Franco-Turkish diplomatic relations, 1901-1904

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Authors Oliver, Lew Dwight, 1911-

Publisher The University of Arizona.

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jfranco-furkish Diplomatic Relations, 1901-1^04

byLew D. Oliver

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

in the College of Letters, arts, and sciences,

toaster of Arts

University of Arizona

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Table of Uontenta

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PageI. Introduction: Turkey and the i owers. . * . 8

II« Tho l.ltylene Incident. * • • .............42

III. The French Attitude Toward the LaoedonlanAgitation (1902-1904)............. .. 78

IV. Conclusion. ............ .. Ill*

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Preface

In choosing Franco-l’urkish diploma tic relations from 1901 to 1904 as a thesis subject, the author anticipated difficulties In finding material. The dearth of references in the secondary sources convinced him that either the period chosen was not very important or else tho historians had failed to uncover valuable material related to it* Sub­sequent study Ins teepored these observations* In the first place, the recon.t publication of tho Prcmch diplomatic docu­ments liac uncovered much material vihich was unavailable when most of the historios of lurkey were writtofi, and, in tho second placo, although European poaco was not jeopardised by any serious I^anco-Turkish crisis during this period, certain incidents between tho two countries eecentuatcd trends in European politics. ' , . . \ " - y

The mithor in brimming his study hoped to throw more light on the struggle for dominance at Constantinople* He wee rewarded in finding that the period from 1901 to 1904 1® marked by an increase in Ceram prestigo and a oorreapondlng doorcase in French influence* The struggle for power m o re­flected in the determination of tie French to withstand tho inroads of the Ctermoa commercial interests* The Sultan,

relying on the fear of Germany and Russia that France mould beoom too powerful in tii® Hoar East, threw his Influence against the french* The latter, then resorting to a naval demonstration, won a Pyrrhic victory. The Sultan was humbled and French interests were protected, but Turkey, out of re­venge , was more and more willing to encourage German economic penetration. ‘

This study does not protend to toll the whole story of the claims which the Cjuai d* Or say tried to collect from the Gultan in 1501. These were not paid until after a second naval demonstration Into in 190S* Bor does it pretend to trace all tho phases of the Kaoodoniun problem. The object is to point out tho armed pressure oxortod by the French in forcing the Sultan to accept tlioir demands and tho influence exorcised la gaining his consent to reforms in I’acedonia.

The author wishes.to express his appreciation of tho valuable aid given by Dr. 0. H. Wcdcl of the University of Arizona.

University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona.Bay 8, 1954.

g j T & m

Introduc tiom Turkey and the .ro?/ors.a . Turkey $ its (toreemeumt.

1. Ruler./ : ' ' ' ' 'a* a s Sultan ezeroised tcBporal power.b. As Kbalii* ezoroised tho spiritual power.

2. Influonoo of the ijoslai.o.a. Nationalists.b» Lod by conservative landed lords,o. Opposed to all reforms.

5. Press and buucation.a. Press completely dopondont on the Oult&n.b. Bdueation very backward.

d. Attempts to centralize administration*a. Ohristiano and landod lords accentuated

tho decentralization.b. Hoform of 1864 succeeded temporarily in

g r e ^ w centralization.5. Govornnont under the.Sultan. ,

a. Governed -.71 th Gomaell of state and Cornell of Ministers.

b# Chief lieutenant was Grand Vizier.«• Ministers directly responsible to Sultan.

6. Policy of Abdul Fandd.a. Afraid of revolution.b. Autocratic.e* Opportunist but dox>onded on Germany.4, Influenced by seerotaries.

7. Financial organization*a. Very largo debts.b. Control of European Powers increased under

Debt Council.3. Influence of tho Powers*

X, Rapid changes. .

Go:many_nont_inportariOron 1800. to 1914.2, Turco-Grcolc, Die put o (1870-1881) .

&• Gausod by prontoo of territorial compenoa- tlons to Greece.

b. I^nsland ddod against- -lurlce.o. .Franco and Germany aided.-nith the sultan.

3. Turoo-Groek Diaputo (1885-1898),a. caused by revolution in Crete.b. Powers first aided with Turkey.c. Groeoo dofoated.d. Croto autonomy was a Greek victory.

4. Armenian ilaacacroa.e. To prevent spread of mtionallom, be i^iglend wished to interrene,c. Germany and Huesie opposed intervention, d# Franco undecided, public.opinion favored

intervontion.. o. no action takm by liners. •

( ? ? Economic interests of Franco in Turkey. 3^ <— >a. Held almost half of.public debt* b* tod more investments than any other lower,o. Controlled Ottoman Bank, d# tod milsoads, ports, quays, lighthouses,

etc. iEconomic intorosto of Germany.a. Arrived late in field.b. Propagandised extensively. e« Established many banks.d. Had as many railroads as .French by 1900.

II. The Mitylme Incident, va/aA. History of the claim® and the rupture of relations.

1. torando Claims.a* Dated from 1875.b. Bevonuos f^arantcoing loan appropriated

by the Porte,c. Turkish courts recognized loan.

2. TuMni Claims.a. Claim transferred from third party to

Tubim.b. Dispute over interest to be paid.

5. Socidte des Quals.

a. Based on Convention concluded Tfith Sultan in 1890.

b* Lost heavily by drop in business after ooKplotion of quays.

c, Sultan muted to buy quays to eliminate opposition to him.

d. Constans, man of action rather than ;diplomat, neEotiatod Td.th the Sultan.

e» The Sultan promised to buy, but at last moment refused to because of opposition of rolisicuo groups*

f. Constans left Constantinople nhcn sultan• refused to allow the Socle to its f u n rights• and to pay the Claims due I’ublnl s M Loren to.

From the rupture of relations to the occupation cf liitylono.1* The French had expected the Sultan to com to

toms Immediately* .' ‘ ' - . •.; ■■■■■ '■ ■ ' ■ t2* The Chamber supported the qua! d1 Or say.

a* The suit on expected the Ministry to be . • overthrown. ■ ; ■ 1be M* larcol Scmbat» Socialist; Revolutionary,

attacked policy of Bolcasse and demanded• aid for Armenians. -

o. M. Delcacso in his speech spoke of French• prestige; ho passed over tho Claim rapidly.

• d. Chamber adopted vote of confidence by 505 to

5» Attempts by both Governments to force a solution* a. Both sent notes to the other Powers, be The Sultan ibreed a drop in Turkish bonds, o* The French refused a loan,d. Tho French refused to inform the Sultan

of the activities of the Young Turks.4. The French press wholeheartedly backed the

Government.5* Tho attitude of Mssla*

a. Tho Sultan asked the Czar to tender• good offices, but the latter refused.

b. The Czar proposed that the Sultan accept' tho i^Tcnoh denando before they wore inoreasod

o. Russia wanted the conflict tormina tod so that she could act with Franco in Macedonia

- ®m A Thrace. _

a» The Csar supported Franco as nuoh tioosaee of fear of Gonaany as for any other reason*

6, Attitude, ofGomany. ■a« The Kaiser refused to offer his good offioca»b. Public opinion was apparently not opposed

to Franco.o.* Baron Far sc hall advised the Sultan to

. accept the demnda before they were increased.7. The attitudes of Great Britain and Italy.

a* Great Britain was looking for friends; sho couldn’t oppose France,

b* The British press favored France.c. Princttl,' Italian Foreign Finis ter, was nore afraid of the electorate than of the French; he feared occupation of Liitylene

. might end pro-French policy.Occupation of Kitylcmo; capitulation of the Sultan.1* The moment chosen was particularly favcrabl®

as no Power was in a position to object stren­uously. ' ' . ' ' .

2. Occupation of iitylene*a. Very fow foreign interests* there.bi ubll-situated if more pressure necessary.e. Island occupied for one day only.

S. The. French press continued to support the Government.

4. lore demands on the Porto,a'. In order to savo face of French Foreign

o m c c .b. Selected claims which would not lead to

conflicts with other Fov/ors.c. Dcmndod the delivery of the berat to the

Chaldean Patriarch.a. Bcsandod the authorization of about 500

school and. hospitals.o. Demandod the firmans necessary to reconotruot

the buildings damgod during the Armenian massacres. 'f. Dorrands made to gain support of conserva­

tives in Chamber.5. on IIov. 9th the Sultan gave the promises that

the claims would be paid and that the schools and religious institutions would have the privilegesdetsmded.

0« Attitude of Russia.a. iMphaaised ncoossity of evacuation of

tho ialond boforo tho other Powers took■ count cr-nea sores. - -

b. Uoumt Lansdorff ropresentod Russian pressas anti-pronch when according to M. Boutlim it was pro-French, •

@* Lo Tenrps expressed its fear of Russia,d. Russia railed to act with Franco beoauoo

she feared intervention in favor of the Armenians, an increase of tho prostigo of tho, Romn Catholic Church, and default on money owed to Russian subjects.

. 7. The attitudes of the other Foreign Office®.‘ a. Gercany expressed her satisfaction over

the French -success, but Dolcasso doubted • : her sincerity. .• ■. ■ -h« Austria was un&?ubtsdly satisfied.Os l^^land refused to give her attitude,d. Italy was weU-satlsfied when Mityleno

was evacuated. -8. Upon the return of M. Constans to cmistantliioplc,

Frmce-Turkioh relations wore still not too cordial.III. French attitude towards the Macedonian Agitation

(1903-1904).A. History of the agitation*

1* Portiation divided into many nationalities.a. Division facilitated Turkish exploitation, h. Rationality based on religion.Cm Impossibility of determining oompoaltion

of population.3. Intervention of tho lowers to free Bulgaria.

•a* Bulgarian Church incited opposition to Turks.b. Macedonia united to Bulgaria by Treaty of

San stefano. •c. Macedonia returned to sultan by Treaty of

Berlin but promised autonomy.d. Autonomy never granted.

3. Bronomic reasons for She-agitation,a. Realisation of exploitation by 'Turks.b. Heavy tax burden*©♦ Exploitation by the landlords.d. Ho opportunity for protection from Turks.

4. Interest of the B^ers*a. Proximity of disputea region to their

territories,he Pan-Slavism, o. Effect cii balance of power*

5* Attitude of Bulgaria. . a* Bat Ssiuxlisti otrong.b. Responsible for UGi tat ion. -c. r:any Haccdoniano .in Bulgaria.4. Boliovod that Turkish Empire near disin­

tegration.o. Exaroh played important part.

6* Recourse to violence*a„ Used after assassination of Gtamulov in 1894. .

b* Used because of rivalry botween Balltnn ■< states* . . : • - . . . ■o. Anti-Turkish party in power at Sofia*4* Bulgarians hoped to enforce intervention

by atrocities.7. BefOrms of 1902 and 1903.:

a. 3ult®m appointed Hilmi Pasha inspootor- goneral,

h* conditions not improved.. ■ o. Pshmary4* Dissatisfaotim W.th reforms*e. Atrocities continued, f* Reforms not carried out* g* kurzsteg Program*

B* Position of tho Powers.1. Italy.

a. Anzioua to expand in Ballrans.b. Hoped to join Busso-Austrian Entento.

:. o* Distrusted Austri*. ■ .4* Welcomed French support in giining Russian , friendship.

2. Austria*a. Anxious to maintain status quo* be Distrusted Russia.c. Bxpeotsd failure of February Prograe*d. Feared Turkey and Italy.e. Unwilling to enforce drastic reforms.

B, Russia.a. Interested in the Far Hast, h* Hoped for status quo in Balkans.

c. Hot sure of French support#4, i.:urder of. two Buss m b consuls*

4# ^island*a* Did not take active part# to* Opinion was pro-l’acodonian.

• e. Supported Austria,5*. Gemmay* • • • ' . . .

a# Opposed to drastio reforms* ' tom Favored February Program only when certain

that no drastic changes, o* Hoped tint Bulgaria would be humbled, d# Supported Kurzstog Program half-heartedly.

G. Franco.a* Proposed pmgrsn to Sultan in January, 1903 • rejected.

tom Constans expected failure of February ' Frograsu . ' ' ■

o* French interest in Bouraonian policy* d# Lamsdorff's attack on Dolcasso.e. Supported reforms#

Conclusion. •A* Less of - French prectige at Oimstantinoplc.

1* Germn inflimno® imrsaaed. -- ■ - . . - ■2* Ccmeesslons granted to Franco only when threato

■ made* . ■ ■ . ' ' r ■■B. Attempt of France to detach Italy and Houmania from

Central iMwsrs*1. Played on Italy's jealousy of Austria.2* Led Hounania to believe that Austria-Hungary

near dissolution*

CH&PTSn I.’Eyrkoy and the Poucrs

One of the groat pawns is l^uropoon diplomacy at the end of the nlnoteenth .oentury was-the Ottoman Espirse Soonoaio and political concessions* long undeveloped in this tfbackwardcountry, were the prime reasons for the competi­tion. Each country, disciplined by the fear of a General war, held, is check its own ambitions to dominate, yet at the same time intrigued for concessions* M s h joined the other Powers in holding the opinion that pumping life into a political body long ready for oblivion was a futile task*

The body, however, refusing to recognise its impoteney, contributed to the Intriguec by playing ono country against another* The Sultan, hoping to maintain the territorial and financial integrity of his Empire, dangled concessions before the Powers, trusting that the ensuing discord would prevent t h « frc» ualtins against Mm* Ho was so successful at this crafty game that, in spito of all predictions to the contrary the Turkish "Suspire, for the most part, remained intact at tho end of the century.

France, cooperating with the other powers in guarantee­ing Turkish integrity, was at the same time, forcing conces­sions from the Gulfcan* Such concessions oentributod to a

French imperialistic policy -sihlch in turn enhanced French diplomatic prestige at Constantinople* fhis imperialism maybe divided into tT.o categories: regional and financial* The

1 " .first, expressed in territorial aggrandizement in Herth Africa, is not pertinent to the subject at hand; however, the second, characterized by investments in Turkey proper and engender1 % conflicts between France on' one hand and Turkey and the Euro­pean Powers on the other, is the subject of this study*

' ' -A brief survey of the structure of Turkish Governmentwill throw considerable light m. much of the opposition to

,French imperialism* In theory the Ottoman Empire was an ab­solute monarchy, governed by a ruler who, as Sultan, exorcisedthe political power and, as Khalif, the spiritual authority.

. 1 In practice, however, these powers were strictly limited. AsKhalif the ruler found himself curbed by the "ulemasn or Moslem doctors-in-law, and by the "softas" or theological students.The ulemas and softas, drawn from tho wealthy classes wore influential in the selection of the Sultan, and were also power­ful In detmmtming publ ic opinion. Their strength was particu­larly felt in remote parts of the Empire due to the difficulties of communication arid the inefficiency of the imperial governing agencies. Those two groups, speaking for the landed Turkish lords and for the most fanatical Mohammedans, represented the strongest reactionary tendencies in the Empire. The Shiokl-ul- Islam, the actual head of the Mohammedan Church, although

I. British Documents on tho Origins of the World war, Vol. V. (1905-09). Annual Report for Turkey for 1906, p. 1.Henceforth referred to as Brit. Doc.

-10-

appointed toy tba Sultan, had the right to decide the deposi­tion of the latter. Since he held office for life, his appointment tras of groat importance, and M o favor bad.to toe cultivated at all times. The revolutionaries realised as well as the Sultan that no movement.could succeed without the support of thle powerful personage. Sultan Abdul Hamid kept the good will of the shlokl-ul-Islam from the time of . his appointment in 1876 until the revolutionaries gained the upper hand in 1908. Host political and social reforms spon­sored toy the Powers wore opposed toy the uleras, soft as, and

Bthe Sliieicl-ul-Islam. They were apprehensive lost the adoption of such reforms would jeopardise their influence and prestige which might pass to the bated and despised Christian®. The Sultan, on M s part, tried to consolidate his position toy gaining the support of these groups. Consequently, ho devoted himsolf to fostering the spirit of Pan-Islamim. This is the principal reason why he fought all reforms introduced by the • Powers.

In addition# the Sultan was anxious to keep the great mass of his subjects uneducated and uninformed, oinoo the influx of western Ideas night result in the curtailment of bis authority. As a result, one can scarcely say that there was any public opinion In Turkey during the reign of Abdul Hamid. However# there wore several newspapers controlled . rigidly toy th® Sultan, who begrudgingly allowed then to exist.

b ; iHem. ' " ““ ■ : " ;

-XI-

When tbo fir at one was established after the Criiaean War only the eduoated classes could read, iften "then it was not per- nltted to publish much in the way of political news. After Abdul Harld bocane Sultan the Const,antinoplo press (the pro­vincial press being unimportant} was placed under oven more rigid control* The four daily Turkish papers with a circu­lation of only 17,500 were all oubsidisod by tho Government, and consequently, gavo little political news, most of which was badly garbled. One of the favorite subjects was theprogresa of Kohanmedaniaat this sort of nronaganda served to

- • . - , - 3control the lower classes who wore just being taught to road.The influence of these newspa pars was far greater than theircirculation indicated. They were read extensively in cafes,and, in addition, the news was frequently passed on by wordof mouth* Another favorite subject was the disputes dividingthe European Powers; this was intended to allay the approkon-

... 4sions ef the Turks lest the Idapiro be divided. There were also the official journals, published weekly or monthly, and the dozen non-Turkish dailies, all of which exerted little or no influence* Thus the press was prostituted to tho service of the Sultan*

Mucation, like the press, was turned to the needs of the Sultan* The sueoees of the foreign, schools in educating the Christiana is shown by a comparison of the results obtained

SI4. z # :

12=

in Turkish s®bools# Only five percent of the Christianswore illiterate aa contested with thirty percent of the

5Mohammedans* To propagate Pan-Ialanism, Abdul Hamid had established a number of closely supervised schools: twenty-four primary, five hundred higher primary, seventy secondary

■ / : - Cschools, and a University at.Constantinople* Host of the •upper class Turks preferred going.to one of the European , capitals for education rather tlrxn attending the University of Constantinople*

coupled with the restrictions on the press and the rigid control over education, the difficulties of communication - and transportation, and the ethnological differences in the Smpire fostered a decentralisation which together with the : fear of European intervention,. m s one of the two greatest concerns of the Sultan* One of the prime forces toward dis­integration was the resentment of the Turkish landed lords or boys to the Sultan*o interference in local affairs# The Christiana, when in a majority, aleo constituted an ever-present menao® to the authority of the central government* In 1864, in order to consolidate his power and to break down the particularism in the provinces, the Sultan established a new administrative organisation* The Empire was divided into vilayets or provinces, the division not taking into considera­tion national lines* The average population of a vilayet in

i* idea*" ©• T%em.

IMropo m w about 1,000,000 uhila that or ono in Asia -ms about 500,000. Eaoh vilayot had its crm budget and administra­tion, but tho Sultan might demand funds from any of thorn at any tim. Intercourse between them was very difficult since the authorities demanded an elaborate passport. Imperial trans­portation Imd been improved but only with the object of facili­tating government®1 centralisation and not commerce. The vila­yets wore subdivided into sanjaks, kazas, and nahies, corres­ponding generally to French department s, arrondicscmcnts, can-

/ - ' . : ■■■ ' - ; ■ ■■ -v 'tons* and oomtmesi. ^ c h vilayet was administered by a governor*general; the sanjak* by a gevernor; the lama, by a profet; and the nahie, by a myor. The valic or governor-generals were cheeked in three ways: the Imperial Government could demandfunds at any time; it could appoint the licutenont-govorncrs

' ' - - ' " ‘ 8wlto commanded tbs armies; and it appointed the lesser officials.In spite of the corruption and inefficiency of the vilayot governmentsj this reorganization mitigated for a time tho worst effect a of the deomtmlizing forces^

If the Sultan had exercised as absolute a rule over tho entire liapiro as he did at Constantinople* his claim to auto­cratic power would have been - just!fled, Endeavoring to offsetthe decentralizing tendencies of the boys and Cia’istlans,, he ' 1 ' ; - :■ ' . ..was aided by several governmental agencies* directly responsibleto him. The Council, which Included the high dignitaries of State* was known as the Imperial Divan. As the government

YT'i^idm m

*9• t

pT5T"P. ■ 58.

becara© more oonplox, tho Direm was divided into a Council of State, which functioned chiefly as a judicial or^an, and into a council of Ministers, which was responsible for adminis­tration. .The Council of I'.inistoro met twice a week to conduct business. Although the Cultan did not preside, bo fixed its agenda and ratified its decisions. The Grand vizier, who was the chief lieutenant of the Sultan, m d e the Imperial wishes known to the ministers who were individually responsible to Abdul Ratal4. The Council of State, in addition to its judicial powers, had almost the authority of a legislative assembly.. In practice, however, its powers were extremely limited for it lacked the right of initiative, its agenda •. being prepared by the Grand Vizier. If any of its reports displeased the Sultan, they wore returned for amendment. Sinceall of its members were appointed by Abdul amid, his controly " - _.was absolute.

