full version of bruce jesson lecture presented 27 october - 11.11.10
TRANSCRIPT
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KitekorekoeemaupuuanakiotikangametoouManaMotuhake,
Kuangarokoekitepoouriotiraewhaikeeanakoeingaatikangaatetahi
noatu
Whenyoufailtosustainyourbeliefs,sovereignty,freedom
Youbecomelosttoyourselfasyouaresubsumedbythosewhosecustoms
andpracticesyoumustnowserve
In1980 following the furorewhichwas engenderedby the publicationof the
MaoriSovereigntyarticles,BruceJessoncommented:
Essentially,Maorisovereigntyisaboutthecompleteincompatibilityofthe
MaoriandPakehawaysoflife,andabouthoweconomicandpoliticalpower
hasresolvedthisconflictinfavourofthePakeha.1
AtthetimetherewasastridentgroupofMaoriradicalswhoreadilyidentified
with the concept of Maori Sovereignty and with Maori resistance to Pakeha
intrusion into their territories, their values, their mindscapes and their
landscapes.2 The core was drawn from an urban underclass from the
communitiesofSouthAuckland,HastingsandWellington. Theirmessagewas
simple:Pakehahavecolonisedourheartsandourmindsandhavesubstituted
our traditional systems and institutions with ones that Awatere described as
exploitative,oppressive,dehumanisedandspirituallydeficient. 3Itwastimefor
thenationtoturnthepageonaneraofgreed,irresponsibilityandinjusticeand
aneraofchangewasdemanded.
1JessonB,WaitangiaPakehaIssuetoop.108inAndrewSharp(ed) ToBuildaNationCollectedWritings19751999,Penguin,Auckland,2005.2 It is interesting to note that the Oxford Dictionary characterises the term radical as thedeparture from tradition. In these regards, the term Maori Radical would seem to definepeopleoftheilkofDonBrash,i.e.thosewhowouldseektoseverMaorifromtheirtraditions.Ofcourse, inour domesticcontext, the term MaoriRadicalrelatesto thosewhohave struggledthrough the Brash Attacks in their many guises to maintain Maori connections and their
freedomsinthiscountry.TheproofofthisstatementisevidencedmoststarklyinthefactthattheBrashshavefaded,yettheHarawirasstillremain.3JessonB,WaitangiaPakehaIssuetoop.108.
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The Maori World responded over the ensuing decades with a number of
initiativesthatwereinitiallyresistedbytheCrownand,ingeneral,bythePakeha
public. These initiatives included widespread development activity in the
revitalisationofTeReoMaori,autonomousKuraKaupapaeducationinitiatives,controloverMaorihealthandsocialservicesdeliverymechanisms,independent
Maorimedia,anddemandsforredresswithintheTreatySettlementarena.
Thestruggletransformedfromoneofsimpleconfrontationwiththestate toone
that sought the reclamation of Kaupapa Maori theory, practices and
methodologieswiththeassistanceoftheState.WhetherLabourorNational,the
apparatus of the state responded with a variety of quangos like the Maori
Language Commission, the Maori Broadcasting Agency, the Ministry ofMaori
Development, the MaoriEconomic Task Force, the CrownForest Rental Trust
and the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission. The process of
corporatisation had begun, with Maori radicals like me complicit in the
transformation.HoneHarawiraandIwereappointedasfoundingmembersof
TeMangai Paho, theMaoriBroadcasting Agency. Iwas also appointedasthe
DeputyChairpersonofAotearoaFisheriesLtd,asubsidiarycompanycreatedby
theMaoriFisheriesAct1989.
The sameperiod saw the rise ofaMaorielitewithin the process of litigating,
negotiating and then implementing Treaty settlements, many of whom have
become active sycophantsof thebroaderneo liberalagendawhichtransfers a
limitedsubsetofpubliclyownedassetsandresourcesintotheprivateownership
ofcorporationstosettletheinjusticesthathavebeeninflicteduponhapuandiwi
Maori.
AnaurahasbuiltuparoundtheseIwileaderswho,intandemwiththeMaori
Party,arenowtreatedastheauthorisedvoicesofallMaori.ButIamactively
involvedinalltheseissuesandevenIdontknowwhotheyareandwheretheir
mandatecomesfromonparticularissues,letalonewhotheyareaccountableto
andhow.
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In the process, the reality of our people has been lost sight of.As many well
know,the economicmiracle that has allegedly transformedMaori society and
propelledthisforumintowhathasbeendescribedasthemostpowerfullobby
group in Aotearoa is a myth, a carefully constructed illusion. Maori landholdings, even afterTreaty settlementsare taken into account, are small, less
thanthreehectaresperperson,andreturns fromMaorilandareconfinedtoa
smallsectionoftheMaoripopulation,aboutonethird.4Similarlytheassetbase
ofsomeoftheselargecorporations-TeOhuKaimoana,whichisestimatedat
$590 million, only equates to approximately $1,000 per person (if we use
523,000asindicativeofthetotalMaoripopulation).5Thepositionisevenworse
for the most populous iwi like Ngapuhi, whose shareholding per person
diminished to about $500per person upon the terms of the actual allocation
model.6
Statisticscontinuetoreflectthepoorsocio-economicstateofmostMaori.The
Maori unemployment rate is twice as high as non-Maori, and one out of four
Maorireceiveabenefitcomparedtooneoutoftennon-Maori.7Maoriarethree
timesmorelikelytoliveinanovercrowdedhouseholdcomparedtonon-Maori. 8
OnlytwooutoffiveMaoriarecompletingsecondaryeducationwithaLevelTwo
Certificate, compared to two out of threenon-Maori.9 While Maori currently
representaround13%ofthegeneralNewZealandpopulation,wemakeup51%
of the prison population. In 2006, Maori accounted for 43% of all police
apprehensions.10Maorilifeexpectancyis10%lowerthannon-Maori,andMaori
are twice as likely to be obese.11 Our suicide rate is 1.6 times higher than
non-Maori,andouryouthsuiciderateistwicethatofnon-Maori.In2006the
Maoriyouthsuicideratewas31.8per100,000,comparedwiththenon-Maori
4Durie,Mason,NgaKahuiPou:LaunchingMaoriFutures,HuiaPublishers,2003,p.95.5Ibid.6Itshouldbenotedthatthetenlargestiwiinthe2006Censusareasfollows:NgaPuhi122,211;NgatiPorou71,910;NgatiKahungungu59,946;NgaiTahu/KaiTahu49.185;TeArawa42,159;Ngati Tuwharetoa 34,674; NgatiManiapoto33,627;Waikato 33,429; Tuhoe32,670and NgatiAwa15,258.7SocioeconomicIndicatorsathttp://www.socialreport.msd.govt.nz/8Ibid.9Ibid.
10Dannette,Marie,MaoriandCriminalOffending:ACriticalAppraisal,43(2) TheAustralianAndNewZealandJournalOfCriminology,2010,atp.284.11TheSocialReport2009Healthhttp://www.socialreport.msd.govt.nz/atpp.21and29
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rateof16.8 per 100,000.12 Almost halfofallMaoriwomensmokecigarettes,
which is twice as high as non-Maori women,13 andwe are significantlymore
likelytohaveapotentiallyhazardousdrinkingpattern.14
The process I amdescribing is not new. Sadly, itmirrors the all-too-familiar
colonial pattern where governments have aimed to maintain control of
indigenous populations through indirect means; that is, in lieu of direct
military-political control, neo-colonialist powers co-opt indigenous elites
through privileged relationships with their government and opportunities to
profitfromtheireconomic,financialandtradepolicies,attheexpenseoftheir
people. Rangatiratanga, as Moana Jackson reminds, has in effect beenredefinedyetagainasaneo-liberalrightofselfmanagementboundbythegood
faithoftheCrownandwhattheCourtofAppealcalledinthe1987Casetheright
togovern.Movingonfromthepastandrecognisingthespecialplaceoftangata
whenuahasbecomeajourneynotofconstitutionalchangebutofdevolutionand
theauthorityoftheStatetodevolveorpermitIwitomanagecertainresources
andprogrammessubjecttogovernmentfundingandrulesofcontract.
TheNationalIwiChairsForum,inparticulartheexecutivewhoisalsoincharge
ofthesecretariatofthisgroup,hassetthemselvesuptobefirstinthequeueto
sit attheMasters tablewiththe cleardesireofexerting economicinfluence in
corporateterms.15
Itistheseobservationsthathaveinspiredmycontributionthisevening,coupled
withthefactthatassomeonebornandraisedintheDPBcapitaloftheworld
Kawerau,Ihavebeenpersonalwitnesstotheimpactoftheeconomicreformson
heartland NewZealand. I have watched a thriving mill-town reduced to a
communitythatisdependentonthegenerosityofthediminishingwelfarestate
toensurethewellbeingofits families. Readingthe insightfulcommentaryon
12Ibid,p.25.13Ibid,p.27.
14Ibid,p.31.15TeTepu,Series6,Episode15.TranscriptfromInterviewwithNICFleaderTukuroirangiMorganbyWaihoroiShortland.
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myhometownbySimonCollinsinaseriesintheNewZealandHeraldrecently
remindedmethatthepooranddispossessedwhoaremyfamilyandmyclosest
friendsarenotbeingtreatedwithrespectorasrelevanttotheseprocessesand
that Maori elites are complicit in perpetuating this poverty without remorse.Thearticlesraisedaseriousmomentofintrospectiononmypart.
IhopethiscontributionwillenabletheMaoriwhoaspiretotheranksoftheIwi
LeadersForumtoreflectonwhethertheyareinfactleadersofourpeopleor
followers of a New Right process that is designed to disenfranchise tangata
whenua and nullify the guarantee of independence of Aotearoa in Te Tiriti o
Waitangi.Byembracingamodernversionofintegrationthathasallthezest,
scale,speedandpoweroftheoldindustrial-eracapitalistimperialism,theyare
leadingasystematiconslaughtontheMaoriwayoflife.
HikinaTeArai
LiftingtheVeil
WhoistheBrownTable?
