Publisher's Note

A literal t ranslat ion o f the title o f the F rench ed i t i on o f this w o r k (Les

Mots e t les choses) w o u l d h a v e g i v e n r ise to con fus ion w i t h t w o o t h e r

b o o k s that h a v e a l r eady appeared u n d e r the ti t le Words and things. T h e

publ i sher therefore ag reed w i t h the au tho r on the a l ternat ive title The

order o f things, w h i c h w a s , in fact, M. Foucau l t ' s o r ig ina l preference .

I n v i e w o f the r a n g e o f l i terature referred t o i n the tex t , i t has n o t p r o v e d

feasible in e v e r y case to unde r t ake the b ib l i og raph ica l task o f t r ac ing

E n g l i s h translations o f w o r k s o r i g ina t i ng i n o the r l anguages a n d l oca t i ng

the passages q u o t e d b y M . Foucau l t . T h e publ i sher has a c c o r d i n g l y

re ta ined the au thor ' s references to F r e n c h w o r k s a n d to F r e n c h transla­

t ions o f La t in and G e r m a n w o r k s , fo r e x a m p l e , bu t has, a s far a s poss ible ,

c i ted E n g l i s h ed i t ions o f w o r k s o r i g i n a l l y w r i t t e n i n that l a n g u a g e .

v i i i

Foreword to the English edition

T h i s f o r e w o r d shou ld perhaps b e headed ' D i r e c t i o n s fo r U s e ' . N o t b e ­

cause I feel that the reader c a n n o t be trusted - he is, of course , free to

m a k e w h a t h e w i l l o f the b o o k h e has been k i n d e n o u g h t o read. W h a t

r i g h t h a v e I , then, to sugges t that i t shou ld be used in o n e w a y rather than

another? W h e n I w a s w r i t i n g i t there w e r e m a n y th ings that w e r e n o t

clear t o m e : s o m e o f these seemed t o o o b v i o u s , o thers t o o obscure . S o I

said t o myse l f : this i s h o w m y ideal reader w o u l d h a v e a p p r o a c h e d m y

b o o k , i f m y in tent ions h a d been clearer and m y p ro jec t m o r e r e a d y t o

take f o r m .

i . He w o u l d r e c o g n i z e that i t w a s a s tudy o f a re la t ive ly neg l ec t ed f i e ld .

I n France a t least, the h i s to ry o f sc ience and t h o u g h t g i v e s p r ide o f p lace

to ma thema t i c s , c o s m o l o g y , a n d phys ics - n o b l e sciences, r i g o r o u s

sciences, sciences o f the necessary, all c lose to p h i l o s o p h y : o n e can o b s e r v e

i n their h i s to ry the a lmos t unin ter rupted e m e r g e n c e o f t ru th a n d p u r e

reason. T h e o the r disciplines, h o w e v e r - those, fo r e x a m p l e , that c o n c e r n

l i v i n g be ings , l anguages , o r e c o n o m i c f a c t s - a r e cons idered t o o t i n g e d

w i t h empi r i ca l t h o u g h t , t o o e x p o s e d t o the vaga r i e s o f chance o r i m a g e r y ,

to a g e - o l d t radi t ions a n d ex te rna l events , for i t to be supposed that their

h i s to ry c o u l d b e a n y t h i n g o the r than i r regular . A t m o s t , t h e y are e x p e c t e d

to p r o v i d e e v i d e n c e o f a state o f m i n d , an in te l lec tual fashion, a m i x t u r e

o f a rcha i sm and b o l d conjec ture , o f in tu i t ion and bl indness . B u t w h a t i f

empi r ica l k n o w l e d g e , at a g i v e n t ime and in a g i v e n cu l ture , did possess a

w e l l - d e f i n e d regu la r i ty? I f the v e r y poss ibi l i ty o f r e c o r d i n g facts, o f a l l o w ­

ing onese l f t o b e c o n v i n c e d b y t h e m , o f d i s tor t ing t h e m i n tradit ions o r

o f m a k i n g p u r e l y specu la t ive use o f t h e m , i f e v e n this w a s n o t a t the

m e r c y o f chance? I f errors (and t ruths) , the p rac t i ce o f o l d bel iefs ,

i nc lud ing n o t o n l y g e n u i n e d iscover ies , b u t also the m o s t na ive no t ions ,

o b e y e d , a t a g i v e n m o m e n t , the l a w s o f a cer tain c o d e o f k n o w l e d g e ? If, in

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F O R E W O R D T O T H E E N G L I S H E D I T I O N

short , the h i s to ry o f n o n - f o r m a l k n o w l e d g e h a d i tse l f a sys t em? T h a t w a s

my initial hypo thes i s - the first risk I t o o k .

2. T h i s b o o k m u s t be read as a c o m p a r a t i v e , and n o t a s y m p t o m a t o -

log i ca l , s tudy . I t w a s n o t my in tent ion , on the basis o f a par t icular t y p e

o f k n o w l e d g e o r b o d y o f ideas, t o d r a w u p a p ic tu re o f a pe r iod , o r t o

reconst i tu te the spirit o f a cen tu ry . W h a t I w i s h e d to do w a s to present ,

side b y side, a defini te n u m b e r o f e l emen t s : the k n o w l e d g e o f l i v i n g

be ings , the k n o w l e d g e o f the l a w s o f l a n g u a g e , and the k n o w l e d g e o f

e c o n o m i c facts, a n d to relate t h e m to the ph i losoph ica l discourse that w a s

c o n t e m p o r a r y w i t h t h e m d u r i n g a p e r i o d e x t e n d i n g f r o m the seven teen th

to the n ine teen th c e n t u r y . I t w a s to be n o t an analysis o f C lass ic i sm in

genera l , n o r a search for a Weltanschauung, b u t a s tr ict ly ' r e g i o n a l ' s t udy . 1

B u t , a m o n g o the r th ings , this c o m p a r a t i v e m e t h o d p r o d u c e s results

that are of ten s t r i k ing ly different f r o m those to be f o u n d in s ing le -

discipline studies. (So the reader m u s t n o t e x p e c t to f ind here a h i s tory of

b i o l o g y j u x t a p o s e d w i t h a h i s to ry o f l inguist ics , a h i s to ry o f pol i t ica l

e c o n o m y , and a h i s to ry o f p h i l o s o p h y . ) T h e r e are shifts o f emphas i s : the

calendar o f saints and heroes i s s o m e w h a t al tered (Linnaeus i s g i v e n m o r e

space than B u f f b n , D e s t u t t de T r a c y than Rousseau ; the Phys ioc ra t s are

o p p o s e d s ing le -handed by C a n t i l l o n ) . Front iers are r e d r a w n and th ings

usual ly far apar t are b r o u g h t closer, and v i c e ve r sa : instead o f re la t ing the

b i o l o g i c a l t a x o n o m i e s t o o the r k n o w l e d g e o f the l i v i n g b e i n g (the t h e o r y

o f g e r m i n a t i o n , o r the p h y s i o l o g y o f an ima l m o v e m e n t , o r the statics o f

plants) , I h a v e c o m p a r e d t h e m w i t h w h a t m i g h t h a v e been said a t the

same t ime a b o u t l inguis t ic signs, the f o r m a t i o n o f genera l ideas, the l an ­

g u a g e o f ac t ion , the h i e r a rchy o f needs , and the e x c h a n g e o f g o o d s .

T h i s had t w o consequences : I w a s led to a b a n d o n the g rea t d iv is ions

that are n o w famil iar to us al l . I d id n o t l o o k in the seven teen th and

e igh teen th centur ies for the b e g i n n i n g s o f n ine teen th -cen tu ry b i o l o g y (or

p h i l o s o p h y o r e c o n o m i c s ) . W h a t I s a w w a s the appearance o f f igures

pecul ia r to the Class ical a g e : a ' t a x o n o m y ' or 'na tural history* that w a s

re la t ive ly unaffected by the k n o w l e d g e that then ex is ted in an imal o r

p lant p h y s i o l o g y ; a n 'analysis o f w e a l t h ' that t o o k l i tde a c c o u n t o f the

assumpt ions o f the 'po l i t i ca l a r i thmet ic ' that w a s c o n t e m p o r a r y w i t h i t ;

and a ' gene ra l g r a m m a r ' that w a s qu i te alien to the his tor ical analyses and

w o r k s o f exeges is then b e i n g carr ied ou t . E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l f igures , that

is, that w e r e n o t s u p e r i m p o s e d on the sciences as t h e y w e r e ind iv idua l i zed

1 1 sometimes use terms l ike ' thought ' or 'Classical science' , but they refer practically a lways to the particular discipline under consideration.

F O R E W O R D T O T H E E N G L I S H E D I T I O N

and n a m e d in the n ine teen th c e n t u r y . M o r e o v e r , I s a w the e m e r g e n c e ,

b e t w e e n these different f igures , o f a n e t w o r k o f ana logies that t ranscended

the tradi t ional p r o x i m i t i e s : b e t w e e n the classification o f plants and the

t h e o r y o f c o i n a g e , b e t w e e n the n o t i o n o f gener ic character and the

analysis o f t rade, o n e f inds in the Classical sciences i somorph i sms that

appear t o i g n o r e the e x t r e m e d ivers i ty o f the objects unde r cons idera t ion .

T h e space o f k n o w l e d g e w a s then a r ranged i n a to ta l ly different w a y f r o m

that sys temat ized i n the n ine teen th c e n t u r y b y C o m t e o r Spencer . T h e

second risk I t o o k w a s in h a v i n g w i s h e d to descr ibe n o t so m u c h the

genesis of o u r sciences as an ep i s t emo log ica l space specific to a par t icular

pe r iod .

3. I d id n o t opera te , therefore , at the l eve l that is usual ly that of the

historian o f sc ience - 1 shou ld say a t the t w o levels that are usual ly his.

For , o n the o n e hand , the h i s to ry o f science traces the progress o f d is­

c o v e r y , the f o r m u l a t i o n o f p r o b l e m s , and the clash o f c o n t r o v e r s y ; i t also

analyses theories in their internal e c o n o m y ; in short , i t describes the p r o ­

cesses and p roduc t s o f the scientific consciousness . B u t , on the o the r hand ,

i t tries to restore w h a t e luded that consciousness : the influences that

affected it, the imp l i c i t ph i losophies that w e r e subjacent to it, the u n ­

fo rmula t ed themat ics , the unseen obstacles; i t describes the unconsc ious

of science. T h i s unconsc ious i s a l w a y s the n e g a t i v e side of science - that

w h i c h resists it, deflects it, o r disturbs it. W h a t I w o u l d l ike to d o , h o w ­

eve r , is to r evea l a positive unconscious of k n o w l e d g e : a l eve l that e ludes the

consciousness of the scientist and y e t i s part o f scientific discourse, instead

o f d i sput ing its va l id i t y and seek ing to d imin i sh its scientific nature . W h a t

w a s c o m m o n t o the natural h is tory, the e c o n o m i c s , and the g r a m m a r o f

the Classical p e r i o d w a s cer ta in ly n o t present to the consciousness o f the

scientist; o r that par t o f i t that w a s consc ious w a s superficial , l imi ted , and

a lmos t fanciful (Adanson , for e x a m p l e , w i s h e d to d r a w up an artificial

d e n o m i n a t i o n fo r plants; T u r g o t c o m p a r e d c o i n a g e w i t h l a n g u a g e ) ; but ,

u n k n o w n to themse lves , the naturalists, economis t s , and g r a m m a r i a n s

e m p l o y e d the same rules to define the objects p r o p e r to their o w n s tudy,

to f o r m their concep ts , to bui ld their theories . I t i s these rules of f o r m a t i o n ,

w h i c h w e r e n e v e r fo rmula t ed i n their o w n r igh t , b u t are t o b e found o n l y

in w i d e l y differing theories , concep t s , and objects of s tudy , that I h a v e

tried to revea l , by isola t ing, as their specific locus , a l eve l that I h a v e

cal led, s o m e w h a t arbi trar i ly perhaps , a r chaeo log ica l . T a k i n g as an e x a m p l e

the p e r i o d c o v e r e d in this b o o k , I h a v e tried to de t e rmine the basis or a r ch ­

aeo log ica l sys t em c o m m o n to a w h o l e series o f scientific ' representat ions '

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or ' p ro d u c t s ' dispersed t h r o u g h o u t the natural h i s tory , e c o n o m i c s , and

p h i l o s o p h y o f the Class ical pe r iod .

4. I shou ld l i ke this w o r k to be read as an o p e n site. M a n y ques t ions

are laid o u t o n i t that h a v e n o t y e t f o u n d answers ; a n d m a n y o f the gaps

refer ei ther t o earlier w o r k s o r t o o thers that h a v e n o t y e t b e e n c o m p l e t e d ,

o r e v e n b e g u n . B u t I shou ld l ike to m e n t i o n three p r o b l e m s .

T h e p r o b l e m o f c h a n g e . I t has b e e n said that this w o r k denies the v e r y

poss ibi l i ty o f c h a n g e . A n d y e t m y m a i n c o n c e r n has been w i t h changes .

In fact, t w o th ings in par t icular s t ruck m e : the suddenness and t h o r o u g h ­

ness w i t h w h i c h cer tain sciences w e r e s o m e t i m e s r e o r g a n i z e d ; and the fact

that a t the same t i m e s imilar changes occu r r ed in apparen t ly v e r y different

disciplines. W i t h i n a f e w years (a round 1800), the t radi t ion of genera l

g r a m m a r w a s rep laced b y a n essentially his tor ical p h i l o l o g y ; natural

classifications w e r e o r d e r e d a c c o r d i n g t o the analyses o f c o m p a r a t i v e

a n a t o m y ; and a po l i t i ca l e c o n o m y w a s f o u n d e d w h o s e m a i n themes w e r e

l abou r and p r o d u c t i o n . C o n f r o n t e d b y such a cu r ious c o m b i n a t i o n o f

p h e n o m e n a , i t o c c u r r e d t o me that these changes should be e x a m i n e d

m o r e c lose ly , w i t h o u t b e i n g r educed , i n the n a m e o f con t inu i ty , i n e i ther

abruptness o r s cope . I t s eemed to me a t the outset that different k inds o f

c h a n g e w e r e t a k i n g p lace in scientific discourse - changes that d id n o t

o c c u r a t the same l eve l , p r o c e e d a t the same pace , o r o b e y the same l a w s ;

the w a y i n w h i c h , w i t h i n a par t icular science, n e w propos i t ions w e r e p r o ­

duced , n e w facts isolated, o r n e w concep t s bui l t up (the even t s that m a k e

up the e v e r y d a y life o f a science) d id no t , in all p robab i l i t y , f o l l o w the

same m o d e l a s the appearance o f n e w fields o f s t u d y (and the f requen t ly

c o r r e s p o n d i n g disappearance o f o l d ones ) ; b u t the appearance o f n e w

f i e l d s o f s tudy m u s t no t , i n turn , b e confused w i t h those ove ra l l redis ­

t r ibut ions that al ter no t o n l y the gene ra l f o r m of a science, bu t also its

relations w i t h o the r areas o f k n o w l e d g e . I t s eemed to m e , therefore , tha t

all these changes shou ld no t be treated a t the s a m e l eve l , o r be m a d e to

c u l m i n a t e at a s ingle po in t , as is s o m e t i m e s d o n e , or be a t t r ibuted to the

genius o f an ind iv idua l , o r a n e w co l l ec t i ve spirit, o r e v e n to the f ecund i ty

of a s ingle d i s c o v e r y ; that i t w o u l d be bet ter to respect such differences,

and e v e n to t ry to grasp t h e m in their specif ic i ty . In this w a y I tr ied to

descr ibe the c o m b i n a t i o n o f c o r r e s p o n d i n g t ransformat ions that c h a r ­

acter ized the appearance o f b i o l o g y , pol i t ica l e c o n o m y , p h i l o l o g y , a

n u m b e r o f h u m a n sciences, and a n e w t y p e o f p h i l o s o p h y , a t the threshold

o f the n ine teen th c e n t u r y .

T h e p r o b l e m o f causal i ty. I t i s n o t a l w a y s easy t o de t e rmine w h a t has

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caused a specific c h a n g e in a science. W h a t m a d e such a d i s c o v e r y possible?

