ftEC 2 1 2008

OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

PRIORITYCONFIDENTIAL

Note to the Secretary-General

Draft report on Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR)

1. Please find attached a draft of your£eportJo_the_Security Council on Chad andjthe_CAR,pursuant to paragraphs 9 (d) and 13 of Security Council resolution 1706 (2006). We haveconsulted with DPA, DPI, DSS, OCHA, OHCHR, and UNHCR in finalizing the text.

2. As you are aware, the report is based on the fjndings_of the DPKO-led multidisciplinarytechnical assessment mission which wasi_disp_atched to_Chad_and the CAR during the period 21NovemBeTto 3 December 2006^ Due to the prevailing security situation, the mission was notable to visit easfern Chad and northeastern CAR. The report states that the conflict in Darfur hasclearly spilled over into Chad, and that the conflicts in Darfur, Chad and the CAR appear to beincreasingly inter-linked. The report underlines the gravity of the humanitarian and human rightssituation, and states that the situation in the border areas is now a serious threat to peace andsecurity in the whole region. Against this background, thg^report outlines thefollowing_preliminary optipnsjbr a possibleJUnited Nations multidimensional presence_in_Chad and theCAR: -

Option A - Monitoring Mission. The mandate of the monitoring mission would be toobserve the situation in the border areas. It would liaise with the parties, provide early_warning__and contribute to improving the security situation though confidence buildingand preventive measures.

Option B - Monitoring and Protection ̂ Mission. In addition to the above, a largermonitoring and protection mission would contribute to improving security in the borderregion by also providing protectipn,_within its capabilities, to civilians under imminentthreat.

3. The report indicates that a UN mission would need to cover both Chadjmd the CAR andbe separate from UNMIS. It would be headed by_ ajSpeciaj Representative andjhe mjlitary forcewould be brigade-size under option A and division-sjze_under option B. Thejx>lice componentwourdlrivolve some 160 UN police officers,^hfljwQJ4ld_advise^ndjnonitpHocaljx)lice. InChad, building on an innovative approach adopted by UNHCR in the refugee camps,Jpcal_

gendarmes and police would receive_a_subs[stence_ allowance JJPJ21J-]!? UN an^ perform specifictasks for the mission.

4. While recognizing the need to address the rapidly deteriorating security situation and toprotect civilians in the border areas, the_report stresses that the_de2lgj/menlof a UNjriission^would face considerable risks under the current circumstances. Indeed, hostilities are ongoing inboth Chad and the CAR between the Governments and rebel groups. At the same time, there areat present only limited prospects for a meaningful political process between,the Governmentsand the rebels in the two countries or, for that matter, in Darfur. ! • • - . ' • if ;• '" ^ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ " ~ "

11 "~'\ i '" — •- -' '~_c^_5. The report th^reforejscj^rnmends^that, if the Security Council wpre to decide to pursue In ifthe idea of establishing a UN presence in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR, [V£jine?^Wn I!ui

] ' I °™™'

paragraph 9 (d) of resolution 1706 (2006), it should consider authorizing the deployment of arobust monitoring and protection mission (option B).

6. 'n^dejai^iflD^Q-depJ^^ajcQbii&t UN opjgration should be contingent upon a cessation ofto allow the induction of the force, facilitate its_

or^rat^ns_and_fullv comply withltslnari'dateTThe report also recomtne"nds that it be contingentupon the concerned Governments engaging eacTTother and their respective opposition groups,including armed rebel movements, in a process of dialogue and reconciliation aimed at reachinga political solution. In addition, before making a final decision on the deployment in Chad andthe CAR, the report recommends that the Security Council should ascertain that Member Statesare prepared to make available the necessary troops and police, and to assist in addressing thedaunting logistical challenges, which such an operation would face at a time when the UN'scapacities are already stretched.

7. The draft report notes that, in the meantime, the Security Council may wish to considerauthorizing the dispatch of an advance team to Chad and the CAR. This advance team wouldcollect more information on the situation in the border areas, further explore the possibilities fora political agreement between the Governments concerned in the region, and between theGovernments and their respective opposition groups. It would also conduct further detailedplanning and logistic preparations, so as to enable us to submit more comprehensiverecommendations to the Security Council in due course.

—8. DPKO has tried to reflect the views of all relevant UN partners in the draft report. Mostof our partners, including DP A, fully concur with the report, but we have not been able to reachagreement with our humanitarian colleagues, in particular OCHA and UNHCR, on the finalwording of the observations and recommendations. They would have liked to see a moreunconditional recommendation of the immediate deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation inChad and the CAR. They argue that, given the very grave humanitarian and human rightssituation, the cost of inaction outweighs the risks associated with deploying a peacekeepingoperation under the current circumsjan^e^Sorn^^mejnb^rs ; of the Security Council may also findour approach too cautious .[However, for the reasons outlined above, it is DPKO's view that theconditions for an effective peacekeeping operation do not appear to be in place at this time, andwe strongly believe that you must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what itwants to hear. Moreover, we do not believe that in the absence of, at least, a credible cease-fire,we would be able to find the troops and police necessary to conduct this operation.

9. We would be grateful for your earliest possible approval of the report.

Jean-Marie Guehenno19 December 2006

Copies: Ms. Arbour, Mr. Egeland, Mr. Gambari, Mr. Guterres, Mr. Tharoor, Mr. Veness

20/12/0682030.

Report of the Secretary-Generalon Chad and the Central African Republic

pursuant to paragraphs 9 (d) and 13 of Security CouncilResolution 1706 (2006)

I. Introduction

1. In my report on Darfur of 28 July (S/2006/591), Iemphasized the threat to regional peace and security posed bythe situation in Darfur, in particular with respect to Chadand the Central African Republic (CAR). On 31 August, theSecurity Council adopted resolution 1706 (2006), by which itdecided, in paragraph 9 (d), that the mandate of UNMIS inDarfur shall include, inter alia, "to assist in addressingregional security issues in close liaison with internationalefforts to improve the security situation in the neighbouringregions along the borders between the Sudan and Chad andbetween the Sudan and the Central African Republic, includingthrough the establishment of a multidimensional presenceconsisting of political, humanitarian, military and civilianpolice liaison officers in key locations in Chad, including inthe internally displaced persons and refugee camps, and ifnecessary, in the Central African Republic, and to contributeto the implementation of the Agreement between the Sudan andChad signed on 26 July 2006." Furthermore, by paragraph 13 ofthe same resolution, the Council also requested me to report"on the protection of civilians in refugee and. internallydisplaced persons camps in Chad and on how to improve thesecurity situation on the Chadian side of the border withSudan."