InarecentsubmissiontotheUNSpecialRapporteur,JamesAnaya,theNational
ChairsIwiForum(NICF)claimsthatitrepresentsmorethan400,000Maori,over
two-thirdsoftheMaoripopulation,andisportrayedasthenewfrontierofIwi
Maori,theglobalentrepreneurs.16
BothMarkSolomonandTukuroirangiMorgan17havesuggestedthattheNational
Iwi Chairs Forum actually numbers approximately 70 people who convene
quarterly to discuss a broadagenda. It isnot clearwho thesepeople areand
uponwhatrightofrepresentationtheyclaimtospeakonissues.
Ironically,mostofthoseMaoritheyrepresenthavetogotothewebsitetofind
outwhotheirleadersare!AsearchofthewebsitesuggeststhattheNationalIwi
16BackgroundPaper,IwiChairsForumtoUnitedNationsSpecialRapporteuronthesituationofhumanrightsandfundamentalfreedstoProfessorJamesAnayalocatedathttp://www.iwichairs.maori.nz/Special-Rapporteur/Iwi-Chairs-Forum-Background-Paper.pdf
p117QuestionsposedattheHuiaMotuIwiLeadersWorkingGrouponClimateChange10November2009RydgesHotelRotorua.
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ChairsForumisaself-definedgroupofindividualswhomeetregularly,andwho
arechairsoftheirowniwirunanga,tribaltrustboardsorothertribalcorporate
entities,whatiscommonlyreferredtoasIwiAuthorities.
AttendanceattheNICFisrestrictedtoelectedchairsofhapu/iwientitiesofthis
kind who are purportedly mandated to represent their constituents in the
Forum.TheirwebsitenamesMarkSolomon(ChairpersonofTeRunangaoNgai
Tahu), Tuku Morgan (Chairperson of TeArataura), Raniera (Sonny) Tau
(ChairpersonofTeRunangaoNgapuhi),ProfessorMargaretMutu(Chairperson
ofTeRunangaoNgatiKahu),TokoRenata(ChairpersonofHaurakiMaoriTrust
Board),NgahiwiTomoana(ChairpersonofNgatiKahungunguIwiIncorporation)and Api Mahuika (Ngati Porou) as Iwi Chairs who make up the Forum.
Apparently, the further 63 or so individuals have not notified the website
manageroftheirdetails,whichmakesitdifficulttoascertaintheForumsactual
membership.However,thetwoforumsthatIhaveattendedcertainlysuggesta
broadergroupattendsthesemeetings,butthatthebusinessoftheforumisled
bytheiwiChairsprofiledontheirwebsite.
The seven named individuals seem to perform an executive function for the
broaderNICF,supportedbyasecretariat.VariousIwiLeadersWorkingGroups
(ILGs)areformedaroundspecificissues,suchaswater,climatechange,public
privatepartnerships,foreshoreandseabed,whanauoraandgeothermal,where
they consult at the kind of invitation-only hui that I describe below. These
groups operate in similar ways, in that the ILG on a particular issue engages
directlywithgovernment,endeavourstohuiwithIwiandhaprepresentatives
athui they organiseacross the country, and report back toeachNational Iwi
Chairs Forum.What is interesting is that the ILGs seem to rely on mandates
effected at the Forums own quarterly meetings to suggest that have been
confirmedinarepresentativecapacityforiwikatoa.18
18SeediscussionforexampleoftheestablishmentoftheIwiLeadersWorkingGroup(ILG)onForeshoreandSeabedwhichwasformedattheHopuhopuIwiChairsForumon20August2009inBackgroundPaper,IwiChairsForumtoUnitedNationsSpecialRapporteuronthesituationof
humanrightsandfundamentalfreedomstoProfessorJamesAnayalocatedathttp://www.iwichairs.maori.nz/Special-Rapporteur/Iwi-Chairs-Forum-Background-Paper.pdfp9.Thisgroupby26August2009wasseekinganumberofcommitmentsfromtheGovernment.
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AcloserexaminationofthegenesisoftheNICFshowsthatitmainlycomprises
menwhoarechairpersonsormembersofthe57MandatedIwiOrganisations
(MIO)thatwereestablishedtosatisfythecriteriatoreceivefisheriessettlementassets following the Sealords Deal. In an interview with Koha reporter Tina
Wickliffe, TukuorangiMorgan noted that approximately 51 of the MIO are or
havebeenrepresentedattheForum.19Mostoftheseorganisationshavebyno
meanssecuredmandatesfromtheconstituentmembersbeyondthesingleissue
offisheriessettlementmanagementormanagementofsettlementfunds.Debate
betweeniwionhowtosharethatsettlementtookyears,asdidsettingupthe
necessary iwi corporate structures to manage the proceeds.20 The Maori
Fisheries Act 2004 led to the first distribution to iwi of fish quota, cash, and
sharesinAotearoaFisheriesLtdinSeptember2005.
According to its website, in the five years since its inception the National Iwi
Chairs Forum has operated in two main areas: hui convened of national Iwi
Chairstoconsiderstrategicissues;andworkinggroupsestablishedatthebehest
oftheNICFtopreparediscussionpapersaroundstrategicmatters.TukuMorgan,
Ngahiwi Tomoana, Mark Solomon, the late Sir Archie Taiaroa, Professor
MargaretMutuandApiMahuikaareallsaidtohavebeenconvenorsatvarious
timesonvariousmattersunderconsiderationbytheForum.TheNICFidentifies
issuesofconcerntoallMaori-oraverybroadrangeofwhanau,hapuandiwi-
andsetsupworkinggroupstoaddressthem.Eachworkinggroupisconvened
byanIwiChair.Theseworkinggroupsmayco-optexpertisefromamongsttheir
bodies. Thesearethebodies thathavebecomeknownasIwiLeaderGroups
because their membership aims to become that of leaders in the respective
issuesasidentified.
19Wickliffe,;T,;LiftingtheVeilofSecrecy,Koha,Issue7,p.5,PublishedbyFOMANACapitalLtdSeptember2010.20AsLordGoffnotedTreatyTribesCoalitionvUrbanMaoriAuthorities[1997]1NZLR513,517(PC)Maorihavefoundthetaskofdividingthefisheriesresourcetobe"anextremelychallengingprocess;SeealsoTeRunangaoWharekauriRekohuIncvAttorney-General[1993]2NZLR301;WaitangiTribunal, TheFisheriesSettlementReportWai307(DepartmentofJustice,Wellington,
1992).;TeRunangaoMuriwhenuav TeRunanganuioTeUpokoo TeIkaAssociationInc[1996]3NZLR 10, 16;TeWakaHio TeArawaand othersv Treaty ofWaitangiFisheries Commission(4August1998)unreported,HighCourt,AucklandRegistry,CP395/93(Wgtn)AndersonJ.
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Inaddition to its website, theNICF claimtohave a communications network,
largelythroughemail,toexchangeinformationwithiwikatoa,andthereare
email streams that develop amongst iwi leadership groups on specific issues.
However,when I askedwhowaspart of theemail stream, Iwasadvised it ismainly the 50 or so representatives that had been invited to the Coronation
meeting in 2007 that had formalised the group, but that it was a very fluid
matter.21 I am still waiting for a copy of the list of individuals who were
purported to have mandated the creation of the forum, which Tukuroirangi
Morganpromisedwouldbemadeavailabletomefollowingameetingwiththe
IwiLeadersWorkingGrouponClimateChangeinRotoruainNovember2009.
One of the strident criticisms is that a self-selected group of iwi authority
chairpersonsandtheiradvisorshavesidelinedtraditionalcommunitiesandtheir
tikangaMaoriprocessesofengagement,suchasregularlyconvenedadvertised
hui thathapuand iwi leadershavemaintainedpriorto fundamentaldecisions
being made that impact on the lives of the community that they purport to
represent. There is no vetting process on those attending this National Iwi
Chairs Forum: the chairswho register as attending claim to do sounder the
manaoftheirelectingbody;butthereisnoclearindicationwhetherinfactthe
electingbodies orthosehapuandwhanau they represent,havemandatedthe
participation of these individuals on the broad range of issues under
consideration.Theirstatusasleaderspurportstoeliminate,oratleastrelegate
from relevance, other figures of authority that their people might look to for
direction, even though there is the often-token attendance of some elders in
thesemeetings.
ANewMaoriHegemony
ItisnocoincidencethattheNationalIwiChairsForum,(NICF)wheretheChairs
and Convenors and Advisor of Iwi Leaders Groups conduct their consultation
witheachotherandasmallextendedcircle,emergedatatimewhenthefirst
21Hui-a-Motu10November2009atRydgesHotelILG(IwiLeadersWorkingGroup)onClimateChange
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distribution of capital into Maori communities was anticipated following
finalisation of the principles of allocation to be applied to the Sealords deal.
ApartfromTainuiandNgaiTahu,andperhapsoneortwootheriwigroups,this
wastobethefirstallocationofcashtoIwicorporatessincetheinceptionoftheTreaty Settlement framework and it was eagerly awaited by the brown
bureaucracythathadgrowninanticipationofthis.
This group of Iwi Authority representatives are joined in the NICF by
chairpersons fromother organisations, likeTribal Trust Boards, andRunanga.
There is also emerging representation from the corporate arms of Post
SettlementGovernanceEntitiesrequiredtobeestablishedbytheOfficeofTreaty
Settlements to receive settlement assets, so that Tukuorangi Morgan, for
example,claimstorepresentTeArataua,ratherthantheTainuiParliament,the
Kauhanganui.
TheculturethatthenewMaorieliteshaveadoptedincreasinglydemandsthat
Maorientitiesberunonbusinesslines,mirroringthemodeloftheTreasuryand
theBusinessRoundtable.
Paepaerangatiraarecategorisedassymbolic,lackingintherequisiteexpertise
to risk allowing them to have even aminimal amount of control of economic
concerns. The strident demands for a separation of governance from
managementhaveaccompaniedeffortstodiminishtheroleofgovernanceand
inflatethatofmanagementinanefforttoreversetheirhierarchicalstatus.Inso
doing they have actually advocated a disconnection of tangata from their
whenua.