W h y d id this n e w c o n c e p t appear? W h e r e d id this o r that t h e o r y c o m e

f r o m ? Q u e s t i o n s l ike these are of ten h i g h l y embarrass ing because there

are no defini te m e t h o d o l o g i c a l pr inciples on w h i c h to base such an

analysis . T h e embar rassment i s m u c h grea ter i n the case o f those genera l

changes that alter a sc ience as a w h o l e . It is grea ter still in the case of

several c o r r e s p o n d i n g changes . B u t i t p r o b a b l y reaches its h ighes t p o i n t

i n the case o f the empi r ica l sciences: fo r the ro l e o f ins t ruments , techniques ,

insti tutions, even ts , i deo log ies , and interests i s v e r y m u c h in e v i d e n c e ; bu t

o n e does n o t k n o w h o w a n ar t icula t ion s o c o m p l e x and s o d iverse i n

c o m p o s i t i o n ac tua l ly operates . I t s eemed to me that i t w o u l d n o t be

p ruden t for the m o m e n t to fo rce a so lu t ion I felt incapable , I a d m i t , of

o f fe r ing : the t radi t ional exp lana t ions - spirit o f the t ime , t e chno log i ca l or

social changes , influences o f va r ious k inds - s t ruck me for the m o s t par t

as b e i n g m o r e m a g i c a l than effect ive. In this w o r k , then, I left the p r o b l e m

of causes to o n e s ide ; 1 I chose instead to conf ine m y s e l f to descr ib ing the

t ransformat ions themse lves , t h ink ing that this w o u l d be an indispensable

step if, o n e d a y , a t h e o r y of scientific c h a n g e and ep i s t emolog ica l causal i ty

w a s t o be cons t ruc ted .

T h e p r o b l e m o f the subject . I n d i s t inguish ing b e t w e e n the e p i s t e m o ­

log ica l l eve l o f k n o w l e d g e (or scientific consciousness) and the a r c h a e o ­

log ica l l eve l of k n o w l e d g e , I am a w a r e that I am a d v a n c i n g in a d i rec t ion

that i s f raught w i t h difficulty. C a n o n e speak of science and its h i s to ry (and

therefore of its cond i t ions of exis tence , its changes , the errors i t has p e r ­

petrated, the sudden advances that h a v e sent i t o f f on a n e w course) w i t h ­

o u t reference to the scientist h i m s e l f - and I am speak ing n o t m e r e l y of

the conc re t e ind iv idua l represented by a p r o p e r n a m e , bu t o f his w o r k

and the par t icular f o r m o f his t h o u g h t ? C a n a v a l i d h i s to ry o f sc ience be

a t t empted that w o u l d retrace f r o m b e g i n n i n g t o end the w h o l e spon tane ­

ous m o v e m e n t o f a n a n o n y m o u s b o d y o f k n o w l e d g e ? I s i t l eg i t imate , i s

i t e v e n useful, to rep lace the t radi t ional 'X t h o u g h t t h a t . . . ' by a ' i t w a s

k n o w n t h a t . . . '? B u t this i s n o t e x a c t l y w h a t I set o u t to d o . I do n o t

w i s h t o d e n y the va l id i t y o f intel lectual b iograph ies , o r the poss ibi l i ty o f a

h i s tory of theories , concep t s , or themes . I t i s s i m p l y that I w o n d e r w h e t h e r

such descript ions are themse lves e n o u g h , w h e t h e r t hey do jus t i ce to the

i m m e n s e densi ty o f scientific discourse, w h e t h e r there d o n o t exist , outs ide

their c u s t o m a r y boundar ies , sys tems of regulari t ies that h a v e a dec i s ive

11 had approached this question in connection w i th psychiatry and clinical medicine in t w o earlier works .

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x i v

ro le in the h i s to ry o f the sciences. I shou ld l ike to k n o w w h e t h e r the

subjects responsible fo r scientific discourse are n o t d e t e r m i n e d in their

s i tuat ion, their func t ion , their p e r c e p t i v e capac i ty , a n d their pract ica l

possibilities b y cond i t i ons that d o m i n a t e and e v e n o v e r w h e l m t h e m . I n

short , I t r ied t o e x p l o r e scientific d iscourse n o t f r o m the p o i n t o f v i e w o f

the indiv iduals w h o are speak ing , n o r f r o m the po in t o f v i e w o f the

fo rma l structures o f w h a t t h e y are s a y i n g , bu t f r o m the p o i n t o f v i e w o f

the rules that c o m e in to p l a y i n the v e r y ex is tence o f such discourse : w h a t

cond i t ions d id L innaeus (or P e t t y , o r A r n a u l d ) h a v e t o fulfil , n o t t o m a k e

his discourse c o h e r e n t and t rue in genera l , b u t to g i v e it, a t the t i m e

w h e n i t w a s w r i t t e n and accep ted , v a l u e and pract ical app l ica t ion as

scientific d iscourse - o r , m o r e exac t l y , as naturalist , e c o n o m i c , or g r a m ­

mat ica l discourse?

On this po in t , t o o , I am w e l l a w a r e that I h a v e n o t m a d e m u c h progress .

B u t I shou ld n o t l ike the effort I h a v e m a d e in o n e d i rec t ion to be t aken

as a re ject ion of a n y o the r possible approach . D i s c o u r s e in genera l , and

scientific discourse in par t icular , i s so c o m p l e x a real i ty that we n o t o n l y

can , b u t should , a p p r o a c h i t a t different levels and w i t h different m e t h o d s .

I f there is o n e a p p r o a c h that I do reject , h o w e v e r , i t is that (one m i g h t

cal l it, b r o a d l y speak ing , the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l app roach ) w h i c h g i v e s

absolute p r io r i ty to the o b s e r v i n g subject , w h i c h attr ibutes a cons t i tuent

ro le t o a n act , w h i c h places its o w n p o i n t o f v i e w a t the o r i g in o f all h is ­

to r ic i ty - w h i c h , in short , leads to a t ranscendental consciousness . It seems

to me that the historical analysis of scientific discourse should , in the last

resort, be subject, n o t to a t h e o r y of the k n o w i n g subject , b u t rather to a

t h e o r y o f d iscurs ive pract ice .

5. T h i s last p o i n t is a request to the E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g reader . In France ,

cer ta in h a l f - w i t t e d ' c o m m e n t a t o r s ' persist in l abe l l ing me a 's tructuralist ' .

I h a v e been unab le to g e t i t i n to their t i ny m i n d s that I h a v e used n o n e of

the m e t h o d s , concep t s , o r k e y terms that charac ter ize structural analysis .

I shou ld be grateful i f a m o r e serious pub l i c w o u l d free me f r o m a

c o n n e c t i o n that cer ta in ly does me h o n o u r , bu t that I h a v e n o t dese rved .

T h e r e m a y w e l l b e cer tain similarit ies b e t w e e n the w o r k s o f the s t ruc­

turalists and m y o w n w o r k . I t w o u l d ha rd ly b e h o v e m e , o f all p e o p l e , t o

c l a i m that m y discourse i s i ndependen t o f cond i t ions and rules o f w h i c h

I am v e r y l a r g e l y u n a w a r e , and w h i c h de t e rmine o the r w o r k that i s b e i n g

d o n e t oday . B u t i t i s o n l y t o o easy t o a v o i d the t roub le o f ana lys ing such

w o r k by g i v i n g i t an a d m i t t e d l y impress ive - sound ing , bu t inaccurate , labe l .

Preface

T h i s b o o k first arose o u t o f a passage i n B o r g e s , o u t o f the l augh te r that

shattered, as I read the passage, all the famil iar l andmarks of my t h o u g h t

- our t h o u g h t , the t h o u g h t that bears the s t amp of o u r age and o u r

g e o g r a p h y - b r e a k i n g up all the o rde red surfaces and all the planes w i t h

w h i c h w e are a c c u s t o m e d t o t a m e the w i l d p ro fus ion o f ex i s t ing th ings ,

and c o n t i n u i n g l o n g af te rwards t o disturb a n d threaten w i t h col lapse o u r

a g e - o l d dis t inct ion b e t w e e n the S a m e and the O t h e r . T h i s passage quo tes

a ' cer ta in C h i n e s e e n c y c l o p a e d i a ' in w h i c h i t is w r i t t e n that ' an imals are

d i v i d e d in to : (a) b e l o n g i n g to the E m p e r o r , (b) e m b a l m e d , (c) t ame ,

(d) s u c k i n g p ig s , (e) sirens, (f) fabulous , (g) stray d o g s , (h) inc luded in

the present classification, (i) f renzied, (j) i nnumerab l e , (k) d r a w n w i t h a

v e r y fine camelha i r b rush , (1) e t cetera, (m) h a v i n g jus t b r o k e n the w a t e r

p i tcher , (n) that f r o m a l o n g w a y o f f l o o k l ike flies' . In the w o n d e r m e n t

o f this t a x o n o m y , the t h i n g w e apprehend i n o n e g rea t leap, the th ing

that, by means o f the fable, i s demons t r a t ed a s the e x o t i c c h a r m o f ano the r

s y s t e m o f t h o u g h t , i s the l imi ta t ion o f o u r o w n , the stark imposs ib i l i ty o f

t h i n k i n g that.

B u t w h a t i s i t imposs ib le t o th ink, and w h a t k ind o f imposs ib i l i ty are

we faced w i t h here? E a c h o f these s t range ca tegor ies can be assigned a

precise m e a n i n g and a demons t rab le con t en t ; s o m e o f t h e m do cer ta in ly

i n v o l v e fantastic entities - fabulous animals or sirens - bu t , prec ise ly b e ­

cause i t puts t h e m in to ca tegor ies o f their o w n , the C h i n e s e e n c y c l o p a e d i a

local izes their p o w e r s o f c o n t a g i o n ; i t dis t inguishes careful ly b e t w e e n the

v e r y real animals (those that are frenzied o r h a v e jus t b r o k e n the w a t e r

p i tcher ) and those that reside so le ly i n the r e a l m o f imag ina t i on . T h e

possibi l i ty o f dange rous mix tu r e s has been e x o r c i z e d , he ra ld ry and fable

h a v e been re lega ted t o their o w n exa l t ed peaks : n o i nconce ivab l e a m p h i b i ­

ous maidens , n o c l a w e d w i n g s , n o d isgus t ing , s q u a m o u s ep idermis , n o n e

x v

F J ' . E F A C E

of those p o l y m o r p h o u s and d e m o n i a c a l faces, no creatures b rea th ing fire.

T h e qua l i ty o f mons t ros i t y he re does n o t affect a n y real b o d y , no r does

i t p r o d u c e modi f i ca t ions o f a n y k i n d i n the best iary o f the i m a g i n a t i o n ; i t

does n o t lu rk i n the depths o f any s t range p o w e r . I t w o u l d n o t e v e n b e

present at all in this classification had i t n o t insinuated i tself in to the e m p t y

space, the interstitial b lanks separating all these entities f r o m o n e another .

I t is n o t the ' f abu lous ' an imals that are imposs ib le , s ince t hey are d e s i g ­

nated as such, b u t the na r rowness o f the distance separat ing t h e m f r o m

(and j u x t a p o s i n g t h e m to) the stray d o g s , or the animals that f r o m a l o n g

w a y o f f l o o k l ike flies. W h a t transgresses the boundar ies o f all i m a g i n a ­

t ion , of all poss ible t h o u g h t , i s s i m p l y that a lphabet ical series (a, b , c , d)

w h i c h l inks each o f those ca tegor ies to all the o thers .

M o r e o v e r , i t i s no t s i m p l y the o d d i t y o f unusua l j ux t apos i t i ons that

w e are faced w i t h here . W e are all famil iar w i t h the d i sconce r t ing effect

o f the p r o x i m i t y o f e x t r e m e s , o r , qu i te s i m p l y , w i t h the sudden v i c i n i t y o f

things that h a v e n o re la t ion t o each o the r ; the m e r e act o f e n u m e r a t i o n

that heaps t h e m all t o g e t h e r has a p o w e r of e n c h a n t m e n t all its o w n : T am

n o l o n g e r h u n g r y , ' Eus thenes said. ' U n t i l the m o r r o w , safe f r o m m y

saliva all the f o l l o w i n g shall b e : A s p i c s , A c a l e p h s , A c a n t h o c e p h a l a t e s ,

A m o e b o c y t e s , A m m o n i t e s , A x o l o t l s , A m b l y s t o m a s , Aph i s l i ons , A n a c o n ­

das, Ascar ids , A m p h i s b a e n a s , A n g l e w o r m s , A m p h i p o d s , A n a e r o b e s , A n n e ­

lids, A n t h o z o a n s . . . . ' B u t all these w o r m s and snakes, all these creatures

r edo len t o f d e c a y and s l ime are s l i ther ing, l ike the syl lables w h i c h d e s i g ­

nate t h e m , in Eus thenes ' sa l iva : that is w h e r e t h e y all h a v e their common

locus, l ike the umbre l l a and the s e w i n g - m a c h i n e on the ope ra t i ng table ;

s tar t l ing t h o u g h their p r o p i n q u i t y m a y b e , i t i s never theless w a r r a n t e d by

that and, by that in, by that on w h o s e so l id i ty p r o v i d e s p r o o f of the

poss ibi l i ty o f j u x t a p o s i t i o n . I t w a s cer ta in ly i m p r o b a b l e that arachnids ,

a m m o n i t e s , and annel ids should o n e d a y m i n g l e o n Eus thenes ' t o n g u e ,

but , after all , that w e l c o m i n g and v o r a c i o u s m o u t h cer ta in ly p r o v i d e d

t h e m w i t h a feasible l o d g i n g , a r o o f unde r w h i c h to coex i s t .

T h e mons t rous qua l i t y that runs t h r o u g h B o r g e s ' s enumera t i on c o n ­

sists, on the con t r a ry , i n the fact that the c o m m o n g r o u n d on w h i c h such

m e e t i n g s are poss ible has i tself been des t royed . W h a t i s imposs ib le i s n o t

the p r o p i n q u i t y o f the th ings listed, b u t the v e r y site o n w h i c h their

p r o p i n q u i t y w o u l d be possible . T h e a n i m a l s ' (i) f renzied, (j) i nnumerab l e ,

(k) d r a w n w i t h a v e r y f ine camelha i r b rush ' - w h e r e c o u l d t hey e v e r

mee t , e x c e p t i n the immate r i a l sound o f the v o i c e p r o n o u n c i n g their

enumera t i on , o r on the p a g e t ranscr ib ing it? W h e r e else c o u l d t hey be

x v i

j u x t a p o s e d e x c e p t i n the non -p l ace o f l anguage? Y e t , t h o u g h l a n g u a g e

can spread t h e m before us, i t can do so o n l y in an un th inkab le space.

T h e central c a t e g o r y o f animals ' i nc luded in the present classif icat ion' ,

w i t h its exp l i c i t reference to p a r a d o x e s we are famil iar w i t h , i s ind ica t ion

e n o u g h that we shall n e v e r succeed in def in ing a stable relat ion o f c o n ­

tained t o con ta ine r b e t w e e n each o f these ca tegor ies and that w h i c h

includes t h e m a l l : i f all the animals d i v i d e d up here can be p laced w i t h o u t

e x c e p t i o n in o n e o f the d ivis ions o f this list, then aren ' t all the o the r

d ivis ions to be found in that o n e d iv i s ion t oo? A n d then again , i n w h a t

space w o u l d that s ingle , inc lus ive d iv i s ion h a v e its exis tence? A b s u r d i t y

des t roys the and o f the e n u m e r a t i o n by m a k i n g imposs ib le the in w h e r e

the th ings e n u m e r a t e d w o u l d be d i v i d e d up . B o r g e s adds no f igure t o the

atlas o f the imposs ib le ; n o w h e r e does h e str ike the spark o f poe t ic c o n ­

fronta t ion; he s i m p l y dispenses w i t h the least o b v i o u s , b u t mos t c o m ­

pe l l ing , o f necessities; he does a w a y w i t h the site, the m u t e g r o u n d u p o n

w h i c h i t is possible fo r entities to be j u x t a p o s e d . A van i sh ing tr ick that is

m a s k e d or , rather, l a u g h a b l y indicated by o u r a lphabet ical o rder , w h i c h

is to be taken as the c lue (the o n l y v is ib le o n e ) to the enumera t ions of a

C h i n e s e encyc lopaed i a . . . . W h a t has been r e m o v e d , in short , is the

f amous ' ope ra t i ng tab le ' ; and r ende r ing to Rousse l 1 a small par t o f w h a t

is still his due , I use that w o r d ' t ab le ' in t w o supe r imposed senses: the

n icke l -p la ted , r u b b e r y table s w a t h e d in w h i t e , g l i t t e r ing benea th a glass

sun d e v o u r i n g all s h a d o w - the table w h e r e , for an instant, perhaps fo r ­

ever , the umbre l l a encounte rs the s e w i n g - m a c h i n e ; and also a table, a

tabula, that enables t h o u g h t to ope ra te u p o n the entities o f o u r w o r l d , to

pu t t h e m in o rder , t o d i v i d e t h e m in to classes, t o g r o u p t h e m a c c o r d i n g

to names that des ignate their similarit ies and their differences - the table

u p o n w h i c h , since the b e g i n n i n g o f t ime , l a n g u a g e has intersected space.

