from inst to gov part 1
DESCRIPTION
First part "From institutions to governance"TRANSCRIPT
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From Institutions to Governance
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Self-organization is key in complex adaptive systems
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Self-organization is key in complex adaptive systems
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Why does this matter?
Because governance is becoming increasingly complex, and provides more
space for self-organization!
Compare with Folke et al (2005)
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Global changes in the political landscape
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Global changes in the political landscape
Decentralization
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Global changes in the political landscape
Decentralization
Public Private Partnerships
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Global changes in the political landscape
Decentralization
Public Private Partnerships
Non-governmental organizations
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Global changes in the political landscape
Decentralization
Public Private Partnerships
Non-governmental organizations
International agreements
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Centralized decision-making
Central policy-maker (e.g. environmentalministry)
Regional or local state authorities
Local natural resource users
Decision-making
Implementation and monitoring
Behavioral response
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Decision-making in complex governance systems
Central policy-maker (e.g. environmental ministry)
Regional or local state authorities
Local natural resource users
Decision-making,implementation,negotiations,partnerships
Implementation, monitoring, negotiations, partnerships
International norms, agreements
Decentralization
Non-state actors
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Adaptive Management Adaptive Co-management
Holling (1978): AM, iterated process in the face of uncertainty, experimentation, continuous evaluations
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Adaptive Management Adaptive Co-management
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Adaptive Management Adaptive Co-management
Co-management!Adaptive, learning, sharing of
decision-making btw stakeholders
Fikret Berkes and colleagues
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Adaptive Governance
Extension of adaptive co-management:
* not place bound* can include and explore, several place bound attempts of ACM at the same time* polycentric* higher levels of social organization, up to global* explorative framework!
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Illustrations of adaptive governance
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Making Sense of Complexity in Governance
All systems don’t look the same!
Two main approachesi) Box typologies
ii) Network typologies
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Box typology, example - Urban Governance
Jon Pierre
ParticipantsObjectives
InstrumentsOutcomes
.....
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Box typology, example - Urban Governance
1980s, is a Darwinistic perspective on local economic development; cities
that cannot sustain their economic growth should not be artificially supported
by national government. Furthermore, inwelfare states such as the Scandina-
vian countries and theNetherlands, the central state has experienced growing
budget deficits, which has led to cutbacks in local government grants. Sup-
porting declining cities and regions, therefore, is no longer an option.
Table 1 summarizes the fourmodels of urban governance. Patterns of sub-
ordination describe different relationships between urban economic policy
and the market economy. In both positive and negative subordination, urban
policy is responding to, rather than proactively governing, the economy. In
positive subordination, urban policies conform and contribute to the market
economy, whereas negative subordinationmeans that urban economic devel-
opment policy is so constrained by the capitalist economy that it is effectively
unable to make a contribution to the functioning of the economic system.10
Hula (1993, 38) described local government restructuring as a case of posi-
tive subordination; local governments are restructuring in ways “that mobi-
lize types and levels of private resources not normally available to purely
public institutions,” in ways “that shift program goals toward traditional eco-
nomic elites,” and in ways “that may reduce popular control.”
As Table 1 suggests, there are such distinct differences between the four
governance models that conflict within the city administrative apparatus
should only be expected. Cities tend to contain these different institutions by
allowing for a multiorganizational and fragmented structure in which differ-
ent segments of the organization are enabled to develop different models of
governance. It remains clear that the differences in perspective on urban poli-
tics that the models display suggest that urban “ungovernability” is in part
388 URBAN AFFAIRS REVIEW / January 1999
TABLE 1: Models of Urban Governance: Defining Characteristics
Models of Urban Governance
Defining Characteristics Managerial Corporatist Progrowth Welfare
Policy objectives Efficiency Distribution Growth Redistribution
Policy style Pragmatic Ideological Pragmatic Ideological
Nature of political exchange Consensus Conflict Consensus Conflict
Nature of public-private exchange Competitive Concerted Interactive Restrictive
Local state-citizen relationship Exclusive Inclusive Exclusive Inclusive
Primary contingency Professionals Civic leaders Business The state
Key instruments Contracts Deliberations Partnerships Networks
Pattern of subordination Positive Negative Positive Negative
Key evaluative criterion Efficiency Participation Growth Equity
at Stockholms Universitet on November 17, 2010uar.sagepub.comDownloaded from
From Pierre (1999), Urban Affairs Review
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Box typology, example - Urban Governance
1980s, is a Darwinistic perspective on local economic development; cities
that cannot sustain their economic growth should not be artificially supported
by national government. Furthermore, inwelfare states such as the Scandina-
vian countries and theNetherlands, the central state has experienced growing
budget deficits, which has led to cutbacks in local government grants. Sup-
porting declining cities and regions, therefore, is no longer an option.
