franklin county, ohio (3 f~b i1 '2.l. criminal division columbus, ohio 43215 tel: 614.228.0523...

TN TIIE COURTor COMMON PLEAS,,., 1, \ \0: S\ FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO

(3 �f�~�b '2.L. AI CRIMINAL DIVISION

CASENO, 96-CR-2767Plaintiff,

-v-

RICHARD A. MONTGOMERY,

Defendant.

JUDGEBESSEY

MOTION TO DISMISS

Now comesthe Defendant,by and throughcounsel,and respectfullymovesthe Court

for an Orderdismissingthe instantcaseagainstthe Defendantasthe prosecutionof this caseis

in violation ofO.R.C. § 2901.13,the SpeedyTrial Clauseof the Sixth Amendment,andthe Due

ProcessClauseof the FourteenthAmendment. A Memorandumin support of Defendant's

Motion to Dismissis attachedheretoandincorporatedherein.

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Respectfullysubmitted,

J y R. Davis (0064009)avis Law Offices Co., L.P.A.

523 SouthThird StreetColumbus,Ohio 43215Tel: 614.228.0523Fax: [email protected] Defendant

T *-

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEASr* *. r \ FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO

i1"

1 CRIMINAL DIVISION

\ * VSTATE OF OHIO,

CASE NO. 96-CR-2767Plaintiff,

-v-

RICHARD A. MONTGOMERY, JUDGE BESSEY

Defendant.

MOTION TO DISMISS<

-Jin Now comes the Defendant, by and through counsel, and respectfully moves the Court

c -c Ov-.

y £5 < for an Order dismissing the instant case against the Defendant as the prosecution of this case isV3 >

o ^c> ^o in violation of O.R.C. § 2901.13, the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and the Dueo DUJ

< Oy; Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A Memorandum in support of Defendant's><

Motion to Dismiss is attached hereto and incorporated herein.

* ¦* Respectfully submitted,l; .

C^> < / ': ¦-i

l.j , ;J; ¦

*ioi€y R. Davis (0064009)

avis Law Offices Co., L.P.A

r 523 South Third StreetColumbus, Ohio 43215Tel: 614.228.0523Fax: [email protected] for Defendant

Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=2196fc1f-1424-4fa8-bcab-e967f599f9e7

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORTOF DEFENDANT'SMOTION TO DISMISS

A. PROCEDURALBACKGROUND

On May 9, 1996,the Indictmentwasfiled in the instantcaseallegingthat theDefendant,

RichardMontgomery,failed to appearat a probationrevocationhearingscheduledfor April 29,

1996,havingbeenreleasedupona recognizancebond. Exhibit A. Along with this Indictment,

the Staterequesteda Warrantbe issued,which was also filed by the Clerk on May 9, 1996.

Exhibit B. At the requestof the State,this warrantwas issuedto Mr. Montgomery'saddressat

345 SchulerStreet,Newark, Ohio. Id. However, this warrant was issuedto the Sheriff of

Franklin County,not the Sheriffof Licking County,whereMr. Montgomeryresided. Id. The

record of this casewith the Clerk of Courts revealsno notation nor return of suchwarrant.

Exhibit C.

Mr. Montgomerycontinuedto resideat the SchulerStreetaddressfor another3 12 years,

until January,2000, at which time he moved to his current addressat 14485 JackrunRoad,

Rockbridge,Ohio. Since 1996, Mr. Montgomeryhas lived openly in thesecommunitiesand

has continuedto have repeatedcontactwith the State: working, paying taxes, renewinghis

driver's license,etc. At no time did Mr. Montgomeryseekto concealhimself. Nor would Mr.

Montgomeryhavehadany reasonto do so, as he was not madeawareof the existenceof this

chargeandthewarrantuntil July, 2007.

Mr. Montgomerywas madeawareof this chargeonly when, upon applying for Social

Securityafter retirementdue to a heartattack,he was informedby the personnelthat a warrant

existedfor his arrestandthathewould bedeniedbenefitsif hedid not haveit takencareof.

Mr. Montgomeryimmediatelycontactedan attorneywho petitionedthe court to have

the probationwarrant lifted and the capiasset aside. The warrantwas in fact lifted and the

Motion to Dismiss

- 2 -

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

A. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 9, 1996, the Indictment was iled in the instant case alleging that the Defendant,

Richard Montgomery, failed to appear at a probation revocation hearing scheduled for Apil 29,

1996, having been released upon a recognizance bond. Exhibit A. Along with this Indictment,

the State requested a Warrant be issued, which was also iled by the Clerk on May 9, 1996.

Exhibit B. At the request of the State, this warrant was issued to Mr. Montgomery's address at

345 Schuler Street, Newark, Ohio. Id However, this warrant was issued to the Sheriff of

Franklin County, not the Sheriff of Licking County, where Mr. Montgomery resided. Id The

<CL record of this case with the Clerk of Courts reveals no notation nor return of such warrant.

UJ

oo

NO 8la Exhibit C

O gLi. ^

Mr. Montgomery continued to reside at the Schuler Street address for another 3 V% years,-I° 5 ¦ *55 5 2 until January, 2000, at which time he moved to his current address at 14485 Jackrun Road,5

yot> Rockbridge, Ohio. Since 1996, Mr, Montgomery has lived openly in these communities andQ

has continued to have repeated contact with the State: working, paying taxes, renewing his

driver's license, etc. At no time did Mr. Montgomery seek to conceal himself. Nor would Mr.

Montgomery have had any reason to do so, as he was not made aware of the existence of this

charge and the warrant until July, 2007*

Mr, Montgomery was made aware of this charge only when, upon applying for Social

Secuity ater retirement due to a heart attack, he was informed by the personnel that a warrant

existed for his arrest and that he would be denied beneits if he did not have it taken care of.

Mr. Montgomery immediately contacted an attorney who petitioned the court to have

the probation warrant lited and the capias set aside. The warrant was in fact lited and the

Motion to Dismiss

-2-


underlying capiaswas set asideby JudgeHogan on July 18, 2007. Exhibit D. Further, the

probationunderwhich Mr. Montgomerywas allegedto have abscondedwas terminated. Id.

Thewarrantfiled in this casewaslikewise recalledon December13,2007. Exhibit C.

B. LAW AND ARGUMENT

I. Prosecutionis BarredPursuantto O.R.C.§ 2901.13

Section 2901.13(A) of the Ohio Revised Code states, in pertinent part, that: "[A]

prosecutionshall be barredunlessit is commencedwithin the following periodsafteran offense

is committed: (a) for a felony, six years." Generally,"[a] prosecutionis commencedon the

date an indictmentis returnedor an information filed, or on the datea lawful arrestwithout a

warrant is made, or on the date a warrant, summons,citation, or other processis issued

whicheveroccurs first." O.R.C. § 2901.13(E). In the instant case,the indictment alleging

Failure to Appear, was filed well within the six year period. However, the return of an

indictmentis not controlling where,ashere,therehasbeena completelack of duediligenceon

thepartof the statein commencingtheprosecutionon this Indictment.

Section2901.13(E)further statesthat:

A prosecutionis not commencedby the return of an indictmentorthe filing of an informationunlessreasonablediligenceis exercisedto issue and exerciseprocesson the same. A prosecutionis notcommencedupon issuanceof a warrant,summons,citation, or otherprocess,unless reasonablediligence is exercisedto execute thesame.

Here, despitethe fact that Mr. Montgomerywas living openly at the sameaddressto

which the warrantwasissuedfor until January2000,the Statefailed to make anyeffort to serve

Mr. Montgomeryand commencethe prosecution. A review of the court record for this case

revealsno return of servicenoted nor filed. Further, the Warrant is issuedto the Sheriff of

Motion to Dismiss

- 3 -

underlying capias was set aside by Judge Hogan on July 18, 2007. Exhibit D. Further, the

probation under which Mr, Montgomery was alleged to have absconded was terminated. Id.

The warrant iled in this case was likewise recalled on December 13,2007. Exhibit C

B. LAW AND ARGUMENT

I. Prosecution is Barred Pursuant to O.R.C. § 2901.13

Section 2901.13(A) of the Ohio Revised Code states, in pertinent part, that: "[A]

prosecution shall be barred unless it is commenced within the following periods ater an offense

is committed: (a) for a felony, six years." Generally, "[a] prosecution is commenced on the

date an indictment is returned or an information iled, or on the date a lawful arrest without a<

2 warrant is made, or on the date a warrant, summons, citation, or other process is issuedOU

*> 8vi t

isLU Q 5 whichever occurs irst." O.R.C. § 2901.13(E). In the instant case, the indictment alleging

OS* —k

33 NO- 2 so g¦t 1 Failure to Appear, was iled well within the six year peiod. However, the return of an

3 *J 8 y indictment is not controlling where, as here, there has been a complete lack of due diligence on

2the part of the state in commencing the prosecution on this Indictment

Section 2901.13(E) further states that:

A prosecuion is not commenced by the return of an indictment orthe iling of an information unless reasonable diligence is exercisedto issue and exercise process on the same. A prosecution is notcommenced upon issuance of a warrant, summons, citation, or otherprocess, unless reasonable diligence is exercised to execute thesame.