This empowerment of corporatised iwi structures has been driven by two
discourses.22Thefirstcentredaroundtherationalethatthecommercial,social
andregulatoryfunctionsofgovernmentdepartmentsshouldbeseparated,which
22 In two consultation documents called Te TirohangaRangapu and Te Urupare Rangapu
approvedIwiauthoritiesweretobecreatedtodelivercertainprogrammes,usuallyinhealthorsocial welfare. Iwi were to be agents and service providers for the Crown operating withappropriatelyindigenizedPakehastructures.
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hadcommencedduringtheRogernomicsera.ThesecondwastheStatesneed
foramechanismtomanagesettlementofMaoriintereststhatwereguaranteed
byTeTiritioWaitangiandwhichhadthreatenedtoactasajudderbartothe
Crown agenda to privatise, and for certainty about who to deal with in thecommercial environment. These discourses informed a market view of
devolutionthroughadecision-makingmodelthatonlyrecognisedtheauthority
of those iwi groupswho had been approved by the state. As Graham Smith
observed: Who names what constitutes leadership of iwi therefore is
determinativeofwhotheexpertsare,23andthereforefromwhomoneshould
seekMaoriopinion.
The economic agenda of the NICF was legitimised by the outcomes of a Hui
TaumatathatwasconvenedinWellingtonfrom1-3March2005,whichbrought
together a wide range of perspectives to look at ways to accelerate Maori
economicgrowth.Itwasthesecondhuiofitskind,thefirstheldinOctober1984
before the onslaught of Rogernomics. The 2005 hui was borne from the
recognition that Maori had been disproportionately affected by the radical
economic reforms of the intervening period and the failed closing the gaps
policy. A Maori Economic Taskforce was established following the Maori
EconomicSummit.ProminentamongstitsmembershipwasRobMcLeodofthe
Business Roundtable, Ngati Kahungungu Runanga Chairperson Ngahiwi
TomoanawhowaslatertoassumetheChairpersonroleoftheTreatyofWaitangi
FisheriesCommissionandNgaiTahuleaderMarkSolomon,whohasbeenaclear
driverbehindtheNationalIwiChairsForumandisaconvenorofoneoftheIwi
Leaders Groups (ILG) relating to Public/Private Partnerships.24 The other
memberswereBenthamOhia,JuneMcCabe,JohnTamihereandDaphneLuke,as
23SmithG,KimihiateMaramatanga,DoctoralThesis,Chapter5,p.103.24TheworkinthisareahasbeenprogressedunderMinisterSharplesTaskforceonMoriEconomicDevelopment.TheTaskforcehasanumberofportfoliosspanning;theprimarysector;accesstocapital,labourforcedevelopmentandtraining,smallandmediumenterprisedevelopmentandsupport;Moribrandingopportunities,infrastructureinvestment,kaupapaMorimodelsofcommercialismandco-investmentamongstIwiandwiththeCrown.MarkSolomonisleadingtheworkstreamonco-investmentamongstIwiandwiththeCrown.SeeBackgroundPaper,IwiChairsForumtoUnitedNationsSpecialRapporteuronthesituationof
humanrightsandfundamentalfreedstoProfessorJamesAnayalocatedathttp://www.iwichairs.maori.nz/Special-Rapporteur/Iwi-Chairs-Forum-Background-Paper.pdfp11
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well as Leith Comer, Chief Executive of Te Puni Kokiri and Hon Georgina Te
Heuheu,AssociateMinisterofMaoriAffairs.25
Thepotentialimpactsofsuchseparationseemallthemoresignificantwhenwerememberthattheprocessesofindividualisationallowlandsandothertaongato
beseenastradeablecommodities.Thesemeasuresaresaidtobenecessaryto
achieve the oft-quoted mantra of taking Iwi Maori from grievance to
developmentmode.Thefactthathistoryshowsthemethodtobedangerously
flawed hardly seems to register. Instead, a new type of internecine conflict
erupts,26astheappetiteforpowerofthosewhowouldseektocontroltheasset
base intensifies the covetous desire to obtain more. In the Treaty settlement
litigation that has resulted from the process, a central concern has been the
repeated bureaucratic inadequacies that resulted in a failure to protect the
interests of individuals and groups not (or inadequately) represented at the
negotiatingtable.Whenthecourtshavebeenfacedwiththesechallengesthey
have almost always opted for the view that these are political, as opposed to
legal, matters and are therefore not justiciable and have been reluctant to
intervene. The difficulty is that the iwi authority structures themselves are
without the apparatus to ensure proper democratic and accountability
mechanismsbythosewhoproclaimamandateatthisnationallevel.Theclaims
for Mana Motuhake and Political Independence by hapu are effectively
25TePuniKokiri;TheMaoriEconomicTaskforceKokiriKokiri152009.26TheCrownpolicytonegotiatethesettlementofTreatyclaimswithlargenaturalgroupingswithtribalinterestsatanIwilevelratherthanatahapu,whanauorclaimantlevelhasbeenthesubjectofmuchattentionbythejudiciaryinanumberofcontextsfromchallengestotherobustnessofmandates,concernsaroundthefailuretoaddresstheneedsofoverlappingclaimsandallegationsthatcustomaryrelationshipstolandarebeingtransformedcontrarytoTeTiritioWaitangiandsettledprinciplesofMaoriLawasnegotiatedfollowingtheLandscase.See:TheNgatiAwaCrossClaimsSettlementreportWai9582002TheTeArawaMandateReport:Te
WahangaTuarua;Wai11502005;andtheTamakiMakaurauSettlementProcessReportWai
13622007;HayesvWaitangiTribunalHACWNCP111/0110May2001;WaitahaTaiwhenuaoWaitakiTrustvTeRunangaoNgaiTahuHCWNCP41/9817June1998;MilroyvAttorneyGeneral[2005]NZAR562(CA)andNewZealandMaoriCouncilvAttorneyGeneral[2008]1NZLR318(CA);PouwharevKrugerCIV-2009-485-976HighCourt;AttorneyGeneralvKenehiMair&Ors[2009]NZCA625;HarongavAttorneyGeneral[2010]NZCA201;ForafulldiscussionofthegenesisofthepolicySeealsoAnnieMikaere,"SettlementofTreatyClaims:Full
andFinal,orFatallyFlawed?",(1997)17NZULR425;MalcolmBirdling,"HealingthePastorHarmingtheFuture?'LargeNaturalGroupings'andtheTreatySettlementProcess",(LLB(Hons)ResearchPaper,VictoriaUniversityofWellington,2003),12.
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surrenderedtotheIwiLeadersquestforgreaterparticipationandinfluencein
theNewZealandEconomy.
TheresultisanewMaorihegemonythatsitswithinanationalone.ThisMaori
hegemonyemergesoutofthenew iwi leadershipsassumptionofa highcaste
status, becausemembers of theNICFor theirdelegations are increasingly the
onlyindividualsthattheCrownseesasrelevantonMaoriissues.Yetthestatus
of the NICF exists within a framework of authority that has been created or
redefinedwithinthesettlementprocesstoaccommodatetherequirementsofthe
Office of Treaty Settlements as part of the Crowns Settlement Policy. The
processofCrownapprovalandrecognitionbytheOfficeofTreatySettlements,
prior to the determination of what and how much the Crown will grant in
settlement,reflectstheoldpatternsoftheNativeLandCourtandhighlightsthe
broader and more obvious subordination of traditional Maori processes of
decision-making.Thecompliantacceptanceofthisstateofaffairs,bythefewfor
the many,27 illustrates the continuing subjugation of Maori to a neo liberal
economichegemony toprotect the stability of the construct ofCrownunitary
sovereignty.
ItisunsurprisingthatthecoalescenceoftheIwiChairsleadershipintoanational
bodycalledtheNationalIwiChairsForumhasbroughtwithitadesirebythe
Crowntoentertain nationalsettlementsonkey resources like climate change,
freshwater,geothermal, foreshoreandseabedandpublic privatepartnerships.
Rather than dealingwith these issues inaccordancewithTeTiriti oWaitangi
27ManychairsoftheNationalIwiChairsForum (NICF)likethelateArchieTaiaroa,whowasalsoaformerChairpersonofthenowdefunctNationalMaoriCongress,havealonghistoryoffightingfortherightsofiwiandhaputomaintaintheirmanamotuhakeandpoliticalsovereignty.SirArchieTaiaroawastheCo-Chairpersonwith the lateSirHepiTeHeuheuatoftheHirangiHuiconvenedtoconsideraPan-MaoriresponsetothequestionsofthecontroversialFiscalEnvelopePolicy.Thedifficultyinthepresentregimeisthatthemodelsofsettlementbeingagreedtobymany of the Iwi Chairpersons and their constituents (like the statutory boards created overWaikato River and the Rotorua Lakes in the past) are still models of participation andmanagementofpolicywithintheCrownsrubricofauthoritywhichdeniesthelegitimacyoftinorangatiratanga in the modern context and highlights the fact that the Crown Treaty PolicyFrameworkisstillinthemainunilaterallydevelopedbytheCrown.Furthermorethequestion
mustbeposeddoIwiChairshavethemandatetointerfaceontheseissueswiththeCrownbythepeoplesatthegrassrootswhomtheypurporttorepresentonmatterswhentheirorganisationsfocusisquiteoftenlimitedtoparticularlandmanagementorfisheriesmanagementissues.
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guarantees,theForumseemstobepromotedandacceptedasaMaoriissueone-
stopshop.
ThisupperlayerofMaorisociety,createdtoengagewiththeCrown,providesaconvenient interface thatmakes itunnecessary for the Crownorthe anointed
leaders to communicate directly with those intransigents who refuse to
relinquishtheiridentities.Whenitisseeninthiscontext,thenewlyconstructed
layerofMaorileadershipseemstobeaquangowhichtheCrownthenresources
as part of its specific consultation requirements in the expectation it will
generateanacceptableMaoriview.
