipment from the lower,20-meter deck up to a higher level on theplatforms. In that way the deck wouldbecome part of the jacket, and the platformswould have about 10 extra meters to go on.Part of this work was in the process of beingdone as a temporary solution to gain time.Full scale, it would both be costly, result inless space (which could lead to the need fora new platform), and involve a very longshutdown period to carry it out. Theproduction loss and the consequences forgas deliveries were also important reasonsfor not choosing this solution. Thealternative that remained was elevation ofthe platform decks.

Jack-UpWhen the proposal was first launched, itseemed to most people like something outof science fiction. It was received withskeptical laughter by many - includingPhillips management.

The questions were many, and theproblems to be dealt with seemedimpossible in the beginning. The Frenchcompany Technip had done somethingsimilar, on a small scale, for an oil companyin the Arabian Gulf - and they felt it couldbe accomplished on a large scale on the sixsteel platforms in question at the EkofiskComplex.

In April 1986 it was clear that Phillips, asoperator, would choose the jacking solution.In a report to the partners and authoritiesthis was the definite conclusion.

The six-meter jacking of the six steelplatforms and the crane-hoisting of the twoflares plus 2/4G platform decidedlyamounted to the most favorable solution.This would secure the platforms against asubsidence of at least 7.5 meters, andpreserve flexibility and space for the future.

For while they had been working at fullcapacity on the physical alternatives on theplatforms, different models had beencomputer-simulated to calculate the extentof the subsidence — and, not least, todetermine how much the total subsidence

2i02i would be. All the models reached the

conclusion that the total subsidenceresulting from compression of the reservoirwould come to around 6 meters. If thereshould also occur a compression of the3,000 meter area between the reservoir andthe ocean floor, the total subsidence couldcome to 11-11.5 meters, but there wasnothing that indicated this would happen.Furthermore — should this «impossibility»occur, it would be possible to carry outanother jacking operation.

The companies in the Phillips Group andthe authorities gradually approved thisdecision - and the summer of 1987 was thetime set for the jacking operation.

But an important element still remained inorder for the solution to be complete. Howcould the Ekofisk Tank be secured? It couldnot be jacked up.

(For the actual jacking operation — see thespecial feature story at the end of thischapter.)

The Protective BarrierParallel with the preparations for andimplementation of the jacking project,Phillips worked at full capacity, along withvarious groups of experts, to find asatisfactory method of securing the EkofiskTank.

It became clear early on that jacking wasnot the solution here, and efforts wereconcentrated as time went by on twopossibilities. One was to build a protectivewall around the Tank between the 20- and30-meter levels. This alternative wasdiscussed thoroughly, but there was nogetting around the fact that this would onlybe a temporary solution — and there weremany questions surrounding the problem ofventilation. The other alternative was tobuild a protective barrier around the wholeTank - outside the breakwater wall. Thiswould be a permanent solution that wouldsecure the «heart and brain» of the entireEkofisk system for the future.

The Phillips Group chose the morepermanent solution — the final decision wasmade in the beginning of 1988. The cementwall will be built in two sections that will befitted together around the Tank,approximately 3 meters outside thebreakwater wall. It is constructed by slipforming like a regular concrete platform.Then it will be towed out to the EkofiskTank in two parts, maneuvered into202

position, fastened together and loweredonto the ocean floor. The concrete wall willbe built like a double wall, each one aboutone-half meter thick. From the inner to theouter wall there will be about 18 meters, andthe whole structure will be around 106meters high — and tower 30 meters abovesea level.

In February 1988 the contract for theprotective barrier was awarded to the newNorwegian company Peconor — with thedate of completion set for the summer of1989.

Lifetime of the FieldsThere are many factors of uncertainty whichmust be considered when we attempt tocalculate the lifetime of the Ekofisk area.First and foremost, our starting point mustbe the fact that oil and gas fields have alimited life duration. Oil and gas are notrenewable resources — they must come to anend at some point or another. These arefacts that we have to accept. Then it is up tothe authorities and the licensees to workthings out so that the resources are utilizedin the best possible way.

An oil and gas field is no longercommercial when costs exceed income. Forthe Ekofisk area — the seven fields and thetransportation system — this is a verycomplex set of problems. Each of the sevenfields must be evaluated on its own - whileat the same time a good deal of joint costshelp keep operation costs down for theindividual field. Furthermore, income from

processing and transportation of oil and gasfrom other fields - and potential newdiscoveries — mean that the lifetime of thewhole Ekofisk area can be extended.

But the opposite can also occur through acatastrophic fall in oil and gas prices. If thisshould happen, all the calculations wouldhave to be re-done, and there would be atotally different picture from the one whichforms the basis for the figures in thisaccount. They are based on calculationsmade in 1986 and 1987 - and on predictionsas to the price development as it isperceived in 1988.

Marketing ProspectsWhen the decision was made to developEkofisk, the price for a barrel of crude oil ofcomparable quality lay at around$2.00-2.50. If we take inflation intoconsideration, this would be equivalent toabout $11.00 per barrel in 1988. The pricedevelopment in recent years has shownfluctuation from around $20.00 down to$13.00-14.00, but for the most part it hasstayed at $16.00-18.00.

This means that it will continue to beprofitable to operate the Ekofisk area.Making an accurate prediction as to thefuture development toward the year 2000 -and even 50 years beyond — is difficult. Theanalyses Phillips has done on behalf of thePhillips Group for the fields in the Ekofiskarea have taken as their average price$18.00 per barrel - with $15.00 as theminimum and $20.00 as the maximum.

This is how theEkofisk Complexwill appear after theprotective barrieraround the Tank isadded in the summerof 1989. The detailson the drawing of thebarrier are notcorrect — cranes andlifeboats, forexample, will beinstalled on thebarrier.

203

Remote control anddemanning of the

two Albuskjellplatforms are being

considered in order toreduce operatingcosts — and thus

increase the life spanof this field.