T h a t passage f r o m B o r g e s k e p t m e l a u g h i n g a l o n g t ime , t h o u g h n o t

w i t h o u t a cer tain uneasiness that I f o u n d hard to shake off. Perhaps b e ­

cause there arose in its w a k e the suspicion that there is a w o r s e k i n d of

disorder than that o f the incongruous, the l i n k i n g t o g e t h e r o f th ings that

are inappropr ia te ; I m e a n the d isorder in w h i c h f ragments of a l a rge

n u m b e r o f possible orders gl i t ter separately i n the d imens ion , w i t h o u t l a w

or g e o m e t r y , o f the hetcroclite; and that w o r d should be taken in its m o s t

l i teral, e t y m o l o g i c a l sense: in such a state, th ings are ' l a id ' , ' p l a ced ' ,

' a r ranged ' in sites so v e r y different f r o m o n e another that i t is imposs ib le

1 R a y m o n d Roussel, the French novelist. C f . Miche l Foucault 's Raymond Roussel (Paris, X£X53)- [Translator's note.]

x v i i

P R E F A C E

to f ind a p lace of res idence for t h e m , to def ine a common locus benea th

t h e m all . Utopias afford conso la t i on : a l t h o u g h t h e y h a v e no real loca l i ty

there is never theless a fantastic, un t roub l ed r e g i o n in w h i c h t h e y are able

t o un fo ld ; t hey o p e n up cities w i t h vas t avenues , supe rb ly p lan ted gardens ,

count r ies w h e r e life i s easy, e v e n t h o u g h the r o a d to t h e m is ch imer ica l .

Heterotopias are d i s tu rb ing , p r o b a b l y because t h e y secret ly u n d e r m i n e

l a n g u a g e , because t hey m a k e i t imposs ib le to n a m e this and that, because

they shatter o r t ang le c o m m o n names , because t h e y des t roy ' s y n t a x ' i n

a d v a n c e , and n o t o n l y the s y n t a x w i t h w h i c h w e cons t ruc t sentences bu t

also that less apparen t s y n t a x w h i c h causes w o r d s and th ings (next to and

also oppos i t e o n e ano ther ) t o ' h o l d t oge the r ' . T h i s i s w h y Utopias p e r m i t

fables and discourse: t h e y run w i t h the v e r y gra in o f l a n g u a g e and are

part of the fundamenta l d i m e n s i o n of the fabula; he terotopias (such as

those to be f o u n d so of ten in B o r g e s ) desiccate speech , s top w o r d s in their

t racks, contes t the v e r y poss ibi l i ty o f g r a m m a r a t its source ; t hey dissolve

o u r m y t h s and sterilize the l y r i c i s m o f o u r sentences.

I t appears that certain aphasiacs, w h e n s h o w n va r ious differently

c o l o u r e d skeins o f w o o l on a table t op , are consis tent ly unab le to a r range

t h e m in to a n y c o h e r e n t pa t tern; a s t h o u g h that s imple rec tang le w e r e

unable to serve in their case as a h o m o g e n e o u s and neutral space in w h i c h

th ings c o u l d be p laced so as to d isplay a t the same t ime the con t inuous

o rde r o f their identit ies o r differences as w e l l as the semant ic field of their

d e n o m i n a t i o n . W i t h i n this s imple space in w h i c h th ings are n o r m a l l y

a r ranged and g i v e n names , the aphasiac w i l l create a mu l t i p l i c i t y o f t iny ,

f r agmen ted r eg ions in w h i c h nameless resemblances agg lu t ina te th ings

in to u n c o n n e c t e d islets; in o n e corner , t hey w i l l p lace the l i gh te s t - co loured

skeins, in ano the r the red ones , s o m e w h e r e else those that are softest in

tex ture , in y e t ano ther p lace the longes t , o r those that h a v e a t inge of

pu rp le o r those that h a v e been w o u n d up in to a bal l . B u t no sooner h a v e

t h e y b e e n a d u m b r a t e d than all these g r o u p i n g s d issolve again , for the

field of ident i ty that sustains t h e m , h o w e v e r l imi ted i t m a y be , i s still t o o

w i d e n o t to be unstable ; and so the sick m i n d cont inues to infinity,

c rea t ing g r o u p s then dispers ing t h e m aga in , h e a p i n g up d iverse s imilar i­

ties, d e s t r o y i n g those that s e e m clearest, spl i t t ing up th ings that are

ident ical , s u p e r i m p o s i n g different criteria, f renz ied ly b e g i n n i n g all o v e r

again , b e c o m i n g m o r e and m o r e dis turbed, and tee ter ing f inal ly on the

b r ink o f anx ie ty .

T h e uneasiness that m a k e s u s l a u g h w h e n we read B o r g e s i s cer ta in ly

related to the p r o f o u n d distress o f those w h o s e l a n g u a g e has been

x v i i i

P R E F A C E

des t royed : loss o f w h a t i s ' c o m m o n ' t o p lace and n a m e . A t o p i a , aphasia.

Y e t o u r t ex t f r o m B o r g e s p roceeds i n ano the r d i rec t ion ; the m y t h i c a l

h o m e l a n d B o r g e s assigns t o that d is tor t ion o f classification that p reven t s

us f r o m a p p l y i n g it, to that p ic tu re that lacks all spatial cohe rence , is a

precise r e g i o n w h o s e n a m e a lone const i tutes for the W e s t a vast rese rvo i r

of Utopias. In o u r d r e a m w o r l d , i s n o t C h i n a prec ise ly this p r i v i l e g e d site

of space? In o u r t radi t ional i m a g e r y , the C h i n e s e cu l tu re is the m o s t m e t i ­

cu lous , the m o s t r i g i d l y o rde red , the o n e m o s t d e a f t o t e m p o r a l even ts ,

m o s t a t tached to the p u r e de l inea t ion o f space; we th ink o f i t a s a c i v i l i z a ­

t ion o f dikes and d a m s benea th the eternal face o f the s k y ; w e see it,

spread and f rozen , o v e r the entire surface o f a con t inen t su r rounded by

wa l l s . E v e n its w r i t i n g does no t r e p r o d u c e the fug i t i ve f l ight o f the v o i c e

in ho r i zon ta l l ines; i t erects the mot ion less and s t i l l - recognizeable i m a g e s

o f things themse lves i n ver t ica l c o l u m n s . S o m u c h s o that the C h i n e s e

e n c y c l o p a e d i a q u o t e d by B o r g e s , and the t a x o n o m y i t p roposes , lead to a

k ind o f t h o u g h t w i t h o u t space, t o w o r d s a n d ca tegor ies that l ack all life

and place, bu t are r o o t e d in a c e r e m o n i a l space, o v e r b u r d e n e d w i t h c o m ­

p l e x f igures , w i t h t ang led paths, s t range places , secret passages, and u n e x ­

pec t ed c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . T h e r e w o u l d appear t o be , then, a t the o the r

e x t r e m i t y o f the earth we inhabi t , a cu l tu re en t i re ly d e v o t e d t o the o r d e r ­

i n g o f space, b u t o n e that does n o t dis t r ibute the mul t ip l i c i t y o f ex i s t ing

th ings in to a n y o f the ca tegor ies that m a k e i t possible for us to name ,

speak, and th ink .

W h e n we establish a cons idered classification, w h e n we say that a cat

and a d o g r e semble each o the r less than t w o g r e y h o u n d s d o , e v e n i f b o t h

are t ame o r e m b a l m e d , e v e n i f b o t h are f renzied, e v e n i f b o t h h a v e j u s t

b r o k e n the w a t e r p i tcher , w h a t i s the g r o u n d o n w h i c h w e are able t o

establish the va l id i t y o f this classification w i t h c o m p l e t e cer ta in ty? O n

w h a t ' t ab le ' , a c c o r d i n g t o w h a t g r i d o f identi t ies, s imil i tudes , analogies ,

h a v e w e b e c o m e a c c u s t o m e d t o sort o u t s o m a n y different and s imilar

things? W h a t is this c o h e r e n c e - w h i c h , as is i m m e d i a t e l y apparent , is

nei ther de t e rmined by an a priori and necessary conca tena t ion , n o r i m ­

posed on us by i m m e d i a t e l y pe rcep t ib le contents? Fo r i t i s n o t a ques t ion

o f l i n k i n g consequences , b u t o f g r o u p i n g and isola t ing, o f ana lys ing , o f

m a t c h i n g and p i g e o n - h o l i n g c o n c r e t e con ten t s ; there i s n o t h i n g m o r e

tenta t ive , n o t h i n g m o r e empi r i ca l (superficially, a t least) than the process

o f establ ishing an o rde r a m o n g th ings ; n o t h i n g that d e m a n d s a sharper

e y e or a surer, bet ter-ar t icula ted l a n g u a g e ; n o t h i n g that m o r e insistently

requires that o n e a l l o w onese l f t o b e carr ied a l o n g b y the prol i fera t ion o f

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P R E F A C E

qualit ies and fo rms . A n d y e t a n e y e no t consc ious ly p repared m i g h t w e l l

g r o u p t oge the r cer tain s imilar f igures and dis t inguish b e t w e e n others on

the basis of such and such a difference: in fact, there is no s imi l i tude and

no dis t inct ion, e v e n for the w h o l l y unt ra ined pe rcep t ion , that i s n o t the

result o f a precise ope ra t ion and o f the app l ica t ion o f a p r e l i m i n a r y

cr i te r ion . A ' sy s t em of e l emen t s ' - a def ini t ion of the segments by w h i c h

the resemblances and differences can b e s h o w n , the types o f va r i a t ion b y

w h i c h those s egmen t s can be affected, and, lastly, the threshold a b o v e

w h i c h there is a difference and b e l o w w h i c h there is a s imi l i tude - is

indispensable for the es tabl ishment o f e v e n the simplest f o r m o f o rder .

O r d e r is, a t o n e and the same t ime, that w h i c h is g i v e n in things as their

inner l a w , the h idden n e t w o r k that de termines the w a y they con f ron t o n e

another , and also that w h i c h has no exis tence e x c e p t in the g r i d crea ted by

a g l ance , an e x a m i n a t i o n , a l a n g u a g e ; and i t is o n l y in the b l ank spaces of

this g r i d that o r d e r manifests i tself in dep th as t h o u g h a l ready there,

w a i t i n g in si lence for the m o m e n t o f its express ion .

T h e fundamenta l codes of a cul ture - those g o v e r n i n g its l a n g u a g e , its

schemas of pe rcep t ion , its e x c h a n g e s , its techniques , its va lues , the h ie r ­

a r c h y of its pract ices - establish fo r e v e r y m a n , f r o m the v e r y first, the

empi r i ca l orders w i t h w h i c h h e w i l l b e dea l ing and w i t h i n w h i c h h e w i l l

b e a t h o m e . A t the o the r e x t r e m i t y o f t h o u g h t , there are the scientific

theories o r the ph i losoph ica l interpretat ions w h i c h exp la in w h y o rde r

exists i n genera l , w h a t universal l a w i t o b e y s , w h a t pr inc ip le can a c c o u n t

fo r it, and w h y this par t icular o rde r has been established and n o t s o m e

other . B u t b e t w e e n these t w o reg ions , so distant f r o m o n e another , lies a

d o m a i n w h i c h , e v e n t h o u g h its ro l e i s m a i n l y an in t e rmed ia ry o n e , i s

nonetheless fundamen ta l : i t i s m o r e confused, m o r e obscure , and p r o b ­

a b l y less easy to analyse . It is here that a cu l ture , i m p e r c e p t i b l y d e v i a t i n g

f r o m the empi r ica l orders prescr ibed for i t by its p r i m a r y codes , inst i tut ing

an initial separa t ion f r o m t h e m , causes t h e m to lose their o r ig ina l trans­

pa rency , rel inquishes its i m m e d i a t e and invis ib le p o w e r s , frees i tself

sufficiently to d i s cove r that these orders are perhaps n o t the o n l y possible

ones or the best ones ; this cu l tu re then finds i t se l f faced w i t h the stark

fact that there exists , b e l o w the l eve l o f its spontaneous orders , th ings that

are in themse lves capable of b e i n g o rde red , that b e l o n g to a cer tain

u n s p o k e n o rde r ; the fact, in short , that o rde r exists. As t h o u g h e m a n c i ­

pa t ing i tself to s o m e ex t en t f r o m its l inguis t ic , pe rcep tua l , and pract ical

gr ids , the cu l tu re supe r imposed o n t h e m ano the r k ind o f g r i d w h i c h

neutra l ized t h e m , w h i c h b y this super impos i t ion b o t h revea led and e x -

x x

P R E F A C E

e luded t h e m a t the same t ime , so that the cu l tu re , by this v e r y process ,

c a m e face to face w i t h o rde r in its p r i m a r y state. I t i s on the basis of this

n e w l y p e r c e i v e d o rde r that the codes o f l a n g u a g e , p e r c e p t i o n , a n d p r a c ­

tice are c r i t ic ized and rendered par t ia l ly inva l id . I t i s on the basis of this

o rde r , t aken as a f i rm founda t ion , that genera l theories as to the o r d e r i n g

o f th ings , and the in terpre ta t ion that such an o r d e r i n g i n v o l v e s , w i l l be

cons t ruc ted . T h u s , b e t w e e n the a l ready ' e n c o d e d ' e y e and re f lex ive k n o w ­

l edge there is a m i d d l e r e g i o n w h i c h l iberates o rde r itself: i t is he re that

i t appears, a c c o r d i n g to the cu l tu re a n d the a g e in ques t ion , c o n t i n u o u s and

g radua ted o r d i scon t inuous and p i e c e m e a l , l i n k e d to space o r cons t i tu ted

a n e w a t each instant by the d r i v i n g fo rce o f t ime , related to a series o f

var iables o r def ined b y separate sys tems o f coherences , c o m p o s e d o f r e ­

semblances w h i c h are e i ther successive o r c o r r e s p o n d i n g , o r g a n i z e d

a r o u n d increas ing differences, e tc . T h i s m i d d l e r eg ion , then, in so far as

i t m a k e s manifes t the m o d e s o f b e i n g o f o rde r , can b e pos i t ed a s the

m o s t fundamenta l o f a l l : an ter ior t o w o r d s , pe rcep t ions , and gestures ,

w h i c h are then t aken to be m o r e o r less exac t , m o r e o r less h a p p y , e x ­

pressions o f i t ( w h i c h i s w h y this expe r i ence o f o rde r i n its pu re p r i m a r y

state a l w a y s p lays a cr i t ical r o l e ) ; m o r e sol id, m o r e archaic , less d u b i o u s ,

a l w a y s m o r e ' t rue ' than the theories that a t t emp t to g i v e those express ions

exp l i c i t f o r m , exhaus t i ve app l ica t ion , o r ph i losoph ica l founda t ion . T h u s ,

i n e v e r y cu l tu re , b e t w e e n the use o f w h a t o n e m i g h t call the o r d e r i n g

codes and reflections u p o n o rde r itself, there i s the p u r e expe r i ence of

o rde r and o f its m o d e s o f b e i n g .

T h e present s tudy i s an a t t emp t to analyse that expe r i ence . I am c o n ­

ce rned to s h o w its d e v e l o p m e n t s , s ince the s ix teenth cen tu ry , in the m a i n ­

s t ream of a cu l tu re such as ou r s : in w h a t w a y , as o n e traces - against the

cur ren t , as it w e r e - l a n g u a g e as it has been s p o k e n , natural creatures as

t h e y h a v e b e e n p e r c e i v e d and g r o u p e d toge the r , and e x c h a n g e s a s t hey

h a v e b e e n pract ised; i n w h a t w a y , then, o u r cu l ture has m a d e manifes t

the e x i s t e n c e - o f order , and h o w , t o the moda l i t i e s o f that o rder , the

e x c h a n g e s o w e d their l a w s , the l i v i n g be ings their constants , the w o r d s

their sequence and their representa t ive v a l u e ; w h a t moda l i t i e s o f o rde r

h a v e been r e c o g n i z e d , pos i ted , l i nked w i t h space and t ime , in o rde r to

create the pos i t ive basis o f k n o w l e d g e a s w e f i n d i t e m p l o y e d i n g r a m m a r

and p h i l o l o g y , i n natural h i s to ry and b i o l o g y , i n the s tudy o f w e a l t h and

pol i t ica l e c o n o m y . Q u i t e o b v i o u s l y , such a n analysis does n o t b e l o n g t o

the h i s to ry o f ideas o r o f sc ience : i t i s ra ther an i n q u i r y w h o s e a i m i s to

r ed i scove r o n w h a t basis k n o w l e d g e and t h e o r y b e c a m e possible; w i t h i n

x x i

P R E F A C E

x x i i

w h a t space o f o rde r k n o w l e d g e w a s cons t i tu ted ; o n the basis o f w h a t

his tor ical a priori, and in the e l e m e n t of w h a t pos i t iv i ty , ideas c o u l d

appear , sciences be established, e x p e r i e n c e be ref lected in ph i losoph ies ,

rat ionali t ies be f o r m e d , o n l y , perhaps , to d isso lve and van i sh s o o n after­

w a r d s . I a m n o t c o n c e r n e d , therefore , t o descr ibe the p rogress o f k n o w ­

l e d g e t o w a r d s a n o b j e c t i v i t y i n w h i c h t o d a y ' s science can f inal ly b e r e c o g ­

n ized ; w h a t I am a t t e m p t i n g to b r i n g to l i g h t i s the ep i s t emo log i ca l f ield,

the episteme in w h i c h k n o w l e d g e , env i saged apar t f r o m all cri teria h a v i n g

reference to its ra t ional v a l u e or to its o b j e c t i v e f o r m s , g r o u n d s its

pos i t iv i ty and t he r eby manifests a h i s to ry w h i c h i s n o t that o f its g r o w i n g

per fec t ion , b u t ra ther that o f its cond i t i ons o f poss ib i l i ty ; i n this a ccoun t ,

w h a t shou ld appear are those conf igu ra t ions w i t h i n the space o f k n o w ­

l e d g e w h i c h h a v e g i v e n rise t o the d iverse f o r m s o f empi r i ca l sc ience.

