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Full Cases - writsPage | 1

ALEXANDER YANO VS. CLEOFAS SANCHEZ, ET AL.G.R. No. 186640February 11, 2010

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On December 28, 2007, respondent Cleofas Sanchez (Cleofas) filed before this Court a petition docketed asG.R. No. 180839 for issuance of a Writ of Amparowith Motion for Production and Inspection directed against

Gen. Hermogenes Esperon (Gen. Esperon), the then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines(AFP).

On January 2, 2008, the Court[1]

resolved to issue a Writ ofAmparo and ordered Gen. Esperon to make averified return of the writ before Court of Appeals Justice Edgardo Sundiam, who was ordered to hear anddecide the case which was eventually redocketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00010 WR/A.

Cleofas amended her petition[2]

on January 14, 2008 to include herein co-respondent Marciana Medina(Marciana) as therein additional petitioner, and to implead other military officers

[3]including Lt. Ali Sumangil (Lt.

Sumangil) and Sgt. Gil Villalobos[4]

(Sgt. Villalobos) as therein additional respondents.

In theAmendedPetition, Cleofas and Marciana (respondents) alleged that on September 17, 2006 at around8:00 p.m., their respective sons Nicolas Sanchez and Heherson Medina were catching frogs outside their

home in Sitio Dalin, Barangay Bueno, Capas, Tarlac; that at around 1:00 a.m. of the next day, September 18,2006, Nicolas wives Lourdezand Rosalie Sanchez, who were then at home, heard gunshots and saw armedmen in soldiers uniforms passing by; that at around 4:00 a.m. of the same day, Lourdez and Rosalie went outto check on Nicolas and Heherson but only saw their caps, slippers, panaand airgun for catching frogs, aswell as bloodstains; and that they immediately reported the matter to the barangayofficials.

Respondents narrated that they, together with other family members, proceeded on September 19, 2006 tothe Capas Station of the Philippine National Police (PNP). Accompanied by officials of the NationalCommission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP),

[5]they also tried to search for Nicolas and Heherson at the Camp

Detachment of the 71stInfantry Batallion of the Philippine Army (Army) in Barangay Burgos, San Jose, Tarlac,

and at the Camp of the Bravo Company of the Armys 71st Infantry Batallion inside Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac

City, but to no avail.

Furthermore, respondents alleged that Josephine Galang Victoria, also known as Antonina Galang(Josephine), niece of a neighbor, later informed them that she had seen two men inside Camp ServillanoAquino of the Northern Luzon Command (Nolcom) in San Miguel, Tarlac City on September 21, 2006, whomJosephine later identified as Nicolas and Heherson (the victims) after respondents had shown her theirphotographs; and that Josephine informed them that she saw the victims again on September 24, 2006 andNovember 1, 2006,

[6]this time at the Camp of the Bravo Company of the Armys 71

stInfantry Batallion inside

Hacienda Luisita, where she had occasion to talk to Lt. Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos. Respondents filed acase on December 21, 2006 before the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), which endorsed

[7]the same to

the Ombudsman for appropriate action.

Contending that the victims life, liberty and security had been and continued to be violated on account of theirforced disappearance, respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ of Amparo, the production of the victimsbodies during the hearing on the Writ, the inspection of certain military camps,

[8]the issuance of temporary and

permanent protection orders, and the rendition of judgment under Section 18 of the Rule on the WritofAmparo.[9]

Meanwhile, a consolidated Return of the Writ,[10]

verified by Gen. Esperon, Lt. Sumangil, Sgt. Villalobos, Maj.Gen. Juanito Gomez (Maj. Gen. Gomez) as Commander of the Armys 7

thInfantry Division, and Lt. Col. Victor

Bayani (Lt. Col. Bayani) as Camp Commander of Camp Servillano Aquino of the Nolcom in Tarlac City, wasfiled with the appellate court on January 24, 2008. Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano (Lt. Gen. Yano), CommandingGeneral of the Army, filed a Return of the Writ upon his return from an official trip abroad.

In their Return, the military officers denied having custody of the victims. They posited that the proper remedyof respondents was to file a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus,since the petitions ultimate
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objective was the production of the bodies of the victims, as they were allegedly abducted and illegallydetained by military personnel;

[11]that the petition failed to indicate the matters required by paragraphs (c), (d)

and (e), Section 5 of the Rule on the Writ ofAmparo, such that the allegations were incomplete to constitute acause of action, aside from being based on mere hearsay evidence, and are, at best, speculative; thatrespondents failed to present the affidavits of some other competent persons which would clearly validate theirclaim that the military violated the victims right to life, liberty or security by abducting or detaining them; andthat the petition did not allege any specific action or inaction attributable to the military officers with respect totheir duties; or allege that respondents took any action by filing a formal complaint or visiting the military

camps adverted to in order to verify Josephines claim that she saw the victims on two different occasionsinside the camps, or that they took efforts to follow up on the PNP Capas Stations further action on theircomplaint.

[12]

Denying he violated the victims right to life, liberty and security,Gen. Esperon specifically asserted that, incompliance with the Defense Secretarys direct ive in relation to cases of Writ ofAmparoagainst the AFP, heissued directives to the Nolcom Commander and the Armys Commanding General to investigate andestablish the circumstances surrounding reported disappearances of victims insofar as the claim on thepossible involvement of the military units was concerned; and undertook to bring any military personnelinvolved, when warranted by the evidence, to the bar of justice.

