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Foreign-Policy Making under the Democratic Party of Japan

From Rhetoric to Reality

April 2012

The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

April 2012

Weston S. Konishi

A publication of

The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

Foreign-Policy Making under the Democratic Party of Japan

From Rhetoric to Reality

F R O M R H E T O R I C T O R E A L I T Y i

Contents

Introduction and Acknowledgments iii

Executive Summary v

Main Findings v

From Rhetoric to Reality: Foreign-Policy Making under the Democratic Party of Japan 1

Internal Challenges 4

intra-party Divisions 4

The Complexities of Coalition Politics 7

institutional Reforms: Toward Politician-Led Decision-Making 11

The DPJ’s Foreign Policy: Competing Visions 15

Realists 16

Pacifists 17

Centrists 17

Neo-Autonomists 18

Caveats 20

Prime Minister Hatoyama: An Agenda for Change 23

External Constraints on the Hatoyama Administration 27

The Kan Administration: Political Transition and Crisis Management 30

The Noda Administration: Shifting to the Center? 40

Findings and Implications 45

The impact of Structural Obstacles on DPJ Foreign-Policy Making 45

Continuity versus Change 46

The DPJ: A Hawkish Party? 47

Bilateralism vs. Multilateralism 49

Competing Schools of Thought 51

Conclusion 54

APPENDiX A: Impact of Major Events on Cabinet Approval Ratings 56

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APPENDiX B : The 2010 NDPG Process 59

APPENDiX C: Survey Data of DPJ Foreign Policy Viewpoints 62

APPENDiX D: Profiles of Key DPJ Politicians 63

APPENDiX E: Chronology of Major Events under DPJ Governments 79

Bibliography 86

About the Author 103

F R O M R H E T O R I C T O R E A L I T Y i i i

Introduction and Acknowledgments

After more than fifty years of one-party dom-inance under the Liberal Democratic Par-ty (LDP), Japan’s political landscape changed dramatically with the victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in parliamentary elections on August 30, 2009. As an opposition party, the DPJ had promised sweeping changes across a broad range of domestic and foreign policy is-sues. On the domestic front, the DPJ called for the elimination of wasteful government spend-ing, greater government transparency, and re-form of the bureaucrat-led decision-making process that had become entrenched under LDP rule. On foreign policy, the party pledged to forge a more “equal” security alliance with the United States, enhance ties with China and other Asian nations, and establish a more asser-tive and independent foreign policy agenda for the nation. As the newly elected prime minister, Hatoyama Yukio, prepared to take office in Sep-tember 2009, there was a sense that Japan was in the midst of a quiet revolution of sorts.

Over two years later, the dramatic change promised by the DPJ has not entirely come to fruition. As a ruling party, the DPJ has failed to turn much of its lofty rhetoric into reality. Its do-mestic agenda has largely stalled, while some of its more grandiose foreign policy proposals, such as creating an East Asian Community (EAC), have been back-shelved or abandoned. The over-whelming priority of party leaders has been to keep the DPJ from splintering into its many fac-tions and to maintain its position as the ruling party. It has been forced to form coalitions with ill-fitting political partners in order to maintain a majority of seats in the Diet (parliament).

After just nine months in office, Prime Minis-ter Hatoyama resigned, taking responsibility for his floundering government and his mismanage-ment of relocation plans for U.S. military bases on Okinawa. Hatoyama’s successor, Prime Min-

ister Kan Naoto, presided over Japan’s most chal-lenging crisis since World War II—the March 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake—before succumbing to his own political fate as a result of his inconsistent leadership. Now Noda Yoshi-hiko, the third DPJ prime minister in two years, is facing equally daunting political challenges.

For observers of Japan’s foreign policy, the diplomatic and strategic implications of the gov-ernment changeover in 2009 have been difficult to discern, especially given the backdrop of on-going political turmoil in Tokyo. Before the DPJ came to power, questions arose about whether the new government would institute significant changes to Japanese foreign and security poli-cies. Of primary concern, particularly to policy makers in Washington, was whether the DPJ-led government might tilt Japan away from its traditional emphasis on the U.S.-Japan alliance (bilateralism) and toward a closer strategic re-lationship with the Asian mainland (multilat-eralism). Based on previous statements by DPJ leaders, as well as party manifestos, it seemed reasonable to assume that the DPJ would carry out this shift. Yet some argued that, once in pow-er, the DPJ government would ultimately come to see the limitations of alternative security ar-rangements and would fall back into the status quo strategic partnership with the United States.

So far, the latter prediction appears more ac-curate. The DPJ-led government has not fun-damentally altered Japan’s foreign policy. The “big change” in diplomatic and strategic direc-tion that some speculated would accompany the new government in Tokyo has failed to materi-alize. Despite the rhetoric, particularly by for-mer Prime Minister Hatoyama, Japan has not developed closer strategic ties with Asia nor, in any real sense, moved away from the alliance with the United States. And yet, the U.S.-Japan security relationship has changed—if not as a

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result of a concerted policy shift, then at least through a series of missteps and mixed signals that marked the first year of the DPJ’s rule. The bilateral alliance has since appeared to be adrift at times, as alliance management difficulties have undermined momentum toward enhanced bilateral strategic relations.

What explains the present state of affairs, as well as the DPJ’s inability to follow through on its promise to reorient Japanese foreign policy? Is it the result of a fierce internal debate over com-peting visions of Japan’s grand strategy? Did one school of thought within the DPJ or ruling co-alition win out over another? There seems lit-tle doubt that the answer to these questions lies more in the general state of confusion and polit-ical dysfunction that marked the first year of the DPJ-led government than in a more compelling story of an internal struggle over grand strategy. Yet despite the dysfunction and lack of coordi-nation, the new government has actually taken steps to advance Japan’s diplomatic and strate-gic interests in some important ways. Indeed, far from a total breakdown of policy making, there have been surprising areas of active diplomacy and security policy. Indeed, a broader analysis is required to fully understand how and why some initiatives of the DPJ’s foreign-policy making suc-ceeded and how others failed.

In order to shed more light on these points, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), with generous support from the Smith Richard-son Foundation, embarked on a research proj-ect to examine the DPJ’s foreign-policy making since it took power in 2009. The project exam-ines the key people, policies, and processes that have come to underlie the DPJ’s foreign-policy making as a ruling party, and it includes an at-tempt to define and categorize four main foreign policy strains within the party. Rather than focus on the current state of U.S.-Japan relations, this study examines Japan’s broader diplomatic and strategic activity beyond the bilateral relationship while considering how these actions might im-pact the U.S.-Japan relationship in the future.

This report draws on research findings based on Japanese and English-language primary sourc-

es and data as well as the author’s background in-terviews with numerous DPJ and opposition party lawmakers, parliamentary staff, government of-ficials, journalists, and researchers on both sides of the Pacific.

Many people provided invaluable knowledge and input throughout the course of this under-taking. Not all can be named here, but the au-thor would especially like to thank Akita Hiroyu-ki, Amiya Kosuke, Aoba Hiroo, John Brandon, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Gordon Flake, Michael Green, Haku Shinkun, Hayashi Yoshimasa, Hira-oka Hideo, Jeffrey Hornung, Ishiba Shigeru, Kato Yoichi, Kinoshita Hideyomi, Kobayashi Yutaka, Kojima Hiroshi, Nakayama Toshihiro, Mark Manyin, Mizuno Takaaki, Nagashima Akihisa, Nodomi Mitsuru, Ono Hikariko, Ono Keiichi, Osawa Jun, Charles Perry, Saiki Akitaka, Sakamo-to Takashi, Sato Ken, Richard Samuels, Michael Schiffer, Sheila Smith, Sugawa Kiyoshi, Suzuki Atsuo, Takahashi Sugio, Tanaka Hitoshi, Toya-ma Kiyohiko, Uchida Yuka, Yamaguchi Nobo-ru, Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi, and Yamanouchi Kan-ji for their insights and encouragement.

The project was initially the brainchild of the former IFPA director of Asia-Pacific studies, James Schoff, who kept it on track even as he transitioned to the Pentagon as a senior adviser on Asia policy. Kawakami Takeshi of Takushoku University helped consult on the project, gener-ously opening doors to normally inaccessible in-terview subjects and sharing his own prescient insights along the way. IFPA staff who contrib-uted their skills and expertise to the final prod-uct include Adelaide Ketchum (editing), Chris-tian Hoffman (graphic design and publishing), Charles McClean (research) and, most of all, Na-kai Aki, whose tireless research and analysis were indispensable to the completion of this project. The entire IFPA team is grateful to Allan Song of the Smith Richardson Foundation for making SRF’s financial support possible. It goes without saying that the author alone bears full responsibil-ity for whatever flaws remain in the report. One final note is that Japanese names appear with the family name first and the given name second, as is the Japanese custom.

F R O M R H E T O R I C T O R E A L I T Y v

Executive Summary

This report surveys the past two years of Japanese foreign and defense policy making, since the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) overthrew the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to become Japan’s main ruling party in September 2009. In its campaign rhetoric before taking power, the DPJ promised major changes to Japanese diplomacy, including a more “equal” alliance with the United States, closer ties to China and other Asian nations, and a more “proactive” diplomacy under UN-mandated international operations. However, the DPJ’s track record over the past two years shows that many of these goals have been left unfulfilled. This report details some of the internal structural obstacles that impeded the DPJ’s ability to accomplish its vision of a revamped foreign policy and shows how external factors have influenced the direction of the party’s foreign and security policies over the past few years. The DPJ’s diplomatic behavior has had major implications for the alliance with the United States as well as for Japan’s role in regional and global affairs.

Main Findings• The “big change” in Japanese foreign policy

following the DPJ’s takeover in 2009 did not transpire according to some expectations. On the contrary, the DPJ’s foreign policy increas-ingly resembles the status quo—emphasizing the centrality of the U.S.-Japan alliance—rather than a dramatic rebalancing of diplo-matic and strategic engagement toward Asia.

• Several key structural factors have impeded the DPJ’s ability to make good on its vision of a revamped foreign policy. Intense intra-party rivalries, complex coalition dynamics, a resur-gent LDP-led opposition, and external devel-opments in the regional security environment

have, in particular, forced the new ruling par-ty to modify its original foreign policy goals.

• The party’s initial attempts to implement sweeping reforms to Japan’s decision-making system severely complicated the policy-mak-ing process, leading to major complications in alliance relations with the United States. Mixed signals and the lack of policy coordi-nation under the first DPJ prime minister, Hatoyama Yukio, set off tensions in the U.S.-Japan alliance, especially over the politically sensitive 2006 bilateral agreement to relocate the U.S. Marine Air Station Futenma on Oki-nawa.

• Efforts to improve diplomatic ties with China and South Korea, particularly through histor-ical reconciliation, have not been as easy to accomplish as the DPJ envisioned. The dis-pute over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands in September 2010 was a particular setback that continues to hamper Sino-Japan relations, and more recent historical and territorial dis-putes with Seoul have hampered progress in ROK-Japan ties.

• The DPJ appears to have abandoned attempts at regional institution-building, such as devel-oping a new East Asian Community, in favor of pursuing deeper trilateral strategic partner-ships (i.e., U.S.-Japan-Australia, U.S.-Japan-South Korea, and U.S.-Japan-India strategic dialogues) and remaining active in existing regional institutions such as Asia-Pacific Eco-nomic Cooperation (APEC) and the East Asian Summit.

• The DPJ includes adherents to at least four main foreign policy schools of thought that are identified in this report: realists (those who favor a strengthened defense policy and U.S.-Japan alliance), pacifists (those who want to maintain constitutional restrictions on security policy and do away with the U.S.-

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Japan alliance), centrists (those who do not have deep foreign policy convictions but who tend to lean toward the realist school by de-fault), and neo-autonomists (those who want a strong defense policy in order to gain great-er strategic independence from the United States). The DPJ is in some ways rooted in the pacifist tradition, but no one school of thought dominates the party, and the neo-au-tonomists, centrists, and realists have wielded varying degrees of influence at different times over the past two years.

• The DPJ’s security policy has shown a hawk-ish streak, particularly when it has come to protecting Japanese sovereign territory and

direct national interests, such as shipping lanes in the Gulf of Aden. The ruling party’s adoption of the 2010 National Defense Pro-gram Guidelines (NDPG) makes important improvements to Japan’s security policy, no-tably shifting from the traditional “basic de-fense force” posture to a more operationally oriented “dynamic defense” posture.

• Despite the unresolved impasse over Futen-ma and initial attempts by the DPJ to strike a less deferential dynamic vis-a-vis Washing-ton, realists and centrists in the ruling party have been able to quietly pave the way for en-hanced defense cooperation with the United States. These steps include a recent decision to relax arms export regulations, improve cy-ber security cooperation, and other areas of interoperability between the two allies. Nev-ertheless, proponents of the bilateral alliance within the DPJ have not been able to make significant progress to date in pursuing the kind of “global alliance” that was the thrust

of LDP strategic planning with the United States.

• The trend toward increasingly pragmatic and realistic leadership in Tokyo, particularly un-der Prime Minister Noda, has improved the overall tone of the U.S.-Japan alliance rela-tionship. However, structural challenges in-herent in the Japanese political system leave in question the prime minister’s ability to de-liver on key initiatives such as the Futenma relocation plan and Japan’s participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Fur-ther, Japanese leaders face a range of domes-tic issues, including the reconstruction of the Tohoku region and the revitalization of the domestic economy, that will take priority over many foreign policy matters.

• As the Obama administration orchestrates a strategic pivot toward Asia, Japan should be a key partner of the United States in this en-deavor. Washington should consult with To-kyo and encourage Japan’s involvement in every aspect of America’s regional diploma-cy, but should be aware that Japanese leaders are limited in their ability to commit to ma-jor regional and global initiatives that require significant amounts of domestic political cap-ital to implement.

Structural challenges inherent in the Japanese political system leave in question the prime minister’s ability to deliver on key policy initiatives.

F R O M R H E T O R I C T O R E A L I T Y 1

From Rhetoric to Reality Foreign-Policy Making under the Democratic Party of Japan

In the two years since the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took control from the Liberal Dem-ocratic Party (LDP) as the main ruling party of Japan in September 2009, its foreign policy has been episodic and difficult to define. In many ways, the DPJ’s foreign policy can be charac-terized more by its prominent missteps than by any achievements stemming from its ambitious campaign manifestos. As an opposition party, the DPJ long criticized the LDP for an exces-sive reliance on U.S. strategic leadership, which the DPJ claimed to come at the expense of clos-er ties with Asia and a more “independent” for-eign policy.1 In contrast, the DPJ promised to forge a more “equal” and “mature” alliance with the United State and revamp political and eco-nomic ties with Asia, primarily through the cre-ation of an East Asian Community. The party also pledged to pursue a more “proactive” role in global affairs under the auspices of UN-char-tered international activities. Finally, in addi-tion to a range of populist domestic proposals, the DPJ promised to reform the LDP’s bureau-crat-led decision-making process with a system that would give greater decision-making author-ity to politicians. The DPJ’s historic victory over the LDP in lower house elections on August 30, 2009, presented the party with an unprece-dented opportunity to make good on all of these campaign promises.

However, over the course of three succes-sive DPJ prime ministers—Hatoyama Yukio, Kan Naoto, and Noda Yoshihiko—the new rul-ing party has not been able to fulfill many of its lofty campaign goals. Although the DPJ vague-ly defined what it meant by an “equal” alliance with the United States, few would argue that Ja-pan has gained any kind of strategic parity with

1 Democratic Party of Japan, “Basic Policies,” April 1998, http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/policy/basic.html (accessed October 27, 2011); Dem-ocratic Party of Japan, “2009 Change of Government.”

its superpower ally. Instead, the bilateral alliance has at times appeared adrift amid ongoing prob-lems with the planned relocation of the Futen-ma U.S. Marine air station on Okinawa, par-ticularly after Prime Minister Hatoyama’s early decision to reexamine relocation options.2 As for closer ties to Asia, the new government in Tokyo has made some progress toward improving dip-lomatic and strategic relations with the Repub-lic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) and other likeminded nations such as Australia and India. But efforts to enhance political ties with the Peo-ple’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) have been set back by territorial disputes and geopolit-ical tension between the two countries. The flag-ship initiative to deepen Japan’s engagement in the region, an East Asian Community, has been back-shelved, along with a more “proactive” UN-centered diplomacy. Instead, Japan’s foreign pol-icy has at times appeared more reactive, as the new government has struggled to coordinate its policies in response to a string of external diplo-matic challenges.

Nonetheless, the policy picture has not been entirely bleak. After a tumultuous nine months under the fledgling administration of Prime Min-ister Hatoyama Yukio, successive DPJ leaders have made some gradual—if not inconsistent—improvements to their governing approach. Along with this shift has come some progress in strengthening Japan’s foreign and defense poli-

2 In 2006, the U.S. and Japanese governments agreed to a “roadmap” for relocating the U.S. Marine Air Station Futenma from a heavily pop-ulated area in Naha, Okinawa, to Camp Schwab, in a less populated area on the north part of the island. The new air station would include a landing strip to be built partly offshore in Henoko Bay. Local op-position groups have fiercely resisted the Futenma relocation facility (FRF), citing environmental concerns and the burden of continuing to host a large U.S. military presence on Okinawa. The U.S. government has studied and rejected alternative relocation plans, such as a possi-ble consolidation of Marine and Air Force units on the Kadena U.S. Air Force base.

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cies. Following Hatoyama’s mishandling of the Okinawa base realignment issue with the Unit-ed States, the Kan administration signaled a re-newed effort to strike a more conciliatory tone toward Washington and to shore up the alliance in the face of rising security concerns over Chi-na and North Korea. Similarly, Tokyo has dem-onstrated close solidarity with South Korea in the face of North Korean provocations, paving the way for unprecedented negotiations between Tokyo and Seoul on enhancing bilateral defense ties. Complementing these moves was the De-cember 2010 release of the revised National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which outline shifts in Japan’s defense plans, most no-tably toward a more operationally oriented “dy-namic defense” posture.

As the DPJ passed the two-year mark of its rule, however, it faced major domestic polit-ical challenges that threatened the survival of the DPJ-led administration as well as the rul-ing party itself. Indeed, party survival has argu-ably been the singular preoccupation of the DPJ since coming to power, distracting party leaders from a sustained focus on foreign and security policy or achieving any cohesion on these issues within the ruling camp. Exploiting a power split in the Diet (parliament), the LDP-led opposition was gearing up for a showdown over budget-re-lated legislation in the spring of 2011, aiming to bring down Prime Minister Kan along with the ruling party. Kan’s fate seemed all but sealed as the looming budget showdown approached.

Then, on March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9 earthquake struck off the coast of Japan’s Mi-yagi prefecture, unleashing a massive tsunami which left some twenty thousand people dead or missing, demolished entire towns, and heavi-ly disrupted communication and transportation networks vital to first responders. Damage from the tsunami also led to the failure of reactor-cool-ing systems at the Daiichi Fukushima nuclear power plant, triggering fears of widespread ra-diation contamination and a complete nuclear meltdown. The damage to the Tohoku region further disrupted key economic sectors, the do-

mestic supply chain, and energy output affecting Tokyo and the nation’s economy as a whole. In a statement made soon after the earthquake hit, Prime Minister Kan called the March 11 “triple disaster” the worst crisis to hit Japan since the end of World War II.3

Although the disaster put off the legislative showdown over the budget, thus giving the Kan government a new lease on life, it was also to be the cause of its downfall nearly six months later. To his credit, Prime Minister Kan was relative-ly quick to accept foreign offers of disaster as-sistance, including a massive humanitarian aid and disaster relief effort by U.S. military forc-es based in Japan, dubbed Operation Tomoda-chi (Friend). However, the central government also seemed confused about the correct course of action to deal with the nuclear crisis at Fuku-shima and to rehabilitate the devastated Tohoku region, estimated to cost some $300 billion. Doubts about the government’s competence and ability to manage the crisis quickly deep-ened among the public. Capitalizing on these mistakes, the LDP-led opposition introduced a parliamentary no-confidence vote against Kan in June. The prime minister narrowly survived the vote, but with his approval ratings sliding into the high teens, he finally stepped down on Au-gust 26 after passing a set of disaster-related bills in the Diet. Following a short intra-party contest for party leader (a position that by default would decide the next prime minister), Noda Yoshihiko emerged as the victor, and he formed his cabinet on September 2, 2011.

Now the third DPJ prime minister to lead Ja-pan since the party took over in 2009, Noda faces a daunting array of challenges. First and fore-most, of course, is the rehabilitation of the To-hoku region and the containment of the nuclear crisis at Fukushima which, although improved from the initial emergency situation, remains “very serious,” according to the International

3 BBC News, “Japan Quake: Worst Crisis since WWII, Says PM,” March 13, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12726297 (ac-cessed October 27, 2011).


Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).4 Thousands of displaced residents remain in the area and the public health concerns associated with the leak-age of radioactive material from the Daiichi Fu-kushima plant continue to be a major problem. A second priority is the revitalization of the na-tional economy that, even before the disaster, was struggling to cope with a rising yen, balloon-ing public debt, stagnant domestic growth, and the threat of a global recession. Prime Minis-ter Noda’s attempt to tackle the debt problem through a 10 percent raise in the consumption tax has triggered fierce political resistance, both inside and outside the ruling coaltion.

The magnitude of domestic challenges ex-acerbated by the March 11 disaster left the im-pression that foreign policy, almost by necessity, might be put on the back burner by the Noda government. Yet Japan’s foreign and national se-curity policies face enormous challenges as well. High on the priority list, as the new prime min-ister and his top foreign policy advisers came to office, was strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance following the period of drift that resulted from the Futenma base realignment problems.5 An-other issue of particular importance to Wash-ington has been whether Japan will join the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) re-gional trade initiative. Noda decided to join ear-ly trade negotiations in November 2011, but the issue of TPP membership has been an extreme-ly divisive one within the DPJ, and it is an open question whether the new prime minister can overcome domestic opposition to formal mem-bership in the multilateral trade agreement. Oth-er foreign policy challenges include deepening strategic concerns about China’s increasing as-sertiveness on the global stage as well as ongoing anxieties about North Korea’s nuclear develop-ment and potential instability.

4 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko to the 178th Session of the Diet,” Sep-tember 13, 2011, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/noda/statement/201109/13syosin_e.html (accessed October 27, 2011).

5 Nagashima Akihisa, special advisor to Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko for foreign and security policy, in discussion with the author, October 5, 2011.

Thus, in its second year as Japan’s ruling par-ty, the DPJ has already faced a range of challeng-es that have forced it to roll back some of its most ambitious plans for reshaping the nation’s foreign and strategic policy approaches. As many experts predicted, the DPJ faced a steep learning curve as it transitioned from opposition to ruling party. The past few years are more a story of how the DPJ progressed along that learning curve than about how it brought about a fundamental shift in Japanese foreign policy, as its campaign rheto-ric had promised. Along the way, a complex mix of factors—from internal power struggles within the domestic political landscape to external pres-sures from international actors—has influenced the decision-making and policy options that DPJ leaders eventually settled on. Although a com-plete analysis of these factors requires a more ex-haustive work, this report attempts to provide a comprehensive overview of the key players, pro-cesses, and policies that helped shape and color

the DPJ’s foreign and security policies since the party came to power. Such a survey can, perhaps, paint a more accurate picture of the confusing twists and turns taken by the new government and where potential trends are likely to take Ja-pan’s foreign policy under the DPJ.

In its second year as Japan’s ruling party, the DPJ has faced a range of

challenges that have forced it to roll back its most ambitious plans for

reshaping the nation’s foreign policy.


Internal Challenges

In retrospect, it is possible to see that several fac-tors have helped shape the DPJ’s foreign-policy making since 2009, providing some explanation for its diplomatic setbacks as well as its modest successes in improving Japan’s foreign and de-fense policies. Some of these factors have been internal structural and political dynamics, while others derive primarily from responses to exter-nal developments and events. On the internal side, the DPJ’s grandiose foreign policy vision ran into structural and political realities almost as soon as the party took control of government. The implementation of policies requires con-sensus-building among key stakeholders and a realistic assessment of what can or cannot be accomplished given existing political realities. However, the DPJ leadership initially set out to enact sweeping reforms and changes to Japan’s policy-making process with seemingly little re-gard for how those changes might complicate policy implementation or coordination. Fur-ther, the DPJ’s policy agenda faced significant challenges due to intra-party divisions, the com-plex machinations of coalition politics, and the immaturity of the DPJ’s own decision-making practices. These internal structural challeng-es have undermined the DPJ’s capacity to im-plement policies that were promised during the 2009 lower house election campaign. Internal domestic factors have had such an impact on the DPJ’s foreign-policy making process that di-vorcing one from the other would paint an in-complete picture of the ruling party’s diplomatic behavior since coming to power two years ago.

Intra-party DivisionsThe DPJ has struggled, almost since its incep-tion, to maintain cohesion despite numerous competing groups of varying ideological posi-tions within the party. As an opposition party,

these internal divisions were glossed over for the sake of party cohesion and to present a unified front against the LDP. However, since the DPJ came to power in September 2009, intra-party divisions have been exacerbated by growing dif-ferences over policy and by intensifying rivalries among party leaders with increasingly polarized political positions. Rifts within the party have re-peatedly threatened to splinter the DPJ along its multiple factions, while the party leadership has struggled to fend off staunch opposition from the LDP-led opposition parties.

The DPJ was originally established in 1996 by a consolidation of reformist New Party Sakigake members (mainly LDP defectors) and moder-ate Socialist Party members. The DPJ expanded in 1998 through a merger of four smaller parties seeking to create a solid opposition force to the LDP, and it was later joined in 2003 by the Lib-eral Party led by Ozawa Ichiro. Most of the party leadership has been drawn from former centrist or center-right LDP lawmakers, but the rank and file have had a left-of-center political orientation that includes a number of former Socialist Party members. The diversity of ideological positions within the DPJ has led to significant internal di-visions, primarily between the party’s conserva-tive and liberal wings. In particular, issues such as the overseas deployment of Japan Self-De-fense Forces, the U.S.-Japan alliance, social se-curity and tax reform, and international trade agreements have generated considerable inter-nal debate. As a result, for much of its history, the DPJ has struggled to agree on coherent alterna-tives to LDP policies, and since the DPJ came to power, that dilemma has only worsened.

The DPJ’s internal divisions have been ex-acerbated by the influence of powerful figures within the party, particularly Ozawa Ichiro. A former LDP power broker and one of the prin-cipal figures in the political rise of the DPJ, Oza-


wa has been the leader of the largest internal party faction, with over one hundred members (including the so-called Ozawa Children, or first-term lawmakers). Known as a master polit-ical strategist and campaigner, Ozawa is large-ly credited with orchestrating the DPJ’s historic victory in the 2009 lower house election, after which he was appointed party secretary general by Prime Minister Hatoyama. In this role, Oza-wa took the lead in orchestrating the new ruling party’s overall political strategy while the prime minister oversaw government policies—a tacit arrangement that contradicted the DPJ’s rheto-ric on open and transparent decision making.6 But Ozawa’s ongoing legal problems surround-ing a political funds scandal have severely tar-nished his public image and left him something of a party outcast.

The abrupt resignation of Prime Minister Hatoyama and the subsequent succession in June 2010 of Kan Naoto as the DPJ’s second prime minister raised the possibility that Ozawa might be marginalized under the new regime, made up of an anti-Ozawa coalition among par-ty faction leaders such as Prime Minister Kan, Maehara Seiji, and Noda Yoshihiko. However, that September, Ozawa decided to challenge Kan for the party presidency, a post that would simultaneously make him prime minister. The showdown between Ozawa and Prime Minis-ter Kan highlighted—and in many ways deep-ened—the rifts within the DPJ. Although Kan ultimately defeated Ozawa and retained his pre-miership, the outcome of that battle did not re-solve or heal the intra-party divisions or, for that matter, settle Ozawa’s political fate—despite the suspension of Ozawa’s party membership until the resolution of his legal problems.

In fact, the internal power struggle between the Kan supporters (the Kan-Maehara-Noda factional coalition) and Ozawa supporters (the Ozawa-Hatoyama factional alliance) only grew in intensity, sparking increasingly heated policy debates between the two sides. Kan’s supporters

6 Steven Vogel, “Japan’s Long Road to Competitive Politics,” Current His-tory 109, no. 728 (September 2010): 232–36.

generally supported Japan’s participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the implementation of the May 2010 U.S.-Japan joint statement on the Futenma relocation facility (FRF), the in-crease in the consumption tax, a balanced bud-get, and a review of the 2009 DPJ manifesto to reset the party agenda.7 On the other hand, Oza-wa supporters generally opposed most of these measures. The growing divergence over major policy issues increasingly undermined the Kan administration’s ability to implement policies and to negotiate with opposition parties on leg-islative agendas.

Although the September 2010 showdown be-tween Kan and Ozawa supporters highlighted the increasing bipolarization of the DPJ, there are still numerous other factions within the DPJ. These groups originally grew out of their mem-bers’ former party affiliations and were loose-ly organized, allowing lawmakers to have dual memberships with other factions. As new mem-bers continued to fill the party rank and file, factions came to be based more on personal affil-iations rather than on policy preferences or ide-ological leanings.8 Based on data from surveys of DPJ lawmakers taken before the 2009 lower house election, for instance, it is clear that most DPJ factions embrace very broad policy prefer-ences, even on normally polarizing issues such as whether to emphasize the United States, the UN, or Asia in Japan’s foreign policy.9 The data also show that in most cases, faction leaders and faction rank-and-file members often do not share the same preference on matters of foreign or se-curity policy. As a result, it is generally difficult to determine what particular party factions stand for or to distinguish one from another based on ideological positions.

7 Jiji Press, “Minshu Daihyosen 2010: Kan, Ozawa ryoshi no seisaku hikaku [The DPJ presidential election 2010: Policy comparison between Kan and Ozawa],” August 26, 2010, http://www.jiji.com/jc/v?p=ve_pol_seitou-minsyu-leader20100827j-09-w350 (accessed October 27, 2011).

8 For further details on policy differences between faction leaders and faction followers, see appendix C, “Survey Data of DPJ Foreign Policy Viewpoints.”

9 Ibid.


However, since the party leadership contest between Kan and Ozawa in September 2010, DPJ factions have begun to jell into more co-hesive policy-oriented groups. The key issue of the summer 2010 DPJ presidential election was whether to strictly follow the 2009 DPJ campaign manifesto and its populist-oriented spending pro-grams, including a controversial child allowance, or to abandon it in favor of fiscal austerity mea-sures aimed at balancing the budget. The man-ifesto therefore became a wedge issue, splitting the party between those who wanted to adhere to it and those who wanted to reshape the party agenda.10 This split also served to deepen mem-bers’ loyalty to particular factions, and many fac-tions have since banned dual membership in ri-val groups.11

The March 11 earthquake also began to change the dynamics of factional competition within the DPJ. At first, the Kan and Ozawa camps split over how to pay for the five-year re-construction plan for the devastated Tohoku re-gion, estimated to be some �19 trillion (or close to $300 billion).12 The prime minister and his supporters favored a consumption tax while the Ozawa group argued that such a broad tax in-crease would unfairly hit families affected by the disaster.13 As the prime minister struggled to man-age the triple crisis amid falling public approv-al ratings, the Ozawa-Hatoyama alliance joined the LDP-Komeito opposition in introducing a

10 “Manifesto taiketsu, shusei no Shusho vs kaiki no Ozawa shi [Man-ifesto confrontation: Kan for reshape vs. Ozawa for return],” Yomiuri Shimbun, August 29, 2010, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/fea-ture/20100806-849918/news/20100829-OYT1T00410.htm (accessed October 27, 2011).

11 “Minshu de habatsuka kasoku?, kakemochi giin ni fumie” [Accelerat-ing factionalization in the DPJ? A litmus test to dual membership], October 21, 2010, Yomiuri Shimbun, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/fea-ture/20100806-849918/news/20101021-OYT1T00942.htm (accessed October 27, 2011).

12 Inoue Yuko, “Analysis: Japan’s Reconstruction Steel Demand to Fall Short,” Reuters, August 11, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/11/us-japan-steel-reconstruction-idUSTRE-77A0S920110811 (accessed October 27, 2011).

13 Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, “Gemba naikakufu tokumei tanto daijin kishakaiken yoshi heisei niju san nen shi gatsu juku nichi [Press conference by the Minister of State for National Policy Gemba Koichi-ro],” April 19, 2011, http://www.cao.go.jp/minister/1101_k_genba/kaiken/2011/0419kaiken.html (accessed December 1, 2011).

no-confidence motion against Kan in the lower house of the Diet. However, Kan narrowly sur-vived the no-confidence vote by teaming with the Maehara and Noda factions to defeat the mea-sure.

Yet once Kan’s allies successfully fought off the challenge from the Ozawa-Hatoyama camp, they began to turn against the prime minister, hoping that his resignation would be a quid pro quo for greater legislative cooperation from the LDP-led opposition.14 This would be crucial, as Kan promised to resign on the condition that the Diet pass three key pieces of legislation: 1) a second supplementary budget for reconstruction, 2) a deficit bond bill, and 3) a renewable energy bill. Thus, the ruling party split into three main competing camps through the summer of 2011: those who still supported the prime minister (the Kan group), those who had tried to unseat him through a no-confidence vote (the Ozawa-Hatoyama alliance), and those who were actively working with the opposition to compel the prime minister to resign (the Okada-Maehara-Sengoku coalition). The last group eventually prevailed and, with the passage of the deficit bond bill and renewable energy bill in late August 2011, Kan announced his resignation on August 26.

Kan’s resignation was immediately followed by the DPJ presidential election, which would decide the next prime minister of Japan. Once again, the party split into two main camps, with the Ozawa, Hatoyama, and Yokomichi groups backing Kaieda Banri for prime minister and the Noda and Kan groups backing Noda Yoshihiko. After securing the additional support of the Kano group in the runoff election, Noda emerged as the victor and as Japan’s next prime minister. In an effort to bridge the divide within the ruling party, Noda immediately appointed two Ozawa supporters to his cabinet and made

14 Hakuraku, “Maboroshi to kashita Kan Ozawa nuki dairenritsu” [Failed attempt to form a grand coalition without Kan and Ozawa], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 10, 2011, http://www.nikkei.com/news/topic/article/g=96958A9C93819697E2EBE2E2938DE2EBE2E4E0E2E3E3E2E2E2E2E2E2;q=9694E2EBE2E4E0E2E3E3E5E3E3E5;p=9694E2EBE2E4E0E2E3E3E5E3E3E4;n=9694E2E3E2E6E0E2E3E2E5E5E1E3;o=9694E2E3E2E6E0E2E3E2E5E5E1E0 (accessed June 10, 2011).


Koshiishi Azuma, a top Ozawa ally, secretary general of the DPJ.

Noda’s attempts to unify the party through his multi-factional cabinet lineup ini-tially appeared to be success-ful. In the early months after his election as prime minis-ter, the DPJ arguably seemed more unified than at any time since becoming the ruling par-ty. However, as the prime minister pursued con-troversial policies, such as Japan’s participation in the TPP negotiations and the proposed consump-tion tax increase, the party once again began to splinter among various competing factions, with some lawmakers even deciding to split from the party. In January 2012, Noda reshuffled his cab-inet lineup in the hope of strengthening his pub-lic support rate, which had slipped from the high 50s to the 30s by the end of 2011.

If anything, Noda’s calculated selection of cabinet members and senior party officials underscores the complex factional dynamics that DPJ leaders have had to grapple with since coming to power. Indeed, the numerous power struggles for party leadership highlight the fact that no one party figure enjoys broad-based support across the various party factions. Not only does this make policy making extremely difficult, as the prime minister cannot guarantee party-wide support on any significant piece of legislation, but it also means that he must fight a two-front war—both internally among the various intra-party factions and externally with opposition parties, as will be seen in the following section.

The Complexities of Coalition PoliticsA major difficulty for the DPJ has been manag-ing its disparate coalition partners while fending off challenges from the opposition, including a resurgent LDP. Although the DPJ won a ma-jority of seats in the August 2009 lower house

(House of Representatives) parliamentary elec-tion, it still required a coalition with the leftist Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the conser-vative People’s New Party (PNP) to maintain control of the upper house ( House of Coun-cillors). This awkward political arrangement may have been necessary to sustain the DPJ’s position as the main ruling party, but it further stretched the already fragmented DPJ in polar opposite ideological directions. Lacking suffi-cient majorities in both houses of the Diet, the DPJ has subsequently been forced to make ma-jor compromises to its policy agenda in order to accommodate coalition partners and pressure from opposition forces.

This dilemma had major consequences for Prime Minister Hatoyama, especially after his decision to reexamine the 2006 base realignment agreement with the United States. The SDP has long opposed the U.S. military presence in Japan and, as a member of the ruling coalition, it now had an opportunity to exert considerable influ-ence on the direction of the base realignment review. As the Hatoyama government launched the review process, SDP party chief Fukushima Mizuho threatened to leave the coalition unless the Futenma Marine air station were relocat-ed off Okinawa entirely, preferably to Guam.15 15 “Fukushima toshu, Futenma genko an nara renritsu ridatsu shisa” [SDP

President Fukushima suggests departure from the ruling coalition if the current Henoko option is taken], Yomiuri Shimbun, December 3, 2009, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20091203-OYT1T00347.htm (accessed December 3, 2009); “Shamin kichi mondai de PT tachiage, ichigatsu ni Guam shisatsu” [SDP establishes project team on the Futenma Relocation Facility, to send research delegation to Guam in January], Sankei Shimbun, December 24, 2009, http://sankei.jp.msn.

DPJ Intra-party GroupsDPJ Intra-party groups in summer 2009 DPJ intra-party groups established after 2009Name members Name membersOzawa ichiro Group 120 Tarutoko Group 20Hatoyama Group 30 Ozawa Sakihito Group 10Kan Group 40 Gemba Group 30Maehara Group 50 Kano Group 30Noda Group 25Yokomichi Group 20 S O U R C E S : Jiji Press, Mainichi

Kawabata Group 30 Shimbun, and Asahi Shimbun

Hata Group 20Society of Liberals 15


When Hatoyama finally announced his decision to stick to the 2006 realignment agreement, Fu-kushima was deposed from her cabinet post, thus shattering the fragile coalition government and forcing Hatoyama to resign soon thereafter.