2. Subsequently, the African Union Peace and Security Councilissued a communique on 20 September 2006, which encourages""any steps that could be taken, including by the UnitedNations, to enhance security along the borders between Sudanand Chad and between Sudan and the Central African Republic,as well as ensure the protection and security of refugees inChad".

3. In order to formulate recommendations pursuant toparagraphs 9 (d) and 13 of resolution 1706 (2006), I .dispatched a multidisciplinary technical assessment mission toChad and the CAR, led by the Department of PeacekeepingOperations (DPKO) and comprised of representatives of theDepartment of Political Affairs (DPA), the Department ofPublic Information (DPI), the Department of Safety andSecurity(DSS), the Office for the Coordination of HumanitarianAffairs (OCHA), the United Nations High Commissioner forRefugees (UNHCR) and the Office of the High Commissioner for

Human Rights (OHCHR), during the period 21 November to 3December. Mr. Hedi Annabi, Assistant Secretary-General forPeacekeeping Operations, joined the mission for high-levelconsultations from 29 November to 3 December. The mission metwith President Deby of Chad and President Bozize of the CARand other senior Government officials, both civilian andmilitary, and with political parties, representing both themajority and opposition movements, civil society, as well aswith humanitarian and human rights representatives. Themission also met with United Nations partners and members ofthe diplomatic community in both countries. In the CAR, theteam furthermore met with the commander of the ForceMultinational de la CEMAC (FOMUC) , a sub-regional forceestablished by the Communaute Economique et Monetaire de1'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC), as well as with a joint EU-AUmission, which was in the country to conduct a mid-term reviewof FOMUC.

4. Due to the prevailing security situation, the technicalassessment mission was not able to visit northeastern CAR andeastern Chad, the regions bordering Darfur. The duration ofthe team's visit to Chad was also curtailed, as it was held upin Bangui for two days due to security concerns following amajor rebel attack on Abeche and other areas in eastern Chadat the end of November. Only a part of the team subsequentlytravelled to N'Djamena, as it became clear that a field visitto eastern Chad would not be possible in view of the ongoinghostilities.

5. Accordingly, the present report provides an overview ofthe political, security, humanitarian and human rightssituation in both countries and, in particular, of theprotection of civilians in refugee and IDP locations in Chad.It also outlines some preliminary options regarding thepossible mandate, structure and concept of operations of amultidimensional United Nations presence in both countries.

II. Political and security situation

Chad

6. Since independence in 1960, Chad has faced recurrentviolent conflict and political instability, which havehindered the emergence of strong State institutions anddemocratic governance in the country. Moreover, successivemilitary coups have contributed to a culture of violence stillprevailing in the country. The lack of political stability andinsecurity have also seriously hampered economic development,despite prospects of high revenues from the new oil industry.

7. After taking power from Hissene Habre in December 1990,President Idriss Deby Itno won three successive presidentialelections in 1996, 2001 and 2006. During this period, Chad hasnot been able, despite some progress, to achieve fullyinclusive governance.

8. A constitutional amendment adopted in June 2005 allowedPresident Deby to run for a third term in the electionsconducted in May 2006. The defection of high-ranking militaryofficers in 2005-2006 and their decision to join variousChadian rebel groups further undermined the political climateand posed a serious threat to the Government. These rebelgroups have exploited the volatile situation in the borderareas to launch what appear to be increasingly coordinatedattacks against the Armee Nationale Tchadienne(ANT).

9. The rebel groups reportedly comprise significant numbersof former ANT officers as well as non-Chadians, includingSudanese nationals. On the other hand, some Sudanese armedelements, including from the Justice and Equality Movement(JEM) and National Redemption Front (NRF), also appear to bepresent in the northeastern area of Chad, around Bahai. Thereare also allegations that Sudanese rebel groups are recruitingfrom refugees camps in Chad.

10. In view of the ever more volatile situation in the borderregion and pursuant to the Tripoli Agreement of 8 February2006, as well as the N'Djamena Accord of 26 July 2006, Chadand Sudan agreed to establish a joint mechanism to monitor thesituation along the common border through the deployment ofmixed military forces in several areas along the border.However, these Agreements have not been implemented andrelations between the two countries have deterioratedconsiderably. Both parties have accused each other ofsupporting rebel groups and/or "mercenaries" seeking todestabilize the respective governments. At the same time,there is only very limited dialogue between the Government ofChad and the political opposition or the rebel groups.

11. Rebel and criminal activities, as well as inter-ethnicclashes, have increased in eastern Chad during the recentmonths. These activities have included attacks by Sudan-basedJanjaweed militia, which have launched raids into Chad,looting and pillaging. On 13 November, Chad declared a stateof emergency in the eastern part of the country, in particularin Ouaddai, Wadi Fira and Salamat prefectures. The emergencywas also extended, preventively, to Hadjer Lamis, Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti, Moyen Chari and to N'Djamena prefectures.Following the recent brief occupation of Abeche in easternChad by rebels on 25 November, the upsurge of rebel activitiesaround Biltine, 60 km northeast of Abeche, and rebel threats

to attack N'Djamena, the Government, on 28 November, declaredthat it was in "a state of war" with Sudan, and accused bothSudan and "elements" in Saudi Arabia of providing support tothe rebels.