204

These figures have been used as the basis forthe lifetime calculations for the seven fields.In addition to the oil price, the marketingprospects for gas have become at least asimportant. Little by little gas has become agreater financial contributor for the PhillipsGroup than oil. This has to do with the factthat it is possible to recover comparativelylarger amounts of gas than oil - and that,through the gas sales contracts, productionhas been limited in relation to that whichwould have been possible with maximumproduction.

Therefore the availability of gas to theEuropean market will be decisive for pricedevelopment. That a gas market will existseems to be quite clear. This is also boundup with the discussions on tying the gas line

to Emden to the Danish transportationsystem — and perhaps to Sweden as well.The Swedes have voted to shut down theiratomic energy plants, and gas may be analternative.

The Edda FieldDuring the summer of 1987, Eddaproduction - viewed in isolation - becameunprofitable. The field has fluctuated onboth sides of this point, as the prices of oiland gas have evolved. The decision todevelop Tommeliten, however, haslengthened the field's lifetime. In 1988Statoil sold the gas from the firstdevelopment phase on Tommeliten up tothe year 1992, but no one believes that thisfield, which has been developed with subsea

installations and is remote-controlled fromEdda, will have such a short lifetime.Tommeliten will probably exist until2003-2005, and that gives Edda a lifetimethat is dependent upon Tommeliten's.

CodThe Cod field, as the only producingsandstone reservoir in the Ekofisk area todate, has constantly come up with positivesurprises. Every time perforations in thewells are carried out, the productionincreases. Viewed in isolation, the lifetime ofthe field would seem to extend to just pastthe year 2000, but there are many factorswhich indicate that the field and theplatform will be in operation much longer.There are also prospects for new

commercial discoveries in this area - whichcould be tied in to the platform. NorskHydro has made a discovery northeast ofCod, and there are other interestingstructures which remain to be drilled in thearea.

The Phillips Group has completed a deepwell from the Cod platform down to theJurassic formation, but the reservoir was tooimpervious and, at the same time, itcontained little gas to propel the oil up tothe platform. On the basis of that well, thePhillips Group has given up hope of findinganything commercial in the cellar under theCod reservoir.

AlbuskjellAlbuskjell has split owner interests 50-50between the Phillips Group and NorskeShell. This means that questionssurrounding the field's lifetime aretwo-sided. For the Phillips Group whichowns the pipelines to the Ekolisk Complex,processing at the Complex, and hasownership in the pipeline system to shore,the field viewed in isolation has a lifetimeextending to the year 2000-2002.

The work to try to extend the lifetime ofAlbuskjell includes studies on de-manningthe platforms - and operating them byremote control from the Ekofisk Complex.How much this will lengthen the field'slifetime remains to be seen.

Albuskjell produces 98% from the LowerCretaceous reservoir. Only 2% comes fromthe Upper Danian formation. Experimentsare being carried out to increase recoveryfrom the Danian formation, but the resultsare uncertain. Furthermore, if theexperiments on the Danish shelf aresuccessful, it may be possible to drillhorizontal wells through this formation.This would increase production from thefield.

Albuskjell is a gas and condensate field.Therefore it is not only increased recoverythat determines its lifetime, but also themarket demand for gas.

Another factor for the Albuskjellplatforms is the possibility of tying in fieldsthat lie in the British J-block. Phillips isoperator there and is working now onpossible development solutions, including atie-in with and processing on the Albuskjellplatforms. This may be possible even if theAlbuskjell platforms are de-manned and 205

remote controlled from the EkofiskComplex.

West EkofiskDuring the start-up phase, much seemed toindicate that West Ekofisk was the field thatwould be producing for a very long time. Asit has turned out, producing the reservoirhas gone faster than expected. This is notdue to the field's being smaller thanassumed, but rather because productivityhas been very good. In 1988 the lifetime forWest Ekofisk appears to extend to sometimebetween the years 2000 and 2005.

In the slightly longer term, the platform isa candidate for de-manning. In the shortterm, the maintenance activity on the wellsis too great for this to be possible. It isdifficult to de-man a platform with a lot ofactivity on the drill floor around the clock.

The pressure in the reservoir on WestEkofisk during the start-up phase was aboutthe same as for Ekofisk - 7200 psi.However, the pressure here has fallen morequickly than in the main field, and in 1988 itis at 2000 psi. West Ekofisk mainly producesgas.

TorThe production development on the Torfield has been interesting. At start-up, amaximum production per well of between2000 and 5000 barrels of oil per day wasexpected. When production got under wayin earnest, it turned out that the wells wereproducing 15,000-20,000 barrels per day.Therefore the production peaked early, andfell soon thereafter.

With gas-lifting of oil in the wells, Torhas had its lifetime extended considerably,and in 1988 calculations show that the fieldwill live beyond the license period, whichexpires in 2011.

EldfiskAlong with the main Ekofisk field, Eldfisk isthe field that will be producing longest inthe Ekofisk area. There is much thatindicates that Eldfisk will extend to the year2035.

The two Eldfisk platforms produce fromthree reservoirs — and it is the Eldfisk 2/7Bplatform in the north, producing from thenorthern reservoir, which has the longestlifetime. However, one goal is to try tobalance out the lifetimes of the platforms.This would pay off the day the installationswere to be removed, so that as many aspossible could be removed at the same time.The Eldfisk field represents great challengesfor the operator and licensees. There is acompound structure in the reservoir thatoffers new possibilities. Water and nitrogeninjection are being investigated, but theeconomics here will scarcely be as good ason the Ekofisk field.

South EldfiskIn 1988 the Phillips Group drilled a deepwell on South Eldfisk. One of the earlyexploration wells had been drilled there but,because of problems, that well was nottested properly. The pressure is enormouslyhigh -just under 14000 psi - and thatplaces extra demands on the testing andproduction equipment. This well, the 2/7-

The lifetime of oiland gas fields

depends on the pricedevelopment and

production costs. The1988 life span

analysis for the sevenEkofisk fields is

shown here, with thedarker color

illustrating theshorter life scenario.