Here, despite the fact that Mr. Montgomery was living openly at the same address to

which the warrant was issued for until January 2000, the State failed to make any effort to serve

Mr. Montgomery and commence the prosecution. A review of the court record for this case

reveals no return of service noted nor filed. Further, the Warrant is issued to the Sheriff of

Motion toDismiss

-3-


Franklin County, not Licking County where Mr. Montgomerywas residing. Since January,

2000, Mr. Montgomeryhas beenopenly residing at his currentaddressin Rockbridge,Ohio,

wherehe hasbeenlisted in the phonedirectory, beenpaying taxes,beenrenewinghis driver's

license,etc..

The burdenis on the State to demonstratethat the prosecutionhas beencommenced

within the applicablestatuteof limitations and that reasonablediligencehasbeenexercisedin

the serviceof processor warrant.Statev. Climaco,Climaco,Seminatore,Lefkowitz & Garofoli

(1999), 85 Ohio St. 3d 58, 1999 Ohio 408, 709 N.E.2d 1192, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 154;

Statev. King (1995),103Ohio App.3d 210,658N.E.2d 1138, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 1816

(10th App., Franklin); Movant respectfullyassertsthat the Statecannotmeet its burdenas it

appearsthat no effort, beyondthe issuanceof a warrantto the wrongjurisdiction was madein

this case.

II. Prosecutionis BarredUnder the SpeedyTrial Clausesof the United StatesConstitutionandtheOhio Constitution.

Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, "[i]n all criminal

prosecutions,the accusedshall enjoy the right to a speedyandpublic trial, by an impartial jury

of the Stateanddistrict whereinthe crime shall havebeencommence." Section10, Article I of

the Ohio Constitutionsimilarly guaranteesthe right to a speedytrial, andtheserightshavebeen

found to becoextensive.Statev. Walker (10th App, Franklin2007)2007Ohio 4666,2007Ohio

App. LEXIS 4208, citing Statev. Bayless(10th App., Franklin 2002) 2002 Ohio 5791,at PI0,

appealnot allowed(2003),98Ohio St.3d1480,2003Ohio 974,784N.E.2d712.

The right to speedytrial is fundamentalto the Americanjustice system,Klopfer v. N.

Carolina(1967),386U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1; Smith v. Hooey, (1969) 393 U.S.

374, 89 S.Ct. 575,21 L.Ed.2d 607; Barkerv. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514,92S.Ct. 2182,33

Motion to Dismiss

- 4 -

Franklin County, not Licking County where Mr. Montgomery was residing. Since January,

2000, Mr. Montgomery has been openly residing at his current address in Rockbridge, Ohio,

where he has been listed in the phone directory, been paying taxes, been renewing his driver's

license, etc..

The burden is on the State to demonstrate that the prosecution has been commenced

within the applicable statute of limitations and that reasonable diligence has been exercised in

the service of process or warrant. State v. Climaco. Climaco, Seminatore, Lefkowitz & Garofoli

(1999), 85 Ohio St 3d 58, 1999 Ohio 408, 709 N.E.2d 1192, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 154;

State v. King (1995), 103 Ohio App.3d 210, 658 N.E.2d 1138, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 1816

¦m (10th App., Franklin); Movant respectfully asserts that the State cannot meet its burden as it<a

cappears that no effort, beyond the issuance of a warrant to the wrong jurisdiction was made in

ou * 8oS this case.

to ^§¦ ¦ IL Prosecution is Barred Under the Speedy Trial Clauses of the United States

< Constitution and the Ohio Constitution,y

Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, "[i]n all criminali

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public tial, by an impartial jury

of the State and district wherein the cime shall have been commence." Section 10, Article I of

the Ohio Constitution similarly guarantees the ight to a speedy tial, and these ights have been

found to be coextensive. State v. Walker (10th App, Franklin 2007) 2007 Ohio 4666,2007 Ohio

App. LEXIS 4208, citing State v. Bavless (10th App., Franklin 2002) 2002 Ohio 5791, at P10,

appeal not allowed (2003), 98 Ohio St.3d 1480, 2003 Ohio 974, 784 N.E.2d 712.

The ight to speedy trial is fundamental to the Ameican justice system, Klopfer v. N.

Carolina (1967), 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1; Smith v. Hooey, (1969) 393 U.S.

374, 89 S.Ct 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607; Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct 2182, 33

Motion to Dismiss

-4-


L.Ed.2d 101. It is lleld ltl.esselltial to protectat leasttllree basicdell1alldsof crilllillal jllstice ill

the Anglo-Americanlegal system: '(1) to preventundueand oppressiveincarcerationprior to

trial, (2) to minimize anxietyand concernaccompanyingpublic accusationand (3) to limit the

possibilitiesthat long delaywill impair the ability of an accusedto defendhimself.'" Hooey,at

377-378,quoting United Statesv. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed2d 627, cited in

Walker,at PI3.

In addressingchallengesto prosecutionsunder the SpeedyTrial Clause,the Supreme

Court rejectedan inflexible bright-line standard,andinsteadapplied"a balancingtest, in which

the conduct of both the prosecutionand the defendantare weighed." Barker, at 530. In

.( applying this test, the Court identified severalfactorswhich courtsshouldconsider: the length�~.j

:' ti V'I �~ of the delay in prosecution;the reasonfor the delayin prosecution;the defendant'sassertionof8 �~�~�~�~�8en �~�~�~�V�) �~�~ �~ �~ �~ : :s his or her rights; and any prejudiceto the defendant. Id., seealso, Doggettv. United States�~ �:�2�0�~�~ rJ}

�~ f- �~�~�~�>

�~ �~ i; �~ ! (1992),505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct.2686, 120L.Ed.2d520 (discussingthe inquiriesunderBarker).« ..J£-.u.. �~

;;; 518 The first, and"triggering" factor in the Barkertest is the lengthof the delay. Id. "Until5=«o thereis somedelaywhich is presunlptivelyprejudicial, there is no necessityfor further inquiry

into the other factors which go into the balance." Id., at 530. This is to be determinedon a

case-by-casebasisas "the length of the delay that will provokesuchan inquiry is necessarily

dependentupon the peculiarcircumstancesof the case.To "trigger" this analysis,it must be

allegedthat the interval betweenaccusationandtrial hascrossedthe thresholddividing ordinary

from 'presumptivelyprejudicial' delay." Id. While this is dependentuponthe factsof the case,

it has been generally found that post-accusationdelays of 1 year, to be "presumptively

prejudicial". Doggett,at 652, fn. 1, citing 2 W.Lafave& J. Israel,Criminal Procedure§ 18.2,

p. 405 (1984).

Motion to Dismiss

- 5 -

L.Ed.2d 101. It is held "essential to protect at least three basic demands of ciminal justice in

the Anglo-American legal system: '(1) to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to

tial, (2) to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and (3) to limit the

possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself."' Hooey, at

377-378, quoting United States v, Ewelt 383 U.S. 116, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed2d 627, cited in

Walker, at P13.

In addressing challenges to prosecutions under the Speedy Tial Clause, the Supreme

Court rejected an inflexible bright-line standard, and instead applied "a balancing test, in which

the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed." Barker, at 530. In

applying this test, the Court identiied several factors which couts should consider: the length

¦of the delay in prosecution; the reason for the delay in prosecution; the defendant's assertion of

S §1 his or her rights; and any prejudice to the defendant. Id., see also, Doggett v. United Statesli¦* 2 <3* g (1992), 505 U.S. 647,112 S.Ct. 2686,120 L.Ed.2d 520 (discussing the inquiies under Barker!.

*n The first, and "tiggering" factor in the Barker test is the length of the delay. Id. "Until>2

there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for further inquiry

into the other factors which go into the balance," Id., at 530. This is to be determined on a

case-by-case basis as <4the length of the delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessaily

dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. To "tigger" this analysis, it must be

alleged that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary

from 'presumptively prejudicial' delay." Id. While this is dependent upon the facts of the case,

it has been generally found that post-accusation delays of 1 year, to be "presumptively

prejudicial". Doggett, at 652, fn, 1, citing 2 W.Lafave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 18.2,

p. 405 (1984).