The DPJ’s difficulties in managing the coali-tion government have only deepened over time. A poor showing in the July 2010 upper house election, due mainly to Kan’s mishandling of consumption tax reform, resulted in a “twist-ed Diet” (nejire kokkai) in which the opposition controls the upper house and can block impor-tant budget-related measures. Under these cir-cumstances, Kan was again forced to cooperate with the SDP, along with the coalition partner PNP, in order to pass legislation through the Diet and avoid a budget crisis.

But, as before, this meant tradeoffs on pol-icy-related issues. When the Kan administra-tion raised the possibility of loosening Japan’s arms export ban the SDP balked, thus forcing the government to maintain the status quo pol-icy.16 The SDP also demanded the elimination of expenditures in the annual budget related to the proposed Futenma relocation plan—a con-cession that the Kan government ultimately did not make.17 The PNP has, of course, also exert-ed influence on DPJ policy making. Ideological-ly opposed to neoliberal economic reforms such as deregulation and more open trade policy, the PNP has complicated the DPJ’s policy debates on such issues as postal privatization and partic-ipation in the TPP.18

com/politics/situation/091224/stt0912241259006-n1.htm (accessed December 24, 2009).

16 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Press Conference by Prime Minister Kan Naoto,” December 6, 2010, http://www.kantei.go.jp/for-eign/kan/statement/201012/06kaiken_e.html (accessed December 1, 2011).

17 “Henoko yosan sakujo wo kyohi, Minshu Shamin ni tsuchi” [DPJ rejects SDP’s demand to eliminate Futenma relocation expenses from annu-al budget], Okinawa Times, February 15, 2011, http://www.okinawa-times.co.jp/article/2011-02-15_14573/ (accessed October 27, 2011).

18 Asahi Hiroyuki, “Kokuminshinto: Minshu ni irakame!? TPP kosho ni no-boseruna” [PNP President Kamei is upset with the DPJ’s plans for TPP negotiations], Mainichi Shimbun, January 27, 2011, http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/news/20110127k0000m010125000c.html (accessed Janu-ary 27, 2011).

In light of these difficulties, Prime Minister Kan attempted to woo the opposition New Komeito Party into an alliance by emphasizing the ideological overlap between the two parties. However, as support for the Kan cabinet continued to slide, the Komeito leadership saw no advantage in cooperating with the unpopular government.19 Further, since the Komeito-LDP coalition was established in 1999, both parties have deepened their cooperation in local electoral campaigns, giving the parties little incentive to abandon each other. Instead, the Komeito took an increasingly confrontational stance toward the DPJ by criticizing Prime Minister Kan’s mishandling of the March 11 disaster and his reconstruction plans.20 When the no-confidence motion against Kan came up in June, the Komeito was more eager to submit the motion in the lower house than the LDP leadership.21

After its resounding defeat in the 2009 lower house election, the LDP seemed on the verge of obsolescence, struggling to rebuild itself as a viable challenger to the new ruling party. The DPJ government’s various missteps since coming to power, however, have provided the LDP with a large target for attack and a new lease on life. From the outset, Prime Minister Hatoyama’s handling of the Futenma issue led the public to question the DPJ’s ability to manage national security matters with Japan’s all-important ally, the United States. Other major problems included Ozawa’s political money scandal, which discredited the image of the DPJ as a relatively clean political party, and Prime Minister Kan’s

19 “Komei ni shusenron, soki kaisan de tozei kaifukkatsu nerau” [The Ko-meito seeks an early dissolution of lower house to recover lost seats in 2009], Toonippo, February 22, 2011, http://www2.toonippo.co.jp/tokushuu/seikyoku/20110222.html (accessed October 27, 2011).

20 “Komeito nai de hiromaru mudo, soreha kenKan” [Anti-Kan mood is spreading inside the Komeito], Yomiuri Shimbun, April 16, 2011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20110416-OYT1T00587.htm (ac-cessed April 16, 2011).

21 Sasaki Mie, “Niekiranu Tanigaki shi ni iradatsu Komei, hajo kogeki, ki wo issureba mo chansu nashi” [Toward the submission of the no-con-fidence motion: the Komeito gets frustrated with hesitant LDP Presi-dent Tanigaki], Sankei Shimbun, May 28, 2011, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/110528/stt11052801310002-n1.htm (accessed Oc-tober 27, 2011).


inconsistent handling of the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands incident with China in September 2010, which further shook public confidence in the ruling party’s leadership (the Senkaku/Diaoyutai incident is described in greater detail later in this report).

The LDP-led opposition has capitalized on these mistakes to mount a formidable resurgence against the ruling coalition. In particular, the LDP and its partners have taken advantage of the “twisted Diet” to block legislation introduced by the ruling coalition, including legislation for budget-related measures, and have censured or threatened to censure key members of the DPJ cabinets as punishment for their missteps.22 This latter strategy forced the resignation of key players in the Kan administration, such as former Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku Yoshito (for his response to the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands dispute) and former Foreign Minister Maehara Seiji (for his acceptance of campaign funds from a foreign national).

The sudden departure of key ministers in the DPJ cabinets had a direct impact on the Kan cabinet’s decision-making process. The resigna-tion of Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku ended the DPJ’s efforts to seek a more cooperative dy-namic between politicians and the bureaucracy. Maehara’s removal from the cabinet also rep-resented a major setback for those in the party who advocated a stronger alliance with the Unit-ed States. Maehara is considered a rising star in the party and a potential future prime minister, but his resignation from the cabinet added to the

22 “Housho zokuto hyomei ni yato hanpatsu, niju ni nichi ni monseki ketsugian teishutsu” [Justice Minister’s stay provokes a backlash. The opposition submits a censure motion], Asahi Shimbun, November 22, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/special/minshu/TKY201011210443.html (accessed October 27, 2011); “Sengoku shi no monseki kaketsu, shintai ron ga fujo, Mabuchi shi mo mimeini kaketsu” [Censure motions against Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku and Transport Minister Ma-buchi passed], Asahi Shimbun, November 27, 2010, http://www.asa-hi.com/special/minshu/TKY201011260538.html (accessed October 27, 2011); Jiji Press, “Yoyato kobo, sangatsu yamaba, yosan kanren hoan ga shoten” [Battle between ruling and opposition parties comes to a boil in March, budget related-measures bills are key], January 23, 2011, http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=pol_30&k=2011012300128 (ac-cessed January 23, 2011).

impression of a ruling party that was slowly be-ing picked apart by the opposition.

The March 11 disaster overwhelmed an al-ready embattled Kan administration. In the im-mediate aftermath of the disaster, there was a sense that some form of bipartisan coopera-tion between the ruling and opposition camps would emerge for the sake of the nation and to begin the arduous process of reconstructing the devastated Tohoku region. Speculation of an “emergency cabinet” (kyukoku naikaku) bring-ing together a coalition of ruling and opposition parties rose. But Prime Minister Kan fumbled ef-forts to reach out to the LDP and Komeito and,

with his approval ratings sliding, the LDP deter-mined there were few incentives to cooperate with his administration, even over basic recon-struction measures. Yet even as the prime min-ister struggled to cooperate with the opposition, the Okada-Maehara-Sengoku group in the DPJ was working out a deal with the LDP and Ko-meito leaders to depose Kan once his conditions for resignation were met, namely passage of the three post-disaster bills.

The arrival of the Noda administration in September 2011 coincided with a slight change in tone in the inter-party dynamics of the Diet, at least initially. The LDP and Komeito showed some early signs of flexibility, in part due to the relatively high approval rating at the outset of the first Noda cabinet.23 However, this minor truce did not last long, and as the Noda government

23 Nakata Takuji and Okazaki Daisuke, “Noda naikaku hassoku, Jimin kai-san yokyu kaezu, Komei ha kyoryoku shisei ni katamuku” [Noda admin-istration launched, LDP still seeks lower house dissolution, but Komeito leans on a cooperative posture], Mainichi Shimbun, September 3, 2011, http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/nodaseiken/archive/news/2011/09/20110903ddm005010147000c.html (accessed October 27, 2011).

The DPJ has been forced to make major compromises to its policy agenda to

accommodate coalition partners and pressure from opposition forces.

1 0 F R O M R H E T O R I C T O R E A L I T Y

took on increasingly controversial issues, includ-ing a proposed sales tax increase and social se-curity reform, its popularity began to slip. On January 13, 2012, Noda replaced five members of his original cabinet in a bid to boost support for his government. Among those replaced in the cabinet reshuffle was former Defense Minister Ichikawa Yasuo, who was censured by the oppo-sition for claiming that he knew nothing about the infamous 1995 rape of an Okinawan school-girl by three U.S. service members—an astonish-ing admission for a defense chief charged with overseeing sensitive base realignment plans.

As of this writing, Prime Minister Noda is gearing up for a battle in the current Diet, as he seeks passage of the controversial consumption tax increase and a special government bonds bill. Noda’s political survival hinges on his ability to unite his party around his policy initiatives. Yet several DPJ lawmakers have defected from the party in recent months in opposition to Noda’s consumption tax hike. The LDP-led opposition, meanwhile, has debated whether to push for dis-solving the Diet in order to make way for a gen-eral election or whether to cooperate with Noda to introduce the consumption tax hike. Already the sixth prime minister in five years, Noda may face the same political fate as his two DPJ pre-decessors if he is not able to reestablish support for his government in time for the proposed gen-eral elections.

Institutional Reforms: Toward Politician-Led Decision MakingThe DPJ’s initial effort to implement sweeping reforms to the government decision-making pro-cess has had a significant impact on its policy-making behavior over the past two years. After coming to office, the Hatoyama administration immediately embarked on an effort to give cab-inet ministers and other political leaders greater authority over bureaucrats and the policy-mak-ing process. In particular, the prime minister moved to replace bureaucrats with politicians in formulating and coordinating policies across

various government ministries and agencies. A cornerstone of this effort was the abolition of the administrative vice ministers’ meeting (jimujik-anto kaigi), previously the most senior-level pol-icy coordinating meeting in the government bureaucracy. Hatoyama also abolished the DPJ policy research council (or seichokai), a policy coordinating body similar to one that the LDP had used to build consensus among bureau-crats, party members, and interest groups.

In place of these mechanisms, Prime Minister Hatoyama elevated the decision-making authority of the top three political figures in each ministry (seimu sanyaku). This had the effect of excluding bureaucrats from a key decision-making body and allowing the seimu sanyaku to take greater initiative in developing and promoting government policies.24 Another institutional change, promised during the 2009 election campaign, was to establish the National Strategy Bureau (kokka senryaku kyoku, or NSB), loosely modeled after the U.S. National Security Council (NSC). The NSB was to be based in the prime minister’s office and would be charged with setting the strategic direction of key foreign and domestic policies. A preliminary version of the NSB, the National Policy Unit (kokka senryaku shitsu, or NPU) was established by Prime Minister Hatoyama pending Diet approval of a more institutionally powerful NSB.

Despite these major changes, many of Hatoyama’s initial institutional reforms back-fired, or at least failed to produce an effective top-down decision-making process. A major problem was the lack of governing experience among many DPJ lawmakers now charged with developing their own policies. Without guid-ance from experienced bureaucrats, the seimu sanyaku struggled to master the intricate details of their agency portfolios.25 Further, the abo-24 Democratic Party of Japan, “2009 Change of Government.”25 “Seiji shudo nante ukatsunakoto itta, Edano shi” [Edano admits the DPJ

said such a thoughtless thing as politician-led decision making], Yomi-uri Shimbun, November 14, 2010, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20101114-OYT1T00509.htm (accessed October 27, 2011); Sei-fu internet terebi [Government Internet TV], “Press Conference by Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku Yoshito,” http://nettv.gov-online.go.jp/prg/prg4226.html (accessed December 1, 2011); “Seiji shudo, hansei ikisu-

F R O M R H E T O R I C T O R E A L I T Y 1 1

lition of the seichokai and the inability of the ruling party to create a full-fledged NSB under-mined the ability of the prime minister to take the lead in the policy-making process and to ef-fectively coordinate policies across various cabi-net ministers.26 The result was confused top-level

gi, Kan shusho datsu datsu kanryo sengen” [Prime Minister Kan admits the excess of politician-led decision making, and declares de-de-bu-reaucratization], Asahi Shimbun, January 21, 2011, http://www.asa-hi.com/politics/update/0121/TKY201101210126.html?ref=reca (accessed October 27, 2011).

26 “Motto shidoryoku ga areba, Hatoyama zen shusho, Futenma mon-dai de hansei no ben” [Former Prime Minister Hatoyama wished a full-fledged NSB could have given him more leadership capacity],

messaging and, at times, a highly dysfunctional decision-making process.

This pattern of dysfunction has had direct consequences for Japanese national interests. Tensions in the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship since the DPJ came to power stemmed as much from mixed signals sent to Washington as from any concerted policy shift by the new government in Tokyo. Particularly in the early days of the Hatoyama administration, various members

Asahi Shimbun, June 12, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/politics/up-date/0611/TKY201006110502.html (accessed June 12, 2010).

DPJ Cabinet Changes and Key Resignations (As of January 30, 2012)Name Ministry Term ReasonFukushima Mizuho Consumer Affairs

and Food Safety9/16/2009 – 5/28/2010

PM Hatoyama deposed Fukushima after her refusal to accept the Futenma relocation plan.

Kamei Shizuka Financial Services/ Postal Reform

6/8/2010 – 6/11/2010

Kamei resigned to protest the DPJ’s inability to pass postal reform bill.

Arai Satoshi National Policy 6/8/2010 – 9/17/2010

PM Kan replaced Arai in the first reshuffled cabinet because of his political fund mishandling issues.

Yanagida Minoru Justice 9/17/2010 – 11/22/2010

Yanagida resigned because his remarks were criticized as contempt for the Diet.

Sengoku Yoshito Chief Cabinet Secretary 9/17/2010 – 1/14/2011

PM Kan replaced Sengoku in the second cabinet reshuffling after the passage of an upper house censure motion, claiming his mishandling of the Senkaku incident.

Mabuchi Sumio Land, infrastructure, Transport and Tourism

9/17/2010 – 1/14/2011

Mabuchi was also replaced after being censured in the Diet for the Senkaku incident.

Okazaki Tomiko National Public Safety Commission

9/17/2010 – 1/14/2011

PM Kan replaced Okazaki in the second cabinet reshuffling because of the criticism against her crisis management during the Yeonpyeong-do shelling incident.

Maehara Seiji Foreign Affairs 1/14/2011 – 3/7/2011

Maehara resigned to take responsibility for accepting political donations from a Korean national living in Japan.

Matsumoto Ryu Reconstruction in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake

6/27/2011 – 7/5/2011

Matsumoto resigned because of his comments to the governors in the disaster areas.

Hachiro Yoshio Economy, Trade, and industry 9/2/2011 – 9/11/2011

Hachiro resigned after making insensitive comments about the radiation leakage at the Fukushima power plant.

ichikawa Yasuo Defense 9/2/2011 – 1/13/2012

PM Noda replaced ichikawa in the first cabinet reshuffle after he was censured in the upper house for being unqualified to be defense minister.

Yamaoka Kenji Consumer Affairs 9/2/2011 – 1/13/2012

Yamaoka was replaced after being censured in the Diet for being unqualified for his post.

Hiraoka Hideo Justice 9/2/2011 – 1/13/2012

PM Noda replaced Hiraoka in the first cabinet reshuffle after learning of his staff secretary’s previous conviction for fraud.

Renho Murata Government Revitalization 9/2/2011 – 1/13/2012

PM Noda replaced Renho in the first cabinet reshuffle because of her ties to someone arrested on tax evasion charges.

Note: Prime Minister Kan reshuffled his cabinet twice. The first reshuffle, on September 17, 2010, followed the DPJ’s loss in the upper house election and his

victory over Ozawa Ichiro in the DPJ presidential election. The second reshuffle, on January 14, 2011, aimed to address the censure motions against

his ministers and declining approval ratings. Prime Minister Noda reshuffled five members of his cabinet for similar reasons on January 13, 2012.


of the cabinet voiced conflicting views on the potential options for relocating the Futenma Marine air station on Okinawa, raising concerns on the other side of the Pacific that the new government in Tokyo was carelessly mishandling the bilateral alliance.27 The developing fiasco over the Futenma relocation plan highlighted the tortured decision-making process that plagued the Hatoyama administration and that led to its eventual downfall in June 2010, just nine months after winning office in the historic 2009 election.

After succeeding Hatoyama as prime minister in June 2010, Kan Naoto, perhaps for several major reasons, did not pursue institutional reforms as vigorously as his predecessor had.28 As the DPJ’s second premier, Kan could not claim as strong a mandate for change as had Hatoyama. Further, the Kan government no doubt learned from some of the mistakes of the Hatoyama administration, notably the consequences of introducing dramatic reforms at the expense of policy coordination. Kan’s cabinet ministers initially took a less adversarial stance vis-à-vis the bureaucracy, for the most part relying on bureaucratic input more readily than under the Hatoyama cabinet, although with some important exceptions. Indeed, over time, the Kan government appeared to revert to the party’s traditional distrust of the bureaucracy, a trend that became manifestly clear during the Senkaku/Diaoyutai crisis with China and in the central government’s fitful handling of the March 11 disaster.

Prime Minister Kan’s initial rollback of institutional reforms led to some incremental improvements in the DPJ’s decision-making process. In order to include more party backbenchers (particularly those who opposed

27 Jeffrey Bader, “U.S.-Japan Alliance at 50: Toward a Reenergized Part-nership,” keynote speech, event at the Henry S. Stimson Center, Wash-ington, D.C., June 7, 2010.

28 For example, Prime Minister Kan decided to downgrade the Nation-al Policy Unit, from a decision-making entity to a think tank-like pro-posal-making entity. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Press Conference by Prime Minister Kan Naoto,” July 30, 2010, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/statement/201007/30kaiken_e.html (ac-cessed December 1, 2011).

Ozawa) in the decision-making process, Kan reestablished the seichokai—although he gave the committee much less influence over policy making than it traditionally had enjoyed under the LDP. The prime minister also attempted to give the NPU a clearer mandate, charging it with oversight of economic growth policy, free trade agreements (FTAs), economic partnership agreements (EPAs), and the proposed TPP. However, lacking sufficient institutional clout, the NPU was marginalized in the budget-making process and never evolved into a full-fledged agency with greater institutional authority. In its current incarnation, the NPU remains a far less central policy-making organ than was originally envisioned under previous DPJ plans.

Most importantly, Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku was instrumental in convincing Prime Minister Kan to bring bureaucrats back into the policy-making fold.29 Unlike under the Hatoya-ma administration, bureaucrats were encour-aged to participate in the so-called top-three politicians’ meeting (seimu sanyaku kaigi), an official ministry decision-making entity, and to coordinate policies amongst themselves without excessive oversight from politicians. In a some-what symbolic move, Prime Minister Kan re-placed Minister of Health, Labor, and Welfare Nagatsuma Akira, a notorious bureaucrat-bash-er, after his first cabinet reshuffle. In a departure from long-held DPJ tenets, Kan even loosened restrictions on the practice of amakudari (or “de-scent from heaven”), in which bureaucrats are permitted to retire to lush private sector jobs.30

While Kan’s initial scaling back of institutional reforms led to some improvement in policy

29 “Seimu sanyaku kaigi ni jikan mo, Kanbochokan, datsu kanryo wo shusei” [Administrative vice-ministers attend the three top politicians meeting, Chief Cabinet Secretary changes a policy of de-bureaucrati-zation], Asahi Shimbun, December 28, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/1228/TKY201012280218.html (accessed October 27, 2011).

30 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Cabinet Answer to the Ques-tion Delivered by Member of the House of Representatives Nakaga-wa Hidenao on the Kan Administration’s Policy to amakudari,” official blog of Representative Nakagawa Hidenao’s office, February 22, 2011, http://nakagawahidenao.jp/n_media/228_kaitou.pdf (accessed De-cember 1, 2011).


coordination, gaps remained and the government still struggled to find an effective policy-making system that would be different from the LDP’s system. Obama administration officials noted (with some relief) that the first Kan cabinet was far more consistent in its message to Washington than the previous administration.31 This led to smoother bilateral relations, despite ongoing problems over the base realignment process. Bureaucrats in various ministries in Tokyo also indicated that the adversarial dynamic between DPJ politicians and government officials subsided significantly under Kan.32 However, considerable structural obstacles remained in the way of smooth policy implementation. The “twisted Diet,” deteriorating support from within the party, and plummeting public approval ratings all severely undermined Prime Minister Kan’s ability to effectively implement policies.

The March 11 disaster, however, seemed to revive bad habits in the DPJ’s decision-making process, raising the question of whether Kan’s leadership style was as pragmatic as it had initially appeared to be. With Sengoku no longer serving as chief cabinet secretary, the Kan administration reverted to old form, sidelining bureaucrats in the early crisis management phase in favor of unofficial outside advisers and a cadre of ruling party politicians. Approximately twenty ad hoc advisory councils and meetings were established to advise the prime minister, but they lacked clear mandates or coordination with relevant ministries and officials.33 Further, they tended to duplicate each other in many aspects of the disaster management plans.

31 Interview with senior Defense Department official, August 13, 2010.32 Interviews with senior Japanese bureaucrats, August 5–17, 2010.33 For example, there were at least six headquarters for emergency di-

saster measures, assistance for evacuees, nuclear disaster measures, Fukushima power plant disaster measurers, economic damage due to lack of nuclear power generation, and energy demand and supply emergency measures as of April 19, 2011. In addition to these head-quarters, the Kan administration established one standing meeting, five regular meetings, and seven ad hoc meetings regarding the re-covery and reconstruction efforts. “Taiou no soshiki ranritsu minao-su, Kan shusho” [Prime Minister Kan reorganizes too many meetings], Mainichi Shimbun, April 19, 2011, http://mainichi.jp/select/weath-ernews/20110311/archive/news/2011/04/19/20110420k0000m010109000c.html (accessed October 27, 2011).

The eventual appointment of a reconstruction minister clarified some of these problems, but there is no doubt that in the months after the disaster hit a breakdown of coordination occurred at nearly every level of the Japanese decision-making system.34

Cognizant of these systemic flaws and their political ramifications, Prime Minister Noda has appeared to make some attempt to improve the policy-making process and to develop

a functioning institutional framework for implementing strategic plans and policies. One of his first acts was to appoint the policy-savvy Maehara Seiji to be chairman of a revamped Policy Research Committee (seichokaicho). Under this system, the seichokaicho is authorized to pre-approve any bills, budgets, or treaties that the cabinet submits to the Diet. The main goals of this change are reportedly: 1) to incorporate more voices (especially party backbenchers’) into the seichokai deliberations, thus ostensibly developing greater consensus within the party on certain policy issues; 2) to give the seichokaicho more power to negotiate bills with opposition parties; and 3) to effectively implement policies once they are decided.35

Yet Noda also added another layer to the decision-making process, ostensibly to enhance top-down decision making, through the establishment of the cabinet and DPJ top-three

34 “Kokunan norikoeru seiken wa, daishinsai to Kan naikaku” [Adminis-tration capable of overcoming national crisis? Great disaster and Kan administration], Tokyo Shimbun, editorial, April 30, 2011, http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/article/column/editorial/CK2011043002000068.html (accessed December 1, 2011).

35 Minshuto Yakuin Kai [Democratic Party of Japan Standing Officers Council], “Seisaku ni kakawaru togi no kettei ni tsuite” [DPJ’s policy decision making], September 13, 2011, http://www.dpj.or.jp/down-load/4861.pdf (accessed October 27, 2011).

Tensions in the U.S.-Japan alliance have stemmed as much from mixed signals

from Tokyo than from any concerted policy shift by the DPJ government.


leaders’ meeting (seifu minshu sanyaku kaigi). This new entity initially consisted of six senior party leaders, including Prime Minister Noda, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu, Secretary General Koshiishi Azuma (also chair of the DPJ upper house caucus), Policy Research Council chair Maehara Seiji, Diet Affairs Committee chair Hirano Hirofumi, and Acting Secretary General Tarutoko Shinji. The cabinet and leaders’ meeting was established as a final decision-making body, with policies then being officially authorized by the cabinet.36

The Noda government also announced plans to form two new executive offices that would ostensibly enhance top-down decision making. The Council on National Strategy and Policy (kokka senryaku kaigi) is a public/private sector policy-making body that is charged with taking the lead in developing long-term strategies for economic growth, as well as addressing budget issues, tax and social security reform, currency issues, EPA/FTAs, and other matters. Another office that is currently under consideration is a proposed National Security Council (kokka anzenhosho kaigi) modeled after the U.S. National Security Council. This office would be charged with setting key foreign and national security policies. It remains to be seen how these policy-making entities will function vis-à-vis existing government agencies and whether they will be effective in establishing greater top-down decision-making authority.

To date, Noda has also shown a greater willingness to work with bureaucrats and to restore their involvement in top-level decision making. The administrative vice ministerial meetings (jimujikanto kaigi) that were abolished by Prime Minister Hatoyama, and then briefly reinstated by Prime Minister Kan to deal with the March 11 disaster, have now been fully restored and expanded to address a wider range of policy issues. Now called inter-ministerial coordination meetings (kakufusho renraku kaigi), they are to include the chief cabinet secretary and deputy

36 Ibid.

chief cabinet secretary as representatives of the legislative branch.37

Whether Prime Minister Noda’s institution-al changes will improve his government’s overall decision-making process is still an open ques-tion. DPJ leaders have learned hard lessons about hastily introducing institutional reforms at the expense of adequate policy coordination and implementation (see appendix A for a graph of DPJ cabinet approval ratings in response to major events). Noda’s moves suggest that these lessons have been taken to heart, and that he has chosen to modify rather than completely elim-inate many of the LDP-era governing practic-es, most importantly, the use of the seichokai. Indeed, whether the seichokai under Maeha-ra’s leadership can successfully embody a top-down policy-making mechanism while at the same time generating greater consensus within the ruling party is likely to be an important bell-wether of success for the Noda government as a whole. As the seichokai has been charged with handling the controversial question of member-ship in the TPP, its actions will have significant policy ramifications for Japan and its future di-rection under the DPJ-led government.

37 “Jimujikan kaigi fukkatsu he, seijishudo wazuka ni nen” [Two years af-ter government change, the administrative vice-ministers meeting is virtually revived], Asahi Shimbun, September 10, 2011, http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0910/TKY201109090741.html (accessed October 27, 2011); Seifu internet terebi [Government Internet TV], “Press Conference by Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu,” Sep-tember 6, 2011, http://nettv.gov-online.go.jp/prg/prg5258.html (ac-cessed December 1, 2011).


The DPJ’s Foreign Policy: Competing Visions

In 1998, the DPJ drafted its “Basic Policies” as a basis for the party’s policy platform. The “Ba-sic Policies” identified two main foreign policy goals: 1) to achieve more independence (shy-utaisei or jiritsu) in its diplomatic activities; and 2) to strengthen national security (kuni no anzen).38 In order to achieve these two goals, subsequent campaign manifestos proposed three key objectives: 1) to establish a more “equal” al-liance partnership with the United States while maintaining the centrality of the U.S.-Japan al-liance in Japanese security policy; 2) to forge deeper political and economic ties with Asia (primarily through the creation of an East Asian Community, which aims to make interstate con-flicts less likely through regional interdepen-dence); and 3) to implement a more “proactive” UN-centric diplomatic agenda.39 While these foreign policy strategies were routinely men-tioned in DPJ campaign manifestos and other policy platforms, DPJ leaders offered only am-biguous (and often contradictory) details about these goals and objectives and how they planned to achieve them once the party came to power.

This ambiguity was the result of DPJ leaders’ concerns that more detailed policy prescriptions

38 Democratic Party of Japan, “Basic Policies.”39 The following manifestos were issued between April 2001 and Au-

gust 2009: Democratic Party of Japan, “Policies for the 19th House of Councillors Elections: A Fair Deal for All,” April 17, 2001, http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/policy/19hc-elec.html#a_01 (accessed November 3, 2011); Democratic Party of Japan, “The DPJ Manifesto: Creating a Dy-namic Japan: Towards a Secure Society,” October 2003, http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto_eng/images/fullmanifesto.pdf (accessed November 3, 2011); Democratic Party of Japan, “Manifesto 2004: Di-rectly and Single-Mindedly,” June 24, 2004, http://www.dpj.or.jp/eng-lish/manifesto4/pdf/manifesto_2004_a4.pdf (accessed November 3, 2011); Democratic Party of Japan, “DPJ Manifesto for the 2005 House of Representatives Election: Nippon Sasshin: Toward a Change of Gov-ernment,” August 30, 2005, http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto5/pdf/manifesto_05.pdf (accessed November 3, 2011); Democratic Par-ty of Japan, “Manifesto: The Democratic Party of Japan’s Platform for Government: Putting People’s Lives First,” July 2007, http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto/DPJManifesto2007.pdf (accessed November 3, 2011); Democratic Party of Japan, “2009 Change of Government.”

might cause further ideological splits within the party.40 It was far easier for the party to reach a basic consensus on proposals that were the oppo-site of LDP policies, an approach that had direct consequences for foreign and security policy. Al-though the DPJ acknowledged the U.S.-Japan alliance as the cornerstone of Japan’s diploma-

cy, the DPJ criticized the LDP’s foreign policy as overly reliant on the United States and com-ing at the expense of closer diplomatic ties with Asia. The DPJ also favored a more conciliatory approach to historic problems with China and South Korea than the right-of-center LDP. Yet concrete plans for achieving these objectives re-mained vague. Making matters worse was the sometimes lofty rhetoric of DPJ leaders, such as Hatoyama Yukio’s frequent mention of yuai (fra-ternity) as a guiding principle of his diplomat-ic vision.41

40 The Sankei Shimbun article cites a mid-ranking DPJ member’s com-ment as follows: “If the DPJ begins to discuss policy principles, the DPJ will be broken up. The DPJ members did not gather in terms of poli-cy identity, so the DPJ is a party that cannot be made head or tail of. That is why it is better not to have a party line.” “Minshuto kaibo: Dai ichi bu Seiken no katachi (2) Koryo naki seito” [DPJ anatomy: volume 1: Governance posture (2): Party without party line], Sankei Shimbun, March 3, 2009, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/situation/090303/stt0903030003000-n1.htm; http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/situa-tion/090303/stt0903030003000-n2.htm; and http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/situation/090303/stt0903030003000-n3.htm (accessed March 3, 2009).

41 Hatoyama Yukio defined “yuai” as the principle of “independence and coexistence.” In further detail, Hatoyama described “yuai” as “a princi-

The success of the seichokai (Policy Research Committee) is likely to

be an important bellwether of the DPJ’s ability to implement a top-

down policy-making mechanism.


The DPJ’s vague foreign policy prescrip-tions became an increasing source of concern as the party prepared to take the reins of pow-er after its election victory over the LDP in Au-gust 2009. Some observers speculated at the time that the DPJ’s calls for a more “equal” or “ma-ture” alliance with the United States was code for a fundamental shift away from the U.S.-Ja-pan alliance and toward closer strategic ties with China.42 Other experts argued that the DPJ’s in-tentions were less about distancing Japan strate-gically from the United States than about chang-ing the deferential dynamic between Tokyo and Washington in strategic decision making.43 Still other experts predicted that the new DPJ-led gov-ernment would run into structural obstacles (in-cluding both internal factors described above and external factors described below) that would im-pede its ability to follow through on its more am-bitious foreign policy promises and that the new government would ultimately accede to the status quo.44 The DPJ’s diplomatic track record over the past two years indicates that the last two scenarios played out more than the first, although often in confusing ways. The seemingly schizophrenic na-

ple that aims to adjust to the excesses of the current globalized brand of capitalism and make adjustments to accommodate the local eco-nomic practices that have been fostered through our traditions.” To Hatoyama, “yuai” is “the compass that determines our political direc-tion” and “a yardstick for deciding our policies.” Hatoyama Yukio, “My Political Philosophy,” official website of Hatoyama Yukio, http://www.hatoyama.gr.jp/profile/fraternitye.html (accessed November 3, 2011).

42 Bruce Klingner, “Japanese Election Poses Challenges for U.S. Alli-ance,” Web Memo, no. 2600, Heritage Foundation, August 31, 2009, http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2009/pdf/wm_2600.pdf (ac-cessed November 3, 2011); Mark Landler and Martin Fackler, “U.S. Is Seeing Policy Thorns in Japan Shift,” New York Times, September 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/02/world/asia/02diplo.html?scp=3&sq=Japan&st=nyt (accessed November 3, 2011); “Shake-Up in Japan: Two Parties Are Better Than One,” Washington Post, September 1, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/31/AR2009083103044_pf.html (accessed November 3, 2011); Jim Hoagland, “Shockwaves from Japan’s Elec-tion,” Washington Post, September 6, 2009, http://www.washington-post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/04/AR2009090402969.html?nav=emailpage (accessed November 3, 2011).

43 Leif-Eric Easley, Tetsuo Kotani, and Aki Mori, “Electing a New Japanese Security Policy? Examining Foreign Policy Visions within the Democrat-ic Party of Japan,” Asia Policy, no. 9 (January 2010): 45–66.

44 Easley, Kotani, and Mori (January 2010) predict that the DPJ will take the status quo policy line.

ture of the DPJ’s foreign-policy making is indica-tive of the ideological strains that have competed for influence since the party took control in 2009.

No formal or official breakdown exists of DPJ foreign policy schools of thought. Further, in-tra-party groups generally do not ascribe to any particular foreign policy viewpoint, and individ-ual members typically do not label themselves in conventional terms such as “realists” or “ideal-ists.” In an effort to create a framework in which to describe the foreign-policy making within the party, this study has devised a classification of the various and competing foreign policy vi-sions within the DPJ. Four major foreign policy schools of thought have been identified, draw-ing on a number of background interviews with DPJ members as well as empirical data. While the categorization is inherently subjective, every effort has been made to rely on objective data and primary sources, such as policy statements by groups and individual lawmakers. Following are the four main schools of thought identified in this study, as well as further descriptions of their adherents and viewpoints on certain for-eign and security policy issues.45

RealistsRealists in the DPJ hail from the conservative wing of the party and are strongly in favor of strengthening Japan’s security and defense pol-icies. Their first priority is to revise Article 9 of the constitution to allow Japan to have a more normal defense posture and to exercise the right of collective self-defense.46 Realists have a high threat perception, particularly with regard to 45 Richard J. Samuels provides a thorough examination of various Japa-

nese foreign policy ideologies in his book, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Universi-ty Press, 2007). This report borrows some of Samuels’ labels for various foreign policy ideologies in Japan, particularly the pacifists and neo-autonomists, although this study examines these groups solely with-in the context of the DPJ, not across other political parties.

46 Article 9 of the Japanese constitution renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and prohibits the “threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.” The Japanese government has in-terpreted Article 9 as a restriction on exercising the right of collective self-defense, thus constitutionally limiting Japan’s contributions to in-ternational security operations.


China and North Korea, and they see the alli-ance with the United States as the best securi-ty option for Japan given these threats. It follows that realists fear abandonment by the United States and therefore are committed to maintain-ing the U.S. force presence in Japan, although they may not always agree with U.S. preferenc-es for base realignment plans on Okinawa.47 Re-alists appear to be the most “pro-U.S.,” but that does not mean they prefer to follow Washing-ton’s lead in all matters. Realists are skeptical of the usefulness of the UN and regional insti-tutions, but they do not fundamentally oppose them. As the more conservative wing of the par-ty, realists are skeptical about the need to rec-oncile historical grievances with neighboring countries.48 In general, realists are younger par-ty members, and their numbers are relative-ly small. However, when allied with centrists in the DPJ and with likeminded lawmakers in the LDP, this group can be effective in carry-ing out important improvements in defense-related policies. Prominent realists in the DPJ include Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko, Policy Research Committee chairman Maehara Seiji, and the chief foreign policy advisor to the prime minister, Nagashima Akihisa.

47 Maehara Seiji, a prominent realist, initially opposed the plan to relocate the U.S. Marine air station at Futenma to Henoko Bay, as the Obama administration has demanded. “Maehara fuku daihyo ni kiku” [Ask-ing DPJ Vice President Maehara], “Minshuto do miru do kataru “ [How should we see and talk about the DPJ], Asahi Shimbun Globe, June 8, 2009, http://globe.asahi.com/feature/090608/side/05.html (accessed January 5, 2012).

48 Prime Minister Noda, another realist, angered China and South Korea when he said that the fourteen Class-A war criminals interred at the Yasukuni Shrine should no longer be considered war criminals. See, for instance, Deng Shasha, “Japan’s New PM Needs to Respect China’s Core Interests, Development Demands,” Xinhua News Agency, Au-gust 29, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-08/29/c_131082001.htm (accessed January 5, 2012); for the ROK Foreign Ministry’s statement, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea, “Official Commentary on a Japanese Minister’s Re-marks Regarding Class A War Criminals,” August 16, 2011, http://www.mofat.go.kr/ENG/press/pressreleases/index.jsp?menu=m_10_20 (ac-cessed January 5, 2012).

Pacifists

Pacifists in the DPJ strongly support maintaining Japan’s postwar peace constitution and severely restricting the country’s security policy. They op-pose any revision to Article 9 of the constitution and any relaxation of the restrictions on collective self-defense.49 Pacifists have a low threat percep-tion, believing that if Japan does not pose a threat to others, others will not pose a threat to Japan. Given their low threat perception, pacifists do not fear abandonment by the United States; rather, they fear entrapment in U.S.-led military oper-ations. They oppose U.S. bases and any Futen-ma relocation plan that does not include a more comprehensive withdrawal of U.S. forces. Adher-ents to this school of thought support the UN, al-though not necessarily expanded Japanese partic-ipation in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs). They also support Asian regionalism, believing that deeper economic integration will enhance stability. Pacifists make up a large part of the old guard party members, particularly those former-ly belonging to the Socialist Party. They may not represent the future of the party, but they repre-sent its ideological foundations. DPJ pacifists gen-erally belong to the Society of Liberals (riberaru no kai), an intra-party group of twenty to forty law-makers who hold these views.50 Hiraoka Hideo, the minister of justice during the first Noda cab-inet, is a leading member of the Society of Lib-erals. Other prominent pacifists are Yokomichi Takahiro, currently the speaker of the House of Representatives, and Deputy Chief Cabinet Sec-retary Saito Tsuyoshi.

CentristsCentrists in the DPJ are lawmakers who do not have particularly strong foreign policy

49 See, for instance, the profile for Hiraoka Hideo, a prominent pacifist, in appendix D, “Profiles of Key DPJ Politicians.”

