SD009R/09/en

Functional safety manual

RMA422Process Transmitter

Application

1 to 2-channel transmitter power supply with

intrinsically safe current inputs, limit value monitoring

with 2 change-over contacts, mathematic functions and

1 to 2 analog outputs to satisfy particular safety systems

requirements as per IEC 61508/ IEC 61511-1 (FDIS).

The measuring device fulfils the requirements

concerning

• Functional safety as per

IEC 61508/IEC 61511-1

• Explosion protection (depending on the version)

• Electromagnetic compatibility as per IEC 61326.

Your benefits

• Use in a safety-instrumented system up to SIL 2,

independently evaluated (Functional Assessment) by

exida.com as per IEC 61508/

IEC 61511-1

RMA422

2 Endress+Hauser

Table of contents

SIL Declaration of Conformity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Abbreviations, standards and terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Determining the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Safety function with RMA422 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Safety function for limit temperature monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Safety function data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Unit version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Supplementary device documentation RMA422 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Commissioning and iterative tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Using the RMA422 for

continuous measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Locking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Safety-related parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Specific safety-related parameters for RMA422 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

PFDAVG dependent on selected maintenance interval . . . . . . . . . 8

Repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Exida.com management summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Declaration of Hazardous Material and De-

Contamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

RMA422

Endress+Hauser 3

SIL Declaration of Conformity

Functional safety of a process transmitter according to IEC 61508/IEC 61511

Endress+Hauser Wetzer GmbH+Co. KG, Obere Wank 1, 87484 Nesselwang declares as manufacturer, that the process transmitter

RMA 422 is suitable for the use in a safety-instrumented system according to standard IEC 61511-1, provided the relevant safety instructions are observed.

The FMEDA provides the following parameters:

Product RMA 422 with analogue output RMA 422 with limit contact

Analogue input 1 2 1 2

SIL 2

Proof test interval 1 year

Device type B

HFT 1)

0 (single channel use)

SFF > 86 % > 85 %

PFDAVG 2)

3.90x10-4

4.50x10-4

3.86x10-4

4.46x10-4

MTBF 3)

160 years 139 years 154 years 134 years

Safety function 4)

monitoring

low level

high level range

low level

high level range

λsd in FIT 245 55 291 283 69 343 9 9

λsu in FIT 286 286 286 328 328 328 493 587

λdd in FIT 60 250 14 74 289 14 14 14

λdu in FIT 89 89 89 103 103 103 88 102

1) according to clause 11.4.4 of IEC 61511-1

2) the value complies with SIL2 according to ISA S84.01 and IEC 61511-1

3) according to Siemens SN29500

4) assuming setting of 4 to 20 mA

The device including the modification process was assessed on the basis of prior use.

Nesselwang, 30 January 2004 Endress+Hauser Wetzer GmbH+Co. KG

General manager

SIL-04001a/09/e

Hauser+EndressThe Power of Know How

RMA422

4 Endress+Hauser

Introduction

Abbreviations, standards and

terms

Abbreviations

Explanation to the abbreviations used can be found in the SIL-Brochure (SI002Z/11).

Relevant standards

Terms

Determining the Safety

Integrity Level (SIL)

The achievable Safety Integrity Level is determined by the following safety-related parameters:

• Average Probability of Failure on Demand (PFDAVG)

• Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) and

• Safe Failure Fraction (SFF).

The specific safety-related parameters for the RMA422, as a part of a safety function, are listed in the "Safety-

related parameters" chapter.

The following table displays the dependence of the "Safety Integrity Level" (SIL) on the "Average Probability of

Failure on Demand" (PFDAVG). Here, the "Low demand mode" has been observed, i.e. the requirement rate for

the safety-related system is maximum once a year.

Sensor, process transmitter, logic unit and actuator together form a safety-related system, which performs a

safety function. The "Average Probability of Failure on Demand" (PFDAVG) is usually divided up into the sensor,

process transmitter, logic unit and actuator sub-systems as per Figure 1.

Fig. 1: Share of the process transmitter in the "average probability of dangerous failure on demand" (PFDAVG

! Note!

This documentation considers the RMA422 as a component of a safety function.