It can be seen free tho constant threats to his authority that Abdul Hamid led a precarious existence as Sultan. Ho did not dare abdicato because, with the loss of power, ho feared the loss of life as well* He had.conoeatratcd in his palace of ildis Kiosk the control of all tho adminiotrativo, dlplomtio, police, and financial resources of tho Empire. His rule wastyrannical; he did not hesitate to use any roans to break

10 " ■ ' vopposition* several intoresting stories arc told of his repressive tactics. Electric lights could not bo used at

xbid., Po ii.10. gmilo Bourgeois,

Vol. IV., p. 247.

15*Constantinople beeauso a dynuno van needed. The Sul tonfeared dynamite bombs; honse be forbade dynamos (lestthrough similarity of names) they nere of the came atrociousnature, A shipment of oh cm is try textbooks to an Americanoollego 'ms h e M up because tho censors thought that theformula H^O meant Hamid II equals nothing, obviously a caoo

IXof high treason*

Sine® Abdul Hamid centralized control in his onn Mnds, his opinion of "the groat porcro is a fair index to Turkish foreign policy. For crar.mle, tho persecution of the Armenians and o£ th® nationalities in liacodonia embittered Anglo-Turkish relations during tho 1850*s and after. Before the Basso- Japanese I7ar the Sultan profoundly dint rusted Russia» Ho did not four Austria, expeo ting her to be held in check by Gsrmny. In spite of his - distrust of Italy ho made every effort to gain the good will of the royal government* Ho was aware that Italy had designs in Tripoli, but did not believe that the occupation would occur during hie lifetime. He was very friendly towards Franco. Knowing that her aid in checkmating the Young Turks at Paris was very necessary, ho . purchased this aid through o m e css ions. Furthermore, the solvency of the government depended on French financiers. He thought America was harmless, perhaps, because of her demo­cratic institutions and missionary zeal. Ho did all in his power to keep Rumania from allying with Bulgaria, lie hated

vna. at earns ha vis „ short' ast, P. %57.

10-Mid ai@Sru®t®4 Bul^irla and her Icing, probably hocauoo of thoKaoedonlan Agitation* Greeoo was regarded as an Instrumentfor exerting pressure on Sofia because the Crocks nere alsovictimized in Ivaoedonia. The Sultan really bad no definitepolicy, being essentially an opportunist. Ills one groatconcern m s tho maintenance of cordial relations with Germany,12whom ho rightfully regarded as his strongest friend.

The Sultan's secretaries, acting independently of theGrand Vizier and the ministers, played an important part,thanks to their influence over the Sultan. In 1676 tholiberals had forced Abdul Hamid to accept their candidatesfor secretary. Although he accepted the choice of tho liberalstemporarily ho soon dismissed them, and appointed his own can- 15didates* A few remarks in regard to Izaet Pasha and TcwfikPasha are apropos because of tho part they played in the i'ity-lene Incident* Izset Pasha, the second secretary, despisedthe Sultan and had no friends at court* However, Abdul Hamidtolerated him because ho thought hin Indisponsablo. Hisinsight into the psychology of tho Ltoliammadans is indicatedby the increase in the Sultan* a pressige resulting from thebuilding of the Hodjas Railroad. 3y investing his fortuneoutside of Turkey, ho felt more secure against tho politicalvicissitudes oharactorlstic of Turkish government* He wasprepared to seek safety in flight, should such a course bo

14necessary* Tev/fik Pasha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, having

12. Brit* DOC.. Vol* V . . on. elt*. p*IS. ifa~id*V p. 8.14* Idea*

a Gmmaa vstfo, energetically supported the policies of the German Government; nevertheless, he m o not anti-British* lie played the part of a buffer between the European eovem-Bents and the Palace, the real director of the foreign policy.

The authority of the Turkish diplomats was substantially reduced us the European Powers increased their control over the imperial finances. The Sultan created the Council for the Administration of tho Ottoman Public Debt in 1681 by tbo Decree of Euharen to provide for the funding of the public debt *. The Counc11, compoeed of one.representative from ©ach of the oountries interested - the United Kingdom, STance, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Turkey had complete control of assessment, collection, and expenditure of certaindesignated revenues. The English and tho French alternated

16in holding the presidency f&r five year terms# Customsduties couldbe increased only with the Council’s consent.It•considered the major part of the imperial administrative

17and financial questions. By employing tho Armenians, whoare.competent administrators# and by no longer exemptingJSMbeys from taxes, the Sultan increased his revenue under tho

18Council’s adslnietretlctt# ; Tho sorvico of LT 17,000#000 of the funded debt which totaled LT 88,000,000 was entrusted to the Ottoman Bank, while the reminder was administered by

15

lb* Idem* '16, mrTHdwin Poors, Life of Abdul Hamid, p, 171.17, Sdw.;I'oad Earle. Turkey, the Great powers and the Bagdad

ruilroad * p. 11.18, pears, op. cit., p, 177.

•10-

the oounQlle In addition, the floating debts raised the total■iadebtednoos "to.LT 150,000,000. Tho revenues reserved for theretirement or the original debt were most of the proceedsof tho salt and tobaoeo monopolies, tho stamp, silk, spirits,-and fishery revemies, the teboeoo tithes, the Bouneliantribute, and certain customs receipts. About twenty-fivepercent of all revenue was set aside for tho debts; tho root,

■ ' •: ■ : ishowever, was not adequate to moot governmental expenses* Theannual revenue was about LT 24,000,000, the expenditures about LT 27,500,000, thus leaving a deficit of LT 3,500,000. The chief source of revenue was tho tithes which brought in about LT 3,600,000. Other sources wore the income taxes, tho mili­tary exemption tax, the monopolies, tho property tax, and the tariffs. The greatest expenditure was the public debt which took LT 9,600,000. The Sultan, receiving LT 1,800,000, wasthe highest paid official, the others as a whole receiving20starvation wages. The economic penetration of tho Powers in Turkey served to Increase the indebtedness of the Turkish government, and as this indebtedness increased, tho Council for the Administration of the Public Debt obtained control over mere and more rovenuo. Finally, no change could be made in the government without the consent of the Powers which controlled tho Council.

Tho seesaw of influence of tho different Powers in Turkey

16. Brit, d o c,. Vol. V.. opV cit.V p»4b.20. Vi* konroe, Turkey and the Turks, p. 144.

io conncotod v;ith the rapid chanceo of hogemony in Europe, Before I Q # yrenoo m s tho cost. influent ial nation at Con­stantinople, After the defeat of napoleon, the destruction of the Trench fleet, and the taking of Halt a by tho English,: - Freneh influeno® suffered an eclipse, the English stopping in to take its place, Frcn 1815 to 1.882 tho Sultan looked to the English fleet for protection, yet during this entire period and even up to the present day, French eulturo has been and is more firmly established than tho English at Con­stantinople, The French gorerment under tho Bourbons and tte Orloanlsts followed a policy antagonistic to Turkey: Hohmet All was supported in Egypt, Algeria was conquered, and tho penetration of Tunis nhioh. resulted in occupation in 1881 was actively carried forward. The Sultan was quicker to accept English rather than Russian aid, believing that, in tho long run it would cost less. In 1054 the English with tho support of the French, who were trying to regain their pres­tige in international politics, protected tho sultan against an attack of Russia, A quarter of a century later England, this tine with Austria, again acted to block the Russian advance on Constantinople,. France was too interested in re­establishing the balance of power in Europe and in the duel for Tunis to assume an active part as protector of tho Sultan, Blsmark, who played the leading role in adjusting the balance of power, was more interested in maintaining tiio status quo than in appearing as either the protector or despoilor of tho

a

Sultan. TIig end of this Turco-2nGlioh honeymoon onmo In 1882 when the Sultan was jolted out of bis bliss by the occupa­tion of %ypt.

The Sultan felt bis isolation from 1802 to 1888 when no Power acted as bio protector. The French, embarking on a colonial policy, found thoir interests in conflict with those of Turkey.' In addition, the French people, stirred up by politicians liico Ganbotta, worn not willing to eoo tho Govern­ment involved in any policy which might weaken or compromise the nation when the opportunity to regain Alsace-Lorraine came* Any ranoroohomant with England was prevented by Gladstone, who favored the Balkan nationalities, and by the occupation of Egypt which coiaa not soon be forgotten. Hi® sultan dis­trusted the Osar, rememboring the Treaty of San Stefano*GerMtny had not yet become colbny-conwlous, still being ruled by Bismrk* a uatria-Hungary was busy digesting Bocnia-Hor- aegovina, and it is doubtful anyway if tho Forte would have welcomed a friendly gesture from Vienna. Italy, having embarked on a colonial policy in northern Africa, was slowly exhausting her resources; furthermore the Sultan knew of her designs in Tripoli. As a result of the indifference of the other powers, the stage was well-prepared for German dominance over tho Sultan* The industrialists, rapidly coming to the front in politics, were forcing an aggressive policy of economic pene­tration on the Gorman government.

The conflict between Greece and Turkey from 1878 to 1681 is an Illustration of what attitude the Powers took in regard

«-21»

to tho Porto boforo tlio gr0,7th or Gcrran prootlse. It is tzcII to hold In nina that mfiliah influence at this tine ras quite firmly entronehod* At the Congress of Berlin, on the pro­posal of Franse, the Peijera rococnnmdod to the Sultan that rhessaly end part of Epirus be ceded to Grcooo, tho Pouersreserving to thmsolvos tho right to offer thoir mediation

21to faoilitBt® the negotiations* In July, 1378, the Crock minister, Delyannis, proposed n conference at Prcvosa; but ISngland and Austria blocked the proposal* At this tine, w'addlngton, Philhellene president of the French Council, pro­posed that tho Turks receive Janina and the Greeks a larger territory in Thessaly* in spit0 of tlie objections of bothTurkey and Greece, the Poucrs united in advancing this proposal22which, however, was nover carried out. Great Britain secretly'aided tha Turks, in refusing to code territory to the Crocks* Sir Henry la yard, British ambassador »t Constantinople, prac­tically carried on the Turkish foreign relations* in January, 1880, do Preycinet, French ninister of Foreign Affairs, called the attention of tho Goman {pvcrncent to the obligation of the powers to Greece. Blsmaric agreed in Birch to a congress on the question* Salisbury, who was-likewise intending to call a congress at which Turkey would bo represented, hesitated to support D1stark, probably fearing a new attempt to despoil the Sultan* Hot satisfied at!th Biomark1 o proposal for &

a H u. A. iyffe. A History of S/Qdom KUronc. i>. 10#',22* Bourgeois, on. oit,, p. 69.

congress, do Froyclnot again appealed to the Gorrran government, stating t;hat according to tho Treaty of Berlin, the question should be settled by a conference of the European Powers and mot by a congress* By larch, the Powers had concurred with the rrench in the convocation of a conference*

At this Juncture Gladstone succeeded Salisbury as English: ... . . . . ■ ' 'prime minister* Being violently anti-Turkish, ho repudiated the policies of his predecessor, sir Henry Layard was re­called from Constantinople, and the now envoy introduced 1 . ■ . - • . ■England* s policy by insisting that Turkey recognise the

25 ,rights of the Balkan nationalities. Franco, naturally, became apprehensive of this sudden change in English policy. Granville, foreign minister under Gladstone, proposed that the oonferenoe already agreed upon by Salisbury should be■ J ;• ' >held at Berlin. However, do Freycinot thought that.it should be held at Paris since ho bad taken the initiative in the affair. Gladstone had the approval of Germany, Russia, and Italy in stating that the conference was being convoked in order that Turkey might bo called "to receive the summons of Europe and to learn what she had to code". Italy and Russia also supportod the English project calling for an enlargementof both Albania and hontonegro* Franco then presented a

. . ' ■counter-plan by which the only change would bo the addition of Jemima and Motcovo in Epirus to Grecoo. Austria had .

25. Idem.

supported this proposal from tho boginnins, and when Bis mark endorsod it, thsmrnoh project nas inmediately adopted, tho Saglisk proposal being rejected*

Turkey refused to oodo tho lands, and tho Powers contem­plated sending a fleet to enforce their decision, Tho English projF^sdl to send a squadron xias opposed by the French and Qenaan Governments, uhic h did not xzish to ozert pressure on the sultan* Merertheloss, a fleet m i g finally sent to Gravoaa, but the Sultan, sensing the division of the For,ors, Ignored it* Tho French, fearing that their support of England, would precipitate a war, sided with Gerrany in opposing tho sending of a fleet to Turkish waters* King George of Greece, realising the necessity of following a moderate course, dd- nandod, with the support of the French, the resignation of frieoupis, the jingo prime minister, 1A 0 was succeeded by the moderate Oomoundros* Under Bartholctny-3aint-Eilalre, tho new Foreign Minister, the aim of the Cual d'Orsay was to secure the oxmaent of Greece to relinquish some of the territories tMt she M d been promised in 1878* In the meantime the feverish preparations for war in both Grooce and Turkey greatly alarmed tho Powers * To prevent a possible war Barthelomy-3aint-ililaire, in Doc,, 1880, proposed the follow­ing settlement: Turkey could bo certain of a revision ofth© Treaty of Berlin, and Greece would be benefitted by the

kd. " lbid.\ n* Ifl.

influence of the Ponors • Turkey consented on condition that the conference b# held at Constantinople under her supervision. The Gorr-tan ambassador, Hatsfeld, declared that "they trould obtain the consent of the Porto only by communicating to it . in advance the base of the territorial concessions vrhich it nould have to make.* Hatafold knew that Turkey was determined to keep Janina, Hot novo, lari sea, and Prevosa, the principal cities of Bpimm and Theoaaly. Bicmark, therefore, proposed to the English ambassador at Constantinople, tiiat Greece re­ceive. Crete said that Turkey keep Epirus and Thessaly. He was opposed by Italy, the rival of Greece in the Kcdltcrranoan, end by the French ambassador at Constantinople, It. Tissot,whom Bismark biased for the failure of his plan. Blsnark .

#finally obtained the acceptance by the Porte of another com­promise* According to this Agreement , Turkey, kept all of Spirus, Metzovo, Janina, end Prevosa, on coding to Greece Larissa and Thessaly to the Yolo River. The Greeks finallydecided to accept those terms which became the basis for the

25Turoo-Greek Convention of July 2, 1801*

This incident, showing the decided change in English policy, helps to explain why Germany gradually superceded England in prestige. The first indication of German Influence was the Sultan's acceptance of the Turco-Grcck Convention on the surest ion of Biomrl:. The period during which Turkey

M5'#. ' ' p'*~ 75«

ma.without.■ tlw aapport.of a Po??er m s aliaost at an end for Germany bad turned to the Hear m at as a ophero of influence« -

h socond conflict botnom Groooo and Turkey, indicatlns tho attitude of tho Poworn in regard to Crete, camo five years later and laatod for. twelve years. In 1805 and 188G Crete endeavored to interest the Powers in her annotation to Greece, Frame refused to ho tempted since she was afraid of compli­cations. Non® of the other Powers cared to take the side

' ' ■ 28of the Cretans, In 1877 the Cretans, thanks to the good : offices of the English consul, succeeded in obtaining tho Pact of ifcilepa, promising cortain privileges which wore never granted. In 1880 the Sultan abrogated the Pact, issuing a firman or imperial order which was far less liberal, Never­theless, Abdul Hamid refused to apply oven the firman. From 1889 to 1894 all the governors were Mohammedans, the Assembly did not meet, taxes wore higher them ever, and there was more graft and corruption. The Sultan finally consented to appoint Christian governors and to convoke the Assembly, Those con­cession® served only to encourage th» Cretans who demanded the re-establishment of the Pact of Ealcpa, King George of Greece threatened to Intervens against the Turks, The Sultan responded by recalling the Christian governor and by appointment of a Turkish one. At this the whole island revolted, and the

a . hebidour. :*Europe,

Powers Intervened in proposing this proercti as a means of settling'the dispute: (1)- the appointment of a Christiangovernor-general for five years v/ith the consent of the lowers, (2) tbs Christians wore to hold two-thirds of the offices, (5) there wore to bo biennial assoablios and olections, (4) the island was to receive half of the customs receipts, •and (5) the control of the administration was to be confided

' 8?to the Powers. The Sultan accepted the program, but the delays in carrying it out resulted in an insurrection. The Concert of Powers prevented the landing of Greek troops in Crete. IBnotata:, Premioh Foreiiin lUnister, was supported by the Chamber of Deputies in declaring that Crete could be left neither to Greece nor to Turkey, but must be declared autonomous. The French government was preoccupied especially in not compromising itself and in avoiding any possibility of war. It refused even the condominium that jaaglnnd proposed; perhaps, the object of this proposal was to get Franco to forget %ypt. The aaglish project of autonomy was finally adopted by the Powers, who also domandod that Greece withdrawher troops and ships, when she refused, they decided to block-

88ado the island. Greece, then foolishly deciding to fight on the m i n land, suffered a severe defeat and was forced to beg tho Powers to intervene. The Preliminaries of Peace,

W. ibid.pT'iSffi. : ' “83. Ibid.. p. 336.

Tillich were prepared on Sent* 18, cave place to the Turco-*Greek Treaty of Doo, 4, 1G9?, vrhic!i, pushing back the Greek frontier.in Thessaly, imposed on the Athenian Government an indemnity of 100,000,000 franco. As for Croto, a Hogloment was drafted the same day; it accorded to the island a Christian governor appointed with the consent of the Powers, proportioned the number of officials between the Moslem, and Christian pop­ulation®, and finally settled the questions relative to tho general assembly, to the finances, to tho polioo, and to the judiciary* it took considerable time for the bo boestablished, the Admirals governing until Get*, 1898* Tho Sultan was highly dated over his victory; it was a striking testimonial to tho effectiveness of tho army trained by Goman officers* The Powers had been so evenly balanced that they all had hesitated to take tho least action in Turkey, fearing that war might be precipitated*

The growing friendship of the Turks and tho Germans received a now impetus in the 1890Ta. At that time the Sultan had incurred the hostility of European peoples by the wanton massacres of the Armenians. The miser,, at the psychological moment, stepped .in.and assured Abdul maid that in the face of a hostile Sorope'he: could depend on German friendship.