S u c h an enterprise i s n o t so m u c h a h is tory , in the t radi t ional m e a n i n g of

that w o r d , as an ' a r c h a e o l o g y ' . 1

N o w , this a r c h a e o l o g i c a l i nqu i ry has r evea led t w o grea t discont inui t ies

in the episteme o f W e s t e r n cu l tu re : the first inaugura tes the Class ical a g e

( r o u g h l y h a l f - w a y t h r o u g h the seven teen th c e n t u r y ) a n d the second , a t

the b e g i n n i n g o f the n ine teen th cen tu ry , m a r k s the b e g i n n i n g o f the

m o d e r n a g e . T h e o rde r o n the basis o f w h i c h w e th ink t o d a y does n o t

h a v e the same m o d e o f b e i n g a s that o f the Class ica l th inkers . Desp i t e the

impress ion w e m a y h a v e o f a n a lmos t un in te r rup ted d e v e l o p m e n t o f the

E u r o p e a n ratio f r o m the Renaissance to our o w n d a y , despite o u r poss ible

b e l i e f that the classifications of L innaeus , m o d i f i e d to a grea te r or lesser

d e g r e e , can still l ay c l a i m t o s o m e sort o f v a l i d i t y , that C o n d i l l a c ' s t h e o r y

o f v a l u e can b e r e c o g n i z e d t o s o m e ex t en t i n n ine teen th -cen tu ry m a r ­

g ina l i sm, that K e y n e s w a s w e l l a w a r e o f the affinities b e t w e e n his o w n

analyses and those of C a n t i l l o n , that the l a n g u a g e of general grammar (as

e x e m p l i f i e d in the authors o f P o r t - R o y a l o r in B a u z e e ) i s n o t so v e r y far

r e m o v e d f r o m o u r o w n - all this quas i - con t inu i ty on the l eve l o f ideas

and themes is doubt less o n l y a surface appea rance ; on the a rchaeo log ica l

l eve l , we see that the s y s t e m o f posi t ivi t ies w a s t r ans formed i n a w h o l e ­

sale fashion a t the end o f the e igh teen th and b e g i n n i n g o f the n ine teen th

cen tu ry . N o t that reason m a d e a n y p rogress : i t w a s s i m p l y that the m o d e

o f b e i n g o f th ings , and o f the o rde r that d i v i d e d t h e m u p before presen t ­

i n g t h e m to the unders tanding , w a s p r o f o u n d l y al tered. I f the natura l

h i s tory o f T o u r n e f o r t , L innaeus , and Buf fbn can b e related t o a n y t h i n g

1 T h e problems of method raised by such an ' a rchaeology ' w i l l be examined in a later w o r k .

P R E F A C E

a t all o the r than itself, i t i s n o t to b i o l o g y , to C u v i e r ' s c o m p a r a t i v e

a n a t o m y , o r t o D a r w i n ' s t h e o r y o f e v o l u t i o n , bu t t o B a u z e e ' s genera l

g r a m m a r , t o the analysis o f m o n e y a n d w e a l t h a s f o u n d i n the w o r k s o f

L a w , o r V e r o n d e For tbonna i s , o r T u r g o t . Perhaps k n o w l e d g e succeeds i n

e n g e n d e r i n g k n o w l e d g e , ideas i n t r ans fo rming themse lves and a c t i v e l y

m o d i f y i n g o n e ano the r (but h o w ? - historians h a v e n o t y e t en l igh tened

us on this p o i n t ) ; o n e t h ing , in a n y case, i s ce r ta in : a r c h a e o l o g y , a d d r e s s i n g

i tself t o the gene ra l space o f k n o w l e d g e , t o its conf igu ra t ions , and to the

m o d e o f b e i n g o f the th ings that appear i n it, defines sys tems o f s i m u l ­

taneity, as w e l l as the series of mu ta t i ons necessary and sufficient to

c i r cumscr ibe the th reshold o f a n e w pos i t i v i ty .

In this w a y , analysis has b e e n able to s h o w the c o h e r e n c e that ex is ted ,

t h r o u g h o u t the Class ical a g e , b e t w e e n the t h e o r y o f representa t ion and

the theories o f l a n g u a g e , o f the natura l orders , and o f w e a l t h and v a l u e .

I t i s this con f igu ra t i on that, f r o m the n ine teen th c e n t u r y o n w a r d , changes

ent i re ly ; the t h e o r y o f representa t ion disappears as the universa l f o u n d a ­

t ion of all poss ible o rders ; l a n g u a g e as the spon taneous tabula, the p r i m a r y

g r id o f th ings , a s an indispensable l ink b e t w e e n representat ion and th ings ,

is ecl ipsed in its tu rn ; a p r o f o u n d his tor ic i ty penetrates in to the hear t of

th ings , isolates and defines t h e m in their o w n c o h e r e n c e , imposes u p o n

t h e m the f o r m s o f o rde r i m p l i e d b y the c o n t i n u i t y o f t i m e ; the analysis o f

e x c h a n g e and m o n e y g i v e s w a y t o the s tudy o f p r o d u c t i o n , that o f the

o r g a n i s m takes p r e c e d e n c e o v e r the search for t a x o n o m i c characterist ics,

and, a b o v e all, l a n g u a g e loses its p r i v i l e g e d pos i t ion and b e c o m e s , in its

turn, a his tor ical f o r m cohe ren t w i t h the dens i ty o f its o w n past. B u t a s

th ings b e c o m e inc reas ing ly re f lex ive , s eek ing the p r inc ip le o f their in te l l i ­

g ib i l i ty o n l y i n their o w n d e v e l o p m e n t , a n d a b a n d o n i n g the space o f

representat ion, m a n enters in his turn , and fo r the f i r s t t ime , the f i e ld o f

W e s t e r n k n o w l e d g e . S t r a n g e l y e n o u g h , m a n - the s tudy o f w h o m i s

supposed by the na ive to be the o ldes t inves t iga t ion since Socrates - i s p r o b ­

a b l y no m o r e than a k i n d of rift in the o rde r of th ings , or , in a n y case, a

conf igu ra t ion w h o s e out l ines are d e t e r m i n e d b y the n e w pos i t ion h e has

s o r e c e n d y t aken u p i n the f i e l d o f k n o w l e d g e . W h e n c e all the ch imeras

o f the n e w h u m a n i s m s , all the facile solut ions o f a n ' a n t h r o p o l o g y ' u n d e r ­

s tood as a un iversa l ref lect ion on m a n , ha l f -empi r ica l , ha l f -ph i losoph ica l .

I t i s c o m f o r t i n g , h o w e v e r , and a source of p r o f o u n d r e l i e f to th ink that

m a n is o n l y a recen t i n v e n t i o n , a f igure no t y e t t w o centur ies o ld , a n e w

w r i n k l e in o u r k n o w l e d g e , a n d that he w i l l disappear aga in as soon as that

k n o w l e d g e has d i s c o v e r e d a n e w f o r m .

xxiii

P A R T 1

P R E F A C E

<1

I t i s ev iden t that the present s tudy is, in a sense, an e c h o of my u n d e r ­

t a k i n g to w r i t e a h i s to ry of madness in the Class ica l a g e ; i t has the same

ar t iculat ions in t ime , t a k i n g the end of the Renaissance as its s ta r t ing-

po in t , then e n c o u n t e r i n g , a t the b e g i n n i n g o f the n ine teen th c e n t u r y , j u s t

a s m y h i s to ry o f madness d id , the th reshold o f a m o d e r n i t y that w e h a v e

n o t y e t left b e h i n d . B u t whe rea s i n the h i s to ry o f madness I w a s inves t i ­

g a t i n g the w a y in w h i c h a cu l tu re can de t e rmine in a mass ive , gene ra l

f o r m the difference that l imi t s it, I am c o n c e r n e d he re w i t h o b s e r v i n g h o w

a cu l tu re exper iences the p r o p i n q u i t y o f th ings , h o w i t establishes the

tabula o f their relat ionships and the o rde r b y w h i c h t h e y m u s t b e c o n ­

sidered. I am c o n c e r n e d , i n short , w i t h a h i s to ry o f r e semblance : on w h a t

cond i t i ons w a s Class ica l t h o u g h t ab le t o reflect relat ions o f s imi lar i ty o r

e q u i v a l e n c e b e t w e e n th ings , relat ions that w o u l d p r o v i d e a founda t ion

and a jus t i f ica t ion for their w o r d s , their classifications, their sys tems of

e x c h a n g e ? W h a t his tor ical a priori p r o v i d e d the s ta r t ing-po in t f r o m w h i c h

i t w a s possible to define the g rea t c h e c k e r b o a r d o f dis t inct identit ies

established against the confused , undef ined , faceless, and , as i t w e r e ,

indifferent b a c k g r o u n d o f differences? T h e h i s to ry o f madness w o u l d b e

the h i s to ry o f the O t h e r - o f that w h i c h , for a g i v e n cu l tu re , i s a t o n c e

in ter ior and fo r e ign , therefore to be e x c l u d e d (so as to e x o r c i z e the

in ter ior dange r ) b u t by b e i n g shut a w a y (in o rde r t o r educe its o therness) ;

w h e r e a s the h i s to ry o f the o rde r i m p o s e d o n th ings w o u l d b e the h i s to ry

of the S a m e - o f that w h i c h , for a g i v e n cu l tu re , i s b o t h dispersed and

related, therefore t o be d is t inguished by k inds and to be co l l ec ted t o g e t h e r

in to identi t ies.

A n d i f o n e considers that disease i s a t o n e a n d the same t ime disorder -

the exis tence o f a per i lous otherness w i t h i n the h u m a n b o d y , a t the v e r y

heart o f life - and a natural p h e n o m e n o n w i t h its o w n constants , r e s e m ­

blances , and types , o n e can see w h a t s cope there w o u l d be for an a r c h a e o ­

l o g y o f the m e d i c a l p o i n t o f v i e w . F r o m the l im i t - expe r i ence o f the

O t h e r t o the cons t i tuen t fo rms o f m e d i c a l k n o w l e d g e , and f r o m the lat ter

t o the o rde r o f th ings and the concep t ions o f the S a m e , w h a t i s ava i lab le

t o a r chaeo log i ca l analysis i s the w h o l e o f Class ical k n o w l e d g e , o r ra ther

the threshold that separates us f r o m Classical t h o u g h t and const i tutes o u r

m o d e r n i t y . I t w a s u p o n this th reshold that the s t range f i gu re o f k n o w l e d g e

ca l led m a n f i r s t appeared and revea led a space p r o p e r to the h u m a n sciences.

In a t t e m p t i n g to u n c o v e r the deepest strata o f W e s t e r n cul ture , I am res tor ­

i n g to o u r silent and apparen t ly i m m o b i l e soil its rifts, its instabi l i ty , its

f laws; and i t i s the same g r o u n d that i s o n c e m o r e s t i rr ing unde r o u r feet.

x x i v

C H A P T E R I

Las Meninas

i

T h e painter i s s tanding a l i t t le b a c k f r o m his c a n v a s f i ] . He is g l a n c i n g a t

his m o d e l ; perhaps he i s cons ide r ing w h e t h e r to a d d s o m e f in ishing

t o u c h , t h o u g h i t i s also possible that the first s t roke has n o t y e t been m a d e .

T h e a r m h o l d i n g the b rush i s ben t to the left, t o w a r d s the pale t te ; i t i s

mot ionless , for an instant, b e t w e e n canvas a n d paints. T h e ski l led hand i s

suspended in mid -a i r , arrested in rapt a t tent ion on the painter ' s g a z e ; a n d

the g a z e , in return, wa i t s u p o n the arrested ges ture . B e t w e e n the f ine p o i n t

o f t he b rush a n d the s teely g a z e , the scene i s a b o u t to y i e l d up its v o l u m e .

B u t n o t w i t h o u t a subt le sys t em o f feints. By s tanding back a l i t t le,

the painter has p laced h i m s e l f t o o n e side o f the pa in t ing on w h i c h he i s

w o r k i n g . T h a t is, fo r the specta tor "at present o b s e r v i n g h i m he i s to the

r igh t o f his canvas , w h i l e the latter, the canvas , takes u p the w h o l e o f the

e x t r e m e left. A n d the canvas has its b a c k tu rned to that specta tor : he can

see n o t h i n g o f i t b u t the reverse side, t oge the r w i t h the h u g e f r ame on

w h i c h i t i s s t retched. T h e painter , on the o the r hand , i s per fec t ly v i s ib le

in his full h e i g h t ; o r a t a n y rate, he i s n o t m a s k e d by the tall canvas w h i c h

m a y soon absorb h i m , w h e n , t a k i n g a step t o w a r d s i t aga in , he re turns to

his task; he has no d o u b t j u s t appeared , a t this v e r y instant, be fo re the eyes

o f the spectator , e m e r g i n g f r o m w h a t i s v i r t u a l l y a sort o f vas t c a g e p r o ­

j e c t e d b a c k w a r d s b y the surface h e i s pa in t ing . N o w h e can b e seen,

c a u g h t in a m o m e n t o f stillness, a t the neutra l cen t re o f this osci l la t ion.

His da rk torso and b r i g h t face are h a l f - w a y b e t w e e n the v is ib le and the

invis ib le : e m e r g i n g f r o m that canvas b e y o n d o u r v i e w , h e m o v e s in to

o u r g a z e ; b u t w h e n , in a m o m e n t , he m a k e s a step to the r igh t , r e m o v i n g

h i m s e l f f r o m o u r g a z e , h e w i l l b e s tanding e x a c t l y i n f ront o f the canvas

he i s pa in t ing ; he w i l l enter that r e g i o n w h e r e his pa in t ing , n e g l e c t e d for

a n instant, w i l l , for h i m , b e c o m e vis ib le o n c e m o r e , free o f s h a d o w a n d

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

4

free o f re t icence . A s t h o u g h the pa in ter c o u l d n o t a t the same t i m e b e

seen on the p ic tu re w h e r e he i s represented and also see that u p o n w h i c h

he i s represen t ing s o m e t h i n g . He rules a t the threshold o f those t w o i n ­

c o m p a t i b l e vis ibi l i t ies .

T h e painter i s l o o k i n g , his face tu rned s l igh t ly and his head l ean ing

t o w a r d s o n e shoulder . He i s s tar ing a t a p o i n t to w h i c h , e v e n t h o u g h i t i s

inv is ib le , w e , the spectators , can easily assign an objec t , s ince i t i s w e , o u r ­

se lves , w h o are that p o i n t : o u r bod ies , o u r faces, o u r eyes . T h e spectacle

he is o b s e r v i n g is thus d o u b l y inv is ib le : first, because i t is n o t represented

w i t h i n the space of the pa in t ing , and, second , because i t i s si tuated p r e ­

c ise ly in that b l ind po in t , in that essential h id ing -p l ace in to w h i c h o u r

g a z e disappears f r o m ourse lves a t the m o m e n t o f o u r actual l o o k i n g . A n d

y e t , h o w c o u l d w e fail t o see that invis ib i l i ty , there i n f r o n t o f o u r eyes ,

since i t has its o w n pe rcep t ib l e equ iva len t , its sealed-in f igure , in the

pa in t ing itself? We c o u l d , in effect, guess w h a t i t i s the pa in te r i s l o o k i n g

a t i f i t w e r e possible for us to g l ance for a m o m e n t a t the canvas he is

w o r k i n g o n ; b u t all we can see o f that canvas i s its t ex tu re , the hor i zon ta l

and ver t ica l bars o f the stretcher, and the o b l i q u e l y rising f o o t o f the easel.

T h e tall, m o n o t o n o u s rec tang le o c c u p y i n g the w h o l e left p o r t i o n o f the

real p ic tu re , and represent ing the b a c k o f the canvas w i t h i n the p ic tu re ,

reconst i tutes in the f o r m of a surface the invis ib i l i ty in d e p t h o f w h a t the

artist i s o b s e r v i n g : that space i n w h i c h w e are , a n d w h i c h w e are. F r o m

the eyes of the pa in ter to w h a t he i s o b s e r v i n g there runs a c o m p e l l i n g

l ine that w e , the o n l o o k e r s , h a v e n o p o w e r o f e v a d i n g : i t runs t h r o u g h

the real p ic tu re and e m e r g e s f rom its surface to j o i n the p l ace f rom w h i c h

we see the painter o b s e r v i n g us; this do t t ed l ine reaches o u t to us ine luc t -

ab ly , and l inks us to the representa t ion o f the p ic ture .