[13]

Maj. Gen. Gomez likewise denied having custody or knowledge of the whereabouts of the victims, stating thatit was not army policy to abduct civilians in his area of responsibility ,

[14]and that he was away on official

business at the time of the alleged disappearance of the victims.[15]

Lt. Col. Bayani attested that he was designated Camp Commander only on September 1, 2007 and thus hadno personal knowledge about the victims alleged disappearance or abduction on September 18, 2006; that hewas informed by his immediate predecessor that no individuals were detained in the camp as it did not evenhave detention facilities; and that in compliance with Gen. Esperons directive, their command was conductingfurther investigation to verify the allegations in the petition.

[16]

Lt. Sumangil denied having spoken to Josephine inside the camp on September 24, 2006, on which datecivilians were not allowed to enter except on official missions or when duly authorized to conduct transactionsinside the camp. He thus concluded that Josephine lied in claiming to have seen the two victims inside theCamp of the Bravo Company of the 71

stInfantry Batallion inside Hacienda Luisita on September 24, 2006 or at

any time thereafter. He instead recounted that on September 24, 2006, he spoke for the first and only time,

but only at the gate of the camp, with a person who identified herself as Antonina Galang, who informed himabout the disappearance of the victims since September 18, 2006. Warning him that these men weremembers of the New Peoples Army (NPA), she advised him not to entertain any queries or complaints relativeto their alleged disappearance.

[17]

Sgt. Villalobos echoed Sumangils disclaimer about having any of the victims in his custody or meeting anyonenamed Josephine Victoria, or about the latter having entered the camps kitchen to drink water.

Lt. Gen. Yano stated that upon his return from his official functions overseas, he immediately inquired on theactions taken on the case. He averred that he had never participated directly or indirectly; or consented,permitted or sanctioned any illegal or illegitimate military operations. He declared that it had always been hispolicy to respect human rights and uphold the rule of law, and to bring those who violated the law before thecourt of justice.

In opposing the request for issuance of inspection and production orders, the military officers posited that apartfrom compromising national security should entry into these military camps/bases be allowed, these orderspartook of the nature of a search warrant, such that the requisites for the issuance thereof must be compliedwith prior to their issuance. They went on to argue that such request relied solely on bare, self-serving andvague allegations contained in Josephines affidavit, for aside from merely mentioning that she saw Nicolasand Heherson on board an army truck near the Nolcom gate and, days later, inside the kitchen of the71

stInfantry Battalion Camp inside Hacienda Luisita and while logging outside said camp, Josephine had

stated nothing more to ascertain the veracity of the places where she allegedly saw Nicolas and Heherson .[18]
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On whether the impleaded military officers were either directly or indirectly connected with the disappearanceof the victims, the appellate court, after hearing, absolved, by the assailed Decision of September 17,2008,

[19]Gen. Esperon, Lt. Gen. Yano, Maj. Gen. Gomez, and Lt. Col. Bayani for lack of evidence linking them

to the disappearances, and further ruled as follows:

All said, this Court is convinced that petitioners have not adequately and convincinglyestablished any direct or indirect link between respondents individual military officers and thedisappearances of Nicolas and Heherson. Neither did the concerned Philippine Army Units

have exerted fully their efforts to investigate and unearth the truth and bring the culprits beforethe bar of justice.

The concerned Philippine Army units (such as the Northern Command and the 7thInfantry

Division, which had jurisdiction over the place of disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson,should exert extraordinary diligence to follow all possible leads to solve the disappearances ofNicolas and Heherson. The Philippine Army should be reminded of its constitutional mandateas the protector of the people and the State.

RELIEFS

While as We stated hereinbefore that We could not find any link between respondentsindividual military officers to the disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson, nonetheless, the fact

remains that the two men are still missing. Hence, We find it equitable to grant petitionerssome reliefs in the interest of human rights and justice as follows:

1. Inspections of the following camps: Camp Servillano Aquino, San Miguel, Tarlac City, anymilitary camp of the 7

thInfantry Division located in Aqua Farm, Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac City,

within reasonable working hours of any day except when the military camp is on red alertstatus.

2. Thorough and Impartial Investigation for the appropriate Investigating Unit of thePhilippine Army at Camp Servillano Aquino and the Philippine Army, 7

th Infantry Division in

Fort Magsaysay to conduct their respective investigation of all angles pertaining to thedisappearances of Nicolas and Heherson and to immediately file charges against those foundguilty and submit their written report to this Court within three (3) months from notice.

SO ORDERED.[20]

(underscoring supplied)

The military officers filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration (Motion), arguing in the main that sincerespondents failed to prove the allegations in their petition by substantial evidence, the appellate court shouldnot have granted those reliefs.

[21]

The appellate court denied the Motion by the assailed Resolution of March 3, 2009.[22]

Taking up the cudgels for the military, Gen. Alexander Yano,[23]

Lt. Gen. Victor Ibrado,[24]

and Maj. Gen. RalphVillanueva

[25](petitioners) filed the present petition for review of the appellate courts assailed issuances,

faulting it for

. . . NOT CATEGORICALLY DENYING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OFAMPARO PURSUANT TO SECTION 18 OF THE RULE ON THE WRIT OFAMPARO DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE THEIRALLEGATIONS IN THEIR PETITION FOR AMPARO BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. . . .[AND] . . . DIRECTING PETITIONERS TO:

(A) ALLOW RESPONDENTS TO INSPECT CAMP SERVILLANO AQUINO,NORTH LUZON COMMAND, PHILIPPINE ARMY, SAN MIGUEL, TARLACCITY AND ANY MILITARY CAMP OF THE 7

THINFANTRY DIVISION

LOCATED IN AQUA FARM, HACIENDA LUISITA, TARLAC CITY; AND.
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(B) CONDUCT THOROUGH AND IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION OF THEDISAPPEARANCE OF THE AGGRIEVED PARTIES, FILE CHARGESAGAINST THOSE FOUND GUILTY AND SUBMIT WRITTEN REPORTWITHIN THREE MONTHS FROM NOTICE.