The Quitan, remaining true to the Turkish tradition, decided to find sons pretext to massacre the Armenians to end

laid*4 be

«2Q~

the national movement. :The Arr.enlons from early times have Hired In the northeastern part of Asia I'lnor. :i‘any aro ad­herents of the Oregcri&n Church, ifcleh claims to be the oldest Christian ohmroh, In ezistmee* , Although resembling the Greek Orthodox Clmrch in m n y trays, it has remained an absolutely independent organisation under a chief official called Cathol­lo us* The Grcfiorlnns and also the Armenians, who are Greek Catholics, retained their religions in spite of the OttomanConquest* . However, not all of them noro.under Turkish ruleiosince there was a large number living in Kimslan territory,

■ France hod boon recognised as' the "protector of the Boiaem Catholicb in the Turkish- Eteplre; this ms. also true in.the.caso of the Armenians until a largo number of then nassed

. 51under the rule of Russia, It is interesting to note that

52the Turks massacred only the Groperlan#, not the Catholics,In August and Sept ember of 1894 many Amonlan# wore murdorodby the Kurds boeauco they indicated that they might refuseto pay taxes* In reality, the massacre was incited by thePorte, which feared Artimian nationalism* The Triple Alliance,which favored Turkey, took,no action* Btm&uso Russia refusedto interrene, Franco, hor ally, vras unable to exert pressureon the Sultan* By the Cyprus Ooiwention of 1878 the Sultanin exchange for the protection of his Enpire had promised to

. ' ; - - 33 :/ 'grant certain rights to the Armenians, Therefore,. Great

iiistorr of the kalian peninsula, p,42551, bebidour, on, cit*, p* 2^7-8*52, J, A, a, Harriott, The Eastern Question, p, 401.53, Daria* on, cit., p.258. “

Britain, tho other aleatory of the ConvontloR, nao henna to protect the alstreated rd.norlty, . Yot the British hesitated beoaxise they knew that Intervention would hurt thoir flnanolal interests and beoauso Italy was the only Power supportiRg, them. AMul IZanid was quite confident that Russia would not intorvono because of her Armenian minority, and ho was equally as con-» . 2‘idont that Russia would prevent ISngliah intervention because of the four of the capture of Constantinople* Tho English collected a fleet of elghteen ships at Salonika, while tho Russians, m d e apn» military dispositions in Armenia, and at Sebastopol. At Toulon, 'France prepared her fleet* Austria and Italy also mobilized their fleets.. Tho Hussion foreign office oven auspootod that tha Snslish had stirred up tho massacres to have an oxenno for intervention* The Czar, in spite of the fact that tho French govornnont had not yot taken a clear stand, declared to tho, Sultan that ho had agreed wit 11 the l^renoh to defend Constantinople anti tho Straits. Tho Russian aiabassador at Paris at the same time ratio tho statement that the Cx&r would. defend the Turkish Bsplro, if England attempted to enter the Straits* Baron Far sc hall at Berlin blamed tho English for having brought the. question to such an acute state*At Baris thero was oven talk of raising tho Egyptian question, . and M. Jules Gambon, Frwich ambassador at Constantinople, emphasised the necessity of fbrmlng a closer union with Russia*

£>4* Bourgoois, op* oit., p* B50o ■ ””35* Idem. -------

-50-Salisbury, rrho was coaln prime nlniator, by uay of relieving the tension proposed on investigation of the situation. The Sultan insisted tliat instead of reforming only tho Armenian eovemaont it would ho necessary to institute the c a m re­forms in all parts of the hmpiro aiGUltanoously. England opposed the Sultan, knowing that unless sore specific provi­sions wore mado nono of tho reforms would over bo carried cut. However, with tho aid of Russia and France the Sultan carried his point. Tho promises made by tho Forte wore never fulfilled,since the Czar promised Abdul Hamid that no pressure would bo

36exerted.The raessaero in August, 1896, aftor tho attempted raid

of the Armenians on the Ottoman Bank resulted in renewed37

efforts on England*o part to obtain coorcivo action. TheFrench proposed that an international fleet, composed on aproportional basis of ships furnished by all the Powers, bostationed near the Dardanelles. Russia flatly rejected thoproposal, saying that she could not permit the English andItalians to have more ships near the Straits. Hanotaux, scouringthe support of the Chamber by promising that France would neverintervene, sacrificed tho safety of tho Christian population of

38Armenia to prevent a grave European crisis.

551 PeFI&ur. op. cit., p.37. Marriott, op. olt., np. 353-4. On Aug. 26, tho Armenians

in Constantinople, despairing of aid from Europe seised the Ottoman Bank in Gal&ta. Tho Turks retaliated by mur­dering 6,000 of them.

38. Ibid., pp. 230-1.

-31-

On the ooe&eiOB of tho Armenian caaoacrcs the French flag t?as insulted by tho Turks in entering on ^treonian monastery under French protection. Tho French ambassador domandod an apologye The Forte, intending to drag out tho settlement, proposed to negotiate. Tho French refused and cent a smallforeo ashore Yfhioh placed the flag over tho monastery from

. ' 59 -which It liad boon tom*

The Sultan liad boon Isolated in tho face of a hostileEurope as a result of tho massacres. It is true that Russia*had prevented intervention, but that m s not because of lovo for the sultan. Hues la thought she xzould have more to gain if-the inevitable crisis involving tho dislocation of the Ottoman mpiro nore postponed. Kaiser William II por- forced a very diplomatic act in visiting the Sultan in 1808*It m o an indication that Abdul Hamid might depend on German' * ■ . . .

support in tho face of a LXirope horrified by the massacres.The Germane as a result obtained the concession for tho construc­tion of the Bagdad Railroad, tho concession for the sale of allthe munitions bought by the Turkish government, and important

■ ‘ . . ' ■ # commercial and industrial priviloges*

The period from 1888 to tho world war marks tho supremacy ofBerlin at Constantinople* nevertheless, tho English and par-

* \ -

ticularly the French interests wore so firmly entrenched that oven in 1914 the Sultan cemel&ered tho wishes of tho Bntonto

_ Pears, op, oit., pp# 116-7. ‘ ' ' ” : ' ”*40. Brit. Doc. veT. V., op* olt.. p* 45.

Cordialo.Franco lost much of her presides by her encroachments on

Turkish territory in northern itfrica. However, her abilityto influacoo the Sultan is inaicated by the fact that herholdings of the Ottoman Public Debt increased from 38,9# in1881 to 44,9# in 1898, During the sane period the holdingsof German interests increased from 4,7# to 12,1#* laigland

) 41was the loser, her holdings dropping from 28,9# to 10#* TheFrench took the major share In sixteen of the twenty-six loan

42emissions from 1854 to 1914, On the eve of tho Uorld vJar,the French investments In enterprises was computed at nine■ -hundred and tlireo million franco, the German at five hundredand fifty-three million, and tfco English at two hundred and

45thirty million, as a rule tho French government favored the investDent of capital in Turkey* but before giving offi­cial sanction it imposed conditions or sought concessions. In son© instances as in tho case of the Turkish lottery bonds issued to finance tho Oriental Railroads In the European provinces, it prohibited tho listing of certain securities on the Bourse, "in 1894-97 it acted as tho intermediary be­tween Turkey and tho Banquo do Paris et Pays Bao (which wasdrawn into the affair by the French government) in arranginga loan for Crete as part of a never executed plan of govorn-

44mental and adisinlstratIvo reform drawn up by the Powers."

41. Herbert Fois* imropoV the world* s Banlior* 1870-1914, 9,320. quoting Schafer, Doutche-Turlclscho Freundscliaft. p. 12.

42, Idem.43, Ibid,, p, 323.44. Foie, qp.,. cl,n., quoting the commission pour la Dofenso des

Portouro do Valours ot de Fonda ottomans.

Dolcasue', French Foreign minister, in a opocch in the Cheober at Deputies in 1501 onumorated the InvestKonto in IWkey, H a t ins the railroads from Beirut to liana, frop Eoralna to Adana, from Mondania to Broucse, fron Jaffa to Jerusalem, fron Smyrna to Cassaba, end fron Salonika to Constantinople, the Lydian' tranwaya, the ports of Beirut and of Eeraeloa, andthe quays of Cons ton t iaoplo, of Smyrna, and of Salonika, the

45Ottoman Bank, and the Turkish Hothouses# The Frenchlavestm«ts in railroads in 1614 was estimated at a billion

46frame* ' _ The Imperial Ottoman Bank, controlled by French ; interests, m s x-zith ito olzty- t m branohes treasurer-general and fiscal agent for the Sultan* Sineo it had been chartered in England, many English bankers held positions on its Board, but it m s regarded by the British government as under the control of the French foreign office* It is true that at times the qua! d* Orsay had difficulty exercising this control due to the oloso relations between the Imperial Ottoman and Deutsche Banks* The Ottoman Bank m s responsible for the floating of cany of the Turkish loans in;Paris. It divided control of the Ottoman Tobacco Eonopoly tilth an Austro-German group. It was also represented on the important French rail- roads in Turkey and on the Bagdad railroad by roans of inter­locking directorates. Its interest m s recognised by the port

1BEZ Documents diplomtiques francais (1870-1614) , ^"sorio(1901-1911). Tome premier (1 janvier-Sl deoembre, 1901). Document Ho* 468* Henceforth referred to as Doc. Die. 'Fran

46* Fels, op. eit., p* 330*

companies afc Gonotantinople and at Beirut and by the com­panies supplying Tiator, etreet car service, end electric light to conetftntiooplc. I^any Frmeh companies, establishing connection# with this bank, obtained numerou# contracts and ventures throughout the jdapire — rcadc, ports, docks, tramways, irri^titai wrk®, lighting and power plants. The coal de­posits of Anatolia hold an important place in tho Industrial­ization of Turkey. Tho exploitation of the chief of the coal fields in the vicinity of Heraclea -was started in 1896 by a French corporation, ’Rhio h invostod more than a million francs in the enterprise in the next seven years. By 19ID the mines- • ...' 4Qwore producing in excess of 600,000 tons of coal annually. In spite of the Turkish friendship. for Germany, tho French in­vestor was moot responsible for tho economic progress of the Ottoman j&aplre. -: . :

Hevertheloss, it would bo far from accurate to presume that the Gorman interests were not ccnsidorablo. Tho two most Important characteristics of those interests were their rapid expansion after 1808 and their manipulation which enabled tho Kaiser to control Turkish foreign policy, Germany gained her first foothold in Constantinople as the result of a military mission. Until 1870 tho Vronoh-hatL had a nliiaion a_t. Crmatantino

47. idem. " ' ' ' ' — — — — - —— —4 0 . 3iariie, op, c i t . m p . 14*# . r g e ls . op, c l t . . p . 320.

##

it m s then withdrawn beoanso of the war with Oornany.After the defeats of 1077 tho Turlaj invited the French tosend another mission, but tho invitation was refused.' TheGorman ambassador at Constantinople. Baron Batzfeld, sawtho opportunity, and liad .the Kaisor^sond^Baion von dor Golta

• 50whoso twolvo_yoarL_stay considerably increased German prestige.In I860 a connanvLwas established in Berlin with a capitalof 80,000,000 marks to promote tho economic penetration ofAsia Minor. Extensive propaganda was used to get the Germanpublic interested in tho movement. Dr. A. Sprenger becameone of the leading propagandists. Tho Pan-German Leaguepublished a pamphlet with the title "Germany's Claim to theTurkish Inharltance", and Friedrich Kaxmann in his book

T~ — : ~ ™ ~ " . siMittolcuropa popularized German penetration into Asia Minor.After the Kaiser's visit to Constantinople in 1069 Germancommercial expansion was rapid. Baron Batzfeld realizing theopportunities.for trade. Baron Marcohall, the most capableof Gei'can diplomats who became ambassador._to__ Turkey in 1897was a boliever in Pan-Germanism and a bitter ojfpommt ofEngland, lie did muohLJao. establish strong economic ties betweenTurkey and Germany.

In 1888 the year of the original railroad concession to the Deuteeh® Bank export® from Goimany to Turkey were valued

"Sol EarlcV op. oit.. p0 a s. ~ ........... ’ ’ '51* Marriott, op* cit., p. 404.SB* Mrle, op. cit.. p. 39.

LLvU. T

at ll,700,000 cmrlcs; by 1893, ttIioti the line m s cooplotca to . iaisora, they amounte4 t© 40,900,000 uarko, an Increase of over 700#. At tho close of the century imports from Turkey / into Germany reaohod tte high figuro of 28,900,000 marks*By 1898 tho Gorman interests wore by far the most active in Asiatic Turkey* Torpedoes wore furnished to the Turkish navy, by the Krupp-osmod Germania Shlpbuildins company* The Sultan* s military machine was oquipped with small arms by Ludwig Loctto and Company of Berlin, while Krupp of Bason was dividing with Armstrong the orders for artillery* Th® Deutsche Palastlna Bank, which founded branches at Beirut, Damascus, Gaza, Haifa, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Hablus, Nazareth, and Tripoli-in-Syria, was established by a group of Geraon financiers in 1899* Nr.Gaults, a contemporary French journalist, gave a good diagnosisor the situation: -Mj V'

(T " ' ■ \wIa this commercial struggle, Germany takes the offensive, 55England remains cm. the defensive, and France begins to lose out

The Gemsn merchants studied the Turkish market, supplyingcheap articles which could bo readily sold, lav Gaulle relatesthe following conversation with a Tuik:

"My grandfather bought his purse from a I-Tenolmon; ho paid two pounds for it; it was made of leather* Ny father bought his from an Englishman; ho paid one pound for it; it was made of oil cloth* I paid about fifteen shillings for mine; it's made of polished cardboard." 56

in spite of the struggle between tho French and Germancommercial groups, the banks representing the two groups

5 5 * Ibid.; p* 36*54* Ibid., p* 57•55* Harriott. op* clt., p. 394* 56, Idea. ; • .

*5*y

joined in many loem: iseue®* Aeoerding to Sir Adam Block,British representative on the Debt Council, there m s a per­manent understanding botnoon. them. In a memorandum sent to the British government, ho stated......."it mxild seem thatas far back as 1094 some agreement tmo come to between the French and Germans for a Joint participation in the financial. operations of this c o u n t r y . w h a t e v e r the date of the agreement may be, it is certain that an agreement of some kindexists." The principals in this understanding were tho Deutsche

57Bank and the Imperial Ottoman Bank* More evidence of this accord between the German and French investors will bo .shown . in tho discussion a? the railroad expansion*

Hear the end of the century the chief form of imperialism in Turkey was railroad building* In 1883 all the railroads were controlled by tho English end French capitalists. The oldest and most important line in Anatolia, tho Smyrna-Aidin line, belonged to an English company as did the short but valuable Heasine-Adena Line* Another group of British financiers held a lease on the Ilaidar-Cassaba Railroad* The Smyma- Gaseaba Line, which operated one hundred and sixty-eight kilo­meters of track extending north and east from the port of56 . - ■Bo&nm, belonged to a French company* In 1888 the Sultan granted more valuable railwoneessions to the French and English* The French owners of the Smyrna^Caasaba Line, in

W l Fei's op* eit*a p* SSI* ' ' ! ■ “58. Earle, OP* 'cTt. t p. 29.

-58" . ' '' -/ . .

exchange for substantial subsidies from the Turlcish treasury,more to build a lino from Kanissa to soma, a distance of aboutono hundred kilometers. The Onyma-Aidin Railroad, t/hich wasBritish-controllod, was authorised to .build 240 kilometers oftrack, A group of French and Belgian promoters received aconcession for a steam tramway from Jaffa to Jerusalem* TheFrench also received a concession for a line from Beirut toDamascus, The Sultan offered the controllers of the Eaitiar-pasha-lBBid Railroad oxtonslvo subsidies to build a line toAngora with the idea of oxter, dinf it to Bagdad; the Bngliah •company was not able to raise the capital. Sir Vincentcaillard, Chairrson of the Cttonan Public Debt Adminiotration,failed in an effort to form an Anglo-American syndicate to

59construct a line to Bagdad, .

In 1887 German Interests were not represented in the' " " : ' ■ "railroads of Asiatic Turkey, By 1893 a line had been con-

" ’ :struqted to Aurora, and on extension of this line to Bagdad was being__surveyed# At the. outset English interests held ono- quarter of the capital in the Bagdad Railroad, Later, however, the Deutsche m n k through a holding company gained complete control. By 1897 the Goman-owned Anatolian Railroad Company liad constructed over 1000 kilometers of track, Tho French and English were losing out to the Deutsche Bank, which financed tire German railroads, Upon the urgent representations

-59-ef the French ambassador, the Sultan authorised the extensionof the 3&yrna**Cascaba Line t m hundred and fifty-too kilo-iaetero from Jilnahehr to Lflun Karahissar. The Cttoman Treasuryalso gave substantial guarantoos for the construe tioa by French

GOInterests of the Danasous-Eoms-.Moppo Railroad In Syria.

On Ilov* 27, 1899, the Sultan declared that the Deutsche Bank iio\^C^Qgaiye-tho_conco3sion for the construe tion_pf a m l l ^ d jeron_Ronia to .Bagdad .and- the Persian Gulf. Tbo Bank naa entit l e to the concession because in 1888 and again in 1895 the Sultan had declared that it ?;ould have first considera­tion. Lt this time the field was clear, for the Russian group Of promoters had withdrawn becauso of lack of support at homo.A French group had agreed to work with the Dent so ho Bank, and the English were forced to withdraw becauso of the Boor Trap*The situation was favorable to Germany because Fashoda andevents in the Middle Last had served to put Russia, France,

. . 61 .

and Great Britain at swords point s. The Deutsche Bank deserved the concession, since it alone proposed that the rail­road follow the overland route to Bagdad. The proposals of the other promoters, who wished to build along the coast, did not satisfy the Turkish government for economic and military reasons. Another reason why the Germans received the concession was because of the Sultan's determination to make the Anatolian

tK).61. I b i d . p. Hem.-

lino8, Bhlch belonged to the Deutsche Baltic, the center of the s^stocu In addition, the Gernans ind cade an excellent record in the administration of thin line. Still another reason nas the.desire of the Sultan to foster Pan-Islanlsn. Ho knot? very well that England, France, and Buosia were all opposed to this.spirit, so quite naturally ho turned to Geimany. Furthermore, at this tine Germany appeared as the only sincere tod disinterested friend of Turkey in contrast to tho other Honors.

Russia was satisfied that Germany should build the rail­road; even Deleaaoo did tot object to the secondary role that the French interests wore to play. The English news- ; papers endorsed tlie projwt. Cecil Rhodes and Joseph Chamberlain both expressed their approval. Tho imperial decree formally granting the. concession nas issued in 1602. The French end German representatives cooperated in gaining tho consent ofthe Debt Council to set aside certain revenues for tho Bail- 62road. By the end of 1899 the British had four hundred andforty kilometers of track in Turkey, tho French one thousandtwo hundred and sixty-six, and the Germans one thousand treaty

63kilometers*

The railroads aided tho Sultan in the integration of his Empire. Yet at the cats tics by relinquishing financial control of the revenues he jeopardised his freedom of action. The

M . Hears, op. olt., p. 17d. ' : ' '63. Peis, op. cit., quoting the AUdoutscho Blatter, Dec. 17.

1899,

leosloEis, since they believed, ho m s under tho influence of the ‘lowers, assumed, a more independent attitude* Abdul Hamid protected himself by resisting the demands, although he knew full well that lie would be obliged to rako concessions in the end. 'fhls rosistanco proved good propaganda in appeal­ing to the Hoslemse The extension of the railroads and the Busasroua other concessions given to the Gorman interests from the last decade of the nineteenth century to 1914 is the tangible evidence that German influence was predominant at Constantinople* The Frenoo-dtorkish relations immediately showed.the effects of the new interests* It is undoubtedly true that the French in their distrust' were inclined to over­estimate the influence of the Gormans, yet the dependence of the Gultaa on the advise of Baron harschall, German am­bassador, can scarcely be questioned* Thus a new order, the establishment of which would result in a diminution of French prestige, was being established in Turkey*

OBAPTSB II. ■ - - . • ' : ■ . ■The tiity len o Inoiilent

Slnoo Frmoh. imporiaHsm was finanoiol, tho Qnai d* Orsay rogarded. Its prestige as dependent on the success of tho banking interests. In the Mityleno Incident the pressure, which resulted in the Sultan acknowledging all the demands of the bankers, showed the Forei/n Office that Turkey realised her dependence on the French* However, the reluctance of Deloamse, Foreign Minister, to take an active part in forcing the kaoedonion reforms on tho Porte points to his interest in minimising the m m of forco. The rivalry between the Dual and Triple Alliances is reflected in the competition for prestige at Constantinople.