In appearance , this locus is a s imple o n e ; a ma t t e r of p u r e r ec ip roc i t y :

we are l o o k i n g a t a p i c tu re in w h i c h the pa in ter i s in turn l o o k i n g o u t a t

us. A m e r e conf ron ta t ion , eyes ca t ch ing o n e another ' s g l ance , di rect

l o o k s s u p e r i m p o s i n g themselves u p o n o n e ano the r a s t h e y cross. A n d y e t

this s lender l ine o f rec iproca l v i s ib i l i ty embraces a w h o l e c o m p l e x ne t ­

w o r k o f uncertaint ies , e x c h a n g e s , and feints. T h e pain ter i s t u rn ing his

eyes t o w a r d s us o n l y in so far a s we happen to o c c u p y the same pos i t ion

as his subject . W e , the spectators, are an addi t ional factor . T h o u g h g ree t ed

b y that g a z e , w e are also dismissed b y it, rep laced b y that w h i c h w a s a l w a y s

there be fo re w e w e r e : the m o d e l itself. B u t , inverse ly , the painter ' s g a z e ,

addressed to the v o i d c o n f r o n t i n g h i m outs ide the p ic ture , accepts as m a n y

m o d e l s as there are specta tors ; in this precise b u t neutra l p lace , the o b s e r v e r

L A S M E N I N A S

and the o b s e r v e d take part in a ceaseless e x c h a n g e . No g a z e i s stable, or

rather, in the neutra l f u r r o w of the g a z e p i e r c ing a t a r igh t ang le t h r o u g h

the canvas , subject and objec t , the spectator and the m o d e l , reverse their roles

to infini ty. A n d here the g rea t canvas w i t h its b a c k to us on the e x t r e m e

left of the p ic tu re exercises its s econd func t ion : s t ubbo rn ly invis ible , i t

p revents the re la t ion o f these gazes f r o m e v e r b e i n g d i scove rab le o r d e ­

f ini tely established. T h e o p a q u e f i x i t y that i t establishes on o n e side renders

fo reve r unstable the p l a y o f m e t a m o r p h o s e s established in the centre b e ­

t w e e n specta tor and m o d e l . Because we can see o n l y that reverse side,

w e d o n o t k n o w w h o w e are, o r w h a t w e are d o i n g . Seen o r seeing?

T h e painter i s o b s e r v i n g a p lace w h i c h , f r o m m o m e n t t o m o m e n t , n e v e r

ceases to c h a n g e its con ten t , its f o r m , its face, its ident i ty . B u t the a t ten t ive

i m m o b i l i t y o f his eyes refers u s b a c k to ano the r d i rec t ion w h i c h t h e y h a v e

often f o l l o w e d a l ready, and w h i c h soon , there can b e n o d o u b t , t h e y w i l l

take aga in : that o f the mot ion less canvas u p o n w h i c h i s b e i n g t raced, has

a l ready been t raced perhaps , for a l o n g t ime and fo reve r , a por t ra i t that

w i l l n e v e r aga in be erased. So that the painter 's s o v e r e i g n g a z e c o m m a n d s

a v i r tua l t r iangle w h o s e ou t l ine defines this p ic tu re of a p ic tu re : a t the

top - the o n l y v is ib le co rne r - the painter 's e y e s ; a t o n e of the base angles ,

the invis ible p lace o c c u p i e d by the m o d e l ; a t the o the r base ang le , the

f igure p r o b a b l y ske tched o u t o n the invis ib le surface o f the canvas .

As soon as t h e y p lace the specta tor in the f ield o f their g a z e , the painter ' s

eyes seize h o l d o f h i m , fo rce h i m to enter the p ic ture , assign h i m a p lace

a t o n c e p r i v i l e g e d and inescapable , l e v y their l u m i n o u s and v is ib le t r ibute

f r o m h i m , and p ro jec t i t u p o n the inaccessible surface o f the canvas w i t h i n

the p ic ture . He sees his inv is ib i l i ty m a d e v is ib le to the pa in ter and trans­

posed in to an i m a g e fo reve r invis ib le to himself . A shock that is a u g ­

m e n t e d and m a d e m o r e inevi tab le still by a m a r g i n a l t rap. A t the e x t r e m e

r ight , the p ic tu re is lit by a w i n d o w represented in v e r y sharp pe r spec t ive ;

so sharp that we can see scarcely m o r e than the embrasure ; so that the

f lood o f l igh t s t r eaming t h r o u g h i t bathes a t the same t ime , and w i t h equa l

generos i ty , t w o n e i g h b o u r i n g spaces, o v e r l a p p i n g b u t i r reduc ib le : the

surface o f the pa in t ing , t o g e t h e r w i t h the v o l u m e i t represents ( w h i c h i s

to say, the painter ' s s tudio , or the salon in w h i c h his easel i s n o w set u p ) ,

and, i n front o f that surface, the real v o l u m e o c c u p i e d by the specta tor

(or aga in , the unreal site o f the m o d e l ) . A n d as i t passes t h r o u g h the r o o m

f r o m r igh t to left, this vas t f lood o f g o l d e n l igh t carries b o t h the specta tor

t o w a r d s the pa in ter and the m o d e l t o w a r d s the canvas ; i t i s this l i gh t t o o ,

w h i c h , w a s h i n g o v e r the painter , m a k e s h i m vis ib le t o the specta tor and

5

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

turns in to g o l d e n lines, i n the m o d e l ' s eyes , the f r ame o f that e n i g m a t i c

canvas on w h i c h his i m a g e , o n c e t ranspor ted there , i s to be i m p r i s o n e d .

T h i s e x t r e m e , part ial , scarce ly ind ica ted w i n d o w frees a w h o l e f l o w o f

d a y l i g h t w h i c h serves a s the c o m m o n locus o f the representa t ion . I t

balances the invis ib le canvas on the o the r side o f the p i c t u r e : j u s t a s that

canvas , by t u rn ing its b a c k to the spectators , fo lds i tse l f in against the

p i c tu re represent ing it, and fo rms , by the supe r impos i t i on o f its reverse

and v i s ib le side u p o n the surface o f the p ic tu re d e p i c t i n g it, the g r o u n d ,

inaccessible to us, on w h i c h there sh im m ers the I m a g e par excellence, so

does the w i n d o w , a p u r e aper ture , establish a space as manifest as the

o the r i s h i d d e n ; a s m u c h the c o m m o n g r o u n d o f painter , f igures , m o d e l s ,

and spectators , as the o the r i s sol i tary (for no o n e is l o o k i n g a t it , n o t e v e n

the pa in te r ) . F r o m the r igh t , there s t reams in t h r o u g h an invis ib le w i n d o w

the p u r e v o l u m e of a l i gh t that renders all representa t ion v i s ib l e ; to the

left ex t ends the surface that concea ls , on the o the r side of its all t o o v i s ib le

w o v e n tex ture , the representa t ion i t bears . T h e l igh t , b y f l o o d i n g the

scene ( I m e a n the r o o m as w e l l a s the canvas , the r o o m represented on

the canvas , and the r o o m in w h i c h the canvas stands) , e n v e l o p s the f igures

a n d the spectators and carries t h e m w i t h it, unde r the painter ' s g a z e ,

t o w a r d s the p lace w h e r e his brush w i l l represent t h e m . B u t that p l ace i s

c o n c e a l e d f r o m us. W e are o b s e r v i n g ourse lves b e i n g o b s e r v e d b y the

painter , and m a d e v is ib le to his eyes by the s a m e l igh t that enables us to

see h i m . A n d j u s t a s w e are a b o u t t o app rehend ourse lves , t ranscr ibed b y

his h a n d as t h o u g h in a m i r r o r , we f ind that we can in fact a p p r e h e n d

n o t h i n g o f that m i r r o r b u t its lustreless b a c k . T h e o the r side o f a p s y c h e .

N o w , as i t happens , e x a c t l y oppos i t e the spectators - ourse lves - on the

w a l l f o r m i n g the far end o f the r o o m , V e l a z q u e z has represented a series

o f p ic tu res ; and we see that a m o n g all those h a n g i n g canvases there i s o n e

that shines w i t h par t icular br ightness . Its f rame is w i d e r and da rke r than

those of the o thers ; y e t there i s a f ine w h i t e l ine a r o u n d its inner e d g e

diffusing o v e r its w h o l e surface a l i g h t w h o s e source i s n o t easy to de te r ­

m i n e ; for i t c o m e s f r o m n o w h e r e , unless i t be f r o m a space w i t h i n itself.

I n this s t range l i gh t , t w o si lhouettes are apparent , w h i l e a b o v e t h e m , and

a l i t t le b e h i n d t h e m , is a h e a v y pu rp l e cur ta in . T h e o the r p ic tures r evea l

little m o r e than a f e w pa le r pa tches bu r i ed in a darkness w i t h o u t d e p t h .

T h i s par t icular o n e , on the o the r hand , opens o n t o a pe r spec t ive o f space

in w h i c h r e c o g n i z a b l e fo rms recede f r o m us in a l i gh t that b e l o n g s o n l y

to itself. A m o n g all these e lements in t ended to p r o v i d e representat ions,

w h i l e i m p e d i n g t h e m , h i d i n g t h e m , c o n c e a l i n g t h e m because o f their

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7

pos i t ion or their dis tance f r o m us, this is the o n l y o n e that fulfils its

func t ion in all hones ty and enables us to see w h a t i t i s supposed to s h o w .

D e s p i t e its dis tance f r o m us, despi te the s h a d o w s all a r o u n d it. B u t i t

isn ' t a p i c tu re : it is a m i r r o r . It offers us at last that e n c h a n t m e n t of the

d o u b l e that unt i l n o w has been den ied us, n o t o n l y by the distant pa in t ings

b u t also by the l i gh t in the f o r e g r o u n d w i t h its i ronic canvas .

Of all the representat ions represented in the p ic tu re this i s the o n l y o n e

v i s ib le ; bu t no o n e i s l o o k i n g a t it. U p r i g h t bes ide his canvas , his a t ten t ion

ent i re ly t aken up by his m o d e l , the pa in ter i s unable to see this l o o k i n g -

glass sh in ing so sof t ly beh ind h i m . T h e o the r f igures in the p ic tu re are

also, for the m o s t part , tu rned to face w h a t m u s t be t a k i n g p lace in f ront -

t o w a r d s the b r i g h t inv is ib i l i ty b o r d e r i n g the canvas , t o w a r d s that b a l c o n y

o f l i gh t w h e r e their eyes can g a z e a t those w h o are g a z i n g b a c k a t t h e m ,

and no t t o w a r d s that dark recess w h i c h m a r k s the far end o f the r o o m

in w h i c h t h e y are represented. T h e r e are, i t i s t rue, s o m e heads tu rned

a w a y f r o m us i n prof i le : b u t no t o n e o f t h e m i s tu rned far e n o u g h to see,

a t the b a c k o f the r o o m , that sol i tary mi r ro r , that t i ny g l o w i n g r ec t ang le

w h i c h i s n o t h i n g o the r than v is ib i l i ty , y e t w i t h o u t a n y g a z e able t o grasp

it, to render i t ac tual , and to e n j o y the s u d d e n l y r ipe fruit o f the spectacle

it offers.

I t mus t be admi t t ed that this indifference i s equal led o n l y by the m i r r o r ' s

o w n . I t i s ref lect ing n o t h i n g , in fact , of all that i s there in the same space

as itself: nei ther the pa in ter w i t h his b a c k to it, n o r the f igures in the cent re

of the r o o m . I t i s n o t the v is ib le i t reflects, in those b r i g h t depths . In

D u t c h pa in t ing i t w a s t radi t ional for mi r ro r s to p l a y a dup l i ca t ing r o l e :

t hey repeated the o r ig ina l contents o f the p ic tu re , o n l y inside an unreal ,

mod i f i ed , con t rac ted , c o n c a v e space. O n e s a w i n t h e m the same th ings

as o n e s a w in the first instance in the pa in t ing , bu t d e c o m p o s e d and r e -

c o m p o s e d a c c o r d i n g to a different l a w . H e r e , the m i r r o r i s say ing n o t h i n g

that has a l ready been said before . Y e t its pos i t ion i s m o r e or less c o m p l e t e l y

cent ra l : its u p p e r e d g e i s e x a c t l y on an i m a g i n a r y l ine r u n n i n g h a l f - w a y

b e t w e e n the t o p and the b o t t o m o f the pa in t ing , i t hangs r i gh t i n the

m i d d l e o f the far w a l l (or a t least i n the m i d d l e o f the p o r t i o n w e can

see) ; i t o u g h t , therefore , t o b e g o v e r n e d b y the same lines o f pe r spec t ive

a s the p ic tu re itself; we m i g h t w e l l e x p e c t the same s tudio , the same painter ,

the same canvas to be a r ranged w i t h i n i t a c c o r d i n g to an ident ica l space;

i t c o u l d be the per fec t dup l i ca t ion .

In fact, i t s h o w s us n o t h i n g of w h a t i s represented in the p ic tu re itself.

Its mot ion less g a z e ex tends o u t in f ront o f the p ic ture , in to that necessari ly

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

8

invis ib le r e g i o n w h i c h f o r m s its ex t e r i o r face, to app rehend the f igures

a r r anged in that space. Instead o f s u r r o u n d i n g v is ib le objec ts , this m i r r o r

cuts s t ra ight t h r o u g h the w h o l e f i e l d o f the representat ion, i g n o r i n g all

i t m i g h t app rehend w i t h i n that f i e ld , a n d restores v i s ib i l i ty to that w h i c h

resides outs ide all v i e w . B u t the invis ib i l i ty that i t o v e r c o m e s in this w a y

i s no t t he invis ib i l i ty o f w h a t i s h i d d e n : i t does n o t m a k e its w a y a r o u n d

a n y obstac le , i t is n o t d i s tor t ing a n y pe r spec t ive , i t is address ing i tse l f to

w h a t i s invis ib le b o t h because o f the p ic ture ' s s t ructure and because o f

its ex is tence as pa in t ing . W h a t i t is ref lect ing is that w h i c h all the f igures

w i t h i n the pa in t ing are l o o k i n g a t so f ixed ly , o r a t least those w h o are

l o o k i n g s t ra ight ahead; i t i s therefore w h a t the spec ta tor w o u l d be ab le

t o see i f the pa in t ing e x t e n d e d further f o r w a r d , i f its b o t t o m e d g e w e r e

b r o u g h t l o w e r unt i l i t i nc luded the f igures the pa in ter i s us ing as m o d e l s .

B u t i t i s also, since the p ic tu re does s top there, d i sp lay ing o n l y the pa in te r

a n d his s tud io , w h a t is ex te r io r to the p ic ture , in so far as it is a p i c tu re - in

o the r w o r d s , a rec tangula r f r a g m e n t o f lines and co lour s in tended to r e p ­

resent s o m e t h i n g t o the eyes o f a n y possible spectator . A t the far end o f

the r o o m , i g n o r e d by all, the u n e x p e c t e d m i r r o r holds i n its g l o w the

f igures that the pa in ter is l o o k i n g a t (the pa in ter in his represented , o b ­

j e c t i v e real i ty , the real i ty o f the pa in ter a t his w o r k ) ; b u t also the f igu res

that are l o o k i n g a t the pa in ter (in that mater ia l real i ty w h i c h the lines

and the co lour s h a v e laid o u t u p o n the canvas ) . T h e s e t w o g r o u p s o f

f igu res are b o t h equa l ly inaccessible, b u t in different w a y s : the f i r s t b e ­

cause o f a n effect o f c o m p o s i t i o n pecu l i a r t o the pa in t ing ; the second b e ­

cause o f the l a w that presides o v e r the v e r y exis tence o f all p ic tures i n

genera l . H e r e , the ac t ion o f representat ion consists i n b r i n g i n g o n e o f

these t w o fo rms o f inv is ib i l i ty in to the p lace o f the o ther , i n a n unstable

supe r impos i t ion - and in r ende r ing t h e m b o t h , a t the same m o m e n t , a t

the o the r e x t r e m i t y o f the p ic tu re - a t that p o l e w h i c h i s the v e r y h e i g h t

o f its representa t ion: that o f a reflected d e p t h in the far recess of the

pa in t ing ' s dep th . T h e m i r r o r p r o v i d e s a metathesis o f v i s ib i l i ty that affects

b o t h the space represented in the p ic tu re and its na ture as representa t ion;

i t a l l o w s us to see, in the cent re o f the canvas , w h a t in the pa in t ing i s o f

necessi ty d o u b l y invis ib le .