Not only is this obstructive of the direct relationship foreshadowed and
guaranteedbyTeTiritioWaitangi,whichisonebetweenNgaRangatiraoNga
HapuandtheCrown;itisindicativeofamorefundamentalfactthatthegroups
accountabilityisnottoourownkaupapa. Itisnotunreasonable toassertthat
the Crown is seeking to engineer a Treaty partner in its own image that is
subordinatetoit.
TheComplicityoftheMaoriParty
These developments require consideration within the context of the Maori
PartyswillingnesstorelinquishitsresponsibilitiestoanelitegroupofIwiChairs
whoseMaoriviewenablesitscoalitionpartnertoachievewhatitneeds,while
claimingithascleanhands.
WhentheMaoriPartystormedintoParliamenton15September2004,securing
four seats and upsetting Labour's safe and complacent hold on the Maori
electorates,itsetintrainarethinkofthewayMaoripoliticalparticipationwith
themainstreampartieswouldbemanaged.Inthehoneymoonperiodfollowing
theMaoriPartys entryintoParliamenttheywerecourtedbya rangeofMaori
interests,nottheleastofwhichweremanywholaterbecameprimemoversin
theNationalIwiChairsForum.HuiwerecalledatvenueslikePukawa,Waitangi
and Ngaruawahia, the Kingitanga stronghold, with Tuku Morgan taking a
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prominent role that builton relationshipswith theMaoriParty leadershiphe
hadnurturedduringitsyearsinopposition.
TherelationshiphasbeencementedovertimewithmeetingsbeingconvenedatthesegatheringsbyIwi leaders,ostensibly tobrief thePrimeMinisterand his
cabinet colleagues about business that the National Iwi Chairs Forum has
discussed, with Maori Party leaders Sharples and Turia invited to attend.
According to Tuku Morgan, it was one such gathering, which happened to
coincidewiththecoronationcommemorationsin2007,atwhichtheNationalIwi
Chairs Forum was formalised to promote Maori-Crown relationships.28 The
relationship has no doubt assumed greater prominence in this latest
Parliamentary term since the Maori Party cut a deal with National, who had
alreadyachievedacoalitionagreementwithACT.
InaParliamentarydebateontheForeshoreandSeabedHoneHarawiraputitthisway:
TeUruroaslinewasbasicallythattheMaoriPartyishappytoallowthis
mattertobesettledbytheIwiLeadersForumasthebestgrouptorepresentMaori
innegotiations,giventhateverymemberisanelectedmemberoftheirowniwi.
Andthereisundoubtedlyconsiderablesupportforthatpointofview,butifIcanbesobold,Isuggestthatthatisnotnecessarilytheviewheldbythetensofthousands
ofpeoplewhohavevotedfortheMaoriPartyoverthepast5years.
Infact,goingbacktowhentheMaoriPartywasstilljustatwinkleinsomebodys
eye,IbetthatifIdaskedthe40,000peoplewhomarchedonparliamentbackin2004whethertheythoughttheForeshoreandSeabeddebateshouldbesettledby
theIwiLeaders,Ireckon39,500ofthemwouldhaveprobablysaidno.29
Thissummarisesthedifficultywhichtheseundemocraticprocessespresentand
howtheMaoriPartyhaspositioneditselfintheprocess.
28Wickliffe;T;LiftingtheVeilofSecrecyKohaIssue7p.5PublishedbyFOMANACapitalLtdSeptember2010;29http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA1002/S00209.htm
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LessonsfromHistory
To demonstrate the inappropriateness of such a remedy, let me juxtapose it
againstthepracticesofthecolonialinstitutionthatisperhapsmostconsistentlyseen as one of the major causes of grievance, the Native Land Court. The
WaitangiTribunalhas foundthat theNative LandCourtwas designed to nail
homeBritish ascendency following conflict bypicking apart the communities
thatMaorihadhistorically looked toforprotection. Itwasdesignedopenlyto
destroytribaltitles[and]flattenoutthenetworkofrights.30 Inthisway,the
interests of hapu were transformed into an individualised form of private
ownershiptobeheldbyaselectgrouponbehalfofthecollective.Thecollective
size of the asset conveniently masked the miniscule and paltry fragments of
individualinterest,andwhetherbyreasonofdebt,greed,orunfamiliaritywith
thenewsystem,[theselectelite]startedtoactasindividualsandnotaskaitiaki
onbehalfoftheirpeople.31Asthepeoplewerecutout,sotoowastheirabilityto
enforcetheaccountabilityoftheleadershipinaccordancewithtikanga. 32Itwas
withinthisimposedrealitythataMaorivulnerabilitywascreatedandexploited.
History is repeating itself. The process that isnow beingadopted to remedy
prejudices that flow from injustices inflicted upon Maori is a process of
transferring assets from collectiveMaori ownership to control by an elite - a
process that has been repeatedly criticised for the intergenerational
impoverishmentthatitimposeduponMaoriinthepast.
ThedestructionofMaoricommunitiesandthesubordinationoftheirintereststo
achieveeconomicimperativesappearstobesofundamentallyingrainedintothe
politicalpsychethatitisasmuchapartofNewZealandCultureasBuzzyBees
andPictureTeaTowels.
30WaitangiTribunal,TurangaTangataTurangaWhenua,WAI-814,2004,p.436.31Ibid,p.438.32Ibid.
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RidingtheTideofDiscontent
Toput thesedevelopments inabroadercontext,the FisheriesActwaspassed
whenDonBrashandtheNationalPartyhadwhipped-upanti-Maori,anti-Treatysentiment into a frenzy - the Iwi versus Kiwi dichotomy. One commentator
suggests itwas these events, coupledwith the widespread protests byMaori
following the NgatiApa decision and the Labour Partys entrenchment of the
Foreshore and Seabed Act, that became a call to arms for Ngai Tahu Chief
Executive Mark Solomon to organise corporate opposition.33 It is claimed
becauseofthishewenttoseethelateQueenDameTeAtairangiKaahutogetthe
royal seal of approval for a pan-tribal coalition to drive Maori interests and
concerns.
But there is amajorelementmissing in this explanationof the genesis of the
National Iwi Chairs Forum. What is clear to me was that like the protest
movementsofthe1980s,theForeshoreandSeabeddebacleof2004,whichsaw
the creationof theMaoriParty, hadmobilisedMaoriback onto the streets in
numbersthathadnotbeenseenforadecadeormore.Itisestimatedthatover
60,000 Maori participated in the Hikoi that followed the clamour for direct
action after the Labour Partys leadership, the Prime Minister and
Attorney-General,rejectedtheNgatiApadecision.
Inthethirteendayjourney fromtheFarNorthtoWellington,Maoriorganised
protestsinWhangarei,Auckland,Hamilton,Rotorua,Taupo,Whanganui,Wairoa,
Napier, Waipukurau, Palmerston North and New Plymouth in outrage at the
largest confiscationof lands to have occurred since the early colonial period.
Networks that had long lain dormant since the 1980s were reactivated. The
initial call came from Ngati Kahungungu elders to Hikoi in the spirit of Mana
MotuhakeandKotahitanga.ThentheleadershipandformerorganisersofWAC,
(Waitangi Action Committee),TeKawariki, TeKotahitangaoWaiarikiand the
PeaceMovementAotearoa called for a national co-ordinationofdirect action.
33Wickliffe,;T,;LiftingtheVeilofSecrecy,Koha,Issue7,p.5,PublishedbyFOMANACapitalLtdSeptember2010.
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Oldheadswerejoinedbyanewvanguardofenergeticyoungwomenleadersof
theTinoRangatiratangaMovement.KuraKaupapanetworkswere tapped into
andhapuandmaraecommitteeswereapproachedinthestyleoftheGreatLand
MarchtotakeresponsibilityforvariouslegsofthejourneytoParliamentwhenitbecame clear that the Labour Party was to entrench the ownership of these
remnantsofthecoastlinewhichsitoutsidegeneraltitle(some30percentofthe
total land mass involved) into Crown hands. The huge inequity which still
subsistsintherecentlyintroducedMarkIIversionofthislaw,isthatMaoriwere
to be conferred the opportunity to negotiate limited rights to these lands as
proscribedbystatute,whilevaststretchesofthecoastlinewhicharealreadyin
private ownership, remained untouched and outside the confiscation and
regulatoryregime.
TheNICFhavecapitalisedonthatmomentumforchange.Surfingonthetideof
discontent theyhaveassumed the spacethatgrassrootsactivistscreatedand
promotedneoliberalgoals,suchastherighttoexploitthevastnaturalresources
under the sea, that are more in keeping with capitalism than with the tino
rangatiratangathatwasbeingcalledfor.Significantly,theyhavemovedalsoto
assume the role that had previously been occupied by the earlier Crown
construct,theNewZealandMaoriCouncil,inthisregard.
TeraukawaaRerenoa
PirikitePunui
Hekaioraora
LiketheparasiteofRerenoa
ThatclingstothePunuiDevouringitsessencealive
SeparatingTangatafromWhenua
Ironically,many groupswho had argued that it is for iwi to determinewhat
constitutesaniwiandwhoalsorepresentsiwi,becamelegallyincorporatedto
take advantage of the opportunityoffered byLabours Iwi RunangaAct. It is
apposite toremind ourselves that this Iwi Runanga legislationdid not survive
because the proposalwas considered to be a monoculutral documentwhichundermined the tribal base of Te Ao Maori, misinterpreted cultural values,
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culturesandbeliefsoftheIwiandsoughttoregulatetribalaffairsinamanner
thatwasinconsistentwithcustomarybeliefs.34
One cannot under-estimate the influence of the Fisheries Commissionideologues,ShaneJonesandWhaimutuDewes, inthis reorganisationofMaori
communitiesintoiwicorporateseither.35Bothhadbeenprominentadvocates
inthe IwiCorporatismdebatesgenerated bythe IwiRunangaBill,withShane
Jonesbeingpartofa laterattempt inthe1990stodevelopwhathetermedan
elitepaepae, a taumata to be created as the authoritative voice comprised of
representatives of four organisations - the Maori Womens Welfare League,
MaoriCongress,theMaoriCouncilandtheFederationofMaoriAuthorities.But
thisideafoundered,ashasthevisibilityofmanyoftheseorganisations,withonly
FoMAmaintainingany prominence in the nationalMaoripolitical scenetoday
andtheNewZealandMaoriCouncilunderreview.