The history of the claims mado by Lorando and Tub Ini throws no little light on the lax financial methods used by the Turkish government. On Her. 17, 1875. tho lorando Brothers, banlcerq of French origin, lent a sun of LT 20,000 to tho IMldar Paoiia, Hailroad at Ismld: the loan m s guarantood hy_jho rail- road administration, by the minister of Public 7,’orks, and by the Treasury. This was supplemented by a second loan of Ig 55,000 to the Minister of Finanoe, the general revenues for 1890 of the vilayets of Salonilcn. and Andrinople being tho

guarantee. Bmovor, tho second lean amounted to onlyLT 45,000 for tbs Treasury, sinoo the bankers deducted almost

. 8twenty percent as commission. Tho interest was fixed at twelvepercent. Certain revenues were car-marked to liquidate theloan, and the Government, having the option of appropriatingthe revenues reserved, promised in any case to retire tho

3loan in two years. By 1895 the principal and interest amounted

4to 41,000,000 franco. Tho Government drew upon the revenuesbut failed to make 6my_arrangements for liquidation. ThoFrench ambassador became interested in the affair since Lorando,although not a French citizen, was of French origin, hie grand-

• - 6 father Isaving boon a member of the Chamber of Deputies in 1056.The legitimacy of the claim had boon established by a judgmenthanded down by a Constantinople court and also by a firman orofficial order of tb® Sultan* Movertholes®, the rorte refused

' 6 ' * .

to consider payment. This claim was complicated hy_^ther financial affairs of the Lorando Brothors. The Ottoman Bank W d lent thorn 1,000,000 francs. In 1901, as they were not in a position to pay interest, the Bank sued thorn. The loss of their property strengthened their determination to collect on the claims due from the Treasury. The question was brought

1

H aooV pip. Fran., Tome i» op. 6it.. Mo. Z>bQ.2. J. u. Gambior. "Tho ICallph an& tho Monoy-Lendors." Fort­

nightly Hoviow, Vole 76, p# 686.3. Victor Wr&r&, ^L*Affaire turcuo”, la Revue do Paris. Vol. 6

p. 883.4* Doc. Dip. Fran.. Tome I, on. clt. Ho. 350#5. fronois ebarmes, "Qhroniqu© do la c^uinzalno”.

Deux Hondos, Vol. 168, p. 470, Mov. 15, 1901.6. Poo. Dip, Franc. Tome I. o p. oit.

up in the .French Chanbor of Donation end thoroughly oiroa.fho liXenoh aabasoaflor first aemandod the payment of IT 547,000to liquidate the olalta* The,Turks proved their ability asnegotiators by scaling this sum. doun to LT 250,000, TheSultan had agreed to pay. and to sign gb agrooment, Honovcr,ho ohanged hlo Bind and suggostod the continuation of thenegotiations, Tho other outstanding problems wore regulated

8before this questIon,ms settled.

Tub ini, another banker of French extras tion^jaco appealedto the dual d'Orsay to aid in tho collection of a claim, TheSultan, in spite of court decisions establishing the justiceof the claim, stubbornly refused to consider payment, Tublni,assuring; the support of tho French government by pointing to

. 9the naturalisation of his grandfather under Louis Z7I, first brought action against tho Sultan in 1894, The immediate cause of the suit was the assumption by the plaintiff of tho claim® of a third party, The Sultan, although not contesting the legality of the, transfer, had obstinately refused to consider liquidation* The justice of the claim was apparently well-established when the Turkish court handed down a Judgment condemning the Sultan to pay Tubinl.LT 165,000, plus tho interests until time of payment* The minister of the Treasury, taking advantage of legal loopholes, again brought tho affair into the courts* B® apparently believed that they might bo

7

V*' Die'Gross#8*9*

Yol, i89 Document lie..dCTi,nette(1871-1914). referred to as G.p.

m rd, op, oit.

prevailed, upon to revoroo their decision* This belief sas justifiod by tho corruption charactoristie of the imperial- local oyatom. However, icnorlns tho pressure from the Govern­ment , the courts once more gave a Judgment in favor of Tublni* The Treasury was assessed, in addition to tho original claim, the cost of the two trials, mliing a total sum of LT 169,000. French ambassador had unsuccessfully urged sottlomaat since 1885. The Treasury also owed Tublni for an important loan made by his father. However, this claim was not being pressed. In view of the difficulties in the way of the collection ofcore recent claims, the possibility of its liquidation was .10very remote. The first claim, twice recognized by the Turkish courts, was like the Lorondo Claims one of the last questions to bo settled. The Sultan finally agreed to pay it after the fleet had been sent to Ltitylcne.

The history of the socleto dos Duals, Docks, et Entrepots is another-eaaapl® of friction between Franco and Turkey. It is an oxcollent illustration of how the Sultan torn between the religious sentiment of his subjects and th® demndo - of a European Power was forced to submit to tho latter when armed pressure was exerted upon him. According to a Convention signed in 1990, the soolote, which was exclusively French in origin, capital, and personnel, received from the Sultan the right to construct and to exploit quays on the two shores of the Golden Horn * The quays eon# truetod in stone were to be

io. Doc. Dip. Fran.. Tome 1. on. olt., lio. bb7.

exploited by tho Socleto for ninoty-fivo years*. Ten percentof the tot,Bl revenues, consioting of tolls end duties. Heroto go to the Turkish treasury# Tho control of the Socicftonas to bo voatod in the Porto, yot the forcer Has to pay all

Htho costs of administration and police# The agreement atthis time m s satisfactory to both parties, as the French

: • .

anticipated tho business that Constantinople had been enjoying, and the Sultan Has getting the quays without any outlay# Eon- over, Hlien the quays wore completed in 1895, tho business of Constant inoplo had begun to fall off* The English text lie and hardware oomeree, nhich tod its distributing center at Con­stantinople, was being driven from the Caspian, Transcaucasia,

. .

I*m i , and Persia by the invasion of Russian products nhich were distributed from Astrakhan, Batoma, and Odessa, In addition, the Armenian trade centered in Constantinople was ruined by the massacres, Sarell, the English consul at Con­stant inoplo, wrote that ”today from being a center of distri­bution for all the Turkish Empire, Persia, and the Balkan States, Constantinople has fa21m to a simple markst for its immediate vicinity." The Sccicte began to grow apprehensive about its profits. After having made large expenditures at the beginning (tho Turks claimed 17,000,000 francs, tho English35,000,000, and tho French 50,000,000) , it was not anxious to

"'quoted by Rtfeard. on, ci¥»13. Ibid,, p, 884#

built, butcake further outlays. The quays lad already been the docks and Harehousos still retrained to be constructed. However, the aooloto bad fourteen• years to conpleto the work* Since the principal investors, Hichol-lasha and Granet, ex- . Minister of the Posts, were also interested in othor projects

iInvolving heavy capital investment a, they did not wish to eoeplete the: work. Their dot ordination was fortified by the Aggravation of conditions in Constantinople - the cholera in1692, the earthquake in 1894, the mssacroo in 1895 and 1696, .

-

the Cretan revolt in 1696, end the diversion of oonneroo15towards Smyrna and. Salonika by the railroads. The Bngllsh

consular report of 1901 concluded: "The quays Affair included the construction ctf warehouses from which the Socidt6 counted on a largo revenue. But tho carrying trade has practically left Constantinopleg tho anticipations from this source aro no longer encouraging. In tho end the quays will be bought by the Turkish Govemnont." : :

Although, there was a provision in tho Oonvontlon which permitted the sultan to buy the quays at any tine during the ninety-five years, immediately after their completion, there was no indication that this was what bo intended to do. The Turkish ministers, being well paid by the French, did not want to buy the quays.. However, tho private interests of tho sultan soon made it Imperative that he purchase them. Article II of

Ib id .V p. M b . " ""14. quoted by Berard, op. clt., p. 886.

tho Convention gavo tho occicto tha right to use oronoo and unloadinc niaobinoo and to establish at can ferry beats for. serif la®, between the ttro shores of , the Golden Horn. All those who had been earning thsir Ilyins by diaer^aricing passongors and freight lamed.lately couplalnod to the Government. Abdul Hanid found himself obllgod to suspend certain rights of,the Goeioto to assure,employment for tho discontented. The Sultan discovered that the rights conaodod to the French would result In conflicts with other government a. Article 83 fixed the tolls that the Sooidte would be able to elmrgo according to a rate determined by the Porte,. Tho rate was scarcely promul­gated w h m the six European ambassadors complained that it was too high. In 1096 a Cocraission met and after a year and a half prepared a new rato to whic h Austria still objected. Article 28 of tho now agreoLient obliged the Sultan in exchange for the construetlea ©f new customs houses at the expense of the Sooiote to pay the costs of all customs visits and formal­ities on the property, of the Societe* At the sane tine the Germn-controllod /matollan Hallroau obtained the right to construct <iu®y® opposite Constantinople, The French objected against the levying of a duty sineo they had already received the monopoly. The Sultan repudiated the agreement with the German interests; the Kaiser intervened; the Sultan re-estab­lished the rights of the company. This resulted in new diffi­culties which were not settled with the Sooioto until much

ISlatoro Tho third rcacon why the Sultan v/iahed to purohace the q imy# was to prevent tho entry of Young lurk conspirators; ho was afraid tint tho French would fall to take proper pro- cautiona to keep out revolutionaries* Furthermore, ho knew that the Young Turk movement was centered at Paris. Thore­fer if difficulties developed with tho French government#the control of the porta might ho used to secure additional 16eonoeoslons* Thus the Sultan was forced to take every effort te control the soolet#* The French, on the other hand, wore determined to resist to the last la order to assure tho contin­uation of their prestige at Constantinople* They wore favored in this determination by tho fact that the Sultan was In no position to buy the quay#*

Cons tons, who became French ambassador to 'Turkey early in 1899, played an important role in Hoar Eastern polities for the next few years. He was respected by the Sultan, who

is. ibid; : ' ~ ~16* kiitox-ial. Independent, &us« 39, 1901* The French,

operating the quays, controlled the door of the Empire. The fact tint the Young Turks had for a number of years boon undermining Abdul Hamid’s position made the quays doubly important. It is true that' there wore other ways of entering Turkish territory. However, it was easier to enter via Constantinople becauso water transportation presented fewer difficulties than land.

*00-

17foarod hia becauao of his roputatioa in fighting Boultm^iane*A number of evaluations of M e ability tioro m d o by the period­icals oomen ting on rraaoo-'Purkish relations and by the various

ISdiplomats at Oenataatlmeple* The concensus of opinion seemed to be that ho m s primarily a man of action and not a diplomat. Nevertheless, ho traa probably hotter fitted to call tho bluffs of the Sultan than the average diplomat. In the opinion of hie colleagues ho sometimos acted moro hastily than ho should have, fho support given him by the Council and the Chamber indicatedthat his aggressive policy m e quite acceptable to the French

-people. ■ ■ . ■ ■. ' - ' - .

In M s first- interview nlth tho Sultan Constans obtained

17• "Bdirard.' op. bit.."p"» 887. An editoriair*IH18. ___________ (Aug. 29, 1901) states thatConstans is a statesman and a diplomat in one. And tho interests of France are in rped hands." Cn the other hand, the "Chremiepe do M quinsaino” of the Revue dos Douz ilendes (Sopt., 1901) says that "Constans has not the patience of a professional diplomat; he has been mi out moro quiolily than another diplomat by the unending delays that they (the Turks) liavo caused." Anwriter in.the Fortnightly Revlon (Cot., 1901) assorts that "anyone who knows constans personally would be quite aware that ho is tho last can in tho world to aot without design. 'Shm Constans does a thing, it is with on object and it las been carefully thought out. He is not tho can to be hurried into anything i l l - a d v i s o d . T h e Russian ambassador at Constantinoplo severely criticised Constans* treatment of the Quays Affair, saying that ho m s Incapable. Baron Barsohall, German ambassador,, believed that ho had bungledand that Bapst, French Cliargo d*Affaires. credit for having rectified constans* errors, ,Harschall was apparently basing his judgment on the belief that th® Quays Mfair M d not been settled, while in reality it m s adjusted several days after Constans left Constantinople.

- M r

the promise of eociponnations if the Gormen company loviotlduties in competition with the soolcto. However, in I larch,1899, the Sultan on the advice of hie first secretary, Tahsen .Bey, refused t W promised compensation#. Tho French thouasked for a reduction in tho charges and duties.paid to thePort© by the Sooiafce* 'The support given tho proposals by thesecond secretary, Isset Bey, proved of no avail* Tho. Suitsninduced const ana to accept the principle of sale of the quays,cm condition that the outstanding cuestions be adjusted and

19that the quays remain under French control*In June, 1900, Michel Pasha made the first proposition

asking 69,000,000 francs for tho quays* A year Inter tho Sooiote was willing to sell at 41,000,000* Tho question seemed sell on tho way to adjustment when tho Sultan suspended the rights of the soolsts* Howovor, at the camo time he acoopted

. ■ ■ m ...41,000,000 frames as tho basis of discussion* In a conversa­tion between Abdul Bamid and Oonstano it was decided that the quays would bo bought at a determined price, that the payment would be made eight months after the signature of the contract, and that it would be. guaranteed by a commission on a loan fixed by an trade and obtained by annual parents of LT 210,000* Since the Statan insisted that ho was very fatigued, it was decided that an agreement would ho drafted and signed later* shortly afterwards Granet, administrator of the Societe, m s

r9*~"¥erard* op, clt, .:....r...... :20. Ibid., p. 889.

called to the Palace to alga It* Tlio signing nac postponed •nhen ho m a told that the Suit on would 'have to approve of 'several uniErportant modifications. Then the Turks presentedan entirely non project, by -nhich the Socle to but not the

" " 21Porto would be bound. The Fronch flatly rejected it. The reason for the repudiation of tho ngrocnont by the Sultan was the pressure exerted on M n by the Shiokl-ul-Islan. Tho latter abirred up tho nationalists had organised a strong party by saying that the quays wore worth only 20,000,000 franco and that the Sultan was going to pay 41,000,000 for them, hbdul Hamid, threatened by tho powerful Moslem party, immed­iately repudiated M ® verbal a greomcn t ‘ with Cons tans. There was a popular movement from whioh'the'Frehoh interesta sufferedheavily, Consfcans agreed to return to the original position

, , 23if the Sultan would restore the rights of the Socleto.On July 26 Constans tried to see the Sultan, who pleaded a

toothache* The Grand Vialor, to whoa Abdul Hamid referred the1‘reneh ambassador, sold he had orders to buy the quays* SIlculBasha, building minister, opening negotiations with Granot, --offered 2O,000f0CM) fmaea to be paid after conversion and, ■ 23unification of the public debt; the offer was flatly refused.Early in August after a stormy interview the Sultan promised.to restore the privileges of the Socleto within eight days,’

. . ' ‘ ■ ' \ ; ■ 1boo, cip.' Iran., Tome i." Mo. 364. **"

22. Seiuru, dp.1'cit* ■ • ■25. G. g. VolT^IIl. 5668. ■ ' ' ' . . ■

and the Question of sale rae to bo considered later.Donmtans* ^roatost fear at this time nac apparently

tlxat hstisight suffer loiss of pres tine by failure. Eo tool: the precaution of aald.ng for a leave of absence In case pressure was applied. He seemed confident that the ratter would be settled quieltly in stating tliat "wo arc certainly not going to bombard a Turkish port for a question of money,but wo shall find, perhaps, other ways to annoy then with

' 24 ■ ■our ships.n The Porto, probably in hopes of drawing out' ;negotiations, proposed tliat the quays bo sold in six months,

'

and that if at that, time no agreement bad been reached on the price the - Qooloto would regain its rights. Cons tans was willing to cone to an agroement, but ho feared that tho gultan would refuse to bind himself. Hi a apprehensions woreincreased when Abdul Hamid told him that the rights of the■ ■ .

it - '3oci©te liad never boon suspended. However, the Sultan’ssecretary, in submitting papers to prove this statement, dis-

' ■ . 25covered that he had proved tte contrary.Ccmstans then informed Dole ass o' of tho situation. Tho

Foreign Minister toM the ambassador that if the Cult on re­fused to come to toms in regard to the claims of both tho

■ ; •• - ; , - : ■ :Makers and the Dooloto he should leave Constantinople.CoostAns gave the Sultan eight days', then an additional week

*6i- Tim. : ; ; ■; ; ^m.f.v#

-54—

to moot the domndo, and finally loft Cons taut inople on Aug.37. on passing. out of the harbor, he was met by the Waterof uerosionloa and the Hiniater of Agriculture^ who, on behalfof the Sulton, bogged him. to postpone his departure. This

26Gonotans refused to•do. On the same day Cranet, administra­tor of the cooieto, was invited to the Palace♦ By Sept. 1 a settlement had been reached: (1) the Socleto. was to receive41,000,000 franco for the quays, (2) the sale was to be post­poned for a year because of the financial condition of the 'Porto, (3) the Socleto was to have full rights during the■year,, and (4) the amounts paid to tho Sultan wore to be ro-

27dueed to fifty percent of tho net profits. However, tho bankers1 claims still remained unsettled.

It is quite probable that if the French government had anticipated the rupture of relations and then intervention

28uenstans would never have threatened to leave Constantinople.As it was, Deleasse confidently expected the dispute to beadjusted immediately after the breaking off of relations. Anumbor of factors had so weakened French prestige that thoSultan felt quite safe in ignoring the demands of the cuftidt0rsay. In the first place, the lack of a definite policyin treating with the Porte had seriously compromised She

. 29 - -Foreign Office. The incrcaso in Gorman prostlgo resulted ina corresponding decrease in French Influence, due to the

2d. Doc. Bin. Franc.. Tomo j. on. Git*, ho.27. keraru, op. clt.28. Charges, op. clt., p. 471.29. ■ Idea.

that France !md jeopardised her interests /by not intoi-vcning to prevent the Arson inn nassacrco can ccarcoly bo accepted as England nos regarded as the protector of the Armenians*She Havne des D#u% Mondes criticises the Quai d* Orsay for traiting two months after the departure of Gcnstans before •Mrting armed pressure on the Sniton. The delay gave Abdul Hamid an opportunity to seek the support of some Pcuor opposed to the cm tension of French interests; fortunately for Dole asse, the Turkish cause vms very ueak, and, in addition, no Tomer caw anything to gain by contesting France’s position*

The Sultan hnd expected the Ghairber of Deputies-to refuseto support the Government in intervening. He hoped that do-:: " . .

laostio and foreign questions mould bo so linked that the minis­try mould be unable to follom a vigorous policy. He evenwent so far as to boliovo that the ministry mould be overthrown

50cm the question of intervention* Perhaps, he m s not committ­ing a grave miscalculation; the nevus des Douz rondos states that the Cabinet found it difficult to support the banking interests due to the condemnation of these interests by agroup of deputies who wore Boro interested in the advance of

31liberal ideas*

Cn Hov. 4 the interpellation, of i!» mrcel Sombat, Social­ist Revolutionary, "on the relations of Franco with Turkey" was

■' , - ■' " . • ' ______;_______ : ■SoT Berarcl, ot>. oit*. p* 88h. r‘" - .~...31. €hannes. oi>. oit.. p. 470.

/

doMtode Beloaono cave the history of the Q,uays Affair, otatiins that "if the Llinistry vrora cnfccblca, all our enter- prices in the Orient would be dollvorod to the' caprieo or to tho hostility of the Porto and to the imperial authorities*And thodo enterprises aro of no small importanoo." Ho gave a brief explanation of the Lorando and fubini Claims, tho Armenian masacres, and the situation of tho Christians in the Orient* Yjiowiiig the weakness of his position if ho stressed the claims before the Chamber which oomotimes quoo- tioned imperialism, lio passed over then quicldy. The major part of his speech was devoted to waving the flag and glorify­ing French prestige in the Orient. Ocmbat neglected nothing in throwing discredit on the Tubini and Lorando claims. Hepointed out that although the claimants might have had French

54forebears, they themselves had resided in the Orient for a number of years* He stressed the fact that the Government had refused to intervene in favor of tho Armenians, yet now itwas devoting a H of its energies to colloctlng two slightly

55.. . . . .shady claims* Intervention in Armenia was urged by several other speakers* The Chamber finally voted an order of tho day in favor of the Armenians* According to tho order of the day proposed by m s * Ckastenot and PJLvaud and passed by 505 to 97 votes, the Chamber expressed "its confidence in tho

SI* ' 'pbcV Dip.'"%an.V Tome iV on# oit.. ho..46B. "55* I^em* " .54* . Mrard. op* cit« • .55* Charges, op* cit*. p, 475,

Qttfmnmmnt in order to have the honor and rights of France respected*** This vote of confidence cano on l!ov» 4, the day

36before the Frmch fleet appeared off of the island of Eitylcno, Them the Chamber, much to the embarrassment of tho Sultan,' indicated its vrillingaess to coo the government uso force to protect the interests of its nationals® •

After the rupture of relations the Sultan sent a note t© She Powers, attempting to dustix*y his stand. Tha Cxmi d* Of may in response sent a cocmunlmo' to the different foreign offices presenting its case. Abdul Hamid used all the means at his disposal to defer the adjustment of the conflict, be­lieving that the longer ho waited-the more favorable the terns would be. His advisors. Including Htmlr Boy, former ambassador to Paris, emphasized the least important things to hold tho Sultan to this idea. Tte Porto engineered a drop in 'Turkish bonds, hoping that the cnzloty caused to French Investors by this action, would result in sufficient pressure on tho French government to necessitate a revision of its demands. Tho

37French retaliated by refusing to consider a loan of LT 800,000. However, both Governments at the end were no nearer a solution. The Foreign Offie© then employed in its most effective forma weapon which it had threatened to use for some times the fear of revolution* The Young Turks, intriguing to overthrow the sultan, were directing their movement from Paris. The Turkishambassador was regarded more as a personal agent of the Sultan! . • _ -

_ D0Ci> Fran., Tome I, op. cit.37. Los iinhales* on. eit.