50 For further details of the Society of Liberals’ foreign policy positions, see “Riberal no Kai Seisaku Teigen: Omoiyari no kuni Nihon wo meza-shite” [Society of Liberals’ policy proposal: Toward thoughtful Nation Japan], official website of Hiraoka Hideo, July 16, 2008, http://www.hiraoka-hideo.jp/ (accessed November 3, 2011).


convictions but whose positions tilt toward the realist school, particularly when faced with real-world foreign policy challenges. Although they may not be as ideologically polarized as realists or pacifists, centrists may still have strong beliefs about specific policy ideas, promoting, for example, non-nuclear principles and Japan’s active engagement in UN PKOs. Centrists understand that the security challenges confronting Japan call for policies that do not necessarily align with the DPJ’s idealistic vision. Because of this, their default position is to maintain the status quo and their ultimate policy choices tend to resemble LDP policies. A subset of the centrist school is made up of pragmatists, in this case DPJ lawmakers who have shifted from their original ideological or policy positions since becoming ruling party members in 2009. Often, these members come from a left-of-center background, and may still hold those views on a personal basis, but have gradually adopted a more realist approach as governing lawmakers.51 They tend to be seasoned political veterans. Prominent pragmatists include former Prime Minister Kan Naoto and many former members of his cabinet, such as former Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi (a dovish former LDP member), Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano Yukio, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku Yoshito, and Foreign Minister Matsumoto Takeaki.

Neo-autonomistsThe DPJ’s neo-autonomist school is perhaps the most fascinating of the four groups and is unique to Japanese politics. Neo-autonomists overtly re-sent Japan’s strategic dependence on the United States and seek a more independent and self-em-powering foreign policy.52 They see the United 51 Former Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi has, for instance, admitted

that his personal views on defense policy differed from his official posi-tion as defense chief. Jun Hongo, “Kitazawa Vague on Support Options for Global Antiterror Role,” Japan Times, September 25, 2009, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20090925a6.html (accessed January 5, 2012).

52 While serving as DPJ president in 2005, Okada Katsuya, for instance, stated that: “… Japan’s security policy has been so dependent on the

States as a declining power and therefore fear en-trapment, both with regard to U.S.-led foreign military operations and by what they see as a sink-ing ship (the United States).53 It is easy to assume that this group is anti-American but its views are more nuanced, and its members often consider themselves friends of the United States. Some might also assume that this group would want to fall in with a rising power like China. However, this would contradict their independent streak. On the contrary, neo-autonomists believe Japan should stand on its own two feet, whether it is vis-à-vis China or the United States. They are neo-nationalists in the sense that they have an almost chauvinistic confidence in Japan, especially in re-lation to the United States, although they are not at all xenophobic. Many of these lawmakers were born in the last days of World War II and have vivid memories of impoverished Japanese chil-dren calling out “give me chocolate” to occupa-tion GIs. They believe that Japan, as a nation, has fallen into a similar mindset of dependency on the United States and are committed to ending that deferential dynamic.54 Neo-autonomists are similar to neoliberals in international relations theory, in that they cope with potential threats by

United States that it has been in a state of ‘auto pilot.’ For a sovereign nation, however, one-sided dependence for one’s security on the other country is nothing but the abdication of political responsibility.” Demo-cratic Party of Japan, “Toward Realization of Enlightened National In-terest – Living Harmoniously with Asia and the World,” May 18, 2005, http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/vision/03.html#05.

53 Ibid.54 For an example of neo-autonomist views toward the United States, see

Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi’s interview in Naoya Fujiwara et al., Kokka kino wo takenaosu – Wakate seijika ga mezasu atarashii nihon no katachi [Re-forming the state function: A new form of Japan that younger politicians seek] (Tokyo: First Press, 2009). Yamaguchi argued: “The most important problem in Japanese diplomacy is the loss of a mentality of indepen-dence. Before World War II, Japan had its own vision, whether good or bad, and followed it. But after the end of the war, Japan held on tight-ly to a view that Japan would benefit most if Japan listened to whatev-er the United States says. During the war, it was taught that the Amer-icans were evil, but once we got to know them, they looked so friendly. When asking [American GIs] “give me chocolate,” they gave us delicious chocolate. In the end, Japanese held onto the view that they would ben-efit as long as they had good relations with the Americans. In terms of diplomacy, they thought, Japan would benefit as long as Japan listens to whatever the United States says. For its own good, Japan should not think for itself. Japan has wound up having such a socio-political com-plex” (p. 96).


DPJ Foreign Policy Schools of Thought

Realists Pacifists Centrists Neo-autonomistsNational Security Hawkish Dovish Originally moderate

or dovish but have become more hawkish as ruling party members

Hawkish on homeland security but idealistic on international order

Article 9 of the Japanese

Constitution

Revise Article 9 to become more normal nation and enhance international security role, including contributions to alliance with the United States

Maintain Article 9 to restrict Japan’s international security involvement and alliance with the United States

Flexible on Article 9, revise if necessary

Revise Article 9 to allow greater autonomy vis à vis the United States

Threat Perception High Low Rising LowAbandonment vs.

Entrapment by U.S.Fear of abandonment (hedge with U.S.)

Fear of entrapment (hedge against U.S. decline)

Rising fear of abandonment (hedge with U.S.)

Fear of entrapment (hedge against U.S. decline)

Alliances & Partnerships

Enhance ties with likeminded nations; hedge against China

Seek friendly relations with all nations, including China

Enhance ties with likeminded nations; seek stable ties with China

Enhance ties with Asian nations to counterbalance U.S. and seek closer ties with China

U.S. Bases Maintain Eliminate Maintain Reduce, seek alternative security options

Collective Self-Defense

Support Oppose Flexible Flexible

SDF Overseas Deployments

Support, in support of coalition and UN mandates

Oppose, including for most UN PKO

Flexible Support, particularly under UN PKO auspices

JSDF Capabilities Enhance Restrict Enhance as necessary

Enhance

UN and Regional Institutions

Support UN and Asian regionalism but not as substitute to U.S.-Japan alliance

High support for UN, although not UN PKO missions for SDF, and support for Asian regionalism

Moderate support for UN and Asian regionalism

High support for Asian regionalism, moderate support for UN

Historical Reconciliation

Reluctant Support Support Support


seeking to integrate them into the international system through free trade and multilateral insti-tution building. They are particularly interested in regional institutions such as the proposed East Asian Community, which they also see as a coun-terbalance to Japan’s strategic dependence on the United States. Of the various schools, neo-auton-omists are probably most ardently “Asianist” in their vision of Japan’s regional position. They are a relatively small group within the DPJ but they have influential leaders and their call for a more assertive foreign policy may appeal to a young-er generation of Japanese. The most prominent neo-autonomist is former Prime Minister Hatoya-ma Yukio. Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi, a former diplo-mat and current parliamentary vice minister of foreign affairs, is another outspoken member of this group, and the current deputy prime minis-ter and former foreign minister, Okada Katsuya, has expressed views that are consonant with this school of thought.

CaveatsWhile survey data suggests that members of the ideological extremes—that is, the realists and the pacifists—are fairly consistent in their view-points and do not drift from camp to camp,55 centrists and neo-autonomists are less easily de-finable and show inconsistencies across multiple indicators.56 Their positions tend to vacillate be-tween realist and pacifist positions, often in con-tradictory ways, such as by supporting a more active overseas role for the SDF while oppos-ing looser restrictions on collective self-defense. Further, according to one policy-savvy Diet member, as many as 60 percent of party mem-bers are “indifferent” to foreign policy issues and therefore do not subscribe to any particular for-eign policy school of thought.57

Many of these “indifferent” lawmakers are “Ozawa Children,” relative newcomers to the party who were recruited by the former DPJ sec-

55 For further details of the key DPJ politicians’ survey data and the past remarks on foreign and security policies, see appendixes C and D.

56 Ibid.57 Interview with senior DPJ lawmaker, August 12, 2010.

retary general in 2009. Ozawa, who has wielded enormous influence within the party, is himself difficult to classify as subscribing to any particu-lar school of thought. Many observers remember his behind-the-scenes work as an LDP lawmaker in enabling Japan’s security contributions to the allied coalition during the first Gulf War. Oza-wa has also been a vocal proponent of Japan’s becoming a “normal” nation, thus earning him some identification with the realist camp.58 How-ever, Ozawa has also grown increasingly critical of the U.S.-Japan security arrangement, includ-ing the large presence of forward-deployed U.S. forces on Okinawa59—a position that suggests neo-autonomist leanings. Since Ozawa is diffi-cult to pin down in any one camp he is, in some ways, in a category by himself.

Similarly, it would be misleading to suggest that the above schools of thought represent coher-ent or widespread ideological strains within the DPJ. The DPJ’s more formal intra-party groups, for instance, generally are comprised of members who unite around particular leaders, not ideolo-gies. One notable exception is the Society of Lib-erals, which is one of the few formal factions in the DPJ with a core ideological identity, although it is perhaps more concerned with domestic than foreign affairs.60 With the exception of the pac-ifist school of thought, the other foreign policy schools have a limited number of followers. The realists and neo-autonomists, for instance, have relatively few solid members but, in a party with

58 Ozawa Ichiro, Nihon Kaizo Keikaku [Blueprint for a new Japan: The re-thinking of a nation] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993).

59 “Nihon no boei wa Nihon ga sekinin wo, Minshu Ozawa shi ga hatsu-gen” [Japan should take more responsibility for its own defense, DPJ President Ozawa said], Asahi Shimbun, February 25, 2009, http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0225/TKY200902250292.html (accessed February 25, 2009); “Ozawa shi no Dai Nana Kantai de jubun hatsugen, yoyato ni hamon” [Ozawa’s Seventh Fleet remark causes controversy between ruling and opposition parties], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, February 26, 2009, http://www.nikkei.co.jp/news/seiji/20090226AT3S2502525022009.html (accessed February 26, 2009).

60 Riberaru no Kai [Society of Liberals], “Riberal no Kai Seisaku Teigen: Omoiyari no kuni Nihon wo mezashite” [Society of Liberals’ policy pro-posal: Toward thoughtful Nation Japan], official website of Hiraoka Hideo, July 16, 2008, http://www.hiraoka-hideo.jp/ (accessed No-vember 3, 2011).


shallow foreign policy expertise, their leaders can be influential out of sheer force of intellect.

Another caveat is that it is difficult to gauge which schools of thought are most influential at any given time or are representative of the DPJ as a whole. The party is in some respects rooted in the pacifist tradition, but (as further discussed later in this report) the other schools of thought have exerted greater influence on policy making since the DJP became the ruling party in 2009.

An even more difficult factor to quantify is how deeply DPJ lawmakers actually believe in their stated foreign policy positions. Taken at face value, DPJ leaders can be convincing-ly outspoken about their foreign policy beliefs, but their policy-making behavior as ruling law-makers suggests that their rhetoric often outstrips reality—stated goals are often unmet, not just be-cause of the aforementioned structural obstacles, but also as a result of an apparent lack of follow-through or realistic planning.

The most glaring example of this tendency is the party’s approach to the idea of creating an East Asian Community (or EAC), a goal repeat-edly included in DPJ manifestos. The formation of an EAC was arguably the flagship foreign pol-icy goal of the Hatoyama administration—ele-mental in the neo-autonomist vision of achieving more diplomatic equilibrium between Asia and the United States—and the prime minister him-self gave considerable rhetorical emphasis to the idea until the very last days of his premiership. At face value, then, promoting regional institution-alism was undeniably a core priority of the new administration. Yet, beyond the rhetoric, there is little evidence that the Hatoyama cabinet in-vested anything more than lip service to the cre-ation of the EAC or any other new multilateral forum. The Foreign Ministry, for instance, was not given marching orders to implement a plan for regional institution building, or even to lay the diplomatic groundwork for recruiting poten-tial member nations.

Nor was there a consensus among party lead-ers on the conceptual dimensions of the EAC. Although numerous DPJ members espoused the

idea, few, if any, could persuasively describe how it might be implemented and what would differ-entiate it from other regional institutions. There was, in fact, no agreement on the membership of the EAC, including the crucial question of

whether or not the United States would be al-lowed to join. Prime Minister Hatoyama and his foreign minister, Okada Katsuya, made contra-dictory public statements on this matter, indicat-ing a lack of consensus at the highest levels of the party.61 Further, the two men differed over whether the EAC should have a security com-ponent to it or whether it should focus primari-ly on regional economic integration.62 To date,

61 Hatoyama Yukio did not necessarily intend to exclude U.S. membership in an EAC, while Okada Katsuya preferred the exclusion of the United States from membership. Prime Minister Hatoyama stated in a press conference on September 16, 2009, “As you know, the spirit of frater-nity in one sense serves as a starting line. In the case of the EU this has extended as far as a common currency, the euro. I feel that to envisage a regional community in Asia, particularly in East Asia in the medium to long term is the correct path to take, even though in a sense there are major differences in our countries’ systems. This idea certainly is not intended to exclude the U.S. dollar or the United States. Quite the contrary, as a step beyond this initiative I believe we should envisage an Asia-Pacific community, and I do not think that this could readily be achieved without the United States,” http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/hatoyama/statement/200909/16kaiken_e.html (accessed November 3, 2011). Foreign Minister Okada made a foreign policy speech in the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan on October 7, 2009: “I would like to think the membership of an EAC includes Japan, China, South Korea, ASEAN, India, Australia, and New Zealand,” and, “an EAC will begin with economic cooperation. Then I would like to expand the cooperation in energy, environment, health, and so on,” and, “a common currency is a long term agenda.” in “Higashi Ajia Kyodotai koso ni Amerika kuwa-ezu, Okada gaisho” [Foreign Minister Okada says an East Asian Com-munity excludes the United States], Sankei Shimbun, October 7, 2009, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/policy/091007/plc0910072045012-n1.htm (accessed October 7, 2009).

62 Hatoyama Yukio envisioned an EAC for a possible regional collective security mechanism in the future, while Okada focused on an EAC as a vehicle mainly for regional economic interdependence. Hatoyama

Rhetoric from leading DPJ lawmakers has shaped and colored Japan’s

diplomatic behavior since the party came to power in 2009.


there has been no discernible push to create the EAC and the concept has been all but dropped from the party leadership’s talking points.

Nonetheless, rhetoric does matter in interna-tional statecraft, and even if the DPJ has struggled to implement much of its foreign policy agen-da, statements by party leaders reflecting vary-ing foreign policy positions have shaped and col-ored Japan’s diplomatic behavior since the fall of 2009. Perhaps for this reason, the style of lead-ership and policy making under the DPJ’s first three prime ministers—Hatoyama, Kan, and now Noda—has been noticeably different, with direct implications for Japan’s foreign relations. While the Hatoyama cabinet exhibited the neo-autono-mist tendencies outlined above, the Kan admin-istration largely presented a more pragmatic and centrist streak in its foreign-policy making. The former approach led to tensions in the U.S.-Japan alliance and a domestic political crisis, while the latter approach restored a degree of stability in the bilateral alliance. Prime Minister Noda appears to be the most realist-oriented of the new prime ministers, thus far signaling a conservative diplo-matic approach as Japan faces major challenges both at home and abroad.

said, “We, recognizing the importance of human dignity, seek to en-joy, together with the peoples of the world, the benefits of peace, free-dom and democracy, and commit ourselves to work continually and unceasingly towards the goal of establishing a system of permanent and universal economic and social cooperation and a system of col-lective national security in the international community, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.” Hatoyama Yukio, Shin Kenpo Shian: Songen aru Nihon wo tsukuru [New constitutional draft: Toward a respectable Japan] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo, 2005), quoted in Hatoyama Yukio, “Shin Kenpo Shian” [New constitutional draft], official website of Hatoyama Yukio, http://www.hatoyama.gr.jp/tentative_plan/ (accessed Novem-ber 3, 2011). Okada’s version of an EAC does not include a traditional security role because he believes the U.S.-Japan alliance plays such a role: “On security issues, my assumption is that there is no peace and stability in Asia without the U.S.-Japan alliance. I do not think that an Asian version of NATO including the United States and China would ex-ist in 2015. My version of EAC excludes the traditional security roles.” Okada Katsuya and Hashimoto Goro, “Okada Katsuya Minshuto dai-hyo, gaiko bijon wo kataru” [DPJ President Katsuya Okada discusses his foreign policy vision], Chuokoron 120, no. 7 (July 2005), quoted in Okada Katsuya, “Hatsugen Hodo [Comments and reports],” official website of Okada Katsuya, July 8, 2005, http://www.katsuya.net/opin-ion/2005/07/post-103.html (accessed November 3, 2011).


Prime Minister Hatoyama: An Agenda for Change

As the DPJ’s first prime minister, Hatoyama Yukio entered office with unique expectations that his new government would represent a stark contrast from previous LDP regimes. A top pri-ority of this agenda for change, particularly in the foreign policy arena, was to carry out the par-ty’s vision of a more “equal” alliance relation-ship with the United States. The prime minister himself was especially eager to take on this task, as a leading proponent of a more assertive and autonomous Japanese diplomacy that would hedge against gradual U.S. decline. In a now fa-mous op/ed published in the New York Times shortly before he took office, Hatoyama argued that Japan must counterbalance U.S.-led “mar-ket fundamentalism” through economic inte-gration with Asia63—a line of thinking that is emblematic of the neo-autonomist school in the ruling party.

As Hatoyama formulated his new govern-ment, he appointed a number of party mem-bers and outside advisers who reflected his basic worldview. (This is not to suggest that other fac-tors such as party rank and factional membership were not primarily considered in the cabinet lineup.) Okada Katsuya, who had been criti-cal of Japan’s deferential treatment of the Unit-ed States, was made foreign minister.64 Ozawa Ichiro, who was ramping up criticism of U.S.

63 Hatoyama Yukio, “A New Path for Japan,” New York Times, August 26, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/opinion/27iht-edha-toyama.html (accessed November 3, 2011).

64 After Okada publicized his foreign policy vision as DPJ president in 2005, he told an interviewer, “Although the former Deputy State Sec-retary Armitage expressed his concern on an EAC, I would like to say let Japan take care of the Asian issues by its own to some degree. Why does not the U.S. trust Japan more?… . In U.S.-Japan relations, it is necessary to reach a FTA with the U.S. and to harmonize the markets of the U.S. and Japan. To the U.S., an EAC is behind Japan. Japan will become a connector between the U.S. and East Asia.” Okada Katsuya and Hashimoto Goro, “Okada Katsuya Minshuto daihyo, gaiko bijon wo kataru” [DPJ President Okada Katsuya discusses his foreign policy vi-sion]. For Okada’s foreign policy vision in 2005, see Democratic Party of Japan, “Toward Realization of Enlightened National Interest – Liv-

bases on Okinawa in the lead-up to the August 2009 parliamentary elections, was appointed sec-retary general of the party. Further, as the new leadership sought to distance bureaucrats from the policy-making process, the Kantei (the offi-cial residence of the Japanese prime minister) appeared to turn to unofficial outside advisers for policy expertise. Terashima Jitsuro, a former business executive and confidant of the prime minister, was particularly prominent in the early days of the Hatoyama administration. In numer-ous articles and media appearances, Terashima railed against the status quo U.S.-Japan security arrangement, which he criticized as subjugating Japan to U.S. strategic objectives.65

Thus, armed with a mandate for change and a team of relatively likeminded cabinet officials and advisers, Prime Minister Hatoyama em-barked on an attempt to forge a new, post-LDP diplomacy, including a recalibrated strategic dy-namic with the United States. Almost as soon as it started, though, the Hatoyama government ran into difficulties executing its neo-autonomist vision of a more independent foreign policy—due not just to the aforementioned internal chal-lenges, including its own problems with effective policy implementation, but also to external chal-lenges and obstacles that it faced in the interna-tional arena. This is not to say that the Hatoyama cabinet failed to implement foreign and security policies across the board. Most notably, the new government made advancements in some key bi-lateral relationships and in Japan’s contribution to anti-piracy operations. But the subsequent track record of accomplishments underscores the difficulties that the new ruling party faced

ing Harmoniously with Asia and the World,” http://www.dpj.or.jp/eng-lish/vision/summary.html (accessed November 3, 2011).

65 Terashima Jitsuro, “Joshiki ni kaeru ishi to koso: Nichibei Domei no saik-ouchiku ni mukete” [Will and initiative to return to a common sense: Reconstructing the Japan-U.S. alliance], Sekai [The World] 801 (Feb-ruary 2010): 118–25.


in executing its overall vision of a revamped dip-lomatic and strategic agenda.

While the new government talked of the U.S.-Japan alliance as the center of Japan’s security policy, the Hatoyama administration immediately began taking steps to redefine the bilateral dynamic. Among the first steps was to withdraw the SDF from refueling missions in the Indian Ocean, aimed at supporting U.S.-led anti-terror operations in Afghanistan, and to review the 2006 U.S.-Japan agreement to relocate the Futenma Marine air station on Okinawa. The DPJ also considered placing Japan’s Host Nation Support (HNS) to the United States in its budget screening process in order to lay the groundwork for a potential reduction of HNS in upcoming budgets. Finally, the new government in Tokyo announced that it would launch an investigation of a Cold War-era secret deal between previous LDP governments and Washington to allow the transit of U.S. nuclear-armed vessels through its ports, in violation of Japan’s so-called three non-nuclear principles.66

The new government—perhaps naively—appeared to believe that it was cautiously proceeding with these steps, although it was not taken that way by Washington. For example, the withdrawal of the SDF refueling mission was phased in and the review of the 2006 base relocation plans did not affect the existing agreement to relocate the Futenma airbase to Henoko Bay, a less-populated area on Okinawa. The issue of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) revision was postponed until the Futenma review was concluded. The DPJ also recognized the importance that the United States placed in stabilizing Afghanistan, deciding to commit $5 billion for Afghan reconstruction aid over the following five years.67 Another

66 The three non-nuclear principles state that Japan will neither possess nor manufacture nuclear weapons, nor will it permit their introduction into Japanese territory. The principles were first clarified by Prime Min-ister Sato Eisaku in a speech to the Lower House Budget Committee on December 11, 1967. The principles have been publicly recognized as a national principle, but they do not constitute a formal law.

67 The 2009 DPJ manifesto promised the withdrawal of Maritime Self-Defense Force operations from the Indian Ocean. While the Hatoyama administration attempted to keep this promise, it began to search for

proposal that was floated in the 2009 manifesto, and that was meant to offset Washington’s concerns about the DPJ’s commitment to the bilateral relationship, was to launch a bilateral U.S.-Japan FTA (to date, a bilateral FTA has not been seriously pursued by either government).

In its attempt to rebalance Japan’s ties with the United States and Asia, the new government in Tokyo took steps to improve bilateral ties with its regional neighbors, in particular China and South Korea. The Hatoyama government was aware of the many difficult issues between Chi-na and Japan, from historical grievances to ter-ritorial disputes, but the DPJ was hopeful that by setting a friendlier tone in bilateral relations both nations would be able to move beyond their differences.

However, Prime Minister Hatoyama went a step further by, at first, signaling a greater em-phasis on Sino-Japan ties over U.S.-Japan ties. Days after his appointment as prime minister, Hatoyama traveled to New York for a UN Gener-al Assembly meeting and chose to meet Chinese President Hu Jintao before meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama—an unusual change of protocol for a sitting Japanese prime minis-ter. At a later trilateral summit with South Korea, Hatoyama reportedly told his Chinese counter-part that Japan was overly dependent on the Unit-ed States.68 Other leading DPJ figures made sim-

an alternative policy option to support the Afghanistan reconstruc-tion efforts. While South Korea decided to re-deploy the South Korean military to Afghanistan, the Hatoyama administration examined var-ious options including a possible SDF dispatch to Afghanistan. In the end, the Hatoyama administration decided not to dispatch the SDF but to increase the financial assistance to Afghanistan to $5 billion in the following five years, from $2 billion under past LDP administra-tions. “Jieitai no Afugan haken, Shusho shosu demo nozomasikunai” [Prime Minister Hatoyama is against the SDF dispatch to Afghanistan, not even a few], Asahi Shimbun, November 5, 2009, http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/1104/TKY200911040461.html (accessed Novem-ber 5, 2009); Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Kanbo chokan kasha happyo heisei niju ichi nen juichi gatsu toka gozen” [Press confer-ence by Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano Hirofumi], November 10, 2009, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/rireki/2009/11/10_a.html (accessed December 1, 2011).

68 Arima Hiroki, Higashioka Toru, and Hakota Tetsuya, “Kitachosen tainichi kaizen nozomu, On shusho setsumei, Nicchukan shunou kai-gi” [North Korea hopes a better relation with Japan, Chinese Premier Wen explained at the Japan-China-South Korea trilateral summit],


ilar gestures toward China. Most famously, DPJ Secretary General Ozawa led a delegation of 140 ruling party lawmakers to Beijing for a courtesy visit in December 2009. It was not lost on U.S. officials that a similar DPJ delegation visit was not being planned to Washington.

The 2009 DPJ manifesto policy index also called on improving ties with South Korea as a top diplomatic priority.69 As with China, Japan’s relations with South Korea have been hampered by ongoing territorial disputes and historical grievances. In particular, the Dokdo/Takeshi-ma Islands dispute and the ongoing controversy over Japanese history textbooks have repeatedly derailed progress toward improved bilateral re-lations. Again, the Hatoyama administration of-fered conciliatory gestures toward Seoul from the outset. In contrast to past practices, for in-stance, the Hatoyama administration dropped direct references to the Dokdo/Takeshima terri-torial dispute in the government’s guidelines for high school textbooks.70

More concretely, the new government sig-naled renewed interest in restarting negotia-tions with Seoul over a bilateral FTA, an idea that had been proposed by previous LDP govern-ments but never finalized with a formal agree-ment.71 The DPJ hoped that a strengthened ROK-Japan relationship, underpinned by a new bilateral FTA, would lead to greater trilateral co-operation including China.72 Both the trilateral

Asahi Shimbun, October 10, 2009, http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/1010/TKY200910100165.html (accessed October 10, 2009).

69 Democratic Party of Japan, “Minshuto Seisakushu Index 2009” [DPJ Pol-icy Index 2009], July 23, 2009, http://archive.dpj.or.jp/policy/manifes-to/seisaku2009/img/INDEX2009.pdf (accessed November 3, 2011).

70 Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) of Japan, “Daijin kisha kaikenroku (heisei niju ichi nen juni gatsu it-suka)” [Press conference by the MEXT minister], December 25, 2009, http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/daijin/detail/1288500.htm (ac-cessed December 1, 2011).

71 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Nikkan gaisho kaidan no gaiyo” [South Korea-Japan foreign ministers’ meeting summary], January 16, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/korea/kaidan/sk_1001_gai.html (accessed December 1, 2011).

72 The DPJ Policy Index 2009 states, “In order to contribute to stability and peace in East Asia and the world, the DPJ will strengthen the South Ko-rea-Japan bilateral relations, and then construct a strong, trustworthy, and cooperative relation among China, South Korea, and Japan. The DPJ will make efforts to conclude a South Korea-Japan bilateral FTA and to

cooperation and the ROK-Japan FTA were con-sidered requisite steps toward the creation of an East Asian Community. The importance placed on South Korea was symbolized by Prime Minis-ter Hatoyama’s decision to go to Seoul as his first official bilateral visit, in October 2009.

The Hatoyama government took steps to im-prove bilateral ties with other nations as well. In a carryover from LDP policies, the new gov-ernment sought to deepen diplomatic and stra-

tegic ties with India and Australia. Although the DPJ planned to differentiate itself from the LDP, the opportunity to diversify Japan’s strate-gic partners beyond the United States resonated with the party’s neo-autonomist ambitions. At a summit meeting in New Delhi, Prime Minister Hatoyama and Indian Prime Minister Manmo-han Singh agreed to enhance security coopera-tion between the two countries, including the regularization of a bilateral defense ministers’ meeting, the establishment of an annual “2+2” foreign and defense administrative vice minis-ters’ meeting, a maritime security dialogue on sea lanes of communication, and joint exercis-es for anti-piracy operations. The Hatoyama ad-ministration also agreed to an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) with Australia for peacetime security cooperation. In his meet-ings with Australian counterparts, Foreign Min-ister Okada advanced bilateral dialogue on the issue of nuclear arms reduction and nonprolif-eration.73

solve the Takeshima issue.” Democratic Party of Japan, “Minshuto Sei-sakushu Index 2009” [DPJ Policy Index 2009], July 23, 2009, 15.

73 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Submission by the Governments of Japan and Australia of a “New Package of Practical Nuclear Disar-

While calling the U.S.-Japan alliance the center of Japan’s security policy,

the new Hatoyama government immediately attempted to redefine

the bilateral alliance dynamic.


Another pillar of the DPJ’s foreign policy agenda as it took over the government was to have a more “proactive” UN-oriented diploma-cy. The DPJ manifestos mention three policy areas regarding UN-related security operations: 1) anti-piracy operations, 2) peacekeeping oper-ations, and 3) peace-building operations.74 Al-though as an opposition party the DPJ opposed the SDF anti-piracy operations bill, the party manifesto in principle supports anti-piracy op-erations on the condition that they be led pri-marily by the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and that MSDF activities come under more strict civil-ian control. The 2009 DPJ manifesto also em-phasizes Japan’s more active participation in UN peacekeeping operations, including the use of force if certain conditions are met. Finally, the 2009 manifesto supports Japan’s active role in peacebuilding operations, including financial aid, support for the development of central gov-ernments (such as training for rule-of-law initia-tives), medical aid, and support for infrastructure projects.

Given the emphasis on the United Nations in DPJ policy platforms some observers speculated that the Hatoyama government might reorient Japan’s diplomacy toward a UN-centric model. Instead, the new government grappled with internal divisions over UN policy and, somewhat ironically, sought ways to leverage Japan’s global security engagements in strategic negotiations with the United States.75

The issue of Japan’s participation in UN PKO missions proved to be divisive from the start.

mament and Non-Proliferation Measures for the 2010 Review Confer-ence of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” March 23, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2010/3/0323_01.html (accessed December 1, 2011).

74 Democratic Party of Japan, “Minshuto Seisakushu Index 2009” [DPJ Pol-icy Index 2009], 15–17; Democratic Party of Japan, “Minshuto Seisaku Index 2005” [DPJ Policy Index 2005], August 2005, http://www1.dpj.or.jp/policy/manifesto/seisaku2005/ (accessed November 3, 2011).

75 Sengoku Yasushi, “PKO haken, taibei kaizen nerau” [PKO dispatch, seeking to improve relations with the United States], Mainichi Shim-bun, January 26, 2010, http://mainichi.jp/select/weathernews/news/20100126ddm002030097000c.html (accessed January 26, 2010); Japan Ministry of Defense, “Press Conference by the De-fense Minister,” January 26, 2010, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/ki-sha/2010/01/26.html (accessed December 1, 2011).

Party leaders considered relaxing the current PKO law, which prohibits SDF missions in ongoing military conflicts. Although many DPJ lawmakers generally support more proactive Japanese participation in UN PKO missions, internal debates over the PKO law revealed sharp differences within the party. Foreign Minister Okada, for instance, was in support of looser PKO restrictions, but the prime minister favored maintaining the current restrictions.76 Defense Minister Kitazawa was also eager to dispatch the SDF, but primarily in support of U.S.-led overseas operations, such as the deployment of P-3Cs to the Indian Ocean and SDF missions in support of the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.77 Okada, on the other hand, was more eager to dispatch the SDF in UN PKO missions outside the scope of U.S.-led operations, such as a potential mission to Sudan. In the end, the Hatoyama administration failed to reach a consensus on these policies, instead approving the less controversial deployment of SDF personnel for humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations following the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti.78

The new ruling government also explored how it might enhance Japan’s role in Afghan re-construction and anti-piracy operations in ex-change for greater flexibility from the United

76 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Press Conference by Minister of Foreign Affairs Okada Katsuya,” October 23, 2009, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/kaiken/gaisho/g_0910.html#5 (accessed December 1, 2011); Jiji Press, “Buki shiyo kijun kanwa ni hiteiteki, Okada gaisho no shini kakunin, Hatoyama shusho” [Prime Minister Hatoyama is neg-ative to loosening the rules of engagement, and will confirm Foreign Minister Okada’s true intention], March 17, 2010, http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=pol_30&k=2010031700240 (accessed March 17, 2010).

77 Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi expressed his concern regarding the deteriorating security situation in Sudan. “Sudan PKO ni heri butai hak-en wo kento, yoka kara genchi chosa” [Helicopter unit dispatch to Su-dan PKO is considered, research delegation scheduled for May 8], Asahi Shimbun, May 7, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0506/TKY201005060325.html (accessed May 7, 2010).

78 Japan dispatched 190 engineering personnel and 160 support person-nel to Haiti, for a total of approximately 350 SDF personnel. The SDF mission includes the clean-up of debris; the flattening of the evacuees’ camp construction land; the repairing of the roads; and the construc-tion of a minor facility. The initial term of the mission was from Feb-ruary 5, 2010, to November 30, 2010. The Kan cabinet extended the mission to January 31, 2012.


States in base realignment talks. In particular, the DPJ hoped that expanding Japan’s involvement in the Afghan reconstruction effort would lead to U.S. concessions in the Futenma relocation plan.79 However, by linking Japan’s internation-al engagement to the basing issue, the Hatoya-ma government was, in effect, undermining its promise to conduct foreign policy independent-ly from U.S. strategic interests. And it soon be-came clear that Washington was unwilling to se-riously entertain alternative options to the 2006 agreement on the Futenma relocation, despite any tacit quid pro quos offered by the Hatoya-ma cabinet.80

External Constraints on the Hatoyama AdministrationWhile the Hatoyama cabinet struggled to settle in as the new ruling government, it soon con-fronted both internal and external obstacles to its vision of greater diplomatic autonomy from the United States. In particular, the effort to re-balance Japan’s diplomatic orientation between the United States and Asia met with significant structural challenges beyond the domestic polit-ical arena. The United States reacted negatively to the Hatoyama administration’s mixed signals on base realignment plans, leading to major ten-sions in bilateral alliance relations. China and other neighboring countries in Asia also proved unreceptive to Tokyo’s entreaties to form a new regional community, or even to significantly re-

79 “Maehara Kokkosho, Shusho ni Nichibei kankei wo sinan, naiyo wa naisho” [Land and Transport Minister Maehara gives Prime Minister Hatoyama a lecture about Japan-U.S. relations, the content is secret], Asahi Shimbun, November 17, 2009, http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/1117/TKY200911170457.html (accessed November 17, 2009); “Okada gaisho wa Amerika ga Kadena togo wo ukeireru to rikai, Ameri-ka koden yaku” [Foreign Minister Okada thinks the U.S. would accept the Kadena merger option, U.S. diplomatic cable translation], Asahi Shimbun, May 13, 2011, http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0512/TKY201105120499.html (accessed May 13, 2011).

80 Murayama Yusuke and Ito Hiroshi, “Amerika kokan, Futenma no minaoshi shinai iko, Minshu no koyaku meguri hatsugen” [U.S. officials made it clear that the U.S. will not renegotiate the Futenma reloca-tion issue associated with the DPJ’s manifesto], Asahi Shimbun, Sep-tember 3, 2009, http://www.asahi.com/international/update/0903/TKY200909030141.html (accessed September 3, 2009).

vamp diplomatic relations on a bilateral basis. The combination of internal and external fac-tors working against the new government’s plans ultimately led to its demise just nine months af-ter taking office.

Initially, the Obama administration signaled that it was willing to be patient as the new government in Tokyo found its footing, despite being eager to make progress on the 2006 base realignment plan.81 The Hatoyama government’s early mixed signals about the relocation plans quickly frustrated U.S. officials and, by October, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was calling on Tokyo to move forward on the plan by the end of 2009.82 However, the new DPJ-led government appeared optimistic that it could work out a deal with the Obama administration to seek alternative options for the Futenma relocation plan.83 The prime minister’s decision to reexamine other relocation options further

81 Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said that American officials will “take great care” as they work with the DPJ, and, “this is a whole new generation of people who are experiencing this together for the first time,” and, “it may take time for them to be able to fully enunci-ate.” Campbell also added, “In terms of the basics, we are very comfort-able.” Foster Klug, “US Diplomats Say US-Japan Alliance to Stay Strong,” Associated Press, September 2, 2009, from the Seattle Times, http://se-attletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2009794683_apususja-pan.html (accessed November 3, 2011).

82 In a visit to Japan in October 2009, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated in a joint press conference with Defense Minister Kitaza-wa Toshimi: “Our view is clear. The Futenma relocation facility is the lynchpin of the realignment road map. Without the Futenma realign-ment, the Futenma facility, there will be no relocation to Guam. And without relocation to Guam, there will be no consolidation of forces and the return of land in Okinawa. Our view is this may not be the per-fect alternative for anyone, but it is the best alternative for everyone, and it is time to move on… . We have investigated all of the alterna-tives in great detail and believe that they are both politically untenable and operationally unworkable. With respect to a time limit, we have not talked in terms of a time limit, but rather the need to progress as quickly as possible.” U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assis-tant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), “Joint Press Conference with Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates,” October 21, 2009, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4501 (accessed November 3, 2011).

83 Tera Kotaro and Higashioka Toru, “Futenma kyogi, Shusho, Nichibei goi wa zentei denai” [On the Futenma working group consultation, Prime Minister Hatoyama says the Henoko option is not the premise], Asa-hi Shimbun, November 14, 2009, http://www.asahi.com/politics/up-date/1114/TKY200911140370.html (accessed November 14, 2009).


exacerbated an already tense climate in bilateral relations.

U.S. concerns were also heightened by the increasingly obvious confusion in the new government’s decision-making process. As described earlier in this report, consensus building among the three parties in the ruling coalition proved highly problematic for the new government, particularly reconciling the staunch anti-base position of the SDP. This was compounded by Hatoyama’s erratic leadership style and conflicting public statements on the relocation issue made by cabinet ministers and key party figures. Further, under the DPJ’s politician-led decision-making process, bureaucrats were sidelined from deliberations over the highly complex and delicate base realignment plans. Lacking a depth of knowledge in this area, the new ruling cabinet appeared increasingly amateurish in its handling of the bilateral alliance.84

Much has been made of Prime Minister Hatoyama’s mishandling of the base realignment process and U.S.-Japan relations in general. However, his administration’s approach to China also proved to be less than successful. In essence, Tokyo’s efforts to improve the atmospherics in Sino-Japan ties did not lead to improvements in more substantive areas of the bilateral relationship, as the novice ruling party may have expected. Despite the DPJ leadership’s diplomatic overtures to China, for instance, Beijing ignored Tokyo’s concerns about its nuclear weapons stockpiles, pointedly refusing to buy into Foreign Minister Okada’s calls for a nuclear weapons-free zone in Northeast Asia.85 Although the DPJ initially expected China to be more enthusiastic about an East Asian Community, Beijing reacted coolly to that idea

84 Kyodo News, “Futenma kyogi, gaimu kanryo no haijo hoshin, sei-ji shudo he Hatoyama naikaku” [Hatoyama administration excludes the MOFA bureaucrats from the Futenma relocation consultation with the U.S.], March 11, 2010, http://www.47news.jp/CN/201003/CN2010031001001099.html (accessed November 3, 2011).