Giventhishistory,itisnotsurprisingthatoneofthestrongestcriticismsofthe
NationalIwiChairsForumis thatit isnotdemocraticandismadeupofavery
smallsectoroftheMaoricommunitywhohaslittle,ifany,directaccountability
tothewhanauandhapuitserves.
Thepeopleat thegrassroots,anduntilrecentlyMaoriwomen,werepractically
invisibleinthedelegationsthathavemetwithvariousgovernmentMinistersof
the Crownonthe issuesof the Foreshore and Seabed replacement legislation,
EmissionsTradingSchemeandPublicPrivatePartnerships.Moredisconcerting
is that those most directly affected by these policies, Maori communities
themselves, seem to be irrelevant in the whole process of reporting and
accountability and are forced to rely on media releases and the nightly
state-funded televisionprogrammesTeKaeaandTeKarere for informationon
what the ILGs or theNCIF isup to. It hasnot gone uncommented either that
duringtheWaitangicommemorationstheIwiChairsForumpreferstomeetin
34NZPD,6December1989,14429.
35InCrownProposalsfortheSettlementofTreatyClaimstheCrownalsoclaimsthatitwishestobe sure that the assets and resources transferred toMaori weremanaged and administeredwithinaproperlegalstructure.
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hotelvenuesatHaruruFallsandtheWaitangiCopthorne,awayfromwherethe
publicdebatesareoccurringaroundTeTiritiatTeTiiMarae,againdenyinghapu
and iwi the right to have an understanding and input into thematters under
consideration.Theirstyleofoperationisquitedistinctfromthatwhichoperatedduring the era of the National Maori Congress, which actively encouraged
representationofupto5delegatesfromeachoftheiwiparticipantswithspecific
representationforRangatahiMaori,Womenandothersectorsofthecommunity.
Whatisalsoclear isthatovera relativelyshortperiodtheNCIFExecutivehas
emerged as the key stakeholdergroupwhichappears todetermine theMaori
Partys position on fundamental issues, and the Maori Party has acted as adoormantoallowthemaccesstothekeycabinetstrategycommitteeonTreaty
Issues comprising National Party Members of Parliament Bill English, Gerry
Brownlee, Chris Finlayson, the Prime Minister, John Key and Maori Party
co-leaderPitaSharples.Iusethismetaphordeliberately,becauseinthewordsof
Tuku Morgan in an interview conducted in Te Reo Maori with Waihoroi
ShortlandontheMaoriTelevisioncommissionedprogrammeTeTepu:36
Kotetokoononei-kahokimaiaukitetokoononei,a,kiaahuanei,he
torutoruana,he,ngameaoteAoMaorikataeatetotoroatutepatoto
i runga i te kuaha o te Pirimea, ka tuwheramai, ahakoa he aha te
kaupapa.
Thissix,backtothesix.IthinkthereareveryfewMaoriwhocanknockat
thePMsdooranditwillopen,whatevertheissue.
Hetorutoruanaingameaperaana.
Veryfewpeoplecandothat.
Ka mutu, ahakoa ka whakaturia ko tena ko tena ko te mahi uaua
rawa atu ko te patoto i runga i nga kuaha o nga Minita nei, ka
tuwheramai,katomoatutatoukirotokiteatawherawheraiotatou
kaupapa.
Whilst different people are chosen, whats really difficult is knocking at
theseMinistersdoors,toopenup,toletusin,todiscussourissuesadroitly.
36 Te Tepu, Series 6, Episode 15. Transcript from Interview with NICF leader TukuroirangiMorganbyWaihoroiShortland.
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Na,koiratemahinuikiahuanei.
Ithinkthatsthemaintask.
Nareira,hemamaake,kiatukumatetokoononei,ngakuahaneiepa-epatukiatu,epatotoatu,kiatereteputaatutomatoukiroto,kite
atahamahama ite tepu kimuai te aroaroo te kawanatanga, ki te
meaatu,e,aneietewhakaarooteiwiMaoriputanoaitemotunei.
You see, its easier, tolet thissix beatagainstthesedoors, knockonthese
doors,toenterquicklytohammerthetableinfrontofGovernmentttosay,hey,hereiswhatMaoriaroundthecountrythink.
As even prominent right wing commentator Matthew Hooten has observed:
TheGroups interrelationshipswith iwi, theMaoriPartyand theGovernment
aremurky.TheGroupdoesnotclaimtospeakforallMaori,butbehavesasifit
does.37IwillusethecasestudiesoftheETS,TreeLordsandWhanauOrato
illustratethepoint.
TheHijackoftheMaoriDevelopmentAgendabyILG
TheEmissionsTradingScheme
In2002theLabour-ledgovernmentpassedtheClimateChangeResponseActto
enableNewZealandtomeetitsobligationsundertheKyotoProtocol.Justprior
toXmas2006on18December,theGovernmentreleasedfurtherinformationon
NewZealand's options in responding to the issue of climate change. The
Ministry of Environment planned 11 regional consultation hui with Maori to
occurbetween12February2007and14March2007,withfinalsubmissionsdue
on 30March. The process of consultation was prescriptive. At each hui,
attendees were required to discuss the information and to select a single
representative to a Climate Change Maori Reference Group38 for a twelfth
37 HootonMatthew:Foreshore & Seabed IssueRisksGoing offthe RailsExceltiumCorporate&
PublicAffairsQuarterly;SummerEdition2010;p.10.38 LTukua,S Wilson, AHoukamau,J Ruru, TPaenga, MBlack,S Clair,T Wilson,HRuru andMSkerrettseeFigure:RelationshipswiththeIwiLeadershipGroupMinistryofEnvironment.
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consultative huion29March2007,whichhad beenaddedasanafterthought.
FinalsubmissionsonETSwereduethenextday,on30March2007.39
Atallofthe12consultationhui,theprincipalconcernsoftheparticipantsfellintofourbroadcategories: the focusof theemissions tradingschemewastoo
stronglyoneconomicsattheexpenseoftheenvironment(withenvironmental
benefitsunclear);theneedtoensuretheobligationsofTeTiritiwereprovided
for; the need togiveparamouncy toaMaoriworldviewand abroadTikanga
Maori approach; and that there appeared no obvious way for Maori to have
meaningfulandongoinginputinthescheme.Moreover,thelargestandrichest
industrieswerebeingprotectedfromthecostoftheirpollutingwiththeburdenbeing shared across all other sectors. Major criticisms of the consultation
processincludedthelackofanyanalysisoftheeffectsonMaori.
On24July2007,theMaoriReferenceGroup(MRG)hadmetwithMinistersofthe
Crown David Parker, Michael Cullen and Parekura Horomia to hear the
Governmentresponsetotheirsubmission.40Whatisclearisthatrightuptothis
pointtheCrownrepresentativeshadalsomaintainedstrategicrelationshipswith
the Federation of Maori Authorities (FoMA), who claimed to be acting in a
representativecapacitynotonlyfortheirmembersbutalsoforandonbehalfof
all Maori who own land or were Crown Forest License (CFL) claimants to
pre-1990forestlandsandsubstantialpost-1989forests. 41Therewasnosignof
formal recognition of the NewZealand Maori Council in this process of
engagement, which is highly unusual given their joint role in cementing
obligations via the courts with respect to the proposed sell down of the
NewZealand State Forests and the consequent passing of the Crown Forest
AssetsActsome20yearsearlierandthestatutoryfunctionthatisthepreserve
39NewZealandMinistryfortheEnvironment(2007), ConsultationwithMaorionClimateChange:HuiReport,MinistryfortheEnvironment,Wellington.40 Submission on Climate Change (Emissions Trading and Renewable Preference) Bill to theFinance and Expenditure Committee, Iwi Leadership Group and Maori Reference Group
Executive,29February2008.41 Federation of Maori Authorities: Submission to the Emissions Trading Scheme ReviewCommittee.
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of the NewZealand Maori Council to act in a representative capacity for all
Maori.42
The very next day, Ministers Cullen, Horomia and Jim Anderton met with "acollectiveofiwileaders"43tooutlinetheGovernment'spreferredresponsetothe
questionofclimatechange.Fromthiscollective,anIwileadershipgroupwas
then established,which includedApiranaMahuika,Timi TeHeuheu andMark
Solomon for the ILG and Paul Morgan for FOMA. Interestingly the NCIF
background paper confirms that the ILG working party was established in
October 2007 but does not note at whichmeeting of theNCIF that this was
confirmed.Noneoftheseindividualshadbeenselectedfromthe12regionalhui
to represent theMaori opinion on ETS. Their leadership of the processwas
assumed following themeetingwith the CrownMinisters. Theywere initially
calledtheClimateChangeMaoriLeadershipGroup,buthassincebeenchanged
totheClimateChange IwiLeadershipGroup,and isusuallynowreferredtoas
simplytheIwiLeadershipGroup(ILG)speakingonissueslessdirectlyrelatedto
climatechange.