-57-

58*

to watch the activities of the Young Turks than as the diplo­matic representative of the Turkish Government* The French, who hitherto had "been more interested in maintaining the status q u o, since they feared a change in government might lead to a repudiation of part of the public debt, had aided Abdul Hamidfey instructing their consuls in the Balkans to send reports. .. , 38 . • ■ , ■■ : ^on the Young Turks to Constantinople, When Munir Bey wasInformed that his presence in Paris was no longer desired, thePorte discovered that It no longer possessed a source of infor-v • v ■: . - .. . ' 7 . V. ' ■ ■ 3# :

matlom on the activities of the revolutionaries. The Sultanimmediately indicated his fear by forbidding the use of the term "Young Turk". There is little doubt but that the Sultan came to terms more readily because of his fear of a revolu­tionary movement. Knowing the character of Abdul Hamid, it would be surprising if this were not true.

The French press wholeheartedly supported the Foreign Office, There were, perhaps, two reasons for this unanimity: the leading newspapers were probably subsidized by the Q.ual d’Orsay, and there was. an opportunity to wave the flag. I»e Teams expressed the fear of the Government lest France be isolated: "Turkey had not awakened to the pressure being exerted on her byvthe ..

isT39.40.41.

O T d . ^ f f f 7 - 5 o ? ° ™ 0 ^ * “ • sli-’ I!o- 4S1-"Episodee of the Month", The National Review. Oct., 1901. The venality of the French press was well-known a U over Europe. It beoame the practice of foreign governments to buy up the press when nssessary. The generous "gifts" ofthe Austrians in 1908 is an example of this. It is also true that the l@adli% newspapers were subsidised by the Q m L &'Qjzmx,*

foreign Powr®# The Suit cm bad revert o& to reactionary42

policies* Franco io detemlneci In her policy". The Figaro sap a chance to appeal to the nationalists. It firnly stated that "beoauee Frence had the rocouroeo she Bust resist;"po pill «aot full reparation an a. no Poper shall stand between

43us and the Port#". Tho Soho do Paris, forgetting its habitual reactionary eheraotor, pent on a revolutionary spree in urgingthe Government to use the Young Turks to obtain generous

44terns. It should bo noted that the nowspapors did not con- • si dor the just ieo of tho claims. They sap in the Sultan* s re­sistance a challenge to French prestige and expressed tho issue in grandiloquent terms, quite forgetting that the Sultan night be justified. . i

In eonsltering tho attitudo of tho Powers towards tho rupture of relations, it is difficult to know just what the notitvos behind their actions wore; the diplomatic documents and newspapers only hint at then. Littlo is known of tho espionage system of the Turkish embassador at Paris, of the interference with French mils in Constantinople, of tho attitude of the Sultan towards French merchants doing businessin tfa® Levant, and of the increase in Gorman influence at

45Constantinoplo. - ' ■ : ■ ■ . -

Although I’ranc® was allied to Russia, she was not at all sure of the Czar*a support. Three woeko after the rupture of

42. (luoFed in Literary Digest * sept. 28, 1W1.. |4em. ....

45. quoiing tho How York Times in Current Literature, Oct., 1901.

relations, tbo iiussion GeMssaaor at Constantinople,tefornca Bapst, ioialn French Oharno d»Affaires, thatthe Sultan wished his Government to tender its good offices in the settlement of tho dispute. Abdul Hamid said that the French were demanding 9%.intercot on the Horan do Claims, while he was willing to pay only 6£, Tho Russian ambassador refused, saying that the logical course for. the Sultan was to accept all the demands* He criticized Abdul Hamid for not having token some steps toward tho adjustment of tho differences immediately after tho recall of Genstans. Ho warned him that tho French would undoubtedly increase their demands if no settlement wore reached in the near future. On Cct. 7, Count Lansuorff informed the French ambassador that tho Sultan had asked the Czar to modiato. , Tho Czar refused, telling Abdul Hamid that if he wished to avoid raking more conoossions, ho should accept tho,demands. Lamsdorff advised the French to nettle tho disput e as soon as possible in order that the powers might act olmultanooualy to force a change in the .Sultan’s policy in Macedonia and Armenia. Ho declared that Dolcasso'was justified in treating the Porto firmly. It was tho opinion of tho French ambassador at St. Petersburg that the Russians wore more interested in tho .Balkans tlion in Ajnmnia. Tho Am­bassador also said that regardless of what happened ho bcliovod 'Frame could be sure of Russian support as long as tho Armenian question was not Involved* On Cot. 11 Count Lamsdorff, .

boo. Din. Ivan Ibid.* Tomo I. Ho. 428.1. QP. bit

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QOt las on Informtion ho In a received from Sinovioff, proposed to the breach Oliargo d'affaires that some delay be alio?;ed in the payment of the Lorando Claims since the Turkish treasury uas empty. The French should receive some cuaianteeo, not overlapping those already given Russia. In making this pro­posal Laasdorff insisted t M t ho had no intention of inter­vening. T3o emphasised the necessity of terminating tho affair as quickly ao possible in order that if the occasion aroso

48the Russian and French diplomats would bo ablo to cooperate.Cn Oct. 17 Zinovioff informed tlse Sultan that there was no possibility of Russian intervention and, in addition, that ifhe refused to aooopt tho French demands ''extreme measures0

49might be employed* in spite of the insistence of tho RussianForeign Office on its disinterestedness, Lamsdorff was the lastfoi-eign minister to approve of French intervention. The Czar * ' - ' ■ . . . SOwas probably afraid of the pro-Armenian sentiment in France.The argument has been advanced, on the other hand, that thoCzar was in-reality using France to offset the anticipated

51German expansion in Turkey. ■ Tho Kovolo Vremyn, oomi-officini Russian newspaper, pointed out this danger and also showed that Germany could buy grain cheaper from Turkey because tho internal duties on grain exported to Germany were removed. Thn IToyoati and tho Bosova also attributed the support of the Czar to the fear of Germany* It is interesting to. note that in dis­covering tho reason why lamsdorff supported tho French nono of48. IMd*. Tome -I. Bo."#?;49. gig., T o m I, HO. 452.50. 3&ard, on. cit*. p. 891.51. Gambler, op. cit., p. 351.

*#tho important it©«paper3 rxmtionod the Dual Allianoo.The German dooumnto boar out tho French statements in

rcsard to Bu g sia. Baron harcchall, Gorran ambassador to Turkey, cmpMslzod tho Insist m o o of lamsdorff that the dispute be settled as soon as possible. Russia persuadod

53tho French to scale doun their claims in tho Lorando Affair.Lansdorff believed, according to Aarschall, that Russian pros-tige would suffer if t!io Turks failed to come to a settlement.Ho nau playing hie own game in trying to convince the Sultan54what a,good friend Russia was. The Germans wore reassured by the conviction that the Russians were unwilling to sec France too strong at Constantinople. Lamsdorff1 a tortuouspolicy, they believed, relieved them of any responsibilityop .in protecting the Cuiton.

It is more difficult to consider the attitude,of Germany since the Foreign Offies itself hesitated a long time before ©oneluding what course to follow. The French thought that the Sultan naked the Imperial Government to tender its good offices in settling the difficulties. At the same time the Porte, after two years of resistance, sanctioned by Irado^the status of tho German company of the port of Haidar-Paoha. Nevertheless, according to the French, the Imperial Government refused to mediato, advising the Sultan to acoodo immediately to tho

bZm quoted53. ' G. P.54. ibid. , I>oq# ,55. Ibid.,, Doc.,56. poc. Dip. Fran.i

Literary Digest. Mopt." Vol. AVIil • DOC »j 5677 .

5075/6687.

Tome I, on. oit.. ho. 584.

jfronoh demnda* The leading nawspapors In both Austria and Gormny opposed intervention, Tho ITationalo Soltung at Berlin and the Hone Praia Prosso at Vienna both nirrored the viovs of the Foreign Offices, Public opinion in Germany followed tho dispute with great calmness, apparently not believing itself bound to side with Turkey, Several newspapers wore favorable to the Freneh, particularly in the Quays Affair,

■■■■■ : , ' . ' V ' ■ ... •Others were unable to soe why the ambassador llnlred this affairwith the lorando and Tublnl Glaims, The latter, aoeording tothese newspapers, wore not entitled to condensation since theyhad intentionally failed to demand payment during several

' 59years in order that they night present exaggerated claims,Baron liar so hall warned, the Sultan on every occasion to settlewith the French as soon as possible in order that they wouldnot increase their demands. The Qua! d»Orsay indioated by itsmarginal notes that it did not trust izarsohall and was rather

60 .of the opinion that ho was encouraging tho Sultan to resist. However, Maraohall was impartial and never suspected that tho

• : 61 • • . vFrench doubted his sincerity.

The German Foreign Office was enially ao suspicious.Chancellor Bulow was apprehensive loot the French were planningto exchange their olains for territorial compensations. Ho

' ■■■■ . 63feared that they liad designs oh Tripoli or Morocco, The

67

Quoted In Lltorarop; cit., KOe 598

Corr&n Ohar^o d'Affairos at Constantinople echoed those fearsin reporting that the French had probably not revealed their63real interests. An indioation of this distrust may be foundin tho insistence of the Goman diplomats that tho Sultan64eamply with the demands as soon as possible. The Charged*Affaires reported the antagonism between Constano and the-other officials of tho French embassy. Tho Germans believedthat the Russians wore encouraging the Turks to resist in65order to fish in troubled waters. The significant pointin regard to Germany and France was the mutual suspicionwhich made it impossible to cooperate.

English and French relations at this time were improvingas Faohoda became an unpleasant memory and tho Entente Cordlalebecame more and more a possibility. England was in no positionto oppose France oven if she had boon so inclined because of thoBoor War. Furthormoro, her quest for friends cade it imperativethat ah© support Franco. Tho Saturday Review assorted that ifFranco limited herself to the goals outlined then the Fowors

: •. * - would have no reason to complain of her action; however, itewer ted' that thoro ueccod to bo somo fear that the French would

66met stop when their original demands wore conceded. The Daily Rows and the Times both unconditionally supported the demands. The Spectator stated that France was making a deter-

Ibid., boo.. 067%. "64, IHu., DOC., 5674.65. Ibid., Dop.» 5678.66* quoted In. Current Llteraturo. op. clt. 67* quoted In Literary Digest, Dept. "ii¥, leoi*

nincd effort to regain tho prestige that chc had had at Constantinople, it also belioved that England should lend her support in order to strike a blow at Gorcany. The more sus­picious Speaker and Corning Leader balloted that tho demands

68were being used to soroon a new Russian aggression* It might bo concluded that what opinion thore was in England was pre-French. . \

Prlnetti, Italian fordrji minister, attempted to carry . water on both shoulders. lie questioned the French ambassador as to whether a squadron would bo sent into Turkish waters.E@ justified his quest ion by saying that Italy had anticipated sending a fleet to visit Constantinople. Ho assured the French that ho had no.intention of intervening, and would be willing to postpone the departure of tho Italian fleet until tho dispute was sottied. Several days lator, the derate ambassador wrote from Homo that Prlnetti was axeltod lest theFrench seise Smyrna or Kitylono. - The Italian Chamber, according

. - , . ■ ' ■ : ; ...... . . ■ .

to tli© ambassador, in such a case would attack the Finis try. Prlnetti told tho Gormans that tho Italian fleet would sail for Turkish waters* Apparently he was trying to impress the Germans with his hostility to tho French when he was assuringthe fiuai d*Orsay that nothing would bo done to inconvenience it.

. . - - ' • "Bulow, evidently unmindful of the negotiations between Home and Paris, tried to calm Italy. He told Prlnetti that

0&. 'I^em.', ~~ ' ' ' ' '69. G. P. V01., XFIII. Doc., 5680.

-G6-

Hussia would hold Franco in chock and advised him to sound©»f 3t • Petersburg* Bulow insisted that Germny rras not

70interested in the matter. A few days later Prinetti again told the German ambassador that an Italian fleet would sail into Turkish waters. He insisted that any seizure of terri­tory by the Frmch would bo the signal for like action on thepart of Italy; ho emphasized tho obligxtion of Italy to "protect"

: 71 ■the Turks in Tripoli. He was assuring the French, on one tend, that he would postpone the departure of the fleet if it might be interpreted as an unfriendly gesture. On the other hand, he was stressing to the Germans his fears of French aggression and was loudly proclaiming his intentions of sending a fleet into Turkish waters*

When Turkey persistently refused to come to terms in spite of the refusal of the Powers to support tier, the situa­tion of Franco demanded that something be done* It became necessary either to ca pi tula to or to intervene. Capitulation would have involved the renunciation of prestige at Constan­tinople; such a course was impossible duo to tho extensive interests of French investors* Therefore, Intervention was the only alternative*

The moment chosen for this display of force was particu­larly favorable* Great Britain was unable to oppose it even if sho had been so inclined since she was occupied in South

TO; Ibid., Coo*, li&il. - : ““ ' “71* I W . , Doc., 5602.

•Sf-

Africa, since the French financiers held some $400,000,00072

worth of British bonds, and since she was already Involved73

in a dispute with the Sultan over Koweyt, Germany remainedsilent either because her financial and industrial situationwas seriously endangered or else because she was not interested,Austria was embarrassed by religious, racial, and politicaldifficulties. Since she was contemplating an invasion offbrace and Macedonia, Italy could not support the Sultan,Hussia, although not completely in accord with French policies,

74was willing to use any opposition to Germany*" Early in November a French fleet consisting of two battle­

ships, three cruisers, and two torpedo boat destroyers wasgiven secret orders to proceed toward tto Asiatic coast of 75Turjcey, The Government had considered seizing Beyrouth,Smyrna, or Salonika as a measure of coercion, but had netdone so because of the determination not to interfere with-theeconomic interests of the other Powers. Kitylehe, one of th®largest islands of the western Asiatic coast, was particularlysuitable to their purpose, since none of the Powers had ex-

76tensive Interests there. The Island Is admirably situated, being halfway between Smyrna ahd the Bardahelles. It is too distant from Cyprus to cause Great Britain to be apprehensiveand yet close enough to Constantinople to render it useful

' • ' 77if the Sultan should be stubborn* The fleet appeared off the' ■ ' ' . ' ■ . '

72% Quoting the Mow York sun In Literary Digest, Voi.. 2 3,p.5*8.75. MLa Chroniqu© politlqueH. Lbs Annales, Vol. 36-37, p. 20.74. literary Digest, op. cit.75. wKews of the ViOGk". Outlook, Vol. 69, p. 688.76. "La Chronique politique, Les Annules* Hov. 10, 1901.77. quoting the Brooklyn standard Union in Literary Digest.

Bov. 16, 1901.

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coast of Eityleno on Hov. 5. For various reasons no land­ing was effected during the succeeding two days; on Hov. 8 the customs houses of the three ports were occupied by marines. However, occupation would never have occurred if the Turkish authorities had not interfered with the tele­graphic communications. The Sultan had accepted the demandsbefore the occupation, but no notification was given to the78 ■ . ■. V - .French admiral. Less than twenty-four hours after the landing

' • . 79of the troops they were back on the ships again. However, in order to be sure that the Sultan did not repudiate his pro­mises almost as soon as they were given, the fleet withdrew slowly through the Grook archipelago.

As a whole the press supported the occupation. Le Temps stated that Italy, Austria, and the United States had all used coercive measures; France had to do the same to keep from being called a third rate Power. The foreign newspapers also supported the dual d* Orsay. The Austrian press gave its support with the condition that the occupation should be temporary and that the demands should not be extended. The German and

78% Foreign delations of the United. States* 1901. Ho. 107. "79. Doc. Din. Dr an.. Tome I, op. cit., Mo. 497.80. I3em. ' . \

81English press took the same stand. However, the j i M M * anAmerican periodical, believed that the occupation would mean

. 82that the Concert of Powers would lose its influence in Turkey,

After having sent a fleet to Hitylene, the Foreign Office to save its faoe was forced to increase its demands. This might have been embarrassing if new financial claims had been pro­

-60-

mised everything. To forestall this danger the additional de­mands, the importance of which was stressed far out of pro­portion to their real value, concerned the dhurohes and schools under French protections First, it was insisted that:the Sul­tan recognise the berat of the Chaldean Patriarch. As earlyas Aug, 9 the papal Secretary of State, Cardinal Rampolla,

, 83was urging the French to demand the be rat. The French interest was stimulated when it was discovered that the Patriarch had asked the German government to plead his cause at Constantinople. Hcweverj, there was some satisfaction in the refusal of Berlins in addition^ it was believed that the Patriarch had been urged

81. "How the Franc a-Turkish Difficulty May Affect all Europe",literary Digest, Hov. 30, 1901, - f

82. Editorial, Nation, Vol* 73, p. 350* "France seems resolved on pursuing the dolleotion of her claims against Turkey a PH tga.9o.ft> and both English and Italian squadrons are wit- m s sing the arrival of a French fleet in the Aegean Sea,The event Is significant chiefly because it marks the com­plete downfall of the traditional British, and one might say European, theory of dealing with the Porte, It was Disraeli, vhe established t W theory that the Ottoman Empire must be maintained at all hazards . v

83. Poo. Dip. Fran.. Tome I, op, cit.* Ho. 355*

. - ■ . - - ■ 84 •to make the demands by Geruan agents. The request for. 85 .

the herat was among the new demands made on Get. 26.The conflict between the Sultan and the Christian insti­

tutions protected by France was not of recent origin. It had become acute in May, 1901, when the Porte issued an irade forbidding French members of the Roman Catholic orders to settle in Turkey without special authorization. This discrim­ination against the orders was the repudiation of a privilege established in 1535 by the Capitulations* The French Govern­ment had not objected immediately as it was primarily interested in settling some other claims first. The difficulties were aggravated by the refusal to recognize French schools and hos­pitals. At this time France possessed or protected in Turkey and the Holy Land two hundred and forty-five schools and three hundred and sixty churches, convents, hospitals, dispensaries,and sanctuaries; only a hundred had been recognized by the

86Sultan. When the Turkish Government refused to accept the French claims,and the fleet was sent to Mitylene, Delcasseproposed as .the second additional demand the recognition of the

. ’ ■ ■ ' ■ ■ ' - • ■ 87schools, hospitals, and religious institutions* Russia ex­pressed no little apprehension over this demand, giving as an

88 -

excuse the fear that everything might be compromised* This

34*. Ibid*. Tome I. Ho. 574. : — ' —85, Graham Stuart, French Foreign Policy, p. 48.86., "La .Ohronique politique", Les innales. Vol, 36-37, p. 305* 87* Stuart, op. cit«88. Doc. Dip. Fran.. Tome I, op. cit., Ho, 470*

excuse was rather weak, as all the Powers, including Germany, had aoquiesed. Russia had an ulterior motive which was prob­ably fear of the influence of the Roman Catholic Church* The Czar, as protector of the Greek Catholics in the Turkish Empire, was naturally jealous of any increase in the Power of the Pope. : The third additional demand was linked to the second; it concerned the granting of firmans authorizing ..necessary construction and repairs upon - lastiSitii ions damaged

89in the Armenian troubles * It is quite apparent that the : foreign Office was thinking of the Chamber of Deputies when it made these demands* Anticipating an.interpellation ontthe rupture of relations with the Porto, Dolcasso' was preparing io ask for the support of the conservative clerical groups.He was quite sure that the Left, which was*opposed to imperial­ism, would mention the failure of the Government to intervene on behalf of the Armenians. Therefore, in order that he, might have other high moral grounds on which to justify the support given private claims, it was necessary to make demands for the Church. The Revue dos Deux Hordes points out the contra­diction in this policy; the religious groups within the countrywere being dissolved, while at the same time protection was~

90extended to the same groups in Turkey* , .