Standard Explanation

IEC 61508,

Part 1 – 7

Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems

(Target group: Manufacturers and Suppliers of Devices)

IEC 61511

Part 1 – 3 (FDIS)

Functional safety – Safety Instrumented Systems for the process industry sector (Target

group: Safety Instrumented Systems Designers, Integrators and Users)

Term Explanation

Dangerous

failure

Failure with the potential to put the safety-related system in a dangerous or non-functional

condition.

Safety-related system A safety-related system performs the safety functions that are required to achieve or

maintain a safe condition e.g. in a plant. Example: temperature measuring device – logic

unit (e.g. limit signal generator) – valve form a safety-related system.

Safety function Defined function, which is performed by a safety-related system with the aim of achieving

or maintaining a safe condition for the plant, considering a specified dangerous incident.

Example: limit temperature monitoring

Safety Integrity Level (SIL) PFDAVG (Low demand mode)

4 ≥ 10–5...< 10–4

3 ≥ 10–4...< 10–3

2 ≥ 10–3...< 10–2

1 ≥ 10–2...< 10–1

PFD 10%AVG ≤

Actuator(e.g. valve)

Logic unit(e.g. PLC)

Process transmitter(e.g. RMA 422)

Sensor(e.g. temperaturemeasuring device)

RMA422

Endress+Hauser 5

Safety Integrity Level RMA422 (Type B)

The following table displays the achievable "Safety Integrity Level" (SIL) of the entire safety-related system for

type B systems depending on the "Safe Failure Fraction" (SFF) and the "Hardware Fault Tolerance" (HFT). Type

B systems are, for example, sensors with complex components such as ASICs (→ see also IEC 61508, Part 2).

Safety function with RMA422

Safety function for limit

temperature monitoring

G09-RMA422xx-14-00-xx-en-000

Fig. 2: Safety function with analog output

Safe Failure Fraction

(SFF)

Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT)

0 1 (0)1)

1) In accordance with IEC 61511-1 (FDIS), Clause 11.4.4, the "Hardware Fault Tolerance" (HFT) can be reduced by

one (values in brackets), if the following conditions are true for devices using sensors and actuators with complex

components:

– The device is "proven in use".

– The device allows adjustment of process-related parameters only, e.g. measuring range, upscale or downscale

failure direction, etc.

– The adjustment level of the process-related parameters of the device is protected, e.g. by jumper, password (here:

numeric code or key combination)

– The function has a "Safety Integrity Level" (SIL) requirement less than 4.

All conditions are true for the RMA422.

2 (1)1

< 60% not permitted SIL 1 SIL 2

60 ...< 90 % SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3

90 ...< 99 % SIL 2 SIL 3 –

≥ 99 % SIL 3 – –

RMA422

6 Endress+Hauser

G09-RMA422xx-14-00-xx-en-001

Fig. 3: Safety function with relay

The sensors, powered by the RMA422 process transmitter, generate an analog signal (4 to 20 mA) in proportion

to the measured value. Mathematic functions allow the formation of a new process variable. The process

transmitter makes the analog signals in proportion to the new process variable available to a downstream logic

unit, such as a PLC. The limit values can also be monitored directly with the RMA422 by means of 2 change-

over contacts.

Safety function data

" Caution!

The data for the safety functions are listed in the "Safety-related parameters" chapter.

! Note!

MTTR is set at eight hours.

Safety-related systems without a self-locking function must be monitored or set to an otherwise safe state after

carrying out the safety function within MTTR.

Unit version SIL from serial number: 5C00104114, December 2002

Supplementary device

documentation RMA422

Depending on the version, the following documentation must be available for the Process transmitter RMA422:

" Caution!

• The installation and setting instructions, and the technical limit values must be observed in accordance with

the Operating Instructions (BA103R).

• For devices which are used in explosion-hazardous, the supplementary documentation (XA) resp. Control

Drawings must also be used in accordance with the table.

RMA422 supplementary documentation

For further information, see Technical Information TI072R.

Explosion protection/Certificates Operating instructions Other Ex-Documentation

none BA103R none

ATEX II(1)GD [EEx ia] IIC BA103R Safety instructions XA003R

RMA422

Endress+Hauser 7

Commissioning and iterative tests

Using the RMA422 for

continuous measurements

The operability of the safety installation must be tested at appropriate time intervals. It is the responsibility of

the user to select the type of check and the intervals in the specified time frame. The test must be completed

in such a way that the fault free function of the safety installation combined with all components can be

validated.