In October 2007, the government conducted a further 12 consultation hui
specificallyontheETSandengagednewtechnocrats,theMaoriReferenceGroup
Executive (MRGE) ofRogerPikia, JamieTuutaand LisaKanawa to facilitate a
processofengagementwithMaoriassistedbyconsultancygroupIwiCorporate
SolutionsleadbyWillieTeAho.44Inaddition,areportwascommissionedonthe
42MaoriCommunityDevelopmentAct1962ss17and18.43 Submission on Climate Change (Emissions Trading and Renewable Preference) Bill to theFinance and Expenditure Committee, Iwi Leadership Group and Maori Reference GroupExecutive,29February2008.44 The Ministry of the Environment also supported participation of Maori Reference GroupmembersateachoftheregionalhuiandsupportedadditionalhuifortheMaoriReferenceGroupon25Septemberand25October2007;aMaorileadership-leadNationalMaoriClimateChangeHuion3Septemberand26October2007;aNationalMaoriForestryHuion8November2007;andweeklymeetingsofanexecutiveofMaoriReferenceGroupduringOctoberandNovember.Finally,governmentsupportwasalsoprovidedforthetransportation,accommodationandmeals
formembersoftheClimateChangeIwiLeadershipGroup,MaoriReferenceGroupExecutiveandsecretariattomeetwithMinistersandattendallnationalhuiincludingthemostrecentoneheldon18December2007.
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Maori impacts from theETS InterimHigh Level Findings by Chris Karamea
InsleyandRichardMeade.45
TheMaoriReferenceGrouporganised aNationalMaoriClimateChangeHui inRotoruainOctober2007,withthreesubsequenthuiinNovember,Decemberand
February2008heldinHamiltonandWellington.Astatementinaletterdated
13December2007fromtheIwiLeadershipGrouptoMinistersCullen,Anderton,
Horomia,NanaiaMahuta,TrevorMallardandParkerinresponsetoanOfficials'
Reportistelling:"wehaveadvocatedontwoplatforms.Thefirstplatformis
theTreatyofWaitangiandthesecondistheMaoriEconomy.Duetothetight
timeframes and the economic nature of the ETS, we have focused on the
economicimpacts."46
TheIwiLeadershipGroup(ILG)andMaoriReferenceGroupExecutive(MRGE)
gave a joint submission on the Climate Change (Emissions Trading and
Renewable Preference) Bill to the Finance and Expenditure Committee on
29February2008claimingthattheirpositionhadbeenunanimouslysupported
by Iwi leaders that met at Waitangi on 4February 2008 (and again on
20February2008atPukawa).47
Parallel to this process, the Maori Party had been developing its own policy
approachtothequestion.TheMaoriPartyMinorityreportontheBill,whichwas
eventuallyreleasedearlyin2009,verymuchreflectedthemattersthathadbeen
promoted by Maori during the consultation hui. The report stated that: the
nation needs to grapple with the notion of sustainability and the increasing
challengeposedbyachangingclimatesystemandpendingpeakoiltothinkand
livedifferently,tolivesustainably,48andoptedtoopposetheETSinfavourof
theimpositionofacarbontax.Thegravamenforthispositionwasexpressed
45Dated23October2007.46Mahuika,Apirana(forandonbehalfoftheClimateChangeIwiLeadershipGroup),Letterof13October2007,ClimateChangeIwiLeadershipGroupResponsetoOfficialsReport.47 Submission on Climate Change (Emissions Trading and Renewable Preference) Bill to the
Finance and Expenditure Committee, Iwi Leadership Group and Maori Reference GroupExecutive,29February2008.48EmissionsTradingSchemeReviewCommittee:114.
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thisway:anETSallowssectorstopolluteandtradeuptotheKyototarget,but
doesnotincludeincrementalemissionsreductiontargetsinitsdesign.With
theemphasisontrading-establishingandmaintainingtheconditionsforit-the
overarching problem of unsustainable economic growth remainsunaddressed.49
Labourslawwaspassed.Priortothefinalisationoftheschemeinlate2009the
IwiLeadersGroup(ILG)andMaoriReferenceGroup(MRG)convenedafurther6
huioveraperiodof12dayscalledbetween28October2009and10November
2009.50Despitetheshorttimeperiod,theILGclaimover170attendedthehui
withthehighestturnoutbeing92peopleattheNationalHuiinRotoruaandthe
smallest turnout 2 people at the Nelson hui. That is, 170 people out of the
500,000estimatedMaoripopulation. The ILG claimed intheirreport ofthese
meetingsthatthecaliberoftheattendeesateachofthehuimeantthegroup
hadasignificantlevelofsupportfromMaoridomfortheirproposal.
As onewhoattended thehui in Rotorua in this roundof consultationonthis
matter, it needs to be emphasised that thesemeetings are by no meanswell
advertised,openandtransparentintheirpurposeandobjectives.Thereislittle
materialdistributedpriortohuiandthehuithemselvesareconductednotbythe
Iwi Leaders Group, (ILG), but by the technocrat advisers that are in their
travellingroadshows.IntheinstanceoftheETS,theILGsecretariatcompriseda
groupaptlynamedIwiCorporateSolutions,WillieTeAho,hiswife,LindaTeAho
and employeesGina Rangi andMahinarangi Maikawith Mr Te Aho being the
49EmissionsTradingSchemeReviewCommittee:113.SpecificreasonsforopposingtheETSalsoincludeda)anETSwillnotmakeasignificantcontributiontoloweringourdomesticemissions;b) the Maori Partywas unconvinced that the market is the bestmechanism to set pricesoncarbon;c)thecurrentmodeoflivingindevelopedcountriesisnotsustainableintothefutured)the urgency of the climate-change crisisdemands the developmentand implementationofaneffective scheme that is not reliant onwhether or when the price of carbon increases to asufficient level to incentivise change; e) intensity based allocations and subsidies distort themarket model by allowing businesses to increase their emissions without penalty and berewardedforit.
50ClimateChangeLeadershipGroupPositionPaper,13November2009preparedfortheMaoriPartylocatedathttp://cst.org.nz/groups/job_vacancies/files/f/909433-2009-12-14T165354Z/13%20Nov%20ILG%20position%20paper%20for%20Maori%20Party.pdf
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maininterfacebetweenhuiparticipantsandthegroup.51Muchoftheadvicethat
wasprofferedinsupportoftheILGspositionontheETSwasnotavailablefor
distributiononthebasisofthecommercialsensitivityofthematters.Evenmore
worryingwas that the ILGspositionhad byOctober 2009 departed from theMaoriPartyminorityviewthathadopposedthegovernmentsschemebecause
ofitsrelativeineffectivenessandinequalities,includingthesubsidisationofthe
nations largest polluters at the cost of households and small-medium
businesses.52
AlthoughtheMaoriPartywerenotwillingtotalkaboutitsrelationshipwith,or
theeffectoflobbyingby,theIwiLeadershipGrouporthewiderNICFforthat
mattertheirpositionsonanemissionstradingschemebythistimewereclosely
aligned.Newspaperreportsatthetimesuggestedthatindividualsamongstthe
ranks of the Maori Party National Council tried a last ditch effort to seek
commitmenttotheearlierminorityreportpositionon thebasisoftheburden
the scheme would place on low income households.53 The party's co-vice
president,TeOrohiPaul,issuedastatementtomakeitclearthepartywasnot
aboutto"welch"onthedealwiththegovernment,althoughthisspecificmatter
hadnotbeenpartoftheMaoriParty-NationalPartyrelationshipagreement.
TreeLords
These developments cannot be understood in isolation from the commercial
forestryinterestsintheTreelordssettlement.On25September2008thelargest
ever Treaty ofWaitangi deal, since the 1992 Sealords fisheries arrangement,
passedintolaw.TheCentralNorthIslandForestsLandCollectiveSettlementAct
legislatedtheso-calledTreelordsdealwhichinvolved$195.7millionofCrown
forest landcovering176,000hectares, plusabout$223million in land rentals
51Seediagramhttp://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/climate/summary-key-themes-consultation-hui-Feb08/html/figure/page8/html52EmissionsTradingSchemeReviewCommittee,seealsoSustainabilityCouncilofNewZealandMediaRelease12November2009.HouseholdswouldbearhalfthetotalcostsresultingfromtheproposedchangestotheETSduringitsfirstfiveyears(52%),whileaccountingforjustafifthofallemissions(19%).Pastoralfarmerswouldgaina$1.1billionsubsidyandpaytheequivalentof2%of their fair share of the KyotoBill during the first five yearsof the scheme, while large
industrialproducerswouldgaina$488millionsubsidy.53http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/3095679/Maori-Party-revolt-threatens-Emissions-Trading-Scheme
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thathadaccumulatedintheCrownForestRentalTrustsince1989andanannual
incomestreamof$13million.Itwasalsoasignificantnewstepinthatitwasa
treaty settlement across several tribes, rather than a pan-tribal or individual
tribe-Crowndisposition.
CrownForestryRentalTrust(CFRT)annualreportsshow$57millionwaspaid
out in costs to effect the deal since 1990, with $30million of that allocation
directlyattributedtothefiveyearperiodinwhichtheTreelordsAgreementin
Principlewasnegotiatedandthensigned.Almost$20millionwentonexpenses
foriwirepresentativestomeetandnegotiateamongthemselvesregularly.Part
ofthe$57millionwasspentalsoonlawyers(intheprocessesoflitigationand
lobbying over the period), consultants and those paid to implement the deal.
Significantly this expenditure did not include the further allocation from
Treasurythatwasallocatedaspartoftheexpensestoconcludethedealin2008.
What isknownis that individual iwi facilitatorswhowere initially engaged to
facilitateinformationflowbetweentheCrownandthoseiwiengagedbenefitted
significantlyfromthearrangement.GeorgeAsher,wasreportedtohaveearned
$88,000 during May and June 2008 from Crown Forestry Rental Trust alone.
Twootheriwifacilitators,MattTePouandGrahamPryor,earned$67,500each
over the sameperiod. The Treasury increased the spendingonthe deal's iwi
facilitators by $90,000, although it refused to confirm each person's cut.
MrAsher confirmed in an interview with the New Zealand Herald that the
negotiations component of the settlement cost about $5 million, including
administrativesupport.54
ProvidedtheGovernmentwasabletopassitsemissionstradinglegislation,the
CentralNorthIsland(CNI)collectiveofiwicoveredbythesettlementreportedly
stoodtogainitabout$40millionincarboncreditsaspartoftheTreelordsdeal.