On learning of the occupation of Mityiene the Sultan was greatly shaken, as on the day that Admiral Caillard sent marines to take the customs houses the Sultan had accepted all• „ ' % • ' - ‘ ■ '• -

.89. Stuart. op, cit., p* 48%90. Cbarmes. op* cit., p. 473.

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-?s-

tho domnda. The Porte assumed that the French had not intended to occupy the island, but that in the absence ofcommuniontIona the occupation had taken place. Abdul Hamidhad suppressed the movement engineered by the Shiekl-ul-Islam,but he/was still afraid that a new wave of nationalism mightsweep him from the throne, - :

The first letter sent to the French by Tewfik Pasha andrelating to terms, was received by the "unofficial' Ohara®d*Affaires on Nov, 8. The Sultan capitulated, granting allthe demands. To make certain that the promises would beexecuted, certain guarantees were demanded and obtained* TheSultan even gave more than the demands by consenting to theenlargement, foundation, construction, or reparation of anyFrench institution for six months after the conclusion of - 92the agreement. The Pope expressed his satisfaction and

93gratitude over the recognition of the Chaldean Patriarch.Diplomatic relations were re-established when Bapst was toldthat he might now act inthe official capacity of Charge d*Affaires. .For the arrangements having a financial characterfree securities were to be reserved. For the questions relatingto the recognition or the construction of schools and religiousestablishments written accords of a definitive character were

94to be concluded.

In spite of the Dual Alliance, Russia was the ©nly Power

91

91. DO£92,. T5XI ,93. T5Ia., Toms. I, No. 49894. Ibid., Toro I, No. 455

*Tome I} No. 498.455.

-73 -which seemed-'to embarrass France in the slightest whenF.ltyleno v/as occupied. On Nov, 8, the day of the occupation*Zinovieff refused to see Bapst, While Baron imrschall, on theother hand, admitted the French representative and assured

. .. . 95him that he count on the aid of Germany, On Nov, 7» Lamsdorffhad urged France to accept the promise to adjust the claims anddemands and to close the affair as soon as possible. He dealtwith purported news from London, Berlin, and Rome that thePowers were ready to profit from the situation created bythe intervention, and stated that they would probably actwithin forty-eight hours^ Furthermore, according to Lamsdorff,the Serbian minister showed Impatience to reopen agitationin the Balkans, and Prince George of Crete might talas theFrench Intervention as encouragement to break off all relationswith the Sultan, Russia, he asserted, could not supportFrance during the acute phases of the conflict, hut wouldbe willing to aid in the liquidation. He represented thepress as being anti-French while, according to the French

96Charge d'Affalres, just the contraiy was the case. On Nov. 8, Lamsdorff again insisted that relations be re-established at the earliest possible moment. He mentioned that if Franee insisted on prolonging the negotiations she might discover that the other Powers would support the Sultan. He hinted that the Greek Orthodox Church might proffer counter-demands

95% Ibid., Tome I, No, 46Y. • ” .96. TGI?., Tome I, No. 480.

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97if sow settlement were not soon consummated. Delo&esewas evm more uncertain of the Russian attitude when Z-inovieffin an article in the Frankfort Gazette stressed th© need ofliquidating certain claims of the Russian government against

: ' 98the Sultan before consideration of the Lorando Claim. A week later Barrere, French ambassador at Rome, informed Deloass^ that the rumor was being circulated that France and Russia • were unable to cooperate in exerting pressure on the Sultan#This view had been substantiated by the following quotation in Le Temps for Itov. 13:

"Undoubtedly Russia is a loyal, faithful ally, but the Turkish affairs const ituto precisely the only point of friction between Russian policy and our own#- Since the Crimean War, we follow different designs in the Eastern Mediterranean”. 99

Delcaase, to allay the suspicions of Barrere, answeredthat "Zlnovleff had from Oct. 25 signified to the Porte byorder of his Government that it could not count on any aid fromthe side of Russia and that if it resisted a long time to thedemands of Franco, it would expose itself to seeing us take

100recourse to extreme measures”. Nevertheless, in M s commu­nications with the Fraaoh Charge'd*Affaires at St; Petersburg Deloasse showed his anxiety lest Russia take the aide of Turkey. In summary, Russia hesitated to support France probably because she feared the demand of the Chamber for intervention in favor of the Armenians, the growth in prestige of the Roman Catholic

99* Ibid., tome I, No. 488.98. Ibll., Tome I, No. 454.99. i H t U ; Tom® 1, NO. 585.100. W a t ., Tome I, No; 559.

75

CMroh, and that the French claims would be paid before those of her own subjects.

■ Germany was not interested in the occupation cf Mltylene.101She counted on Russia to prevent Franco from going too far.The Kaiser, however, doubted the sincerity of the French diplo­mats when they firmly maintained that they had no territorial 102ambitions. The Marquis de Reverseaux, French ambassador at Vienna, reported to Delcasse that the warmest congratulations received after the French success came from the German ambassa­dor. However,-the Marquis echoed Delcasse*s opinion in doubting the sincerity of the German ambassador, who bad also assuredhim that the Kaiser himself was elated at the success of the 105French* There is no reason to believe the opinion .statedin the national Review that Germany because of the fear ofFrench supremacy in the Near East became very solicitous about

104England’s Interests.

The Austrian government gave unqualified support to the French. Count Gpluchowskl stated that France in pushing her claims was discouraging any future resistance on the part of the Sultan. Austria, the same year, bad presented claims to the Porto, but these bad been Immediately paid sine® the

105Sultan did not care to reckon with two fleets at the same time.

The English government, after having received the official explanation of the Mltylene Incident, refused to give its

lOi: G.P., Vol. XVIII, DOC., 5681. : ' ' ' ~~ L102. iHid.. Vol. XVIII, DOC., 5686.105. Doc. Dip. Fran.. Tome I, op. oit.. No. 491.104. ?1 Episodes of the Month”. National Review, Vol. 38, p. 48.105. Doc. Dip. Fran.. Tome I. op. cit.. No. 482.

96-

opinion. Lord Lansttowne stated tliat be would take the matter under consideration. Some of the English newspapers, such as the Daily kail, were bitterly opposed to the occupation; the . rest of the proas was lukewarm. ,

Barrere, French a^iassador at Foma, explained the situa­tion in kitylene to Prinetti, wlu) expressed his satisfaction with tho action of France* lie also premised that Italy would not send the fleet she had planned to send earlier to Constan­tinople until the French had adjusted their differences withthe. Sultan. This promise was quite at variance with the opin-

106Ions expressed to Go many. Prinetti-warned that if Francoshould find it convenient to remain at Mitylone, Italy would

107be forced to seise other territories in compensation. Publicopinion at first was very suspicious of tho French in spite ofthe assurances of the Ouai d'Orsay. This might be traced tothe propaganda of Criapi, the influence of which had not yetentirely disappeared. However, after the withdrawal fromHitylene, Italian opinion was more favorable than over towards 100France. ,

Constans- was received by the Sultan in an audienoo on25ov. 26. Abdul Hamid was very cordial, emphasising thonecessity of adjusting all difficulties in the future beforethey became too serious. Constans believed that tho Sultan

109realized his dependence on French financiers. However, the

XoS; g. p., Voi. ylil. p o o.,107. Doc. Dip. Fran.; Tome I, op. olt.. Ko. 474.108. ibid.. Toae~T7: Ho. 460. ■ ■ .109. ITOT.. Tone I, HO. 548.

77-

Port e showed its real colors in objecting to two French shipsbeing stationed at Constantinople when each of tho other twoPowers had two there. The Incident was terminated when thesecond French ship entered without obtaining the necessary 110 ; . papers. Riza Ahmed, Turkish writer, in an article publishedin Dec., 1901, stressed the necessity of establishing warmrelations between the Porte and France because of the closecultural bonds. He pictured Franco as being the champion of

111 'liberal tendencies in the Ottoman j&apire.

I5K Ibid.. Tome 1. No. 521. — — - — — —111. "la Politique francaise en Orient", Hlza Ahmed, la Grande

Revue, Dec., 1901.v

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CHAPTSR III

The French Attitude Towards the Kaoedonian Agitation

(1902-1904)

Since ancient time a Macedonia has been merely a geo­graphical expression, comprising under the Sultan the vilayets of Monastir, Salonika, and Koesovo, The diversity of nation­alities prevented the growth of national sentiment as in the regions inhabited by homogeneous peoples. The Turks contri­buted toward the lack of unity by doing all within their power to destroy any nascent sentiment of a Macedonian nationality. Being on the highway from the Danube to Salonika, this region lias be on visited by all peoples settling in the Balkans. Thus one finds here remnants of every race ever having made the Balkans their home. . -

The following brief history of Macedonia provides the background for a diplomatic history of the agitation for inde­pendence from Turkey. The granting of permission by the Sultan to the Bulgarians in 1870 to establish a church independent . from the Greek Catholic Church led to results which the Porte had never anticipated. It probably believed that it would be able to play the new Bulgarian national church against the Greeks. The Sultan overlooked the agitation whioh would enable

79-

Russia in 1877 to find an excuse to attack the Turkish Empire.The creation of a Great Bulgaria placed Bulgaria, EasternRobmelia, and Macedonia all in one great state. It the Powershad permitted this satellite of Russia to exist, many of thefuture difficulties would have been avoided. Instead, Macedoniawas given back to the Sultan, and Bulgaria and Eastern Roumoliawere declared autonomous but were to be under different princes.There was one compensation in the fact that by the Treaty ofBerlin the Sultan promised autonomy to Macedonia. Unfortunately

1the Powers never forced him to fulfill this promise.

The problem of determining nationality had probably been the origin of most of the agitation. If all factions had been able to unite against the Turk, independence might have quickly been realized. But unfortunately the ethnological groups spent their energy on each other, instead of concentrating on the governing class. Since religion was the basis upon which nationality was determined, the national groups disseminating the most propaganda or using the most effective terrorist methods had been the most successful in making converts. A - French diplomat at Salonika jokingly remarked that if he bad a million francs he would be able to convince the entire Macedonia! population that they were descendants of the French crusaders. However, the population had tended to divide Itself nationally into several geographical groups. In the south the majority were Greeks, who lived chiefly in the towns and cities where they were exf ten successful merchants. Never the less, in Salonika the majority of the population ware descendants of the Jews

1. E. J. Dillon, "Reign of Terror in Macedonia", Contemporary Review. Vol._ 83- n« 20v, .........

*•80—

forced to leave Spain during the roign of Ferdinand andIsabella, in the northwest were found the Serbians mixedwith the Albanians, who had seized a large part of the landafter the region had been almost depopulated by the Turkishmassacres. The fact that the dominant element, living in thenorth and east, was undoubtedly Bulgarian might partially beexplained by the success of the first propaganda movementswhich were engineered from Sofia. However, it was practicallyimpossible to determine the approximate proportions of thevarious national groups. A number of estimates, most forpropagandizing purposes, had been made. An American writerventured the estimate that five-sixths of the population were 2Bulgarian; another more moderate observer of the same nation-ality gave the figure as a little less than half Bulgarian.The Turks, according to some writers, numbered approximately

4,5.a third of the population. Several others. Including a

' 6Turk, declared that they comprised less than twenty percent. The determination of nationality from religion led to rapid changes which made it impossible to ascertain with any accuracy the percentages of the national groups.

The reason for the Liaoedonian revolt was largely economic. The most enterprising of the peasants often attended schools

Charles Johnston. ^Macedonia*s Struggle for Liberty", North ~ American Review. Vol., 177, pp. 224-5.

3. Louise Parker Hie hards, "What the Macedonian Trouble Is",North American Review, Vol., 7, p. 4066.

4. Anonymous, "The Macedonian Struggle", Review of Reviews. Vol.. 28, pp. 422-3.

5. Richards, op. oit.6. Barakatullan, mulhemmed, "A Mohammedan View of the Macedonian Problem", North American Review. Vol., 177, p. 747.

maintained by the P m era. There they enjoyed so many con­veniences that on returning to their poverty-stricken homes, they became dissatisfied with the conditions brought about by the ruthless exploitation of the Turks and were willing recruits for any revolutionary movement. The unrest was aggravated by the realization that the highly fertile soil could be made to yield a greater return if the Turks, with their antiquated methods, could be drivm out of the country.

The most bitter complaint was against the tax burden*First, there was a heavy indirect tax of eight to eleven percent on all imports. Then there was the monopoly on tobacco and matches. The heaviest burden was the direct taxes, paid in cash and. levied on cattle, sheep, other livestock, orchards, and harvests. There was also a poll tax for which only Christians were liable. Investigations of the English consular office at Uskub of a typical village revealed the weight of the tax burden which amounted to LT 530 for 150 houses or about LT 3 10s per household. After satisfying the tax- gatherers and landlord the net average Income was only LT 10.The Jewish tax-farmer by over-assessment collected twice as8much as he paid for the right of collection• Nominally there were fixed times when the taxes were due, but in practice special assessments were continually levied with no consideration of the capacity of the peasant to pay. Often being unable to

■' - ... - - ; • . *■T. H. Brallsford. "The kaoedonlan Revolt", fortnightly

Review," Vol,, 80, pp# 428-30.8. Idem. '

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meet hia obligations, ho was forced to work them off in the corvee. In a prosperous village out of a male population of five hundred and sixty no less than three hundred and seventy were forced to work off their obligations in 1902. In addition to these taxes, the Christians had to pay a local lord or bandit for protection. The Albanians and Turks alone could carry arms, and as a result extorted what they wished from the other peoples. Refusal to pay meant confiscation of pro­perty, all kinds of indignities, and in some cases even assass- ination.

The landlord completed the exploitation already begun by the state. Some of the lands were owned by the peasants themselves, some were owned by fellow Christians who, neverthe­less, showed little sympathy; but the great majority of the villages belonged to a Turkish lord or bey who worked his fields on a system of profit-sharing. The bey who owned the land and cottages supplied seed and in some cases salt and petroleum to hia tenant. The peasants were allowed to cut wood, but they had to provide the labor, the ploughs, and draught animals for tilling the soil. In addition, they contrib­uted unpaid labor on the bey’s estate in in his mill, cut wood for him, and transported his produce to market. Half the harvest was turned over to the bey as part of his share, but the whole tithe was paid by the peasant. About LT 25 per

' ' ' ' ' ■ ' ' ~ ' ~

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annum was produced by the average peasant household; LT 3 10®'went to the tax-collector, LT 1 10® to the resident brig end,

LT 10 and an unspecified amount of labor to the bey, and finally10

LT 10 remained for the peasant. To aggravate the injustice the peasant had no opportunity to defend what little he had.The courts never decided against the beys, and the police were the private retainers of the Turkish lords. The system of exploitation was perfectly devised.

The atrocities committed in Macedonia by both the Turkish troops and the Slav and Greek brigands focused European atten­tion at the beginning of the century on this region* Undoubted­ly the Powers most coneemed would have preferred to ignore the events and to have limited their remonstrances to paper programs, as in the case of the Armenians, if the question had not been brutally thrust upon them. One reason for the greater interest was the proximity of the disputed region to the territories of the great Powers; another was the necessity of stealing the thunder of the Pan-Slavists in order to avoid a possible war between Austria and Russia, rivals in the Balkans. Finally, a third reason was the possibility of a test of power of the two groups of European alliances - Russia, representing the Dual Alliance, and Austria, the Central Powers, Outside of the two principal powers - Austria and Russia - Franc9, although but

Icu ibid., pp. — — —

indirectly involved, was regarded aa an important factor ■because .of her interests in Turkey. England, following the traditions of Gladstone, had boon strongly urging a reform of the Ottoman Empire. Germany, anxious for concessions and un­willing to jeopardize her. position, was very likely to support Turkey or else to remain silent. Italy, indulging in her

7national pastime, objected more vociferously than intelligently to every, change in the Balkans, regardless of whether or not her interests were involved.

The state, most energetically supporting.the anti-Turkishpropaganda in Macedonia was Bulgaria,.which bordered on two

'of the three. Macedonian vilayets. She received her autonomy in 1878 but was dissatisfied in view of the boundaries outlined under tho Treaty of San Stefano. Her population in 1903 was almost four million;.the per capita wealth was not great, as may be concluded from.the fact that there were not ten men in the country worth $200,000. The Government was on a sound financial basis until 1892. when the first, deficit occurred.

The interest of Bulgaria in Macedonia arose largely from her determination to expand towards the Aegean and to g^ln a port if. possible. However, a deeper reason for. her interest was her racial connections. Thirty, percent of the civil servants and officers in the. army were Macedonians. In addition, they

11. Editorial. "The Macedonian Struggle", Review of"Keviewa. :Vole- 28, p. 424.12. Dillon, OQ. 01t#& pp. 318-19.

.-85-oomprleed one-half of the population of Sofia# A third reason for the intervention m s the belief that the Turkish Empire m s near dissolution# ^Macedonia, in that case, due to its heterogeneous population would probably not be an independent state but would be divided among the Balkan Powers. Therefore, if a strong pro-Bulgarian sentiment was imbued in the Macedonians, it would be possible to annex the greater part of the three vilayets,

Bulgarian nationalism dates from 1870 when the Sultan consented to an independent Bulgarian church under an Exarch#A vigorous nationalism was rewarded in 1878 by an autonomous Bulgaria. However, the movement did not stop at this point, as the energetic and virile Bulgarians not only bad designs on Eastern Roumelia which was annexed in 1885 but also began to propagandize Macedonia. Their efforts were rewarded by the establishment of four new Exarchate bishoprics in the earlynineties. During this period the propaganda bad, for the most

■ - 14 -part, been peacefully disseminated. The Bulgarians, for afew years after 1878, had looked forward to annexing the wholeof Macedonia. They soon discovered that there was littlepossibility of.this,'so they encouraged the Macedonians toestablish an autonomous state, which might bo absorbed later.The agitation resulted in two Macedonian parties: the Pan-

: ' . ' ■ 15Slavisto and the Centralists, who favored autonomy.

15. V/. Miller. Pitoman Empire, p. 4MI '14. Ferdinand Scheville. History of the Balkan Peninsula, p. 453.15. "Bulgaria and Macedonia». Koview of lleyiews, V01..2G. p.721.

quoting from an article of George Gaulis in the Revue do, Paris.