[26] (emphasis and underscoring

supplied)

The Court finds merit in the petition.

In ruling in favor of Lt. Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos, the appellate court resolved the case on the basis of thecredibility of Josephine as a witness. It arrived at the following findings:

To prove that these two military officers took or have custody of Nicolas and Heherson,petitioners presented Josephine Galang Victoria, also known as Antonina Galang, a niece ofpetitioner Cleofas Sanchez neighbor, who allegedly saw Nicolas and Heherson inside CampServillano Aquino on September 21, 2006 when she visited her uncle, a certain Major HenryGalang, who is allegedly living inside the camp; that a few days later, she again saw Nicolasand Heherson at Aqua Farm at Hacienda Luisita, where the camp of Bravo Company of the71

stInfantry Battalion is located and where Heherson was seen sweeping the floor and

Nicolas was seen cooking, having wounds in their legs near the feet as if sustained from a

gunshot wound; that on November 1, 2006, she went back upon advice of Lt. Sumangil to giveher a cellfone which Tech. Sgt. Villalobos handed to her for her to know where Nicolas andHeherson will be brought; that they [sic] saw the two outside getting some woods under thewatchful eye of a soldier when Sumangil kicked Nicolas for being slow and thereafter, she didnot see the two anymore.

While Josephine Galang Victorias story of how she saw the subject two missing persons(Nicolas and Heherson) appeared initially as plausible, however, her credibility as a witnesshad been successfully destroyed by the following witnesses presented by the respondents.

1) Barangay Captain Rodolfo P. Supan of Cut-Cut II, Tarlac City, attested that she knows acertain woman named Josephine Galang Victoria who introduces herself as Antonina Galang,niece through the cousin of his wife and a long-time resident of Cut-Cut II since birth until she

lived with her partner Philip Victoria and they still visit and goes to her auntie or siblingshouse; that he knows the reputation of Josephine Victoria as bad regarding her telling thetruth, her truthfulness and integrity, known to fool others and invents stories for moneyreasons, that she cannot be trusted even if she is under oath before God and the State.

2) As if that is not yet enough, Gloria Galang Mansalay testified that she is a resident of Cut-Cut II since birth in 1964 and she knows Josephine Galang Victoria because she is herniece being the daughter of her older brother; that she even took care of Antonina as a childbut her general reputation in telling the truth, her fidelity and integrity is bad, known to foolothers, a liar and invent [sic] stories for reason of money.

3) Clarita Galang Ricafrente saying that she is a resident of Cut-cut II and Antonina Galang isa niece and attested the same negative reputations against Antonina.

It appears that said negative testimonies of Josephine Galang Victorias relatives were neversuccessfully rebutted by her and the Court gives credence to them. No ill motive [sic] wereestablished against the said witnesses to testify against Antonina Galang.

Furthermore, Antonina Galang stated that she was in Camp Servillano Aquino when she firstsaw Nicolas and Heherson riding in an army truck because she was visiting her uncle, MajorHenry Galang, allegedly living in the camp. Parenthetically, this story of Antonina Galang wasput to doubt. TSG Edgard Reyes who attested that as a meter reader in the camp, MajorGalang was no longer residing there in September 2006. This testimony and revelation of
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TSG Reyes only bolstered the testimonies of the other witnesses on Antonina Galangspenchant to invent stories or tell a lie.

In sum, We are not inclined to give credence to the claims of Antonina Galang that the twomissing person [sic] she saw first in Camp Servillano Aquino and later, in Aqua Farm, wereNicolas and Heherson. Notably, Antonina Galang never did see the faces of the two but wereknown to her through photographs. Certainly, there may be a difference between photographsand the faces in person.

To be noted also is that even the two wives of Nicolas did not make an express attestationthat they saw Nicolas and Heherson in the company of those armed men who passed theirplace in the early morning of September 18, 2006.

[27](underscoring supplied)

NOTABLY, respondents neither moved for reconsideration nor appealed the appellate courtsSeptember 17,2008 Decision.

The entrenched procedural rule in this jurisdiction is that a party who did not appeal cannot assign such errorsas are designed to have the judgment modified. All that said appellee can do is to make a counter-assignmentof errors or to argue on issues raised at the trial only for the purpose of sustaining the judgment in his favor,even on grounds not included in the decision of the court a quoor raised in the appellants assignment of errors

or arguments.[28]

This tenet is enshrined as one of the basic principles in our rules of procedure, specifically to avoid ambiguityin the presentation of issues, facilitate the setting forth of arguments by the parties, and aid the court in makingits determinations. A party who fails to acquire complete relief from a decision of the court has variousremedies to correct an omission by the court. He may move for a correction or clarification of judgment, oreven seek its modification through ordinary appeal. There is thus no basis for the Court to skip the rule andexcuse herein respondents for failure to properly avail themselves of the remedies in the face of the partiescontentions that have remained disputed.

[29]

What is thus left for the Court to resolve is the issue of whether the grant of the RELIEFS[30]

by the appellatecourt after finding want of substantial evidence are valid and proper.

Sections 17 and 18 of theAmparo Rule lay down the requisite standard of proof necessary to prove eitherpartys claim,viz:

SEC. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establishtheir claim by substantial evidence.

The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence asrequired by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence asrequired by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official dutyhas been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability.

SEC. 18. Judgment. - The Court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time thepetition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantialevidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper andappropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The requisite standard of proof substantial evidence - speaks of the clear intent of the Rule to have theequivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in resolving amparopetitions.
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To the appellate court, the evidence adduced in the present case failed to measure up to that standardsubstantial evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Sincerespondents did not avail of any remedy against the adverse judgment, the appellate courts decision is,insofar as it concerns them, now beyond the ambit of review.