12. The ANT is currently composed of some 25,000 troops ofwhich 15,000 are reportedly deployed in eastern Chad. Underthe Chadian Constitution, the National Police and NationalGendarmerie share law enforcement responsibilities in thecountry. Together, they have an estimated 10,000 personnel.The National Police is present primarily in urban areas,whereas the Gendarmerie is deployed in the countryside.However, the current police presence in the eastern regionsreportedly consists only of about 200 police officers dividedbetween the Commissariats of Abeche and Biltine. The level oftraining and basic logistic support of these units isinsufficient, and their strength is grossly inadequate torespond to the needs of a population estimated at 1.1 millionin the three eastern provinces.

13. The limited presence of the French military forces inChad appears to have a significant stabilizing influence,although they have refrained from intervening in the recenthostilities between rebel groups and the Government.Altogether, over a thousand French troops, supported bysignificant air assets, are based in Chad.

14. In a Note Verbale dated 7 November 2006, the Governmentof Chad expressed its preliminary views on a possible UnitedNations role in eastern Chad pursuant to Security Councilresolution 1706 (2006). The Note called for the limiteddeployment of "an international civilian force" to ensuresecurity in the refugee camps established in the east of thecountry and to "guarantee their neutrality". At the same time,it proposed that the force be made up of gendarmes provided byAfrican countries and paid for by Europe or the UnitedNations. The Note further indicated that the Government didnot want Chad to be used as "a rear base for an interventionin Darfur under United Nations auspices without the priorconsent of Sudan". However, in a follow-up Note Verbale dated15 November 2006, the Government of Chad alleged that"genocide" was being committed at the Chadian-Sudanese borderand accused Sudan of instigating a "scorched-earth" policy inDarfur and eastern Chad. The Note Verbale called on theinternational community to deploy a "United Nations force"along the border with Sudan, and to "effectively implementSecurity Council resolution 1706 (2006)".

15. During a meeting with Mr. Annabi on 2 December, PresidentDeby confirmed that his Government welcomed, in principle,the deployment of a United Nations presence in eastern Chad,

pursuant to paragraph 9 (d) of Security Council resolution1706 (2006) . However, President Deby noted that the modalitiesof such a deployment would have to be further discussed at thetechnical level. At the same time, he stressed his decisionto have several refugee camps relocated away from the borderfor security reasons. Subsequently, in a letter addressed tothe President of the Security Council dated 9 December,President Deby confirmed that he would agree to the deploymentof "an international presence at the border with Sudan" tostrengthen security in the area and ensure protection ofrefugees and IDPs.

Central African Republic

16. The history of the CAR, a large and sparsely populatedcountry, has been marked by deep rooted poverty, ethnictension, pervasive political instability and armed conflict,including over the last ten years. The country has also beenaffected by regional instability and internal conflict inneighbouring countries, which have resulted in movements ofrefugees, arms and rebel groups across its porous borders.

17. Following a series of internal conflicts and mutinies in1996 and 1997, sub-regional mediation efforts led to theestablishment of the Mission Interafricaine de Surveillancedes Accords de Bangui (MISAB) in February 1997. It wasreplaced in April 1998 by a United Nations peacekeepingoperation, the Mission des Nations Unies en RepubliqueCentrafricaine (MINURCA). Following the successful holding ofelections in September 1999, MINURCA was withdrawn andreplaced by a United Nations peacebuilding support office,(BONUCA). This Office continues to support efforts toconsolidate peace and achieve national reconciliation.

18. In August 2002, the security situation in the CARdeteriorated markedly, in particular in the northern part ofthe country. In October 2002, the Economic and MonetaryCommunity of Central Africa (CEMAC) established amultinational force (FOMUC) in the CAR. Since then, the force,which consists of 380 troops from Chad, Gabon and the Republicof Congo, has played a useful role. The current mandate ofthis subregional force, which expires on 30 June 2007, is tocontribute to the stability of CAR and the restructuring ofthe Forces Armees Centrafricaines (FACA).

19. A national dialogue launched in 2002 was interrupted whenGeneral Francois Bozize replaced President Ange-Felix Patassein the wake of a coup d'Etat in March 2003. Subsequently, the

transitional Government of President Bozize organized anational dialogue in September 2003 with the participation offormer CAR Presidents, with the exception of PresidentPatasse.

20. While General Bozize subsequently won presidential andlegislative elections in May 2005, the fragile stability inthe country has been further exacerbated by the insecuritycaused by criminal gangs and the emergence of an armedrebellion in both the northwest and the northeast. The rebelgroups consist of supporters of former President Patasse andof elements formerly associated with President Bozize, whohave since then turned against him. Attacks against the FACAhave occurred on a regular basis and the CAR authorities arehaving difficulties maintaining law and order in several partsof the country.

21. One of the CAR rebel groups claimed responsibility forattacking and occupying the town of Birao in the northeasternprefecture of Vakaga on 30 October 2006. During the months ofNovember, they also occupied the towns of Ouanda Djalle andSam Quadja in the same prefecture. The CAR authorities haveaccused Sudan of providing support to the group. The CARauthorities have regained control of these areas, with supportfrom FOMUC and France.

22. The attack and occupation of Birao occurred shortly afterviolent confrontations in Chad between the ANT and a Chadianrebel group. The timing of these two events has led tospeculation that Chadian rebel elements may have forged tieswith certain CAR rebel groups, using northeastern CAR as arear base and alternate route to launch attacks into Chad.This perception is reinforced by reports indicating thatapproximately ten days after the attack on N'Djamena in April2006, an aircraft landed in northeastern CAR on at least twooccasions and offloaded troops and military equipment.

23. The FACA does not currently have the capacity to providea secure environment throughout the country and is verydependent on the support provided by FOMUC and France. It iscomposed of some 4,000 troops of which only 1,200 are assessedto be operational. These troops are considered to have somepotential, but they lack leadership, equipment, training, andregular sustenance, in particular salaries and logisticalsupport. There is evidence that during military operations,FACA troops have committed human rights abuses againstcivilians whom they believe to be supporting the rebels.

24. At present, both the CAR gendarmerie and police haveabandoned the three Prefectures in the North-East (Bamingui-Bangorartf Haute-Kotto and Vakaga) . The total strength of theNational Police and Gendarmerie is 3,145, but as currentlyconfigured, they cannot effectively address the current crisisin the North-East. Both the military and the police are inneed of urgent reform to enable them to provide effectivesecurity throughout the country, while abiding by basic humanrights standards.