Motion toDismiss

-5-


Orlce tllis tlrrcsllold sllowirlg is rlladc, tllc court Illust tllerl consider,asOlle factor aIl10Ilg

others, the "extent to which the delay stretchesbeyond the bare minimum neededto trigger

judicial examinationof the claim." Barker,at 533-34. This is significantin thatthis factorsinto

the questionof prejudiceto the defendant,as the presumptionthat pretrial delayhasprejudiced

a defendantintensifieswith the lengthof the delay. Doggett,at 652.

Here, the delay in prosecutionof Mr. Montgomerywas in excessof 11 years,grossly

beyondthethresholdfor a finding of "presumptiveprejudice"to theDefendant.

The next factor to be consideredunder the Barker test is the reasonfor the delay in

prosecution. Here, it is clear that the Statewas grosslynegligentin seekingto commencethis

prosecution,which must also weigh against the State. In consideringthe effect of such

negligenceon this balancingtest,the Court in Barkerspecificallyfound that:

"different weights [are to be] assignedto different reasonsfordelay" ... Althoughnegligenceis obviouslyto be weightedmorelightly than a deliberateattemptto harm the accuseddefense,itstill falls on the wrong sideof the divide betweenacceptableandunacceptablereasonsfor delayinga criminal prosecutiononce ithasbegun. And suchis the natureof the prejudicepresumedthatthe weight we assignto official negligencecompoundsover timeas the presumptionof evidentiary prejudice grows. Thus, ourtoleration of such negligence varies inversely with itsprotractedness,... andits consequentthreatto the fairnessof theaccused'strial. Condoningprolongedand unjustifiabledelaysinprosecutionwould bothpenalizemanydefendant'sfor the state'sfault and simply encouragethe governmentto gamblewith theinterests of criminal suspects assigned a low prosecutorialpriority. The Government, indeed, can hardly complain tooloudly, for persistentneglectin concludinga criminal prosecutionindicatesan uncommonlyfeeble interestin bringing an accusedto justice; the moreweight the Governmentattachesto securingaconviction,the harderit will try to get it.

Doggett,at 656-57,citing Barker.

Motion to Dismiss

- 6 -

Once tills threshold showing is made, the court must then consider, as one factor among

others, the "extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to tigger

judicial examination of the claim." Barker, at 533-34. This is significant in that this factors into

the question of prejudice to the defendant, as the presumption that pretial delay has prejudiced

a defendant intensiies with the length of the delay. Doggett, at 652.

Here, the delay in prosecution of Mr. Montgomery was in excess of 11 years, grossly

beyond the threshold for a inding of "presumptive prejudice" to the Defendant,

The next factor to be considered under the Barker test is the reason for the delay in

prosecution. Here, it is clear that the State was grossly negligent in seeking to commence this

prosecution, which must also weigh against the State. In consideing the effect of such<1ex

£ ID 3negligence on this balancing test, the Cout in Barker specifically found that:

ou"different weights [are to be] assigned to different reasons for

£It P delay" ... Although negligence is obviously to be weighted more3 lightly than a deliberate attempt to harm the accused defense, itJ K n

still falls on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable andwv 8^

GO unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution once ithas begun. And such is the nature of the prejudice presumed that

1

the weight we assign to oicial negligence compounds over timeas the presumption of evidentiary prejudice grows. Thus, ourtoleration of such negligence varies inversely with itsprotractedness,... and its consequent threat to the fainess of theaccused's tial. Condoning prolonged and unjustiiable delays inprosecution would both penalize many defendant's for the state'sfault and simply encourage the government to gamble with theinterests of ciminal suspects assigned a low prosecutorialpiority. The Government, indeed, can hardly complain tooloudly, for persistent neglect in concluding a criminal prosecutionindicates an uncommonly feeble interest in bringing an accusedto justice; the more weight the Government attaches to secuing aconviction, the harder it will try to get it.

Doggett. at 656-57, citing Barker.

Motion toDismiss

-6-


Here, it is clearthat Mr. Montgomery'scasewas not a high priority for the Stategiven

the lack of effort on the partof the Statein pursuingthis case. Thecompletefailure of the State

to attemptserviceof the warrantfor over 11 yearsconstitutesa completelack of diligenceand

utter negligencewhich is compoundedby the length of the delay and the fact that Mr.

Montgomerywasliving openlyin thecentralOhio area.

The third factor to be consideredunderthis analysisis the accused'sinvocationof the

right to speedytrial. In the instantcase,Mr. Montgomerywasnot awareof the existenceof the

Indictmentor Warrantuntil he wasnotified by personnelat the SocialSecurityOffice that there

wasa warrantfor his arrest. Upon this realization,Mr. Montgomerycontactedan attorney and

�~ the probationwarrantwas set aside. Additionally, the court withdrew the capiasupon which0.:...i

:' t:i 'Ii ::E this Indictmentis based,andterminatedMr. Montgomery'sprobation. Defendantnow, with theo UJ - 0u �~�~�~�~�~CI'J. �V�}�~�'�O�~�~

�~ �~ �~ �~ ; �~ assistanceof counsel,assertshis right to a speedytrial. The fact that Mr. Montgomerywasnot�-�:�I�:�O�N�~�tJ.. f- �"�~�~ >�~ �:�I�:�;�g�-�-�~2 5 �~ �~ ; @ awareof the initiation of this matter,and thus could not asserthis rights thereunderdoesnot;> �a�:�:�J�U�J�<�~<: �~�5�f�-�u�.�.�~..J N U �~rfJ '0 preventMr. Montgomeryfrom now assertinghis fundamentalrights. Barker,at 526 (rejecting>=<:o

the demand-waiverrule concerninginvocationof speedytrial rights, in favor of case-by-case

reviewof factorsandcircumstances).

The final factor to be considered underthe Barker test is the prejudicesufferedby the

defendantas the result of the delay in prosecution. This prejudiceincludesthe typesof harm

previouslycited in Statev. Hooey. 393 U.S. at 377-78. Of theseforms of prejudice,"the most

seriousis the last, becausethe inability of a defendantadequatelyto preparehis caseskewsthe

fairnessof the entiresystem." Doggett,at 530,citing Barker,at 532.

As in Doggett, it is this form of prejudicewhich is asserted,since,as in Doggett, the

Defendantwas not subjectedto pretrial incarceration,nor was he awareof unresolvedcharges

Motion to Dismiss

- 7 -

Here, it is clear that Mr. Montgomery's case was not a high prioity for the State given

the lack of effot on the part of the State in pursuing this case. The complete failure of the State

to attempt service of the warrant for over 11 years constitutes a complete lack of diligence and

utter negligence which is compounded by the length of the delay and the fact that Mr.

Montgomery was living openly in the central Ohio area.

The third factor to be considered under this analysis is the accused's invocation of the

ight to speedy trial. In the instant case, Mr. Montgomery was not aware of the existence of the

Indictment or Warrant until he was notified by personnel at the Social Secuity Ofice that there

was a warrant for his arrest Upon this realization, Mr, Montgomery contacted an attorney and

the probation warrant was set aside. Additionally, the court withdrew the capias upon which<

mthis Indictment is based, and terminated Mr. Montgomery's probation. Defendant now, with the

*> 8UJ Q assistance of counsel, asserts his right to a speedy trial. The fact that Mr, Montgomery was noty |

2 <c " 5

h4

aware of the initiation of this matter, and thus could not asset his rights thereunder does not> S << «°

prevent Mr. Montgomery rom now asserting his fundamental ights. Barker, at 526 (rejecting

the demand-waiver rule concerning invocation of speedy trial ights, in favor of case-by-case

review of factors and circumstances).

The inal factor to be considered under the Barker test is the prejudice suffered by the

defendant as the result of the delay in prosecution. This prejudice includes the types of harm

previously cited in State v. Hooey. 393 U.S. at 377-78. Of these forms of prejudice, "the most

serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the

fairness of the entire system." Dogget., at 530, citing Barker, at 532.

As in Doggett. it is this form of prejudice which is asserted, since, as in Doggett, the

Defendant was not subjected to pretial incarceration, nor was he aware of unresolved charges

Motion toDismiss

-7-


againsthim. It is clearthat the passageof over 11 yearsfrom the filing of the Indictmentin this

caseto possibletrial in this matterhasseverelyand irreparablyprejudicedMr. Montgomeryin

thedefenseof his case.

The loss of possibledefenses,both proceduraland substantive;the loss of witnesses

with actual recollectionof the events;the potential loss of documentary evidence;all weigh

heavilyagainsttheDefendant'sability to obtaina fair trial.