The PhillipsGroup's license for

the seven fields willexpire in the year

2011.

2061990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

The drilling rig"Dyvi Stena" teststhe discovery in well2/7-20X on SouthEldfisk on 7 June1988. If this find iscommercial, it willeither be developedby subsea wellheadsor a small wellheadplatform.

20X, will be equipped with a subsea wellheadtied to Eldfisk 2/7A-FTP for a long-termtest. Should the discovery be sufficientlylarge, a new wellhead platform may be apossibility.

Whether or not this might then holdsignificance for the lifetime of the field willdepend upon the size of eventualdiscoveries.

The Ekofisk FieldThe lifetime for the reservoir on the mainEkofisk field could possibly extend to

between the years 2040 and 2050. As aresult of water injection expansion andpossible injection of nitrogen, these are theperspectives in 1988 for the main field in theEkofisk area. Viewed in connection with thetransportation function at the EkofiskComplex, the field's lifetime can be furtherextended. This is especially true forproduction platform 2/4C whereEngineering Manager Rolf Wiborg ofPhillips believes there can be productionuntil the year 2100.

207

«Jack

M.H. "Mike"McConnell is

Managing Directorof Phillips Petroleum

Company Norwayin 1988.

208

«This is a once-in-a-lifetime experience.* Thiswas typical of the comments made by many ofthe nearly 15,000 people involved, in one way oranother, with the jacking project at the EkofiskComplex during the summer of 1987.

Lifting the heavy steel platforms nearly 6.5meters by means of hydraulic jacks, swinging6-meter long extension spools into place, andthen lowering the platforms onto the extensionspools all seemed like a fairy tale — or like gazinginto the future with no foundation in reality.

The span of time in which the project was tobe carried out was probably more questionablethan were the many technical aspects of theproject. A three-year project was to beimplemented during the course of sixteenmonths.

When the decision was made as to the plan ofoperation, a project organization was formed inrecord time under Phillips E & C division. Thedesigning work on the various platforms to bejacked up — or lifted by the «DB 102» crane barge— was distributed among many companies so asto avoid capacity — related limitations. Overallcoordination was in the hands of the French firmTechnip, which was responsible for the idea andthe basic solutions.

During the fall of 1986 the first constructionwork was begun by the subcontractors. For astart, a rail system had to be made below all sixof the platforms. In order to bring the heavyjacking equipment into position by the platformlegs, there had to be a transportation system.The cranes on the individual platforms could notreach in. Over 2,000 meters of monorailswere prefabricated, and the assembling could getunder way in early 1987. This turned out to bequite an extensive operation, because a numberof pipelines and tanks had to be moved in orderto make room for the tracks.

The installation work at Ekofisk was carriedout by two companies, OIS (Oil IndustryServices) and HKG (Haugesund Kaldnes deGroot). They had three platforms each to makeready. For a long time it looked as though thetimetables would not hold. In February andMarch 1987 the work was well behind schedule,but in April and May a maximum effort wasmade by all involved. «We're going to pull thisoff,» seemed to be everyone's attitude. Amaximum effort was made not only out atEkofisk, but also among the many thousandemployees of the various contractors spread allover Europe.

The first major milestone in the project wasreached on 31 May when the first platform legwas cut to make room for the force majeure ofthe jacking program — the bolted flanges. Beforethis operation took place, the jacks had alreadybeen installed and made operational, so theweight that the platform leg normally holds wastransferred to the jacks.

During the weeks that followed, leg after legwas cut and flanges installed. The data systemthat would steer the jacks and coordinate thewhole operation was tested.

The trial run, before the really big hoist offour platforms simultaneously on the south sideof the Ekofisk Tank, was' the jacking of 2/4Hhotel platform. At midnight on 16 Julyeverything was ready; at 0348 hours the startingsignal was given. Within 12 hours' time the jobwas done. The 10,500 ton deck section of theplatform was elevated 6 meters. The operationhad gone better than anyone had believed itwould, but there was room for a little polishingwork for jacking supervisor Mo Hobley and his

Small glimpses of thepreparations for thejacking of the sixplatforms at theEkofisk Complexduring the summerof 1987. The first tobegin workunderneath theplatform decks werethe scaffoldingbuilders. They werefaced with many anairy challenge duringthe project. After2,500 meters ofmonorails were inplace, the first jackscould be fitted. Theplatform legs werethen cut, and boltedflanges welded on tothe legs. JackingManager MoHobley checks outthe jacks, while thefinishing touches areput on the six meterlong extensionspools.

209

14- Giant Discovery

Platform 2/4H hasbeen jacked up. Ittook less than 12

hours to elevate theplatform, and the

extension spools maynow be slid intoplace. The Hotel

platform was thefirst test applying theprinciples in practice.

210

crew before the big trial of strength.The original plan was to jack up five

platforms simultaneously in August, but it wasdecided that 2/4R to the north of the EkofiskTank should be elevated by itself — before thefour platforms to the south. On 15 August 1987at 1430 hours the elevation was under way witha jacking speed of 40 mm per minute. The lifttook just less than 24 hours — as compared withthe 72-hour plan.

On 17 August everything was ready onceagain — now the last four platforms were to beelevated at the same time. In that way aminimum of cables and pipelines would have tobe severed. Only the ones leading into theEkofisk Tank would need to be cut. The Tankwould remain as before. During the course of 14hours and 24 minutes, the platforms wereelevated 6.4 meters. Then they could be loweredonto the extension spools - and the jacking jobwas completed.

A whole world participated in the applausethat followed.

Out at Ekofisk, however, the work continued.While production was shut down so the jackingoperation could be completed, necessarymaintenance work was carried out. Furthermore,the pipes that had to be cut were to beconnected again before everything would beready for production start-up.