Meanwhile, the requirement for a government official or employee to observe extraordinary diligence in theperformance of duty stresses the extraordinary measures expected to be taken in safeguarding every citizen sconstitutional rights as well as in the investigation of cases of extra-judicial killings and enforced

disappearances.[31]

The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty doesnot result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner fromestablishing his or her claim by substantial evidence. The omission or inaction on the part of the public officialprovides, however, some basis for the petitioner to move and for the court to grant certain interim reliefs.

In line with this, Section 14 of theAmparoRule provides for interim or provisional reliefsthat the courts maygrant in order to, inter alia, protect the witnesses and the rights of the parties, and preserve all relevantevidence, viz:

SEC. 14. Interim Reliefs. Upon filingof the petition or at anytime before finaljudgment, the court, justice or judge may grant any of the following reliefs:

(a) Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motuproprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediatefamily be protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or private institutioncapable of keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an organization, association orinstitution referred to in Section 3 (c) of this Rule, the protection may be extended to theofficers involved.

The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extendtemporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of theimmediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.

The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that

may be imposed by the court, justice or judge.

(b) Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after duehearing, may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other property,to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing theproperty or any relevant object or operation thereon.

The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported byaffidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforceddisappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.

If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of theinformation, the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine themerit of the opposition.

The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of theaggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated.

The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspectionand the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe otherconditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall expire five (5) daysafter the date of its issuance, unless extended for justifiable reasons.
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(c) Production Order. The court, justice, or judge, upon verified motion and after duehearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of any designateddocuments, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, orobjects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to thepetition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by oron behalf of the movant.

The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of

the information, in which case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambersto determine the merit of the opposition.

The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights ofall the parties. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

These provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court beforeit arrives at a judicious determination ofthe amparo petition. For the appellate court to, in the present case, still order the inspection of the militarycamps and order the army units to conduct an investigation into the disappearance of Nicolas andHeherson afterit absolved petitioners is thus not in order. The reliefs granted by the appellate court torespondents are not in sync with a finding that petitioners could not be held accountable for the disappearanceof the victims.

Respondents posit that there appears to be some shared confusion as to whether the reliefs granted by theappellate court are final or interlocutory. They thus implore this Court to modify the appellate courts judgmentby considering the reliefs as temporary or interlocutory and by adding thereto an order for the production oflogbooks and reports.

[32]

At this late stage, respondents can no longer avail themselves of their stale remedies in the guise of prayingfor affirmative reliefs in their Comment. No modification of judgment could be granted to a party who did notappeal.

[33]

If respondents believed that the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court was merely interlocutory,they had every opportunity to question the conclusion of said court, but they did not. They could haveopposed petitioners motion for reconsideration filed with the appellate court, it being a prohibited

pleading

[34]

under the AmparoRule, but they did not.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 17, 2008 Decision and March 3, 2009Resolution of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it grants the assailed earlier-quoted reliefs are SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, et al. vs. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASSN., et al.G.R. No. 182795 - June 5, 2008

REYES, R.T., J.:

THE present petition filed on May 26, 2008 seeks the issuance of a Writ of Amparo upon the followingpremise:

Petitioners were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined and embodied inour Constitution, as the result of these nefarious activities of both the Private and Public Respondents.This ardent request filed before this Honorable Supreme Court is the only solution to this problem viathis newly advocated principles incorporated in the Rulesthe "RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO."

1
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It appears that petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City.Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to bedemolished pursuant to a court judgment.

While they attempted to focus on issuance of what they claimed to be fraudulent and spurious land titles, towit:

Petitioners herein are desirous to help the government, the best way they can, to unearth these so-called "syndicates" clothed with governmental functions, in cahoots with the "squatting syndicates" -- - - the low so defines. If only to give its proper meanings, the Government must be the first one tocleans (sic) its ranks from these unscrupulous political protges. If unabated would certainly ruinand/or destroy the efficacy of the Torrens System of land registration in this Country. It is therefore theardent initiatives of the herein Petitioners, by way of the said prayer for the issuance of the Writ ofAmparo, that these unprincipled Land Officials be summoned to answer their participation inthe issuances of these fraudulent and spurious titles, NOW, in the hands of the PrivateRespondents. The Courts of Justice, including this Honorable Supreme Court, are likewisebeing made to believe that said titles in the possession of the Private Respondents wereissued untainted with frauds.

2

what the petition ultimately seeks is the reversal of this Courts dismissal of petitions in G.R. Nos. 177448,

180768, 177701, 177038, thus:

That, Petitioners herein knew before hand that: there can be no motion for reconsideration for thesecond or third time to be filed before this Honorable Supreme Court. As such therefore, Petitionersherein are aware of the opinion that this present petition should not in any way be treated as suchmotions fore reconsideration. Solely, this petition is only for the possible issuance of the writ ofamparo, although it might affect the previous rulings of this Honorable Supreme Court in thesecases, G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701 and 177038. Inherent in the powers of the SupremeCourt of the Philippines is to modify, reverse and set aside, even its own previous decision,that can not be thwarted nor influenced by any one, but, only on the basis of merits andevidence. This is the purpose of this petition for the Wri t of Amparo.

3

We dismiss the petition.

The Rule on the Writ of Amparoprovides:

Section 1. Petition.The petition for a writ of amparois a remedy available to any person whose rightto life, liberty and securityis violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of apublic official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasissupplied.)