As it is impossibleto prove a negative,or to know what defensescould have been

presenthadthe Statediligently proceededwith prosecution:

Considerationof prejudice is not limited to the specificallydemonstratable,... affirmative proofof particularizedprejudiceis not essentialto every speedytrial claim. Moore [v. Arizona414 U.S. 25, 38 L.Ed.2d 183, 94 S.Ct. 188], Barker, supra,at533. Barker explicitly recognizedthat impairment of one'sdefenseis the most difficult form of speedytrial prejudice toprove because time's erosion of exculpatory evidence andtestimony"can rarely be shown." 407 U.S. at 532. And thoughtime cantilt the caseagainsteitherside,... onecannotgenerallybe surewhich sidehasbeenprejudicedmoreseverely. Thus,wegenerallyhave to recognizethat excessivedelay presumptivelycompromisesthe reliability of a trial in ways that neitherpartycan prove or, for that matter, identify. While suchpresumptiveprejudicecannotalone carry a Sixth Amendmentclaim withoutregard to the other Barker criteria, . . . it is part of the mix ofrelevantfacts, and its importanceincreaseswith the lengthof thedelay.

Doggettat 654.

Given the difficulty often encounteredin proving specific, particularprejudicesto the

defenseafter a lengthydelayin prosecution,the Court in Doggettlookedat the otherfactorsin

the Barkertest,mostparticularly,the lengthof the delay in prosecutionandthe reasonfor such

a delay. There,the extremelengthof the delay, and the reasonfor the delay -negligenceand

lack of diligenceon thepartof the state- weighedheavily in theCourt'sdecision:

Motion to Dismiss

- 8 -

against him. Tt is clear that the passage of over 11 years from the iling of the Indictment in this

case to possible tial in this matter has severely and irreparably prejudiced Mr. Montgomery in

the defense of his case.

The loss of possible defenses, both procedural and substantive; the loss of witnesses

with actual recollection of the events; the potential loss of documentary evidence; all weigh

heavily against the Defendant's ability to obtain a fair trial.

As it is impossible to prove a negative, or to know what defenses could have been

present had the State diligently proceeded with prosecution:

Consideration of prejudice is not limited to the speciicallydemonstratable,. . . affirmative proof of particularized prejudiceis not essential to every speedy trial claim. Moore fv. Aizona

<0- 414 U.S. 25, 38 L.Ed.2d 183, 94 S.Ct 188], Barker, supra, at

b 533. Barker explicitly recognized that impairment of one'sou * S defense is the most diicult form of speedy tial prejudice to

u S prove because time's erosion of exculpatory evidence andO testimony "can rarely be shown." 407 U.S. at 532. And though

O SO time can tilt the case against either side,.., one cannot generallys isi 3 be sure which side has been prejudiced more severely. Thus, we2

W1 u generally have to recognize that excessive delay presumptivelycompromises the reliability of a tial in ways that neither party

I

can prove or, for that matter, identify. While such presumptiveprejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim withoutregard to the other Barker citeia, ... it is part of the mix ofrelevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of thedelay.

Doggett at 654.

Given the dificulty oten encountered in proving specific, particular prejudices to the

defense ater a lengthy delay in prosecution, the Court in Dogget looked at the other factors in

the Barker test, most particularly, the length of the delay in prosecution and the reason for such

a delay. There, the extreme length of the delay, and the reason for the delay - negligence and

lack of diligence on the part of the state - weighed heavily in the Court's decision:

Motion toDismiss

- 8-


To be sure,to warrantgrantingrelief, negligenceunaccompaniedby particularizedtrial prejudice must have lasted longer thannegligencedemonstrablycausingsuch prejudice. But evenso,the Government'segregiouspersistencein failing to prosecuteDoggett is clearly sufficient. The lag between Doggett'sindictment and arrestwas 8 �~ years,and he would have facedtrial 6 years earlier than he did but for the Government'sinexcusableoversights. The portion of the delay attributabletothe Government'snegligencefar exceedsthe thresholdneededtostatea speedytrial claim; indeedwe have called shorterdelays"extraordinary." See Barker, supra, at 533. When theGovernment'snegligencethus causesdelay six times as long asthat generallysufficient to trigger judicial review, ... and whenthe presumption of prejudice, albeit unspecified, is neitherextenuated, as by the defendant's acquiescence,. . . norpersuasivelyrebutted,thedefendantis entitledto relief.

Doggett,at 657-58.

In the instantcase,the Stateexhibitedgrossnegligenceanda completelack of diligence

in failing to serveMr. Montgomerywith the WarrantandIndictmentfor over 11 years. This far

exceedsthe"presumptiveprejudice"thresholdsetby the Courtandeventhedelayfor which the

Courtgrantedrelief in Doggett.

Given that here,as in Doggett,the State'snegligencehascauseda delay in prosecution

that would clearly trigger judicial review, and the presumption of prejudice is neither

extenuated,asby the defendant'sacquiescence,nor persuasivelyrebutted,this Defendantis also

entitledto relief.

III. Prosecution is Barred by the Due Process Clauseof the FourteenthAmendment

TheDueProcessClauseof the 14th Amendmentprovidesthatno Statemay"depriveany

personof life, liberty, or property,without due processof law. This includesmore than the

assuranceof a fair process,encompassing"a substantivesphere as well, 'barring certain

governmentalactions regardlessof the proceduresused to implement them.'" County of

Motion to Dismiss

- 9 -

To be sure, to warrant granting relief, negligence unaccompaniedby particularized trial prejudice must have lasted longer thannegligence demonstrably causing such prejudice. But even so,the Government's egregious persistence in failing to prosecuteDoggett is clearly suicient The lag between Dogget'sindictment and arrest was 8 XA years, and he would have facedtrial 6 years earlier than he did but for the Government'sinexcusable oversights. The portion of the delay attributable tothe Government's negligence far exceeds the threshold needed tostate a speedy trial claim; indeed we have called shoter delays"extraordinary." See Barker, supra, at 533. When theGovernment's negligence thus causes delay six times as long asthat generally suficient to trigger judicial review,. .. and whenthe presumption of prejudice, albeit unspeciied, is neitherextenuated, as by the defendant's acquiescence, norpersuasively rebutted, the defendant is entitled to relief.

Doggett at 657-58.

< In the instant case, the State exhibited gross negligence and a complete lack of diligence

*«ci Mu in failing to serve Mr. Montgomery with the Warrant and Indictment for over 11 years. This far

exceeds the "presumptive prejudice" threshold set by the Court and even the delay for which the

asso Cout granted relief in Doggett.u

Given that here, as in Doggett the State's negligence has caused a delay in prosecutionG

that would clearly tigger judicial review, and the presumption of prejudice is neither

extenuated, as by the defendant's acquiescence, nor persuasively rebuted, this Defendant is also

entitled to relief

III. Prosecution is Barred by the Due Process Clause of the FourteenthAmendment

The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment provides that no State may "deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. This includes more than the

assurance of a fair process, encompassing "a substantive sphere as well, 'baring certain

governmental actions regardless of the procedures used to implement them.'" County of

Motion toDismiss

-9-


Sacranlcl1tov. Lcwis (1998), 523 U.S. 833, 840, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043. This

"substantive"due processincludes the protection, albeit in limited circumstances,against

oppressivedelay. United Statesv. Lovasco(1977), 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d

752, rehearingdenied, 434 U.S. 881, 98 S.Ct. 242, 54 L.Ed.2d 164, citing U.S. v. Marion

(1971),404U.S. 307,313 S.Ct.455,30 L.Ed.2d468.

In consideringsucha claim, the court is to consider"the reasonsfor thedelayaswell as

the prejudiceto the accused. Lovascoat 790. In consideringthe sucha claim, it shouldbe

rememberedthat: "[t]he touchstoneof due processis protection of the individual against

arbitrary action of the government,... whetherthe fault lies in the a denial of fundamental

proceduralfairness,... or in the exerciseof powerwithout any reasonablejustification in the

serviceof a legitimate governmentalobjective," and that substantivedue processis violated

whensuchactionof the government"can properlybe characterizedas arbitrary,or conscience

shocking,in a constitutionalsense."Lewis, at 845-847.

Here, the delay of over 11 years in serving the Indictment and Warrant upon Mr.

Montgomery is "presumptively prejudicial." Barker, supra., Doggett, supra. As stated

previously,the delayin prosecutionof this casewascausedby the grossnegligenceandlack of

diligence on the part of the State in seeking to commencethis action by service of the

IndictmentandWarrant.