Settings

Settings It is possible to set up on the RMA422. When used as part of a safety function, an analog signal or a limit relay

can be used. Please refer to the following table for information on the settings which are permitted or not when

using the RMA422 in a safety-related application.

RMA422 with current output:

RMA422 with relay:

For further information see the BA103R operating instructions.

" Caution!

Check the safety function after entering all the parameters.

Locking Device operation has to be locked to protect the process-related parameters from being altered. This is done

using a code which is selected by the user.

Parameter Setting up selections Setting for safety function

Output range 4-20 mA permitted

0-20 mA not permitted

0-10 V not permitted

Fault condition hold not permitted

min permitted

max permitted

Parameter Setting up selections Setting for safety function

Operating mode off not permitted

min permitted

max permitted

trd permitted

alarm permitted

min- not permitted

max- not permitted

trd- not permitted

Parameter Setting up selection Setting for safety function

User code 0000 to 9999 0001 to 9999 (0000 is not permitted,

because no user code is active)

RMA422

8 Endress+Hauser

Safety-related parameters

Specific safety-related

parameters for RMA422

The table displays the specific safety-related parameters for the RMA422:

PFDAVG dependent on

selected maintenance interval

The following diagram presents the dependence of the PFDAVG on the maintenance interval. The PFDAVG

increases as the maintenance interval increases.

Fig. 4: "Average probability of dangerous failure on demand" (PFD AVG) depending on the maintenance interval selected for the RMA422 with analog input 4-20 mA and analog output 4-20 mA.

With analog input 4-20 mA and

analog output 4-20 mA

With 2 analog inp. 4-20 mA and

analog output 4-20 mA

With analog input 4-20 mA and

relay

With 2 analog inp. 4-20 mA and

relay

SIL SIL 2 SIL 2 SIL 2 SIL 2

HFT 0 0 0 0

SFF > 86% > 86% > 85% > 85%

PFDAVG 3,90 x 10–4 4,50 x 10–4 3,86 x 10–4 4,46 x 10–4

TI 1) annual annual annual annual

1) complete function test

1oo1D st ructure

0,00E+00

5,00E-04

1,00E-03

1,50E-03

2,00E-03

2,50E-03

3,00E-03

3,50E-03

4,00E-03

4,50E-03

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Years

Pro

ba

bili

ty

PFDavg

RMA422

Endress+Hauser 9

Fig. 5: "Average probability of dangerous failure on demand" (PFD AVG) depending on the maintenance interval selected for the RMA422 with 2 analog inputs 4-20 mA and analog output 4-20 mA.

Fig. 6: "Average probability of dangerous failure on demand" (PFD AVG) depending on the maintenance interval selected for the RMA422 with analog input 4-20 mA and relay.

1oo1D structure

0,00E+00

5,00E-04

1,00E-03

1,50E-03

2,00E-03

2,50E-03

3,00E-03

3,50E-03

4,00E-03

4,50E-03

5,00E-03

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Years

Pro

ba

bili

ty

PFDavg

1oo1D st ructure

0,00E+00

5,00E-04

1,00E-03

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2,00E-03

2,50E-03

3,00E-03

3,50E-03

4,00E-03

4,50E-03

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Years

Pro

ba

bili

ty

PFDavg

RMA422

10 Endress+Hauser

Fig. 7: "Average probability of dangerous failure on demand" (PFD AVG) depending on the maintenance interval selected for the RMA422 with 2 analog inputs 4-20 mA and relay.

Repair

Repair

! Note!

Together with the failed, SIL-marked E+H device, having been operated in a functional safety application, the

form "Declaration of Hazardous Material and De-Contamination" containing the appropriate information

" Used as SIL device in a Safety Instrumented System" has to be returned.

The "Declaration of Hazardous Material and De-Contamination" can be found in the Appendix at the end of

this Functional Safety Manual.