The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this case wasaffirmed with finality by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not included among theenumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparoismade available. Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executoryjudgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legalbasis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.

Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners claim to the land in question is not alleged in the petition atall. The Court can only surmise that these rights and interest had already been threshed out and settled in thefour cases cited above. No writ of amparomay be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the supposedfactual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected.
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Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the filing of the petition, only if on itsface, the court ought to issue said writ.

Section 6. Issuance of the Writ. Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shallimmediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issuethe writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge may issuethe writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person to serve it.

The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be laterthan seven (7) days from the date of its issuance.

Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in this case, the writ will not be issued and thepetition will be dismissed outright.

This new remedy of writ of amparowhich is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of thehighest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will notspare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court willalso not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, et al., vs. HON. JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIOG.R. No. 182484JUNE 17, 2008

BRION, J.:

Before us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance (pursuant to Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 65of the Revised Rules of Court; Sections 1 and 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;

[1 ]and Sections 1 and 6 of

the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data

[2]

) is the petition for certiorariand for the issuance of the writsof amparo and habeas data filed by the above-named petitioners against the Honorable Judge Elmo delRosario [in his capacity as presiding judge of RTC Br. 5, Kalibo], Sheriff Nelson de la Cruz [in his capacity asSheriff of the RTC], the Philippine National Police stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP StationCommander, the Honorable Court of Appeals in Cebu, 18

thDivision, and the spouses Gregorio Sanson and

Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson, respondents.

The petition and its annexes disclose the following material antecedents:

The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson (the private respondents),filed with the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga-Malay, Aklan (the MCTC) a complaint

[3]dated 24

April 2006 for forcible entryand damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatoryinjunction against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M.Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga, Everly Tapuz Madriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and

Marian Timbas (the petitioners) and other John Does numbering about 120. The private respondents allegedin their complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners under TCT No. 35813 of a 1.0093-hectare parcel ofland located at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag,Boracay, Malay, Aklan (the disputed land); (2) they were thedisputed lands prior possessors when the petitioners armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms andtogether with unidentified persons numbering 120 - entered the disputed land by force and intimidation, withoutthe private respondents permission and against the objections of the private respondents security men, andbuilt thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.

In their Answer[4]

dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied the material allegations of the complaint. Theyessentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary,
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the private respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private respondents certificate of title to the disputedproperty is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim fordamages.

The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a decision[5]

in the private respondentsfavor. It found prior possessionthe key issue in forcible entry cases - in the private respondents favor, thus:

The key that could unravel the answer to this question lies in the Amended Commissioners

Report and Sketch found on pages 245 to 248 of the records and the evidence the partieshave submitted. It is shown in the Amended Commissioners Report and Sketch that the landin question is enclosed by a concrete and cyclone wire perimeter fence in pink and greenhighlighter as shown in the Sketch Plan (p. 248). Said perimeter fence was constructed by theplaintiffs 14 years ago. The foregoing findings of the Commissioner in his report and sketchcollaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that after they acquired the land in question on May 27,1993 through a Deed of Sale (Annex A, Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, p. 276, rec.), theycaused the construction of the perimeter fence sometime in 1993 (Affidavit ofGregorio Sanson, pp. 271-275, rec.).

From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred that the plaintiffs were inactual physical possession of the whole lot in question since 1993 when it was interrupted bythe defendants (sic) when on January 4, 2005 claiming to (sic) the Heirs of

Antonio Tapuz entered a portion of the land in question with view of inhabiting the same andbuilding structures therein prompting plaintiff Gregorio Sanson to confront them before BSPU,Police Chief Inspector Jack L. Wanky and Barangay Captain Glenn Sacapao. As a result oftheir confrontation, the parties signed an Agreement (Annex D, Complaint p. 20) wherein theyagreed to vacate the disputed portion of the land in question and agreed not to build anystructures thereon.

The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the incident of January 4, 2005when the plaintiff posted security guards, however, sometime on or about 6:30 A.M. of April19, 2006, the defendants some with bolos and one carrying a sack suspected to containfirearms with other John Does numbering about 120 persons by force and intimidation forciblyentered the premises along the road and built a nipa and bamboo structure (Annex E,Complaint, p. 11) inside the lot in question which incident was promptly reported to the proper

authorities as shown by plaintiffs Certification (Annex F, Complaint, p. 12) of the entry in thepolice blotter and on same date April 19, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Office ofthe Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan but nosettlement was reached as shown in their Certificate to File Action (Annex G, Complaint, p.13); hence the present action.

Defendants (sic) contend in their answer that prior to January 4, 2005, they were alreadyoccupants of the property, being indigenous settlers of the same, under claim of ownership byopen continuous, adverse possession to the exclusion of other (sic).(Paragraph 4, Answer, p.25).

The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in question is enclosed by aperimeter fence constructed by the plaintiffs sometime in 1993 as noted by the Commissionerin his Report and reflected in his Sketch, thus, it is safe to conclude that the plaintiffs where(sic) in actual physical possession of the land in question from 1993 up to April 19, 2006 whenthey were ousted therefrom by the defendants by means of force. Applying by analogy theruling of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Molina, et al. vs. De Bacud, 19 SCRA956, if the land were in the possession of plaintiffs from 1993 to April 19, 2006, defendantsclaims to an older possession must be rejected as untenable because possession as a factcannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities.

Defendants likewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who forcibly entered the land in questionon April 18, 2006 at about 3:00 oclockin the afternoon as shown in their Certification (AnnexD, Defendants Position Paper, p. 135, rec.).
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The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their allegations made to thecommissioner who constituted (sic) the land in question that they built structures on the land inquestion only on April 19, 2006 (Par. D.4, Commissioners Amended Report, pp. 246 to 247),after there (sic) entry thereto on even date.