85 Agence France-Presse, “Japan, China in Spat over Nuclear Arsenal,” May 16, 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALe-qM5iZ7Bv_WhCWbUhd9XNzSgISgfhlcw (accessed November 3, 2011).

as well.86 As time went on, other contentious issues flared up in the bilateral relationship, such as Chinese naval activities in contested waters and squabbles over the joint development of gas fields in the East China Sea.87 Territorial disputes with China would only intensify in the coming months.

Some observers have called the DPJ’s relations with South Korea its only foreign policy success,88 but here, again, improvements in the overall bilateral relationship did not necessarily translate into a vastly different dynamic between the two countries. Despite the relative calm in bilateral relations under the Hatoyama administration, the two governments did not make a serious push to finalize a bilateral FTA, instead allowing negotiations to remain in limbo. Further, Tokyo’s conciliatory gestures on historical issues did not lead to tangible progress in resolving the ongoing dispute over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands. In April 2010, South Korea decided to conduct maritime geological surveys near the disputed islands, testing the DPJ government’s resolve in the dispute. Tokyo protested the move but remained vague about its official policy toward

86 Jiji Press, “Kyuna kyodotai suishin ni hantai, Chugoku shusho” [Chi-nese Premier Wen opposes the hasty promotion of an EAC], October 24, 2009, http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=pol_30&k=2009102400287 (accessed October 24, 2009).

87 Japan and China agreed to a joint gas field development in the East China Sea in August 2008, but since then bilateral negotiations to re-alize this agreement have stalled. In March 2010, the People’s Libera-tion Army Navy (PLAN) fleet passed through the Miyako Strait, a key point between the East China Sea and the Western Pacific. In early April, a PLAN helicopter had a near collision with a MSDF vessel in the East China Sea. Two days after this incident, the PLAN fleet, including eight surface ships and two submarines, passed through the Miyako Strait. In late April, there was another near collision incident between the PLAN helicopter and the MSDF vessel. “Chugoku no kansai heri, mata Kaiji goeikan ni ijosekkin, Boeisho happyo” [Defense Ministry an-nounced the PLAN helicopter had a near collision with the MSDF vessel again], Asahi Shimbun, April 21, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0421/TKY201004210494.html (accessed April 21, 2010).

88 Sheila A. Smith points out, “Stating openly that he [Noda] will not vis-it the shrine as Japan’s prime minister will be a positive contribution to Japan’s relations with South Korea, which have been relatively good under the DPJ government.” Sheila A. Smith, “Is Japan’s New PM a ‘Na-tionalist’ or a ‘Moderate’?” Asia Unbound, Council of Foreign Relations blog, September 1, 2011, http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2011/09/01/is-ja-pans-new-pm-a-nationalist-or-a-moderate/#more-5370 (accessed November 3, 2011).


the islands until May, when both sides agreed to manage the dispute diplomatically in order to prevent further tensions in the overall bilateral relationship.89

One event that proved to be catalytic in helping to improve Japan-ROK ties was North Korea’s sinking of the ROK naval ship Cheonan in March 2010, which provided an opportunity for the Hatoyama government to demonstrate its support for South Korea in the wake of Pyongyang’s act of aggression. Japan was among the first nations to condemn North Korea for the sinking, earning the appreciation of the South Korean government.90 The Cheonan incident also led to enhanced trilateral defense cooperation among the United States, Japan, and South Korea, with Japan sending observers to joint U.S.-ROK military exercises in the wake of the incident.91 Yet, as Japan-ROK ties improved under the auspices of trilateral defense cooperation with the United States, the DPJ’s

89 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Okada gaimu daijin no hokan no gaiyo” [Summary of Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya’s visit to South Ko-rea], May 16, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/jck/g_kaigi/jkorea_1005_gai.html (accessed December 1, 2011).

90 Prime Minister Hatoyama issued the statement that “Japan strongly supports the ROK. North Korea’s action cannot be condoned by any means, and Japan together with the international community strong-ly condemns North Korea. In handling this matter, Japan will continue its close coordination and cooperation for regional peace and stabil-ity with the countries concerned, including the ROK and the United States.” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Comment by the Jap-anese Prime Minister on the Announcement by the Republic of Korea of the Results of the Investigation into the Sinking of a Military Patrol Vessel,” May 20, 2010, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/hatoyama/statement/201005/20comment_souri_e.html (accessed November 3, 2011).

91 After South Korea officially issued a report holding North Korea re-sponsible for the Cheonan incident in May, the United States and South Korea planned a joint naval exercise in the Sea of Japan in July 2010, inviting Maritime SDF officers as observers. In return, the United States and Japan invited South Korean military officers to a U.S.-Japan joint military exercise in December 2010. Maritime Staff Office, “Bei-kan godo gunji enshu heno kaijo jieikan no obuzaber haken ni tsuite” [Maritime SDF officers’ observer dispatch to the U.S.-South Korea joint military exercise], Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, July 23, 2010, http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/formal/info/news/201007/072301.pdf (accessed December 1, 2011); Japan Ministry of Defense, “Press Con-ference by the Defense Minister,” December 3, 2010, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/pressconf/2010/12/101203.html (accessed December 1, 2011).

goal of creating a stronger Sino-Japan-ROK triangle grew more distant.

The Cheonan incident also served as a wake-up call of sorts to the Hatoyama administration in dealing with real regional security crises. It was, in fact, the first serious regional security crisis to occur on the new government’s watch, and while it did not directly involve Japan, North Korea’s act of aggression sent ripples across the region. For the first time as a ruling party, the DPJ was confronted with a security crisis that demanded some response from Tokyo. To its credit, the Hatoyama government erred on the side of allied solidarity, rather than using the incident as a pretext for distancing itself from the United States.

Yet as the regional security environment grew more tense in the wake of the Cheonan incident it seemed an increasingly inopportune time for Tokyo and Washington to be at odds with each other over base realignment plans. This, coupled with the ruling party’s myriad domestic problems and ongoing political scandals, created a crisis of confidence in the Hatoyama cabinet. After having raised expectations on Okinawa for a more favorable deal on relocating Futenma, Hatoyama finally conceded that he would stick to the 2006 agreement on relocating the air station to Henoko Bay. With his approval ratings plummeting, and the SDP leaving the ruling coalition in protest, Hatoyama announced his decision to resign as prime minister on June 2, 2010.


The Kan Administration Political Transition and Crisis Management

The succession of Kan Naoto as prime minister in June 2010 marked a noticeable transition in governing style in the nine-month period since the DPJ became Japan’s main ruling party. After the debacle over Futenma, Prime Minister Kan moved quickly to restore some degree of stability in the U.S.-Japan alliance and defuse the tension in bilateral ties that had peaked during his prede-

cessor’s tenure. The change in leadership from Hatoyama to Kan went hand-in-hand with a more pragmatic approach to policy making, at least at the beginning of the new administration. To be fair, as the DPJ’s second prime minister, Kan did not face the same expectations for change that his predecessor had coming into office, and the Kan cabinet had the benefit of hindsight to ap-preciate how an overly aggressive reform agenda could have dire political consequences.

The Kan administration therefore initially got off to a promising start. As mentioned earlier, the Kan administration, particularly under the initial direction of Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku Yo-shito, scaled back some of the DPJ’s institutional reforms by reincorporating the bureaucracy into the policy-making process, although it still ulti-mately aimed for a politician-led decision-making system. Alliance managers in Washington were relieved to encounter more consistent messaging from the Kan cabinet than had been the norm under Hatoyama, thus helping to improve the

overall tone of bilateral alliance relations.92 Fi-nally, by refocusing attention on the domestic economic agenda—which included a proposed consumption tax increase, social welfare reform, and more open trade policy—the Kan adminis-tration deflected some of the intense media at-tention away from the Futenma issue and the bi-lateral alliance as a whole.

Another noticeable difference in governing was in the new prime minister’s foreign policy rhetoric and diplomatic outreach, with the Kan administration appearing to reemphasize the centrality of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Gone was much mention of an East Asian Community or the imperative to create a more “equal” alliance with the United States. Soon after taking office, Kan was invited to visit China as his first official overseas visit; rather than making the visit him-self, he sent Hatoyama on his behalf.93 Kan also made an early statement calling for the Futen-ma problem to be resolved within the context of a strong bilateral alliance.94

Kan’s cabinet picks also indicated a move away from a neo-autonomist vision of Japanese diplo-macy toward a more centrist and even realist ori-

92 Interview with senior Pentagon official, June 3, 2010.93 Yamada Muru, “Kan shusho: Hochu miokuri Hatoyama shi dairi kento,”

[Prime Minister Kan passes his visit to China, and instead sends Hatoya-ma as his deputy], Mainichi Shimbun, June 7, 2010, http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/news/20100607dde001010038000c.html (accessed June 7, 2010).

94 Prime Minister Kan stated, “The Japan-U.S. alliance has served as the cornerstone of our foreign policy. This principle should continue to be upheld firmly today… . We caused anxiety among the Japa-nese public over the issue of Futenma… . We have reached an agree-ment with the United States, and we must proceed on the basis of this accord, but at the same time, as is mentioned in the Cabinet de-cision we took, we must make a sincere and all-out effort to reduce the burden on Okinawa. This is a very difficult issue, but it is one that I hope to address with firm resolve and a clear sense of direction.” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Press Conference by Prime Minis-ter Kan Naoto,” June 8, 2010, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/statement/201006/08kaiken_e.html (accessed November 8, 2011).

The Cheonan incident served as a wake-up call to the Hatoyama administration which, until then, had not confronted a serious regional security crisis.


entation. His selection of Maehara Seiji, a foreign policy realist and staunch supporter of the U.S.-Japan alliance, as foreign minister sent a reassur-ing signal to Washington that the new cabinet would work more cooperatively than had the pre-vious administration. Kitazawa, who had earned the respect of defense ministry bureaucrats and alliance managers in Washington, was retained as defense minister in the new cabinet. Nagashi-ma Akihisa, a long-time proponent of the U.S.-Japan alliance and expert on defense policy, was retained as parliamentary secretary (seimukan) of defense. Together, this foreign and defense poli-cy team would prove to be particularly effective in implementing some notable advancements in Japan’s diplomatic and national security policies.

Just as the Cheonan incident in March 2010 spurred the Hatoyama government to address re-gional security concerns, two other events in the regional security environment challenged the Kan administration, spurring certain advance-ments in Japan’s foreign and defense policies un-der the DPJ-led government. The first event—and by far the more serious incident for Japanese security interests—was the September 2010 col-lision between a Chinese fishing vessel and two Japanese Coast Guard patrol boats in waters off the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands. In an unprecedented move, Japanese authorities arrest-ed and temporarily detained the Chinese fishing vessel’s captain and crew, leading to a bitter dip-lomatic spat with Beijing. After several weeks of heightened diplomatic tensions, including Chi-na’s de facto ban on rare earth exports to Japan, Japanese prosecutors reportedly decided to re-lease the Chinese fishing captain out of consid-eration for broader diplomatic ties between the two countries.95

The Senkaku/Diaoyutai incident was a tell-ing display of the DPJ-led government’s response to a direct national security challenge from Chi-na. As may not have been expected from a par-

95 “Senkaku oki no shototsu jiken, Chugokujin sencho wo shakuho, Nic-chu kankei koryo” [Senkaku incident: Naha prosecutor released Chinese captain in consideration of Sino-Japanese relations], Asahi Shim-bun, September 25, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/international/up-date/0924/TKY201009240180.html (accessed September 25, 2010).

ty that had courted closer diplomatic ties with Beijing, the DPJ leadership in Tokyo initially took a hawkish approach to the incident by ar-resting and detaining the Chinese fishing boat crew, a measure that the LDP-led government had not taken when a similar incident occurred in 2004.96 Although this initial response was ro-bust, the Kan cabinet came under strong criti-cism by the Japanese media for its subsequently indecisive handling of the crisis and for eventu-ally seeming to cave in to China’s heavy-hand-ed diplomatic pressure. By January 2011, Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku, who had tried to orchestrate back-channel negotiations with Bei-jing, was forced to resign to take responsibility for Tokyo’s mishandling of the crisis. Prime Minis-ter Kan, already reeling from the DPJ leadership challenge from Ozawa Ichiro, never recovered his political standing after the crisis (which was just the first of more to come).

However damaging the Senkaku/Diaoyutai crisis was to the Kan cabinet, it did serve to bol-ster the credibility and importance of the U.S.-Japan strategic partnership at a time when the alliance was still struggling to recover from the Futenma impasse. The Obama administration registered its support for Japan in the dispute, re-portedly pledging to honor its security commit-ment to protect Japanese administrative territory as Japan’s close strategic ally.97 Tokyo responded

96 On March 24, 2004, seven Chinese civil activists landed on the Sen-kaku/Diaoyutai Islands and were arrested by Japanese police. This was the first landing by foreigners on the islands since October 1996, and the first time that foreigners landing on the islands were arrested. Two days after the arrest, Japan decided to force the Chinese activists to leave Japan. Tokyo and Beijing dealt with this case very deliberately. Although Beijing protested against Tokyo and claimed Chinese sover-eignty over the islands, China clarified that Beijing has consistently in-sisted on a dialogue to resolve this issue. Tokyo also emphasized that Japan would not allow this incident to disrupt overall bilateral rela-tions. “Senkaku shoto, Uotsurijima ni Chugokujin nana nin ga joriku, Okinawa Kenkei ga taiho,” [Seven Chinese landed on the Senkaku Is-lands, and Okinawa Police arrested them], Asahi Shimbun, March 25, 2004, http://www.asahi.com/special/senkaku/OSK200403240036.html (accessed November 8, 2011).

97 After the U.S.-Japan foreign ministers’ meeting on September 23, 2010, Foreign Minister Maehara Seiji told the media that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had reiterated to him that the Senkakus are subject to Article 5 of the bilateral security treaty, which authorizes the United States to protect Japan in the event of an armed attack on territories


in kind, sending renewed signals of its willing-ness to deepen and enhance bilateral defense cooperation.98 In the following months, the Kan cabinet floated the idea of revising Japan’s three arms export principles to allow for greater de-fense technology exchanges with the United States.99 Further, the Kan cabinet decided not to reduce the budget for Host Nation Support for U.S. forces based in Japan.100

The Senkaku/Diaoyutai incident also gave momentum to the realist wing of the ruling party, which hoped for a more robust defense

under the administration of Japan.” Kyodo News, “Clinton Tells Maehara Senkakus Subject to Bilateral Security Treaty,” reported at Nikkei.com, September 24, 2010, http://e.nikkei.com/e/fr/tnks/Nni20100923D-23NY148.htm (accessed November 8, 2011).

98 At the U.S.-Japan foreign ministers’ meeting in Honolulu on October 27, 2010, Secretary Clinton restated that “the Senkakus fall within the scope of Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Coop-eration and Security. This is part of the larger commitment that the United States has made to Japan’s security. We consider the Japa-nese-U.S. alliance one of the most important alliance partnerships we have anywhere in the world and we are committed to our obli-gations to protect the Japanese people.” Foreign Minister Maehara re-plied that “we should like to engage in deeper consultations in order to realize a smooth bilateral cooperation for the defense of Japan and in the case of contingencies in areas surrounding Japan.” U.S. Depart-ment of State, “Joint Press Availability with Japanese Foreign Minis-ter Seiji Maehara,” October 27, 2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/10/150110.htm (accessed November 8, 2011).

99 Prime Minister Sato Eisaku clarified the existing guidelines of arms ex-port as the Three Principles on Arms Export (buki yushutsu san gensoku) in the Diet in 1967. The principles banned the arms export to 1) the communist-bloc countries; 2) those countries subject to embargos on arms exports under the UN Security Council’s resolutions; and 3) those countries engaged or likely to be engaged in international conflicts. In 1976, Prime Minister Miki Takeo expanded the principles to a total ban on the export of arms and arms-related equipment to all countries. In 1983, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro relaxed the principles to ex-empt the transfer of arms-related technologies to the United States, and in 2004 Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro exempted arms exports relat-ed to ballistic missile defense (BMD) joint development and production with the United States. The revision of the principles has been debat-ed since the 1960s, but recently the debate has focused on these two issues: 1) deepening the U.S.-Japan alliance; and 2) maintaining Jap-anese defense industrial foundations. Tomita Keiichiro, “Buki yushutsu san gensoku: sono genkyo to minaoshi rongi” [Three Principles of Arms Export: Current situations and reviews], Chosa to Joho [Issue Brief], no. 726 (National Diet Library, November 1, 2011), http://www.ndl.go.jp/jp/data/publication/issue/pdf/0726.pdf (accessed November 8, 2011).

100 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Outcomes of the Comprehensive Re-view of Host Nation Support (HNS) and the New Special Measures Agree-ment (SMA),” December 14, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/hns_sma1012.html (accessed December 1, 2011).

posture vis-à-vis China, primarily through clos-er strategic cooperation with the United States, but also through a revamped national security policy. This group exerted considerable behind-the-scenes influence during the development of Japan’s 2010 National Defense Program Guide-lines, a five-year plan of the nation’s basic de-fense posture. Before resigning in January 2011, Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku along with Maehara, Noda, and Kitazawa formed a core team of cabinet-level ministers that helped to shepherd the revised NDPG draft through sev-eral deliberating bodies and ad hoc parliamenta-ry committees that competed to shape the final document (see appendix B for more on the pro-cess of developing the 2010 NDPG).

The final result of the NDPG process turned out to be a set of recommendations for increased U.S.-Japan defense cooperation in areas such as joint weapons development and intelligence sharing. Most significantly, the new NDPG par-allels aspects of the 2010 U.S. Quadrennial De-fense Review (QDR), which emphasizes a joint AirSea Battle Concept (ASBC) as a counter to China’s growing anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities.101 Japan’s version of this concept is to enhance the nation’s air and sea defense ca-pabilities while shifting to a “dynamic defense” posture that focuses on operational capabili-ties.102 The NDPG also calls for a repositioning of Japanese defenses from the northern sections of the archipelago to the southwest, in order to deter potential threats to Japan’s sovereign inter-ests in the Sea of Japan.103

All of these moves effectively ended any speculation that the DPJ-led government under Prime Minister Kan might fundamentally reorient Japan’s strategic position away from the United States and toward China. Not only did the new NDPG signal deeper defense ties

101 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf (accessed November 8, 2011).

102 Japan Ministry of Defense, National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond, December 17, 2010, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/pdf/guidelinesFY2011.pdf (accessed November 8, 2011).

103 Ibid.


with Washington, it also called attention to Japan’s heightened concerns about Chinese strategic ambitions in the wake of the Senkaku/Diaoyutai crisis and other territorial disputes in the South China Sea. In a January 2011 foreign policy speech, Prime Minister Kan articulated a policy message that some Japanese experts took as an affirmation of the status quo and a relinquishment of the DPJ’s aspirations to rebalance Japan’s diplomatic relations between the United States and Asia.104

Another regional security crisis that helped sharpen the DPJ’s attention on strategic deci-sion making was North Korea’s shelling of Yeon-pyeong Island on November 23, 2010, one of the most violent clashes on the Korean Peninsu-la since the end of the Korean War. Once again, the incident called for an appropriate response from South Korea’s neighbors, and the Kan ad-ministration unequivocally stated its support for Seoul.105 As with the Cheonan incident earlier

104 Prime Minister Kan Naoto made a foreign policy speech on January 20, 2011, in which he said that “regardless of the change in government, this relationship must, in my view, continue to be maintained and rein-forced.” Prime Minister Kan also laid out his thinking with regard to for-eign policy and national security, presenting five main pillars: 1) the Ja-pan-U.S. alliance as the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy; 2) new development of foreign relations with Asia; 3) promotion of econom-ic diplomacy; 4) addressing global issues; and 5) Japan itself respond-ing with precision to the security environment surrounding it. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Japanese Diplomacy at a Historic Watershed: Lecture Presentation on Foreign Policy by Prime Minister Kan Naoto,” January 20, 2011, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/statement/201101/20speech_e.html (accessed November 8, 2011).

105 Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku Yoshito stated at a press conference on November 23, 2010, “As to the position of the Government regarding this situation, [first,] this incident of shelling by the DPRK cannot be toler-ated and Japan strongly condemns the DPRK. [Second,] Japan extends its condolences to the government and the people of the ROK regard-ing the human cost of this shelling, and Japan supports the position of the government of the ROK. Third, insofar as this act of provocation by means of the shelling by the DPRK undermines the peace and security of not only the ROK but the entirety of Northeast Asia, including Japan, we demand an immediate cessation of all such acts. Fourth, in line with the instructions given by the Prime Minister at the ministerial meeting, Japan will address future developments in close coordination with the ROK, the United States, and other relevant countries. In addition, the Japanese government will work together to engage in the collection of information and we will take appropriate measures in preparation for contingencies.” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Excerpt from the Press Conference of Mr. Sengoku Yoshito, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Held on the Afternoon of Tuesday, November 23, 2010,” November 23,

that year, the Yeonpyeong Island shelling spurred closer trilateral defense ties among Japan, South Korea, and the United States. In an unprecedent-ed meeting of the foreign ministers from each country, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, ROK Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan, and Jap-anese Foreign Minister Maehara Seiji issued a joint statement condemning North Korea for the unprovoked attack and outlining further steps to deepen trilateral strategic cooperation.106 This was followed by a joint ROK-Japan defense min-isterial meeting where the participants agreed to examine the possibility of a bilateral acquisition and cross-servicing agreement, or ACSA, to en-hance peacetime security cooperation between the two countries.107

ROK-Japan relations were already on the up-swing, thanks in large part to the Kan adminis-tration’s efforts to reconcile historical grievances with South Korea. Marking the one-hundred-year anniversary of Japan’s annexation of Korea, Kan issued a statement of remorse on August 10, 2010, that went further than any previous Jap-anese statement to address that episode in his-tory.108 The statement also included a concrete

2010, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/topics/20101123_chief_cabinet_secretary_e.pdf (accessed November 8, 2011).

106 The joint statement mentioned that “the Ministers recognized that the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK Alliances and Japan-ROK partnership are essential to the maintenance of peace and stability in Asia. All three reaffirmed their mutual bilateral responsibilities and steadfast commitments under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America and the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, which serve as the foundations for the two alliance relationships.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Trilateral Statement: Japan, Republic of Korea, and the United States of Ameri-ca,” December 6, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/juk_js1012.html (accessed November 8, 2011).

107 Japan Ministry of Defense, “Press Conference by the Defense Minister,” January 10, 2011, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/press-conf/2011/01/110110.html (accessed December 1, 2011).

108 Prime Minister Kan Naoto mentioned in the statement that “I would like to face history with sincerity. I would like to have courage to squarely confront the facts of history and humility to accept them, as well as to be honest to reflect upon the errors of our own,” and, “to the tremen-dous damage and sufferings that this colonial rule caused, I express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and my heartfelt apology,” and, “our relationship is not confined to our bilateral relations, but rather it is a partnership where we cooperate and exercise leadership for the peace and prosperity of the region and the world by encompassing a broad spectrum of agenda: the peace and stability of this region envisioning,


promise to return Korean documents and arti-facts taken by Japanese authorities during the annexation period.109 On November 16, 2010, Prime Minister Kan and ROK President Lee Myung-bak signed a bilateral accord confirming the repatriation of these documents. The Diet ratified an agreement to return stolen cultural artifacts in June 2011, scheduling the actual re-turn of the Korean cultural assets to take place over the following six months.

Despite these improvements, historical and territorial disputes between Tokyo and Seoul have not been completely resolved, a reality that has prevented both sides from elevating their se-curity cooperation to the next level. In March 2011, the Kan government authorized a junior high school textbook citing Japanese sovereign-ty over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands while, that May, three ROK opposition party lawmakers vis-ited the Kuril Islands, touching a sore spot in Japan’s territorial dispute with Russia over the is-land chain.110 That was followed by a June visit by two ROK ministers to the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands. Seoul and Tokyo protested each other’s moves through diplomatic channels,111 offsetting

among others, the future establishment of an East Asia community.” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Statement by Prime Minis-ter Kan Naoto,” August 10, 2010, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/statement/201008/10danwa_e.html (accessed November 8, 2011).

109 Ibid.110 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Minister for Foreign Affairs Mat-

sumoto Takeaki Lodges a Protest against Dr. Kwon Chul-hyun, Ambas-sador of the Republic of Korea to Japan,” May 25, 2011, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2011/5/0525_02.html (accessed De-cember 1, 2011).

111 On March 30, 2011, Japan’s Ministry of Education announced the results of a junior high school textbook examination process showing that ten geography and civics textbooks mentioned the Dokdo/Takeshima dis-pute in comparison with three textbooks in 2004. South Korean For-eign Minister Kim Sung-hwan summoned the Japanese ambassador and protested. Furthermore, the South Korean ambassador to Japan visited Foreign Minister Matsumoto Takeaki and protested, and South Korean President Lee expressed his dissatisfaction in the press conference. On the same day (April 1, 2011) of President Lee’s press conference, South Korean Minister of Education Lee Ju-Ho visited Dokdo/Takeshima. After this visit, the following South Korean ministers visited Dokdo/Takeshi-ma: Special Affairs Minister Lee Jae-Oh (April 12, 2011), Gender Equal-ity and Family Minister Paik hee-young (May 25, 2011), and Public Ad-ministration and Security Minister Maeng Hyung-kyu (June 15, 2011). On the Japanese side, Foreign Minister Matsumoto administrative vice ministers lodged a few protests with the Korean ambassador. For exam-

the sense of momentum in bilateral security co-operation after the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Is-land incidents.

The range of regional security challenges fac-ing the Kan government in the fall of 2010 pro-vided further impetus for enhancing Japan’s dip-lomatic and strategic relations with India and Australia as well. Although this approach built on some of the progress made under Prime Min-ister Hatoyama, it also led to a significant rever-sal of at least one established DPJ policy. In the party’s 2009 policy index, the DPJ criticized the 2007 U.S.-India nuclear deal as evidence of a double standard, claiming that it was inconsis-tent with U.S. nuclear policy toward North Ko-rea and Iran.112 But, eager to deepen strategic ties with India while also gaining lucrative contracts for Japanese firms, the Kan administration decid-ed to launch negotiations on civilian nuclear co-operation with New Delhi.113 This was followed by the signing of an economic partnership agree-ment (EPA) with India in October 2010, the first such trade agreement reached by a DPJ-led gov-ernment.

Similarly, the Kan administration took steps to continue deepening Japan’s strategic ties with Australia. Symbolizing this effort, Foreign Minis-ter Maehara chose a visit to Canberra in Novem-ber 2010 as his first overseas bilateral meeting.

ple, Foreign Minister Matsumoto stated on May 25, 2011, that “the visit to Dokdo/Takeshima by Ms. Paik Hee-young, Minister of Gender Equal-ity and Family, was unacceptable from the perspective of Japan’s terri-torial rights over the island, and thus it was highly regrettable.” Hana-no Yuta, “Takeshima, Senkaku Keisai ga oohabazo, chugaku kyokasho juninen haru kara” [Junior high school textbooks mention Takeshima and Senkaku more from spring 2012], Asahi Shimbun, March 31, 2011, http://www.asahi.com/national/update/0330/TKY201103300362.html (accessed November 8, 2011); “Kankoku kyoikusho ga Takeshima ho-mon kyokasho mondai de taikosochi ka” [South Korean Minister of Ed-ucation visited Takeshima as a countermeasure against the textbook issue?], Tokyo Shimbun, April 1, 2011, http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/s/article/2011040101001023.html (accessed April 1, 2011); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Minister of Foreign Affairs Matsumoto Takeaki Lodges a Protest against Dr. Kwon Chul-hyun.”

112 Democratic Party of Japan, “Minshuto Seisakushu Index 2009” [DPJ Pol-icy Index 2009], 16.

113 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Press Conference by Minister for Foreign Affairs Okada Katsuya,” June 25, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm_press/2010/6/0625_01.html (accessed Decem-ber 1, 2011).


At the meeting, the two states agreed to accel-erate negotiations over the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), to plan for a Japan-Australia “2+2” meeting some-time in 2011, and to consider a possible U.S.-Japan-Australia minister-level trilateral strategic dialogue on the sidelines of the July 2011 East Asian Summit Foreign Ministers meeting (the last trilateral strategic dialogue had been held in September 2009). The meeting ultimate-ly did not take place but working-level defense cooperation proceeded nonetheless. The three countries held a director-general-level trilateral security and defense cooperation forum (SDCF) in January 2011 (the last SDCF had been held in November 2009) and a bilateral Japan-Aus-tralia director-general-level foreign and defense meeting in April 2011.

In addition to these steps, U.S., Japanese, and Australian naval forces conducted a joint exercise in June 2010 (this joint trilateral naval exercise was the third since 2007, the last having been held in September 2009), and the Australian air force participated as an observer in a U.S.-Japan joint air force exercise in Guam in January 2011 (the first-ever trilateral air force exercise). Tokyo and Canberra also took steps to promote nuclear nonproliferation, jointly launching a new non-proliferation group in August 2010 with other non-nuclear-armed countries such as Canada, Germany, and Turkey.114

The March 11 disaster in Japan provided fur-ther opportunities to deepen cooperation and trust between Tokyo and Canberra. Australia was the only country other than the United States al-lowed to conduct a military transport operation

114 To follow up the action plans agreed at the NPT Review Conference, Ja-pan and Australia agreed to try launching a non-nuclear-armed states group including Germany, Canada, and South Korea. In September 2010, this new group held its first meeting in New York and includ-ed Australia, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. South Korea is not a member yet. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Meetings on Nuclear Disar-mament and Non-proliferation: Japan and Australia Launch a New Ini-tiative, etc.,” September 24, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/npt/upt_un65.html (accessed December 1, 2011).

inside Japan.115 Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard was also the first foreign leader to vis-it the disaster-torn areas, in April 2011. Austra-lia’s disaster relief operation, however, was initial-ly limited by the fact that the bilateral ACSA had not yet been ratified by the Diet. (Although the

ACSA was finally ratified in April 2011, the Japa-nese government still needs to revise the current MOD law in order to authorize the SDF’s coop-eration with Australia under the bilateral agree-ment. The revision of the MOD law passed in the lower house of the Diet in May 2011, but it was defeated in the upper house in Decem-ber 2011.)116

Under Prime Minister Kan, Japan’s UN pol-icy struggled to find a consistent course, falling far short of the 2009 DPJ manifesto’s call for a

115 Australia dispatched one of its four C-17 transport aircraft and provid-ed transport for the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) 15th Brigade (Naha, Okinawa) from March 14 to March 25, 2011. Australia used two more C-17s for the emergency transport of high-pressure water pumps from Australia to Yokota Air Base in response to the nuclear power sta-tion accident. Australia was the only country other than the United States to provide support to the SDF. South Korea, Thailand, Israel, and France used their military transport aircraft to deliver relief supplies, a medical team, a rescue unit, and the other equipment from their home countries to Japan. Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2011 (annual white paper), August 2, 2011, 22, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2011.html (accessed November 8, 2011).

116 A bill to revise current Defense Ministry law was delivered to the upper house Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on August 30, 2011. Since then, the bill has been stalled. When Australia supported the transport of the GSDF during the Great East Japan Earthquake, the SDF could not provide food or fuel to the Australian military because this bill had not passed in the Diet. Jiji Press, “Boeisho Secchiho, seiritsu muzukasiku, kanbujinji, Nichigo kankei ni eikyo” [A revision of Ministry of Defense law is difficult to pass in the Diet, affecting the MOD personnel reshuf-fling and Australia-Japan relations], July 24, 2011, http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=pol_30&k=2011072400089 (accessed July 24, 2011).

The range of regional security challenges facing the Kan government in the

fall of 2010 provided further impetus for enhancing Japan’s strategic

ties with India and Australia.


more proactive diplomacy under the UN ban-ner. Following up on Prime Minister Hatoya-ma’s postponed review of the existing PKO law, the Kan administration launched an interagen-cy vice-ministerial panel in October 2010 to ex-amine Japanese policies regarding the UN PKO. After ten months of studying the issue, the panel released an interim report in July 2011.117 The report provided an overview of Japan’s current UN-related policies but failed to raise substan-

tive recommendations about revitalizing Japan’s UN policy, presumably shying away from bring-ing up policy proposals that might stir further de-bate and controversy within the ruling party.118

Another key challenge for the Kan adminis-tration was finding an appropriate peacekeeping mission for the JSDF—one that would provide a meaningful contribution to international secu-rity while also assuring that the mission would meet Japan’s strict constitutional limitations on use of military force. Much attention initially fo-cused on Sudan as a potential area for a Japanese

117 Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, Cab-inet Office, “Interim Report of the Study Group on Japan’s Engagement in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” July 4, 2011, http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/info/pdf/20110711_report.pdf (accessed November 8, 2011).

118 When Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano Yukio received this report he said, “It is necessary to make a decision after holding a political-level meeting this fall.” However, after the no-confidence motion impasse in June, it was uncertain who would be the prime minister in the next few months. The senior vice minister of the cabinet office in charge of peacekeeping operations, Azuma Shozo, told the media, “I wish I could have shown more specific direction in the report, but I did not do so because political leadership is necessary to take such a direc-tion.” “PKO go gensoku minaoshi ketsuron sakiokuri” [Conclusion on the revision of the PKO Five Principles was postponed], Sankei Shim-bun, July 5, 2011, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/110705/plc11070501140006-n1.htm (accessed July 5, 2011).

peacekeeping operation. During the Kan admin-istration, Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku and Foreign Minister Okada were particularly sup-portive of a mission to Sudan, while Defense Minister Kitazawa opposed such a plan, citing the dangerous security situation in that coun-try and a preference for deploying the SDF for anti-piracy operations.119 In the end, Kan sided with Kitazawa, deciding not to dispatch the SDF to Sudan because of logistical complications.120

As an alternative to UN-led missions, Prime Minister Kan explored contributions to other global engagements, particularly those that gen-erally supported U.S.-led initiatives. However, the administration once again ran into structur-al obstacles that limited its policy options. Soon after the decision to forgo the JSDF mission to Sudan, for instance, the government began ex-amining a possible MSDF refueling operation in the waters off the coast of Somalia. Defense Minister Kitazawa was particularly supportive of this idea in light of requests by NATO, the EU, the ROK, India, and other countries for Japan to take part in such operations.121 However, the Kan administration soon realized that a revised special measures anti-piracy law would not like-ly pass the so-called twisted Diet, thus abandon-ing the mission before it was ever launched.122

119 “Sudan PKO Boeisho matta de haken dannen, chisetsu na chosei, kokusai shinyo teika ni kikikan” [Defense Minister stopped the Sudan PKO, immature policy coordination, declining international prestige], Sankei Shimbun, July 13, 2010, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/pol-icy/100713/plc1007132034021-n1.htm (accessed July 13, 2010).

120 Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku Yoshito emphasized the difficulty of inland transport operations and the lack of support systems for the he-licopter unit as the main reasons for the decision. “Sudan PKO heno Ri-kuji heri butai, haken miokuri” [The Kan administration decided not to dispatch the GSDF helicopter unit to the Sudan PKO], Yomiuri Shimbun, July 13, 2010, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20100713-OYT1T00743.htm (accessed July 13, 2010).

121 Defense Minister Kitazawa at a press conference on July 16, 2010, stat-ed, “We have been requested to dispatch a replenishment vessel. How-ever, as this requires legislative preparations, we are going to study the issue from various viewpoints in the days ahead.” Japan Ministry of Defense, “Press Conference by the Defense Minister,” July 16, 2010, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/pressconf/2010/07/100716.html (accessed November 8, 2011).

122 Defense Minister Kitazawa said at the press conference on July 23, 2010, “We have been considering various options for the SDF to play an active role in overseas and international cooperation activities, including PKO.

In response to the March 11 disaster, Operation Tomodachi demonstrated a remarkable degree of coordination and interoperability between U.S. and Japanese military forces.


The Kan government also examined opportu-nities to assist the United States and the ISAF in Afghanistan. During their November 2010 sum-mit in Tokyo, Prime Minister Kan told President Obama that his administration was considering a possible dispatch of SDF medical officers to pro-vide medical training to the Afghan military.123 Initially, the Kan administration hoped to dis-patch the medical officers without going through the legislative process of revising or drafting a new special measures law to allow the mission.124 However, this proved to be wishful thinking. As with the Sudan PKO mission, the Kan govern-ment concluded that a new law would not be pos-sible under the prevailing political conditions in the Diet.125 The targeting of Afghan military hos-pitals by pro-Taliban forces further discouraged any attempt by Kan to champion a medical dis-patch bill through the legislative process.

More than any other single event, the March 11 disaster had profound implications for the Kan government and its foreign-policy making. In some ways, the disaster, as tragic as it was, trig-gered a deepening of Japan’s ties with several na-tions that came to its assistance in the wake of the disaster. The massive U.S. military effort to pro-vide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

The replenishment activity by the MSDF is one of these options… . We haven’t decided whether or not we would dispatch the MSDF for that purpose. It is rather near-sighted to stop important international con-tribution just because the Diet has been in an incongruous situation. If the activity serves Japan’s interest in making international contribu-tion, I think we could find out a means of solution even in the incon-gruous situation of the Diet by calling on other parties to join in con-structive discussions.” Japan Ministry of Defense, “Press Conference by the Defense Minister,” July 23, 2010, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/press-conf/2010/07/100723.html (accessed November 8, 2011).

123 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting,” November 13, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/meet_pm_1011.html (accessed December 1, 2011).

124 “Afugan he boei ikan ra ju nin haken kyoiku kunren de nennai nimo” [The Kan administration considers the dispatch of ten SDF medical officers to Afghanistan for training purpose this year], To-kyo Shimbun, October 15, 2010, http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/s/arti-cle/2010101401000959.html (accessed October 15, 2010).