And after a shorter pause than planned,Ekofisk could resume production — and oil andgas deliveries. That was perhaps as great atriumph as the jacking operation itself.

Within a month after the elevation wasaccomplished, the crews were able todisassemble the jacks, hydraulic power units andother necessary equipment. The entire job wasfinished.

Once again there was tangible proof of thesaying, «Ekofisk — One of a Kind».

By dusk on 16 July1987 the job on2/4H was done. In21 hours and 43minutes, less timethan had beenestimated, theplatform legs hadbeen extended by sixmeters. It was just inthe nick of time,though, as theweather turned badand during the rest ofthe month was suchthat the margins setfor the jackingoperation could nothave been met.

The next jackingproject was the 2/4Rplatform, north ofthe Ekofisk Tank. Itwas jacked up on 15August, and thebiggest challengebegan some 24 hourslater — the fourplatforms: 2/4P,2/4C,2/4Qand2/4FTP. Thisjacking wascompleted in approx.14 hours — and onthe morning of 17August 1987 theentire job was done.

Ill

Ekofisk and Norway

Production of crudeoil from the Ekofisk

area began on asmall scale in 1971.

In 1972, dailyproduction hadreached approx.

40,000 barrels, andremained stable until

1974/75 when thepermanent platforms

were put on stream.Up to 1980 there

was a steadyincrease as field after

field was put intoproduction.

(Chart shows annualproduction figures.)

212

«In a way it can be said that the Ekofiskdiscovery was one of the most importantevents in our postwar history.* This is howNorwegian historian Yngvar Ustvedt7

evaluates the significance of Ekofisk.The Ekofisk discovery represented

Norway's inauguration as an oil nation. Andwhen the first tanker withNorwegian-produced crude oil docked atthe Shell refinery at Sola on 4 August 1971,it was only fitting that the first drops werepoured into a special bottle to be presentedto HRH King Olav V.

The Ekofisk discovery was also the firstdiscovery of significance in all of the NorthSea, and it stimulated exploration activitiesthroughout the North Sea Basin.

When Ekofisk was discovered, the climatefor continued exploration had cooledconsiderably as compared with the firstyears when the virgin territory was openedup for the wildcatters. The question oftenasked is, what would have happened to theexploration activity in the North Seawithout the Ekofisk discovery? Would theoil companies have turned their backs on theNorth Sea — would the past 20 years inNorway have lacked the label «the oilepoch«? Hardly, but it would have meant adelay in Norway's «oil age». Both PhillipsPetroleum Company's chairman, Pete Silas,and Statoil's former managing director,Arve Johnsen, agree on this point. And thetiming for the really substantial income tothe State from oil taxes and royalties wouldbe important. When the oil crisis hit in 1973,Norway was in a unique position ascompared with other countries in WesternEurope — in a few years' time it would

Ekofisk ProductionBy the end of 1987 the seven fields in theEkofisk area had produced more than 1.3billion barrels of crude oil and 100 billioncubic meters of gas, plus a considerableamount of NGL.

From a modest start in July 1971, peakproduction was reached in 1980 when theaverage daily production came to 427,442barrels. The highest single day productionmeasured that year was 624,000 barrels.8

71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87

In 1975 the trainingship "ChristianRadich" visited theEkofisk Complex. Inaddition to theplatforms at theComplex we seeEkofisk 2/4 Bravoon the right with itscharacteristic twoderricks.

Since the peak year of 1980, productionhas declined, and in 1987 it averaged142,232 barrels per day. This figure isespecially low due to the four-weekshutdown in connection with the Ekofiskjacking operation and as a result of the 7.5percent production curtailment imposed bythe Government.

The same development has occurredwithin gas production. When the gas pipe-line became operational in September 1977,daily gas deliveries were in excess of onebillion cubic feet within a few days' time. Inthe peak year of 1980, production reached1.7 billion cubic feet per day. Gas volumeshave not experienced the same degree ofdecline as for oil; in 1987 gas productionhad declined to 0.9 billion cubic feet per dayon the average.

The NGL facilities at Teesside becameoperational in 1979, and the volume trendhas been somewhat different from that of oiland gas. Peak production was reached in1983, with a daily average of 44,278 barrels.

Price DevelopmentDramatic — that has to be the best way tocharacterize the price development for crudeoil since Ekofisk was declared commercial on13 January 1971. The price of Libyan crudelay at $2.53 per barrel in January 1971. InJuly, when Ekofisk started initial production,the price had increased to $3.42. The year1971 marks a historic point in the pricedevelopment. From the turn of the centuryuntil 1971, the real price of crude oil wasfairly stable. The big jump carne in 1973when the price passed $11.50 by year end.And the price continued to spiral. In January1980 Libyan crude oil had topped $26.00 -and one year later the price hit $40.30 perbarrel.

The good news for the Phillips Groupand the Norwegian authorities was that oilprices increased in step with increases inEkofisk production. This, of course, meantthat income estimates for this whole periodwere far surpassed by the pricedevelopment. This in turn had a great 213

Until 1974 the gasproduced was burned

off in the flare on"Gulftide". When

the permanentplatforms came on

stream, gas injectioninto the reservoir

was started bymeans of the

injection equipmenton 2/4C. We see

that productionincreases —gradually

until it takes a leapwhen the Emden gaspipeline is opened in

1977.

Production ofNGL— natural gas liquids-started up in 1979.

The reason for thelate start-up was a

delay in thecompletion ofNGL

facilities at Teesside.Peak production was

reached in 1983when the average

daily production ofNGL was more than

44,000 barrels.

600 mill

400 mill

200 mill

71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87

16 mill

14 mil

12 mi

79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87

impact on the profitability of the fields andmeant that the owners of the Ekofisk fieldswere able to pay off their investmentsduring «the good years».