1oo1D structure

0,00E+00

5,00E-04

1,00E-03

1,50E-03

2,00E-03

2,50E-03

3,00E-03

3,50E-03

4,00E-03

4,50E-03

5,00E-03

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Years

Pro

ba

bili

ty

PFDavg

RMA422

Endress+Hauser 11

Exida.com management summary

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G

Ne

sse

lwa

ng

G

erm

an

y

Co

ntr

act

No

.: E

+H

03

/02

-17

R

ep

ort

No

.: E

+H

03

/02

-17

R0

21

Ve

rsio

n V

1,

Re

vis

ion

R1

.0,

Ja

nu

ary

20

04

Ste

ph

an

Asch

en

bre

nn

er

RMA422

12 Endress+Hauser

© e

xid

a.c

om

Gm

bH

e+

h 0

3-0

2-1

7 r

021 v

1 r

1.0

, January

27,

2004

Ste

phan A

schenbre

nner

Page 4

of

29

Tab

le 5

: S

um

mary

fo

r R

MA

422 w

ith

rela

y o

utp

ut

an

d o

ne in

pu

t – P

FD

AV

G v

alu

es

T[P

roo

f] =

1 y

ea

r T

[Pro

of]

= 5

ye

ars

T

[Pro

of]

= 1

0 y

ea

rs

PF

DA

VG =

3,8

6E

-04

P

FD

AV

G =

1,9

3E

-03

P

FD

AV

G =

3,8

5E

-03

Tab

le 6

: S

um

mary

fo

r R

MA

422 w

ith

rela

y o

utp

ut

an

d o

ne in

pu

t – F

ailu

re r

ate

s

λ sd

λ su

λ dd

λ du

SF

F

DC

S

DC

D

9 F

IT

49

3 F

IT

14

FIT

8

8 F

IT

> 8

5%

2

%

14

%

Tab

le 7

: S

um

mary

fo

r R

MA

422 w

ith

rela

y o

utp

ut

an

d t

wo

in

pu

ts –

PF

DA

VG v

alu

es

T[P

roo

f] =

1 y

ea

r T

[Pro

of]

= 5

ye

ars

T

[Pro

of]

= 1

0 y

ea

rs

PF

DA

VG =

4,4

6E

-04

P

FD

AV

G =

2,2

3E

-03

P

FD

AV

G =

4,4

5E

-03

Tab

le 8

: S

um

mary

fo

r R

MA

422 w

ith

rela

y o

utp

ut

an

d t

wo

in

pu

ts –

Failu

re r

ate

s

λ sd

λ su

λ dd

λ du

SF

F

DC

S

DC

D

9 F

IT

58

7 F

IT

14

FIT

1

02

FIT

>

85

%

2%

1

2%

Th

e b

oxe

s m

ark

ed

in

ye

llow

(

)

me

an

th

at

the

ca

lcu

late

d P

FD

AV

G va

lue

s a

re w

ith

in th

e

allo

we

d r

an

ge

fo

r S

IL 2

acco

rdin

g t

o t

ab

le 2

of

IEC

61

50

8-1

bu

t d

o n

ot

fulfill

th

e r

eq

uir

em

en

t to

n

ot

cla

im m

ore

th

an

10

% o

f th

is r

an

ge

, i.e

. to

be

be

tte

r th

an

or

eq

ua

l to

1,0

0E

-03

. T

he

bo

xe

s

ma

rke

d i

n g

ree

n (

) m

ea

n t

ha

t th

e c

alc

ula

ted

PF

DA

VG v

alu

es a

re w

ith

in t

he

allo

we

d r

an

ge

fo

r S

IL 2

acco

rdin

g t

o t

ab

le 2

of

IEC

61

50

8-1

an

d t

ab

le 3

.1 o

f A

NS

I/IS

A–

84

.01

–1

99

6 a

nd

do

fu

lfill

th

e r

eq

uir

em

en

t to

no

t cla

im m

ore

th

an

10

% o

f th

is r

an

ge

, i.e

. to

be

be

tte

r th

an

or

eq

ua

l to

1

,00

E-0

3.