125 “Afugan ikan haken sakiokuri Shusho, ketsudan sakeru” [Prime Min-ister Kan postpones his decision to dispatch the SDF medical officers to Afghanistan], Sankei Shimbun, January 12, 2011, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/policy/110112/plc1101120115001-n1.htm (ac-cessed January 12, 2011).

to affected communities, dubbed Operation To-modachi, presented an opportunity for the Unit-ed States to come to Japan’s aid at a time of great distress, demonstrating to the Japanese public the depth of commitment inherent in the bilateral al-liance and proving the range of interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces during a full-fledged crisis.126 The rescue relief operations con-ducted by Australia, South Korea, and China also established a general sense of goodwill between Japan and its neighbors after what had been a tur-bulent year in regional diplomacy.

Yet the March 11 disaster, of course, also unleashed a series of other daunting challenges for the Kan government, from the radioactive leakage at the Fukushima nuclear power plant to the devastation of the Tohoku region and its resulting impact on the national economy. Adding to these problems was the Kan cabinet’s own struggle to stay on top of events and to deal with Japan’s greatest crisis since the end of World War II—all in the face of staunch political resistance from the LDP-led opposition and increasingly bitter infighting within the ruling party ranks. Given the range of domestic challenges set off by the March 11 earthquake, it seemed clear that foreign policy would not be

126 At the maximum, approximately twenty-four thousand U.S. troops, 189 aircraft, and twenty-four naval vessels were involved in the hu-manitarian assistance and relief efforts. Operation Tomodachi was the first time that SDF helicopters used U.S. aircraft carriers to respond to a crisis. Other U.S. vessels transported SDF troops and equipment to the disaster areas. Also for the first time, U.S. military units operated un-der Japanese command in actual operations. Specifically dedicated li-aison officers helped to smooth communication. One area in which U.S. troops played a key role was the reopening of airfields (Sendai airport, for instance) and ports in order to allow more supplies to be delivered to the disaster areas. The United States also stepped up efforts to assist the Japanese government to control the damaged reactors at the Fu-kushima Daiichi facility. The Marines’ Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force (C-BIRF) was deployed from the United States to pro-vide training to the SDF operating in the area of the damaged reactor. The Global Hawk drone flew over the reactor site in order to collect data and imagery for the Japanese government. For further details of the U.S. military operations at the event, see Andrew Feickert and Emma Chanlett-Avery, “Japan 2011 Earthquake: U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Response,” Congressional Research Service report for Congress, R41690, June 2, 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41690.pdf (accessed November 8, 2011).


the government’s primary focus of attention in the immediate aftermath of the disaster.

Nonetheless, the Kan administration did its best immediately following the disaster to maintain momentum in two key areas of its diplomatic agenda: the bilateral U.S.-Japan alliance relationship and trilateral relations with Japan’s most important regional neighbors, China and South Korea. In June 2011, just three months after the Great East Japan Earthquake, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (also known as the 2+2 meeting) issued a joint strategic objectives statement outlining a host of proposed policies aimed at deepening cooperation in the bilateral alliance from the near to long term.127 Reflecting the extraordinary degree of joint cooperation between the U.S. and Japanese militaries in response to the March 11 disaster, both allies emphasized plans to enhance bilateral HA/DR operations. Other points included:• Strengthening U.S.-Japan-Australia and U.S.-

Japan-ROK trilateral security cooperation• Encouraging China’s responsible and con-

structive role at both the regional and global levels, while building trust among the Unit-ed States, Japan, and China

• Encouraging India’s growing regional en-gagement and promoting U.S.-Japan-India trilateral dialogue

• Maintaining maritime security by defending the principle of freedom of navigation

• Establishing a regular bilateral extended de-terrence dialogue to promote a near- and long-term nuclear strategy

• Pursuing closer cooperation in technology and equipment sharing, with Japan prom-ising to pursue its ongoing study of interna-tional joint development and production of defense-related systems

127 Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Gates, Minister of For-eign Affairs Matsumoto, Minister of Defense Kitazawa, Joint State-ment of the Security Consultative Committee: Toward a Deeper and Broader U.S.-Japan Alliance: Building on 50 Years of Partnership, June 21, 2011, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/pdfs/joint1106_01.pdf (accessed November 8, 2011).

Prime Minister Kan also moved to sustain diplomatic engagement with China and South Korea through trilateral dialogue. In May 2011, just two months after the earthquake, Kan invit-ed the leaders of both countries to visit the disas-ter-hit areas in the Tohoku region, followed by a trilateral summit meeting in Tokyo. At the sum-mit, the three leaders discussed nuclear safety is-sues and a deepening of trilateral cooperation on renewable energy policy, disaster management, and other issues.128 Importantly, they also agreed to meet in a similar trilateral format on a regu-lar basis, with a secretariat for the trilateral meet-ings permanently based in Seoul. While the May meeting did not produce major strategic initia-tives, it can be viewed as an important first step in outlining further confidence-building mea-sures at the trilateral level.129

Despite these efforts to remain engaged in crit-ical diplomatic relations with the United States, China, and South Korea, the Kan government was unable to accomplish much else of note in the foreign policy arena in the six months be-tween the Tohoku earthquake and the prime minister’s resignation in August—somewhat un-derstandable given the magnitude of domestic challenges facing the government after March 11. Perhaps more notable was what Kan was un-able to accomplish during his fifteen-month ten-ure as a whole. Although he had entered office with renewed promises to make progress on the Futenma relocation plan his administration was unable to claim much headway on the issue in the face of continued opposition from local com-munities on Okinawa as well as his own waning political clout in Tokyo.

Another major piece of unfinished business was Prime Minister Kan’s push to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Kan’s failure to unite his party and the ruling coalition in support of

128 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Summit Declaration, May 22, 2011, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/jck/summit1105/declaration.html (accessed November 8, 2011).

129 See-Won Byun, “The China-South Korea-Japan Triangle: The Shape of Things to Come,” Asia Pacific Bulletin, no. 115, June 6, 2011, http://asia-foundation.org/resources/pdfs/ByunChinaROKJapanJune2011.pdf (ac-cessed November 8, 2011).


the proposed agreement left in some doubt the prospect of joining TPP talks at the November 2011 APEC meeting in Honolulu. Failure to join the TPP would likely be a major setback for Japan’s commercial trade interests and would leave Japan on the sidelines of the Obama administration’s banner regional trade initiative for the Pacific Rim.


The Noda Administration Shifting to the Center?

As the Noda government took over from the Kan cabinet in September 2011, the fate of these key initiatives—the Futenma relocation plan and participation in the TPP—remained in limbo amid several other pressing domestic concerns. But early signs suggested that the new prime minister might be a different kind of leader from his predecessors and is more committed to mak-ing concrete progress on both fronts. Indeed, if Hatoyama represented a tilt toward a neo-auton-omous direction for Japan, and Kan represented an incremental recalibration toward the status quo, Noda so far appears poised to make even more concrete progress toward a realist vision of Japan’s foreign and defense policies.

Unlike Hatoyama and Kan, Noda comes from the conservative wing of the ruling party, and his past record of policy positions suggests fair-ly consistent leanings toward the realist school of thought on foreign and defense issues.130 In a book that he wrote before the DPJ won the 2009 elections, for instance, Noda articulated his be-lief in the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance and in the need for a more proactive defense pol-icy.131 Soon after his election as prime minister, Noda outlined his political philosophy in a Voice magazine article, proclaiming his “adherence”

130 For further details of Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko’s preference and his past remarks on foreign and security policy, see appendixes C and D.

131 On relations with the United States, Noda writes that “there is no question that the U.S.-Japan alliance has been the cornerstone in the postwar Japanese diplomacy,” and, “at the present there is no posi-tive reason to dissolve the alliance with the U.S… . My basic stance is that the alliance should be evolved in the future.” Noda also states, “While maintaining relations with the U.S. as a cornerstone, Japan should make efforts for economic diplomacy toward the emerging states such as the BRICs. The twenty-first-century agenda for Japan is to develop an independent strategic diplomacy while achieving the balance.” Noda Yoshihiko, Minshu no Teki: Seiken Kotai ni Taigi ari [En-emies of Democracy: Great Cause in the Government Change] (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2009), especially chapter 4, “On Foreign and Security Pol-icy as the Son of an SDF Officer.”

to the U.S.-Japan alliance and arguing that the idea of an East Asian Community “need not be developed” until greater political stability emerg-es in the region.132

Noda, in turn, chose several prominent real-ists for key positions in his first cabinet. These include Maehara Seiji for the important post as seichokaicho (chairman of the Policy Research Committee), Nagashima Akihisa as the prime minister’s top foreign policy adviser, and Gem-ba Koichiro as foreign minister. Ichikawa Yas-uo stood out as the least policy-savvy member of the Noda foreign and security policy team, openly admitting his lack of experience in se-curity matters in a press interview shortly after his appointment as defense minister.133 In Janu-ary 2012, Ichikawa was replaced as defense chief by Tanaka Naoki, another relative newcomer to defense-related issues. (Soon after assuming his new position, Tanaka was harshly criticized by the LDP for making impolitic comments about the potential timetable for implementing the Futenma relocation plan.)

It remains to be seen whether this team can effectively implement its vision of a more real-ist-oriented foreign and defense policy. In a visit to Washington in September, Maehara publicly called for loosening the rules of engagement for Self-Defense Forces and lifting Japan’s ban on weapons exports.134 However, his statements did

132 Noda Yoshihiko, “Waga Seiji Tetsugaku: kono kuni ni umarete yokatta to omoeru kuni wo ikani tsukuruka” [My political philosophy: How to construct a state where we can feel happy to be born], Voice 406 (Oc-tober 2011), 44–53.

133 Japan Ministry of Defense, “Press Conference by the Defense Minister” September 5, 2011, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/press-conf/2011/09/110905.html (accessed December 1, 2011).

134 Maehara Seiji, “Japan-US Alliance in the Multilateral Cooperation” (Key-note speech, the inaugural session of the Tokyo-Washington Dialogue, “The US-Japan Alliance after 3-11” in Washington, D.C., at the Stimson Center, September 7, 2011, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Maehara_speech.pdf (accessed November 17, 2011).


not appear to have been vetted in advance by par-ty leaders, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimu-ra Osamu promptly emphasized that Maehara’s opinions did not reflect the official position of the Noda government.135 The incident was a telling example of the governing party’s ongoing mes-sage coordination problems and the resistance to any “unilateral” attempts by Maehara and oth-er likeminded lawmakers to revamp Japan’s for-eign and defense policies without broader intra-party support.

Still, the new prime minister has tried to con-vey a more resolute policy agenda. In his first policy speech before the Diet on September 13, Noda promised to make the recovery and recon-struction from the Great East Japan Earthquake the top priority of his cabinet, along with revi-talizing domestic economic growth and fiscal health.136 But the prime minister also signaled a renewed commitment to the Futenma reloca-tion plan as well as Japan’s participation in TPP talks. Calling the U.S.-Japan alliance the “cor-nerstone” of Japan’s diplomacy and national se-curity, Noda underscored the need to relocate Futenma in line with the 2006 bilateral agree-ment while considering the burden on local Okinawan communities.137 Noda also promised to “conduct thorough discussions” on whether or not to participate in early rounds of the TPP trade talks and to make a final decision by the November APEC meetings in Hawaii.138

Noda has subsequently become more invest-ed in the idea of joining the TPP, despite hard-ening opposition to the agreement from within the DPJ as well as from the main opposition par-ties. Proponents of the agreement, who appear to be the majority of cabinet ministers, believe that Japan cannot afford to pass over the TPP in the face of rising economic and strategic compe-

135 Seifu internet terebi [Government Internet TV], “Press Conference by Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu,” September 8, 2011, http://nettv.gov-online.go.jp/eng/prg/prg2340.html (accessed December 1, 2011).

136 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Policy Speech by Prime Min-ister Noda Yoshihiko to the 178th Session of the Diet.”

137 Ibid.138 Ibid.

tition, particularly vis-à-vis China.139 Opponents, headed by former agriculture minister Yamada Masahiko, see the TPP as a threat to the domes-tic agriculture sector while other lobbying inter-ests have claimed that the trade agreement could undermine Japan’s food safety standards and in-surance industry.140

The intra-party Economic Partnership Project Team was established to study the TPP and to develop some consensus within the ruling party about Japan’s commitment to the talks. However, the project team was unable to bridge the divide within the party, instead warning Prime Minister Noda to proceed cautiously in his approach to the agreement.141 After some delay, Noda announced in advance of the APEC meetings in Honolulu that Japan would enter into preliminary TPP talks with the aim of making a final decision on participation based on a consideration of Japan’s national interests.142

139 “TPP jiku ni Nichibei renkei kyoka, Shushohosakan ga igi kyocho” [Ad-visor to the Prime Minister emphasizes the importance of the TPP to strengthen the U.S.-Japan cooperation], Yomiuri Shimbun, Novem-ber 1, 2011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20111101-OYT1T00999.htm (accessed November 1, 2011).

140 After Prime Minister Kan announced that his administration would consider Japan’s participation in the TPP, some DPJ members launched an anti-TPP group called TPP wo Shincho ni Kangaeru Kai (Group for considering the TPP deliberately) with approximately 110 DPJ and PNP Diet members in October 2010. During intra-party discussions, approx-imately 120 DPJ and PNP Diet members attended the anti-TPP rally on October 21, 2011. See, for example, “Noda oroshi ni naranai? TPP shin-choha ni ondosa” [Difference inside the anti-TPP group prevents the anti-Noda movement?], Yomiuri Shimbun, October 22, 2011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20111022-OYT1T00190.htm (ac-cessed October 22, 2011).

141 Minshuto Keizai Renkei Purojekuto chimu [DPJ Economic Partnership Project Team], “Keizai Renkei Piti Teigen: APEC ni mukete” [Economic Partnership PT proposal: Toward the APEC], November 9, 2011, http://www.dpj.or.jp/article/100477/%E7%B5%8C%E6%B8%88%E9%80%A3%E6%90%BA%EF%BC%B0%EF%BC%B4%E6%8F%90%E8%A8%80%E3%82%92%E6%94%BF%E8%AA%BF%E5%BD%B9%E5%93%A1%E4%BC%9A%E3%81%8C%E4%BA%86%E6%89%BF (accessed November 17, 2011).

142 At the press conference, Prime Minister Noda said, “I have decided to enter into consultations toward participating in the TPP nego-tiations with the countries concerned, on the occasion of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Honolulu, Hawaii, which I will be attending from tomorrow. To be sure, I am fully aware that while the TPP offers significant ben-efits, numerous concerns have also been spelled out.” Prime Min-


Despite the tentative language, Noda’s an-nouncement caused an uproar among oppo-nents of the agreement both within the ruling party and the opposition, with LDP leader Tan-igaki Sadakazu threatening to censure Noda in the Diet for “prematurely” committing Japan to

the TPP talks.143 Although this threat was not carried out, enormous political obstacles remain in the way of Japan’s full participation in the TPP, including the potential Diet debate over ratification of the trade agreement once negoti-ations are completed. With the DPJ deeply di-vided over the issue, Prime Minister Noda will need to marshal considerable political support in order to take further steps toward joining the TPP regime.

On the security side, the Noda government has made efforts to shore up the U.S.-Japan al-liance relationship and to make at least some progress on the Futenma relocation plan, despite ongoing technical and political complications re-lating to the move. In order to work around the Futenma problem, Noda’s foreign policy advis-er, Nagashima Akihisa, has advocated “deepen-ing” the U.S.-Japan strategic relationship by en-

ister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Press Conference by Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko,” November 11, 2011, http://www.kantei.go.jp/for-eign/noda/statement/201111/11kaiken_e.html (accessed Novem-ber 17, 2011).

143 When members of the press told LDP President Tanigaki that some LDP members were asking for a no-confidence motion in the lower house against the Noda cabinet or a censure motion in the upper house against Prime Minister Noda, Tanigaki replied, “We will not lose that out of our sight in the future consideration.” Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, “Press Conference by LDP President Tanigaki Sadakazu,” Novem-ber 14, 2011, http://www.jimin.jp/activity/press/president/114490.html (accessed November 17, 2011).

hancing joint defense planning and operations and “widening” bilateral cooperation in such ar-eas as free trade and energy cooperation.144 This approach has led to recent measures to enhance bilateral cooperation in cyber security, missile de-fense, maritime security, and other key aspects of the alliance relationship.

Although the complexities of the Futenma is-sue continue to bedevil alliance managers, the Noda government has made a concerted effort to make progress on the relocation plans. In De-cember 2011, Tokyo submitted an environmen-tal impact study to Okinawa Governor Nakaima Hirokazu, marking a crucial step toward imple-menting the relocation plan.145 And on Febru-ary 8, 2012, Tokyo and Washington announced a decision to “delink” the relocation of Futen-ma from the proposed transfer of eight thousand Okinawa-based U.S. Marines to new facilities on Guam. This decision, in other words, would no longer make the transfer of U.S. Marines on Oki-nawa contingent on progress on Futenma—an approach that could help diffuse tensions on the island and allow for construction of the new run-way at Camp Schwab to proceed as planned. De-spite this latest move, the final implementation of the FRF is still a long way off and by no means a foregone conclusion, given the considerable political opposition that continues to complicate base realignment plans.

The Noda administration has made some headway in other security issues as well. Per-haps most surprising has been the Noda govern-ment’s early engagement of global and regional issues, particularly in overseas peacekeeping op-erations and in efforts to check China’s maritime and territorial ambitions in concert with other

144 Nagashima Akihisa (special advisor to Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko for foreign and security policy), in discussion with the author, October 5, 2011.

145 The Henoko Bay relocation plan calls for the construction of a new air-craft runway, part of which would be built on landfill. In order to be-gin construction of the landfill site, however, the central government must submit an environmental impact study to the governor of Okina-wa. After the environmental impact process has been completed, the central government will then be allowed to submit a formal request to the governor for final approval of the runway project. Koyu Suimen Umetate Ho [Public Water Body Reclamation Act of Japan], Article 42.

With the DPJ deeply divided over the TPP, Prime Minister Noda will need to marshal considerable political support in order to make further commitments to the trade talks.


regional partners. Unlike previous DPJ adminis-trations, the Noda cabinet moved almost imme-diately to commit SDF troops to international peacekeeping operations, in part to convey the nation’s gratitude to the international commu-nity for assisting in the March 11 disaster relief operations.146 The prime minister announced his pledge to contribute to peacekeeping opera-tions in South Sudan at a UN General Assembly meeting in late September 2011 and sent survey teams almost immediately in order to assess the current situation in the newly established Afri-can state.147 By October, plans were underway to dispatch a GSDF engineering unit to South Su-dan for stabilization and infrastructure-building operations over the next five years.148

Although the South Sudan mission in itself did not trigger significant political opposition, controversy has been sparked by suggestions that the Noda administration might call for re-vising the rules of engagement for the GSDF dispatch.149 Under Japan’s current rules of en-

146 Prime Minister Noda said, “We received support from over 160 coun-tries and forty international organizations following the Great East Japan Earthquake. At the General Assembly of the United Nations some time ago, I expressed our gratitude and communicated to the world our resolve to return the favors we received. Part of efforts to do this will be international peace cooperation activities… . We are now in the final stages of a study into whether we can contribute to the situation in South Sudan.” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cab-inet, “Address by Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko at the 2011 Air Re-view,” October 16, 2011, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/noda/statement/201110/16kunji_e.html (accessed November 17, 2011).

147 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Address by H.E. Mr. Noda Yoshihiko, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Sixty-Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” September 23, 2011, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/noda/statement/201109/23enzetu_e.html (ac-cessed November 17, 2011).

148 For further details on the recent status of preparing the SDF engineer-ing unit to South Sudan, see Japan Ministry of Defense, “Press Confer-ence by the Defense Minister,” November 1, 2011, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/pressconf/2011/11/111101.html (accessed November 17, 2011).

149 While Prime Minister Noda denied loosening the rules of engagement in order to consider the SDF dispatch to South Sudan, DPJ Policy Re-search Committee Chair Maehara ordered a joint Cabinet Office-Foreign Affairs-Defense divisions meeting to review the current Five Princi-ples of UNPKO, including the rules of engagement. Jiji Press, “PKO ho minaoshi honnkaku rongi, buki shiyokijun no kanwa shoten, Minshu” [DPJ begins to review the UN PKO Law and focuses on the loosening of the rules of engagement], November 5, 2011, http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=pol_30&k=2011110500197 (accessed November 5, 2011).

gagement, Japanese peacekeepers are prohibited from using their weapons except when under di-rect attack, and peacekeeping missions can only be undertaken after the close of hostilities in the host nation.150 Both of these standards may be difficult to meet in a country that is still strug-gling to contain violence and instability. A re-vision of the PKO rules of engagement would likely lead to a clash between the Noda govern-ment and the SDP, which has firmly opposed any changes to Japan’s PKO principles.151

The Noda government has also embarked on an effort to enlist India and other Asian countries in developing a common maritime security strat-egy, in part to check China’s rising assertiveness in the South China and East China Seas. At the November 19, 2011, East Asia Summit in In-donesia, Noda proposed a joint paper outlining three main principles for maritime security in East Asia: the freedom of navigation, the obser-vance of international rules and norms, and the peaceful reconciliation of territorial disputes.152

150 The International Peace Cooperation Law sets the five conditions to the SDF dispatch to the UNPKO as follows: 1) a cease-fire must be in place; 2) the parties to the conflict must have given their consent to the operation; 3) the activities must be conducted in a strictly impar-tial manner; 4) participation may be suspended or terminated if any of the above conditions ceases to be satisfied; and 5) use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect life or person of the SDF personnel. The law was revised in 2001, and the use of weap-ons is allowed to protect persons under SDF supervision and SDF weap-ons and equipment. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Current Issues Surrounding UN Peace-keeping Operations and Japanese Perspective,” January 1997, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/issues.html (ac-cessed November 17, 2011).

151 A typical SDP argument on this issue is that the missions that the SDF assumes in South Sudan can be sufficiently assumed by NGOs and pri-vate companies, and therefore it is not necessary to dispatch the SDF to South Sudan. For example, see SDF lower-house member Teruya Kantoku’s blog post on November 2, 2011, http://terukan.blog44.fc2.com/blog-entry-917.html (accessed November 17, 2011).

152 Prime Minister Noda proposed an East Asian Maritime Forum initia-tive, which aims to expand the current ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) among the ASEAN members in the ASEAN-Japan Summit and the East Asian Summit. Although the ASEAN summit made an initial draft of the ASEAN chair’s statement, asserting, “We agreed to explore the pos-sibility of convening an expanded AMF, back-to-back with the future meetings of the AMF, to include countries in the wider East Asia region,” the statement that was finally issued toned it down as follows: “We note with interest the proposal of convening an expanded AMF, back-to-back with future meetings of the AMF, to include countries in the wider East Asia region.” Kyodo News, “ASEAN Leaders Agree to Study


The proposal was preceded by several recent agreements between Japan and other regional partners—most of whom have existing maritime territorial disputes with China—to enhance mar-itime security cooperation. These include a No-vember agreement between Japan and India to conduct joint naval exercises in 2012 as well as new agreements with Vietnam and the Philip-pines to enhance strategic cooperation.153

Thus, at this early stage, the Noda administration has made some impressive first steps to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance, bolster Japan’s commitment to regional trade and security institutions, and increase contributions to UN-mandated peacekeeping operations. The question is whether his government will be able to follow through and sustain these commitments over the mid- to long term in the face of ongoing political challenges. Indeed, several of Noda’s proposals, such as the decision

‘Expanded’ ASEAN Maritime Forum,” November 18, 2011, as reported at the Mainichi Shimbun website, http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/international/archive/news/2011/11/18/20111118p2g00m0in047000c.html (accessed November 18, 2011); “Joint Declaration for Enhanc-ing ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership for Prospering Together (Bali Declaration),” Bali, Indonesia, November 18, 2011, http://www.ase-ansec.org/documents/19th%20summit/JP-JD.pdf (accessed Novem-ber 19, 2011); Hanzawa Naohisa “Nihon no Chugoku hoimo ha fuhatsu, shin kaiyo foramu sakiokuri, Noda shusho no koso minorazu” [Japan’s effort to encircle China failed, new maritime forum was postponed, Prime Minister Noda’s initiative did not launch], Sankei Shimbun, No-vember 19, 2011, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/111119/plc11111923490008-n1.htm; and http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/111119/plc11111923490008-n2.htm (accessed November 19, 2011).

153 Although China has claimed that its rise is peaceful and different from the rise of past great powers, China’s assertive behavior in the South China and East China Seas in 2010 began to cause its neighbors to question this avowal. In addition to the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands in-cident in September 2010, Chinese maritime activities in the South China Sea led to tense relations with ASEAN states, especially the Phil-ippines and Vietnam. Since then, maritime cooperation among ASE-AN states has expanded, and in the face of direct territorial disputes with China the ASEAN states have sought stronger ties with non-ASEAN states, such as the United States and India. Also, various trilateral stra-tegic partnerships (for example, U.S.-Japan-Australia and U.S.-Japan-India) have been strengthened. At the bilateral level, Japan and the Philippines agreed to the further promotion of a strategic partnership along with the upgrade of vice-ministerial policy dialogue to vice-min-isterial strategic dialogue in September 2011. In October 2011, Japan also agreed to strengthen the strategic partnership and promote stra-tegic dialogue with Vietnam.

to join TPP, are likely to deepen rifts within the DPJ and to galvanize the opposition. The prime minister started off with fairly high public approval ratings (at or above 50 percent), but these have slumped as he has begun pushing for an unpopular consumption tax. Other contentious issues, such as the Futenma relocation plan and continuing problems with the recovery of the Tohoku region, present formidable challenges for the government that may use up much of the new prime minister’s already limited political capital. Japan, under the Noda government, may finally be on the cusp of achieving a more “proactive” diplomacy—one that is more grounded in the realist vision than the DPJ initially intended—but this will depend on the prime minister’s ability to navigate the complex political landscape that has bedeviled his two predecessors.


Findings and Implications

In many ways, the past two years of DPJ foreign-policy making have played out far differently than either the party’s supporters or detractors might have expected. For those who supported the DPJ’s soaring rhetoric of a revamped Jap-anese diplomacy with closer ties to Asia and a more equal partnership with the United States, the track record of achievements over the past two to three years must be something of a disap-pointment. The DPJ has largely failed to live up to many of its ambitious promises. For critics of the party, however, the DPJ has not been the un-mitigated disaster that some predicted. The DPJ has not fundamentally tilted Japan away from the United States toward a more accommodat-ing strategic relationship with China and the Asian mainland. In short, the big change that some anticipated after the DPJ’s takeover of the government in 2009 did not materialize accord-ing to expectations.

Instead, the DPJ’s policy-making track record shows that its rhetoric has often outstripped reality, both in terms of what the new government was prepared to do to implement its vision and the structural obstacles that limited its policy options. Time and again, Prime Minister Hatoyama evoked the idea of an East Asian Community, but his efforts to achieve that goal were perfunctory at best. Similarly, the DPJ’s rhetoric of a “proactive” UN-centered diplomacy far exceeded what the DPJ-led government actually committed to UN-mandated operations, which, on the whole, has been minimal. Party leaders never clarified what was meant by the DPJ’s vague calls for a more “equal” or “mature” alliance with the United States, so it is difficult to determine categorically whether this goal was unmet. Nonetheless, it is safe to conclude that the U.S.-Japan alliance has not been transformed by a vastly more assertive Japanese diplomacy over the past several years.

Although the DPJ may not have achieved its lofty campaign goals, the party’s actions during its years of governing have provided sufficient material for empirical observations and conclusions about the DPJ’s foreign-policy making, some of which challenge widely held assumptions that were made prior to the party’s coming to power in 2009. The ruling party’s behavioral trends may, in turn, have implications for Japan’s future diplomatic and strategic direction under the DPJ, as well as for the U.S.-Japan alliance, as outlined below.

The Impact of Structural Obstacles on DPJ Foreign-Policy MakingAlthough some analysts predicted that the DPJ’s grandiose foreign policy proposals would be tempered by structural limitations, the extent to which this would influence the DPJ’s foreign policy could only be determined after the par-ty had had a chance to govern. As seen over the past two years, these structural factors—both in-ternal and external—have had a significant ef-fect on the DPJ’s foreign policy, both limiting the new ruling party’s policy options and at times forcing it to be far more reactive vis à vis external events than its “proactive” campaign rhetoric may have suggested.

Almost from the outset, the new ruling party faced a two-front war: attempting to keep the party together despite deepening intra-party divisions (particularly between pro- and anti-Ozawa groups) and managing a complex combination of coalition partners in the face of a resurgent LDP-led opposition. These internal domestic factors have repeatedly stymied the DPJ’s ability to follow through on bold campaign promises and to dramatically transform Japan’s foreign policy, and they are likely to further complicate the government’s ability to implement policies that are of importance to the


United States, such as full participation in the TPP and looser restrictions on exercising the right of collective self-defense.

External obstacles have proved just as formidable. On one hand, the DPJ found that its attempts to change the decision-making dynamic in the U.S.-Japan alliance met with considerable resistance from the Obama administration, which was eager to move forward on the 2006 base realignment roadmap and other bilateral security initiatives. On the other hand, the new government in Tokyo found that its diplomatic overtures to Beijing did not pay off in terms of a noticeably improved Sino-Japanese relationship.

Further, no Asian country appeared eager to rally behind Hatoyama’s call for a new East Asian Community. In the end, the international community proved unwilling partners in the DPJ’s grand design for transforming Japanese diplomacy in the post-LDP era.

By the same token, tensions in the regional security environment have compelled the DPJ to cooperate more closely with the United States despite its initial attempts at a more “independent” foreign policy. North Korea’s provocations in 2010, coupled with the Senkaku/Diaoyutai dispute with China, have highlighted to DPJ leaders the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance—a point that was further reinforced by the U.S. military’s critical role in carrying out disaster relief operations following the March 11 earthquake. Thus, as much as the DPJ has attempted to reduce Japan’s strategic dependence on the United States, external events have forced the new ruling party to rethink its aspirations for a new dynamic in the bilateral relationship.

Continuity versus Change

Since coming to power, the DPJ has grappled with the imperative to differentiate itself from the LDP. In general, the more it has tried an anything-but-LDP approach, the more it has seemed to create problems for itself. This has been the case with the DPJ’s attempts to reform both Japan’s policies and its policy-making pro-cess. As the first DPJ prime minister, Hatoyama Yukio tried to accomplish these two objectives simultaneously, leading to a near breakdown in the delicate decision-making equilibrium be-tween politicians and bureaucrats and to major alliance management problems with the Unit-ed States.

Having learned from these hard lessons, Prime Minister Hatoyama’s two successors gradually toned down the ruling party’s reform agenda. Prime Minister Kan, a far less visionary leader than his predecessor, initially took a more pragmatic approach to governing, ratcheting down lofty foreign policy statements and rolling back some of the institutional reforms that had hampered the previous administration’s decision-making process. However, when faced with the two serious crises of his administration—the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Island dispute and the March 11 triple disaster—Kan reverted to some of the DPJ’s old habits, such as keeping bureaucrats out of the prime minister’s immediate decision-making circle. This no doubt contributed to some of the confusion that plagued his administration after the March 11 disaster and that eventually led to his downfall.

Prime Minister Noda has so far shown a willingness to forgo the DPJ’s agenda for change in favor of more coordinated policy implementation. One symbol of this shift is the role of the seichokai (Policy Research Committee), which Prime Minister Hatoyama abolished as part of his initial reform measures. Recognizing the need for a consensus-building mechanism, Prime Minister Kan reinstated the seichokai, albeit with a limited mandate. Prime Minister Noda has now arguably strengthened

The DPJ’s track record shows that its rhetoric has often outstripped the reality of its policy implementation.


the committee under the leadership of Maehara Seiji, giving it a broader mandate to address a range of priority issues. This, along with the Noda government’s reintroduction of top-level bureaucratic policy coordination, suggests that his administration has to some degree come to terms with the DPJ’s long-held aversion to LDP-era governing practices.

It remains to be seen whether this trend continues beyond the Noda cabinet. But it seems clear that with each successive DPJ government the imperative to differentiate itself from the LDP diminishes—a point that is reinforced by the increasingly obvious demand by Japanese voters for a government that places a higher priority on competence over change, particularly as the nation continues to grapple with the aftereffects of the March 11 disaster.154 That is not to say that the slide toward LDP-style governing will go hand-in-hand with improved policy making per se. The LDP system certainly had its flaws, including a weak top-down decision-making structure and an overreliance on bureaucrats for policy-making initiative. Thus the question is whether the DPJ can decide on which LDP institutions and practices work best and which should be eliminated or improved upon given Japan’s current political and administrative system (the seichokai’s ultimate role in the DPJ’s policy-making process will be one indication of how the ruling party confronts this issue over time).

As to how the change agenda applies to foreign policy, it appears that the DPJ is increasingly comfortable embracing the status quo and accepting the fact that some aspects

154 For example, according to a November 2011 Yomiuri Shimbun poll, 76 percent of the Japanese public believes the state of Japanese politics has deteriorated. The three main reasons for this decline were given as: 1) politicians being out of touch with public concerns; 2) slow deci-sion making; and 3) the inability of politicians to present a future vision for the country. Respondents also indicated their desire for politicians to have the following three characteristics: 1) resolve; 2) leadership; and 3) common sense. “Seiji: Nisen juichi nen juichi gatsu mensetu ze-nkoku yoron chosa” [Politics: November 2011 national public poll by interview], Yomiuri Shimbun, November 12–13, 2011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/fe6100/koumoku/20111125.htm (accessed De-cember 16, 2011).

of its world vision are beyond reach, at least for the time being. Prime Minister Noda’s recent comments about putting off the pursuit of an East Asian Community, for instance, illustrate the relinquishment of one of the DPJ’s long-held diplomatic goals.155 This trend should help ease anxieties in Washington of further drift in the bilateral alliance and restore some degree of predictability to the DPJ’s overall foreign policy approach, including its diplomatic engagement toward China.

The DPJ’s toned-down foreign policy agenda also creates opportunities for greater overlap with LDP policy priorities, such as loosening Japan’s arms export bans and reconsidering SDF restrictions on the use of force in international peacekeeping operations. Although the ruling and opposition camps are at loggerheads on virtually every domestic legislative item, a nascent bipartisanship has emerged on some aspects of Japanese foreign and defense policy. Still, the anti-LDP strain runs deep in the party’s self-image and it seems optimistic to assume that this aversion has run its course after just a few years in power. In all likelihood, the tension between continuity and change will remain an undercurrent in DPJ internal debates for the foreseeable future, leaving it far from a foregone conclusion that the DPJ will continue to adhere to the status quo ad infinitum.

The DPJ: A Hawkish Party?The DPJ’s initial emphasis on change and re-form belies the fact that some of its policies and initiatives have been carried over from previous LDP governments. The DPJ has actually adopt-ed a handful of initiatives that were launched by the LDP but never fully implemented or com-pleted. This trend has occurred most notably in the defense realm, where the DPJ has shown a hawkish streak when it has come to protecting Japan’s sovereign territory and direct national in-terests. In retrospect, this may not have been so

155 Noda Yoshihiko, “Waga Seiji Tetsugaku: kono kuni ni umarete yokatta to omoeru kuni wo ikani tsukuruka” [My political philosophy: How to construct a state where we can feel happy to be born].


surprising given the party’s past legislative be-havior but, because of its label as a left-of-cen-ter party, it may have been assumed that the DPJ would be dovish on security issues once it came to power.

As some experts have pointed out, even while in the opposition, the DPJ occasionally support-ed LDP initiatives to bolster Japan’s ability to de-fend its national interests from outside threats.156 In 2007 and 2008, for instance, the DPJ cooperat-ed with the LDP to pass the Basic Acts on Ocean Policy and Space, which strengthen Japan’s de-fenses on the high seas and in outer space.157 And key figures in the DPJ were supportive of the LDP’s efforts to engage in anti-piracy operations to protect shipping lanes in the Gulf of Aden.158 Indeed, once in power, the Hatoyama govern-ment moved expeditiously to complete Japan’s first overseas military facility, in Djibouti, which was a carry-over of former LDP Prime Minister Aso Taro’s initiative to protect critical shipping lanes off the Somali coast. Another example is in the 2010 NDPG, which built on many of the recommendations made by the LDP’s Katsuma-ta Commission in August 2009, including the notion of a “dynamic defense” policy that would strengthen the JSDF’s ability to prevent threats from directly reaching Japan. In some cases, the DPJ has exceeded the LDP’s standard operating procedures for protecting Japan’s territorial in-terests. The Kan government’s detention of the Chinese fishing boat captain during the Septem-ber 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyutai crisis was an un-precedented response to such an incident, raising complaints from Beijing that Tokyo was violating a tacit agreement on handling such disputes.159 156 Easley, Kotani, and Mori, “Electing a New Japanese Security Policy?”157 Ibid.158 Political support for the anti-piracy operations was made all the eas-

ier by the fact that the operations were relatively uncontroversial—indeed, popular—among Japanese voters. An Asahi Shimbun public opinion poll taken in 2009 found that 61 percent of respondents sup-ported the SDF anti-piracy mission, compared to just 26 percent who opposed them. Asahi Shimbun Public Opinion Poll, April 20, 2009, http://www.asahi.com/special/08003/TKY200904200328.html (ac-cessed January 30, 2012).

159 Jiji Press, “Senkaku tanaage goi hitei wo hihan, Chugoku gaimusho” [Chinese Foreign Ministry criticized the Japanese denial to the past Senkaku/Diaoyutai back-shelf agreement], October 26, 2010, http://

Although Tokyo eventually released the fishing boat captain under intense diplomatic pressure, the Kan government’s initial reaction to the inci-dent appeared to signal a more robust response to China’s territorial challenges. The 2010 NDPG plan to shift military assets from the northeast end of the Japanese archipelago to the southeastern islands is another indication of the DPJ govern-ment’s interest in fending off China’s perceived territorial encroachment.