15

Several factors tended to e ton go the prepaganaa from peaceful methoda to terror!am# One was the entrance of Serbia, Greece, and Roumanie in the field of propaganda, Serbia, which began to fear that Bulgaria would soon dominate the Balkans, propagandized most effectively in Old Serbia, which , was the northern part of the vilayet of Koesovo, However, she was not very successful in Monastir or in Salonika where Bulgaria was already well-established, The Greeks were more active than the Serbs in opposing the inroads of the Exarch. They represented the prosperous commercial class whose very prosperity stirred up the opposition of the oppressed peasants. In spite of the fact that the appeal of the Greek Church had already been compromised, since it had boon prostituted to the purposes of the Sultan, the Greeks still remained strong in southern Salonika. Their propaganda was rendered even more innocuous by the treacherous aid accorded the Sultan against the other nationalities# The Roumanians, although never hoping or expecting to acquire any territories in Macedonia, espoused the cause of the Kutzo-Vlachs, who were scattered and numerically far weaker than any of the other national groups* King Carol was playing politics in order to make a favorable agreement with Bulgaria in regard to the Dobrudja should Macedonia be divided. Turkey, taking steps to end propaganda in the disputed region, was aided by Greece and Serbia, both of which were interested in preventing Bulgarization. Tho

16. hoc. Dip, ffran,. Tome III, QP» cit., Ko. IBB. ‘ ' ~

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-8?

hand of the Sultan was forced since ho was trying to strmethen his position as spiritual head of the Moslems by catering to the fanatic s. As a result ho was fbroed by public opinion to suppress any Christian movement, Abdul Hamid was between the devil and the deep blue sea. On one side, were the Balkan states which justly expected aid from Europe if attacked by Turkey, They were like a crowd of small boys who, tormenting a shaggy, yellow dog, knew full well that if the dog turned on them, they could expect aid from nearby protectors. On ’ the other side, were the Moslems, who condemned all concessions. The Sultan had more to gain by refusing reforms, since Macedonia was probably lost in any case, and since, by holding the confi­dence of the Mohammedans^ he could keep the rest of his Empire,

The second reason’for recourse from peaceful methods to violence was the triumph of the pro-Russian party. This came in 1894 after the assassination of Staabulov, partisan of friend­ly relations with Turkey, The ruler of Bulgaria, Prince Fer­dinand, who was suspected of planning Stambulov1 o death, never anticipated how his throne would be jeopardized by the Macedonian Party, which tried to foree him to give official sanction to the propaganda. Eg had to point out to the Powers that the terrorism was not the work of the Government, but of a small clique which had successfully evaded prosecution because of the inability of the Government to fix guilt. On the other hand, he had to quiet Bulgarian public opinion by not too

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vigorously opposing the m r k of the t,!aoedonian Committee, the agency responsible for the propaganda and terrorism*

Finally, the third reason for violence was the hope that the centering of European attention on Macedonia would result in a movement to grant it autonomy. Greece had succeeded in such a policy in Crete. However, as will be pointed out, this policy proved a boomerang, since the Powers, desiring to keep peace, proved more friendly to Turkey than had been the ease in similar incidents.

The situation reached an acute stage after 1900. 2 aoedoniadue to the violences of the brigands and of the Turkish troops who were equally as bad, was reduced to a shambles. This ©very* man* s land was quickly transformed into a no man’ s land. The peasants wore exploited hot only by the Turks but by their own countrymen who levied heavy assessments on them. The fact that refusal to pay often led to assassination resulted in a heavy emigration during this period.

The general belief by 1903 that Macedonia would be de­tached from Turkey led the Balkan states to mark out zones of propaganda, in June, Turkey appealed to the Powers to force Bulgaria to dissolve the Macedonian Committee. Russia and Austria answered that the first move must come from the Sultan. Accordingly Hilmi Pasha was appointed inspector-general of reforms, and the Sultan even went further in introducing a program of reforms which was unacceptable to the insurgents.

T7I G. P. Gooch, history of a Europe, p. 398.

It is difficult t© conclude Aether Ililmi Pasha actuallyintended to carry out the reforms. His popularity with theambassadors at Constantinople leads one t© believe that ifhe had the opportunity he would have acted* One authoritydeclared that he presented many fine projects, but they were

10all blocked by the Sultan* An anti-Turkish writer, stating■ .that Ililmi Pasha never intended to carry out the reforms,

revealed that one thousand bandits were taken and then released,and, in addition, that no attempt had been made to punish the

19Moslems for their crimes against the Christians, It was impossible to fix full responsibility for the massacres on either party. Undoubtedly the Turks slaughtered many Slavs, but it was equally true that the Slavs were guilty on every possible occasion of retaliation. The only regret was that the Powers failed to take action sooner.

Early in 1903,'Austria and Russia, both interested in the maintenance of the status quo, took steps to alleviate condi­tions. Their mutual jealousy prevented the advancement of any comprehensive program of reforms. It was agreed, however, that reforms were necessary to reduce the disorders, to prevent misdeeds, to guarantee equal rights for the Christians, to insure the removal of negligent or corrupt officials, and to guarantee the integrity of the Turkish territory against a Balkan attack.

In February, the two Powers presented the following reforms:

10. WV D. Allen, The Turks in Europe, p. '19. Brailaford, op* cit., pp. 441-43.

—90—

1# An inepeo tor-gene m l , who would hold office for three years unless Austria and Russia consented to his removal and who would be able to use the Imperial troops in Macedonia at any time without consulting the imperial government, was to be appointed by the Suit an; Abdul Hamid had already appointed Hilmi pasha, but he did not have a fixed term nor the option of using the imperial troops in Macedonia without the consent of the Sultan*

lie The vails or governors of the three vilayets had to conform to the instruction® of tho inspector-general and were to aid him*\ HI* The reorganization of the police and gendarmerie was to be undertaken by foreign experts supervised by the Turkish Government, only twenty percent of the gendarmerie was to be Christian, but this percentage was to be increased so that ultimately it would be proportional to the population. Officers, having previously shown fitness, were to command the gendarmes. It would not be necessary for the Christians to read and write Turkish if it wore difficult to find those who aid, . ■ . ■ ' " . ' ■ ■. - ./. ■ : ; .' - ■- IV. The rural guards were to be chosen from the inhabi­

tants of the villages and were to be Christians where the majority of the population was Christian*

V, Some means bad to be developed for controlling the Albanians, who were guilty of mistreating the Christians*

VI* An amnesty was to be granted to those who were not directly Involved in the political crimes and also to those who had emigrated*

VII# A budget was to be prepared for each vilayet which would provide for the payment of all its expenses out of the funds before they wore set aside for any other use. There were to be ameliorations in the collection of the taxes# All the revenues were to be placed in a bank supervised by the Ottoman Bank and were to bo spent only on a special order,

Nobody was satisfied with the reform; even their most ardent advocates scarcely believed that they would solve theproblem* The Suit an, realizing the uncertainty of his position- - 'as head of the Mohammedans* accepted them because otherwise he feared that something more drastic might be proposed. Hie fears in regard to an uprising proved to be more than justified, as the Albanians iranediately revolted because of their objections to the program# As they done were armed, it was impossiblefor the Christian® to aid in enforcing order. In fact, those

, . • , . ■ ;■ ■■

few Christians admitted to the gendarmerie were obliged to carry clubs in lieu of gun a. Naturally under these circum­stances the population, regardless of its religious beliefs, preferred to depend for its security on the old Turkish police rather than trust am unarmed Christian force# The Sultan was afraid to send troops into northern Macedonia to repress the uprising, since the most trusted guards at the Yildiz Kiosk,

20. Boo. Dip. Fran.. Tome III, Ho. 99. : ~ “

the imperial palace, along with many of the civil officers, were Albanians* Not even remonstrances on the part of the Powers were suf fie lent to stir Abdul liaadA to aet ion*

In "Bulgaria opinion on the reforms was divided* In gen­eral the program was judged to be too moderate; something more drastic had boon expected* It was hoped that the Sultan would refuse to carry out the reforms, and thus annexation In spito of the Russian foreign office might be possible* The Stambulov newspapers attacked Russia and the Bulgarian Government. It was too much to believe that the Government would be able toremain in power long because of the determined stand that

21public opinion was taking for intervention* The radical party hoped to stir the Powers to intervene by committing acts which might force their hands* The Suit on, exercising sovereignty over the region, was forced to maintain order; therefore, if atrocities were oomitted again® t the nationals of the Powers, the Bulgarians believed that intervention.would result* The kidnapping of an American missionary illustrates the type of tactics used to draw world attention* A Turkish writer asserted that the Bulgarians destroyed twenty Turkish villages tryingto precipitate a war* England alone of the powers, according; ' ' ■■■-■■ . ' ■ BS ' . ' ■■ ' ' ' ;

to this writer, favored the Bulgarian cause. Blackmail wasfreely used against the Turks, and those refusing to pay were

21. Ibid.» Tome III. Ho. ill* ~22. Barakatullah, op. cit., p. 747.

often assassinated./ Even ti# other Bollcsn mtlonalitiGssuffered becaui® tho Bulgariena feared resistance to fchoirplane* On® hundred and fifty Greek notables wore assassinated

' ' ' ■ . " : . 23along with a largo nuidber of influential Serbs* The Greeksresponded to those tactics by wholeheartedly supporting therepressive measures of the Turks, In addition, the GradeGovernment declared tint it reserved the richt to demand thesaoo privileges for its nationals as tho Bulgarians mightrcecive*

A brief survey of oaoh of the reforms will indicate why the situation was not Improved. Tho inspoctor-generalsalthough appointed for throe years end able to uso tho imperial

• ' ■ ' ' ■ ■ -troop®, was still dependent on the Sultan who, making his own choice for this position, was careful mot to choose anyone who might roduco tho privileges of the hoslats. Tho vails, rely­ing on their influence at Constantinople and tho weakness of the m s p w t o r - ^ e m l , refused to comply with his instructions* The anticipated reorganisation’of the gendarmerie and police Btmm: took place; tho Loslcms had no intention of placing arms uhich might bo used against them in tho liands of the Christian®* Tl«5 same thing was also true of the rural guards, Tho sugges­tion that some moans be developed for controlling the Albanians was completely disregarded for reasons shown above. The amnesty to the political offenders was never taken seriously. The

23% G. T, Abbott, "haoedonia and Its i ovolutionary committees”,' Nineteenth Contury. Vol*, 53, p* 410*

24, Doc* bio..Franc.. Tome III, on, oit., ho, 122,25. Ibid., Tome III, Uo* 312.

Ottoman Bank, which was to supervise the expenditures and receipts of the vilayets, was net given sufficient power to enable it to prevent requisitions being zm&e by the imperialS©Vermont« And as a result, the gendarmerie, being unpaid,

: . - ' ' : ' r" 2*was forced as hitherto to live off the population#During the summer of 1905 the situation beoano so acute

that Austria and Russia both warned Turkey and Bulgaria thatneither could count on aid unless they accepted the FebruaryProgram# However, the apparent inability of the Sultan tocope with the Albanian revolt, which gradually became worse,and the obvious intention of the Bulgarians to make conditionsso bad that the Potters would bo forced to intervene resultedin a general belief all over Europe that some change had to

27be rcado in the state of affairs#Count Jvaciedorff mot the Austrian minister Count GoluchowsIdL

at the Castle of Kurzstog near Vienna in Oct., 1903. Thsydecided to continue the same method already inaugurated inFebruary, but more drastic reforms dosignod to end the turmoil

28were to be enforced under closer European supervision# Autonomy was not granted# Instead, southern Macedonia was divided into five- gendarnerlo dis trio t a; British at Brava, French at sores, Italian at konastir, Hussion at Salonika, and Austrian at Eskub. Although eonditlona wore somewhat improved, they atill continued to bo bad# liono of the national groups ceased its pro^ganda,

26# iimilsford. op# eit.V p# 445# ' r " ' ' !27. Gooch, op. clt#, p# 399.26# Doc. Din. Fran#. 2oino III, ou* clt*. No*. 453.

while at the same time the Sultan was forced by public opinion to adopt a firmer stand to satisfy the Moslems. The problem was by no means solved, but did not occupy the center of the political stage for several years.

Although Italy did not succeed in forcing herself into the councils of the two Powers attempting to establish order in Macedonia, she did, however, make her influence felt in the settlement. Her claim to intervene was based on the resi­dence of 5,000 Italians at Salonika, on the relationship ofthe royal family with the Montenegrin dynasty, and finally

29on her interest in assuming a protectorate over Albania# Thehand of France was clearly seen in the whole Italian policy.Hot that France urged Italy to demand concessions, but thatan attempt was made to obtain concessions from Russia on Italy’sbehalf. In January, 1905, Barrore, French ambassador at Rome,wrote to Deleasse that. Italy had agreed to the February Programafter the Russian ambassador had assured the royal governmentthat France favored it; he also said that France should indicatemore clearly her interest in the problem to offset any possibilityof gaining the impression that an accord of Austria, Russia, and

: 30 ' ■■ ... 'herself was possible. The Austrian forei^a minister and theItalian ambassador at Vienna, mindful of the rupture that mightoccur, carefully explained that their respective governmentswere not responsible for the propaganda in Albania. Austria

25% Herbert Vivian. "Aaoeclonian Gonaoiraoy,\ Fortnightly Review, Vol., 79, p. 828.

30. Poo. Dip. Fran., op. cit.. Tome III, NO. 41.

further clarified her stand in declaring that Albania wouldnever be permitted to pass under the rule of a great Power,although she might be given her independence. One reasonfor this attitude was the conviction that the dangers ofsubjugating the region would be more than Austria cared toundertake; therefore, the whole question was to prevent any

31other Power from stopping into it.The interest of Franco in smoothing out relations between

Russia and Italy was indicated in the despatch of Barrere to Deloasse, He stated that the chief concern of the Italian foreign office was the question of whether Russia would be able to block Austrian aggression in the Balkans. In order to protect herself, Italy was anxious to be admitted into the confidence of Lamsdorff. The Russian ambassador at Rome favored a rapprochement, but Lamsdorff, who had little respect for the Italian Government, refused. Barrere expressed the hope that Frame might, through her influence with the Russian foreign offleg, bring about an accord between Rome and St. Peters­burg. Bompard, French ambassador at St. Petersburg, outlined the reasons behind Lamsdarff's decision. He stated that Russia refused to give Italy any assurances in regard to Albania because she was interested primarily in the maintenance of the status quo. The support given Italy in Albania might be

51732. Tome III, Ho. 62. Tome III, *0. #65.

interpreted as encouragement which would lead to no end of0€Mplloatlon@« He emphasised that the Entente with Austriawas aimed only at maintaining the status quo* However, headmitted that since there wore no guarantees as to the futurethe Entente might formulate some agreement for the divisionof sphere® of Influence* Bompard, fearing that Russia, Austria,and Germany would he dram closer toother, cautioned Delcasseagainst espousing the Italian claims too energetically; France

35should wrensin'the disinterested spectator”* As a concessionto public opinion and as an index of her own uneasiness lestAustria capitalise upon the occasion, the Italian Governmentsent a squadron of eight warships to Salonika and had the restof her fleet ready to sail. The foreign office made it quiteclear that the demonstration was not intended as a warning to

54Russia whose friendship was still desired*The Austrian foreign office was undoubtedly anxious to

settle the Macedonian question without reviving the ghost of Turkish disintegration* The sincerity of Austria was not to be questioned; nevertheless, criticism might be advanced against her dilatory method of meeting a problem which was deemed sufficiently important to precipitate a Balkan war. Bompard, discounting the Russian promises that Bulgaria would not be supported even though Turkey refused the reforms, feared that

55T54. * • Tome HIVHI, Ho* 215.

public opinion would force Lamsdorff to aid tho Bulgarians.Austria also held tho same opinion, and this, perhaps, explained hor reluctance to support too vigorously a change in Macedonia* Tho I'arquis d@ Beveraeaux, French ambassador at Vienna, re­porting opinion soon after the acceptance of the February Program, believed that Count ooluchowski hoped that the reforms, so quickly accepted, would be applied. The Austrian foreign office judged the supervision of the Ottoman Bank inadequate, since the Sultan’s susceptibilities made a sinking fund impossible.The Bulgarian agent and 1,1. de Kallay, Minister of Finances and Governor-General of Bosnin-Herzegovina, were both pessi­mistic over the results of the reforms. The general consensusof opinion in official circles was that, in spite of her deolar-

' ■ ' - ■ ' ' - ■ ■ . • ' ■ - ■ . ' ; Se ­at ions of disinterestedness, Russia was to be distrusted* Thedanger of a break in the negotiations was increased when theHovoie, semi-official St. Petersburg newspaper, denied theright of Austria to occupy the sanjak of Novi-bazar; this standwas viewed with great alarm in Vienna. The Pester Lloyd.Viennese newspaper, countered by pointing out Austria’s right ■ 37 under the Treaty of Berlin.

Turkey and Italy both feared that Austria would intervene.A Turkish writer charged that the Austrians were conducting from Hovi-bazar an active propaganda among the Albanians to

35

TomaTome

III, Mo. 101. Ill, No. 103. Ill, No. 208.

gain their friendship* A different version of the situation uas given by the French ambassador at Vienna; who stated that the Austrians were considoring military measures against the • Albanians to quell the disturbance at Mitrovitza, but that Vienna hoped th® Sultan would be able to cope with the uprising. The Austrian and Italian naval demonstrations before Salonika tended to embitter relations between the two countries. CountQoluchowski feared that the Bulgarians might get a false inter-

- .pretation of the intervention, and be encouraged to continue-theagitation* .■■ i!ie fears were somewhat allayed when France con-. - ■ . ' : V 39 • 'sontod to dispense vd.th any deioonstratlon.

In September, 1903, the report of - the French ambassadorafter the February Program had obviously failed revealed thestate of opinion at Vienna.• Goluchowski said that the reformscould not be carried out because of the,bad faith of Turkey.The Sultan gave orders which remained dead letters upon therefusal of the insurgents to accept them. The sympathies ofEurope, according to Goluchowski, had’been alienated by the

40brigandage incited by the Bulgarians. Austria at this time still looked to a peaceful'solution.

The attitude of Russia is readily explainable if one keeps in mind her expansion in the Far East. Expending her resources and energy in China, she couM not follow an aggressive

gOV ikM; , Tome III;-Ho; W w39. IFIdV, Tome III, No'. 224;40. Ibid;. Tome III, No; 421;

«*3JOO«*

policy- in tho Balkans* Austria Imau of this crpanoion but m o never willing to trust 3t, Petersburg. The other Powers uore moro oonsi flora to in ro^xrd to lotas dorff1 s statements.As early as January, 1903, the Hussion foreign minister par­ticipated in a conversation with Goluohonskl. The tvo foreign* ministers decided to work out a program of reforms and submit them to the powers. It was agreed that the reforms would not include autonomy, would provide for a just administrationof the furies "ana Christians, and would provide guarantees for42 ' 'tho ozeoution of the toms. These proposals crystallized into the February Program, which failed because of its mildness.

Bomparfl described Count lacadorff1 s attitude toward the problem; lamsdorff had thus far assumed the lead because he presumed that Russia had more interests in the Balkans and was in a bettor position to regulate the disputes than any other Power» Ho had opposed the Pan-Slav agitation, which was not as strong as it had boon, end lad refused to aid tho Slav groups in tho Balkans. He bad changed his aggressivo policy, according to tho French, because the prize was not worth the fight for Constantinople• inasmuch as that city wasnot as important as it had boon, and because Russia was expanding43 . ;in tho Far East. ' X .

tthen it became readily perceivable that the February

41. Ibid*, t a m 111* ROh 4ju42. IbYcT., Torn III, Ho* 66.43. T H E . , Tom III, Mo* 105*

/

Ref or ibs bad failed to alleviate the situation* the liberal element in France began to agitate against Russia. Le Katin published an article, attributed to Delcasse, which repres­ented a-decidedly pi‘o-French attitude towards the Macedonians. Lamsdorff immediately protested vigorously against the article and the public mootings in favor of the Macedonians. Delcasse' responded by .saying that the Government was not responsible for the private meetings, that it had not encouraged them in any way, and that it was not .in a position to control Le Temps or any other newspaper. In view of these facts, he continued, the attack of the Eovoie Vremia. the semi-official Russian newspaper, and Lamsdorff were unjustified* Furthermore, be insisted. Frame had very generously given Austria and Russia a free hand when she might have intervened, and the Frenchagents had been instructed to do all within their power to see

44that the program was carried out* The ineident was thus closed,leaving both foreign offices dissatisfied*

The prim® object of Russian relations with Bulgaria andTurkey was to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. In Kay,1903, the Czar showed his consideration for the Sultan’s pro-carious position by not too vigorously pushing his claims for

45the murder of a Russian consul. Bulgaria was clearly told that, if she incited a war with Turkey, Rues la would not com® to her support. However, the fear of Pan-Slavism resulted in

44.. Ibid., Tome III. llQm 168.: ' ' ~ “45. 1513".. Tom® III, No. 225.