Table 1 summarizes the fourmodels of urban governance. Patterns of sub-
ordination describe different relationships between urban economic policy
and the market economy. In both positive and negative subordination, urban
policy is responding to, rather than proactively governing, the economy. In
positive subordination, urban policies conform and contribute to the market
economy, whereas negative subordinationmeans that urban economic devel-
opment policy is so constrained by the capitalist economy that it is effectively
unable to make a contribution to the functioning of the economic system.10
Hula (1993, 38) described local government restructuring as a case of posi-
tive subordination; local governments are restructuring in ways “that mobi-
lize types and levels of private resources not normally available to purely
public institutions,” in ways “that shift program goals toward traditional eco-
nomic elites,” and in ways “that may reduce popular control.”
As Table 1 suggests, there are such distinct differences between the four
governance models that conflict within the city administrative apparatus
should only be expected. Cities tend to contain these different institutions by
allowing for a multiorganizational and fragmented structure in which differ-
ent segments of the organization are enabled to develop different models of
governance. It remains clear that the differences in perspective on urban poli-
tics that the models display suggest that urban “ungovernability” is in part
388 URBAN AFFAIRS REVIEW / January 1999
TABLE 1: Models of Urban Governance: Defining Characteristics
Models of Urban Governance
Defining Characteristics Managerial Corporatist Progrowth Welfare
Policy objectives Efficiency Distribution Growth Redistribution
Policy style Pragmatic Ideological Pragmatic Ideological
Nature of political exchange Consensus Conflict Consensus Conflict
Nature of public-private exchange Competitive Concerted Interactive Restrictive
Local state-citizen relationship Exclusive Inclusive Exclusive Inclusive
Primary contingency Professionals Civic leaders Business The state
Key instruments Contracts Deliberations Partnerships Networks
Pattern of subordination Positive Negative Positive Negative
Key evaluative criterion Efficiency Participation Growth Equity
at Stockholms Universitet on November 17, 2010uar.sagepub.comDownloaded from
From Pierre (1999), Urban Affairs Review
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Box typology, example - Urban Governance
1980s, is a Darwinistic perspective on local economic development; cities
that cannot sustain their economic growth should not be artificially supported
by national government. Furthermore, inwelfare states such as the Scandina-
vian countries and theNetherlands, the central state has experienced growing
budget deficits, which has led to cutbacks in local government grants. Sup-
porting declining cities and regions, therefore, is no longer an option.
Table 1 summarizes the fourmodels of urban governance. Patterns of sub-
ordination describe different relationships between urban economic policy
and the market economy. In both positive and negative subordination, urban
policy is responding to, rather than proactively governing, the economy. In
positive subordination, urban policies conform and contribute to the market
economy, whereas negative subordinationmeans that urban economic devel-
opment policy is so constrained by the capitalist economy that it is effectively
unable to make a contribution to the functioning of the economic system.10
Hula (1993, 38) described local government restructuring as a case of posi-
tive subordination; local governments are restructuring in ways “that mobi-
lize types and levels of private resources not normally available to purely
public institutions,” in ways “that shift program goals toward traditional eco-
nomic elites,” and in ways “that may reduce popular control.”
As Table 1 suggests, there are such distinct differences between the four
governance models that conflict within the city administrative apparatus
should only be expected. Cities tend to contain these different institutions by
allowing for a multiorganizational and fragmented structure in which differ-
ent segments of the organization are enabled to develop different models of
governance. It remains clear that the differences in perspective on urban poli-
tics that the models display suggest that urban “ungovernability” is in part
388 URBAN AFFAIRS REVIEW / January 1999
TABLE 1: Models of Urban Governance: Defining Characteristics
Models of Urban Governance
Defining Characteristics Managerial Corporatist Progrowth Welfare
Policy objectives Efficiency Distribution Growth Redistribution
Policy style Pragmatic Ideological Pragmatic Ideological
Nature of political exchange Consensus Conflict Consensus Conflict
Nature of public-private exchange Competitive Concerted Interactive Restrictive
Local state-citizen relationship Exclusive Inclusive Exclusive Inclusive
Primary contingency Professionals Civic leaders Business The state
Key instruments Contracts Deliberations Partnerships Networks
Pattern of subordination Positive Negative Positive Negative
Key evaluative criterion Efficiency Participation Growth Equity
at Stockholms Universitet on November 17, 2010uar.sagepub.comDownloaded from
From Pierre (1999), Urban Affairs Review
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ii) Network typologies - polycentric systems
Vincent Ostrom
Polycentric systems - many centers of decision making that are formally independent of each other.