Yet, there are limits to how far the DPJ has been willing to extend the boundaries of Ja-pan’s security commitments, especially when it has come to security issues that are less tangi-bly linked to Japan’s national interests. One area where the DPJ has fallen short of its campaign pledges is in Japan’s contributions to UN-mandat-ed international peacekeeping operations. The party had long argued for UN-centered diploma-cy and a more “proactive” engagement of peace-keeping operations. However, once in power, the DPJ’s commitment to these operations was less than impressive. Although the Hatoyama govern-ment was quick to dispatch SDF troops to Haiti to assist in reconstruction efforts in the wake of that nation’s earthquake in January 2010, the rul-ing party until recently prevaricated on a more dangerous peacekeeping mission to South Su-dan. Some 258 SDF personnel are currently de-ployed on UN peacekeeping operations, a far cry from the “proactive” contribution that the DPJ promised while campaigning against the LDP.160

The DPJ’s reluctance to expand overseas SDF deployments has had implications for the U.S.-Ja-pan alliance, particularly in the context of broad-ening the scope of the alliance beyond region-al security concerns. Prime Minister Hatoyama’s

www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=pol_date1&k=2010102600988 (accessed Oc-tober 26, 2010). The South China Morning Post, a Hong Kong-based newspaper, reported that China was becoming more aggressive on the territorial disputes. Cary Huang, “Diaoyus Row Marks Shift in Beijing’s Diplomatic Posture; Growing Power Emboldens China to Be More Ag-gressive,” South China Morning Post, October 2, 2010, LexisNexis Aca-demic.

160 United Nations Peacekeeping, The Ranking of Military and Police Con-tributions to UN Operations: Monthly Report, October 31, 2011, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2011/oct11_2.pdf (ac-cessed December 16, 2011).


withdrawal of the JMSDF’s refueling mission in the Indian Ocean in 2009 signaled an abrupt end to Japan’s contributions to coalition forces en-gaged in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). As an alternative, Tokyo pledged $5 billion in fi-nancial support for the stabilization and recon-struction of Afghanistan but it has held off putting “boots on the ground” in any U.S.-led military ac-tivities in Central Asia and the Middle East. As some experts have surmised, the DPJ has been less enthusiastic about pursuing a “global alli-ance” with the United States, as was the thrust of recent LDP defense policies.161

Instead, the DPJ has arguably been more will-ing to strengthen the bilateral alliance in areas that have a direct bearing on the defense of Ja-pan and its national interests than on matters be-yond the strict purview of the bilateral security treaty. The impasse over Futenma aside, Tokyo has made steady progress on a range of initia-tives to enhance bilateral cooperation in ways that improve the allies’ ability to defend the Jap-anese homeland from potential external threats. These include, for instance:• The joint production and deployment of the

SM-3 Block IIA missile defense program that can protect against missile attacks from the Asian mainland

• The Noda government’s decision in Decem-ber 2011 to relax Japan’s arms export rules to allow for greater joint development of weap-ons systems

• New bilateral measures to improve cyber-se-curity cooperation in the wake of recent hack-ing incidents targeting Japanese government agencies and defense contractors

• The launch of a regular bilateral extended deterrence dialogue to address North Korea’s nuclear threat

• The recent announcement that Japan will purchase approximately forty Lockheed Mar-tin F-35 Joint Strike Fighters as its next-gen-eration fighter jet162

161 Easley, Kotani, and Mori, “Electing a New Japanese Security Policy?”162 “Delivery Concerns Cloud F-35 Jet Pick / Fears U.S. Deadline Vow Could

Be Scuttled by Production Delays, Impact of Euro Crisis,” Yomiuri Shim-

To be sure, these measures benefit both allies, but the DPJ’s willingness to deepen military cooperation with the United States suggests that the party has for the time being placed national security interests above its pursuit of greater “independence” from its long-time security guarantor.

Bilateralism vs. MultilateralismThe DPJ’s increased concern for national secu-rity since becoming the main ruling party has also had implications for Japan’s diplomatic re-lations with its Asian neighbors. As the ruling party has confronted several security challeng-es since taking power, the DPJ appears to have modified its aspirations for regional multilater-alism. Given its past rhetoric, some observers wondered if the new DPJ government would fundamentally shift its strategic diplomacy away from a U.S.-centric model (bilateralism) toward a broader regional approach (multilateralism). Prime Minister Hatoyama fed this impression with his repeated calls for an East Asian Com-munity but, as argued, this vision never evolved

into actual policy. Aside from a somewhat per-functory effort at regional institution-building, two other main factors appear to have impeded the DPJ’s attempts at forging a new multilateral framework for Asia.

First, the DPJ appeared to put great stock in using historical reconciliation as a means of improving overall diplomatic relations with

bun, December 15, 2011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T111214004545.htm (accessed December 16, 2011).

The DPJ has been more willing to strengthen the bilateral alliance

to protect direct national interests than to expand its role in a “global

alliance” with the United States.


other Asian nations that had long been skeptical of Japan’s strategic intentions. To its credit, the DPJ has, on the whole, been more forthright in dealing with lingering historical problems than the LDP. The fact that no sitting DPJ cabinet minister has visited the controversial Yasukuni Shrine has eliminated at least one source of tension between Japan and its key neighbors, China and South Korea. And the DPJ’s concrete efforts to atone for Imperial Japan’s annexation of Korea must be acknowledged as an important step forward in the overall improvement in ROK-Japan ties.

Nevertheless, these gestures did not produce the diplomatic breakthrough that the party may have expected when it pledged to “establish mutual relations of trust with China, South Korea and other Asian countries as a step towards creating an ‘East Asian Community.’”163 Almost from the start, Beijing responded tepidly to Tokyo’s call for an EAC. And while Seoul has appreciated Japan’s renewed commitment to address the history problem, inconsistencies in Japan’s efforts to resolve lingering historical disputes have also led to mounting frustration in South Korea.164 In the end, historical reconciliation has proved to be neither a panacea for Japan’s regional diplomatic challenges nor a rallying point for the creation of a new Japan-led regional order.

A second impediment has been the recent series of regional crises and tensions that have set back momentum toward region-wide strategic cooperation in Northeast Asia. Although North Korea’s provocations over the past few years have deepened trilateral cooperation among Japan, South Korea, and the United States, they have also appeared to further bifurcate the region between the U.S.-led camp and China, Russia, and North Korea. (The succession of North Korean leadership from Kim Jung-il to his son, Kim Jung-un, in December 2011 may have further implications for regional diplomacy

163 Democratic Party of Japan, “2009 Change of Government.”164 The DPJ government’s authorization of controversial Japanese history

textbooks, for instance, has rekindled a public backlash in South Ko-rea.

that are yet to be revealed.) Additionally, China’s recent display of geopolitical assertiveness, including its heavy-handed response to the Senkaku/Diaoyutai incident, has put Japan and other Asia-Pacific nations on the alert regarding Beijing’s ultimate strategic intentions. As anxiety over Beijing’s actions has risen, DPJ leaders have appeared more concerned about coping with China rather than cooperating with it in the context of creating a new regional order.

Even if the DPJ has, for the time being, given up on the idea of building an overarching regional institution, it has remained active in existing multilateral institutions and in other efforts to diversify its network of strategic partners. Japan, for instance, has continued to be actively engaged in a range of multilateral forums and institutions, from its hosting of the APEC summit in 2010 to its leadership role in promoting maritime rules and norms at the recent ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Bali. And Tokyo has eagerly pursued a series of strategic dialogues and partnerships, including the U.S.-Japan-India trilateral dialogue held in late 2011. Yet none of these activities in the multilateral arena appears aimed at loosening Japan’s strategic ties to the United States. On the contrary, as the set of trilateral dialogues with South Korea and Australia suggest, Japan is strengthening and diversifying its strategic partnerships largely within the framework of the U.S. alliance system.165 In sum, the DPJ has not seriously attempted to shift from bilateralism to multilateralism, at least in any form that would indicate a radical departure from Japan’s traditional diplomatic and strategic posture.

That is not to say, however, that the DPJ has completely abandoned its attempts to improve ties with Asia through regional integration. Many party leaders still seek to redefine Japan’s regional diplomacy as a means of coping with China’s rise and, in part, to hedge against a perceived decline of U.S. strategic engagement in Northeast Asia.

165 One notable exception is the new Japan-ROK-China trilateral dialogue. However, the thrust of this dialogue has so far been aimed at enhanc-ing confidence-building measures rather than pursuing alternative se-curity arrangements to replace the U.S. alliance network in Asia.


This “new Asianism” could, over time, take the form of a new regional security structure (including South Korea, Australia, India, and Vietnam) that would seek to manage China’s rise in a cooperative regional framework.166 But achieving this goal would require the kind of persistent diplomatic effort and attention that DPJ leaders have so far failed to exhibit, either as a result of their own leadership deficiencies or the aforementioned internal and external structural obstacles that have inhibited the DPJ from achieving many of its previously stated foreign policy objectives. Further, given the party’s ongoing political challenges at home, it remains to be seen whether its position as a ruling party will last long enough even to attempt such an ambitious diplomatic goal.

Competing Schools of ThoughtShould the DPJ manage to survive as a ruling party, Japan’s future diplomatic direction will likely be shaped and colored by one or another of the foreign policy schools of thought within the party. This report has asserted that four main foreign policy schools of thought have emerged as influential forces within the party: realists (those who want a strengthened defense poli-cy and U.S.-Japan alliance), pacifists (those who want to maintain constitutional restrictions on security policy and do away with the U.S.-Japan alliance), centrists (those who do not have deep foreign policy convictions but who lean toward the realist school by default), and neo-autono-mists (those who want a strong defense policy in order to gain greater strategic independence from the United States).

In some ways, the DPJ’s learning curve on for-eign policy has followed the trajectory of these four schools of thought as it has transitioned from an opposition party to a ruling party. The DPJ is, to some degree, rooted in the pacifist school, as many old guard party members formerly be-longed to the left-of-center Socialist Party. Their

166 Daniel Sneider, “The New Asianism: Japanese Foreign Policy under the Democratic Party of Japan,” Asia Policy, no. 12 (July 2011): 99–129.

viewpoints were reflected in the DPJ’s “Basic Pol-icies,” which promised a foreign and national se-curity policy held “in accordance with the [Japa-nese] Constitution’s pacifism.”167 When the DPJ was an opposition party to the ruling right-of-center LDP, the pacifist line was a useful coun-terpoint to the LDP’s more hawkish position on military activities. Thus, the pacifist vision be-came amplified in the DPJ’s political message as it sought to overthrow the LDP government.

But the DPJ is not a monolithic ideological entity and, once it came to power, leaders from the other schools of thought began to influence the tone, if not the direction, of Japan’s diplomat-ic endeavors. Indeed, each of the last three DPJ prime ministers has left his own distinct stamp on Japan’s diplomatic and strategic approach based, in part, on his particular worldview.

Prime Minister Hatoyama, for instance, pur-sued the neo-autonomist vision of a less de-pendent and deferential relationship with the United States. But his vague notions of an alter-native, yuai (fraternity), diplomacy proved unre-alistic amid rising regional security challenges and tensions with Washington over the Futen-ma relocation plan. His successor, Kan Naoto, largely abandoned the attempt to change the sta-tus quo by recasting the U.S.-Japan alliance on a more “equal” footing, choosing instead to take a centrist approach. Prime Minister Noda now espouses the most overtly realist vision of any DPJ leader to date, effectively abandoning the idea of an East Asian Community and seeking broader and deeper strategic ties with the Unit-ed States and other likeminded nations in order to cope with China’s rising clout in regional and global affairs.

It may appear that with each succession of leaders the DPJ has shifted toward an increasing-ly realist-oriented foreign policy. While this may be true thus far, the question is whether it rep-resents a long-term trend or a temporary swing of the ideological pendulum. As mentioned, no one school of thought dominates the others, nor do their members tend to coalesce into formal

167 Democratic Party of Japan, “Basic Policies.”


party factions based on foreign policy positions per se. This suggests that Japan’s foreign policy approach could be subject to continued fluctua-tions, as leaders of various groups rise and fall in the party hierarchy and as Japan’s political land-scape continues to be in flux.

On the other hand, generational change within the DPJ leadership may turn out to play some role in shaping a more consistent foreign and security policy over the long run. Although the DPJ may be grounded in the pacifist tradi-tion by its old-guard members, many younger-generation DPJ lawmakers are either neutral on

foreign policy matters or lean toward the more assertive foreign policy positions favored by the realist and neo-autonomist camps.168 This may be a reflection of the broader generational shift occurring in Japan, as the pacifist values of the older postwar generation give way to a young-er cohort of Japanese that has fewer inhibitions about national power and Japan’s role on the world stage.

Indeed, it has been a relatively young cohort of DPJ lawmakers, such as Maehara Seiji, Na-gashima Akihisa, and Noda Yoshihiko, who have largely spearheaded recent improvements to Ja-pan’s security policy, such as the 2010 NDPG and the relaxation of Japan’s arms export rules. As this cohort of lawmakers continues to fill the top ranks of the party leadership it may gradually outweigh the influence of old-guard party mem-bers who maintain Japan’s pacifist norms. When allied with centrists in the ruling party, members of the realist camp could continue to improve Japan’s foreign and defense policies over time.

168 Interview with DPJ Diet member, August 12, 2010.

That is not to say that everything that realists hope to change will necessarily be in line with U.S. priorities or policy preferences. Even the staunchest supporters of the U.S.-Japan alliance have, at times, differed with Washington on key policy issues, such as the Futenma relocation plan. Nor should U.S. alliance managers assume that they have more to fear from neo-autono-mists than from realists. Both groups ultimate-ly share a desire for a stronger Japan that can stand on its own two feet more or less indepen-dently from the United States169—the main dif-ference being that neo-autonomists aim to reach that goal far sooner than their counterparts in the realist camp.170

The fact that the realists and neo-autono-mists—perhaps the two most aspirational foreign policy groups within the ruling party—both ulti-mately seek greater independence from the Unit-ed States poses unique challenges for U.S. policy makers. On one hand, the task for U.S. officials is to reassure realists (who fear a sudden aban-donment by the United States) that Washington will remain committed to its security commit-ments in the Asia-Pacific well into the future. On the other hand, they must convince neo-auton-omists (who fear entrapment in a U.S.-led glob-al order that they perceive to be in decline) that the United States is still a global leader and a re-liable force for peace and prosperity around the world. Although by no means mutually exclu-sive, these two tasks will require consistent lead-

169 In response to Ozawa Ichiro’s comment that the United States military should, with the exception of the Seventh Fleet, withdraw from Japan, Maehara stated, “The direction [of Ozawa’s idea] is correct but he did not mention the time schedule. When North Korea launches a missile, Japan has no ability to deal with it on its own. It is important to build trustworthy relations with the U.S.” “Ozawa shi, hikeshini yakki beigun shukusho hatsugen de tonaigai, anpo rongi kasoku” [Ozawa tries to negate impact of his remarks on USFJ reduction, but only heightens security debate inside and outside the DPJ], Sankei Shimbun, Febru-ary 27, 2009, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/situation/090227/stt0902272129008-n1.htm] (accessed February 27, 2009). The com-ment suggests some sympathy for the idea of reducing Japan’s strate-gic dependence on the United States.

170 According to a top DPJ foreign policy aide, realists in the party are more willing to cooperate with the United States until the time comes when Japan can stand on its own militarily. Author interview, November 15, 2011.

Each DPJ prime minister has left his own distinct stamp on Japan’s diplomacy based, in part, on his particular worldview.


ership from Washington and careful diplomacy by U.S. policy makers and officials charged with managing bilateral relations with Japan.

In particular, as has been frequently men-tioned since the DPJ rose to power, U.S. offi-cials need to diversify and broaden their contacts within the party. Familiarity between U.S. offi-cials and members of the DPJ, although much improved since the DPJ’s ascension to power, is still relatively thin compared to the close work-ing relationships that were developed across the Pacific during the LDP’s half-century of ruling-party dominance. Not only must U.S. officials deal with a relatively new cast of counterparts in Tokyo, but they must also reach out to the ideologically diffuse intra-party groups that make up the ruling party. It is especially important for U.S. officials to expand their outreach to DPJ lawmakers who are most skeptical of U.S. pol-icies, such as those who belong to the pacifist and neo-autonomist camps. Convincing these groups to become more supportive of U.S. pol-icies will not be easy, but a more hands-off ap-proach precludes the possibility of developing stronger working relationships with key elements of the ruling party down the road.

Ultimately, though, it is the purpose and va-lidity of U.S. policies that stand the best chance of persuading detractors in the DPJ that the U.S.-Japan partnership is worthy of their support. The United States must earn the respect of Japanese leaders and others who may doubt its relevance as a global leader or a force for good on the world stage. Getting America’s own house in order—both in terms of its domestic political situation and its economic regeneration—is a fundamen-tal element in winning the respect of those who doubt its leadership. Further, the United States must continue to honor its commitments to re-gional and global norms and institutions that support the common good as well as internation-al peace and stability. A perceived withdrawal from these basic commitments would severe-ly harm U.S. credibility and lend greater con-fidence to critics in Japan and elsewhere who

question America’s continued relevance and leadership in the international community.


Conclusion

All this is to say that the DPJ’s policy outlook is by no means static, and another challenge for U.S. officials will be to keep the bilateral alli-ance on a steady course through what is like-ly to be a prolonged period of political change and uncertainty in Tokyo. After a promising start, Prime Minister Noda is already beginning to suffer from some of the domestic political dif-ficulties that weakened his two predecessors. At this writing, his public approval ratings have slipped to the high 30s, amid widespread criti-cism that the prime minister has not clearly ar-ticulated his policy vision, including plans to raise the domestic consumption tax, boost do-mestic economic growth, and rebuild the dev-astated Tohoku region. With the Noda cabinet opposing the consumption tax increase in late March 2012, the prime minister appears to be preparing for a major legislative battle in the Diet and a possible general election in the com-ing months. That could lead to either the revi-talization or the demise of his administration, not to mention his party.

Despite the continuing political uncertain-ty in Tokyo, the U.S.-Japan alliance appears on more stable ground than it did two years ago when the DPJ first came to power. To its cred-it, the Noda administration has made impressive progress of late to enhance bilateral defense co-operation with Washington, agreeing to purchase the U.S.-built next-generation F-35 fighter, to ex-pand bilateral cooperation in cyber-security mea-sures, and to relax Japan’s long-held restrictions on arms exports to allies. The extraordinary bilat-eral cooperation following the March 11 disaster has also demonstrated the depth of interopera-bility and coordination that now exists between the two allies.

But while these are important improvements in bilateral relations, two key tests for the alliance await a final outcome. The first is a final resolu-

tion of the seemingly intractable Futenma prob-lem. Although the Noda government has taken important steps to move the relocation process along, many more hurdles remain in the way of implementing the FRF plans, not least of which is the hardening local opposition on Okinawa. Nor is this entirely a Japanese problem. In light of the impasse over the FRF, as well as mount-ing budgetary concerns, the U.S. Congress sus-pended funding for the transfer of some Marine units from Okinawa to Guam in the 2012 de-fense appropriations bill. The decision to delink the Guam transfer from the Futenma relocation process may provide some flexibility around the problem, but a full resolution of the Futenma is-sue still appears well beyond the immediate ho-rizon, if it is to be achieved at all.

Should the Futenma relocation plan eventu-ally break down without a viable alternative in place, serious questions would arise about the strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance and of the sustainability of forward-deployed U.S. forces in Japan. In a broader context, the failure to re-solve a relatively mundane, if complex, alliance management issue such as Futenma would cast a dark shadow over the credibility of the bilateral alliance as the cornerstone of the U.S. strategic presence in the Asia-Pacific, in turn triggering a ripple of anxiety from Seoul to Canberra. Few in the ruling camp in Tokyo appear to have con-sidered the consequences of such an outcome, including what that would mean for Japan’s se-curity outlook.

Another important test on the horizon is the question of Japan’s formal participation in the TPP, the Obama administration’s flagship eco-nomic initiative for the Asia-Pacific region. Al-though mainly a regional trade mechanism, the TPP would also underpin America’s strategic engagement in the region, particularly among close allies and partners such as Japan. The trade


agreement could serve as the foundation of a re-vamped alliance between Japan and the Unit-ed States, both broadening and deepening the scope of their bilateral engagement. Failure to join the TPP would therefore represent a major setback for U.S.-Japan cooperation in regional economic and strategic affairs.

Indeed, the TPP figures to be a significant economic component of the Obama adminis-tration’s Asia policy, and should Japan succumb to domestic opposition and fail to join it, more doubts are likely to arise about the long-term sa-lience of the U.S.-Japan partnership. Even at this early stage of the TPP debate, the agreement is an extremely divisive issue within the DPJ, pit-ting anti-reform forces against free-trade advo-cates such as Prime Minister Noda. Assuming the TPP talks eventually reach the signing and ratification phase, the issue could reach a polit-ical boiling point that could well tear the party apart once and for all.

The stakes are all the higher since the Obama administration’s announcement in late 2011 of a strategic “rebalance” toward the Asia-Pacific re-gion. 171 After years of involvement in the Middle East, the administration is hoping to refocus U.S. engagement in a region that it considers to be of vital long-term national interest. The Asia-Pacif-ic is also home to more immediate security con-cerns such as potential instability on the Korean Peninsula and China’s rapidly growing military muscle. The refocus on Asia does not just call for a unilateral expansion of U.S. strategic com-mitments but for a broader level of cooperation with friends and allies throughout the region. And as the United States government grapples with mounting budgetary challenges, it is like-ly to seek greater burden-sharing arrangements with these nations.

As America’s foremost ally in Asia, Japan bears an implicit expectation that it will be a key partner in this endeavor. Japan, after all, is still home to the largest U.S. military presence in the region and remains a major trade partner

171 U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priori-ties for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf (accessed February 3, 2012).

of the United States. The bilateral alliance has been the linchpin of security in the Asia-Pacific for the better part of the last half-century, providing a foundation for regional peace and prosperity. For the most part, the two allies see eye-to-eye on a broad range of international rules and norms, from climate change to economic development and nuclear nonproliferation. And the two governments have been close partners in international forums and institutions such as the United Nations, APEC, and the ASEAN Regional Forum.

All of these factors point to a bilateral part-nership that is fundamentally solid and that has a potential to deepen and expand much further. Two years ago, as the DPJ first came to power, this partnership was in question as some feared Japan’s potential tilt away from the United States. Today, those fears of a fundamental stra-tegic shift have subsided, but new questions have

arisen about the DPJ leadership’s ability to over-come domestic political hurdles—including its own budgetary problems—in order to enhance and deepen bilateral cooperation. Complicating matters, of course, are the internecine political battles that continue to threaten the ruling par-ty’s political survival and to inhibit consensus-building toward a coherent foreign policy vision for Japan. Until these obstacles are overcome, the DPJ will likely fall short of its most ambi-tious foreign policy aspirations and continue to frustrate U.S. attempts to elevate bilateral coop-eration to higher levels of regional and global engagement.

Despite continuing political uncertainty in Tokyo, the U.S.-Japan alliance

appears more stable than it did two years ago—although major challenges

face both allies over the future.


APPENDiX A: Impact of Major Events on Cabinet Approval Ratings

%

%

Cabinet Approval Ratings

Combined Yomiuri and Asahi Cabinet Approval/Disapproval Ratings

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Yomiuri Shimbun Asahi Shimbun

disapproval approval

1/13/12

12/10/11

11/12/11

10/15/119/2/11

8/6/117/9/11

6/11/116/5/11

5/16/114/16/11

2/19/111/15/11

12/11/10

11/13/109/4/10

8/7/107/3/10

6/26/106/19/10

6/12/106/8/10

6/2/105/31/10

5/15/104/17/10

3/13/102/20/10

2/5/101/16/10

12/19/09

11/14/09

10/11/099/16/09

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

1/13/12

12/10/11

11/12/1110/7/11

9/2/118/5/11

7/1/116/3/11

5/13/114/1/11

3/4/112/1/11

1/14/1112/3/10

11/5/1010/1/10

9/17/109/3/10

8/28/108/6/10

7/12/107/2/10

6/25/106/18/10

6/12/106/8/10

5/29/105/7/10

4/2/103/5/10

2/5/101/16/10

1/8/10

12/18/0912/4/09

11/6/0910/2/09

9/16/09

PM Noda takes o�ceDPJ takes power

PM Kan takes o�ce

DPJ Presidential Election

Cabinet Reshu�e

No-con�dence vote fails

PM Hatoyama delays Futenma decision

PM Hatoyama resigns

Consumption tax, UH election

Senkaku Incident March 11 Disaster

Tense intra-party debate on TPP and consumption tax


0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

%

%

Which party would you vote for in the next election?

SOURCE: Asahi ShimbunDPJ LDP

Which party do you support?

8/16/117/16/11

6/16/115/16/11

4/16/113/16/11

2/16/111/16/11

12/16/10

11/16/10

10/16/109/16/10

8/16/107/16/10

6/16/105/16/10

4/16/103/16/10

2/16/101/16/10

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

8/16/119/16/11

7/16/116/16/11

5/16/114/16/11

3/16/112/16/11

1/16/11

12/16/10

11/16/10

10/16/109/16/10

8/16/107/16/10

6/16/105/16/10

4/16/103/16/10

2/16/101/16/10

12/16/09

11/16/09

10/16/099/16/09


APPENDiX B : The 2010 NDPG Process

The Kan administration adopted the new Na-tional Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) on December 17, 2010, with the main purpose of publicly presenting Japan’s basic national secu-rity policy, the role of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), the SDF’s structure, and the procure-ment target for defense capabilities over the next five years. The previous NDPG, adopted in 2004, stipulated that a revision be issued in 2009, and the Aso Taro LDP-led administration did receive the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities Report (the Katsumata report) in August 2009.172 However, following the DPJ’s electoral victory, the Hatoyama administration decided to postpone issuing a new NDPG until December 2010, and it launched the Sato Com-mission, a panel of experts, in February 2010 to kick off the process.

After six months of discussion, the Sato Com-mission submitted the report Japan’s Visions for Future Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era: Toward a Peace-Creating Nation (the Sato Report), in August 2010.173 In September, the Kan administration authorized the Securi-ty Council of Japan (SCJ, or anzenhosho kaigi), an official government body of nine ministers, to begin drafting the guidelines to present to the cabinet. In a separate effort, an unofficial body of four ministers involved with national se-curity also worked on the NDPG. At the party level, the DPJ Foreign Relations and Security Research Committee under the DPJ Policy Re-search Committee (the seichokai) initiated in-tra-party discussions in October 2010 to develop the party’s policy proposals for inclusion in the new NDPG.

During the process of creating the Sato Com-mission’s report, University of Tokyo Professor

172 The full final report is available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ampobouei2/090928houkoku_e.pdf.

173 The full final report is available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/shin-ampobouei2010/houkokusyo_e.pdf.

Matsuda Yasuhiro (an expert in Sino-Taiwanese relations) reportedly wrote the initial draft, Kyo-to University Professor Nakanishi Hiroshi (a re-alist scholar of international politics) revised the draft, and Shiraishi Takashi, president of IDE-JETRO (Institute of Developing Economics - Ja-pan External Trade Organization) and an expert on international relations in Asia, finalized the draft.174 Of the Sato Commission, only Nakan-ishi and Kato Ryozo (former ambassador to the United States) had also been members of the 2009 Katsumata Commission. While the Kat-sumata Commission had been led by realist-ori-ented scholars (University of Tokyo Professors Kitaoka Shinichi and Tanaka Akihiko), the Sato Commission included several regional-studies scholars; middle-power diplomacy advocate So-eya Yoshihide also served on the commission.175

The Sato Commission’s report differed from the Katsumata Report in terms of the commis-sion’s makeup, the more regional focus of the policy recommendations, and the more explic-it departure from the Basic Defense Force Con-cept (BDF Concept), but it also had much in common with the Katsumata Report.176 For ex-ample, the Katsumata Report did not complete-ly rule out the possibility of a massive invasion threatening Japan’s survival, but the Sato Report made it clear that such a situation is unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future. The Sato Re-port also added to the Katsumata Report’s list of contingencies addressed by the SDF, such as

174 Mainichi Shimbun, December 4, 2010, http://mainichi.jp/select/sei-ji/archive/news/2010/12/04/20101204ddm003030185000c.html; http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/archive/news/2010/12/04/20101204ddm001030183000c.html.

175 Kaneko Masafumi, “Tekikakuna Shishin Shimeshita Shinanpokon Hoku-kusho” [The new security expert panel report that provided the ef-fective guidelines], PHP Policy Review 4, no. 35, September 10, 2010, http://research.php.co.jp/policyreview/pdf/policy_v4_n35.pdf.

176 Jinbo Ken, “Shinboeitaiko to Aratana boeiryoku no koso” [New NDPG and new defense force initiative], Gaiko [Diplomacy] 5 (January 2011):109–18.


cyber attacks, cruise missile strikes, emergen-cy evacuation operations of Japanese nationals, contingencies in areas surrounding Japan, and pandemics. Although there are these differenc-es, both reports more or less overlapped in such areas as abandoning the BDF Concept, trans-forming the defense structure to deal with com-plex contingencies (by adopting the dynamic deterrence concept), expanding overseas SDF deployments, reconsidering the traditional con-stitutional interpretation on exercising the right of collective self-defense, and revising the five principles of the PKO Law.

Sato Commission members also reported-ly paid significant attention to the 2010 Qua-drennial Defense Review Report, a report of U.S. Department of Defense’s long-term strategy and priorities, released in February 2010.177 In the 2010 QDR report, the joint AirSea Battle Con-cept (ASBC) was emphasized as a way to coun-ter growing Chinese military’s anti-access/area denial capabilities.178 The dynamic deterrence concept in the Sato Report also focuses on the build-up of naval and air operational capabili-ties, and it reportedly reflects the ASBC concept in the 2010 QDR.179

The Kan administration’s SCJ started work on the new NDPG in September 2010, on the same day that Prime Minister Kan defeated Ozawa Ichiro in the DPJ presidential election. Kan presided over the SCJ, which was made up of eight ministers.180 The SCJ held nine meetings

177 The full final report is available at http://www.defense.gov/qdr/im-ages/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf.

178 For China, anti-access/area denial would seek to deny U.S. force-pro-jection capabilities in the event of a conflict. For the United States, the AirSeaBattle Concept entails integrating all U.S. military assets to es-tablish and maintain force-projection capabilities. A key component of this strategy is dispersing U.S. military assets around the region and enhancing base defense measures. For more details for the ASBC, see the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments website, http://www.csbaonline.org/2006-1/index.shtml, and Jose Carreno, Thom-as Culora, Captain George Galdorisi, U.S. Navy (Retired), and Thom-as Hone, “What’s New about the AirSea Battle Concept?” Proceedings 135, no. 8 (August 2010), http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceed-ings/2010-08/whats-new-about-airsea-battle-concept.

179 Mainichi Shimbun, December 4, 2010.180 The eight ministers on the SCJ were Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku

Yoshito, then-Finance Minister Noda Yoshihiko, Foreign Minister Mae-

on the new NDPG, and the unofficial group of four national-security-related ministers (Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku, Finance Minister Noda, Foreign Minister Maehara, and Defense Minister Kitazawa) held seven meetings.181 This group of four was the first to produce a draft NDPG, aided by scholars such as Kitaoka Shinichi (a leading member of the Katsumata Commission) in cooperation with bureaucrats from the Cabinet Secretariat and the Ministry of Defense. One of the drafts written by Kitaoka during these meetings reportedly included the loosening of arms export bans. In the past, the SCJ was often criticized for rubber-stamping drafts of the NDPG prepared for by bureaucrats. But this time, the NDPG process was reportedly politician-led, particularly under the auspices of the four ministers’ meetings. 182

In the party-wide debate on the new NDPG, key members on the DPJ Foreign Relations and Security Research Committee included Nakagawa Masaharu, Nagashima Akihisa, Kira Shuji, Oono Motohiro, and Mimura Kazuya.183 Although it was difficult to reach a consensus because of opposition by the party’s pacifist members, the Research Committee was able to submit a proposal to the Kan administration (including, for example, the loosening of arms export bans) by agreeing to attach a separate document spelling out the opinions of the

hara Seiji, Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi, Chairman of the Nation-al Public Safety Commission Okazaki Tomiko, Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications Katayama Yoshihiro, Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry Ohata Akihiro, and Minister of Land, Transport, Infrastruc-ture, and Tourism Mabuchi Sumio.

181 Lawmaking and Research, Research Unit Report of the Upper House Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, February 2011, http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/annai/chousa/rippou_chousa/backnumber/2011pdf/20110201062.pdf.

182 Toonippo, December 17, 2010, http://www.toonippo.co.jp/tokushuu/danmen/danmen2010/1217.html; Foreign Minister Maehara’s press conference, December 17, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm_press/2010/12/1217_01.html; Nagashima Akihisa blog, January 11, 2011, http://blog.goo.ne.jp/nagashima21/e/9ef59a2d26e771a3c1422e0595eeb7a1.

183 Official blog of Oono Motohiro, December 10, 2010, http://ameblo.jp/oonomotohiro/entry-10732223618.html; Policy Research Committee, final proposal, http://ameblo.jp/oonomotohiro/entry-10732220381.html and http://ameblo.jp/oonomotohiro/entry-10732221791.html.


Society of Liberals (Riberal no Kai, a liberal intra-party group).

While emphasizing deeper cooperation with the United States and its allies, the final product of the new NDPG presented the following key Japanese national security policy directions: 1) the adoption of a dynamic defense force concept; 2) the strengthening of SDF capabilities in Japan’s southwestern islands; 3) the establishment of an organization in the Prime Minister’s Office for inter-ministerial national security policy coordination and advisory function to the prime minister; 4) review of an appropriate defense equipment procurement policy to deal with international changes (i.e., loosening of the arms export ban principles); and 5) the review of an appropriate Japanese participation at the UN PKO.184

While it can be pointed out that the core proposals outlined in the Sato Report (and presumably the Kitaoka draft) are basically in line with the realist school of thought, there are still some important differences between the Sato Report and the new NDPG. For example, the Sato Report’s policy recommendations in favor of revising the arms export ban and participating in joint international weapons development, revising the interpretation of the constitutional right of collective self-defense, and the future revision of Japan’s three non-nuclear principles were greatly toned down or excluded in the final draft of the new NDPG.185 These changes diluted some of the improvements to Japan’s defense policy that the realist camp in the party hoped to achieve.

184 The full NDPG is available at http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agen-da/guideline/2011/index.html.

185 Matsuda Yasuhiro, a member of the Sato Commission, also makes a similar point in his article, “Yasuhiro Matsuda, Japan’s National Se-curity Policy: New Directions, Old Restrictions,” Asia Pacific Bulletin, no.95, February 23, 2011, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/de-fault/files/private/apb095.pdf.


APPENDiX C: Survey Data of DPJ Foreign Policy Viewpoints

Empirical data illustrating individual DPJ members’ foreign policy viewpoints is hard to come by in open source materials. However, two sets of surveys were taken of DPJ members prior to recent general elections that shed some light on the various foreign and security policy positions held by individual party members. The table below includes survey data of policy viewpoints taken from twenty-nine DPJ politicians identified in this study as having relatively senior and/or influential positions within the party. The first three questions were part of a Mainichi Shimbun survey taken of election candidates at the time of the 2009 lower house election186 and the 2010 upper house election.187 The last five questions were asked by the Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo survey at the time of 2009 lower house election.188 The questions, such as whether or not to revise Article 9 of Japan’s “peace constitution” and whether Japan should have a more active military, provide some indication of whether certain DPJ members are hawkish or dovish on these issues. Since similar surveys have not been conducted since the 2010 upper house election it is possible that some Diet members have subsequently

186 Mainichi Shimbun, 2009 lower house election special, http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/09shuinsen/area/. All DPJ lawmakers except for Kitaza-wa Toshimi and Ichikawa Yasuo were surveyed in this poll.

187 Mainichi Shimbun, 2010 upper house election special, http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/10saninsen/.

188 Website of the Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo joint survey, http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atpsdata.html .

changed their positions on certain policy issues. However, when combined with more recent comments and statements, it may be possible to gain some impression of how each Diet member stands (or once stood) on particular policies, and which schools of thought they might belong to according to this analysis. (The table begins on the next page. A blank entry indicate sno response to the question; “N/A” indicates that the Diet member was not up for reelection at the time of the survey.)


Mainichi Shimbun Survey Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo SurveyDo you support the revision of Article 9 of the Constitution?

Japan’s diplomatic posture: U.S.-Japan Alliance-oriented or Asia- oriented

Should Japan dispatch the SDF to Afghanistan?

Should Japan strengthen its defense capabilities?

Should Japan not hesitate to pre-emptively attack when an enemy attack is imminent?

Should Japan exercise the right of collective self-defense?

Should the SDF be more active in UN activities?

Japan’s diplomatic posture: U.S.-Japan Alliance-oriented or UN-centric

Likely foreign policy school of thought

Edano Yukio Cannot tell Should hesitate No Cannot tell Cannot tell CentristFujimura Osamu Asia- oriented No Basically no Basically should

hesitateCannot tell Basically yes Basically UN-

centricCentrist

Gemba Koichiro Yes Alliance-oriented No Basically yes Basically should not hesitate

Basically yes Basically yes U.S.-Japan Alliance Realist

Hata Tsutomu No Alliance-oriented No Cannot tell Basically should hesitate

Cannot tell Cannot tell UN-centric Pacifist

Hatoyama Yukio Cannot tell Should hesitate Basically no Cannot tell Basically U.S.-Japan Alliance

Neo-Autonomist

Haraguchi Kazuhiro

Basically yes Cannot tell No Basically no U.S.-Japan Alliance Centrist

Hirano Hirofumi Yes Alliance-oriented No Cannot tell Basically should hesitate

Cannot tell Basically yes Cannot tell Centrist

Hiraoka Hideo No Asia-oriented No No Should hesitate No Basically no Basically UN-centric

Pacifist

Hosono Goshi (multiple answers)

No Yes Basically should hesitate

Cannot tell Cannot tell Cannot tell Realist

Ichikawa Yasuo N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A CentristKaieda Banri Asia-oriented No CentristKanNaoto

Cannot tell Cannot tell Basically no Cannot tell U.S.-Japan Alliance Centrist

Kano Michihiko No Alliance-oriented No Cannot tell Basically should hesitate

Basically no Cannot tell U.S.-Japan Alliance Centrist

Kawabata Tatsuo No Asia-oriented No Basically yes Cannot tell Cannot tell Basically yes Basically U.S.-Japan Alliance

Neo-autonomist or Centrist

Kitazawa Toshimi No N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A CentristKondo Shoichi No Asia-oriented No Basically no Should hesitate No Cannot tell Basically UN-

centricPacifist

KoshiishiAzuma

No N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Pacifist

Mabuchi Sumio Yes Yes Yes Basically should not hesitate

Basically yes Basically yes Basically U.S.-Japan Alliance

Realist

Maehara Seiji Yes Alliance-oriented Yes Yes Should not hesitate

Yes Basically yes U.S.-Japan Alliance Realist

Matsumoto Takeaki

Yes No Basically yes Cannot tell Cannot tell Basically yes Cannot tell Centrist

Nagashima Akihisa

Yes Basically yes Basically should not hesitate

Yes Cannot tell U.S.-Japan Alliance Realist

Nakagawa Masaharu

Yes Asian-oriented Yes Basically no Basically should hesitate

Cannot tell Neo-Autonomist

Noda Yoshihiko Yes Alliance-oriented No Cannot tell Cannot tell Basically yes Basically yes Basically U.S.-Japan Alliance

Realist

Okada Katsuya Yes No Cannot tell Basically should hesitate

No Yes Basically U.S.-Japan Alliance

Neo-Autonomist

Ozawa Ichiro No Alliance-oriented No No Should hesitate Yes Cannot tell Neo-Autonomist

Ozawa Sakihito Cannot tell Basically should hesitate

Cannot tell Cannot tell Basically U.S.-Japan Alliance

Neo-Autonomist


Mainichi Shimbun Survey Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo SurveyDo you support the revision of Article 9 of the Constitution?