Th

e fu

nc

tio

na

l a

ss

es

sm

en

t h

as

s

ho

wn

th

at

the

P

roc

es

s T

ran

sm

itte

r R

MA

4

22

h

as

a

PF

DA

VG

wit

hin

th

e

all

ow

ed

ra

ng

e

for

SIL

2

ac

co

rdin

g

to

tab

le

2

of

IEC

6

15

08

-1

an

d

tab

le 3

.1 o

f A

NS

I/IS

A–

84

.01

–1

99

6 a

nd

a S

afe

Fa

ilu

re F

rac

tio

n (

SF

F)

of

> 8

5%

. B

as

ed

on

the

ve

rifi

ca

tio

n o

f "p

rio

r u

se

" i

t c

an

be

us

ed

as

a s

ing

le d

ev

ice

fo

r S

IL2

Sa

fety

Fu

nc

tio

ns

in t

erm

s o

f IE

C 6

15

11

-1 F

irs

t E

dit

ion

20

03

-01

.

A u

se

r o

f th

e P

roce

ss T

ran

sm

itte

r R

MA

42

2 c

an

utiliz

e t

he

se

fa

ilure

ra

tes i

n a

pro

ba

bili

stic

mo

de

l o

f a

sa

fety

in

str

um

en

ted

fu

nctio

n

(SIF

) to

d

ete

rmin

e

su

ita

bili

ty

in

pa

rt

for

sa

fety

in

str

um

en

ted

syste

m (

SIS

) u

sa

ge

in

a p

art

icu

lar

sa

fety

in

teg

rity

le

ve

l (S

IL).

Th

e c

om

ple

te lis

t o

f fa

ilure

ra

tes is p

rese

nte

d in

se

ctio

n 5

.1 t

o 5

.4 a

lon

g w

ith

all

assu

mp

tio

ns.

Th

e t

wo

in

pu

ts a

nd

th

e t

wo

ou

tpu

ts o

n e

ach

mo

du

le s

ha

ll n

ot

be

use

d t

o in

cre

ase

th

e h

ard

wa

re

fau

lt t

ole

ran

ce

, n

ee

de

d t

o a

ch

ieve

a h

igh

er

SIL

fo

r a

ce

rta

in s

afe

ty f

un

ctio

n,

as t

he

y c

on

tain

co

mm

on

co

mp

on

en

ts.

Th

e t

wo

in

pu

ts a

re o

nly

allo

we

d t

o b

e u

se

d t

o c

om

bin

e t

wo

sa

fety

cri

tica

l in

pu

t sig

na

ls u

sin

g t

he

ba

sic

ma

the

ma

tics m

od

es o

f a

dd

itio

n /

su

btr

actio

n /

mu

ltip

lica

tio

n t

o

ca

lcu

late

fu

rth

er

pro

ce

ss v

alu

es.

It

is

imp

ort

an

t to

re

aliz

e

tha

t th

e

“do

n’t

ca

re”

failu

res

an

d

the

“a

nn

un

cia

tio

n”

failu

res

are

cla

ssifie

d a

s “

sa

fe u

nd

ete

cte

d”

failu

res a

cco

rdin

g t

o I

EC

61

50

8.

No

te t

ha

t th

ese

fa

ilure

s o

n i

ts

ow

n w

ill n

ot

aff

ect

syste

m re

liab

ility

o

r sa

fety

, a

nd

sh

ou

ld n

ot

be

in

clu

de

d in

sp

uri

ou

s tr

ip

ca

lcu

latio

ns.

© e

xid

a.c

om

Gm

bH

e+

h 0

3-0

2-1

7 r

021 v

1 r

1.0

, January

27,

2004

Ste

phan A

schenbre

nner

Page 3

of

29

Tab

le 1

: S

um

mary

fo

r R

MA

422 w

ith

cu

rren

t o

utp

ut

an

d o

ne in

pu

t – P

FD

AV

G v

alu

es

T[P

roo

f] =

1 y

ea

r T

[Pro

of]

= 5

ye

ars

T

[Pro

of]