25. In a Note Verbale addressed to BONUCA dated 1 November2006, the Minister of Foreign Affairs appealed for theimmediate and effective implementation of the measuresoutlined in paragraph 9(d) of Security Council resolution 1706(2006). During his meeting with Assistant Secretary-GeneralAnnabi on 30 November, President Bozize welcomed the possibleestablishment of a United Nations peacekeeping presence in thenortheast and stressed the need for its deployment as soon aspossible, while asserting that the rebels in the northeastwere supported by Sudan.

III. Humanitarian situation

Chad

26. Currently, Chad is experiencing a multi-facetedhumanitarian crisis linked to the conflict in Darfur and theinstability in northern CAR. As of 30 November 2006, it washosting approximately 232,000 refugees from Darfur, and anadditional 48,000 refugees from the Central African Republic.Altogether, some 92,000 Chadians have been displaced as aconsequence of the recent upsurge in fighting, out of a totalpopulation of about 1.1 million in the eastern part of thecountry.

27. Despite the heavy burden that the Sudanese refugeesrepresent for the country, the Government of Chad has welcomedthem, in accordance with international standards andobligations. However, in order to cope with the situation,N'Djamena has repeatedly appealed to the internationalcommunity for assistance.

28. Out of the 232,000 Sudanese refugees, more than 220,000receive assistance in twelve refugee camps. However, newrefugees from Darfur continue to arrive, albeit at a lowerrate. So far they have been accommodated in the existingcamps.

29. These refugee camps are located in the border regionadjacent to Darfur and, with the exception of two camps, they

are all located more than fifty kilometres away from theborder. In November 2006, the Government of Chad decided thatthe camps should be relocated further inside the country, some500 kilometers from the border, and appealed for internationalassistance to do so. According to the Government, therelocation of the camps is necessary not only to ensure thesecurity of the refugees, but to put to rest the accusationsby the Sudanese Government that N'Djamena encourages Sudaneserebels to use the refugee camps as a rear base. During thetechnical assessment mission, President Deby and other seniorGovernment officials repeatedly insisted on the need torelocate the camps. The Government of Chad and UNHCR haveestablished a technical working group to identify alternative .sites that conform to minimum criteria including security,water, ethnic compatibility, medium-term viability andopportunities for self-sufficiency. In addition, therelocation of the refugees is subject to security conditions.

30. For the most part, IDPs in eastern Chad are not in camps.Between 4 and 16 November, Janjaweed militia reportedlyattacked and burned some 40 villages in the areas south of GozBeida and Koukou Angarana, resulting in the death of between260 to 500 civilians. As a result, some IDPs were dispersedand are now living near refugee camps close to villages andtowns, while others are scattered in locations which renderthe provision of assistance to them more difficult.

31. Ethnic and linguistic affinities among the populations inthe region have so far ensured that tensions between IDPs,Sudanese refugees and the local communities have remained low.However, increased pressure on land and other scarce resourcesas well as recent hostilities in the region, are underminingpeaceful coexistence among the different groups. Humanitarianagencies are increasingly providing host communities withassistance in order to alleviate their burden, but also toreduce tensions. Clearly, however, this assistance isinadequate and greater efforts to provide relief assistanceand implement recovery programmes are needed.

32. Ten UN agencies and 39 international non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs) and members of the Red Cross movement areproviding food, water, sanitation, healthcare, shelter,nutritional support, education, protection, psycho-socialactivities and other assistance to conflict-affected refugees,IDPs, and host populations. In addition to the deterioratingsecurity conditions, the implementation of humanitarianoperations in eastern Chad faces extreme challenges. Theterrain is harsh, vast, has minimal infrastructure, and duringthe rainy season much of the area is virtually impassable.

33. Hostilities and the ensuing criminality have forcedhumanitarian agencies to repeatedly evacuate staff fromeastern Chad. The recent fighting has required a shift tosecurity Phase IV and, as a result, humanitarian and NGO staffserving in eastern Chad are being reduced and relocated. Suchconstant interruptions disrupt the provision of vitalassistance.

34. Due to the complex and fluid security situation,refugees, displaced persons and host communities face a widerange of threats. These are compounded by the absence of themost basic law and order institutions. Among the most seriousthreats are the use of refugee camps for military purposes andlocal populations by the various rebel groups; forcedrecruitment, including of children; criminal activities;inter-ethnic strife; and violent competition over scarcenatural resources. There is evidence of sexual and gender-based violence, but cultural norms prevent survivors fromseeking treatment or reporting incidents. Overall, thegrowing insecurity is the single greatest impediment to theprotection of the civilian population.

35. In response to the increasing security threats to therefugee camps and the difficulties encountered by the absenceof capacity of the Government of Chad to ensure the civilianand humanitarian character of the camps, UNHCR negotiated aMemorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Ministries ofDefence and Territorial Administration in March 2006. The MoUprovides for the deployment of 235 Gendarmes in the 12 refugeecamps. Following the deterioration'of the security situation,an Additional Protocol was negotiated and signed in September2006. Under the Protocol, an additional 75 Gendarmes are tobe deployed, bringing the total number to 315. The role ofthe Gendarmes was also extended to include a presence in andaround Field Offices, so as to improve the security ofhumanitarian staff. UNHCR provides them with the entiresupport package, including a stipend of 80,000 F CFA(US$ 160)per Gendarme, per month.

37. To date, implementation of the security package throughthe national Gendarmes has had mixed results. Although theyhave diligently fulfilled many tasks and many did not flee thetowns attacked by rebels, the Gendarmes do not have thenecessary equipment, training and experience to dissuade orprevent criminal activities, the recruitment of childsoldiers, sexual and gender-based violence, and the presenceof armed combatants among the camp population. So far, only220 Gendarmes have been deployed, and some have been draftedinto the armed forces to fight the rebels.