NationaloptedtocarryovertheseelementsofLaboursETSscheme.Itisnot
insignificantthattheClimateChangeLeadershipGroupreliedheavilyontheCNI
IwiHoldingsLimitedmeetingof5November2009,heldattheTePuniKokiri
Offices,Rotorua,toprovideevidenceofsupportforitsposition.TheMaoriParty
54TahanaY,NewZealandHerald,4July2009http://www.nzherald.co.nz/forestry/news/article.cfm?c_id=47&objectid=10582485
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abandoned its earlier opposition to the scheme and supported the Bill. In
responsetoaquestionaboutwhatitwantedinreturn,Turiareplied:intheend,
it's not so much particularly what the Maori Party want, it is what the Iwi
Leadershipwant,andtheyaretheoneswhohavebeenleadingthedialogue,theyhavebeenaskingustodefinitelysignupforit.55
WhattheILGandtheMaoriPartydidnotpointoutwasthattheschemewould
entitle Maori to less than half the compensation that is being paid to other
classesofowners.Pre-1990forestlandownerswillreceivecompensationofup
to60 emissions unitsper hectare, if the landwas acquiredbefore 31October
2002. Owners of land sold after 31October 2002 receive only 39 units perhectare.ButsuccessfulclaimantstoCFLlandtransferredafter1January2008,
mostlikelytobeMaoribeneficiariesofTreatysettlements,wouldreceiveonly
18 units per hectare. In return, as highlighted in the Ngai Tahu and FOMA
Submissions to the Select Committee examining the National governments
revisedETSscheme,theETSwouldencumberpropertyrights,andimposereal
andheavycostsonusinganddevelopingassets,withaparticularlyprejudicial
effectonthosetransferredunderTreatysettlements.AttheendofNovember2009,adealwasreachedwithETSwhichprovidedanextra$24millionforthe
home insulation scheme, targetedspecifically at low income homes, a specific
requirement to consult on fisheries, forestry and agricultural allocations; on
futuretargetsandonanycomplementarymeasures.AsidedealwithNgaiTahu
andfourotheriwiinwhichtheygeta70-yearleaseon35,000hectaresofDoC
landsand100percentofanycarboncreditsearnedfortheperiodofthelease
and an all expenses paid junket to Copenhagen for two members of the IwiLeadership group, Roger Pikia of CNI Holdings Ltd and Chris Insley of Ngati
PorouForestsLtd.
TheNewRestructuring
55TuriaT;18October2009inTranscriptofinterviewwithGuyonEspineronQ&ASundayOctober182009p5
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This process has not been an isolated one. Parallel to this process of policy
development, regionalconsultationand then interventionbyanelitegroupof
men in thename of the Iwi LeadersGroup has occurred on anumber of key
issues since the Maori Party/National Party cooperation agreement. PrivatePrisons,Public PrivatePartnerships andmost recently theWaterForumhave
followed the same process of engagement almost exactly. Perhaps most
disconcertingisthattheWhanauOrapolicyinitiativehasnowbeenhi-jackedby
thesameinterventionistapproach,sothattheIwiChairsareactivevoicesinthe
privatisationofsocialservicesanddemandingtherightofvetooverproviders
whohaveexpressedinterestindeliveringwhanauoraprogrammes.
WhanauOra
A report was prepared by the Taskforce on Whanau-Centred Initiatives for
TarianaTuria,Minister for the Community and Voluntary Sector. Bill English
joinedMaoriPartyco-leaderandproposedWhanauOraministerTarianaTuria
atTePuniKokiriforthepubliclaunchofthetaskforcereportinApril2010.
TheTaskforcedevelopedaframeworkbasedonareviewofrelevantliterature,
the experiences of health and social service agencies, an analysis of oral
submissions received at 22 hui throughout the country during October and
November 2009 where over 600 people attended, and over 100 written
submissions from individuals and organisations. Common themes emerged,
particularly the need for Whanau Ora to demonstrate a Maori heart, ensure
localrepresentationindecision-making,minimalbureaucracy,sustainabilityand
adequate resourcing, a research and evaluation component and quality
relationshipsbetweenwhanau,providers and iwi. Fundsweretobediverted
fromexistingstateagenciesintoanewWhanauOraTrustwhichwouldcontract
outworktoserviceproviderstodealwiththeproblemsonawhanaubasis.In
otherwords,whereanindividualfamilymemberhadhealth,educationorjustice
systemproblems, the individualwouldbe viewedaspartoftheirwhanau and
thewholewhanauwouldbeengaged in finding solutions. TheTaskforce also
promoted collaboration and shared infrastructure in the wake of the
proliferation of semi-autonomous Maori provider organisations who had
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emergedwithintheframeworkofcommercialcontestabilityofHealthPHOsand
EducationPTEssincethe1980srestructuringofdeliveryoftheseservices.
An Iwi LeadersWorking Groupwas confirmed atWaitangi during the Treatycommemorations in early 2010 to engage with the Crown on the policy. Its
mandate was to achieve the following visions for the contributions of Iwi to
realisingWhanauOra:aJointTreatypartnerapproachtodefiningWhanauOra
outcomesandsupportingtherolloutofWhanauOra;Iwi-ledimplementationof
WhanauOraintheirrespectivetribalareas;andWhanauOrapilots.56
ByMay2010theideaoftheTrusttodevolvetheserviceshaddisappearedand
the budget had been slashed to just 4%of the original proposal. As Nanaia
MahutapointedoutinamediareleaseTarianaTuriamusthavefeltalittleshort
changedafterthegovernmentdecidedtoallocateamere$33.5milliondollarsa
yearfor4yearstofundWhanauora,$800milliondollarsshortofwhatshefirst
expected.InthecaseoftheWhanauOrafundingitlooksasifTarianaisrobbing
PaulatopayPita.57
More significantly, Maori grass roots community workers were starting to
describeWhanauOra asthenew restructuringandopenly askingMaoriParty
Members of Parliament to explain why Whanau Ora, which was once a
overarchingprogrammedesignedtooverhaulthedeliveryofsocialservicesto
Maoriwithfundingof$1billion,hadmorphedintoasmallscaleprogrammefor
allNewZealanders,beingrunoutofTePuniKokirionabudgetlessthanthatof
JohnKeyscycleway.58Questionswerealsoposedaroundhowtoqualitatively
assessthenewprojectandhowmuchoftheallocatedbudgetwillbeutilizedby
TePuniKokiritojustrollouttheproject.
56http://www.iwichairs.maori.nz/Special-Rapporteur/Iwi-Chairs-Forum-Background-Paper.pdfp1157MahutaNanaia,PressRelease:NewZealandLabourParty,6May2010http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA1005/S00089.htm58MaoriLegalForum,July2010,QuestionbyTipeneMarrofNgatiRangitihiandDrMarilyn
Brewin,DirectorofResearch,NgPaeoteMramatangatoMemberofParliamentforTaiTongaRahuiKatene.
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Inafamiliarpattern,MinistersoftheCrown(thistimePaulaBennett)metwith
theIwileadershipGroupinAugust2010imploringthemasrespectedleaders
togobacktohapu,iwiandyourwhanauandsay its time to faceup to the
systemic violence in their communities.59
Tariana Turia was defending thecorporateleadersasthosethatwouldbestprovidethesolutionsintheindustry
ofmiserythatWhanauOraisdirectedtoalleviate,despitetheobviouslackof
expertiseoreveninvolvementbymanyofthemoreprominentmembersofthe
ILGinprogrammesfortheeliminationofviolence.Shecomplainedatthesame
meeting:Wereceiveadailydietofmessageswhichexpresssincereconcerns
abouttheroleofiwi.Theyusethetermcorporateiwi'.Itellyouwhat-when
youarepartofaGovernmentthereisnothingmoredishearteningthantohear
suchcriticismfromourown;ofpeoplewhoaretryingtomoveusforward.60
Reflectionsonwheretofromhere?
In his reflections on Maori Sovereignty, Bruce Jesson reminded Pakeha that
TeTiritioWaitangiforeshadowedacommunitythatbothMaoriandPakehaare
part of.61 He understood the Maori Sovereignty movement as a force of
resistancetoacapitalisteconomythatcommodifiednatureandhumanity. Inthedebateonwhoweareasanation,weneedtore-examineourunderstandingof
national identity and our heritage, and to confront the ongoing process of
colonisationthatdispossessesMaoriofresourcesforthebenefitofothers,asif
wehavenopriorrightorrelationshiptothispartoftheplanet.Thechallengeby
itsnaturerequiresPakehatobreakapartfromthehegemonyofStatepracticeto
align with Maori, not just to confront injustice, but to also dispense with a
constitutionalframeworkfromwhichinjusticeisanaturalproduct.
59BennettPaula,PressRelease,23August2010http://www.national.org.nz/Article.aspx?ArticleID=3372860TuriaTariana,AddresstoIwiLeadersForum19August2010http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA1008/S00477/address-to-iwi-leaders-forum.htm
61Jesson,Bruce,WaitangiAPakehaIssueToo, firstpublishedinAucklandMetro,1983,p.109,andsubsequentlyinAndrewSharp(ed) ToBuilda NationCollectedWritings19751999,Penguin,Auckland,2005.
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Toachievethis,Jessonremindedusthatwemustsetseriousgoalsforournation
and ourselves.62 Facing this challenge will involve a reinterpretation of
sustainability and economic development and, in light of the discussion this
evening,whattheIwiLeaderswouldhaveusbelievetinorangatiratanga,MaoriSovereigntytobe.Thereisnomagicbullet;yetthechallengesthatconfrontus
are urgent and require immediate action. That means believing in and
articulating the values of a pathway to real alternatives sourced in Kaupapa
Maori.
While traditional approaches to development focus on achieving growth,
believing that this would trickle down and benefit everyone, I believe thatpeoplemust be at the centre of thedevelopmentprocess. I look to our own
conceptualframeworkaroundthetermtangatawhenuatoconfirmthis.Because
the present economic growth model is premised on the commodification of
taongaforprofitandtheseparationoftangatafromwhenuatoachievethis,itis
problematicinanumberofways.Economicgrowthofthiskindisnotenoughto
achievehumandevelopmentortomaintaintheethicofcommunitywellbeing
which lays at the heartofconstructs likewhanau (family), hapu (community)
and iwi (nation), which are the esteemed institutions of society expressly
stipulated to be protected in TeTiriti. As Jesson reminds us, a community
dependsoncontinuity. Anation and its institutionsdependoncontinuity too.