A s t range ly literal, t h o u g h inve r t ed , app l ica t ion o f the a d v i c e g i v e n ,

so i t i s said, t o his pup i l by the o l d P a c h e r o w h e n the f o r m e r w a s w o r k i n g

in his s tudio in S e v i l l e : ' T h e i m a g e shou ld stand o u t f r o m the f rame . '

L A S M E N I N A S

II

9

B u t perhaps i t i s t i m e to g i v e a n a m e at last to that i m a g e w h i c h appears in

the depths o f the mi r ro r , and w h i c h the painter i s c o n t e m p l a t i n g in f ront

o f the p ic ture . Perhaps i t w o u l d be better , o n c e and for all , t o de t e rmine

the identities of all the f igures presented or indica ted here , so as to a v o i d

e m b r o i l i n g ourse lves fo reve r in those v a g u e , rather abstract des ignat ions ,

so cons tan t ly p r o n e to misunders tand ing and dup l ica t ion , ' the pa in ter ' ,

' the characters ' , ' the m o d e l s ' , ' the specta tors ' , ' the i m a g e s ' . Ra the r than

pursue to inf ini ty a l a n g u a g e inev i t ab ly inadequa te to the v i s ib le fact, i t

w o u l d be be t te r to say that V e l a z q u e z c o m p o s e d a p ic tu re ; that in this

p ic ture he represented himself, in his s tudio or in a r o o m of the Escur ia l ,

i n the act o f pa in t ing t w o f igures w h o m the Infanta M a r g a r i t a has c o m e

there t o w a t c h , toge the r w i t h a n e n t o u r a g e o f duennas , maids o f h o n o u r ,

court iers , and d w a r f s ; that w e can at t r ibute names t o this g r o u p o f p e o p l e

w i t h grea t p rec i s ion : t radi t ion r ecogn izes that here w e h a v e D o n a M a r i a

A g u s t i n a Sa rmien te , o v e r there N i e t o , i n the f o r e g r o u n d N i c o l a s o

Per tusato , a n Italian jes ter . W e c o u l d then add that the t w o personages

se rv ing as m o d e l s to the painter are n o t v is ib le , a t least d i rec t ly ; b u t that

we can see t h e m in a m i r r o r ; and that they are, w i t h o u t a n y d o u b t , K i n g

Phi l ip IV and his w i f e , M a r i a n a .

T h e s e p r o p e r names w o u l d f o r m useful l andmarks and a v o i d a m b i g u o u s

des ignat ions ; t hey w o u l d tell us in a n y case w h a t the pa in ter i s l o o k i n g

at, and the ma jo r i t y o f the characters i n the p ic ture a l o n g w i t h h i m . B u t

the relat ion of l a n g u a g e to pa in t ing is an infinite re la t ion. I t is n o t that

w o r d s are imper fec t , o r that, w h e n conf ron ted b y the v is ib le , t hey p r o v e

insuperably inadequate . N e i t h e r can be r educed to the o ther ' s t e rms : i t

i s i n va in that w e say w h a t w e see; w h a t w e see n e v e r resides i n w h a t w e

say. A n d i t i s i n v a i n that w e a t t emp t t o s h o w , b y the use o f images ,

me taphors , o r similes, w h a t w e are s a y i n g ; the space w h e r e they a c h i e v e

their sp lendour i s n o t that d e p l o y e d by o u r eyes bu t that def ined by the

sequential e lements o f syn tax . A n d the p r o p e r n a m e , i n this par t icular

c o n t e x t , is m e r e l y an art if ice: i t g i v e s us a f inger to p o i n t w i t h , in o the r

w o r d s , to pass surrept i t iously f r o m the space w h e r e o n e speaks to the

space w h e r e o n e l o o k s ; in o ther w o r d s , t o fo ld o n e o v e r the o the r a s

t h o u g h they w e r e equivalents . B u t i f one wi shes t o k e e p the relat ion o f

l anguage to v i s i o n o p e n , i f o n e wi shes to treat their i ncompa t ib i l i t y as a

s tar t ing-point for speech instead of as an obs tac le to be a v o i d e d , so as to

stay as c lose as possible to b o t h , then o n e mus t erase those p r o p e r names

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

and prese rve the inf ini ty o f the task. I t i s perhaps t h r o u g h the m e d i u m of

this g r e y , a n o n y m o u s l a n g u a g e , a l w a y s o v e r - m e t i c u l o u s and repe t i t ive b e ­

cause t o o b road , that the pa in t ing m a y , little by li t t le, release its i l l umina ­

t ions.

W e m u s t therefore p re tend no t t o k n o w w h o i s t o b e reflected i n the

depths o f that mi r ro r , and in te r roga te that ref lect ion in its o w n te rms .

First, i t i s the reverse of the g rea t canvas represented on the left. T h e

reverse , or ra ther the r i gh t side, since i t d isplays in full face w h a t the

canvas , by its pos i t ion , is h i d i n g f r o m us. F u r t h e r m o r e , i t i s b o t h in

oppos i t i on to the w i n d o w a n d a r e in fo rcemen t o f it. L i k e the w i n d o w , i t

p r o v i d e s a g r o u n d w h i c h i s c o m m o n to the pa in t ing and to w h a t lies

outs ide it. B u t the w i n d o w operates b y the c o n t i n u o u s m o v e m e n t o f a n

effusion w h i c h , f lowing f r o m r igh t to left, unites the a t ten t ive f igures , the

painter , a n d the canvas , w i t h the spectacle t hey are o b s e r v i n g ; whe rea s

the m i r r o r , o n the o the r hand , b y m e a n s o f a v i o l e n t , instantaneous m o v e ­

m e n t , a m o v e m e n t o f p u r e surprise, leaps o u t f r o m the p ic tu re in o rde r

to r each that w h i c h i s o b s e r v e d y e t invis ible in f ront o f it, and then, a t

the far end of its f ict i t ious dep th , to render i t v i s ib le y e t indifferent to e v e r y

g a z e . T h e c o m p e l l i n g tracer l ine, j o i n i n g the reflection t o that w h i c h i t

i s ref lect ing, cuts pe rpend icu l a r ly t h r o u g h the lateral f lood of l igh t . Las t ly -

and this is the m i r r o r ' s th i rd funct ion - i t stands adjacent to a d o o r w a y

w h i c h fo rms an o p e n i n g , l ike the m i r r o r itself, i n the far w a l l o f the r o o m .

T h i s d o o r w a y t o o fo rms a b r i g h t and sharply def ined rec tang le w h o s e soft

l i gh t does no t shine t h r o u g h in to the r o o m . I t w o u l d be n o t h i n g b u t a

g i l d e d panel i f i t w e r e n o t recessed o u t f r o m the r o o m b y means o f o n e

l e a f o f a c a r v e d d o o r , the c u r v e o f a cur ta in , and the s h a d o w s o f several

steps. B e y o n d the steps, a co r r i do r beg ins ; b u t instead of los ing i tself in

obscur i ty , i t i s dissipated in a y e l l o w dazz le w h e r e the l i gh t , w i t h o u t c o m ­

i n g in, w h i r l s a r o u n d on i tself in d y n a m i c repose. A g a i n s t this b a c k g r o u n d ,

a t o n c e near and limitless, a m a n stands o u t in fu l l - l eng th s i lhouet te ; he

i s seen in p rof i l e ; w i t h o n e hand he i s h o l d i n g b a c k the w e i g h t o f a

cur ta in ; his feet are p laced on different steps; o n e k n e e i s ben t . He m a y

b e a b o u t t o enter the r o o m ; o r h e m a y b e m e r e l y o b s e r v i n g w h a t i s

g o i n g on inside it, con ten t to surprise those w i t h i n w i t h o u t b e i n g seen h i m ­

self. L i k e the mi r ro r , his eyes are d i rec ted t o w a r d s the o the r side of the

scene; no r i s a n y o n e p a y i n g any m o r e a t tent ion to h i m than to the m i r r o r .

W e d o n o t k n o w w h e r e h e has c o m e f r o m : i t c o u l d b e that b y f o l l o w i n g

uncer ta in co r r idors h e has j u s t m a d e his w a y a r o u n d the outs ide o f the

r o o m in w h i c h these characters are co l lec ted and the painter i s a t w o r k ;

10

L A S M E N I N A S

perhaps he t o o , a short w h i l e a g o , w a s there in the foref ront o f the scene,

in the invis ib le r e g i o n still b e i n g c o n t e m p l a t e d by all those eyes in the p i c ­

ture. L i k e the images pe r ce ived in the l o o k i n g - g l a s s , i t i s poss ible that he

t o o is an emissary f r o m that ev iden t y e t h idden space. E v e n so, there is a

difference: he is there in f lesh and b l o o d ; he has appeared f r o m the outs ide ,

on the threshold of the area represented; he is indubi tab le - n o t a p r o b a b l e

reflection bu t a n i r rupt ion . T h e mi r ro r , b y m a k i n g v is ib le , b e y o n d e v e n

the wa l l s o f the s tudio itself, w h a t i s h a p p e n i n g in f ront o f the p ic tu re ,

creates, in its sagittal d imens ion , an osci l la t ion b e t w e e n the inter ior and

the ex te r io r . O n e foo t o n l y o n the l o w e r step, his b o d y ent i re ly i n p r o ­

file, the a m b i g u o u s v is i tor i s c o m i n g in and g o i n g o u t a t the same t ime ,

l ike a p e n d u l u m c a u g h t a t the b o t t o m o f its s w i n g . He repeats on the

spot , bu t i n the dark real i ty o f his b o d y , the instantaneous m o v e m e n t o f

those images f l a sh ing across the r o o m , p l u n g i n g in to the mi r ro r , b e i n g

reflected there, and sp r ing ing o u t f r o m i t aga in l ike v i s ib le , n e w , and

identical species. Pale , minuscu le , those s i lhouet ted f igures in the m i r r o r

are cha l l enged by the tall, sol id stature o f the m a n appea r ing in the d o o r w a y .

B u t w e m u s t m o v e d o w n aga in f r o m the b a c k o f the p ic tu re t o w a r d s

the f ront o f the s tage; w e mus t l eave that p e r i p h e r y w h o s e v o l u t e w e h a v e

jus t been f o l l o w i n g . S tar t ing f r o m the painter ' s g a z e , w h i c h const i tutes

an off-centre cent re to the left, we p e r c e i v e first o f all the b a c k o f the

canvas , then the pa in t ings h u n g on the w a l l , w i t h the m i r r o r in their

centre , then the o p e n d o o r w a y , then m o r e pic tures , o f w h i c h , because o f

the sharpness o f the perspec t ive , w e can see n o m o r e than the edges o f

the frames, and f inal ly , a t the e x t r e m e r igh t , the w i n d o w , or ra ther the

g r o o v e in the w a l l f r o m w h i c h the l i gh t i s p o u r i n g . T h i s spiral shell

presents us w i t h the entire c y c l e o f representa t ion: the g a z e , the palet te

and brush, the canvas i nnocen t o f signs (these are the mater ia l too ls o f

representat ion) , the pa in t ings , the reflections, the real m a n (the c o m p l e t e d

representat ion, bu t as i t w e r e freed f r o m its i l lusory or t ruthful contents ,

w h i c h are j u x t a p o s e d t o i t ) ; then the representat ion dissolves aga in : we

can see o n l y the frames, and the l igh t that is f looding the pictures f r o m

outside, bu t that they , in return, m u s t reconst i tute in their o w n k i n d ,

a s t h o u g h i t w e r e c o m i n g f r o m e l sewhere , passing t h r o u g h their da rk

w o o d e n f rames . A n d w e d o , i n fact, see this l i gh t o n the pa in t ing , a p ­

parent ly w e l l i n g ou t f r o m the c rack o f the f r ame ; and f r o m there i t m o v e s

o v e r t o t o u c h the b r o w , the cheekbones , the eyes , the g a z e o f the painter ,

w h o is h o l d i n g a palet te in o n e hand and in the o ther a f ine brush . . .

A n d so the spiral i s c losed, or rather, by means of that l igh t , i s o p e n e d .

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

T h i s o p e n i n g i s no t , l ike the o n e in the b a c k w a l l , m a d e by pu l l i ng

b a c k a d o o r ; i t i s the w h o l e b read th of the p ic tu re itself, and the l o o k s that

pass across i t are no t those of a distant v is i tor . T h e fr ieze that occup ies

the f o r e g r o u n d and the m i d d l e g r o u n d o f the p ic ture represents - i f

we inc lude the pa in ter - e i gh t characters . F i v e o f these, their heads m o r e

or less bent , tu rned or incl ined, are l o o k i n g straight o u t a t r igh t angles

t o the surface o f the p ic ture . T h e cent re o f the g r o u p i s o c c u p i e d b y the

little Infanta, w i t h her f la red p i n k and g r e y dress. T h e princess i s t u rn ing

her head t o w a r d s the r igh t side o f the p ic ture , w h i l e her torso and the

b i g panniers o f her dress slant a w a y s l ight ly t o w a r d s the left; bu t her g a z e

i s d i rec ted abso lu te ly s traight t o w a r d s the spec ta tor s tanding in f ront of

the pa in t ing . A ver t ica l l ine d i v i d i n g the canvas in to t w o equal ha lves

w o u l d pass b e t w e e n the ch i ld ' s eyes . H e r face i s a thi rd of the total h e i g h t

o f the p ic tu re a b o v e the l o w e r f rame. S o that here , b e y o n d all ques t ion ,

resides the pr incipal t h e m e o f the c o m p o s i t i o n ; this i s the v e r y ob jec t o f

this pa in t ing . As t h o u g h to p r o v e this and to emphas i ze i t e v e n m o r e ,

V e l a z q u e z has m a d e use of a t radi t ional visual d e v i c e : bes ide the pr inc ipa l

f igu re he has p laced a secondary o n e , k n e e l i n g and l o o k i n g in t o w a r d s the

central one . L i k e a d o n o r in p raye r , l ike an ange l g r ee t i ng the V i r g i n , a

m a i d o f h o n o u r on her knees i s s t re tching o u t her hands t o w a r d s the

princess. H e r face stands o u t in perfect prof i le against the b a c k g r o u n d .

I t is a t the same h e i g h t as that of the ch i ld . T h i s a t tendant is l o o k i n g at

the princess and o n l y at the princess. A li t t le to the r igh t , there stands

ano ther m a i d o f h o n o u r , also tu rned t o w a r d s the Infanta, leaning s l ight ly

o v e r her , b u t w i t h her eyes c lear ly d i rec ted t o w a r d s the front , t o w a r d s the

same spot a l ready b e i n g g a z e d a t by the painter and the princess. Las t ly ,

t w o o the r g r o u p s m a d e u p o f t w o f igures each : o n e o f these g r o u p s i s

further a w a y ; the o ther , m a d e u p o f the t w o dwar f s , i s r igh t i n the fo re ­

g r o u n d . O n e character i n each o f these pairs i s l o o k i n g straight ou t , the

o the r to the left o r the r igh t . B e c a u s e of their posi t ions and their size,

these t w o g r o u p s co r r e spond and themse lves f o r m a pa i r : beh ind , the

court iers (the w o m a n , to the left, l o o k s to the r i g h t ) ; in front , the dwar f s

(the b o y , w h o i s a t the e x t r e m e r igh t , l o o k s in t o w a r d s the centre o f the

p ic tu re ) . T h i s g r o u p o f characters , a r ranged i n this manne r , can b e t aken

to const i tu te , a c c o r d i n g to the w a y o n e l o o k s a t the p ic tu re and the cent re

o f reference chosen , t w o different f igures . T h e first w o u l d b e a la rge X :

the t o p lef t -hand po in t o f this X w o u l d be the painter 's e y e s ; the t o p

r i gh t -hand o n e , the m a l e cour t ie r ' s eyes ; a t the b o t t o m lef t-hand co rne r

there i s the c o r n e r of the canvas represented w i t h its back t o w a r d s us (or,

L A S M E N I N A S

m o r e e x a c t l y , the foo t o f the easel) ; a t the b o t t o m r igh t -hand corner ,

the d w a r f (his foo t o n the d o g ' s b a c k ) . W h e r e these t w o lines intersect ,

a t the centre o f the X , are the eyes o f the Infanta. T h e second f igure w o u l d

be m o r e that o f a vas t c u r v e , its t w o ends de t e rmined by the pa in ter on the

left and the m a l e cour t i e r on the r i gh t - b o t h these ex t remi t ies o c c u r r i n g

h i g h up in the p ic tu re and set b a c k f r o m its surface; the cent re of the c u r v e ,

m u c h nearer t o us, w o u l d c o i n c i d e w i t h the princess 's face and the l o o k

her m a i d o f h o n o u r i s d i rec t ing t o w a r d s her . T h i s c u r v e describes a

s h a l l o w h o l l o w across the centre o f the p ic tu re w h i c h a t o n c e conta ins and

sets o f f the pos i t ion o f the m i r r o r a t the b a c k .