38. A major concern is that no similar arrangement is inplace covering the IDP locations and the host communities. Atpresent, apart from the border areas in which the Chadian armyoperates, a security vacuum exists, which is being exploitedby various groups and criminal elements. Despite theirinnovative nature, the current arrangements fall significantlyshort of what is required to ensure the protection of thecivilian population.

Central African Republic

39. The humanitarian situation in the CAR is also a cause forserious concern. It is predominantly the result of internalevents and deep rooted poverty, but instability inneighbouring countries, particularly Chad and Sudan, has alsohad an impact. Outside Bangui and major regional towns, basicservices, such as education, water and sanitation, and healthcare, are nearly non-existent. Basic infrastructure islacking. Tensions have been increasing since early 2006, andthe humanitarian community considers that the situation in theCAR is deteriorating rapidly. It is estimated that a quarterof the population is affected, more than 1 million people outof a total population of about 3.8 million. As of September2006, the CAR hosted nearly 20,000 refugees, including 14,000Sudanese, 3,200 Congolese (DRC) and 1,500 Chadians. Themajority of Sudanese refugees are expected to be repatriatedto South Sudan during the course of 2007.

40. The northwest of the country, especially the prefecturesof Ouham and Ouham-Pende, is currently the epicentre of thehumanitarian crisis, with at least 70,000 internally displacedpersons. Tens of thousands of civilians are currently livingin the bush with minimal shelter, health care, safe drinkingwater and sanitation. Their survival depends in part on thefew humanitarian agencies operational in the area. Protectionof the civilian population and the provision of life-savingassistance are the most urgent humanitarian challenges.

41. Vakaga prefecture in the northeast is sparsely populated,with a population of 52,000 (20'03 census) or a populationdensity of 1.1 inhabitants per square kilometer. Given thelack of access and the dearth of information about thesituation in the northeast, an accurate understanding of thehumanitarian situation is not possible at present. Theassumption is that the humanitarian situation in Vakaga iscomparable to the rest of the country. Reportedly, a largenumber of the civilian population has been displaced by therecent fighting in and around Birao. At present, no UN agencyor INGO has a presence in the region. INGOs have requestedGovernment permission to assess the area. The Government,

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however, claims that the area is too insecure for ahumanitarian presence.

IV. Human rights situation

Chad

42. Chad faces major challenges on the human rights front.Existing state structures for the protection and promotion ofhuman rights appear unable or unwilling to tackle theprevailing culture of impunity that seems anchored to ethnicallegiances. The executive is commonly perceived to interferein the work of the judiciary.

43. The international human rights treaties that Chad hasratified are yet to be incorporated in its domestic law. Inperipheral regions, including those bordering Darfur, thetraditional dispute resolution mechanism known as "diya"supersedes Chadian law. In most towns of the eastern regions,the judicial system has reportedly ceased to function. Theensuing impunity compounds inter-ethnic tensions.

44. Reported violations of human rights in Chad includeextrajudicial killings, ill-treatment and torture, forciblerecruitment, including of children,, sexual violence and otherviolations of political rights.

45. The general human rights situation is further aggravatedby the conflict in the areas bordering Darfur. Findings ofinternational human rights NGOs in eastern Chad speak ofseveral hundreds of people killed in the past three months asa result of communal violence. Small arms are readilyavailable. New armed groups proliferate at an alarming rate.Refugee and internally displaced men, women and childrenappear to be caught in a spiral of violence that not onlydeprives them of their means of livelihood, but alsocontinuously undermines their physical integrity.

46. According to reports, civilian population and Sudaneserefugees in the eastern regions receive little or noprotection from state institutions. The low literacy rate,including amongst civilian authorities, the absence of anactive civil society and, increasingly, the erosion oftraditional chiefs' authority represents serious long-termchallenges.

Central African Republic

47. The human rights situation in the CAR is also a seriousconcern. Impunity appears to be a major issue. Several

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documented cases of abuses and crimes committed by uniformedpersonnel have either gone totally unpunished or simplyresulted in perfunctory disciplinary measures. The culture ofimpunity is also manifested in the form of threats which, attimes, amount to violent and even lethal acts against,magistrates, lawyers, human rights defenders and independentjournalists. Human rights abuses are also reportedly committedby the police force and, to a lesser extent, the gendarmerie.

48. The ongoing conflict in the north of CAR results in grossviolations of human rights perpetrated against the localpopulation. The CAR armed forces, in particular thePresidential Guard, are widely held responsible for reprisalsagainst the local population whom they accuse of supportingthe rebels, including burning villages. The mission alsoreceived allegations of abuses committed by rebels.

49. Sexual violence against women, but also men, seems to bea lasting legacy of the 2002/3 rebellions, when it wascommitted on large scale by all parties, to an extent that hasjustified the submission of a case to the InternationalCriminal Court (ICC). There are alarming reports according towhich witnesses for the ICC are being harassed by perpetratorswho now wear state uniforms. One reliable source reported tensof cases of sexual violence perpetrated in the current year.

50. Other current violations reported include the consistentuse of ill treatment/torture of detainees, allegations ofongoing recruitment of child soldiers for deployment in thenorth, including the northeast of CAR, as well as the culturalpractice of slavery affecting the Pygmies.

51. Outside the capital city of Bangui, there seems to be nofunctioning legal system in the CAR, which can be seen as boththe cause and the effect of the prevailing- impunity. Inaddition, there is also a lack of capacity for independentcollection and analysis of human rights related information,especially in conflict affected areas such as the north-east.

V. Preliminary options for a United Nations multidimensionalpresence in Chad and the CAR

Key findings

52. Since the technical assessment mission was not able to .visit eastern Chad or northeastern CAR due to the ongoinghostilities in both areas, it was not possible to developfull-fledged recommendations regarding a possible UnitedNations multidimensional presence in those areas. Thefollowing should therefore be treated as preliminary findings,

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which will need to be confirmed and adjusted by furtherassessments.