“Many elements are capable of making mutual adjustments for ordering their relationships with one another within a general system of rules where each element acts with independence of other elements.”
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ocean acidification
climate changemarine biodiversity
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FAOICES
World BankIUCN
UNEP
WorldFish Centre
UNESCOGlobal Forum on Oceans
Coasts and Islands
UN Ocean
PacFaGPA-MarineICRI
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FAO WB
World FishUNEP
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Other examples
CybersecurityClimate policy
Urban governance
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What do we want “adaptive governance” to achieve?
“The Problem of Fit”
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some networks, while in others, the organizational structure is mainly basedon policy co-ordination offices. Furthermore, some project-oriented sub-networks (usually with only a limited number of participating cities), whichare supported by special EU funding, have emerged within most networks.
The second common structural feature of TMNs is that they are headedby (political) boards consisting of a president, various vice-presidents andadditional board members. These bodies are responsible for general decision-making between General Assembly meetings. Board members represent theircity and are directly involved in local politics and policy-making. Boardmembers are usually powerful representatives (for example a mayor or vice-mayor) of the most active cities who push innovative approaches at locallevel. They share a common interest in transnational learning and theexchange of experience across national borders. Furthermore, board membersrepresent the network externally, for example, at international conferences,and may even engage in direct lobbying, such as in the decision-makingprocesses of the European Commission or the European Parliament.
The third feature of TMNs is their member cities. Joining a TMN is seento have advantages for cities, ranging from the exchange of experience toaccess to funding and the development of direct links between the local and
Figure 1: Structure of Transnational Municipal Networks
Source: Authors’ own data.
CITIES, EUROPEANIZATION AND MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE 315
© 2009 The Author(s)Journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
From Kern & Bulkeley (2009), JCMS
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some networks, while in others, the organizational structure is mainly basedon policy co-ordination offices. Furthermore, some project-oriented sub-networks (usually with only a limited number of participating cities), whichare supported by special EU funding, have emerged within most networks.
The second common structural feature of TMNs is that they are headedby (political) boards consisting of a president, various vice-presidents andadditional board members. These bodies are responsible for general decision-making between General Assembly meetings. Board members represent theircity and are directly involved in local politics and policy-making. Boardmembers are usually powerful representatives (for example a mayor or vice-mayor) of the most active cities who push innovative approaches at locallevel. They share a common interest in transnational learning and theexchange of experience across national borders. Furthermore, board membersrepresent the network externally, for example, at international conferences,and may even engage in direct lobbying, such as in the decision-makingprocesses of the European Commission or the European Parliament.
The third feature of TMNs is their member cities. Joining a TMN is seento have advantages for cities, ranging from the exchange of experience toaccess to funding and the development of direct links between the local and
Figure 1: Structure of Transnational Municipal Networks
Source: Authors’ own data.
CITIES, EUROPEANIZATION AND MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE 315
© 2009 The Author(s)Journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
From Kern & Bulkeley (2009), JCMS
1,400 European cities in city networks
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From Strong to Weak Polycentricity
Weakest - only communicationSelf-organization
Not necessarily non-hierarchical
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From Strong to Weak Polycentricity
Stronger - Self-organization and joint action by
core
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From Strong to Weak Polycentricity
Stronger - Self-organization and joint action by
core
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Strong - high levels of trust, small groupSelf-organization, joint action, conflict
resolution
From Strong to Weak Polycentricity
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Mini-task, 10 min, 3 and 3
• Same system as before, think about it as a polycentric system
• Nodes - who? what?
• type of links - collaboration or just communication?
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BREAK
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Three forces that are reshaping the
Planet
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The AnthopocenePlanetary Boundaries
“The Great Acceleration
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The AnthopocenePlanetary Boundaries
“The Great Acceleration
Political shifts towards networked forms of governance
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The AnthopocenePlanetary Boundaries
“The Great Acceleration
Political shifts towards networked forms of governance
Mass-Self Communication
Information Revolution
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Mini-task, 3 and 3, 10 mins
Pick a political area of interestTry to identify key actors involved in steering
What is their objective?Could be local, could be global, could be multilevel.