Sucha prejudicialdelay,basedsolelyon the nonfeasanceof the State,mustbe saidto be

arbitrary and shockingto the conscience. To havean elevenyearold chargeand warrantbe

discoveredwhile the Defendant is applying for Social Security and brought against the

Defendant when he, and other potential witnesses, can likely not recall the facts and

circumstancesleadingto theallegations;to reinsertthe long armsof the Stateinto the life of the

Motion to Dismiss

- 10 -

Sacramento v. Lewis (1998), 523 U.S. 833, 840, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043. This

ccsubstantive" due process includes the protection, albeit in limited circumstances, against

oppressive delay. United States v. Lovasco (1977), 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d

752, reheaing denied, 434 U.S. 881, 98 S.Ct. 242, 54 L.Ed.2d 164, citing U.S. v. Marion

(1971), 404 U.S. 307, 313 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468.

In considering such a claim, the court is to consider 6tthe reasons for the delay as well as

the prejudice to the accused. Lovasco at 790. In considering the such a claim, it should be

remembered that: "[t]he touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against

arbitrary action of the government, , , . whether the fault lies in the a denial of fundamental

procedural fairness,... or in the exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the0U

service of a legitimate governmental objective," and that substantive due process is violated

when such action of the government "can properly be characteized as arbitrary, or conscience

S 3 SO shocking, in a constitutional sense." Lewis, at 845-847.O o Eu

<5 *

Here, the delay of over 11 years in serving the Indictment and Warrant upon Mr.><Q Montgomery is "presumptively prejudicial." Barken supra.. Dogget, supra. As stated

previously, the delay in prosecution of this case was caused by the gross negligence and lack of

commence

Indictment and Warrant.

Such a prejudicial delay, based solely on the nonfeasance of the State, must be said to be

arbitrary and shocking to the conscience. To have an eleven year old charge and warrant be

discovered while the Defendant is applying for Social Secuity and brought against the

Defendant when he, and other potential witnesses, can likely not recall the facts and

circumstances leading to the allegations; to reinsert the long arms of the State into the life of the

Motion toDismiss

- 10-


Defendantafter over a decadeof law-abiding, to seeka chargeand punishmentagainstthe

Defendanteventhough the underlyingbasisfor the chargehas beenwithdrawn; all of these

"shock the conscience"and "interfereswith rights implicit in the conceptof orderedliberty,

and, thus, violate the Defendant'sDue Processrights. u.s.v. Salerno(1987), 481 U.S. 739,

746, 107S.Ct.2095,95 L.Ed.2d697.

C. CONCLUSION

As the State has failed to commencethis prosecutionagainst the Defendant by

exercisingreasonablediligence in seekingthe serve the Defendantwith the Indictment and

<t: Warrantfiled herein, this prosecutionis time-barredby the applicablestatuteof limitations as0.:�~

:-. E- trl �~ set forth in R.C. § 2901.13. Further, the "presumptiveprejudice"sufferedby the Defendant,o tti - �~U �~�~�M�~ 8en. �t�;�~�~�V�)�~�~ �~ �~ �~ : :s whenconsideredin conjunctionwith the extremedelay, the grossnegligenceon the part of the�S�d�s�:�o�~�;�~�~ Eo- �"�~�~ >�~ x:g--C§�~ § �~ ; �~ e; State in failing to even attempt service of processin this case,and the assertionby the�:�5�~�5�~�~�~rJ) �~�. U Defendantof his constitutionalrights, clearly demonstratethat the prosecutionof this caseafter5=<o

suchandunjustifiabledelayviolatesthe Defendant'sSpeedyTrial andDueProcessrights.

Respectfullysubmitted,

e rey R. Davis (0064009)avis Law OfficesCo., L.P.A.

523 SouthThird StreetColumbus,Ohio 43215Tel: 614.228.0523Fax: [email protected] Defendant

Motion to Dismiss

- 11 -

Defendant ater over a decade of law-abiding, to seek a charge and punishment against the

Defendant even though the underlying basis for the charge has been withdrawn; all of these

ccshock the conscience" and "interferes with ights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,

and, thus, violate the Defendant's Due Process rights. U.S. v. Salerno (1987), 481 U.S. 739,

746, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697.

C. CONCLUSION

As the State has failed to commence this prosecution against the Defendant by

exercising reasonable diligence in seeking the serve the Defendant with the Indictment and

Warrant iled herein, this prosecution is time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations as<

set forth in R.C. § 2901.13. Further, the "presumptive prejudice" suffered by the Defendant,

a when considered in conjunction with the extreme delay, the gross negligence on the part of the

e H f i £ %State in failing to even attempt service of process in this case, and the assertion by the

J as Defendant of his constitutional ights, clearly demonstrate that the prosecution of this case ater1

such and unjustifiable delay violates the Defendant's Speedy Trial and Due Process rights.

Respectfully submitted,

ereyR. Davis (0064009)avis Law Offices Co., L.P.A

523 South Third StreetColumbus, Ohio 43215Tel: 614.228.0523Fax: [email protected] for Defendant

Motion toDismiss

-II -


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersignedherebycertifies that a copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismisswas

serveduponMs. NancyA. Moore, Esq.,at the Franklin CountyProsecutor'sOffice, 373 South

High Street,14th Floor, Columbus,Ohio 43215,by hand-delivery,on February22, 2008.

J ey R. Davis (0064009)avis Law OfficesCo.,L.P.A.

Attorneyfor Defendant

Motion to Dismiss

- 12 -

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss was

served upon Ms. Nancy A. Moore, Esq., at the Franklin County Prosecutor's Office, 373 South

High Street, 14th Floor, Columbus, Ohio 43215, by hand-delivery, on February 22,2008.

R. Davis (0064009)avis Law Oices Co., L.P.A.

Attorney for Defendant

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Motion to Dismiss

-12-


own �r�e�c�o�g�r�r�i�~�l�D�c�e�. did fail to appearin the Franklin County, Ohio Common Pleas

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DAVIS lAW OFFICESCOyLPA.

96CR

INDICTMENT FOR: Failure to Appear onRecogruzanee (293i.29 R.C.) (-) (1 �C�o�u�n�t�)�~

(Total: 1 Count)

CaseNo.

the bodyofF'ranklinCounty.,in the Stateof Ohio. in the r.ameandby the authority

The Jurors of the Grand Jury of the State.of Ohio, duly,'Sele8ted,i.·(· 'J'

CountOne

In the Court of CommonPleas.Franklin County.Ohio. of-', ,j

the GrancilJury term beginningJanuary fifth. in theyearof our Lord, nne�t�h�~�d4...:.:'.

thousandmIle hundred ninet),·qx \\ithin the County of Franklin aforesaid, in

Stateof Ohio,Franklin �C�o�u�n�t�y�~ �~�t�S�:

nine hundredninety-six.

violation of section293i.29of the Ohio RevisedCode.havingbeenrelea.qedon his

Court asrequiredby suchrecognizance.the said releasehaling beenin connection

late of said �f�~�0�1�J�n�t�y�, on or aboutthe 29th day of April in the yearof our Lord, one

of theStatenfOhio upontheir oathdo find andpresentthat RichardA. Montgomery

impaneled,sworn. and chargedto inquire of crimesandoffensescomr.nittcdwithin

K **-_r. :^^_^_j .^_ .^^.i- ^»'* r.i*-*:-

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Case No, 96CR 05

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State of Ohio, »».

Franklin County., ss:INDICTMENT FOR: Failure to Appear onRecognizance (2937.29 R.C.) (-) (1 Count); 1'

(Total: 1 Count)

In the Court of Common Pleas, Franklin County, Ohio, of -.1

•

the Grand Jury term beginning January ifth, in the year of our Lord, one thousand

nine hundred ninety-six.,3

¦* #

Cqult pi}?

The Jurors of the Grand Jury of the State of Ohio, duly selected, >K t V1-1

impaneled, sworn, and charged to inquire of crimes and offenses committed within • it

the body of Franklin County, in the State of Ohio, in the name and by the authoity

of the State of Ohio upon their oath do find and present that

> late of said County, on or about the 29th day of Apil in the year of our Lord, one

thousand nine hundred ninety-six within the Couny of Franklin aforesaid, in

violation of section 2937.29 of the Ohio Revised Code, having been released on his

own recognizance, did (ail to appear in the Franklin Couny, Ohio Common Pleas

Court as required by such recognizance, the said release having been in connection

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A TRUE BILL

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�~�f�I�C�H�A�E�L MILLERProsecutingAttorneyFranklin County,Ohio

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providedandagainstthe peaceanddignity of the Stateof Ohio.