53. The technical mission confirmed that the conflicts inDarfur, Chad and CAR are increasingly inter-linked, posingconsiderable threats to subregional security. The Darfurconflict has already spilled over into Chad with seriousconsequences to this country and beyond, while in the CAR, theGovernment asserts that Sudan is backing the rebels in thenortheast. At the same time, it is clear that the northeast ofCAR has been used by Chadian rebel groups as a route to bypassthe Darfur-Chad border, thereby destabilizing the Vakagaprefecture. The porosity of the borders is attested to by thenumerous reports of infiltrations, incursions and cross-borderactivities by tribal and janjaweed militias, as well as theregular forces and rebels of each of the three countries,except the FACA.

54. The hostilities in Darfur and eastern Chad have alreadyled to a regional humanitarian crisis, involving a total ofover 2.3 million refugees and IDPS on the two sides of theborder. While conditions in northeastern CAR could not beassessed, it is obvious that the recent hostilities have ledto a further deterioration in the humanitarian situationthere. If the current pattern of hostilities continues in theborder areas, this may lead to additional displacement ofpopulations, which in turn will lead to greaterdestabilization of the whole subregion.

55. In the CAR, the sub-regional force, FOMUC, has played auseful role with French assistance, but neither its mandatenor the capacity of this subregional operation are adequate tostabilize the situation.

56. At this time, there is no significant political orreconciliation process to resolve the conflicts in either Chador the CAR. So far, the two Governments have avoided enteringinto discussions with rebel groups, arguing they should firstlay down their arms and back up the reconciliation process.With ongoing hostilities, the prospects of establishingdurable peace and security are bleak. Moreover with theprevailing trends, the armed confrontation may continue andthe humanitarian crisis may intensify.

57. While the technical assessment mission, in both Chad andthe CAR, discussed with senior Government officials thedeployment of a United Nations multidimensional presence, itwas not able to ascertain the views of the armed oppositiongroups. In their contacts with the team, opposition parties inboth countries, however, indicated that armed oppositiongroups would regard a UN operation as partial and supportive

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of the two Governments. In the absence of a credible andinclusive political process, a United Nations multidimensionalpresence would therefore face considerable security risks.

58. Finally, the team also found that the deployment andsubsequent sustainment of any United Nations presence in Chadand the CAR would pose enormous logistical challenges. Thearea of operations is characterised by difficult terrain,extreme weather conditions, very poor infrastructure andabsence of major airfields, and very long distances from thesea ports.

Mandate of a UN multidimensional presence

59. In line with paragraph 9(d) of Security Councilresolution 1706 (2006), a possible UN multidimensionalpresence should seek to improve the security situation in theareas along the borders between the Sudan, Chad and the CAR.The mandate would depend on the size and scope of the presenceauthorized. The preliminary recommendations of the mission arethat the mandate should include the following elements:facilitation of political process/dialogue in the areas ofdeployment; protection of civilians within availablecapabilities; protection of UN personnel and their assets;monitoring and investigating the human rights situation; andstrengthening of the local judicial, police and correctionalsystem. In addition to the activities listed above, themission could also include disarmament, demobilisation andreintegration, gender, conduct and HIV/AIDS components, aswell as mine action efforts, as appropriate.

Overall structure of a UN multidimensional presence

60. Given developments on the ground and the overallpolitical and security assessment, it would seem necessary toconsider establishing a separate United Nations presence forChad and the CAR, which would liaise and coordinate closelywith AMIS/UNMIS and other United Nations operations. Given theinterdependence of the situation in the two countries, thepresence should cover both Chad and the CAR. The new UnitedNations presence would have its headquarters in N'Djamena.Major operational activities would be focused on eastern Chadand northeastern CAR with a liaison office in Bangui.

64. It is envisaged that the presence would bemultidimensional and headed by a Special Representative. Themission's civilian components would be relatively modest insize, and would complement and coordinate closely with

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existing partners and activities in Chad and the CAR,including the Country Teams and BONUCA.

Concept of operations of UN multidimensional presence

61. The technical assessment mission considered two principaloptions for a multidimensional presence:

Option A - Monitoring Mission. The mandate of themonitoring mission would be to observe the situation inthe border areas. It would liaise with the parties,provide early warning and contribute to improving thesecurity situation though confidence building andpreventive measures.

Option B - Monitoring and Protection Mission. In additionto the above, a larger monitoring and protection missionwould contribute to improving security in the borderregion by also providing protection, within itscapabilities, to civilians under imminent threat.

Political and civil affairs

62. Under both options, the mission would need to include apolitical and a civil affairs component. The politicalcomponent would provide support and advice to the SpecialRepresentative, assist him/her in facilitating politicaldialogue within and between the CAR, Chad and Sudan, includingthe implementation of the Tripoli and N'Djamena agreements,and in establishing liaison with United Nations partners,including the African Union and other relevant sub-regionalentities. This component would also be responsible forreporting to Headquarters. The civil affairs component wouldliaise with the local authorities and civil society in theareas of deployment and help promote peace and nationalreconciliation. Both the political and civil affairscomponents would have staff in N'Djamena and in the fieldlocations in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR, as well as inthe liaison office in Bangui.

Military

Military Concept for Option A - Monitoring Mission

63. The tasks of the military force would be to monitor andreport on the cross-border activities of armed groups alongthe border with Darfur, focussing on major crossing points, inorder to provide early warning against infiltration orincursion; maintain liaison with United Nations agencies,funds and programmes, AMIS/UNMIS, BONUCA, French troops, FOMUCand the authorities in Chad and the CAR; and protect UNpersonnel and property. The main points of application for the

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monitoring mission would be nine major border crossings inChad and one in the CAR, as well as key towns in the borderregion. Ideally, efficiency would be improved by similarefforts by AMIS on the Sudanese side of the border.

64. This United Nations operation would have a brigade-sizedconfiguration with a military HQ deployed in Abeche, threebattalion sectors in Chad and a fourth battalion deployed in aseparate sector in CAR.

65. In addition to the ground operation and extensivepatrolling in the border areas, the mission would monitor theborder by aerial observation. Long range patrols would also beconducted. The use of unarmed military observers wasconsidered but discarded, as it was determined that they couldnot be safely deployed in the border region without armedprotection.