Taxes and RoyaltiesNorway's first petroleum tax legislation waspassed in 1965, prior to the awarding oflicenses in the first concession round. Thelaw's objective was to make Norway, andthe Norwegian continental shelf, attractivefor oil exploration. Since the level of riskwas considered to be very high, the taxlevel for the oil industry was set lower thanfor other industry. The municipal tax wasreduced so that the total tax level was set at42.8 percent, as compared with 50 percentfor other stock companies. However, thesemoderate tax rates lasted only until1 January 1972, when the municipal tax wasincreased to the regular rate and the tax basefor oil production matched that of theonshore industry.

When Ekofisk production got under wayin earnest in 1975, new special taxregulations were passed. This came about asa direct result of the strong increase in theoil price — combined with the fact that theNorwegian shelf had become attractive as aresult of the added discoveries of the Friggand Statfjord fields. Total taxation wasincreased to 75.8 percent. In 1980 thespecial tax was further increased from 25 to35 percent, which brought the total tax biteto 85.8 percent.

On 1 January 1987 the tax rules wererevised once more. The tax level was to

214

reflect the strong decline in the price of oil.The basic principles of the new tax policywere to distinguish between old and newlicenses — wherein new licenses weredefined as those awarded after 1 January1986. For new licenses the royalty burdenwas removed, while the special tax for alllicenses was reduced from 35 to 30 percent.

Expectations and RealityIn Storting report no. 22 for 1965/669 theeconomic expectations for the oil activitieswere expressed for the first time in figures.Exploration expenses for the companies inthe first licensing round were estimated at aminimum of NOK 600 million — and it isstated as a condition that the companiesoperate from bases in Norway and utilizeNorwegian industry and the Norwegianwork force to the extent that they arecompetitive. «Substantial shares of theabove mentioned NOK 600 million must

therefore be expected to benefit theNorwegian economy.*10

In Storting report no. 50 for 1970/71, thefinancial expectations for Ekofisk wereexpressed in number terms.Income to the State from the discovery wasset at a minimum of NOK 100 million/maximum of NOK 500 million during a20-30 year period. It turned out quitedifferently in reality, and as early as 1974the issue of what to do with all the oilmoney was raised in a Storting report.11

By the end of 1987, operator PhillipsPetroleum Company Norway alone hadpaid in excess of 62 billion kroner in taxesand royalties to the Norwegian State. If weaggregate the amount from PPCoN toinclude the whole Phillips Group, the State'sincome is more than 168 billion kroner. Thisamount is not quite accurate since theco-venturers have different write-offs, butthe figure draws a realistic picture of the

25I Phillips Norway GroupI PPCoN

20 milliarder

15 milliarde

lOmilliarde

5 milliard

71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87

"Perhaps the mostdifficult task will beexplaining why oil isas expensive insocialist Norway asin capitalistcountries." The artisthas put these wordsinto the mouth ofMinister of FinancePer Kleppe, seatedalong with Ministerof Petroleum andEnergy BjartmarGjerde on a barrel of

The red curveindicates Phillips'contribution in theform of taxes androyalties fromEkofisk. Thesefigures are used asthe basis forcalculating thecontribution of theentire Phillips Group— in other words,total taxes androyalties from theEkofisk area (bluecurve). The figuresare not entirelyaccurate since thevarious members ofthe Phillips Grouphave different taxdeductions.

215

The catering serviceon the platforms has

resulted in theestablishment of a

new industry.Stavanger Catering

and Norske Chalkare examples affirms

which have hadimportant contracts

on the Ekofiskplatforms. Here a

container of suppliesis being unloaded on2/4H at the Ekofisk

Complex.

Oil and gasproduction's

percentage of theNorwegian gross

national product wason the increasethroughout the

1970s. In 1980, itwas 16 percent. The

only sectorsexceeding this were"Manufacturing"

plus "Public, socialand private services."The figures are taken

from Norway'sStatistical "Yearbook

1981.

The gross nationalproduct is one way of

measuring anindustry's value to 80 milliardersociety. The chart

reflects the oilindustry's increasing

importance to the 60 milliarderNorwegian society.

The peak wasreached in 1985 with

a gross nationalproduct of NOK 96

billion.

40 milliarder

216

20 milliarder

71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87

value-generating property of the fields inLicense 018 — the Phillips Group's share inthe Ekofisk area.

The best illustration of the significance ofthe oil industry for the Norwegian economycan be seen in its impact on the GNP. Froma zero start in 1971, the industry reached ahigh of 19.8 percent in 1985. Thepreliminary numbers for 1987 indicate thatthis share has been reduced to just above 10percent.12 Direct income to the State in 1985amounted to approximately NOK 46.6billion.13

Although the GNP share fluctuates withthe price development and productionvolume, the opportunities these amountshave provided and continue to provide forNorwegian politicians should be obvious. Inthis context, how they have used or plan touse this income is of little interest. TheEkofisk discovery in 1969 opened up newdevelopment opportunities for theNorwegian society.

A Norwegian Oil IndustryWhen the exploration activities on theNorwegian shelf got under way in 1966, theoffshore industry was viewed as anopportunity. Norway had no industry withexperience from this new field. The attitudewithin traditional industry was one ofreserve — there was a tendency to «wait and

see» where this new industry was goingbefore getting involved. The AkerMekaniske Verksted was one of the firstNorwegian firms to become directlyinvolved, with the building of «OceanViking*. In addition, Rogaland County andStavanger in particular were especiallyaware of the opportunities this new industryoffered. Arne Rettedal was a key individualas mayor of Stavanger at the time. He madeevery effort to help the oil companies feelwelcome in Stavanger. According toRettedal it was only natural to grasp anyopportunity to fill the vacuum left by thetraditional Stavanger industries of fishingand canning. Phillips not only made surethat the drilling company ODECO placedthe order for the construction of «OceanViking* in Norway, but also saw to it thatNorwegian goods and services were used insupport of the exploration activities.Helikopter Service was in the picture fromthe very beginning. Later the RosenbergVerft in Stavanger was commissioned tocarry out modification work on the jack-uprig «Gulftide», and Kongsberg Vapenfabrikksupplied turbines for electric powergeneration.