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�'�-�·�~�S�7�3�'�~ 13with a chs.rgeof the'commismonof a felony, to v.it: Forgery,as providedin section

2937.99of the Ohio ll.evised Code,contraryto the statutein suchcasesmadeand

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o1 , 3with a charge of the commission of a felony, to wit: Forgery, as provided in section

/2937,99 of the Ohio Revised Cede, contrary to the statute in such cases made and

provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Ohio,

MICHAEL MILLERProsecuting AttorneyFranklin County, Ohio

o.1/A TRUE BILL f

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iso ng Attorney i.

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Foreperson, Grand Jury

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�~�/�'StatE-of Ohio v. Rl\:hardA. �~�I�o�n�t�g�o�m�e�r�yAddn'!ss: 345SchulerStreet- Newaik,OH 43055DOB:. 2/22/45Sex/R.itce: Male?Date Cllr Arrest: -.SSN: �~�~�8�4�-�4�(�)�'�3�3�2�5

Police �.�~�~�n�c�y�: _.�M�u�n�i�c�i�.�~�a�l Reference:Count 1: Failureto Appearon Recogniunce

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State of Ohio v, tn:hard A. MontgomeryAddess: 345 Schuler Street - Newark, 01 Zk s

t/3:/DOB: 2/2*45

Sex/Race: Male?Date of Arrest - -SSN: £84-40-3325Police Agency: - -Municitp*al Reference: - -Count 1: Failure to Appear on Recogni

h 2937.29 -

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05-2767

,O'N �D�A�V�l�S�l�A�W�O�F�F�I�C�E�S�C�O�~�L�P�.�A�.EXHIBIT

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CaseNo.

96CR

RichardA, �1�.�t�o�n�t�g�o�m�e�n�~ �h�a�~ beennameda defendantin �a�n�:�~�n�d�i�c�t�:�m�e�n�t...... " w'-0'. "_ �~�.�/�'

returnedby th(\ GrandJ'ury'.

Pursuantu> Rule9. Ohio Rulesof Criminal �~�u�r�e�, theundersigned

requeststhat you or 8 deputy clerk forth"ith lssue8 warrant to an a.ppropriate

officer anddirecthim to executeit upon the abovenameddefendantat the follo",",ng

MICHAEL MILLERPROSECUTINGATTORNEYFranklin �C�o�u�n�~�r�. Ohio

..1. /

r .....-.n..... ·J ce3 th High StreetColumbus,Ohio 432156141462-.3555

IN THE COURTOF COMMON PLEAS. FRANKLIN �C�O�U�N�T�Y�,�~�o�.CRIMINAL DIVISION "I J 73,: 1 J

address:345 SchulerStreet.. Newark.0" 43055,OT an)- placewithin this �~�~�t�e�.

PRQSECUTIN<t �A�1�T�0�8�N�E�'�~�S �R�E�Q�l�T�E�-�~

FOR ISSlTANCE QF WARR,AJITupoN INDIC7TMENT

TO THE CLERK OF THE COtJRTOF COMMON PLEAS:

\'S.

Stateof Ohio,�P�l�a�i�n�t�i�f�f�~

RJchardA. ,Montgomer)'.TJOB: 2/22/45SSN: 284-40-3325

Defendant.

**mu*e*m*».^'~mm&i

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, FRANKLIN COUNTY, 0JH<1CRIMINAL DIVISION c H 5 73'//

State of Ohio, ll

Plain tif,

vs. Case No.

Richard A. Montgomery3di»

DOB: 2/22/45

96CRc2767

SSN: 2S4-40-3325 '¦ *i

.:vDefendant.

,<¦••¦

VPROSECUTING ATORNEVS REQUESTW BANT

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oTO THE CLERK OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS:

'A>

-.x.|.itRichard A. has been named a defendant in an indictment

*>.,

v.returned by the Grand Jury

Pursuant to Rule 9. Ohio Rules of Ciminal Procedure, the undersigned

-¦ ''Irequests that you or a deputy clerk forthwith issue a warrant to an appropiate• ¦*i

oficer and direct him to execute it upon the above named defendant at the ollowing:i

address: 345 Schuler Street - Newark. OH 43055. or any place within this state.

,iMICHAEL MILLERPROSECUTING ATTORNEYFranklin Countv. Ohio

1 ¦A,

/K

[ting AttorneyJ ce

3 th High Street>

Columbus, Ohio 43215*i

614/462-3555 *^

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DAVB LAW OFFICES GO, LPA.I -

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- S/R: M/X- 003: �0�2�/�2�2�/�~�S

- SSh: 284-40-3325

<OEFENOANT> UIlH;

....:, . '". �~ '''. " . �~�'�. \ - .:

�~�~�~�~�i�i�;�a�-�~ ---..�~�:�'�·�D�E�P�t�i�~�y �~�·�~�C�t�.�:�E�'�R�K �~ �'�,�~ .

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'eOKMON'PLEAS' ·cooRT �~F'RAHKL] H ":COUNTY.. ,.... ,

FAIL TO �A�P�~ ON �R�~�C�O�G�~�9�3�7�.�2�9

RICHARD A. MONTGOMERY

•*** LJARRAHT ON INDICTf£NT - ,INFORI1A'TION (RULE 9) ••••FOkM Xl

PLAINrlfr,

n

'7-

OEFE:NOANl •

RICHARD A. MONTGOMERY,

.JESSE O. 000;or �~�H�E FRANKLIN COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURf, COLUMBUS I OHIO �~�3�2�1�5

CRIMINAL DIVISION

VS.

l'HE STATE OF,OHIO,

RICHARD A. MONTGOMERY345 SCHULE R 'STNEUARK, OH 43055-0000

*** DESCRIBE THE OFFENSE<S) AND STA'TE THE NUMERICAL. ""**"1\* DES1GNATIl'lN OF THE APPLICABLE STATUTE •••

TOTAL 1 COUNTS.

YOU ARE ORDERED TO ARREST RICHARD A. MONTGOMERYAND BRING HIM BEFORE SAID COURT UITHOUT UNNECESSARY DELAY.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO EXECUTING OFFICER:

AN (X) INDICTMENT ( ) INFORMAT10N, A COPt OF WHICH IS ATTACHED HERE10,HAS BEEN FILED IN THE FRANKLIN COL'Nll COLIRf Of" COMMON P'LEAS CHARGING

TO FRANKLIN COUNt''' SH£RIFF; (Of'flC('R AU1H(tRIZ£D 1'U EXEcurE A UARRANT>

.A-:"'*<¦?'*^>-

«-.»^i~n,** i«sw

n «n

JESSE D, 000tLRK Of THE FRANKLIN COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT, COLUMBUS, OHIO *3215

CRIMINAL DIVISION

THE STATE OF OHIO, 21*573' ;o:J

f.-W-m

PLAINTIFF,

96 CR 276/VS. l .

CASE MMBE*-.¦'

>^ ^ r• *RICHARD A. MONTGOMERY,

DEFENDANT,

* UARftAtT ON INDICTMENT - INFORMATION <RULE 9) * >\

FORM XIRICHARD A. MONTGOMERY - S/Ri M/X34* SCHULER ST - 0031 02/22/45NEWARK, OH 43055-0000 - SSNt 284-40-

TO FRANKLIN COUNT* SHERIFF; <OFf JCER AUTHORIZED I'O EXECUTE A UARRAN7)

AN (X) INDICTMENT < ) INFORMATION, A COPY OF UHlCH IS ATTACHE0 HERETO*HAS BEEN FILED IN THE FRANKLIN COUNTY COURT OF COHMON PLEAS CHARGING

RICHARD A. MONTGOMERY <OEFEN0ANT) UITH;

?937.29 >X FAIL TO APR ON RLCOG

k

+*** DESCRIBE THE OFFENSECS) AND STATE THE NUMERICAL ***** DESIGNATION OF THE APPLICABLE STATUTE

nTOTAL I COUNTS.

YOU ARE ORDERED TO ARREST RICHARD A. MONTGOMERYANO BRING HIM BEFORE SAID COURT UITHOUT UNNECESSARY OELAY.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO EXECUTING OFFICER:

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¦ 3DtttJTr?CLtKK', ¦',-¦¦C0NJ1QM RiEAs COURT ¦£ '¦

FRANKLIN COUNTY*.