66. Quick reaction units would be established at both themission and sector levels, and supported by air mobility andspecial vehicles. The mission would need to be supported byengineer companies to assist in construction of United Nationsbases and provide extra operational capability. The forcewould also require at least six military helicopters toprovide troop lift, as well as dedicated medical evacuation. Alevel 2 hospital would be required to be deployed in Abeche,with an enhanced level 1 facility in Birao. Military policeand logistics transport might also be required, subject tofurther assessment.

Military Concept for Option B - Monitoring and ProtectionMission

67. In addition to performing the liaison and monitoringtasks described above, the larger force would deter attacksand provide protection, within its capabilities, to civiliansunder imminent threat in its deployment areas.

68. This option would have a military division-sizedcomposition with Divisional HQ to be located in Abeche. Theforce would comprise three brigade sectors in Chad; and abattalion sector in CAR, In the sectors, the militarycomponent would monitor the cross border activities of armedgroups and conduct patrols to provide area security coveragearound towns, villages and IDP locations. The force would seekto deter attacks by armed groups and react pre-emptively toprotect the civilian population, including refugees and IDPs.The force also would require quick reaction capabilities atforce, sector and battalion levels, which could be deployed byaviation or in special vehicles. The force would also requireadditional enablers, such as engineer companies and additional

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helicopters. In the CAR, the deployment of a strong battalionwould still be limited to the northeastern border region.

Police

69. The police concept of operations would be the same underboth options. In Chad, the United Nations police would assistthe national law enforcement agencies with the following fourbasic tasks: policing refugee camps (12 locations); policingkey towns (including humanitarian bases); patrolling commutingroutes between humanitarian field offices and IDP and refugeepopulation; and policing IDPs areas. These tasks could onlybe performed in combination with a United Nations militarypresence that could provide the necessary security. The abovetasks would be achieved by enhancing local police/gendarmeriecapacity, building on the approach developed by UNHCR in therefugee camps. Preliminary estimates are that some 580 Chadiangendarmes and police would be required. Each of these wouldreceive a subsistence allowance, and additional basic logisticsupport. The mission would require some 160 UN policeofficers, including a Training Team for selection and pre-deployment training of local personnel, and a number of policeadvisers to support and monitor law enforcement activities onthe ground. The use of formed police units could beconsidered, subject to further assessments and developments onthe ground.

70. In the CAR, pending further assessment of the situationin the northeast, the UN police presence would be limited to asmall number of UN police officers to monitor and advise thenational police and Gendarmerie, and liaise with partners,including AMIS/UNMIS, BONUCA, FOMUC and the French forces. Thedeployment would include border policing experts and generallaw enforcement personnel.

Humanitarian

71. The humanitarian operations in Chad and the CAR wouldcontinue to be coordinated by the respective HumanitarianCoordinators, while the new mission in the border areas wouldinclude Humanitarian Liaison Officers (HLOs), in order toensure appropriate liaison between the presence and thehumanitarian community. The number and duty stations of thepotential Humanitarian Liaison presence would depend on theoption chosen.

Human Rights

72. Under both options, a few human rights officers would bedeployed as a part of the mission in key locations to monitor,document and report on the situation in the mandated areas and

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conduct preliminary investigation on cases of major humanrights violations. Particular attention would be paid to theidentification of perpetrators and, thematically, to theissues of sexual violence and child protection. At the sametime, the mission could work closely with local human rightsorganizations and train the local authorities and civilsociety on international human rights standards, including theguiding principles for the protection of internally displacedpersons.

Public Information

73. The mission should include a public informationcomponent, which would explain and promote the UN's mandateand activities in both countries. It should aim to reachrefugees, IDPs, combatants, and the population at large. Thefollowing activities should be considered:

a. To develop and implement a community outreach and advocacyprogramme, which should include workshops, training sessions,as well as other more traditional public informationactivities.

b. To focus on radio broadcasting as the most effective toolof direct communication with the population. Radio programmescould include promotion of human rights, reconciliation,protection, in addition to other programmes promoting the UN'smandate and activities. To achieve the desired radiobroadcasting goals, the UN should first seek to identifysuitable partners already on the ground with the availablenetworks and capacities.

74. Public information facilities should be established inN'Djamena and Abeche in Chad, and in Bangui and Birao in theCAR.

Mission support:

75. Due to the land locked status of both Chad and the CAR,deployment and subsequent sustainment of any UN presence inthese countries would pose enormous challenges. The area ofoperations is characterised by difficult terrain and extremeweather conditions. The region is seriously affected by heavyrains during the period from May to November. Flooding of thearea, together with the forested terrain, results in a swampcovering southeastern Chad, north and northeastern CAR. Thismakes surface movement extremely difficult and hazardous. TheUnited Nations presence would therefore have to rely heavilyon air transport. There is a very high incidence of tropicaldiseases, including malaria, which results in a high degree of

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health risks that would require deployment of advanced medicalfacilities. According to UNAIDS estimates, the national HIVprevalence in CHAD is 3.3% rising to 6% in its largest citiesand 8% in the capital, N'Djamena. CAR is one of the mostaffected countries in the region, with an HIV prevalence of11%. Mission HIV awareness and prevention programmes willneed to be implemented to reduce the risk of peacekeeperscontracting and/or spreading HIV. At the same time, HIVconcerns will need to be integrated into mission functions,such as human rights and the training of national police.

76. Chad and the CAR are also characterised by very poorinfrastructure including roads, bridges, airfields, power,transportation, communications and health facilities.Commercial activity in both countries is limited to thecapital cities, with the exception of mining and petroleumexploration. There is heavy dependence on imported goods andservices. Therefore, any UN presence in both countries wouldrequire out of area sourcing of goods and services. It may bepossible to recruit some skilled staff in Bangui. However,there are very limited possibilities in Chad, owing to demandfor skilled labor by the oil sector and other factors.