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the use of every means at tend to prevent such a conflict, la July* the French and Russian ambassadors at Constantinople sent a Joint note to the Sultan demanding the withdrawal of the Turkish troops on the Bulgarian frontier. The murder of smother Russian consul in August placed Lamsdorff in a diffi­cult position* In deference to public opinion he was forced to assume a firmer stand, yet at the same time he was carefulto cake his demands as moderate as possible in order to facili-46tate a settlement of the problem. The preparation of a fleet la the Black Sea and a demand for indemnity aroused the appre- benslons of the other Powers, including Turkey. A French dis­patch from St. Petersburg described the distrust of Bompard towards Lamsdorff. The Ambassador complained that Lamsdorff, while taking French diplomatic support as a matter of fact, neglected to inform the %ual d'Orsay of events at Constantinople and of his decisions. The Ambassador indicated his suspicionswhen ho asked Delcasse to keep him informed of any incidents

47which might admit of Russian intervention* Austria, Russia,and France, hoping for the continuation of their cooperation,were apprehensive lest Bulgaria be encouraged to continue the 48agitationi The latter might be led on by the belief that the Powers were divided. Russia was undoubtedly sincere in trying to maintain the status quo.

4 ^ ibid., Tome III, no* 400.47. Ibid., Tomo III, Ho. 404.48. i H d .. Tome III, Ho* 426*

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EnglaM made no attempt to take an active part in thei. _ ,1 ■ ' • •• *

preparation of the reforms. Her reserved attitude enabled her t© criticize them wit bout advocating any others. Lansdovme, ^iglish foreign aiaist@r, accepted the February Program, but emly sins® it \ms necessary that something be done immediately and sine© ho had not prepared a program of his own. Be was careful to reserve the right to modify his stand at anytime, ' commenting that the Program was practically the same as some reforms which had already been presented. Two newspapers, re­garded as semi-official, probably reflected the irritation of Lansdowne at being left out in the cold when they criticized■ . . 49 .the program rather harshly.

When the failure of the reforms became apparent, theEnglish foreign office was obliged to take a more determinedstand, . Since public opinion demanded more drastic reformsthan wore advisable if peace were to be maintained in theBalkans, Lansdowne was in a difficult position. The Russiandiplomats and the French agent at Sofia accused the English atConstantinople of supporting the Sultan and those at London,Influenced by public opinion, of supporting reforms. Paul

. ' ' ■ 50Gambon, French ambassador at London, denied this accusation.The visit of Edward VII to Vienna in September aroused the

apprehensions of Lamsdorff. The evolution of English public

49. ibid.. Tome III. Bo. 121. ~ ”50. Ibid., Tome III, Ko. 134.

©pinion to favor more drastic reforms lent some weight to hissuspicions. Both tho Times and the Standard were demanding

, ' ' blgreater freedom for the llaoedonians. The assurance giventhe Austrians by the king that he nould support measures tomaintain peace and the status quo in the Balkans served some-

. — 52what to allay Lamsdorff's worse fears. Probably as a sop to public opinion, Lanadoune shortly after the king's return to London published a set of reforms, demanding virtual autonomy for Kaoedonia, However, Austria and Russia were still left the task of drafting the program as Lansdowne did not press his proposals.

Since in the face of public opinion it did not dare espousev-the cause of the Sultan, the German Government endeavored to follow a middle course. It did not energetically support the reform® because Turkish concessions were being sought. In January, 190S* the Prench ambassador to Germany in a dispatch

4to Delcasse described the attitude at Berlin, .He said that the opinion wee. that although the Haoedonians had been mistreated they had been guilty at the same time of provoking the anger of the Sultan* Approval of the determination to settle the difficulty peacefully had been expressed. The newspapers believed that the obstinacy of the Kacedopians would prove fatal to the February Program. When the Kaiser was assured, that the reforms were to be no more drastic than those proposed

bl. itiTat. •iom ill, no. 422. — --------- ------- — ----------53. Ibid.. Tone, Ho. 459,

in February, lio haotoned to approve thorn, probably at thesano tlma tidvialng the Sultan to do the same. Thus if thereforms woro not carries out, the biam would be placed on.135 \tho Bulgarians and not on the Turks*

In Hay, when it becane obvious that the February Programeo u M not bo enforood, the German Government changed its standbut little* Tho Albanian uprising combined with the crimesat Salonika and Usicub impressed on public opinion the gravityof tho situation* Princo Ferdinand was. severely censored,and some newspapers oven proposed that Bulgaria be occupied

54temporarily to stop the disturbances* In July, Baronllarsohall explained tbs German attitude. He stated that thoschools as centers of agitation of the diverse nationalitiesin Macedonia prevented,a liberal administration, that the Sultanhad made a mistake in recognising cone new Bulgarian bishopsin Macedonia, that the length of the crisis was indeterminable,that tho Albanians were little more than. savages, and finallythat the Grand Vislcr along with most of tho other Turkishofficials was competent* Ho was optimistic in believing that a, 55 -solution would soon bo reached*

In September, Lamsdorff quoted Bulow as saying -tint Turkey should attack Bulgaria, If tho bands continued to cross the. frontier* Bulow, later denying this, stated in retaliation that if Bulgaria were isolated she would bo forced to cease

a c54*

bid*. Tomo

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agitatlng, obviously a charge that Lamsdorff was secretlymipj^rtiag .tha brigands* Gsnaan official opinion was in-

56©lined to favor a Turkish attack on Bulgaria*

The Kaiser was reluctantly forced by public opinion,which demanded that some action be taken, to support theMurzsteg Program* It was probable that he wished to jointhe Auatro-Russian entente and possibly even hoped to induce57 /France to join it. The German attitude during the entire affair was marked by the desire to inconvenience the Sultan as little as possible.

The object of French policy was to permit Austria and Russia to adjust the dispute. At the same time Belcasse wished it clearly understood that this was a concession since France, because of her interests, had just as much right to present reforms*

In January, 1905, the Sultan, anticipating that the Powers would intervene, asked the French Foreign Office what reforms should be made in Kaoodohia. The Qua! d*Orsay responded that the only way to avoid intervention was to make some substantial concessions. It was proposed that the governors be appointed for a definite term and have absolute power over their subor­dinates, that the collection of the dimes which was one of the principal causes of complaint ought to be controlled rigorously, that each province should have its own budget to suppress the

55% Ibid*-. Tome III* Ko. #8.- : ' :57. Ibid.. Tome 111, No*. 437*

practice of drawing on the provincial treasuries, that the gendarmerie, ought to be. reorganized, be paid sufficiently and regularly, be composed of Christians and Mohammedans in propor­tion to the population, and be commanded by a European, andthat the administration of just lee and finance should be sub-

58mittod to European administration. Several days after, thisprogram was proposed the Turkish ambassador asked if theGovernment also approved of the reforms. The answer was in

59the affirmative provided that they were applied. However, the Sultan failed to take action, thus paving the way to the February Program. . : '

Cometano, being undoubtedly influenced by the refusal to accept the French program, wrote to Delcasse that the February Program would probably not be approved by the Sultan unless it were modified* Consent to a definite tenure of office of an imperial ©ommlssloner, according to Cons tans, would never be granted. If by some chance such consent should be obtained, the commissioner might stay in office, but would be unable to exercise any authority without the Sultan*s support, constans favoring a more rigid financial control, proposed that the Ottoman Bank after collecting the revenues should first defray the expenses of local government and then give what might renaln to the Imperial Government. As the failure of the February Program proved, the French ambassador had accurately judged the.

58., Ibid.» Tome III. Ho. 11.59. 151%.. Toma III. Ho. 33. .

*

-100-

wmkneea of. the.refcrtaft*. Constans believed that the onlypart of the program which oould be carried out would be the

60reform of. the gendarmerie; circumstances proved, however,that he was mistaken as none of the reforms were actuallyapplied* . ■- , ■ -. ; -•

The French Foreign Office remained in close touch withopinion at Bucharest* It probably hoped to detach Roumaninfrom the Central Powers just as Italy was being detached*Paul Gambon, in a dispatch to Delcasse, stated that the Ministerof Roumania at London believed that the February Program wouldfail, that autonomy was undesirable because Macedonia mightbe annexed to Bulgaria, and that therefore the only solution

61was a war which would leave Bulgaria humbled by Turkey. TheFrench minister at Bucharest reported that the Roumanian foreignoffice was trying to improve its relations with all the BalkanPowers, that no preparations had been made for a mobilizationbut that the war minister had the necessary funds at his dispo-

68sal, and that Roumania had ordered some new guns from Krupp*In July, due to the failure of.the reforms, Roumanian policy became more apparent, the end being the. prevention of any increase in the. power of Bulgaria* Russia was expected to block Bulgarian expansion, end as an additional precaution, Roumania cooperated with the Central Powers in holding the northern and

60* Ibid*> Tome 111. Ho* 74. '61. TWId*. Tome III, No. 80*68. Ibldi, Tome III, No. 97.*

southeni Slava in line. Eowror, friction had developed withAustria over the treatment of the Transylvanians. Francenoted this friction with great satisfaction because it increasedthe possibilities of a Russo-Roumanian rapprochement which would

" v 65mean the substitution of French for German capital in Roumania.

iSoon after Doloasse approved of the February Program, theRussian and French newspapers became engaged in a press war*The cause was a pro-Macedonian article, presumedly written byDelcasse and appearing in Lo Matin* Doloasse immediatelydenied having written the article giving offense* Moreover*the tension between St* Petersburg and Paris became more acuteas a result of the numerous public meetings in France in favorof the Macedonians* Lamsdorff openly accused the French ofsecretly encouraging the Macedonians to resist* Delcasseanswered that the French Government could not prohibit publicmeetings end could not control the press* Bompard, who sharedthe opinions of Lamsdorff, pointed out how the differences inFrench and Russian policies was being exploited by the Germansand Austrians in trying to shew the rupture of the Dual Alliance.Tie also said that tbs Macedonians were encouraged to make greaterdemands because of the support of a large bloc of French public

64opinion* The French ambassador at Vienna informed Doloasse that Count Goluohowski had been surprised at the attack of the Russian official newspaper on French Balkan policy* The

33: ibid*. Tome III, no. 545. ~64* TbicT*. Tome III, No. 153.

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•ns-

ambassator believed that Lamsdorff was worried by the indiea- . 65 . ■;

tione of a Fr&a@o-2agllah rapproehetaont.During the summer of 1903 the 0,uai A*Qrsay urged Austria

and Russia to prepare a more comprehensive program of reforms. Public opinion in France was demanding that something be done, but Deleasee was determined to leave Austria and Russia prepare the reforms. Bo wholeheartedly endorsed the Burnsteg Program and agreed to supervise the policing of one of the distrlots allotted to the great Power®.

The Macedonian incident is interesting, not because it resulted in any change in the position of the powers, but because it marks the evolution of policies which are not clearly perceived until later. France indicated her intention of detaching Roumania from the Central Powers, and her support of the Italian demands for information on the intentions of Austria and Russia confirmed tlie rauprochement concluded just a short time before. The apparent conformity of the French and English views, exo it lag the ap prohen si ons of Lamsdorff, was to crystallize into the Entente Cordiale* It would be a mistake to believe that Macedonia was the most important factor in causing these shifts in the European alliances; however, there is little doubt but that it played a part.

65. Ibid..Tome III. Ho. 16b.

-Ill—

CHAPTER- IV.

Conelusion

To understand the Frmoh diplomatic relations withTurkey it is nMessary to study the conditions prevailingin Turkey around the turn of the century. T:hm Abdul Hamid came to the throne in 1877, the Ottoman Empire_Jm&_slowlybeen dissolving for war® than, a oontury. The new, Sultanattemptedjfco stop the dissolution by centralizing authorityand by creating now administratlre unita^\ The successesrealized, however, were more than counter-balaneed by the

'new limitations placed on tho Sultan*s authority by anaggressive European Imperialism. ^This imperialism gave rise 'to a Turkish nationalist movem@it which gained recruits byappealing to the fanaticism of the Mohammedans. Abdul Hamid*sposition became more and_more periloua. on. the one hand, ifconcessions were granted to #ie Powers. he faced a strong

- _.. : , ' " ' - - ■nationalist party; on the other hand, if concessions were notgranted, he_was always in danger of seeing the Conoert_of Powers unltjngjfco divide the Empire ^ n g themselves.

The Sultan strengthened his position by playing the Powers^against each other. Since a bitter rivalry already existed among them, this was not particularly difficult. The

118-

Sultan also resorted to the practice of depending on the nro- tection of some one Power which would receive in return for its aid ocrtala prlT.ilafflMi. Prior to the Napoleonic 7/ars the Sultan looked to France for protection. After 1815 England played the dominant role at Constantinople. Finally aboutthe turn of the cmtury Germany came to exert the greatest influence over. Abdul Hamid, jjffaa English and French tried to prevent the increase in German prestige, but because of their encroachments on Turkish territory, were unable to regain their former position®.^

During this transition from French and English to German dominance, the Kitylone Incident occurred, caused by the refusal of the Sultan to.settle some claims purportedly due French citizens, Lorand© and Tubini, two bankers of French origin, who had made loans to the TurklMi Government a number of years before, -were- now demanding payment. The Sultan refused t© eome to terms, maintaining that the Interest was too high. In addi­tion to the bankers1 claims, the Soclete des duals. Docks, et Entrepots, a French financial group exploiting the quay® of Constantinople, demanded that the Sultan either restore its rights and privileges, which had been suspended, or else buy the quays at the Societe1 s price. Constano, the French ambassa­dor, finally threatened to leave Cons tantinople unless a settlement was reached. Sine® the Sultan still refused to accept the terms. Constana, being obliged to make his throat good, left

—113—

the Turkish capital in August, 1905. The Sultan, having heeom® apprehensive lost the French take drastic action, accepted the terms of the Societe shortly after Gonstans* departure. However, the refusal of the Qua! d* Orsay to reduce the bankers* claims prevented the re-establishment of diplomatic relations wit h the Sultan.

'jlth® situation between^the two Govermrients which were trying to obtain diplomat io support remained unchanged for a period of two ooBths. The Sultan attempted to persuade' rr-r— ——r— ' ‘Germany and Russia to tender their good offices,, but both Foreign Offioe^r@fu^ed_,_CLd3d^sing-the‘ Sultan to come to terms before the French made additional demand#*

Mrly in Movmber, tide Frmoh, judging their position untenable, decided to send a fleet to occupy the island of Mitylene. However, Delcaaea" thought tliat additional demands should be made to justify the int ervaition. The new demands, concerning the schools and churches, were of no vital importanceand were presented only to punish the Sultan for having endan-

■ : - . . . - .gered Frmoh prestige* • - -Isolated in the face of a detemijwd Governmnt, the

Suit an c api tula t ed, aoo ep tin/; all the French demand# and offering certain guamntees to insure the fulfillment of his promises.The French fleet withdrew, and diplomatic_relatlon# were resumed on tiov* 9. 1903.

The Incident shows that France could obtain satisfaction from the Sultan only by shaking the mailed fist in M s face.

—114—

CQB®#saions yrere no longer generously offered to French interests. but were prnntcfl onlY-after the Q,uai d'Orsay threatened the Snltm, .Q,ulte in contrast with_Jh.o__li.ench pos^ii3ii-was-4^haJL_o£_fierinany» Even daring the two months when France was vainly trylne to nersniade tho_Sultan to accept her demands so_Jh&jL-diplomatic relations might be resumed. Geimany without any pressure whatsoever was receivins r1oh coneesaions# Fr®ic h^es^^T/as_defini^ly_on_Jhe_wa^_end Germany was becoming the moot influential Power at Constantimeple*

The yaeedonian Agitation again shows the influence exerted by the Powers at ConstantInople. To avert a possible war, all of them were anxious to suppress the Agitation, but difficulties arose when the question of how to suppress it was raised*Austria feared that Russia would be fereed by public opinion to support Bulgaria, if the latter should declare war on Turkey, The Russian Foreign Office stoutly maintained that Bulgaria would be isolated In case of an attack on the Sultan, Austria and Russia united in proposing reforms in February, 1903, and again in October of the same year. However, these reforms, tempered by their mutual fears and jealousies, wore not drastic enough to solve the problem, which even today is a menace to European peace.

French public opinion was overwhelmingly in favor of drastio reforms. Lamsdorff complained bitterly to Deleass© that the pro-Macedonian sympathy in France was encouraging the

-115-

Insurgent a to resist. Nevertheless, the Qua! d* Or say assumed, a very correct attitude In recommending to the Sultan the acceptance of the reforms•

Delcaase the repercmsions from the intervention ofAustria and Russia to strengthen France’s position in Europe.Be won Italy* s friendship by keeping her informed of what Russia and Austria were Intending, to db. He even encouraged Italy . to ask the Russian Foreign Office for Information; butLamsdorff, distrusting the Italians, refused to cooperate with them. Deleasse and Lamadorff jointly tried to detseh Rotmemia fran the Triple Alliance • l’he two Foreign Ministers played on the possibility of the disintegration of Austria-Hungary to enlist Roumanian support, l^irther^csce, Buohare'st, antleipating a possible war with Bulgaria, wished to seouro her roar from attack by establish­ing friendly relations with Raasias end hoped to .secure Serbia,, dependent on St. Petersburg since the Revolution of 1905, as an ally. " ' ; :: '' V ; '/ ' : T - : , ■

Ouring the period t m m 1901 to 1904 Franco-Turkish . dlplommtic relations showed that Oerman influence in raplae®- rent of French prestige was definitely established at Constan­tinople. France was compencatod by the fact that her relations with ri’urkey during this period m abled her to take steps to detach Italy and Roumania from the Central Powers.

- l i e -

Bibliography

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BoofeiAllen, W. 15. D.. The Turks in Europe. Scribners* Son®, M. Y. 1929* ; ' ;------ ...Bourgeois, Emile, Manuel hlstorlque de la Politique Etranger®. Vol. I¥. Librairie Classiqu® Eugene Bolin, Paris, 1926.Davis, William Stearns, A Short History of the Hear East. MaoMillan Go*, K. Y. 1922.Debidour, A* * Hlstoiro diplomatique de 1*Europe. Librairie Felix Alcan, Paris,1916.Earle, Edward Mead, Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railroad, MacMillan Co., E. Y. 1925*Fois, Herbert, Europe, the World*s Banker. 1870-1914. Yale University Press, Hew Haven, 1930•Fyffe, C. A., A History of Modern Europe. Henry Holt and Co^. N. Y. 1917. : : -Gooch, G. P., History of Modern Europe. Henry Holt and Go. .M. Y. 1922. "Marriott, j. a . n., The Eastern Question. Oxford at the Clar­endon Press, 1918.

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..:v' Poriodioals ;Abbott, G. F*, "Hacodonia and Its Revolutionary Committees", Hlnotoon tli century. Yol. fig. on. 414-40-Anonynous, "The Hacodoninn StruGKlo". Review of Heviews, vox. 20, pp. 419-30. --- -------- —Barakatullah* Hullmmmed, ,rA I-’ohammodan View of tho laeodonlan Problem", north /uaorican. Reviow; Vol. 177. on. 759-751.■ , ' ' 1 - ■Berard, Victor, L1Affaire turouo". La Revue do Paris, Vol* 6,p. 888 ., - ' : / ' • — -- ------ : ' 1Brailsford, il. II.* "The Hacodonian Revolt", Fortnightly Review, Vol* 80, pp. 428-45.Charnes, Francis, "La Chroniquo do la quinaaine", P.evuodco Deux Fondes, Vol. 168. n* 470.•1ft CteOBiqu® pollticiue", Los Annulea, Vol* 36-57, p* 505."La Ghronitue politique". Les ijmalea, Vol. 56-37, p. 133."La Cbronique politique", Los Annales. Vol. 36-37, p. 20.Current Literature, Vol. 51, p. 390.Billon, E* J., "Reign of Terror in Macedonia", Contemporary Review. Vol. 83, pp. 305-320.Editorial, "Tho Eaccdonian Btrugnlo”, Review of Reviews. Vol.28, pp* 476-78. ; _ — — — — ---— ' >

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