Japan’s diplomatic posture: U.S.-Japan Alliance-oriented or Asia- oriented

Should Japan dispatch the SDF to Afghanistan?

Should Japan strengthen its defense capabilities?

Should Japan not hesitate to pre-emptively attack when an enemy attack is imminent?

Should Japan exercise the right of collective self-defense?

Should the SDF be more active in UN activities?

Japan’s diplomatic posture: U.S.-Japan Alliance-oriented or UN-centric

Likely foreign policy school of thought

Saito Tsuyoshi No Asia-oriented No Basically UN-centric

Pacifist

SengokuYoshito

Yes Asia-oriented No Basically no Basically should hesitate

Basically no Basically yes Centrist

TarutokoShinji

Yes (multiple answers)

Basically yes Basically should not hesitate

Basically yes Basically yes Basically U.S.-Japan Alliance

Neo-autonomist

Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi

No Asia-oriented No No Basically should hesitate

Basically no Cannot tell U.S.-Japan Alliance Neo-Autonomist

Yokomichi Takahiro

No Asia-oriented No No Should hesitate No Basically no Basically UN-centric

Pacifist


APPENDiX D: Profiles of Key DPJ Politicians

The following analysis provides brief foreign pol-icy profiles of twenty key DPJ lawmakers associ-ated with the first and second Noda cabinets. The profiles include Diet member respons-es to survey questionnaires on foreign and na-tional security policies as well as relevant public statements and comments made to the media and posted on official member websites. Based on this combination of information, each pro-file concludes with a “best guess” assessment of what foreign policy school of thought that partic-ular lawmaker appears to identify with the most (realist, pacifist, centrist, or neo-autonomist).189 Three sets of surveys are cited in this study: 1) a questionnaire conducted by the Koso Nippon Japan Initiative “Clear and Present Danger” sur-vey in October 2001;190 2) an Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo survey conducted at the time of the 2009 lower house election;191 and 3) two Mainichi Shimbun surveys conducted during the 2009 lower house election192 and the 2010 upper house election.193 The Koso Nippon Japan Initiative survey, although somewhat dat-ed, provides some indication of DPJ members’ attitude toward the United States by asking how Japan should have responded to the September 11 terrorist attacks (i.e., whether Japan should cooperate with the United States, whether Japan should deploy SDF troops to Afghanistan, what long-term value the U.S.-Japan alliance has to Japanese interests, and how Japan should man-age the alliance in the future). Both the Asa-hi Shimbun/University of Tokyo survey and the

189 See “The DPJ’s Foreign Policy: Competing Visions,” earlier in this report, for a description of each foreign policy school of thought.

190 Koso Nippon Japan Initiative, “Clear and Present Danger” survey, Octo-ber 2001, http://db.kosonippon.org/question/data.php?id=7#cts.

191 Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo joint survey website, http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atpsdata.html.

192 Mainichi Shimbun, 2009 lower house election special, http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/09shuinsen/area/.

193 Mainichi Shimbun, 2010 upper house election special, http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/10saninsen/.

Mainichi Shimbun survey provide a snapshot of how individual DPJ lawmakers view certain foreign and security policies at the time of the 2009 and 2010 national elections, asking, for in-stance, whether lawmakers prefer a U.S.-Japan alliance-centric, UN-centric, or Asia-centric di-plomacy for Japan. Responses to questions about revising constitutional restrictions on the right of collective self-defense, and whether Japan should preemptively strike enemy bases in the event of an imminent attack, provide a sense of how hawkish or dovish each lawmaker is on se-curity issues (see appendix C for a list of the sur-vey questions).

Edano Yukio(Minister of economy, trade, and industry, sixth term, lower house, born in 1964, a leading member of the Maehara group)Edano’s political stock rose after the March 11 disaster, in which he became the lead spokes-man for the Kan administration’s response to the crisis. Since then, his popularity has risen and he has been mentioned as a potential future prime minister.194 However, his public views on foreign and security policies remain unclear. According to the 2001 Koso Nippon Japan Ini-tiative survey, Edano basically supported the idea of providing military support to the United States in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. On the U.S.-Japan security treaty, Eda-no acknowledged its role in providing for region-al stability, although he expressed concern that it came at the cost of Japan’s diplomatic and stra-tegic independence. Edano also expressed his support for the revision or dismantlement of the

194 For example, “Naikaku seito shiji to kanren mondai: nisen juichi nen hachi gatsu denwa zenkoku yoron chosa” [Cabinet and political parties’ approval ratings and related issues: August 2011 national public poll], Yomiuri Shimbun, August 8, 2011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/fe6100/koumoku/20110808.htm (accessed January 17, 2012).


current U.S.-Japan security treaty in the future, but did not present his idea of an alternative se-curity arrangement.195 In the Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo and Mainichi Shimbun sur-veys in 2009, Edano was vague about whether Japan’s diplomatic stance should be U.S.-Japan alliance-centric, UN-centric, or Asia-oriented. While he opposed Japan’s use of preemptive at-tacks and the revision of the traditional consti-tutional interpretation on the right of collective self-defense, he did not clearly express his stance on the revision of Article 9, the SDF dispatch to Afghanistan, the increase of Japan’s defense ca-pabilities, or SDF participation in UN activities. In his public statements, Edano has acknowl-edged the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance but has advocated a strict interpretation of the bilateral security treaty in order to avoid entan-glement in U.S.-led military activities.196 Edano is also known for his tough stance on China. As chairman of the bipartisan Diet Members’ Group for Considering the Tibet Problem, Eda-no drafted a statement condemning Beijing’s crackdown on Tibetan demonstrators in 2008, saying that his group would not welcome Chi-nese President Hu Jintao to Japan if the situa-tion in Tibet were to continue to deteriorate.197 After the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands incident in September 2010, Edano severely criticized Chi-na, calling it “a menacing neighbor” that could not be trusted in the same way that Japan trusts the United States and South Korea.198 Based on the above information, it appears that Edano has relatively conservative foreign policy views, al-though these are not well formulated enough to classify him as a classic realist. Nor has he been vocal enough about his concerns about entrap-

195 Koso Nippon Japan Initiative. “Clear and Present Danger” sur-vey, http://db.kosonippon.org/statesman/statesman_answer.php?eid=7&sid=1101.

196 Open meeting with Edano Yukio, April 24, 1999, http://www.edano.gr.jp/archive/om/9904om.html.

197 Edano Yukio Email Newsletter 192, March 19, 2008, http://www.eda-no.gr.jp/enews/e-news192.html.

198 Yomiuri Shimbun, “Chugoku wa ashiki rinjin, hochishugi nashi” [Chi-na is a menacing neighbor and lacks rule of law], October 2, 2010, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20101002-OYT1T00660.htm (accessed October 2, 2010).

ment with the United States to count him as an archetypal neo-autonomist. Therefore, it ap-pears that Edano can best be considered a mem-ber of the centrist camp.

Fujimura Osamu(Chief cabinet secretary, sixth term, lower house, born in 1949, a leading member of the Noda group)Fujimura is known as a close aide to Prime Min-ister Noda Yoshihiko. Although Fujimura’s pol-icy interests include education, health, labor, and welfare, his own views on foreign and secu-rity policies remain relatively obscure. Accord-ing to the Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo and the Mainichi Shimbun surveys in 2009, Fujimura favored an Asian-oriented diploma-cy over the U.S.-Japan alliance as Japan’s ideal diplomatic posture, while basically supporting a UN-centric approach over the U.S.-Japan al-liance. Fujimura basically supported the poten-tial revision of the Japanese constitution, but did not express his position on the revision of Article 9 per se. Although Fujimura supported a revi-sion of the traditional constitutional restrictions on the right of collective self-defense, he was op-posed to the idea of an SDF deployment to Af-ghanistan. On his official website, Fujimura has made few remarks on foreign and security policy issues, and he describes himself as primarily an education policy expert.199 Based on this infor-mation, it appears that Fujimura can best be de-scribed as a centrist, with occasional indications of pacifist or neo-autonomist leanings.

Gemba Koichiro(Minister of foreign affairs, sixth term, low-er house, born in 1964, leader of the Gemba group200)

199 Official website of Fujimura Osamu, http://www.o-fujimura.com.200 Asahi Shimbun, “Gemba shi ni chikai giin sanju nin benkyokai, guru-

pu hassoku tono kansoku mo” [Approximately 30 DPJ members close to Gemba launch a study group and expectedly become his own fac-tion], March 9, 2011, http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0309/TKY201103090475.html (accessed January 17, 2012).


Gemba had a relatively low profile before his stint as foreign minister, but media polls typical-ly include his name on the list of possible next prime ministers.201 While Gemba’s policy exper-tise includes financial affairs and internal affairs, his views on foreign and security policies are not widely known. According to the Koso Nippon Japan Initiative survey in 2001, Gemba strong-ly supported Japan’s assistance to U.S. military actions following the September 11 terrorist at-tacks. Gemba acknowledged that the U.S.-Japan security alliance has several benefits, such as limiting Japan’s defense expenditures and pro-viding regional stability and support for free and open economic activity. Gemba indicated sol-id support for maintaining the current U.S.-Ja-pan security treaty. His views on security policy have generally been hawkish, as he has support-ed constitutional revisions to assure Japan’s right to preemptively counter imminent threats and to exercise the right of collective self-defense.202 In the Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo and the Mainichi Shimbun surveys in 2009, Gem-ba chose the U.S.-Japan alliance over both UN centrism and Asia-oriented diplomacy as Ja-pan’s ideal diplomatic posture. Although basi-cally supporting an increase in Japan’s defense capabilities, as well as expanded SDF peace-keeping missions, he was opposed to dispatch-ing SDF troops to Afghanistan. As a relatively conservative lawmaker, Gemba has expressed some reluctance to apologize for Japan’s annex-ation of Korea, although he has acknowledged the need to improve Japan-ROK strategic ties to cope with regional security threats.203 Given his fairly hawkish and conservative viewpoints, it ap-pears that Gemba belongs to the realist school of thought.

201 For example, “Naikaku seito shiji to kanren mondai: nisen juichi nen hachi gatsu denwa zenkoku yoron chosa” [Cabinet and political par-ties’ approval ratings and related issues: August 2011 national public poll], Yomiuri Shimbun, August 8, 2011.

202 Koso Nippon Japan Initiative, “Clear and Present Danger” sur-vey, http://db.kosonippon.org/statesman/statesman_answer.php?eid=7&sid=1241.

203 Press conference by Minister Gemba, Cabinet Office, Government of Ja-pan, August 10, 2010, http://www.cao.go.jp/minister/1006_k_gen-ba/kaiken/2010/0810kaiken.html (accessed January 17, 2012).

Hirano Hirofumi

(Minister of education, culture, sports, science, and technology and former chief cabinet sec-retary, fifth term, lower house, born in 1949, a leader of the Hirano group204 as well as a leading member of the Hatoyama group)Hirano became prominent under the Hatoyama administration, when he was made chief cabinet secretary and the point man for reviewing the Futenma relocation plan. Under the Noda ad-ministration, Hirano initially served as chair of the DPJ Diet Affairs Committee and a member of the cabinet and DPJ top-three leaders’ meet-ing (seifu minshu sanyaku kaigi), the key policy decision-making entity in the Noda administra-tion. When Noda reshuffled his cabinet in Jan-uary 2012, Hirano was appointed education minister and was removed from the cabinet and DPJ top-three leaders’ meeting. Despite his se-niority, his views on foreign and security policies are relatively unknown. According to the Asa-hi Shimbun/University of Tokyo and Mainichi Shimbun surveys in 2009, Hirano chose the U.S.-Japan alliance over Asia-oriented diploma-cy as Japan’s ideal diplomatic posture; howev-er, he did not state his preference between the U.S.-Japan alliance and UN centrism. In the surveys, he supported the revision of Article 9, but opposed the SDF dispatch to Afghanistan and preemptive attack of enemy bases. While he basically supported UN-related SDF dispatches, he did not express his opinion on the increase of Japan’s defense capabilities. Hirano seemed to take issue with former Foreign Minister Okada’s remark that an East Asian Community should exclude the United States, suggesting that the U.S.-Japan alliance be “the cornerstone” of any regional order.205 Hirano recently stated that “Hatoyama’s idea of an East Asian Community 204 “Hirano zen kanbo chokan ga shin guru-pu setsuritsu, niju san nin

sanka, Yushi-kai” [Former Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano launches a new group “Yushi-kai” with 23 DPJ members], Sankei Shimbun, De-cember 1, 2010, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/situation/101201/stt1012012359015-n1.htm (accessed December 1, 2010).

205 “Nichibei kankei kijiku ga zentei, Kanbochokan, gaisho hatsugen nit suite” [On foreign minister’s remarks, chief cabinet secretary says Japan-U.S. relations are the linchpin], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, October 8, 2009,


was a politician-led attempt to overcome friction with neighboring countries and to embrace ec-onomically dynamic Asia as a source for Japan’s own economic growth.”206 Hirano’s comments suggest that he is mainly a centrist, although his close association with Hatoyama may align some of his positions with the neo-autonomist camp.

Hiraoka Hideo(Chairman of the DPJ Administration Com-mittee and former minister of justice in the first Noda cabinet, fifth term, lower house, born in 1954, a member of the Kan group and a lead-ing member of Riberal no Kai (the Society of Liberals)207)Hiraoka served as justice minister in the first Noda cabinet but was replaced in the cabinet reshuffle in January 2012. Hiraoka is widely con-sidered a member of the left wing of the DPJ although, in the Koso Nippon Japan Initiative survey, Hiraoka basically agreed with Japan’s support for U.S. military action in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks (he also sup-ported deploying the JSDF to assist the United States in this regard). Hiraoka’s survey response indicated his recognition of the role that the U.S.-Japan alliance plays in providing for re-gional stability, although he cautioned against the bilateral alliance getting entangled in inter-national conflicts. Hiraoka stated his support for keeping the JSDF at a minimal level of strength necessary to defend the nation from attack, but he did not indicate his opinion on revising Ja-pan’s restrictions on exercising the right of col-lective self-defense.208 In the 2009 newspaper surveys, Hiraoka chose both Asia-oriented di-

http://www.nikkei.co.jp/news/seiji/20091008AT3S0800J08102009.html (accessed October 8, 2009).

206 Hirano Style 17, December 2010, http://www.hhirano.jp/pdf/style-17.pdf.

207 “Minshuto tonai jinmyaku zu” [Map of the DPJ intra-party human net-works], Mainichi Shimbun, January 2012, http://mainichi.jp/select/sei-ji/graph/minsyujinmyaku/14.html, (accessed January 17, 2012).


plomacy and UN centrism over the U.S.-Japan alliance as Japan’s ideal diplomatic posture. He opposed the revision of Article 9, the revision of traditional constitutional interpretations on col-lective self-defense, the SDF dispatch to Afghan-istan, enhancing Japan’s defense capabilities, preempting enemy attacks, and expanding JSDF participation in UN activities. Hiraoka is a lead-ing member of the Society of Liberals, which insists on maintaining Article 9 and current re-strictions on exercising the right of collective self-defense.209 Hiraoka and Kondo Shoichi, a colleague in the Society of Liberals, co-authored a 2006 article criticizing Maehara Seiji’s call for strengthening Japan’s defense policy. The ar-ticle recommended the following policies: 1) Japan should maintain a “defensive defense pos-ture” without exercising the right of collective self-defense; 2) Japan should seek to establish a regional collective security mechanism with Asian neighbors; and 3) Japan should promote mutual understanding with China in order to prevent China from becoming a threat.210 The Society of Liberals also published a policy pro-posal in 2008 that advocates: 1) an emphasis on human security; 2) the creation of a new unit separate from the JSDF that would be dedicat-ed to participating in UN activities; 3) limiting the scope of the U.S.-Japan security treaty to pro-moting regional stability and defending the Jap-anese homeland; and 4) the creation of an East Asian Community that would serve as a region-al collective security mechanism (and including the United States as a member).211 In a recent interview, Hiraoka emphasized the importance of maintaining good relations with the United States and cooperation with the entire Asian re-gion, and he expressed his hope that economic interdependence through an East Asian Com-munity would lead to a regional collective se-

209 Official website of Kondo Shoichi, http://www.kon-chan.org/contents/omoiyari.html.

210 Kondo Shoichi, “The Security Policy That the DPJ Should Aim For,” March 3, 2006, http://www.kon-chan.org/contents/diary_cont.php?month=3&year=2006#689.

211 Official website of Hiraoka Hideo, http://ameblo.jp/hideoh29/en-try-10117708724.html.


curity mechanism.212 Based on his consistent position on maintaining strict constitutional limits on Japan’s defense policy, Hiraoka may be considered a fairly solid member of the pac-ifist camp.

Hosono Goshi(Minister of environment and minister for the restoration from and prevention of nuclear acci-dents, fourth term, lower house, born in 1971, former active member of the Maehara group but currently not strongly affiliated with any fac-tions)Although many DPJ politicians are often catego-rized as either pro- or anti-Ozawa, Hosono is a unique figure in that he has managed to main-tain good relations with both camps. Hosono often expresses realist views on foreign and se-curity affairs but there may be nuances to his position. In the Koso Nippon Japan Initiative survey, Hosono basically supported Japan’s as-sistance (including potential SDF support) for U.S. military actions in response to the Septem-ber 11 terrorist attacks. On the U.S.-Japan se-curity treaty, Hosono indicated that he saw the U.S.-Japan alliance as benefiting Japan’s energy and food security interests and helping to sustain open economic activities and regional stability. He also suggested that the bilateral alliance lim-ited Japan’s capacity to have a more indepen-dent diplomacy. Although Hosono supported maintaining the U.S.-Japan security treaty, he also supported a reduction of the U.S. military presence in Japan as well as increasing Japan’s defense burden. Hosono supported amending the Japanese constitution to allow Japan to ex-ercise the right of collective self-defense.213 In the two newspaper surveys, Hosono did not in-

212 Okada Kohei, “Tairon Nagata-cho: Gaiko Anpo: Hiraoka Hideo shi/Hayashi Yoshimasa zen zosho” [Nagata-cho debate on for-eign and defense policies between Hiraoka Hideo and former Fi-nance Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa], Chugoku Shimbun, March 7, 2011, http://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/mediacenter/article.php?story=20110307105146417_ja (accessed January 17, 2012).


dicate whether Japan should be U.S.-, UN-, or Asia-centric in its diplomatic posture. Howev-er, he supported the increase of Japan’s defense capabilities, while opposing sending the JSDF to Afghanistan and preemptively attacking ene-my bases. Hosono did not express his stance on the revision of Article 9, the revision of tradition-al constitutional interpretations on the right of collective self-defense, or the deployment of the JSDF for UN-related activities. On the idea of an East Asian Community, Hosono wrote on his official blog that he thought this should not be an exclusive multilateral institution, but he ex-pressed some doubt that the United States was a natural member of East Asia, saying, “There is no way that East Asia as a geographical con-cept includes the United States.”214 Hosono vis-ited the United States soon after the collapse of the Hatoyama government and expressed his support for enhancing the SDF’s cooperation with the U.S. military in maritime security op-erations, missile defense, and intelligence, sur-veillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).215 Based on his survey responses and past statements, Hoso-no appears most closely aligned with the realist school of thought, although he may also be con-sidered something of a centrist.

Ichikawa Yasuo(Secretary general of the DPJ upper house cau-cus and former minister of defense in the first Noda cabinet, first term, upper house after serv-ing three terms in the lower house, born in 1942, a member of the Ozawa group)

214 Hosono Goshi’s blog, November 14, 2009, http://blog.goo.ne.jp/mhrgh2005/s/%C5%EC%A5%A2%A5%B8%A5%A2%B6%A6%C6%B1%C2%CE.

215 Ogawa Satoshi, “Shirein anzen kakuho, kokyuho de, Minshu Hosono shi” [DPJ Hosono urges a new permanent SDF overseas dispatch bill for sea lane security], Yomiuri Shimbun, June 19, 2010, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20100619-OYT1T00456.htm (accessed June 19, 2010); Jiji Press, “Shirein boei wo kyoka, nichibei domei no kinouteki kakudai mezasu, Minshu Hosono shi” [DPJ Hosono urges the strengthening of sea lane defense and seeks functional expan-sion of U.S.-Japan alliance], June 19, 2010, http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=pol_30&k=2010061900196 (accessed June 19, 2010).


Ichikawa served as defense minister in the first Noda cabinet but was replaced in the cabinet re-shuffle in January 2012, mainly because of the passage of a censure motion against him in the upper house. Ichikawa is a relative newcomer to defense policy and, in his first press conference as defense minister, he admitted to being “an amateur in national security affairs,” a remark that drew intense criticism from LDP lawmak-ers and the media.216 While he did not respond to the Asahi Shimbun or Mainichi Shimbun sur-veys, his response to the Koso Nippon Japan Ini-tiative survey indicated his opposition to Japan’s assistance to the United States after the Septem-ber 11 attacks, arguing that the U.S. response was not authorized by the United Nations and that the terrorist problem could not be resolved by military force alone. Ichikawa did, on the other hand, acknowledge the U.S.-Japan secu-rity alliance’s role in allowing Japan to main-tain a limited defense budget. On the right of collective self-defense issue, Ichikawa support-ed revising the Japanese constitution in order to exercise the right of collective self-defense. Al-though Ichikawa’s background is thin on foreign and security policy, his responses to past surveys and his other remarks seem to suggest that he is a centrist, with some degree of support for ex-panding Japan’s defense policies.

Jojima Koriki(Chairman of the DPJ Diet Affairs Committee, fourth term, lower house, born in 1947, a mem-ber of the Kawabata group)Since joining the DPJ in 1998, Jojima has gained expertise in agriculture and labor poli-cies and in party and Diet affairs. When Noda reshuffled his cabinet and party leadership, Joji-ma was promoted from deputy secretary general to his current position because of his experience with DPJ-LDP-Komeito policy coordination un-

216 “Boeisho, anpo wa shirouto, korega hontou no bunmin tosei” [Defense minister says he is an amateur in national security affairs but this is true civilian control over the military], Mainichi Shimbun, September 2, 2011, http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/news/20110903k0000m010099000c.html (accessed September 2, 2011).

der the Kan administration as deputy chair of the DPJ Policy Research Committee and be-cause of his personal networks with Komeito party members. According to the Asahi Shim-bun and Mainichi Shimbun surveys, Jojima op-posed the revision of Article 9, the revision of traditional constitutional interpretations of the right of collective self-defense, and the dispatch of the SDF to Afghanistan. In the surveys, Joji-ma basically supported the U.S.-Japan alliance over UN centrism but did not indicate his pref-erence between the U.S.-Japan alliance and Asia-oriented diplomacy. Jojima has made few remarks on foreign and security affairs, except to express his positive stance with regard to the TPP.217 Based on the above information, that Jo-jima appears to be a centrist.

Kano Michihiko(Minister of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, eleventh term, lower house, born in 1942, lead-er of the Kano group218)Until his candidacy in the DPJ presidential elec-tion in September 2011, Kano appeared to keep a low profile in DPJ intra-party politics. But since then, he launched his own faction and, as minis-ter of agriculture, plays an influential role in the decision-making process regarding the TPP. Al-though Kano is an expert in agriculture policy, his views on foreign and security policies are not widely known. In the two newspaper surveys in

217 Official blog of Jojima Koriki, November 5, 2011, http://jojima.weblogs.jp/blog/2011/11/%EF%BC%91%EF%BC%91%E6%9C%88%EF%BC%93%E6%97%A5%E7%88%B6%E3%81%AE%EF%BC%92%EF%BC%93%E5%9B%9E%E5%BF%8C%E3%81%AE%E6%B3%95%E8%A6%81%E3%81%AE%E7%82%BA%E3%81%AB%E6%9F%B3%E5%B7%9D%E3%81%AB%E5%B8%B0%E3%81%A3%E3%81%9F%E6%97%A9%E3%81%84%E3%82%82%E3%81%AE%E3%81%A7%E3%81%82%E3%82%8B%E7%88%B6%E3%81%8C%E4%BA%A1%E3%81%8F%E3%81%AA%E3%81%A3%E3%81%9F%E6%97%A5.html.

218 “Minshuto: Kano guru-pu hassoku” [DPJ: Kano group launches], Mainichi Shimbun, August 31, 2011, http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/news/20110901k0000m010054000c.html (accessed August 31, 2011); “Kano guru-pu, meisho wa Soko-kai, kayo ni teiteikai, yakuin mo sei-shiki kettei” [Kano group named ‘Soko-kai,’ holds a regular meeting on Tuesdays, and decided directors], Yamagata Shimbun, September 16, 2011, http://yamagata-np.jp/news/201109/16/kj_2011091601567.php (accessed January 17, 2012).


2009, Kano chose the U.S.-Japan alliance over both UN centrism and Asia-oriented diplomacy as Japan’s ideal diplomatic posture. But he op-posed the revision of Article 9, the revision of tra-ditional constitutional interpretations of the right of collective self-defense, the proposed SDF dis-patch to Afghanistan, and Japan’s preemption of enemy attacks. Kano has made few remarks on foreign and security policy, except to express his reluctance to sign FTAs or EPAs out of consider-ation for domestic agriculture interests. Based on the above information, it seems that Kano most closely identifies with the centrist school and that he is somewhat dubious about drastic changes to the status quo in Japan’s foreign and securi-ty policies.

Kawabata Tatsuo(Minister for internal affairs and communica-tions, eighth term, lower house, born in 1945, leader of the Kawabata group219)Kawabata is basically known for his policy exper-tise in education, internal affairs, and commu-nications, as well as for his experience in party and Diet affairs. In the 2009 newspaper sur-veys, Kawabata chose an Asia-oriented diploma-cy over the U.S.-Japan alliance as Japan’s ideal diplomatic posture. He opposed the revision of Article 9, the revision of traditional constitution-al interpretations of the right of collective self-defense, and the SDF dispatch to Afghanistan. In the surveys, he basically registered his sup-port for increasing Japan’s defense capabilities as well as expanding SDF dispatches for UN-relat-ed activities. Kawabata has made few remarks on foreign and security policy, but one of his basic stances on policy is “to contribute to the world by independent diplomacy.”220 Based on this in-

219 “Minshu no kaku guru-pu, kessoku uttae, daihyosen he ugo-ki kyu” [DPJ faction urges factional cohesion and scrambles for the DPJ presidential election], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 11, 2011, http://www.nikkei.com/news/category/article/g=96958A9C93819481E3E3E2E0858DE3E3E2EAE0E2E3E38297EAE2E2E2;at=DGXZZO0195166008122009000000 (accessed August 11, 2011).

220 Official website of Kawabata Tatsuo, http://www.kawa-bata.net/sei-saku/index.html.

formation, Kawabata appears to belong to the neo-autonomist or centrist camp.

Koshiishi Azuma(Secretary general of the DPJ and chair of the DPJ upper house caucus, third term, up-per house, after serving two terms in the low-er house, born in 1936, a member of Yokomichi group221)After working as an elementary school teacher, Koshiishi was first elected to the lower house in 1990 as a member of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). Following the “twisted Diet” situation in the post-2007 upper house election, his political influence began to rise as the DPJ upper house leader and close ally of Ozawa Ichiro. Since 2006 Koshiishi has maintained the position of DPJ upper house caucus chair. Although Koshi-ishi continued to support Ozawa Ichiro during the intra-party battle between the pro-and anti-Ozawa camps, Prime Minister Noda appointed Koshiishi as the DPJ secretary general in August 2011, a move that was interpreted as an attempt to unify the party. In the Asahi Shimbun/Univer-sity of Tokyo and Mainichi Shimbun surveys in 2010, Koshiishi basically opposed the Futenma relocation plan inside Okinawa, the revision of Article 9, and the revision of traditional consti-tutional interpretations of the right of collective self-defense. Koshiishi has made few remarks on foreign and security affairs but reportedly made one notable comment, stating that “we talk about the U.S.-Japan alliance all the time, but Japan should move forward in an equilateral/tri-angular manner with the United States and Chi-na from now on.”222 Koshiishi reconfirmed his support for such an equilateral-triangular rela-

221 “Minshu no kaku guru-pu, kessoku uttae, daihyosen he ugoki kyu” [DPJ factions urges factional cohesion and scrambles for the DPJ presiden-tial election], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 11, 2011.

222 “Nichibeichu wa seisankakukei de, Koshiishi shi” [Koshiishi says US-Japan-China relations should be equilateral/triangular], Sankei Shimbun, February 17, 2010, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/sit-uation/100217/stt1002171923007-n1.htm (accessed February 17, 2010).


tionship in October 2010.223 Based on the above information, Koshiishi’s foreign policy views ap-pear to fit with aspects of both the pacifist and neo-autonomist camps.

Maehara Seiji(Chairman of the Policy Research Committee and former minister of foreign affairs, sixth term, lower house, born in 1962, leader of the Mae-hara group224)Maehara is well known for his expertise in for-eign and security policies and his close network of policy elites in the United States. He is wide-ly recognized as a realistic foreign and securi-ty policy advocate, and the following data and information basically confirms this reputation. In the two newspaper surveys in 2009, Maeha-ra chose the U.S.-Japan alliance over both UN centrism and Asia-oriented diplomacy as Japan’s ideal diplomatic posture. He also supported the revision of Article 9, the revision of traditional constitutional interpretations of the right of col-lective self-defense, the SDF dispatch to Afghan-istan, the increase of Japan’s defense capabili-ties, and preemptive attacks on enemy bases. He registered somewhat reluctant support for UN-mandated overseas SDF missions. In an interview conducted before the DPJ’s electoral victory in August 2009, Maehara expressed his intention to differentiate from the LDP’s foreign and security policy by emphasizing more independent diplo-macy: “The LDP administrations have been an order-taker but the DPJ will propose what Japan wants to do…we need to discuss how we will in-crease Japan’s independence while maintaining relations with the United States.”225 While Mae-hara called China a very real concern (“Gen-

223 “Minshu Koshiishi shi, Nichibeichu wa seisankakukei de” [DPJ Koshi-ishi says US-Japan-China relations should be equilateral/triangular], Sankei Shimbun, October 7, 2010, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/poli-tics/policy/101007/plc1010071942012-n1.html (accessed October 7, 2010).

224 “Minshu no kaku guru-pu, kessoku uttae, daihyosen he ugoki kyu [DPJ faction urges factional cohesion and scrambles for the DPJ presidential election], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 11, 2011.

225 “Maehara fuku daihyo ni kiku: Minshuto do miru do kataru” [Asking DPJ Vice President Maehara: How should we see and talk about the DPJ],

jitsu no Kyoui”) at a Washington conference in 2005,226 he has been concerned about other re-gional diplomatic issues as chairman of the DPJ members’ group for building strategic relations with South Korea.227 While Maehara initially op-posed the Henoko option for the relocation of the Futenma U.S. Marine air station,228 he has sub-sequently changed his position and now appears to support the plan, according to news reports.229 Based on his fairly consistent statements through-out the years, Maehara is one of the leading real-ist members in the ruling party.

Nagashima Akihisa(Special advisor to the prime minister in charge of foreign and security policy, third term, low-er house, born in 1962, a member of the Noda group)Nagashima is also well known for his expertise in foreign and security policies and his close ties with Washington. In the two newspaper sur-veys, Nagashima supported the U.S.-Japan al-liance over the UN-centric model as Japan’s ideal diplomatic posture. Nagashima supported the revision of Article 9 and the revision of tradi-tional constitutional interpretations of the right of collective self-defense. Although he expressed support for the increase of Japan’s defense ca-pabilities and Japan’s right to launch a preemp-tive attack on enemy bases, he did not register his opinion on SDF dispatches to Afghanistan and UN-related activities. In an entry on his of-ficial website in January 2011, Nagashima called for more “equality” in the U.S.-Japan alliance, but he argued that the bilateral security treaty

Asahi Globe, June 8, 2009, http://globe.asahi.com/feature/090608/side/05.html (accessed January 17, 2012).

226 Official DPJ website, December 15, 2005, http://www1.dpj.or.jp/eng-lish/news/051215/01.html.

227 For example, the other members are Hatoyama Yukio, Nagashima Aki-hisa, Tamura Kenji, Kazama Naoki, and Ishizeki Takashi.

228 “Maehara fuku daihyo ni kiku: Minshuto do miru do kataru” [Asking DPJ Vice President Maehara: How should we see and talk about the DPJ], Asahi Globe, June 8, 2009.

229 “Henoko isetsu, dokoga yoto demo suishin, Maehara shi ga kyocho” [Maehara says no matter which is a ruling party, Henoko plan should be promoted], Ryukyu Shimpo, July 10, 2011, http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid-179167-storytopic-3.html (accessed January 17, 2012).


was crucial for maintaining Japan’s security and prosperity.230 In 2007, Nagashima also described his vision of an East Asian security communi-ty (a so-called rimland maritime coalition) among Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, and India in order to support U.S. regional en-gagement as a public good.231 On the Futenma relocation facility issue, Nagashima has support-ed the Kadena merger option as an alternative to the current Henoko option.232 Based on his past record, Nagashima is clearly a member of the realist camp, although his emphasis on equal-ity in the U.S.-Japan alliance and his calls for an East Asian security community also suggest a degree of sympathy for some core neo-auton-omists objectives.

Nakagawa Masaharu(Chairman of the DPJ research committee on administrative reform and former minister of education, culture, sports, science, and tech-nology in the first Noda cabinet, fifth term, low-er house, born in 1950, a member of the Hata group)Nakagawa served as education minister in the first Noda cabinet but was replaced in the cabinet re-shuffle in January 2012. Nakagawa is known for his policy expertise in education and foreign af-fairs. According to the Asahi Shimbun/Univer-sity of Tokyo and Mainichi Shimbun surveys in 2009, Nakagawa supported an Asia-oriented di-plomacy over the U.S.-Japan alliance as Japan’s ideal diplomatic stance. He also supported the revision of Article 9 and the SDF dispatch to Af-ghanistan but opposed the revision of traditional constitutional interpretations of collective self-de-fense. Nakagawa has expressed his appreciation for the U.S. force presence in Japan but has also

230 Nagashima Akihisa’s blog, January 11, 2011, http://blog.goo.ne.jp/nagashima21/e/97e77e8d3852d22ecb3bcef1fb9865c1.

231 Ibid., February 1, 2007, http://blog.goo.ne.jp/nagashima21/e/8810def5899d84490c62cb7a83cb3f03.

232 “Futenma genkoan, saikento teian wo, Nagashima shi ga minaoshi uttae” [Nagashima urges Japan should propose to the U.S. a review on Henoko plan again], Ryukyu Shimpo, May 22, 2011, http://ryuky-ushimpo.jp/news/storyid-177359-storytopic-3.html (accessed Janu-ary 17, 2012).

raised questions about the need to maintain the current level of U.S. troops.233 In March 2006, he wrote on his official website that “we are seek-ing, to some degree, a more independent policy from the overly U.S.-dependent posture.”234 In November 2007, Nakagawa wrote on his web-site, “We should review the Host Nation Support and the expenses of the U.S. force realignment to transfer the marines. It is important to have a strong will to become more independent in or-der to decide Japan’s level of defense capabili-ties by analyzing the information related to Chi-nese and North Korean threat by ourselves, not blindly accepting the information from the Unit-ed States”235 Based on the above information, it seems that Nakagawa identifies most closely with the neo-autonomist wing of the party, given his emphasis on more independence in foreign and security policy.

Noda Yoshihiko(Prime minister, fifth term, lower house, born in 1957, leader of the Noda group236)Since joining the DPJ in 1998, Noda has gained expertise in finance and in party and Diet af-fairs, gradually working his way up the ladder to his current position as prime minister. Noda is known as a conservative DPJ member, but he has never held a senior position in foreign and security affairs. Therefore, his views on foreign and security policies were not widely known until he ran in the DPJ presidential election in September 2011. According to the 2001 Koso Nippon Japan Initiative survey in, Noda strongly supported Japan’s assistance in U.S. military ac-tions to respond to the September 11 terrorist at-tacks. Survey results also showed that Noda did not see any negative impact of the U.S.-Japan se-curity treaty in terms of Japanese international

233 “A Word from Nakagawa Masaharu,” January 26, 2006, http://www.masaharu.gr.jp/HP/hitokoto/2006.htm.