77. Most importation into Chad and CAR is channelled throughtwo main corridors: from Douala in Cameroon, and to a limitedextent Benghazi in Libya. Average transit time for aconsignment from Douala to reach Bangui or N'Djamena is aboutsix to eight weeks, depending upon the season. From Bangui orN'Djamena to the local areas, the main supply routes are evenmore complex and transportation is monopolised by a network offormal and informal entities. Therefore, to deploy and sustaina UN presence in this region, the United Nations would have tocreate its own infrastructure in terms of transportation,communications, medical, supply and engineering. Most goodsand services would have to be imported from outside theregion.

78. Due to these constraints, a United Nations deployment inthis region would be time consuming and costly. Since therainy season begins in May, it would be important that adecision to deploy be taken no later than January 2007.Notwithstanding this decision, it would be essential todispatch a small advance team as soon as possible to lay thegroundwork for the possible deployment of a mission.

Safety and Security

79. The multidimensional presence would have an appropriatecivilian security component in order to facilitate a safe andsecure environment for mandate implementation and programme

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delivery. This would be essential given the insecurity thatprevails in the possible areas of deployment.

VI. Observations and recommendations

80. Over the last weeks and months, the situation in theborder areas has deteriorated considerably and is now aserious threat to peace and security in the whole region. Thedevastating conflict in Darfur has clearly spilled over intoChad, and the conflicts in Darfur, Chad and the CAR appear tobe increasingly inter-linked.

81. The humanitarian and human rights situation has alsoworsened and is having a serious impact upon the civilianpopulations in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR. The humantragedy that we are already witnessing in Darfur and theborder areas is likely to worsen, if the current hostilitiesare allowed to continue. I strongly appeal to the Governmentsconcerned, as well as the various rebel groups, to refrainfrom attacking civilians and to respect the humanitarian andcivilian character of the refugee and IDP locations, as wellas the safety of humanitarian workers and their assets. Inthis connection, and pursuant to paragraph 13 of SecurityCouncil resolution 1706 (2006), the necessary securityconditions must be created to allow for the relocation, insafety and dignity, of those refugee camps in Chad, which arecurrently too close to the border area. I urge Member Statesto make the necessary funds available for both the on-goinghumanitarian operations and for the relocation of the refugeecamps.

82. The deployment of the multidimensional presence envisagedby paragraph 9(d) of Security Council resolution 1706 (2006)was discussed with the Presidents of Chad and the CAR.President Bozize called for the deployment of UN troops assoon as possible. President Deby indicated that Chad accepted,in principle, the deployment of a United Nations mission, butpointed out that the nature, strength and composition of suchan operation would need to be further discussed.

83. There is evidently a need to address the rapidlydeteriorating security situation and to protect civilians inthe border areas. However, the situation in eastern Chad andthe northeastern CAR is extremely fluid, with ongoinghostilities between the respective Governments and rebelgroups, especially in Chad. At the same time, there are atpresent only limited prospects for a meaningful dialogue andreconciliation process between the Governments and the rebelsin the two countries. Similarly, there are so far no signs ofa credible and inclusive political process in Darfur.Accordingly, the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping

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force in 'eastern Chad and northeastern CAR would faceconsiderable risks and its safe entry would depend on theconsent of the parties. Otherwise, any UN presence couldbecome the target of attacks by rebel groups, if they were toperceive it as interfering with their cross-border activities.Unless all the concerned parties were to agree to a cease-fireand engage in an intra- and inter-state dialogue aimed at apolitical solution, a United Nations force would be operatingin the midst of continuing hostilities and would have no clearexit strategy. The conditions for an effective United Nationspeacekeeping operation do not therefore seem to be in place atthis time.

84. However, should the Security Council decide to pursue theidea of establishing a United Nations multidimensionalpresence in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR, in line withparagraph 9 (d) of resolution 1706 (2006), it should considerauthorizing the deployment of a robust monitoring andprotection mission, as described in section V above(option B).A smaller mission, as envisaged under option A, would not beable to protect civilians under imminent threat and, at thesame time, stabilize the border area. Moreover, its deploymentwould be fraught with unacceptable risk and raise expectationsthat would likely be disappointed.

85. The decision to deploy such a robust United Nationsmonitoring and protection mission should be contingent upon acessation of hostilities and an agreement by all parties toallow the induction of the force, facilitate its operationsand fully comply with its mandate. I would also recommend thatit be contingent upon the concerned Governments engaging eachother and their respective opposition groups, including armedrebel movements, in a process of dialogue and reconciliationaimed at reaching a political solution. The Security Counciland all Member States with influence on the parties shouldredouble their efforts to promote such a political process. Tothis end, I will continue to consult with the African Unionand other partners on the necessary facilitation efforts to.foster national reconciliation in Chad. Regarding the CAR, theDepartment of Political Affairs has dispatched a mission tothe sub-region to consult national and regional stakeholderswithin the Monetary and Economic Community of Central AfricanStates (CEMAC) to explore peaceful ways and means of resolvingthe current political crisis in that country.

86. In addition, before making a final decision on thedeployment in Chad and the CAR, the Security Council shouldascertain that Member States are prepared to make availablethe necessary troops and police, and to assist in addressingthe daunting logistical challenges, which such an operation

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would face at a time 'when the Organization's capacities inthis area are already stretched.

90. In the meantime, the Security Council may wish toconsider authorizing the dispatch of an advance team to Chadand the CAR. This advance team would collect more informationon the situation in the border areas, further explore thepossibilities for a political agreement between theGovernments concerned in the region, and between theGovernments and their respective opposition groups. It wouldalso conduct further detailed planning and logistic .preparations, so as to enable me to submit more comprehensiverecommendations to the Security Council in due course.

91. In conclusion, I wish to stress that the responsibilityfor addressing the situation in Darfur, eastern Chad andnortheastern CAR must rest, first and foremost, with theleaders of these countries. They must muster the necessarypolitical will and leadership to bring about an effectivecessation of hostilities and, thereby, put an end to theuntold suffering inflicted on the civilian populationsconcerned. I call upon them to honour the various agreementsthey have freely entered into, in particular the Tripoli andN'Djamena agreements. I also encourage the respectiveGovernments and rebel groups to enter into a genuine dialogueand reconciliation process. Only such a process can ensure therestoration of durable peace and stability in the region.

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