T h e r e are thus t w o centres a r o u n d w h i c h the p ic tu re m a y b e o r g a n i z e d ,

a c c o r d i n g t o w h e t h e r the f lut ter ing a t tent ion o f the specta tor dec ides t o

settle in this p l ace or in that. T h e princess is s tanding u p r i g h t in the centre

o f a S t A n d r e w ' s cross, w h i c h i s r e v o l v i n g a r o u n d her w i t h its eddies

o f cour t iers , ma ids o f h o n o u r , an imals , and fools . B u t this p i v o t i n g m o v e ­

m e n t i s f rozen . F rozen by a spectacle that w o u l d be abso lu te ly invis ib le

i f those same characters , sudden ly mot ion less , w e r e n o t offer ing us, as

t h o u g h in the h o l l o w of a g o b l e t , the possibi l i ty o f see ing in the depths o f a

m i r r o r the unforeseen d o u b l e o f w h a t t hey are o b s e r v i n g . In dep th , i t i s

the princess w h o is super imposed on the mi r ro r ; ve r t i ca l ly , i t i s the r e ­

f l ec t ion that i s super imposed on the face. B u t , because o f the perspec t ive ,

t hey are v e r y close t o o n e another . M o r e o v e r , f r o m each o f t h e m there

spr ings an ine luc table l ine : the l ine issuing f r o m the m i r r o r crosses the

w h o l e o f the dep th represented (and e v e n m o r e , since the m i r r o r fo rms a

ho le in the b a c k w a l l and br ings a further space in to b e i n g beh ind i t ) ;

the o the r l ine i s shor ter : i t c o m e s f r o m the chi ld ' s eyes and crosses o n l y

the f o r e g r o u n d . T h e s e t w o sagittal lines c o n v e r g e a t a v e r y sharp ang le ,

and the p o i n t w h e r e they mee t , sp r ing ing ou t f r o m d i e pa in ted surface,

occurs in f ront o f the p ic ture , m o r e o r less e x a c t l y a t the spot f r o m w h i c h

we are o b s e r v i n g it. I t i s an uncer ta in po in t because we canno t see it; y e t

i t is an inev i tab le and per fec t ly def ined po in t t o o , since i t is d e t e r m i n e d

b y those t w o d o m i n a t i n g f igures and c o n f i r m e d further b y other , adjacent

do t t ed lines w h i c h also h a v e their o r i g in inside the p ic tu re and e m e r g e

f r o m it in a s imilar fashion.

W h a t i s there, then, we ask a t last, in that p lace w h i c h i s c o m p l e t e l y

inaccessible because i t is ex te r io r to the p ic ture , y e t is prescr ibed by all the

lines of its c o m p o s i t i o n ? W h a t i s the spectacle, w h a t are the faces that are

reflected first o f all in the depths of the Infanta's eyes , then in the cour t ie r s '

and the painter ' s , and f inal ly i n the distant g l o w o f the mi r ro r? B u t the

13

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

14

ques t ion i m m e d i a t e l y b e c o m e s a d o u b l e o n e : the face reflected in the

m i r r o r is also the face that i s c o n t e m p l a t i n g i t ; w h a t all the f igures in the

p i c tu re are l o o k i n g a t are the t w o f i g u r e s t o w h o s e eyes t h e y t o o present

a scene to be o b s e r v e d . T h e ent ire p ic tu re is l o o k i n g o u t a t a scene fo r

w h i c h i t i s i tself a scene. A c o n d i t i o n of p u r e r ec ip roc i ty manifes ted by the

o b s e r v i n g and o b s e r v e d m i r r o r , the t w o stages o f w h i c h are u n c o u p l e d a t

the t w o l o w e r corners o f the p ic tu re : o n the left the canvas w i t h its b a c k

t o us, b y m e a n s o f w h i c h the ex te r io r p o i n t i s m a d e in to pu re spectacle ;

t o the r i gh t the d o g l y i n g o n the f l o o r , the o n l y e l e m e n t i n the p i c tu re

that i s nei ther l o o k i n g a t a n y t h i n g n o r m o v i n g , because i t i s n o t in tended ,

w i t h its deep reliefs a n d the l i gh t p l a y i n g on its s i l ky hair , to be a n y t h i n g

b u t an ob jec t t o be seen.

O u r f i rs t g l a n c e a t the pa in t i ng t o l d us w h a t i t i s that creates this

spec tac le -as -observa t ion . I t i s the t w o sove re igns . O n e can sense their

p resence a l ready in the respectful g a z e o f the f igu res in the p ic tu re , i n the

as ton i shment o f the ch i ld a n d the dwar f s . W e r e c o g n i z e t h e m , a t the far

end o f the p ic tu re , i n the t w o t iny si lhouettes g l e a m i n g o u t f r o m the

l o o k i n g - g l a s s . In the mids t o f all those a t ten t ive faces, all those r i ch ly

dressed bod ies , t h e y are the palest , the m o s t unrea l , the m o s t c o m p r o m i s e d

of all the pa in t ing ' s i m a g e s : a m o v e m e n t , a little l igh t , w o u l d be sufficient

t o ecl ipse t h e m . Of all these f igures represented be fo re us, t h e y are also

the m o s t i g n o r e d , since no o n e i s p a y i n g the sl ightest a t tent ion to that

ref lect ion w h i c h has s l ipped in to the r o o m beh ind t h e m all, s i lent ly

o c c u p y i n g its unsuspec ted space; in so far as t h e y are v i s ib le , t h e y are

the frailest a n d the m o s t distant f o r m of all rea l i ty . Inverse ly , in so far as

t hey stand ou ts ide the p ic tu re and are therefore w i t h d r a w n f r o m i t in

an essential invis ib i l i ty , t h e y p r o v i d e the cent re a r o u n d w h i c h the ent i re

representa t ion is o r d e r e d : i t i s t hey w h o are b e i n g faced, i t i s t o w a r d s

t h e m that e v e r y o n e is tu rned , i t i s to their eyes that the princess is b e i n g

presented in her h o l i d a y c lo thes ; f r o m the canvas w i t h its b a c k to us to

the Infanta, and f r o m the Infanta t o the d w a r f p l a y i n g on the e x t r e m e

r igh t , there runs a c u r v e (or aga in , the l o w e r fo rk of the X opens) that

orders the w h o l e a r r a n g e m e n t o f the p ic tu re t o their g a z e and thus m a k e s

apparen t the t rue centre o f the c o m p o s i t i o n , t o w h i c h the Infanta's g a z e

a n d the i m a g e in the m i r r o r are b o t h f ina l ly subject .

In the r e a l m o f the anecdo te , this cent re i s s y m b o l i c a l l y s o v e r e i g n ,

s ince i t i s o c c u p i e d by K i n g Ph i l ip IV and his w i f e . B u t i t i s so a b o v e all

because of the t r iple func t ion i t fulfils in re la t ion to the p ic tu re . Fo r in i t

there occu r s an e x a c t supe r impos i t ion of the m o d e l ' s g a z e as i t i s b e i n g

L A S M E N I N A S

pain ted , o f the specta tor ' s a s h e con templa t e s the pa in t i ng , a n d o f the

painter ' s as he i s c o m p o s i n g his p i c tu re (not the o n e represented, b u t the

o n e i n f ront o f u s w h i c h w e are d iscuss ing) . T h e s e three ' o b s e r v i n g '

funct ions c o m e toge the r in a p o i n t ex t e r i o r to the p i c tu re : that is, an ideal

p o i n t in re la t ion to w h a t i s represented, b u t a pe r fec t ly real o n e t o o , s ince

i t i s also the s ta r t ing-poin t that m a k e s the representa t ion poss ible . W i t h i n

that real i ty itself, i t c a n n o t n o t be invis ib le . A n d y e t , that rea l i ty i s p r o ­

j e c t e d w i t h i n the p ic tu re - p ro jec t ed and diffracted in three f o r m s w h i c h

c o r r e s p o n d to the three funct ions o f that ideal and real po in t . T h e y are :

on the left, the pa in ter w i t h his pa le t te in his hand (a self-portrai t o f

V e l a z q u e z ) ; t o the r igh t , the v is i tor , o n e f o o t on the step, r eady to enter

the r o o m ; he i s t a k i n g in the scene f r o m the b a c k , b u t he can see the r o y a l

c o u p l e , w h o are the spectacle itself, f r o m the f ront ; and last ly , in the

cent re , the ref lect ion o f the k i n g and the queen , r i c h l y dressed, mo t ion le s s ,

i n the a t t i tude o f pa t ien t m o d e l s .

A ref lect ion that s h o w s us qu i te s i m p l y , a n d in s h a d o w , w h a t all those

in the f o r e g r o u n d are l o o k i n g at. I t restores, as i f by m a g i c , w h a t i s l a c k ­

i n g in e v e r y g a z e : i n the painter ' s , the m o d e l , w h i c h his represented d o u b l e

i s dup l i ca t ing o v e r there in the p i c tu r e ; in the k i n g ' s , his por t ra i t , w h i c h

i s b e i n g finished o f f on that s lope o f the canvas that he c a n n o t p e r c e i v e

f r o m w h e r e he stands; i n that o f the spectator , the real cen t re o f the scene,

w h o s e p lace h e h i m s e l f has t aken a s t h o u g h b y usurpa t ion . B u t perhaps

this gene ros i ty on the par t of the m i r r o r i s f e igned ; perhaps i t i s h i d i n g

as m u c h as and e v e n m o r e than i t reveals . T h a t space w h e r e the k i n g and

his w i f e h o l d s w a y b e l o n g s equa l l y w e l l t o the artist a n d to the spec ta tor :

in the depths o f the m i r r o r there c o u l d also appear - there o u g h t to appear

- the a n o n y m o u s face o f the passer -by and that o f V e l a z q u e z . F o r the

func t ion o f that ref lect ion i s t o d r a w in to the in ter ior o f the p i c t u r e w h a t

i s i n t ima te ly fo r e ign to i t : the g a z e w h i c h has o r g a n i z e d i t and the g a z e

for w h i c h i t i s d i sp layed . B u t because t hey are present w i t h i n the p ic tu re ,

to the r i gh t a n d to the left, the artist and the v i s i to r c a n n o t be g i v e n a

p lace in the m i r r o r : j u s t a s the k i n g appears in the depths o f the l o o k i n g -

glass prec ise ly because he does n o t b e l o n g to the p ic tu re .

In the g rea t v o l u t e that runs a r o u n d the pe r ime te r o f the s tudio , f r o m the

g a z e o f the painter , w i t h his mot ion les s h a n d and palet te , r i gh t r o u n d t o

the f inished pa in t ings , representat ion c a m e in to b e i n g , r eached c o m p l e t i o n ,

o n l y t o d isso lve o n c e m o r e in to the l i gh t ; the c y c l e w a s c o m p l e t e . T h e

lines that run t h r o u g h the dep th o f the p ic tu re , on the o the r hand , are

n o t c o m p l e t e ; t hey all l ack a s e g m e n t o f their trajectories. T h i s g a p i s

15

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

1 6

caused by the absence of the k ing - an absence that is an artifice on the

par t of the painter . B u t this artifice b o t h conceals and indicates ano the r

vacancy w h i c h is, on the con t ra ry , i m m e d i a t e : tha t o f the painter and the

spectator w h e n they arc look ing a t o r c o m p o s i n g the p ic ture . I t m a y be

that , in this p ic ture , as in all the representat ions of w h i c h it is, as it w e r e ,

the manifest essence, the p r o f o u n d invisibility of w h a t o n e sees is in ­

separable f rom the invisibility of the person seeing - despite all mi r ro r s ,

reflections, imitat ions, and por t ra i t s . A r o u n d the scene are a r ranged all

the signs and successive forms of representa t ion; b u t the d o u b l e relat ion

of the representat ion to its m o d e l and to its sovereign, to its au tho r as

well as to the person to w h o m it is be ing offered, this relat ion is neces­

sarily in te r rup ted . I t can neve r be present w i t h o u t some res iduum, even

in a representat ion that offers itself as a spectacle. In the d e p t h that traverses

the pic ture , h o l l o w i n g it in to a fictitious recess and pro jec t ing it f o rward

in front of itself, i t is n o t possible for the p u r e felicity of the i m a g e ever

to present in a full l ight b o t h the master w h o is represent ing and the

sovere ign w h o is be ing represented.

Perhaps there exists, in this pa in t ing by Velazquez , the representa t ion

as i t were , of Classical representat ion, and the definition of the space i t

opens up to us. A n d , indeed, representat ion under takes to represent itself

here in all its e lements , w i t h its images, the eyes to w h i c h it is offered,

the faces i t makes visible, t he gestures that call i t in to be ing . B u t there ,

in the mids t of this dispersion w h i c h i t is s imul taneously g r o u p i n g t o ­

ge ther and spreading ou t before us, indicated compel l ing ly f rom every

side, is an essential vo id : the necessary disappearance of that w h i c h is its

founda t ion - of the person i t resembles and the person in whose eyes i t

is on ly a resemblance. This ve ry subject - w h i c h is the same - has been

elided. A n d representat ion, freed finally f rom the relat ion that was i m ­

ped ing it, can offer itself as representat ion in its p u r e fo rm.

C H A P T E R 2

The Prose of the World

I T H E F O U R S I M I L I T U D E S

Up to the end o f the s ix teenth cen tu ry , r esemblance p l a y e d a cons t ruc t ive

role in the k n o w l e d g e o f W e s t e r n cu l ture . I t w a s resemblance that l a rge ly

g u i d e d exeges is and the interpreta t ion o f tex ts ; i t w a s resemblance that

o rgan i zed the p l a y o f s y m b o l s , m a d e possible k n o w l e d g e o f th ings v is ib le

and invis ible , and con t ro l l ed the art o f represent ing t h e m . T h e universe

w a s fo lded in u p o n itself: the earth e c h o i n g the s k y , faces seeing t h e m ­

selves reflected in the stars, and plants h o l d i n g w i t h i n their s tems the

secrets that w e r e o f use t o m a n . Pa in t i ng imi ta ted space. A n d representa­

t ion - w h e t h e r in the service o f pleasure o r o f k n o w l e d g e - w a s pos i ted

as a f o r m of repe t i t ion : the theatre o f life o r the m i r r o r o f nature, that w a s

the c l a i m m a d e by all l anguage , its m a n n e r o f dec la r ing its ex is tence and

o f f o r m u l a t i n g its r i gh t o f speech.

We m u s t pause here for a w h i l e , a t this m o m e n t i n t ime w h e n r e s e m ­

blance w a s a b o u t to re l inquish its re lat ion w i t h k n o w l e d g e and disappear ,

i n par t a t least, f r o m the sphere o f c o g n i t i o n . H o w , a t the end o f the

s ixteenth cen tu ry , and e v e n in the ea r ly seven teen th cen tu ry , w a s s imi l i ­

tude c o n c e i v e d ? H o w d id i t o r g a n i z e the f igures o f k n o w l e d g e ? A n d i f

the th ings that r e sembled o n e ano the r w e r e indeed infinite in n u m b e r ,

can one , a t least, establish the fo rms a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h t hey m i g h t

resemble o n e another?

T h e semant ic w e b o f r e semblance i n the s ix teenth c e n t u r y i s e x t r e m e l y

r ich: Amicitia, Aequalitas (contractus, consensus, matrimonium, societas, pax,

et similia), Consonantia, Concertus, Continuum, Paritas, Proportio, Similitudo,

Conjunctio, Copula[i]. A n d there are a g rea t m a n y o the r no t ions that

intersect, o v e r l a p , re inforce , o r l imi t o n e ano ther on the surface o f t h o u g h t .

I t i s e n o u g h for the m o m e n t to indicate the pr incipal f igures that de te r ­

m i n e the k n o w l e d g e o f r e semblance w i t h their ar t iculat ions. T h e r e are

four o f these that are, b e y o n d d o u b t , essential.

17

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

First o f all , convenientia. T h i s w o r d real ly denotes the ad jacency o f

places m o r e s t r o n g l y than i t does s imi l i tude . T h o s e things are ' c o n v e n i e n t '

w h i c h c o m e sufficiently c lose t o o n e ano the r t o be i n j u x t a p o s i t i o n ; their

edges t o u c h , their fr inges i n t e rming l e , the e x t r e m i t y o f the o n e also d e ­

notes the b e g i n n i n g o f the o ther . I n this w a y , m o v e m e n t , influences,

passions, and proper t ies t o o , are c o m m u n i c a t e d . So that in this h i n g e

b e t w e e n t w o th ings a r e semblance appears. A resemblance that b e c o m e s

d o u b l e as s o o n as o n e a t tempts to un rave l it : a r esemblance of the p lace ,

the site u p o n w h i c h nature has p laced the t w o th ings , and thus a s imi l i tude

of proper t ies ; for in this natural conta iner , the w o r l d , ad jacency i s n o t an

ex t e r i o r re lat ion b e t w e e n th ings , b u t the s ign of a relat ionship, obscure

t h o u g h i t m a y be . A n d then, f r o m this contac t , b y e x c h a n g e , there arise

n e w resemblances ; a c o m m o n r e g i m e n b e c o m e s necessary; u p o n the s imi ­

l i tude that w a s the h i d d e n reason for their p r o p i n q u i t y is supe r imposed

a r e semblance that i s the v is ib le effect of that p r o x i m i t y . B o d y and soul ,

for e x a m p l e , are d o u b l y ' c o n v e n i e n t ' : the sou l had to be m a d e dense,

h e a v y , and terrestrial for G o d to p lace i t i n the v e r y hear t o f ma t t e r .