Det norske Veritas was appointed early

on by the Norwegian authorities to handlethe control functions, and the firm wasalready involved in the modifications on"Gulftide".

Norwegian yards were invited to bid onthe first Ekofisk platforms, but with fullorder books they were not interested insubmitting bids. One exception was thejoint venture which undertook theconstruction of the Ekofisk Tank — resultinglater in the formation of NorwegianContractors.

The use ofNorwegian goodsand services hasgradually increasedduring thedevelopment andoperation of theEkofisk area. Onereason is better accessto goods and services— another isimprovedcompetitiveness.

Aker- Verdal is one ofthe shipyardsdeveloped to servethe oil industry -and its influence wasalso felt outsidesouthwesternNorway, Theshipyard hasundertaken severalmajor projects forEkofisk — mostrecently the jacket forwater injectionplatform 2/4K.

217

Norwegian shareForeign share

6 milliarder

5 milliarder

4 milliarder

3 milliarder

2 milliarder

1 milliard

75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87

The impact ofNorway's oil

industry onemployment has

increased steadilyfrom the start.

Rogaland's status as"no. 7 oil county" isquite natural, since

all of the majororganizations are

based in theStavanger area.

RogalandRest of Norway

Albuskjell 2/4F inTrondheim? Yes, theliving quarters that

were replaced in1983 were given toTrondheim College

of Maritime Studiesalong with a sum of

money fortransportation and

installation atLadehammeren.There the living

quarters are used inthe training of future

"oil workers".

60.000

50.000

40.000

20.000

73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87

A happy breakthrough occurred in 1973when Kvaerner Engineering was awardedthe contract for all engineering design workon the Tor and Cod platforms.

Aker became more directly involvedthrough the fabrication of the jackets andmodules for the new platforms. In manyways it can be said that Norwegian industryreally became adapted to the offshoreindustry as a result of the crisis withinshipping.

That this development coincided with theEkofisk development was only natural, sinceit was the only area under developmentuntil the Frigg field got under way. The

218

extent of Norwegian industrial involvementhas continued to grow - and through thesupport of offshore contracts and researchand development projects, Norwegianindustry has established a firm footing in theoil and gas industry.

Norwegian Oil CompaniesNorsk Hydro joined the Phillips Group in1967 as a result of the agreement betweenPhillips and Agip — and the PetronordGroup. Participation in the Ekofiskdevelopment program gave Hydro a goodfoundation for its development into a

Norwegian oil company. In terms ofknow-how and experience as well aseconomics, this development has been ofgreat value for Norsk Hydro, which asoperator in 1988 is in the process ofdeveloping Oseberg, its first oil field.

As early as 1973 — less than one yearafter the State oil company was founded,Statoil became 50 percent owner in theNorpipe pipe and transportation system.This involvement provided Statoil with itsfirst direct revenue-generating project onthe shelf.

In 1988, Statoil joined the Phillips Groupthrough an agreement with the two Frenchcompanies Total and Elf. An even trademade Statoil 1 percent owner in the firstfield development in Norwegian waters.

Ekofisk has been a good "training school"for experts who have become key players inthe development of other fields. Many yearsof experience from Ekofisk could be appliedto the development of and operations onthe many new fields on the Norwegianshelf.

As a result of Ekofisk, a Norwegian oilenvironment has grown up. As new fieldshave been discovered and developed, theoffshore industry has grown in scope andsignificance. But it all began with Ekofisk in1969. In 1987 more than 60,000 persons inNorway were employed in oil-relatedactivities. From a small but significant startat Ekofisk twenty years ago, Norway hasevolved from being an energy importer to anet exporter of energy.

In this book it hasbeen our hope toshow that Ekofiskhas indeed strewn"flowers" around theNorwegian society,all the positive effectsthat this first oil andgas field on theNorwegiancontinental shelf hashad on Norway andthe nation'sinhabitants.

219

PostscriptBy Anders O. Waale

With this book we have tried to give ahistorical account of Ekofisk, from theevents that led to the discovery of the fieldin 1969 - until today, 1988. Of course,everything has not been included. Everysingle company in the Phillips NorwayGroup, for example, could have described itsown individual decision-making processesin connection with its participation inEkofisk, and the experiences andcontributions of the company. We mustremember that the Phillips Norway Groupconsists of companies, both state-ownedand private, from five different nations.Individual decisions have been made thathave had major consequences. One exampleis the exchange of ownership interests in1967, when Phillips and Agip togethertransferred 20 percent of the "Ekofisklicense" (018) to the Petronord Group -which meant that Norsk Hydro, Elf, Totaland three small French companies acquiredshares in Ekofisk. Petrofina did not want to

2.20 take part in this exchange of shares. The

company kept its original 30 percent in the"Ekofisk license", and probably had goodreasons for doing so.Much could also have been said about theNorwegian authorities - and politicians'evaluations and decisions in connectionwith the oil era in general and the Ekofiskactivities in particular. Some aspects havealready been recorded. It will be a challengeto the writers of Norway's oil history toinclude all relevant aspects of the nationaldecision-making process in connectionwith the petroleum activities.The history of Ekofisk remains to becompleted. New chapters will be written inthe years ahead. Certain themes arepredictable, but unexpected events will alsooccur - both positive and negative. All ofthis only confirms that the activities inconnection with Ekofisk are dynamic,exciting, challenging and rewarding — andthat Ekofisk will continue to be animportant element in the Norwegian oilsaga well into the 21st century.