234 Ibid., March 13, 2006.235 Ibid., November 14, 2007.236 “Minshu no kaku guru-pu, kessoku uttae, daihyosen he ugoki kyu [DPJ

faction urges factional cohesion and scrambles for the DPJ presidential election], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 11, 2011.


economic activities, the degree of diplomatic au-tonomy, alliance entanglement, and the promo-tion of friendlier relations with Asian countries. Although Noda supported the revision or aboli-tion of the current U.S.-Japan security treaty in the future, he supported the future transforma-tion of the alliance into a more equal collec-tive self-defense treaty with the United States, such as NATO or the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS). Noda has also supported revising the Japanese consti-tution in order to exercise the right of collective self-defense.237 In the Asahi Shimbun/Universi-ty of Tokyo and Mainichi Shimbun surveys in 2009, Noda chose the U.S.-Japan alliance over Asia- and UN-centric diplomacy as Japan’s ideal diplomatic posture. He also supported the revi-sion of Article 9 and the revision of tradition-al constitutional interpretations of the right of collective self-defense. While he basically sup-ported SDF overseas dispatches for UN ac-tivities, he did not express his opinion on the increase of Japan’s defense capabilities. In addi-tion, he opposed the SDF dispatch to Afghani-stan. Noda published his foreign and security policy vision when he ran for party president in September 2002.238 The first promise in his for-eign and security policy section was “to restore independence in foreign and security policy” by improving the quality of relations with the Unit-ed States. While Noda urged the strengthening of political, cultural, and technological ties with the United States, he also expressed his inten-tion to offset U.S. unilateralism by strengthening relations with Europe. In terms of Asia policy, Noda promised to end the so-called cold war in Asia by implementing the following measures: 1) establishing a collective self-defense securi-ty mechanism (shudanteki anzenhosho taisei) in the Asia-Pacific region; 2) strengthening re-lations with countries that share such values as freedom and democracy; 3) preventing isola-


238 Noda’s Vision for Diplomacy and Security 2, no.1, September 15, 2002, http://www.nodayoshi.gr.jp/report/fax/vol02.html.

tionism in Japan by establishing interdependent ties with China and the international communi-ty; and 4) proposing a Northeast Asian non-pre-emption agreement among North Korea, China, South Korea, and Japan. In August 2011, Noda published an article describing his policy vision and wrote that the U.S.-Japan alliance is Japan’s largest security asset.239 Noda has expressed rel-atively conservative views on history issues, cast-ing doubt on whether Japan should still be held responsible for its wartime actions.240 Based on the above information, Noda seems to belong to the realist camp, although he has shown some enthusiasm for a more independent foreign pol-icy from the United States over the long term.

Okada Katsuya (Deputy prime minister and former minister of foreign affairs, seventh term, lower house, born in 1953, not affiliated with any factions)In terms of political experience, Okada, a sev-enth-term lower house member, is a likely can-didate to be a future DPJ prime minister. His past remarks and behavior on foreign and secu-rity policies basically stress more autonomous decision making while maintaining the alliance relationship with the United States. According to the Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo and the Mainichi Shimbun surveys in 2009, while basically supporting the U.S.-Japan alliance over UN centrism, Okada did not indicate his pref-erence between the U.S.-Japan alliance and Asia-oriented diplomacy as Japan’s primary dip-lomatic posture. He supported the revision of Ar-ticle 9, and the SDF dispatches to UN missions, but opposed the revision of traditional constitu-tional interpretations of the right of collective self-defense, dispatch of the SDF to Afghani-stan, and the preemption of enemy attacks. Oka-239 Koyama Yu, “Posuto Kan Shinjosho: Noda Yoshihiko zaimusho, kyoiku,

Yasukuni de hoshu kyocho” [Post-Kan profile: Finance Minister Noda Yoshihiko, emphasizing his conservativeness by his positions on ed-ucation and Yasukuni Shrine], Mainichi Shimbun, August 18, 2011, http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/news/20110818ddm005010112000c.html (accessed August 18, 2011).

240 Official website of Noda Yoshihiko, October 17, 2005, http://www.no-dayoshi.gr.jp/report/inpage/news_04.html.


da did not express his stance on the increase of Japan’s defense capabilities. In his foreign policy vision, “Toward Realization of Enlightened Na-tional Interest – Living Harmoniously with Asia and the World,” Okada supported the construc-tion of an East Asian Community in 2005. His version of an EAC excludes the United States as a member but limits the role of an EAC to eco-nomic affairs and non-traditional security issues (traditional security issues, he believes, should be handled by the U.S.-Japan alliance).241 In an interview following the publication of his for-eign policy vision, Okada told an interviewer, “Although former Deputy State Secretary Ar-mitage expressed his concern about an EAC, I would like to say let Japan take care of Asian issues by its own to some degree. Why doesn’t the United States trust Japan more?… . Japan should become a bridge between the United States and East Asia.”242 Okada also led the DPJ Diet Members’ League for Promoting Nuclear Arms Reduction and made a proposal to create a Northeast Asia nuclear-free zone with the prin-ciple of a non-first use of nuclear states against non-nuclear states.243 As foreign minister, Oka-da struck a conciliatory tone toward South Ko-rea on the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands dispute244 as well as history issues.245 However, he was fair-ly outspoken in his talks with Chinese counter-parts on issues such as nuclear arms reduction246

241 Okada Katsuya, “Toward Realization of Enlightened National Interest – Living Harmoniously with Asia and the World,” http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/vision/summary.html.

242 Okada Katsuya and Goro Hashimoto, “Okada Katsuya Minshuto daihyo, gaiko bijon wo kataru” [DPJ President Katsuya Okada discusses his for-eign policy vision], Chuokoron 120, no.7 (July 2005), http://www.kat-suya.net/opinion/2005/07/post-103.html.

243 Official website of Okada Katsuya, November 9, 2006, http://www.kat-suya.net/upload/pdf/joyaku_honbun.pdf.

244 Transcript of the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Af-fairs, House of Representatives, March 26, 2010, http://www.shugiin.go.jp/index.nsf/html/index_kaigiroku.htm.

245 Kyodo News, “Riso wa kyotsu no rekishi kyokasho, Okada gaisho ga kankoku shi ni” [Foreign Minister Okada says to Korean media that it is ideal that Japan and South Korea share history textbooks], in Sankei Shimbun, July 14, 2010, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/world/ko-rea/100714/kor1007141241002-n1.htm (accessed July 14, 2010).

246 John Pomfret, “U.S.-China Talks End without Accords on Key Issues,” Washington Post, May 26, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/

and South China Sea disputes.247 Based on the above information, Okada basically belongs to the neo-autonomist camp, although he could also be considered something of a centrist.

Ozawa Ichiro (Former DPJ Secretary General, fourteenth term, lower house, born in 1942, leader of the Ozawa group, which includes approximately 130 members248)

Ozawa Ichiro was first elected to the lower house as a member of the Liberal Democratic Par-ty in 1969. During the LDP era, Ozawa served as chairman of the lower house Committee on Rules and Administration, minister of home af-fairs (December 1985–July 1986), deputy chief cabinet secretary (November 1987–December 1988), and LDP secretary general (August 1989–April 1991). After leaving the LDP in 1993, Oza-wa Ichiro jumped to different parties, including the New Frontier Party before joining the DPJ in 2003. Ozawa Ichiro served as the DPJ par-ty president for approximately three years, from April 2006 to May 2009, and he has been in-strumental in delivering some of the DPJ’s ma-jor electoral victories, including the victory over the LDP in the August 2009 lower house elec-tions. As leader of the largest intra-party faction, Ozawa commands the loyalty of over a hun-dred lawmakers, including the so-called Oza-wa Children (first-term Diet members). During the Hatoyama administration, Ozawa served as the DPJ secretary general (September 2009–June 2010) but was later indicted for a politi-

wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/25/AR2010052503244.html (ac-cessed January 17, 2012).

247 Inukai Naoyuki et al., “Minami Shina Kai keneki, Chugoku tsuyoki, konan gaiko kappatsu ni” [China is aggressive to South China Sea in-terests, and exercises both soft and hard diplomatic measures active-ly], Mainichi Shimbun, July 4, 2011, http://mainichi.jp/select/opinion/closeup/news/20110704ddm003030199000c.html (accessed July 4, 2011).

248 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 11, 2011, http://www.nikkei.com/news/category/article/g=96958A9C93819481E3E3E2E0858DE3E3E2EAE0E2E3E38297EAE2E2E2;at=DGXZZO0195166008122009000000


cal funds scandal, which led to the suspension of his party membership and questions about his ability to remain a dominant power bro-ker within the ruling party. However, in April 2012, Ozawa was found not guilty in the first tri-al over his funding scandal, leading to specula-tion that he may overcome his legal issues and perhaps even run for the DPJ party presiden-cy in September 2012. Ozawa’s foreign policy views are difficult to categorize. Many remem-ber his behind-the-scenes role in orchestrating Japan’s military support for the U.S. and allied coalition in the first Gulf War, but his more re-cent comments suggest profound skepticism to-ward the United States. In the Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo and the Mainichi Shimbun surveys in 2009, Ozawa supported the U.S.-Ja-pan alliance over Asia-centric diplomacy, but he did not choose between the U.S.-Japan alliance and a UN-centric approach. He opposed the re-vision of Article 9, the SDF dispatch to Afghani-stan, an increase of Japan’s defense capabilities, and a hypothetical preemptive attack on enemy targets, but supported the revision of the tradi-tional constitutional interpretation of the right of collective self-defense and SDF participation in UN activities. In 2004, Ichiro Ozawa and Yo-komichi Takahiro (a leading pacifist lawmaker) signed an agreement on basic principles regard-ing Japan’s national security and international contributions.249 This 2004 agreement empha-sized the danger of entanglement in the alliance with the United States and the important role of the UN as a collective security mechanism. Additionally, they proposed the following poli-cy recommendations: 1) maintaining Article 9; 2) promoting Japan’s more active participation in UN activities; and 3) establishing a new SDF unit specifically mandated to engage in inter-national activities, such as UN peacekeeping operations. In 2006, Ozawa, as the DPJ party president, published his own policy vision rec-ommending the following main points: 1) to es-tablish a truly “equal” alliance relationship with

249 The official website of Yokomichi Takahiro, March 19, 2004, http://www.yokomichi.com/

the United States by setting Japan’s strategy, clar-ifying Japan’s position, and actively sharing roles and responsibilities with the United States; 2) to strengthen relations with Asian neighbors, espe-cially in the areas of energy and trade; 3) to pro-mote trade and investment liberalization; 4) to maintain Japan’s defensive defense posture re-gardless of Japan’s inherent right to exercise in-dividual self-defense or collective self-defense; and 5) to participate in UN-related security ac-tivities.250 In February 2009, Ozawa sparked controversy when he commented that the Unit-ed States should withdraw all of its forward-de-ployed forces from Japan except for the Seventh Fleet. He later justified his comment by say-ing that Japan could rely less on the U.S. mil-itary presence if it developed stronger defense capabilities.251 Based on an overall assessment of Ozawa’s foreign policy views throughout the years, it seems that his position has shifted from one in which he was relatively supportive of close U.S.-Japan strategic ties to one that now emphasizes greater autonomy with regard to the United States. Despite this apparent shift, Oza-wa has consistently advocated a more UN-cen-tric foreign policy approach for Japan. In the

250 The official website of the DPJ, http://www1.dpj.or.jp/news/files/061031rinen.pdf

251 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, February 25, 2009, http://www.nikkei.co.jp/news/seiji/20090225AT3S2402Y24022009.html; Yo-miuri Shimbun, February 28, 2009, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/editorial/news/20090227-OYT1T01147.htm; Asahi Shimbun, February 25, 2009, http://www.asahi.com/politics/up-date/0225/TKY200902250292.html; Mainichi Shimbun, February 25, 2009, http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/news/20090226k0000m010125000c.html; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Febru-ary 27, 2009, http://www.nikkei.co.jp/news/seiji/20090227AT3S2703Q27022009.html]-; Mainichi Shimbun, February 27, 2009, http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/archive/news/2009/02/28/20090228ddm005010150000c.html; Sankei Shimbun, February 27, 2009, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/situation/090227/stt0902272129008-n1.htm; Tokyo Shimbun, Feb-ruary 27, 2009, http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/arti-cle/politics/news/CK2009022802000105.html; Jiji Press, February 27, 2009, http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=pol_30&k=2009022700905


final analysis, it may be that Ozawa belongs in a category by himself—an opportunistic politician who knows how to stir up a foreign policy debate for domestic political purposes.

Saito Tsuyoshi(Deputy chief cabinet secretary, first term, low-er house after serving two terms in the upper house, born in 1945, member of Riberal no Kai [the Society of Liberals])Saito began his political career as a member of the Japan Socialist Party, subsequently gaining policy expertise as an upper house member on various foreign and defense policy committees. In the Koso Nippon Japan Initiative survey in 2001, Saito opposed any Japanese assistance to the U.S. military in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, citing, among other reasons, his doubts about the legitimacy of U.S. military actions without a formal UN mandate. Regard-ing the U.S.-Japan security treaty, Saito replied that he saw no benefit in the treaty to Japan at all, stating that it limits Japan’s autonomy in di-plomacy, entangles Japan in international con-flicts, and disturbs Japan’s friendly relations with its Asian neighbors. Saito stated his doubts about the necessity of the SDF for self-defense, even at a minimum level, and supported the review or abolition of the U.S.-Japan security treaty in the future. In addition, Saito stated his support for Japan’s joining a regional collective security system with Asian neighbors after disbanding the U.S.-Japan security system. Saito opposed the re-vision of the constitution to permit the exercise of the right of collective self-defense.252 In the two newspaper surveys in 2009, Saito supported an Asia-oriented diplomacy over the U.S.-Japan alliance, and he supported UN centrism over the U.S.-Japan alliance as Japan’s ideal diplo-matic posture. Saito’s viewpoints clearly catego-rize him as a member of the pacifist camp.


Tanaka Naoki

(Defense minister, third term, upper house af-ter serving three terms in the lower house, born in 1940, chairman of Mokuyo Kai [DPJ upper house members’ group supporting Ozawa Ich-iro])Tanaka Naoki is well-known as the husband of Tanaka Makiko, former minister of foreign af-fairs under the LDP Koizumi administration. Al-though Tanaka was originally elected to the Diet as an LDP member, he joined the DPJ with his wife just before the 2009 lower house election. While he served as parliamentary vice-minister of foreign affairs (1989), director of the LDP for-eign affairs division (1994), and chairman of the upper house committee on foreign affairs and defense (2009) in the past, Tanaka has made few public remarks on foreign and defense affairs. Prime Minister Noda’s replacement of Ichikawa Yasuo with Tanaka Naoki in January 2012 was surprising because it was expected that someone with greater policy expertise would take over from the novice policy maker Ichikawa. Shortly after his appointment as defense minister, Tana-ka made comments that upset the delicate sit-uation on Okinawa, suggesting that the Noda administration plans to begin construction of the Futenma relocation facility in Henoko Bay sometime in 2012. His comment marked the first time a cabinet minister has publicly men-tioned the construction schedule for the facil-ity.253 In addition, during a TV news program Tanaka appeared to misunderstand the differ-ence between the loosening of arms export bans and a possible loosening of the SDF’s rules of engagement (ROE).254 According to the Asa-

253 Sakaguchi Hirohiko, “Zainichi beigun saihen: Futenma isetsu, ri-kai hete nennai chakko, Tanaka boeisho ga genkyu” [USFJ realign-ment: Defense Minister Tanaka says the Futenma relocation facility construction begins this year by gaining Okinawa’s understanding], Mainichi Shimbun, January 16, 2012, http://mainichi.jp/select/sei-ji/news/20120116ddm001010082000c.html (accessed January 17, 2012).

254 Sakaguchi Hirohiko, “Tanaka boeisho: bukishiyo kijun to yushutsu san-gensoku kondo, tv bangumi hatsugen” [Defense Minister Tanaka con-fused the SDF’s rules of engagement with the arms export ban in the TV program], Mainichi Shimbun, January 15, 2012, http://mainichi.jp/


hi Shimbun and Mainichi Shimbun surveys in 2010, Tanaka Naoki opposed the revision of Ar-ticle 9 and the revision of traditional constitu-tional interpretations of the right of collective self-defense. He did not, however, express his positions on the U.S.-Japan security treaty or the Henoko relocation plan. Based on the above in-formation, Tanaka may best be categorized as a centrist.

Tarutoko Shinji(DPJ acting secretary general, fifth term, lower house, the twelfth district of Osaka Prefecture, born in 1959, leader of the Tarutoko group255)Tarutoko’s foreign policy views are not widely known, despite his being a seasoned politician. In the 2001 Koso Nippon Japan Initiative sur-vey, Tarutoko strongly supported Japan’s assis-tance (including the deployment of SDF forces) to the U.S. military after the September 11 ter-rorist attacks. On the U.S.-Japan security treaty, Tarutoko acknowledged the treaty’s benefit to re-gional stability and stated his support for main-taining the bilateral security framework in the future. He supported the revision of constitu-tional limitations on the right of collective self-defense.256 In the two newspaper surveys taken in 2009, Tarutoko basically supported the U.S.-Japan alliance over UN centrism. Although he supported the increase of Japan’s defense capa-bilities, preemptive attacks on enemy bases, and SDF dispatches for UN-related activities, he did not give his opinion on the proposed SDF dis-patch to Afghanistan. Despite his relatively sol-id support for the bilateral alliance, Tarutoko

select/seiji/news/20120116k0000m010036000c.html (accessed Janu-ary 17, 2012).

255 Sakai Hiroshi and Yamamoto Yuji, “Minshu hokai; kawaru tonai rikigaku, jakusho habatsu itten, shuyo posuto kakutoku de ikioi, Taru-koto guru-pu” [DPJ collapse: Balance of factional power changes, small factions such as Tarutoko group secure important posts and gain mo-mentum], Sankei Shimbun, March 10, 2011, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/110310/stt11031023350015-n1.htm (accessed March 10, 2011).


has also criticized Japan’s perceived subservi-ence to the United States. In his official blogs, Tarutoko has railed against Japan’s “flattery di-plomacy” toward the United States,257 which he says comes at the expense of Japan’s national in-terests.258 Based on the above information, Ta-rutoko seems to identify most closely with the neo-autonomist camp.

Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi(Senior vice minister of foreign affairs, third term, lower house, born in 1954, a leading member of the Gemba group)As a former diplomat, Yamaguchi is known for his expertise in foreign affairs. According to the Koso Nippon Japan Initiative survey in 2001, Ya-maguchi basically approved of Japan’s support for U.S. military actions in response to the Sep-tember 11 terrorist attacks, although he was op-posed to sending SDF troops to assist in such operations. Regarding the U.S.-Japan security treaty, Yamaguchi recognized its contribution to maintaining regional stability. Although he supported the maintenance of the current U.S.-Japan security treaty framework in the future, he supported the reduction of the U.S. military presence in Japan and the increase of Japan’s role in security matters. Yamaguchi also sup-ported the revision of the constitutional inter-pretation of the right of collective self-defense.259 In the newspaper surveys in 2009, Yamaguchi chose Asia-oriented diplomacy over the U.S.-Ja-pan alliance as Japan’s ideal diplomatic posture, while supporting the U.S.-Japan alliance over the UN-centric model. Yamaguchi opposed the revision of Article 9, the proposed SDF dispatch to Afghanistan, the increase of Japan’s defense capabilities, and preemptive attacks on ene-my bases, but he did not express his stance on

257 Future Prime Ministers Mirai Sori [a young Diet members’ email maga-zine] 7, October 14, 2002, http://www.rosetta.jp/mirai/m007.html.

258 Future Prime Ministers Mirai Sori 22, February 3, 2003, http://www.ro-setta.jp/mirai/m022.html.



SDF dispatches for UN-related activities. Yama-guchi’s past comments on foreign policy have often been laced with criticism of Japan’s depen-dence on the United States, which he likens to postwar Japanese children asking for chocolate from Occupation GIs.260 Yamaguchi served as director-general of the Federation of DPJ Diet Members for Promoting an East Asian Com-munity, whose chairman is former Prime Min-ister Hatoyama Yukio.261 Based on his outspoken criticism of Japan’s “dependence” on the United States, Yamaguchi can be considered a member of the neo-autonomist camp.

260 See, for instance, Yamaguchi’s interview in Naoya Fujiwara et al., Kokka kino wo takenaosu – Wakate seijika ga mezasu atarashii nihon no kata-chi [Reforming the state function: A new form of Japan that younger politicians seek].

261 Official website of Yomaguchi Tsuyoshi, http://www.mission21.gr.jp/archives/618.html.


APPENDiX E: Chronology of Major Events under DPJ Governments

2009Aug. 30: The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) wins a landslide victory in the lower house election.Sept. 9: The DPJ, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and the People’s New Party (PNP) reach

agreement on forming a ruling coalition.Sept. 16: Hatoyama Yukio is nominated as prime minister in the Diet and launches his cabinet.Sept. 21: Chinese President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister (PM) Hatoyama meet in New York.Sept. 23: PM Hatoyama meets with U.S. President Barack Obama and South Korean (ROK)

President Lee Myung-bak in New York.Sept. 28: China-ROK-Japan trilateral foreign ministers’ meeting held in Shanghai.Oct. 9: PM Hatoyama meets ROK President Lee in Seoul.Oct. 10: PM Hatoyama meets Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and ROK President Lee in Beijing for

a trilateral summit.Oct. 20–21: U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates visits Japan and pushes for progress on base

realignment plans.Oct. 24: The ASEAN Plus Three (APT) summit is held in Thailand, and the East Asian Summit

(EAS) is held the following day.Nov. 10: Japan announces a new financial aid package for Afghanistan of $5 billion over the next

five years.Nov. 11: The Hatoyama administration begins the budget screening process.Nov. 13: President Obama and PM Hatoyama meet in Tokyo.Nov. 14: President Obama delivers a speech in Tokyo on U.S. policy toward Asia.Nov. 30: PM Hatoyama meets Okinawa Governor Nakaima Hirokazu in Tokyo.Dec. 3: SDP President Fukushima Mizuho says the SDP might leave the ruling coalition if the DPJ

decides to accept the plan to relocate the Futenma U.S. Marine air station to Henoko Bay.Dec. 10: DPJ Secretary General Ozawa Ichiro visits China with over 140 DPJ Diet members and

meets Chinese President Hu.Dec. 14: PM Hatoyama meets Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping in Tokyo.Dec. 15: The Hatoyama administration announces Japan will put off a decision on the Futenma

relocation facility (FRF) for a few months.Dec. 18: Hatoyama meets Secretary of State Hilary Clinton in Copenhagen and explains his recent

decision on the FRF.Dec. 24: Tokyo District Public Prosecutor’s Office charges two of PM Hatoyama’s former aides with

falsifying campaign donations.Dec. 25: Japan’s Ministry of Education issues a new high school textbook guideline, not mentioning

the Dokdo/Takeshima issue.Dec. 27-29: PM Hatoyama meets Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi.2010Jan. 12: The mayor of Yonaguni Shima requests Defense Minister (DM) Kitazawa Toshimi to

deploy Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) to the island; Kitazawa commits to studying a possible GSDF deployment.


Jan. 12: Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister (FM) Okada Katsuya meet in Honolulu.Jan. 15: The Special Measures Law authorizing Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)

refueling operations in the Indian Ocean expires.Jan. 15: Three current and former aides to DPJ Secretary General Ozawa are arrested and charged

with falsifying political funding reports in connection with a land purchase in Tokyo.Jan. 17: FM Okada meets Chinese FM Yang Jiechi in Tokyo, focusing on East China Sea gas fields.Jan. 24: Inamine Susumu, an opponent of the current Henoko plan, wins Nago City mayoral

election.Feb. 1: The U.S. Department of Defense publishes the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR).Feb. 4: Tokyo district prosecutors announce a decision not to indict DPJ Secretary General Ozawa

in connection with a funding scandal, but to indict his former aides.Feb. 5: The Hatoyama administration authorizes deployment of SDF troops for the UN PKO in

Haiti.Feb. 11: FM Okada meets ROK FM Yu Myung-hwan in Seoul.Feb. 16: The Hatoyama administration announces the creation of the Council on National Security

and Defense Capability to help develop the new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG).

Feb. 17: An LDP upper house member switches parties, giving the DPJ a majority in the upper house.

March 9: An expert panel submits a report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding confidential agreements between Japan and the United States in the 1960s on the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan.

March 16: FM Okada reiterates Japan’s sovereignty over the Senkaku/Daioyutai Islands in response to a potential new law in China that would protect the islands from Japanese control.

March 18: The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s North Sea Fleet passes through the Miyako Strait.

March 18: DM Kitazawa expresses support for early consideration of GSDF deployment to Yonaguni Island.

March 26: North Korea allegedly sinks ROK Navy corvette Cheonan.April 8: A PLAN helicopter has a near collision with the MSDF ship in the East China Sea.April 10: PLAN East Sea Fleet vessels (eight surface ships and two submarines) pass the Miyako

Strait.April 12: PM Hatoyama meets U.S. President Obama on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security

Summit in Washington and also meets Chinese President Hu.April 18: The speaker of the South Korean House makes the first visit to the Dokdo/Takeshima.April 21: Japan’s Ministry of Defense announces Chinese helicopter approached a Japanese

destroyer conducting surveillance activities.April 22: PM Hatoyama pledges to put his premiership on the line to resolve the FRF issue by

May 31.April 27: A judicial review panel calls for DPJ Secretary General Ozawa to be indicted over a

fundraising scandal, requiring prosecutors to revisit an earlier decision not to charge him.April 30: DM Kitazawa meets Indian DM A.K. Antony in New Delhi.May 3: A Chinese ship shadows a Japan Coast Guard (JCG) ship and demands that the JCG ship

stop conducting oceanographic research near Omami Island.May 4: PM Hatoyama visits Okinawa and states that it would be difficult to relocate all Futenma

base functions outside the island.


May 11: FM Okada announces the construction of the SDF base in Djibouti, for anti-piracy operations off the Somali coast.

May 14: FM Okada says it is necessary to carefully monitor the development of China’s nuclear and naval power.

May 15–16: The foreign ministers of Japan, China, and ROK meet in Gyeongju, Korea. During a bilateral Sino-Japanese foreign ministers’ meeting, Okada urges China’s further efforts at nuclear arms reduction.

May 19: Japan and Australia sign the Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA).May 21: FM Okada and U.S. Secretary of State Clinton meet in Tokyo.May 23: PM Hatoyama makes his second visit to Okinawa and states his decision to accept the

Futenma relocation agreement reached by Japan and the United States in 2006.May 25: DM Kitazawa meets Defense Secretary Robert Gates at the Pentagon.May 28: The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) issues a joint statement reiterating

a commitment to relocate the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.May 28: PM Hatoyama dismisses Consumer Affairs Minister Fukushima from the cabinet for

refusing to support his decision on the FRF.May 29-30: A Japan, China, and ROK summit is held in Jeju, ROK.May 30: The SDP leaves the ruling coalition with the DPJ.May 30–June 1: Chinese Premier Wen and PM Hatoyama meet in Tokyo, and Wen commits to

early negotiations on East China Sea.June 2: PM Hatoyama and DPJ Secretary General Ozawa resign.June 4: Kan Naoto is nominated as prime minister in the Diet.June 8: PM Kan announces his cabinet.June 17: PM Kan announces his plan to increase the domestic consumption tax.June 23: PM Kan visits Okinawa and promises to reduce the burden of the U.S. troop presence

there but reiterates a commitment to the May 28 agreement on the FRF.June 25: Japan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) sign the General Security of

Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA).June 27: PM Kan and President Obama meet during the G20 Summit in Toronto.June 28: Japan and India begin negotiations on a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement.June 29: Russia begins the largest military exercise in the Far East, including in the disputed

Northern Territories, in the post-Soviet era.July 3: PLAN ships pass through the Miyako Strait and head to the Western Pacific.July 6: Japan and India hold the first administrative vice foreign and defense ministers’ meeting in

New Delhi.July 11: As a result of the upper house election, the DPJ loses a majority in the upper house.July 13: The Kan administration decides not to dispatch the SDF to the UN PKO in Sudan.July 16: The Kan administration decides to extend SDF participation in an anti-piracy mission off

the coast of Somalia for one year.July 23: Japan’s Ministry of Defense announces it will send MSDF staff to observe U.S.-ROK joint

military exercises scheduled for July 25–28.July 27: Japan and China hold negotiations in Tokyo to implement the June 2008 agreement on

joint development in the East China Sea.Aug. 10: PM Kan issues a statement apologizing to South Korea for Japan’s colonial rule of Korea.Aug. 27: The Council on National Security and Defense Capabilities in a New Era submits a report

to PM Kan featuring recommendations for the new NDPG.


Sept. 7: A Chinese fishing boat collides with a JCG ship in waters near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands. Japanese authorities arrest and detain the Chinese captain and crew.

Sept. 14: PM Kan defeats Ozawa Ichiro in the DPJ presidential election and is reelected as the DPJ president.

Sept. 17: PM Kan reshuffles his cabinet.Sept. 20: China detains four Japanese nationals employed by Fujita Construction for entering a

restricted military area without permission in Shijiazhuang, Hebei Province.Sept. 21: China rules out a Wen-Kan meeting during the UN General Assembly in New York.Sept. 21: China halts rare-earth exports to JapanSept. 22: PM Kan announces the “Kan Commitment,” an $8.5 billion pledge over five years in the

fields of health and education to support the Millennium Development Goals.Sept. 23: President Obama and PM Kan meet in New York on the sidelines of the UN General

Assembly.Sept. 23: Secretary of State Clinton affirms that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty extends to the

Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands; Secretary of Defense Gates makes similar statements.Sept. 24: Naha Public Prosecutor’s Office releases the Chinese fishing boat captain.Oct. 4: PM Kan and Chinese Premier Wen meet at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Brussels.Nov. 11: Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visits Kunashiri Island, one of the disputed islands

between Japan and Russia.Nov. 13: PM Kan and U.S. President Obama meet on the margins of the Asia-Pacific Economic

Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Yokohama.Nov. 13: PM Kan and Chinese President Hu meet during the APEC meeting in Yokohama.Nov. 14: ROK President Lee and PM Kan meet on the sidelines of the APEC meeting and sign a

treaty that confirms the return of 1,205 Korean cultural treasures taken during Japan’s colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula.

Nov. 22: Justice Minister Yanagida Minoru resigns after criticism of his remarks about Diet deliberations.

Nov. 23: North Korea (DPRK) fires artillery shells at South Korea’s Yeongpyeong Island.Nov. 26: The upper house passes non-binding censure motions against Chief Cabinet Secretary

Sengoku Yoshito and Transportation Minister Mabuchi Sumio for their handling of a collision between a Chinese fishing boat and two JCG vessels near the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands in September.

Nov. 28: Nakaima Hirokazu is reelected as Okinawa governor, promising the relocation of the Futenma base outside Okinawa.

Dec. 3-10: The United States and Japan conduct the bilateral military exercise Keen Sword 2011.Dec. 6: PM Kan announces plans to strengthen ties with the SDP and the PNP before the next

Diet session.Dec. 7: The Kan administration decides not to relax the three arms export ban principles in the

new NDPG.Dec. 14: The U.S. and Japan reach an agreement on Host Nation Support (HNS) for the next five

years.Dec. 17: The Kan administration releases the 2010 NDPG.Dec. 17: PM Kan visits Okinawa to discuss the FRF issue with Governor Nakaima.Dec. 25: PM Kan requests the Sunrise Party of Japan (SPJ) to join the ruling coalition, but the SPJ

rejects the invitation.2011


Jan. 10: DM Kitazawa and South Korean DM Kim Kwan-jin meet in Seoul to discuss closer bilateral military cooperation.

Jan. 14: PM Kan reshuffles his cabinet.Jan. 31: Former DPJ President Ozawa is indicted for alleged involvement in a political funding

scandal.Feb. 15: Japan and India sign a comprehensive economic partnership agreement.Feb. 22: DPJ suspends Ozawa Ichiro’s party membership.March 6: FM Maehara Seiji resigns for accepting political donations from a Korean national.March 11: PM Kan ackowledges that his campaign office received donations from a Korean national.March 11: A magnitude-9.0 earthquake strikes off the Tohoku region in Japan.March 19: PM Kan asks the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) president, Tanigaki Sadakazu, to join

the cabinet and form a grand coalition government between the DPJ and LDP.March 29: The fiscal year 2011 budget passes in the Diet, but the related deficit bond bill is left

up in the air.May 2: Japan’s Diet passes the first supplementary budget for fiscal year 2011 for post-earthquake

reconstruction.May 6: PM Kan orders the suspension of operations at the Hamaoka nuclear power plant southwest

of Tokyo.May 21-22: PM Kan hosts the Japan-China-South Korea trilateral summit.May 26: PM Kan and President Obama meet on the margins of the G8 Summit in Deauville,

France.June 2: PM Kan survives a no-confidence vote in the lower house, presented jointly by the LDP,

Komeito (Clean Government Party), and the SPJ.June 8–9: PLAN warships transit in international waters between Okinotorishima and Miyakojima

for an exercise in the western Pacific.June 21: U.S.-Japan 2+2 SCC is held in Washington, D.C., and issues a joint statement reaffirming

common strategic objectives for the alliance.July 5: Reconstruction Minister Matsumoto Ryu resigns because of gaffes he committed in meetings

with local government officials during a visit to the Tohoku region.July 13: PM Kan suggests Japan should end its reliance on nuclear power.July 25: The Diet passes the second supplementary budget for fiscal year 2011 for post-disaster

reconstruction.Aug. 9: The DPJ, LDP, and Komeito agree to review promises made in the 2009 DPJ election

manifesto.Aug. 26: The Diet passes legislation authorizing the issuance of bonds to fund the fiscal year 2011

budget, and PM Kan announces his resignation.Aug. 29: Noda Yoshihiko defeats Kaieda Banri in a runoff election and is elected as the DPJ president.Aug. 30: The Diet nominates Noda as prime minister.Sept. 2: PM Noda announces his cabinet.Sept. 11: Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry Hachiro Yoshio resigns because of his remarks

on the Fukushima nuclear power plant incident.Sept. 21: PM Noda and President Obama meet during the UN General Assembly in New York.Sept. 22: PM Noda and ROK President Lee meet during the UN General Assembly in New York.Sept. 23: PM Noda and Indian PM Manmohan Singh meet during the UN General Assembly in

New York.


Sept. 27: PM Noda meets Philippine President Benigno Aquino in Tokyo, and they issue a joint statement on their strategic partnership.

Oct. 19: PM Noda visits the ROK as his first bilateral foreign visit and meets President Lee in Seoul.Oct. 25: PM Noda meets U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta in Tokyo.Oct. 31: PM Noda meets Vietnamese PM Nguyen Tan Dung in Tokyo, and they issue a joint

statement promoting a strategic partnership.Nov. 1: Defense Minister Ichikawa Yasuo orders the SDF to begin the dispatch of an engineering

unit to aid in humanitarian operations in South Sudan.Nov. 2: Defense Minister Ichikawa meets Indian Defense Minister A.K. Antony in Tokyo.Nov. 12: PM Noda meets President Obama during the APEC meeting in Hawaii and announces

Japan’s initial involvement in consultations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).Nov. 12: PM Noda meets Chinese President Hu during the APEC meeting in Hawaii. This is the

first bilateral summit between the two leaders.Nov. 15: The Noda cabinet decides to dispatch two GSDF officers to the UN PKO in South Sudan.Nov. 16: U.S. President Obama meets Australian PM Julia Gillard in Canberra and announces

plans to station twenty-five hundred U.S. Marines on a rotating basis in Darwin, Australia.Nov. 18–19: PM Noda attends ASEAN meetings in Bali, Indonesia, including the East Asian

Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Summit, and the Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Summit.

Nov. 21: The Diet passes the third supplemental budget for fiscal year 2011 for post-disaster reconstruction.

Nov. 23: Foreign Minister Gemba Koichiro visits China and discusses PM Noda’s possible visit to China by the end of 2011.

Nov. 29: Defense Minister Ichikawa dismisses the director general of Okinawa Defense Bureau over indiscreet remark in connection with the FRF plan.

Dec. 9: The upper house of Diet passes censure motions against Defense Minister Ichikawa Yasuo and Consumer Affairs Minister Yamaoka Kenji.

Dec. 14-16: Japan, China, and South Korea conclude a study calling for a trilateral FTA.Dec. 18: PM Noda meets with South Korean President Lee in Kyoto.Dec. 19: The Noda administration decides to purchase the F-35 as its next-generation fighter to

replace the F-4.Dec. 19: North Korean media report that DPRK leader Kim Jong Il died on Dec. 17.Dec. 19: The United States hosts Japan and India for the first-ever trilateral dialogue.Dec. 19: FM Gemba meets U.S. Secretary of State Clinton in Washington, D.C., to discuss the

FRF, North Korea, and Iran issues.Dec. 20: The Noda administration approves plans to dispatch GSDF to South Sudan for

peacekeeping activities under the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS).

Dec. 25–26: PM Noda visits China and meets Premier Wen and President Hu.Dec. 27: Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu announces revision of the three principles on

arms exports.Dec. 27–29: PM Noda visits New Delhi to meet Indian PM Singh.Dec. 28: The Noda administration submits an environmental appraisal for the FRF plan to the

Okinawa prefectural government.Dec. 28: Nine DPJ lawmakers submit resignations from the DPJ to protest a planned consumption

tax hike.


Dec. 29: North Korea holds a memorial service for Kim Jong-il and declares Kim Jong-un as the DPRK’s “supreme leader.”

2012Jan. 5: President Obama announces a new defense strategy, focusing more on the Asia-Pacific

region.Jan.12: U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner meets Finance Minister Azumi Jun in

Tokyo and seeks Japanese cooperation with additional economic sanctions against Iran.Jan. 13: PM Noda reshuffles his cabinet.Jan. 17-19: Japan holds preliminary talks with Vietnam and Brunei on the TPP.Jan. 24: FM Gemba mentions the Dokdo/Takeshima issue in his policy speech in the Diet, and

the ROK foreign ministry issues a statement of protest against Japan.Jan. 24–25: Japan holds preliminary talks with Chile and Peru on the TPP.Jan. 26: U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announces plan for defense budget cuts.Feb. 7: Japan holds preliminary talks with the United States on the TPP.Feb. 8: The United States and Japan issue a joint statement announcing a review of the current

USFJ realignment plan in order to delink the FRF relocation and the USMC transfer to Guam.


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About the Author

Weston S. Konishi is director of Asia-Pacif-ic studies at IFPA, where he specializes in Ja-pan and Asia policy issues. In 2009, he served as an analyst in Asian affairs at the Congressio-nal Research Service (CRS), authoring Japan’s Historic 2009 Elections: Implications for U.S. In-terests, the first report to Congress focusing on the Democratic Party of Japan. From 2007 to 2008, Weston was a Council on Foreign Rela-tions/Hitachi International Affairs fellow in Ja-pan, conducting research on Japanese foreign and defense policies at the Tokyo-based Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS) and the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS). From 2004 to 2007, he served as director of pro-grams at the Mansfield Foundation, where he oversaw the foundation’s exchanges, policy di-alogues, research projects, and development activities. From 2000 to 2008, Weston was a monthly contributing columnist on regional af-fairs for the Daily Yomiuri. He is a member of the United States Council for Security Coopera-tion in the Asia Pacific (USCSCAP) and a mem-ber of the U.S.-Japan Network for the Future. Weston received his BA and MA from the Inter-national Christian University in Mitaka, Tokyo, where he was awarded a Monbusho (Ministry of Education) Scholarship.

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