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YI21

JOHN O'GRADY - CLERK OF FRANKLIN COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT

CASE ACTION INQUIRY

SPEC CAT:

IMAGE ••• MORE

0900 AM Rl 2

0900 AM Rl 1

0900 AM Rl 3

0900 AM Rl 020508 0900 AM

INDICT

OPR CAT:

80 032608

80 032608

ooD

o64009 D

CASE: 96 CR 2767 01 O/P/B: FILING DATE:2937 -29 FAIL TO APR ON RECOGNAME: RICHARD A. MONTGOMERY ASSIGNED LOCATION: 80

CASE STATUS: LEGAL: REA FINANCL: CHARGE STATUS: LEGAL: REA FINANCL:

LINE #: FUNCTION: (1 - INQUIRY, 4- IMAGE)DATE SUB# ACTN DESCRIPTION RED LINE# =

01 020608 0003 9279C ORIG COpy HEAR NOTC 8D 032608

02 020608 0002 9279C ORIG COpy HEAR NOTC 8D 032608

03 020608 0002 8431 WAIVR RGHT SPEEDY TR

04 020608 0001 9279C ORIG COPY HEAR NOTC

05 020608 0001 2355 CONTINUANCE ORDER

06 020508 0001 7740 DISCOVERY - REQUEST

07 012508 0005 7720 BILL OF PARTIC-REQ

08 012508 0004 7777 NOTC USE EVID-REQ

09 012508 0003 7740 DISCOVERY - REQUEST

10 012508 0002 0496 APTMNT OF PRIVT CNSL

11 012508 0001 1936 ATTY WITHDRWAL ORDER

12 012408 0001 9925 CRIM PRE-TRIAL STMNT

OPERATOR IO: GU44

DAVIS LAW OFFICES CO... LPA.

EXHIBITC


YI21 CASE ACTION INQUIRY

INDICTCASE: 96 CR 2767 01 O/P/B: FILING DATE: OPR CAT: SPEC CAT:

2937 -29 FAIL TO APR ON RECOGNAME: RICHARD A. MONTGOMERY ASSIGNED LOCATION: 8D


LINE #: FUNCTION: (1 - INQUIRY, 4- IMAGE)DATE SUB# ACTN DESCRIPTION RED LINE# = IMAGE .MORE

01 020608 0003 9279C ORIG COPY HEAR NOTC 8D 032608 0900 AM Rl 202 020608 0002 9279C ORIG COPY HEAR NOTC 8D 032608 0900 AM Rl 103 020608 0002 8431 WAIVR RGHT SPEEDY TR04 020608 0001 9279C ORIG COPY HEAR NOTC 8D 032608 0900 AM Rl 305 020608 0001 2355 CONTINUANCE ORDER 8D 032608 0900 AM Rl 020508 0900 AM

06 020508 0001 7740 DISCOVERY - REQUEST D07 012508 0005 7720 BILL OF PARTIC-REQ D08 012508 0004 7777 NOTC USE EVID-REQ D09 012508 0003 7740 DISCOVERY - REQUEST D10 012508 0002 04 96 APTMNT OF PRIVT CNSL 64009 D11 012508 0001 1936 ATTY WITHDRWAL ORDER12 012408 0001 9925 CRIM PRE-TRIAL STMNT

OPERATOR ID: GU44

DAVE IAW OFFICES CO, LPA.

EXHIBIT

C

w^'T'X'r'r*'™sum


YI21


CASE ACTION INQUIRY

••• MORE

SPEC CAT:

IMAGE0900 AM T 10900 AM T 2

0900 AM T 3

0830 AM PT 1

0830 AM PT 2

0900 AM T

0830 AM PT 3

0830 AM PT

INDICTOPR CAT:

80

CASE: 96 CR 2767 01 O/P/B: FILING DATE:2937 -29 FAIL TO APR ON RECOG

NAME: RICHARD A. MONTGOMERY ASSIGNED LOCATION: 80


LINE #: FUNCTION: (1 - INQUIRY, 4- IMAGE)DATE SUB# ACTN DESCRIPTION RED LINE# =

01 010208 0006 9279C ORIG COpy HEAR NOTC 80 020508

02 010208 0005 9279C ORIG COPY HEAR NOTC 80 020508


04 010208 0003 9279C ORIG COPY HEAR NOTC 80 012308


06 010208 0002 7998 HEAR/EVENT SCHEO'D 80 020508


08 010208 0001 7998 HEAR/EVENT SCHEO'D 80 012308

09 122707 0001 6850 ASSGN ASST PROS ATTY 42422 P

10 122007 0001 7023 WARRANT RTRND-NOT EX 00 05

11 121407 0008 7969 READ OF INDICT WAIVO

12 121407 0007 9850C JUDGE ASSIGN - ORIG

OPERATOR ID: GU44



INDICTCASE: 96 CR 2767 01 0/P/B: FILING DATE: OPR CAT: SPEC CAT:

2937 -29 - - FAIL TO APR ON RECOGNAME: RICHARD A. MONTGOMERY ASSIGNED LOCATION: 8D


LINE #: FUNCTION: (1 - INQUIRY, 4- IMAGE)DATE SUB# ACTN DESCRIPTION RED LINE* = IMAGE .MORE

01 010208 0006 9279C ORIG COPY HEAR NOTC 8D 020508 0900 AM T 102 010208 0005 9279C ORIG COPY HEAR NOTC 8D 020508 0900 AM T 203 010208 0004 9279C ORIG COPY HEAR NOTC 8D 020508 0900 AM T 304 010208 0003 9279C ORIG COPY HEAR NOTC 8D 012308 0830 AM PT 105 010208 0002 9279C ORIG COPY HEAR NOTC 8D 012308 0830 AM PT 206 010208 0002 7998 HEAR/EVENT SCHED'D 8D 020508 0900 AM T07 010208 0001 9279C ORIG COPY HEAR NOTC 8D 012308 0830 AM PT 308 010208 0001 7998 HEAR/EVENT SCHED'D 8D 012308 0830 AM PT09 122707 0001 6850 ASSGN ASST PROS ATTY 42422 P10 122007 0001 7023 WARRANT RTRND-NOT EX 00 0511 121407 0008 7969 READ OF INDICT WAIVD12 121407 0007 9850C JUDGE ASSIGN - ORIG 8D

OPERATOR ID: GU44


YI21


CASE ACTION INQUIRY

...MORE

SPEC CAT:

0001

INDICT

aPR CAT:

5800

8883

6005

4850

0005

9950

0023

7022

7991

0004

0003

0002

0002

0001

0001

0002

0001

0001

CASE: 96 CR 2767 01 O/P/B: FILING DATE:



LINE #: FUNCTION: (1 - INQUIRY, 4- IMAGE)DATE SUB# ACTN DESCRIPTION RED LINE# = IMAGE

01 121407 0006 1821 APPT ATTY FEE-$25

02 121407 0005 0496 APTMNT OF PRIVT CNSL 69002 D

NARRATIVE - SYS GEN APPEARANCE WITHDRAWN

AFFIDAVIT INDIGENCY

CHANGE OF ADDRESS

DEFT RECGNZD-RECOG 0.00 1000.00

WVR DFNDT AT ARRAIGN

BOND SET RECOGNIZANC 1000.00 0001 N

STRIKE SCHED DATE 18 122807 0100 PM

WARRANT - SET ASIDE

WARRANT RECALLED asHEAR/ARRAIGN SCHEO'D 18 122807 0100 PM A

NARRATIVE - SYS GEN ACTION HAS BEEN STRICKEN

04 121407

05 121407

06 121407

07 121407

08 121407

09 121407

10 121307

11 121307

12 121307

OPERATOR 10: GU44



INDICTCASE: 96 CR 2767 01 O/P/B: FILING DATE: OPR CAT SPEC CAT



LINE #: FUNCTION (1 - INQUIRY, 4- IMAGE)DATE SUB# ACTN DESCRIPTION RED LINE* = IMAGE .MORE

01 121407 0006 1821 APPT ATTY FEE-$2502 121407 0005 0496 APTMNT OF PRIVT CNSL 69002 D

NARRATIVE - SYS GEN APPEARANCE WITHDRAWN04 121407 0004 5800 AFFIDAVIT INDIGENCY05 121407 0003 8883 CHANGE OF ADDRESS

06 121407 0002 6005 DEFT RECGN2D-RECOG 0.00 1000.00 000107 121407 0002 4850 WVR DFNDT AT ARRAIGN08 121407 0001 0005 BOND SET RECOGNIZANC 1000.00 0001 N09 121407 0001 9950 STRIKE SCHED DATE IB 122807 0100 PM10 121307 0002 0023 WARRANT - SET ASIDE11 121307 0001 7022 WARRANT RECALLED 05

12 121307 0001 7991 HEAR/ARRAIGN SCHED'D IB 122807 0100 PM A

NARRATIVE - SYS GEN ACTION HAS BEEN STRICKENOPERATOR ID: GU44


YI21JOHN O'GRADY - CLERK OF FRANKLIN COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT

CASE ACTION INQUIRY

SPEC CAT:INDICTOPR CAT:

03 050996 0004 702004 050996 0003 610005 050996 0002 9802C06 050996 0001 9801C

CASE: 96 CR 2767 01 a/p/B: FILING DATE:2937 -29 FAIL TO APR ON RECOGNAME: RICHARD A. MONTGOMERY ASSIGNED LOCATION: 80CASE STATUS: LEGAL: REA FINANCL: CHARGE STATUS: LEGAL: REA FINANCL:LINE #: FUNCTION: (1 - INQUIRY, 4- IMAGE)

DATE SUB# ACTN DESCRIPTION RED LINE# = IMAGE01 050996 0005 7120 WARRANT ISSUED-ADDR 4

NARRATIVE - SYS GEN RETURNED - NOT EXECUTEDWARRANT-PROS REQUEST 00 01 01INDICTMENT FILED2949.091 FEE ASSESS 11.002743.70 FEE ASSESSED 30.00

OPERATOR 1D: GU44



INDICTCASE: 96 CR 2767 01 O/P/B: FILING DATE: OPR CAT: SPEC CAT:

2937 -29 - - FAIL TO APR ON RECOGNAME: RICHARD A. MONTGOMERY ASSIGNED LOCATION: 8D


LINE #: FUNCTION: (1 - INQUIRY, 4- IMAGE)DATE SUB# ACTN DESCRIPTION RED LINE* = IMAGE

01 050996 0005 7120 WARRANT ISSUED-ADDR 4NARRATIVE - SYS GEN RETURNED - NOT EXECUTED

03 050996 0004 7020 WARRANT-PROS REQUEST 00 01 01

04 050996 0003 6100 INDICTMENT FILED05 050996 0002 9802C 2949.091 FEE ASSESS 11.0006 050996 0001 9801C 2743.70 FEE ASSESSED 30.00

OPERATOR ID: GU44


OTHER

�F�R�J�\�l�\�K�I�.�I�~ �C�O�L�~�T�\ CO)1.\10NPLEASCOt:RT�C�R�J�~�1�J�~�j�\�l .. C/\SEPROC!,SSINGSIIEET

DEFf::NDANT

PI"EA 1 �A�K�F�:�~ OR fRIAl .. CONCLl:IJEJ)on . _

PLEA orGUlL r)? to -----------------------------NOLLE PRoseQUIFOUNl) GUILl Y of�F�O�L�J�~�D NOl GUIl_TY of _

�S�E�~�T�E�i�'�i�C�J�N�G DA1..[ PSI Ordered__POST__CBCF

OTHER �D�I�S�P�O�S�l�l�]�O�~

EVdluatc for DlvcrSl0n _._('ompctcntyrrcalrncnt tn Lleu Snnlty at lhe lime

of otlense

Other-----------------

JudlclaJRelease---HeanngHeld

Granted---Denied---

Conhnue for _____Bond I fearing_____I'rJsJ(per Entry)

_____ Heanng_____�S�c�n�t�~�n�c�J�n�g

____H B 180Ileanng

I)AT[

�B�"�~ & CAPIAS for failure to appear

CASH/PROPFRI '1'/C;URCTY s _RECOO $ _

�U�~�S�E�C APP $ ___

80'iD HEARING

�~�O�C�H�A�"�G�C

�A�.�P�P�E�A�R�A�~�C�C

TC) JAL

s

$-----

___tna}

__________REP()RJ INO

___- \VOR" �R�E�L�r�A�~�E

_________HOlIS£: ARRf:ST

_ DRUG �S�C�R�F�:�E�~�S

..�~ �~�5�e�:�t�n�g�A�~�~

OTHER �_�H�_�'�~ �~ -U .--y: �\�,�.�~�~ _ �'�t�_�~�_�~�_�~�_�,�_�.�~ _

COMMUNITY CON·fROL RlVOCATION IIEARING151 HeanngSet I-Icld l>robable�C�a�u�~�e stipulated/found2nd IiearlngSet_ Held ViolatIons �~�l�l�p�u�l�a�t�e�d�l�f�o�u�n�d___-_Communlty Control rermlnated ConlmunllyControl Restoredne\v sanctJon(s) Imposed_____Communlty Control Revoked,Pnsonor JaIl SentenceInlposed(seeauachedDl<iPOS\tlonSheet)

Other------------

JUDOngln:ll ClerL. 01 Courts.COt\tCS Prob:K!on Ikpl �S�~�~�f�T

DATE

DAVIS �l�A�W�O�F�F�I�C�E�S�C�O�~ LPA.

EXHIBITD

FRANKLIN COL\T\ COMMON PLEAS COURTCRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING SHEET

STATE OF OHIO

/CU^lrwC h/Ur^tj f $UL 6$4

DEFENDANT \ CASE NO.

PLEA TAKEN OR J'RIAL CONCLUDED onM**a

plea or GUIL TY toNOLLE PROSCQU!FOUND GUILIV ofFOUND NOT GUILTY of

SENTENCING DATE PS I Ordered POST CBCF OTHER

OTHER DISPOSITION

Evaluate for Diversion Competency Judicial Release

Treatment m Lieu Samtvat ihc time Hearing Heldof ofense Granted

Other Dented

Continue tor Bond Hearing Hearing HB 180 HearingTrial (per Entry) Sentencing

r>DATE

o —§

BF & CAPIAS for failure to appear trial pre-trial to be S^asidc^*:

5C -oBOND HEARING 00 mm

-n oNOCHASGC RCPORtlNG o t/>

otPPEARANCX * WORk REtrASH

soCASH/PROPFRl Y/SURTY $ HOUSCARREST

</> . cRECOO DRUG SCREENS

UNSEC APP

TOIAL $

Prosecuting AUla»\ncv, /OTHER

(IaxMk^

\ \ <*t* \xSit*-*

COMMUNITY CONTROL RLVOCATION HEARING1*1 Hearing Set Held Pobable Cause stipulated/found2nd Hearing Set_ Held Violations siipulaicd/found

Community Control Terminated Community Control Restored new sanction(s) imposedCommunity Control Revoked, Pnson or Jail Sentence Imposed (see attached Disposition Sheet)

Other

*m Jail Time CeditSPECIAL INS! RUCTIONS TO CLERK/SIIERIFF/OTHER: l. . „iti« ji ^ . , \ . - V »r" ¦' '.L \,\i. t'

DAVIS LAW OFFICES CO.IP A.

EXHIBIT

JU DATE DOopnal Clerk ol Count. Copici Probation Dep Sherif


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,

IIIf

IIIIIJ

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(""').-- 'rr1 -.::0:x0'"-"c(J'"

Ore:( ,:0 c.:-f ;J(1)-.

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CASE NU\IBl:-R

542JF03PLAINTIFF,

DE:F"ENOAN1 •

vs.

....

Tf-fF": STAT (-: OF O}..f rfl ,

RICHARD Aw MONfGOMcRY 7

JOHN OJGRADYCI_t:RK OF Tf--IE FRAN}<LIN COlJf\ITY CCJI"lMON PL.EAS COi..JRT, (;()LUr1BUS., OHIO 1-t32t 5

CRIMINAL �D�I�V�I�S�I�O�~

**** CAPIAS RECALLED ****

�S�T�~�I�T�[�: nF (It-flOFRANKLIN COUNTY, 58Tn -rHE �s�~�·�u�.�: RIrF OF �F�R�A�t�~�~�L�"�r�t�" COUN1 y

�~�~�E�T ASIDE

fl

)L.

DA �r�~�:�:�. 07/18/07

J • , ,..J ...

(Cl YG04 ·-C63 )

..._- - '-'-- --_.-------_.__._._-------.--..._-------- --

JOHN OjGRADYCLIIRK OF THE FRANKLIN COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT, COLUMBUS, OHIO 43215

CRIMINAL DIVISION

THE STATE OF OHIO, SkZlFQZ

PLAINTIFF,

-nr coL.acr-F, Jtg> pP St^.VS. CASENUMBLK

RICHARD A, MONTGOMERY,

DEFENDAN!

**## CAPIAS RECALLED #*#*

STATE nF OHIOFRANKLIN COUNTY, SSTn THE SHt-RirF OF FRANKLIN COUNTY

RICHARD A- MONTGOMERY

crSET ASIDE

JOHN OM3R8DY

DATE: 07/18/O7 2• ii^PUTV "CUERK

^ **

(CTYG0V-C63)


franklin county, ohio (3 f~b i1 '2.l. criminal division columbus, ohio 43215 tel: 614.228.0523...

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