Ekofisk Milestones

196227 October - Owen D. Thomas, Ward W. Dunn and Silvio Eha from Phillips, the first oil company

interested in the Norwegian shelf, meet Trygve Lie in Oslo.29 October — Phillips applies for oil and gas concessions on what may become the Norwegian shelf.

19636 June — Phillips is granted permission to carry out seismic tests.

196422 October — Phillips Petroleum Company Norsk A/S is established with its main office in Oslo.

196513 April — The first concession round is announced.18 August — The awarding of first round concessions is made public; the Phillips Group is awarded

three licenses over a total of 11 blocks.6 November — Ed Crump arrives in Stavanger, then opens Phillips' office in that city.

196619 July — The Esso-operated rig "Ocean Traveler" spuds in block 8/3. The first drilling on the

Norwegian shelf is under way.

196714 July - "Ocean Viking" begins exploration on the Norwegian shelf for the Phillips Group -

well 16/11-1.

196824 June - Press release from Phillips on the discovery in block 7/11, Cod.

196921 August - "Ocean Viking" begins drilling on well 2/4-1.18 September - "Ocean Viking" begins drilling on well 2/4-2.25 October — Core samples show that the drill bit is in an oil and gas reservoir of chalk,

the samples saturated with oil.25 December - "Ocean Viking" is towed off location at well 2/4-2.

197027 January — Drilling begins on the first delineation well, 2/4-3.

2 June — In a press release Phillips announces that the Ekofisk discovery is "giant".August — The Ekofisk Commission is appointed by the Government for the purpose of studying

landing alternatives from the Ekofisk field.3 September — The Phillips Group applies for a permit to carry out test production on the Ekofisk field.

12 November -- "Neptun 7" completes work on the discovery well on West Ekofisk. Good test results.17 November — The drill bit from "Ocean Viking" has reached total depth on the first well at Eldfisk.

However, test results are poor. 221

22 November •- "Orion" completes work on the discovery well on Tor for the Amoco/Noco group.The Phillips Group contributes 50% of costs.

29 December — The Phillips Group signs a contract for the building of the 2/4 FTP, B, and C platforms.

197113 January —The Phillips Group delivers the declaration of commerciality for the Ekofisk field.

February — The hundred-year wave for Ekofisk is readjusted from 19.4 to 23.7 meters,causing great delays.

2 April — The Norwegian authorities give the Phillips Group approval for test production from«Gulftide».

14 May - The Phillips Group signs a contract with the French firm C.G. Doris for construction ofthe Ekofisk Tank.

9 June — Norwegian Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli formally opens test production on «Gulftide».15 June — Test production from «Gulftide» gets under way.

1 December — The «Choctaw» crane barge launches the first bridge support to the south flare.The first link in what will become the Ekofisk Complex is in place.

1972February — The Ekofisk Commission presents its recommendation. The conclusion: neither oil nor

gas will be piped to shore in Norway.1 March — The Ministry of Industry approves the Phillips Group's technical plan for the Phase II

development.3 September — «Ocean Viking» completes work on the discovery well on Edda (southwest Ekofisk).

26 October — «Zapata Nordic» completes work on the discovery well on Albuskjell for Shell.The Phillips Group paid 50% of the costs.

197322 January — The Phillips Group signs the first gas sales contract with the consortium on the

Continent.26 April — Norwegian parliament (Storting) approves landing of oil and NGL at Teesside and gas

at Emden.22 May — Laying of the pipeline to Teesside gets under way.

1 July - The Ekofisk Tank is in place on the field.9 July — A Sikorsky S61N helicopter on its way from «Gulftide» to Forus makes an emergency

landing in the sea. Four of the seventeen men onboard lose their lives.

197425 April — Start-up of oil production from well A-13 on Ekofisk 2/4 Alpha. The first permanent

platform in the Ekofisk area, and on the Norwegian shelf, is on stream.3 December - The Ekofisk Tank receives the first crude oil for storage.

197515 October - The first crude oil goes into the pipeline to Teesside, and four days later reaches the

terminal in Great Britain.25 October — Official opening of the Teesside terminal.

1 November — A riser on 2/4 Alpha catches fire as a result of corrosion. Three members of the crew diewhen a rescue capsule falls during the lowering operation.

1976September - Phillips' Norwegian headquarters moves from Oslo to Tananger near Stavanger.October - Employee no. 1000 is hired at Phillips Petroleum Company Norway.

197722 April — The Bravo blowout. Well B-14 on 2/4 Bravo goes out of control during overhaul work,

and the North Sea's first blowout occurs. No personal injuries.30 April — The Bravo blowout is ended.

2 May - Production start-up on West Ekofisk 2/4D platform.8 September — Official opening of the gas terminal at Emden.

17 September — The first gas reaches the Emden terminal.23 November - A Sikorsky S61N helicopter with twelve people onboard crashes enroute from Forus to

compressor platform B-ll. There are no survivors.222

26 December - Production start-up on Cod 7/11.

197824 May — Production start-up on Albuskjell 1/6A.28 June — Production start-up on Tor 2/4E.26 July - Production start-up on Albuskjell 2/4F.

3 September - Occupancy begins on hotel platform, 2/4H.

1979March - Teesside receives the first NGL production from Ekofisk.

7 August — Production start-up on Eldfisk A and FTP.28 October — Production start-up on Eldfisk B.

2 December — Production start-up on Edda. Thus the last production platform on the seven oiland gas fields in the Ekofisk area is on stream.

198027 March —Accommodations rig «Alexander L. Kielland» capsizes near the Edda platform.

One hundred twenty-three people die in the worst accident in Norway's history.

198115 April — The water injection pilot project in well B-16 from Ekofisk 2/4 Bravo gets under way.6 August — The new building which houses Phillips' headquarters in Norway as well as Ekofisk

operations is inaugurated.

19821 October - The Valhall field begins production of oil, and the first oil arrives at the Ekofisk Complex

to be transported to Teesside.