Likewise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical statements of defendantswitnesses, Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, ArielGac, Darwin Alvarez

and Edgardo Pinaranda, in their Joint Affidavit (pp. 143- 144, rec.) [sic] categorically statedthat on or aboutApril 19, 2006, a group of armed men entered the property of our saidneighbors and built plastic roofed tents. These armed men threatened to drive our saidneighbors away from their homes but they refused to leave and resisted the intruding armedmen.

From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of forcible entry happenedon April 18, 2006 but it was only on April 19, 2006when the defendants overpowered by theirnumbers the security guards posted by the plaintiffs prior to the controversy.

Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures depicted in their picturesattached as annexes to their position paper were not noted and reflected in the amendedreport and sketch submitted by the Commissioner, hence, it could be safely inferred that these

structures are built and (sic) situated outside the premises of the land in question, accordingly,they are irrelevant to the instant case and cannot be considered as evidence of their actualpossession of the land in question prior to April 19, 2006

[6].

The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC,Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan)then presided over by Judge Niovady M. Marin (Judge Marin).

On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminarymandatory injunctionthrough an Order dated 26 February 2007, with the issuance conditioned on the privaterespondents posting of a bond.The writ

[7]authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC decision

was actually issued by respondent Judge Elmo F. delRosario (the respondent Judge) on12 March 2007 afterthe private respondents had complied with the imposed condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider theissuance of the writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition.

The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and to DeferEnforcement of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in an Order dated 17 May 2007

[8].

Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition.[9]

The respondent Judge neverthelessissued via a Special Order

[10]a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriffs written

notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively takeactual possession of the land.

The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, a Petition forReview

[11](under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) of the Permanent Mandatory In junct ion and

Order of Demoli t ion of th e RTC of Kal ibo, Br. 6 in Civi l Case No. 7990.

Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition on 19March 2008.[12]

It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present petition last 29 April 2008. Thepetition contains and prays for three remedies, namely: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the RevisedRules of Court; the issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data; and finally,the issuance of the writ of amparo under the Rule on the Writ ofAmparo.

To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present factual positions diametricallyopposed to the MCTCs findings and legal reasons. Most importantly, the petitioners maintain their claims
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ofprior possession of the disputed land and of intrusioninto this land by the private respondents. The materialfactual allegations of the petitionbases as well of the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparoread:

29. OnApril 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting 12 gauge shot gunsintruded into the property of the defendants [the land in dispute]. They were not inuniform. They fired their shotguns at the defendants. Later the following day at 2:00 a.m. twohouses of the defendants were burned to ashes.

30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire fence put up bydefendants to protect their property from intruders. Two of the armed men trained theirshotguns at the defendants who resisted their intrusion. One of them who was identified asSAMUEL LONGNO y GEGANSO, 19 years old, single, and a resident of Binun-an, Batad, Iloilo, fired twice.

31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing them to ashes. [...]

32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were reported by one ofthe HEIRS OF ANTONIO TAPUZ [...]. The terrorists trained their shotguns and fired atminors namely IVAN GAJISAN and MICHAEL MAGBANUA, who resisted theirintrusion. Their act is a blatant violation of the law penalizing Acts of Violence againstwomen and children, which is aggravated by the use of high-powered weapons.

[]

34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and unlettered petitionerscontinue because the private respondents Sansonshave under their employ armed men andthey are influential with the police authorities owing to their financial and political clout.

35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot in dispute by defendantsand the atrocities of the terrorists [introduced into the property in dispute by the plaintiffs] areattested by witnesses who are persons not related to the defendants are thereforedisinterested witnesses in the case namely: Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac,Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Penarada. Likewise, the affidavit of Nemia T. Carmen issubmitted to prove that the plaintiffs resorted to atrocious acts through hired men in their bid to

unjustly evict the defendants.

[13]

The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint for forcible entry that theprivate respondents filed below. Citing Section 33 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amendedby Republic Act No. 7691,

[14]they maintain that the forcible entry case in fact involves issues of title to or

possession of real property or an interest therein, with the assessed value of the property involvedexceeding P20,000.00; thus, the case should be originally cognizable by the RTC. Accordingly, the petitionersreason out that the RTC - to where the MCTC decision was appealed equally has no jurisdiction to rule onthe case on appeal and could not have validly issued the assailed orders.

OUR RULING

We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective, both insubstance and in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatallydefective with respect to content and substance.

The Petition for Certiorari

We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition for certiorarito nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. It is not lost on us that the petitioners have apending petition with the Court of Appeals (the CA petition) for the review of the same RTC orders nowassailed in the present petition, although the petitioners never disclosed in the body of the present petitiontheexact status of their pending CA petition. The CA petition, however, was filed with the Court of Appeals on 2August 2007, which indicates to us that the assailed orders (or at the very least, the latest of the interrelated
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assailed orders) were received on 1 Augu st 2007 at the latest. The present petition, on the other hand, wasfiled on April 29, 2008 or more than eight months from the time the CA petition was filed. Thus, the presentpetition is separated in point of timefrom the assumed receipt of the assailed RTC orders by at least eight (8)months, i.e., beyond the reglementary period of sixty (60) days

[15]from receipt of the assailed order or orders or

from notice of the denial of a seasonably filed motion for reconsideration.