Weastangatawhenuarequireourtangatatobeconnectedtoourhomelandsin
morethananotionalway.
In their haste to break away from tight control of the state and poor
socio-economic status, the ILG have turned towards forces ofglobalisation for
emancipation,eithernotrecognisingthattheywerebeingmanipulatedtowards
new forms of colonialism and domination or unable to identify any real
alternativetoachievetheirgoals .Theirbehaviour,inpart,mirrorstheinability
ofAotearoaNewZealandasanationto confronttheproblemsofconstructing
62Jesson,Bruce,TherehavealwaysbeenAlternatives:OnlytheirPurposeisMad,DunmorePressLtd,1999,p.216.
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alternativeswhentherehasbeensuchasystemicfailurefromourexperiment
withneoliberalismoverthepast25years.
Notwithstanding this, the Government process has been one of concertedco-option ofMaorielites tomaintain this particular agenda. Consultationhas
beenorganisedbysuccessiveGovernmentsontheirterms.Fromthebeginning,
theGovernmenthasimposedunrealistictimeframesforMaoritounderstandall
theissuesandimplications,todiscusswidelyandformopinionsonthis,andto
communicate these to the Government. At each stage, groups have become
smallerand less representativebyrequiring the consultation huitoelectonly
onerepresentativeeachtoformagroupthatwastorepresentallMaori(without
the time to make this possible), or by reducing that group to an executive
(presumably because of commitments and time constraints), or by the Iwi
LeadershipGroupbecomingtheinterfacewiththeCrown.
Despitethefeedbackfromtheconsultationhuithatthefocuswastooeconomic,
forwhateverreasonateachstageoftheconsultativeinput,thetechnocratsand
advisers have focused more on the economics of ETS and devolution of
contractualrelationshipsand benefitstoIwiCorporates,and lessontheother
concerns, such as impacts on the environment and retention of a Maori
worldviewsafeguardingTreatyrelationships.Thisbehaviourhasculminatedin
theMaoriPartycompletelychangingoradaptingitspolicyandobjectivesinline
withtheIwiLeadershipGroupsedicts.Thereisahugesenseofurgency,created
in part by the media hype, to roll out initiatives with very little analysis or
understandingofthephilosophyofthepolicyorimperativesontheirdelivery.
Inthe current context,Maoriare the losers as it is theirassets and resources
exclusivelythatarecapturedwithinaconfiscatoryregime.Theireofthegeneral
public is inflamedbymis-informationcampaignswhichsuggest that the slight
possibilitythatMaorimightachievesomesmallredressisawindfallthatthey
areundeservingof.TheSeabedandForeshoreisaclassicexample.Politicians
and themediawhipped up a furore about the right of Kiwi to suntan on the
beach. Having nationalised these resources, and denied any traditional
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relationships to the Takutai and Papamoana that Maori may possess, the
government is licensing transnational companies like Petrobras to mine the
petroleumandothermineraldepositswhichsubsistinthecontinentalshelf.
ThishighlightstheoldMarxistnotionofafalseconsciousness:Maoriaredefined
inoppositiontowhatisgoodforthenationandaretoldtoforgive,forgetand
moveon.Wearetoldwemustacceptanidentitythatwearenot.Unfortunately
thedenialofrightsandconfiscationcontinuesandthereisnowheretomoveto,
sothey take to the road. Ostracizing the indigenous intheirown landswhen
theysucceedisnotanewpolicy,atleastnottothiscountry,obviousexamples
being the imprisonment of TeKooti at Wharekauri, TeWhiti and Tohu in
DunedinandRuaKenanaandMokomokoinMountEden.Morerecentexamples
includethelateEvaRickard,thelateSydJacksonandthelateNikoTangaroa.It
is important to note that none of these people were imprisoned for acts of
violence,eventhoughstate-sponsoredviolencewasinflictedonthem.
The employmentofpoliciesofRealpolitikto 'radicalise'Maoriviewsserves to
legitimisetheongoingintentionsofthestatetoproceedwithitsagendaandto
denyMaoriparticipationinthedebate.Issuesofjusticeandpolicyarereflected
insteadas issuesofracialdifference. OnceMaoriareseparatedinsuchaway,
thetaskthenturnstocreatinganeliteclassthatwillsycophanticallyagreetothe
agreedpolicyobjectivesonbehalfofthosewhodidn'telectthemtoundertake
suchroles.
ButPakeha NewZealand are losers too. They have been victims of the same
process of corporatism that distances decision-making and denies effective
participatorydemocracy.
Weneedtohaltthisprocess.Achievingthisrequiresamassmovementthatis
dedicated to a sustained struggle, including education, participation,
engagement, debate, organisation, action and reflection. It needs to be
all-pervasive,withtentaclesreachingtotheheartsandmindsofallofthesectors
ofourcommunitiesandtothepulseofournation.Ihaveactivelycampaigned
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for a Planning Council, democratically elected by Maori responsible for the
designofaprocessofdecolonisationwheretheprocessofformulatingthegoals
for Aotearoa NewZealand are as important as the goals themselves. Jesson
himself saw this kind of strategy as an important step to restore democraticprocessestoAotearoaNewZealand,citingthe1984EconomicSummitandRoyal
Commission onSocialPolicy aspotentiallyhopeful precedents that havebeen
suppressed and by-passed by the Cabal that imposed their agenda of neo
liberalism.63
Challenging economic reform and trade liberalisation also requires a critical
perspectiveondevelopment.Thereisalmostnoonetodayaskingquestionsthat
usedtobeaskedin the1970s thedecadeofindependenceforsomePacific
IslandstatessuchasDevelopment forwhom? and Whodecides? Despite
theproliferationofMaoriDoctoralthesesinthelastdecadethereareveryfew
forums of the kindwhereIwas nurtured in the 1980 Sovereigntymovement,
which looked for solutions fromwithin our communities and consciously set
aboutprovidingthetoolsofanalysistodismantlethebarrierstodebatebetween
andamongstwahineandtane,UrbanMaoriandTraditionalCommunities,Maori
andPakeha.
The future Constitutional arrangements of this nation are the key to social,
economicandecologicalwellbeingofusall.Ironically,asingleoutstandingissue
intherelationshipagreementbetweentheNationalPartyandtheMaoriParty
holdstheopportunitytodevelopthiskindofdebateandfortheMaoriPartyto
redeemitsclaimedcommitmenttothekaupapaofTeTiriti.AttheHirangiHui,
whichwasthelastsignificantattemptbyMaoriasanationtograpplewiththis
issue,therewasagreementthatwhatmattersnowisnotsomuchthedetailsofa
Treaty-based constitution or the flow-on constitutional arrangements, but a
commitment to a constitutional review jointly undertaken by Maori and the
Crownfor thepurposeofdevelopingaNewZealandconstitutionbasedonthe
Treaty of Waitangi and, among other things, fully recognising the position of
63JessonBruce,TherehavealwaysbeenAlternatives:OnlytheirPurposeisMad,DunmorePressLtd,1999,p.221.
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MaoriasTangataWhenua.Huiparticipantsdiscountedthepossibilityofdurable
Treaty settlements without fresh constitutional guarantees and a final break
withcoloniallawsandprocesses.
Anysuchprocessmustbeseenasatrulyindependentdiscussion,distinctfrom
andnotaccountabletoTePuniKokiriortheDepartmentof Justiceor thenew
quango,theIwiLeadersforum.Itmustbeaccountabletothecommunitiesfrom
whom and for whom the programmes of change are being discussed and
evolved,andmustactivelyfacilitatetheirparticipation.Forthismechanismto
be effective, the Iwi Leaders model must be rejected and an independently
resourcedsecretariat established to convenea series of constitutional huiand
forums todiscuss the future ofournation that engagesmeaningfully with all
Maoricommunitiesandreportbacktothem.Themandatemustbegroundedin
theongoingentrenchmentoftheguaranteesoftheDeclarationofIndependence
1835 andTeTiriti oWaitangi, and seek toidentify aconstitutionalframework
whoseprinciplesandprocesses can equipus toconfrontthe ecological,social,
economic and spiritual challenges of the 21st century, and the crises of food,
climate,energyandfinancethatarethelegacyofthefailedglobalmarketmodel.
WhileIamnotaRepublican,thisisanotherpointwheremythinkingforchange
convergestoapointsharedbyJesson.InmodernAotearoawemustmovetoa
modelofgovernmentwhichisnotfocusedonjustsettlingthegrievancesofour
colonialpast,butonbuildingonewherethereistrustandrespectamongstthe
communitiesthatco-exist. TheConstitutionalTaskforceIenvisagethereforeto
assistthisprocessmustalsoincludenonMaoricommunityleadersworkingwith
theircommunitiesdistinctfromstatecontrolaspartofthisprocess.Iamsure
just by posing this solution, a whole lot of other questions immediately are
raised,likewhoarethesepeopleandhowaretheyselectedandtowhomare
theyaccountable?NewZealandasasmallnationcaneasilyanswerthisquestion
forthemselves.Nominationsforcommunityrepresentativesarenotunknownin
thenot forprofit sectorwithprocessesofengagementandreportbackpartof
therangeofaccountabilitiestoanysuccessfulnominee.
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Weasanationneedtoformallyengageinthisprocessoftransformation,which
mustbedesigned, controlledand implementedwith the equalparticipationof
the tangatawhenua and othercitizenswho havemadeAotearoaNewZealand
theirhomelands.Thispleaisnotnew.Whatisnewisthegrowinggroundswellof voices joining those of the late Bruce Jesson and myself for a process to
commenceto takeon the entrenchedpowerand influence of the finance elite
andotherswhohavehijackedournation.Weshouldnotallowthemomentumof
thosepleastodissipate.