198313 July — Gas from Valhall comes into the Ekofisk system.9 August — The Phillips Group and the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy reach agreement on

adjustment of taxation terms for the Ekofisk water injection project.

198426 November — Subsidence of the seabed under the Ekofisk Complex is recognized.

198515 October — The Statpipe pipeline is in operation, and gas from Statfjord goes into the pipeline

to Emden.

198620 March - The monument to the «Kielland» accident is unveiled by Crown Prince Harald

at Smiodden near Stavanger.26 July — The water injection pilot project in the lower part of the Danian reservoir gets under

way in well B-16 from Ekofisk 2/4 Bravo.6 October — The Ula field goes on stream, and the oil goes into the Ekofisk system for transportation

to Teesside.

198716/17 July — 2/4H is jacked up six meters.15/16 August — 2/4 R is jacked up six meters.17 August - 2/4FTP, Q, C, and P are jacked up six meters.28 December - Water injection begins in well K-30 from 2/4K platform.

1988February — The contract for construction of the protective barrier for the Ekofisk Tank is signed by

the Phillips Group and the new Norwegian firm Peconord.15 July - The Norwegian authorities approve the plans for Phase II of the water injection project.

223

224

Photo CreditsAcademy Studios Ltd. 101Adresseavisens Forlag 59Leif Berge 85Billedsentralen 128Per-Arne Carlsen 58Egil Eriksson 19, 34 (bottom), 67 (top), 71 (top),

129, 162 (top)Baste Fanebust 145 (bottom)Odd Furenes 46, 157, 219Leif Hauge 36, 166 (top)Jan B. Henriksen 32, 148, 149, 150, 153, 184 (top),

208Husmo-foto 6, 96, 107 (center and bottom), 108,

109 (bottom), 110, 111 (bottom), 113, 114 (top andcenter), 115 (top), 117, 122, 126, 131 (bottom),145 (top), 152, 154, 155, 165, 166 (bottom), 167,169 (bottom), 170, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179,180 (top and bottom), 181, 182, 183, 184 (bottom),185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191 (except top right),192, 195, 199 (right), 203 (with retouch bySvein Bjur), 204, 207, 209, 210, 211, 216, 217, 218,220, 224

Infofilm og video A/S 55, 74, 77, 84, 89 (bottom), 90, 94,95 (bottom), 98 (bottom), 99 (top), 103 (bottom),121

BorgeKalvig 53Bjorn Stale Laerdal 61, 109 (top), 111 (top), 112,

116 (top), 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 144, 151Eirik Moe 127, 143N.A.M.-foto 8Harry Nor-Hansen 116 (bottom), 180 (center)NTB 16, 20, 23, 97, 102, 118, 213Phillips-archives, Bartlesville 9, 10, 14, 30, 33, 34 (top),

35, 68, 73, 81 (top), 82, 86, 88 (bottom), 91,98 (top), 99 (bottom), 100,104, 105, 106, 107 (top), 115 (bottom),166 (center)

Phillips-archives (Tananger and Oslo) 22, 27, 28, 39, 47,52, 57, 64, 65, 67 (bottom), 71 (bottom), 72, 75, 78,81 (bottom), 83, 87, 88.(top), 89 (top), 93, 95 (top),103 (top), 114 (bottom), 130, 131 (top), 132, 133, 134,162 (bottom), 163 (top), 191 (top right), 199 (left)

Stavanger Aftenblad's archives 26, 66, 76Finn E. Stramberg 146Knut S. Vindfallet 138Fjellanger Wideroe A/S 163 (bottom)

Art CreditsPerDybvigldl, 171Roar Hagen 196John Hult 198, 201Henry Imsland 21, 29, 59, 60, 72, 103, 138, 214, 215Leif Raa 96, 169Trog, London Daily Mail 37Stale Adland 13, 25, 48, 51, 69, 79, 170, 193

Notes1 This version is based on interviews with Owen

Thomas and Ward W. Dunn in the fall of 1986, inaddition to the weekly reports they made during thetrip.

2 The official name is Phillips Norway Group. Through- out the rest of the book it will be shortened toPhillips Group.

3 The «Blucher» is the German warship which was sunkby Norwegian artillery as it attempted to invadeOslo on 9 April 1940.

4 Pounds per square inch. Normal pressure at a specificdepth is the same as the pressure within a columnof salt water.

5 C. J. «Pete» Silas was appointed Chief ExecutiveOfficer and Chairman of the Board of PhillipsPetroleum Company in 1985.

6 This applies to offshore employees receiving hourlywages. For other categories it varies between 25 and40 percent.

7 Yngvar Ustvedt: Overflod og oppr0r, vol. 3,page 488.

8 Including NGL production.9 Stortingsmelding no. 22 1966/67 -Exploration and

production of petroleum reserves on theNorwegian continental shelf in the North Sea.

10 Stortingsmelding no. 22 1966/67, page 4.11 Stortingsmelding no. 25 1974/75 - The place of the

petroleum activity in Norwegian society.12 From Statistisk Sentralbyra 1988, GNP - oil and gas

production, drilling and pipeline transportation.13 Min. of Petr. & Energy: Survey of taxes and royalties

from the oil industry to 1/1 -88.

Published by Phillips Petroleum Company Norway,Public Affairs,P.O. Box 220,4056 Tananger, Norwayon behalf of the Phillips Norway Group.

Reprints permitted with source reference.Reprints of artwork and photos prohibited.

Translation from Norwegian: Minda M. Laerdal.

Photo editing, graphic design, layout and cover design:Eirik Moe.

The text is set in Palatino and printed onPhoeno Matt from Papierenfabrik Scheufelen.Typesetting and paste-up: Verbum A.s.Reproduction and printing: Bryne Offset A.s.Binding: Emil Moestue A.s.

ISBN 82-991771-1-1 (English edition)ISBN 82-991771-0-3 (Norwegian edition)