We note in this regard that the petitioners counsel stated in his attached Certificate of Compliance withCircular #1-88 of the Supreme Court

[16](Certificate of Compliance) that in the meantime the RTC and the

Sheriff issued a NOTICE TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION not served to counsel but to the petitionerswho sent photo copy of the same NOTICE to their counsel on April 18, 2008 by LBC. To guard against anyinsidious argument that the present petition is timely filed because of this Notice to Vacate, we feel it best todeclare now that the counting of the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65 cannot start from the April 18,2008 date cited by the petitioners counsel. The Notice to Vacate and for Demolition is not an order that existsindependently from the RTC orders assailed in this petition and in the previously filed CA petition. It is merelya notice, made in compliance with one of the assailed orders, and is thus an administrative enforcementmedium that has no life of its own separately from the assailed order on which it is based. It cannot thereforebe the appropriate subject of an independent petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the context of thiscase. The April 18, 2008 date cannot likewise be the material date for Rule 65 purposes as the above-mentioned Notice to Vacate is not even directly assailed in this petition, as the petitions Prayer patentlyshows.

[17]

Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty of willful anddeliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of forum shopping.

By the petitioners own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of Appeals (docketed as CAG.R. SPNo. 02859) for the review of the orders now also assailed in this petition, but brought the present recourse tous, allegedly because the CA did not act on the petition up to this dateand for the petitioner (sic)to seek reliefin the CA would be a waste of time and would render the case moot and academic since the CA refused to resolve pending urgent motions and the Sheriff is determined to enforce a writ of demolition despite the defectof LACK OF JURISDICTION.

[18]

Interestingly, the petitioners counsel - while making this claim in the body of the petition - at the same timerepresented in his Certificate of Compliance

[19]that:

xx x

(e) the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to question the WRIT OF PRELIMINARYINJUNCTION copy of the petition is attached (sic);

(f) the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION because it held that theORDER TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION OF THE HOMES OF PETITIONERS is notcapable of being the subject of a PETITION FOR RELIEF, copy of the resolution of the CAis attached hereto; (underscoring supplied)

(g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2007 but up to this date thesame had not been resolved copy of the MR is attached(sic).

x x x

The difference between the above representations on what transpired at the appellate court level is repletewith significance regarding the petitioners intentions. We discern -- from the petitioners act ofmisrepresenting in the body of their petition that the CA did not act on the petition up to this datewhile statingthe real Court of Appeals action in the Certification of Compliance -- the intent to hide the real state of theremedies the petitioners sought below in order to mislead us into action on the RTC orders without frontallyconsidering the action that the Court of Appeals had already undertaken.

At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from us, via the present petition, the samerelief that it could not wait for from the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02859. The petitioners act ofseeking against the same parties the nullification of the same RTC ordersbefore the appellate court and
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before us at the same time, although made through different mediums that are both improperly used,constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping that can sufficiently serve as basis for the summary dismissalof the petition under the combined application of the fourth and penultimate paragraphs of Section 3, Rule 46;Section 5, Rule 7; Section 1, Rule 65; and Rule 56, all of the Revised Rules of Court. That a wrong remedymay have been used with the Court of Appeals and possibly with us will not save the petitioner from a forum-shopping violation where there is identity of parties, involving the same assailed interlocutory orders, with therecourses existing side by side at the same time.

To restate the prevailing rules, forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedingsinvolving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on thesupposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resortedto by any party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt toseek a favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal or a special civil action for certiorari. Forum shoppingtrifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice and congest courtdockets. Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against it is a ground for summary dismissal of the case; itmay also constitute direct contempt.

[20]

Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping is defective as one (1) of theseven (7) petitioners - Ivan Tapuz - did not sign, in violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7; Section 3, Rule 46;Section 1, Rule 65; all in relation with Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of Court. Of those who signed, only five(5) exhibited their postal identification cards with the Notary Public.

In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the basis of the supportingattachments, to be devoid of merit. The MCTC correctly assumed jurisdiction over the private respondentscomplaint, which specifically alleged a cause for forcible entry and not as petitioners may have misreador misappreciateda case involving title to or possession of realty or an interest therein. Under Section 33,par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691 , exclusive jurisdictionover forcible entry and unlawful detainercases lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courtsand Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. These first-level courts have had jurisdiction over these cases called accion interdictal even before the R.A. 7691 amendment, based on the issue ofpurephysicalpossession (as opposed to the rightof possession). This jurisdiction is regardless of theassessed value of the property involved; the law established no distinctions based on the assessed value ofthe property forced into or unlawfully detained. Separately from accion interdictalare accion publicianafor therecovery of the right of possession as a plenary action, and accion reivindicacion for the recovery of

ownership.

[21]

Apparently, these latter actions are the ones the petitioners refer to when they cite Section 33,par. 3, in relation with Section 19, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by RepublicAct No. 7691, in which jurisdiction may either be with the first-level courts or the regional trialcourts, dependingon the assessed value of the realty subject of the litigation. As the complaint at the MCTCwas patently for forcible entry, that court committed no jurisdictional error correctible by certiorari under thepresent petition.

In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies, for violation ofthe non-forum shopping rule, for having been filed out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.

The Writ of Amparo

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary risein the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effectiveremedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to therights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under theprevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concernsthat are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous anduncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in line with the extraordinary character ofthe writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands requires that every petition for the issuanceof the Pwrit must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:

(a)The personal circumstances of the petitioner;


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(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act oromission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by anassumed appellation;

(c) The right to l i fe, l iberty and securi ty o f the aggrieved party vio lated or threatened

wi th vio la t ion by an unlawfu l act or om iss ion of the respondent, and how s uch threat or

v io la t ion is commit ted wi th the attendant ci rcumstances deta i led in support ing

aff idavi ts;

(d) The investigation con duc ted, i f any, specify ing the names, perso nal circum stances,

and addresses of the investigating auth ori ty or indiv iduals, as wel l as the mann er and

conduct of the invest igat ion, together wi th any report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts ofthe aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission;and

(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.[22]

The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate factsdeterminable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat toor violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.