= 1

0 y

ea

rs

PF

DA

VG =

3,9

0E

-04

P

FD

AV

G =

1,9

5E

-03

P

FD

AV

G =

3,8

9E

-03

Tab

le 2

: S

um

mary

fo

r R

MA

422 w

ith

cu

rren

t o

utp

ut

an

d o

ne in

pu

t – F

ailu

re r

ate

s

Fa

ilu

re C

ate

go

rie

s

λ sd

λ su

λ dd

λ du

SF

F

DC

S 2

D

CD

λ low =

λsd

λ hig

h =

λdd

24

5 F

IT

28

6 F

IT

60

FIT

8

9 F

IT

> 8

6%

4

6%

4

0%

λ low =

λdd

λ hig

h =

λsd

55

FIT

2

86

FIT

2

50

FIT

8

9 F

IT

> 8

6%

1

6%

7

4%

λ low =

λsd

λ hig

h =

λsd

29

1 F

IT

28

6 F

IT

14

FIT

8

9 F

IT

> 8

6%

5

0%

1

4%

Ta

ble

3:

Su

mm

ary

fo

r R

MA

42

2 w

ith

cu

rre

nt

ou

tpu

t a

nd

tw

o in

pu

ts –

PF

DA

VG v

alu

es

T[P

roo

f] =

1 y

ea

r T

[Pro

of]

= 5

ye

ars

T

[Pro

of]

= 1

0 y

ea

rs

PF

DA

VG =

4,5

0E

-04

P

FD

AV

G =

2,2

5E

-03

P

FD

AV

G =

4,4

9E

-03

Ta

ble

4:

Su

mm

ary

fo

r R

MA

42

2 w

ith

cu

rre

nt

ou

tpu

t a

nd

tw

o in

pu

ts –

Fa

ilu

re r

ate

s

Fa

ilu

re C

ate

go

rie

s

λ sd

λ su

λ dd

λ du

SF

F

DC

S

DC

D

λ low =

λsd

λ hig

h =

λdd

28

3 F

IT

32

8 F

IT

74

FIT

1

03

FIT

>

86

%

46

%

42

%

λ low =

λdd

λ hig

h =

λsd

69

FIT

3

28

FIT

2

89

FIT

1

03

FIT

>

86

%

17

%

74

%

λ low =

λsd

λ hig

h =

λsd

34

3 F

IT

32

8 F

IT

14

FIT

1

03

FIT

>

86

%

51

%

12

%

2 D

C m

ea

ns th

e d

iag

no

stic c

ove

rag

e (

sa

fe o

r d

an

ge

rou

s)

of th

e s

afe

ty lo

gic

so

lve

r fo

r R

MA

42

2.

RMA422

Endress+Hauser 13

Declaration of Hazardous Material and De-Contamination

Because of legal regulations and for the safety of our employees and operating equipment, we need the "Declaration of Hazardous Materialand De-Contamination", with your signature, before your order can be handled. Please make absolutely sure to attach it to the outside of thepackaging.Aufgrund der gesetzlichen Vorschriften und zum Schutz unserer Mitarbeiter und Betriebseinrichtungen, benötigen wir die unterschriebene"Erklärung zur Kontamination und Reinigung", bevor Ihr Auftrag bearbeitet werden kann. Bringen Sie diese unbedingt außen an derVerpackung an.

Serial numberSeriennummer ________________________

Type ofi nstrument / sensorGeräte-/Sensortyp ____________________________________________

Process data/ Prozessdaten Temperature / _________ [°C]Conductivity / _________ [ S ]

TemperaturLeitfähigkeit

Pressure / __________ [ Pa ]Viscosity / __________ [mm /s]

DruckViskosität 2

Used as SIL device in a Safety Instrumented System / Einsatz als SIL Gerät in Schutzeinrichtungen

RA No.

Erklärung zur Kontamination und ReinigungDeclaration of Hazardous Material and De-Contamination

Please reference the Return Authorization Number (RA#), obtained from Endress+Hauser, on all paperwork and mark the RA#clearly on the outside of the box. If this procedure is not followed, it may result in the refusal of the package at our facility.Bitte geben Sie die von E+H mitgeteilte Rücklieferungsnummer (RA#) auf allen Lieferpapieren an und vermerken Sie dieseauch außen auf der Verpackung. Nichtbeachtung dieser Anweisung führt zur Ablehnung ihrer Lieferung.

Instruments International

Endress+HauserInstruments International AGKaegenstrasse 24153 ReinachSwitzerland

Tel. +41 61 715 81 00Fax +41 61 715 25 00www.endress.cominfo@ii.endress.com

SD009R/09/en/13.10

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