The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual allegations heretoforequoted,

[23]that are essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of the petition. These allegations are supported by the

following documents:

(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B.Onag, Apolsida Umambong,Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez andEdgardo Pinaranda, supporting the factual positions of thepetitioners, id., petitioners prior possession, private respondents intrusion and the illegal actscommitted by the private respondents and their security guards on 19 April 2006;

(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts (firing ofguns, etc.) committed by a security guard against minorsdescendants of Antonio Tapuz;

(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentiallycorroborating Nemiasaffidavit;

(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Jackson Jauod regardingthe incident of petitioners intrusion into the disputed land;

(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis, narrating thealtercation between theTapuz family and the security guards of the private respondents,including the gun-poking and shooting incident involving one of the security guards;

(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating that ahouse owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented by a certain Jorge Buenavente, was accidental lyburned by a f i re.

On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the overriding involvement ofproperty issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed bythe private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to theextent that the occurrence ofpastviolence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, isalleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments implied from the presence of armed men bare to thewaist and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits


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compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminentor is continuing.

A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them the statementsof Nemia Carreon y Tapuz and Melanie Tapuzare practically identical and unsworn. The Certification byPolice Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other hand, simply narrates what had been reported by oneDanny Tapuz y Masangkay, and even mentions that the burning of two residential houses wasaccidental.

As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision in the forcible entry case whichrejected all the petitioners factual claims. These findings are significantly complete and detailed, as they weremade under a full-blown judicial process, i.e., after examination and evaluation of the contending partiespositions, evidence and arguments and based on the report of a court-appointed commissioner.

We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop of a dispute (with incidentsgiving rise to allegations of violence or threat thereof) that was brought to and ruled upon by the MCTC;subsequently brought to the RTCon an appeal that is still pending; still much later brought to th e appel latecour twithout conclusive results; and then brought to uson interlocutory incidents involving a plea for theissuance of the writ of amparothat, if decided as the petitioners advocate, may render the pending RTCappeal moot.

Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima facieexistence of the ultimatefacts that would justify the issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuingthreat to thepersons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-relatedand focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the allegedperpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecutionrather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.

Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings, as our action may carry theunintended effect, not only of reversing the MCTC ruling independently of the appeal to the RTC that is now inplace, but also of nullifying the ongoing appeal process. Such effect, though unintended, will obviously wreakhavoc on the orderly administration of justice, an overriding goal that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo does notintend to weaken or negate.

Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at this point the indicators, clear andpatent to us, that the petitioners present recourseviathe remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge tonegate the assailed orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before the appellate court because ofthe use of an improper remedial measure. We discern this from the petitioners misrepresentations pointedout above; from their obvious act of forum shopping; and from the recourse itself to the extraordinary remediesof the writs of certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are far from forthright and sufficientlycompelling. To be sure, when recourses in the ordinary course of law fail because of deficient legalrepresentation or the use of improper remedial measures, neither the writ of certiorarinor that of amparo -extraordinary though they may be - will suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The writ of amparo,particularly, should not issue when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when itwill inordinately interfere with these processesthe situation obtaining in the present case.

While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for rules on the institution ofseparate actions,

[24]for the effect of earlier-filed criminal actions,

[25]and for the consolidation of petitions for the

issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently filed criminal and civil action.[26] These rules were adopted topromote an orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for the issuance of the writ of amparo when the partiesresort to other parallel recourses.

Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and thereported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writof amparo in the absence of any clear prima facieshowing that the right to life, liberty or security thepersonalconcern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or that thedanger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in
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a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions onthe co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.

The Writ of Habeas Data

Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of ultimate facts ina petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;

(b) The manner the r ight to pr ivacy is v io lated or th reatened and how i t af fects the r ight

to l i fe, l iberty or secu ri ty of the aggrieved party;

(c) The actions and recou rses taken by the peti t ioner to secu re the data or info rmation;

(d) The location of the fi les, registers o r databases, the governm ent off ice, and the

person in charge, in pos session or in co ntro l of the data or in format ion, i f known;

(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression ordestruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent.

In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of;and

(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.

Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:

1. [ ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that the PNP mayrelease the report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of violenceemployed against them by the private respondents, furnishing the Court and the petitionerswith copy of the same;

[ ]

66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the Philippine NationalPolice [PNP] to produce the police report pertaining to the burning of the houses of thepetitioners in the land in dispute and likewise the investigation report if an investigation wasconducted by the PNP.

These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus renderingthe petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation ofthe right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, muchless demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police authorities other than those it hasalready set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on theinsufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer forthe issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the fishing expedition that this Court - in thecourse of drafting the Rule on habeas data - had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas datais not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully inorder.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISSthe present petition OUTRIGHTfor deficiencies ofform and substance patent from its body and attachments.

SO ORDERED.


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MERALCO VS. ROSARIO GOPEZ LIMG.R. No. 184769OCTOBER 5, 2010

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Court is once again confronted with an opportunity to define the evolving metes and bounds of the writof habeas data. May an employee invoke the remedies available under such writ where an employer decidesto transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein imputing to her

disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to inform her ofthe details thereof?

Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila ElectricCompany (MERALCO).

On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of theAdministration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncingrespondent. The letter reads:

Cherry Lim:

MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON

NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGABUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO,WALANG UTANG NA LOOB.

[1]

Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it, respondentreported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police.

[2]

By Memorandum[3]

dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCOs Human ResourceStaffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as A/F OTMSClerk, effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of r

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