B u t t h r o u g h this p r o p i n q u i t y , the soul rece ives the m o v e m e n t s o f the b o d y

and assimilates i tself to that b o d y , w h i l e ' the b o d y i s al tered and co r rup t ed

by the passions o f the soul '[2]. I n the vas t s y n t a x o f the w o r l d , the differ­

ent be ings adjust themse lves to o n e another ; the p lan t c o m m u n i c a t e s w i t h

the an imal , the ear th w i t h the sea, m a n w i t h e v e r y t h i n g a r o u n d h i m .

R e s e m b l a n c e imposes adjacencies that in their turn guaran tee further r e ­

semblances . P l ace and s imi l i tude b e c o m e en tang led : w e see mosses g r o w ­

i n g on the outs ides o f shells, plants in the antlers o f stags, a sort o f grass

o n the faces o f m e n ; and the s t range z o o p h y t e , b y m i n g l i n g t o g e t h e r

the proper t ies that m a k e i t s imilar to the plants as w e l l as to the animals ,

also j u x t a p o s e s t h e m [3] . A l l s o m a n y signs o f ' c o n v e n i e n c e ' .

Convenientia is a r e semblance c o n n e c t e d w i t h space in the f o r m of a

g radua ted scale o f p r o x i m i t y . I t i s o f the same o rde r as con junc t ion and

adjus tment . T h i s i s w h y i t pertains less to the th ings themselves than to the

w o r l d i n w h i c h t hey exis t . T h e w o r l d i s s i m p l y the universa l ' c o n v e n i e n c e '

o f th ings ; there are the s a m e n u m b e r o f fishes in the w a t e r a s there are

animals , o r objects p r o d u c e d by na tu re o r m a n , on the l and (are there

n o t fishes ca l led Episcopus, o thers ca l led Catena, and others ca l led Priapus?);

the s a m e n u m b e r o f be ings i n the w a t e r and o n the surface o f the earth

a s there are in the s k y , the inhabitants o f the f o r m e r c o r r e s p o n d i n g w i t h

those o f the latter; and last ly, there are the same n u m b e r o f be ings in the

w h o l e o f c rea t ion a s m a y b e f o u n d e m i n e n t l y con ta ined i n G o d himself ,

18

T H E P R O S E O F T H E W O R L D

' the S o w e r o f Ex i s t ence , o f P o w e r , o f K n o w l e d g e and o f L o v e ' [ 4 ] . T h u s ,

by this l i n k i n g o f r e semblance w i t h space, this ' c o n v e n i e n c e ' that b r ings l ike

th ings t oge the r and m a k e s adjacent th ings s imilar , the w o r l d i s l i nked t o ­

ge the r l ike a cha in . At each p o i n t o f con t ac t there b e g i n s a n d ends a l ink

that resembles the o n e be fo re i t and the o n e after it; and f r o m c i rc le to

c i rc le , these s imil i tudes con t inue , h o l d i n g the ex t r emes apart ( G o d and

mat te r ) , y e t b r i n g i n g t h e m toge the r i n such a w a y that the w i l l o f the

A l m i g h t y m a y penetra te in to the m o s t u n a w a k e n e d corners . I t i s this

i m m e n s e , taut, and v i b r a t i n g cha in , this r o p e o f ' c o n v e n i e n c e ' , that P o r t a

e v o k e s in a passage f r o m his Magie naturelle:

As w i t h respect to its v e g e t a t i o n the p lan t stands c o n v e n i e n t to the

b ru te beast, so t h r o u g h fee l ing does the bru t i sh an ima l to m a n , w h o i s

c o n f o r m a b l e to the rest o f the stars by his in te l l igence ; these l inks p r o ­

c e e d so str ict ly that t h e y appear as a r o p e s t retched f r o m the first cause

as far as the l o w e s t and smallest of th ings , by a rec iproca l and c o n t i n u ­

ous c o n n e c t i o n ; in such w i s e that the super ior v i r t ue , spread ing its

b e a m s , reaches s o far that i f w e t o u c h o n e e x t r e m i t y o f that c o r d i t w i l l

m a k e t r e m b l e and m o v e all the res t [ s ] .

T h e second f o r m of s imi l i tude is aemulatio: a sort o f ' c o n v e n i e n c e ' that

has been freed f r o m the l a w o f p lace and i s ab le to func t ion , w i t h o u t

m o t i o n , f r o m a distance. R a t h e r as t h o u g h the spatial co l lus ion of con-

venientia had been b r o k e n , so that the l inks o f the chain , no l o n g e r c o n ­

nected , r e p r o d u c e d their circles a t a distance f r o m one ano the r in a c c o r d ­

ance w i t h a r e semblance that needs no con tac t . T h e r e is s o m e t h i n g in

emu la t i on of the ref lect ion and the m i r r o r : i t i s the means w h e r e b y th ings

scattered t h r o u g h the un iverse can a n s w e r o n e another . T h e h u m a n face,

f r o m afar, emula tes the s k y , and j u s t as m a n ' s intel lect is an imper f ec t r e ­

f l e c t i o n o f G o d ' s w i s d o m , s o his t w o eyes , w i t h their l imi t ed br ightness ,

are a ref lect ion of the vas t i l lumina t ion spread across the s k y by sun and

m o o n ; the m o u t h i s V e n u s , since i t g i v e s passage to kisses and w o r d s o f

l o v e ; the nose p r o v i d e s a n i m a g e i n min ia ture o f J o v e ' s sceptre and M e r ­

cu ry ' s staff[6]. T h e re la t ion o f emu la t i on enables th ings t o imi ta te o n e

another f r o m o n e end o f the un iverse t o the o the r w i t h o u t c o n n e c t i o n o r

p r o x i m i t y : by dup l ica t ing i tself in a m i r r o r the w o r l d abolishes the d i s ­

tance p r o p e r to it; in this w a y i t o v e r c o m e s the p lace a l lo ted to each t h i n g .

B u t w h i c h o f these reflections cou r s ing t h r o u g h space are the o r ig ina l

images? W h i c h i s the real i ty and w h i c h the p ro jec t ion? I t i s of ten n o t

possible to say, for e m u l a t i o n is a sort of natural t w i n s h i p ex is t ing in

19

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

t h ings ; i t arises f r o m a fo ld in b e i n g , the t w o sides o f w h i c h stand i m ­

med ia t e ly oppos i t e to o n e another . Paracelsus c o m p a r e s this fundamenta l

dup l i ca t ion o f the w o r l d t o the i m a g e o f t w o t w i n s ' w h o resemble o n e

ano the r c o m p l e t e l y , w i t h o u t its b e i n g poss ible for a n y o n e t o say w h i c h o f

t h e m b r o u g h t its s imi l i tude to the o ther ' [7] .

H o w e v e r , e m u l a t i o n does no t l eave the t w o reflected f igures i t has

con f ron ted i n a m e r e l y inert state o f oppos i t ion . O n e m a y be w e a k e r , and

therefore r ecep t ive to the s t ronger influence o f the o ther , w h i c h i s thus

reflected in his pass ive m i r r o r . A r e n o t the stars, for e x a m p l e , d o m i n a n t

o v e r the plants o f the ear th , o f w h i c h t hey are the u n c h a n g e d m o d e l ,

the unal terable f o r m , a n d o v e r w h i c h t hey h a v e been secret ly e m p o w e r e d

to p o u r the w h o l e d y n a s t y o f their influences? T h e da rk ear th i s the

m i r r o r o f the s t a r - sown s k y , bu t the t w o rivals are nei ther o f equal v a l u e

n o r o f equa l d i g n i t y i n that t ou rnamen t . T h e b r i g h t co lour s o f the f l o w e r s

r e p r o d u c e , w i t h o u t v i o l e n c e , the p u r e f o r m o f the sky . A s C r o l l i u s says:

T h e stars are the m a t r i x o f all the plants and e v e r y star in the s k y i s o n l y

the spiritual p re f igura t ion of a p lant , such that i t represents that plant ,

and j u s t as each he rb or p lan t is a terrestrial star l o o k i n g up at the s k y ,

so also each star is a celestial p lan t in spiritual f o r m , w h i c h differs f r o m

the terrestrial plants in ma t t e r a l o n e . . . , the celestial plants and herbs

are tu rned t o w a r d s the ear th and l o o k d i rec t ly d o w n u p o n the plants

t hey h a v e p rocrea ted , i m b u i n g t h e m w i t h s o m e par t icular vir tue[8].

B u t the lists m a y r ema in o p e n , and the un t roub l ed m i r r o r reflect o n l y

the i m a g e o f ' t w o w r a t h f u l soldiers ' . S imi l i t ude then b e c o m e s the c o m b a t

o f o n e f o r m against ano the r - o r rather o f o n e and the same f o r m separ­

ated f r o m i tself b y the w e i g h t o f mat te r o r distance i n space. M a n a s

Paracelsus describes h i m is, l ike the f i rmamen t , ' conste l la ted w i t h stars' ,

b u t he i s n o t b o u n d to i t l ike ' the t h i e f to his g a l l e y - o a r , the m u r d e r e r

to the w h e e l , the fish to the f isherman, the q u a r r y to the hun t sman ' . I t

pertains t o the f i r m a m e n t o f m a n t o b e 'free and p o w e r f u l ' , t o ' b o w t o

n o o rder ' , and ' n o t t o b e ru led b y a n y o d i e r c rea ted be ings ' . His inner s k y

m a y r ema in a u t o n o m o u s and depend o n l y u p o n itself, bu t o n c o n d i t i o n

that b y means o f his w i s d o m , w h i c h i s also k n o w l e d g e , h e c o m e s t o r e ­

s e m b l e the o rde r o f the w o r l d , takes i t b a c k in to h i m s e l f and thus r e ­

creates in his inner f i r m a m e n t the s w a y o f that o the r f i rmament in w h i c h

he sees the g l i t te r o f the v i s ib le stars. I f he does this, then the w i s d o m o f

the m i r r o r w i l l i n turn be reflected b a c k t o e n v e l o p the w o r l d i n w h i c h

i t has b e e n p laced ; i t s g rea t r i n g w i l l spin o u t in to the depths o f the heavens ,

20

T H E P R O S E O F T H E W O R L D

21

and b e y o n d ; m a n w i l l d i s cove r that h e conta ins ' the stars w i t h i n h i m ­

se l f . . . , and that he is thus the bearer of the f i r m a m e n t w i t h all its i n ­

fluences'[9].

E m u l a t i o n is pos i t ed in the first p lace in the f o r m of a m e r e ref lect ion,

fur t ive and distant; i t traverses the spaces o f the un iverse in si lence. B u t

the distance i t crosses i s n o t annul led by the subt le m e t a p h o r o f e m u l a t i o n ;

i t remains o p e n to the e y e . A n d in this duel , the t w o c o n f r o n t i n g f igures

seize u p o n o n e another . L i k e e n v e l o p s l ike , w h i c h in turn sur rounds the

o ther , pe rhaps to be e n v e l o p e d o n c e m o r e in a dup l i ca t ion w h i c h can

con t i nue ad infinitum. T h e l inks o f e m u l a t i o n , un l i ke the e lements o f

convenientia, do no t f o r m a cha in bu t rather a series of concen t r i c circles

ref lect ing and r iva l l ing o n e another .

T h e third f o r m o f s imi l i tude i s analogy. A n o l d c o n c e p t a l ready famil iar

t o G r e e k sc ience and m e d i e v a l t h o u g h t , bu t o n e w h o s e use has p r o b a b l y

b e c o m e different n o w . In this a n a l o g y , convenientia and aemulatio are

supe r imposed . L i k e the latter, i t m a k e s poss ib le the m a r v e l l o u s c o n f r o n ­

tat ion o f resemblances across space; bu t i t also speaks, l ike the f o r m e r , o f

adjacencies, o f b o n d s and jo in t s . Its p o w e r i s i m m e n s e , for the s imil i tudes

o f w h i c h i t treats are no t the v i s ib le , substantial ones b e t w e e n th ings t h e m ­

selves; t hey need o n l y b e the m o r e subt le resemblances o f relat ions.

D i s e n c u m b e r e d thus, i t can ex tend , f r o m a s ingle g i v e n po in t , to an e n d ­

less n u m b e r o f relat ionships. F o r e x a m p l e , the re la t ion o f the stars t o the

s k y in w h i c h t hey shine m a y also be f o u n d : b e t w e e n plants and the earth,

b e t w e e n l i v i n g be ings and the g l o b e t hey inhabi t , b e t w e e n minerals such

as d i a m o n d s and the rocks in w h i c h t hey are bur ied , b e t w e e n sense o rgans

and the face t hey an imate , b e t w e e n skin m o l e s and the b o d y o f w h i c h

t h e y are the secret m a r k s . A n a n a l o g y m a y also b e turned a r o u n d u p o n

i tself w i t h o u t t he r eby r ende r ing i tse l f o p e n t o dispute . T h e o ld a n a l o g y

of p lant to an ima l (the v e g e t a b l e i s an an ima l l i v i n g head d o w n , its

m o u t h - or roo t s - bu r i ed in the ear th) , is ne i ther c r i t ic ized n o r d i sposed

o f b y C e s a l p i n o ; o n the con t r a ry , h e g i v e s i t added force , h e mul t ip l i e s

i t by i tself w h e n he m a k e s the d i s c o v e r y that a p lan t i s an u p r i g h t an ima l ,

w h o s e nu t r i t ive pr inciples rise f r o m the base up to the s u m m i t , channe l l ed

a l o n g a s t em that stretches u p w a r d s l ike a b o d y and is t o p p e d by a head -

spreading f lowers and l eaves : a re la t ion that inver ts b u t does n o t con t r ad i c t

the initial a n a l o g y , since i t p laces ' the r o o t in the l o w e r par t o f the p lan t

and the s t em in the u p p e r part , fo r the v e n o u s n e t w o r k in animals also

begins in the l o w e r part o f the be l l y , and the pr inc ipa l v e i n rises up to the

heart and head '[10] .

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

T h i s revers ib i l i ty and this p o l y v a l e n c y e n d o w a n a l o g y w i t h a universa l

f ield o f appl ica t ion . T h r o u g h it, all the f igures i n the w h o l e un iverse can

be d r a w n toge the r . T h e r e does exist , h o w e v e r , i n this space, f u r r o w e d in

e v e r y d i rec t ion , o n e par t i cu la r ly p r i v i l e g e d p o i n t : i t i s saturated w i t h

ana logies (all ana log ies can f ind o n e of their necessary te rms there) , and as

t hey pass t h r o u g h it, their relat ions m a y be i nve r t ed w i t h o u t los ing a n y

o f their force . T h i s p o i n t i s m a n : he stands in p r o p o r t i o n to the heavens ,

j u s t as he does to animals and plants , and as he does also to the earth,

t o meta ls , t o stalactites o r s to rms . U p r i g h t b e t w e e n the surfaces o f the

un iverse , he stands in re la t ion to the f i r m a m e n t (his face is to his b o d y

w h a t the face of h e a v e n i s to the e ther ; his pu lse beats in his ve ins as the

stars c i rc le the s k y a c c o r d i n g to their o w n f i x e d paths; the seven orif ices

in his head are to his face w h a t the seven planets are to the s k y ) ; b u t he

i s also the f u l c r u m u p o n w h i c h all these relat ions turn, so that we f ind

t h e m aga in , their s imilar i ty un impa i r ed , i n the a n a l o g y o f the h u m a n

an ima l to the ear th i t inhabi t s : his f lesh is a g l e b e , his bones are r o c k s , his

ve ins g rea t r ivers , his b l adde r is the sea, and his s even pr inc ipa l o rgans arc

the meta ls h i d d e n i n the shafts o f m i n e s [ n ] . M a n ' s b o d y i s a l w a y s the

poss ib le h a l f o f a universa l atlas. I t i s w e l l k n o w n h o w Pier re B e l o n d r e w ,

and d r e w in the greatest detai l , the first c o m p a r a t i v e i l lustrat ion o f the

h u m a n ske le ton and that o f b i rds : i n it, w e see

the p i n i o n ca l led the a p p e n d i x w h i c h i s in p r o p o r t i o n to the w i n g and in

the same p l ace a s the t h u m b on the hand ; the e x t r e m i t y o f the p i n i o n

w h i c h i s l ike the f ingers in us . . . ; the b o n e g i v e n as legs to the b i rd

c o r r e s p o n d i n g to o u r hee l ; j u s t a s we h a v e four toes on o u r feet, so the

b i rds h a v e f o u r f ingers o f w h i c h the o n e b e h i n d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o

the b i g toe in us[ i2] .

S o m u c h prec i s ion i s n o t , h o w e v e r , c o m p a r a t i v e a n a t o m y e x c e p t t o a n

e y e a r m e d w i t h n ine teen th -cen tu ry k n o w l e d g e . I t i s m e r e l y that the g r i d

t h r o u g h w h i c h w e p e r m i t the f igures o f r esemblance t o enter o u r k n o w ­

l e d g e happens to c o i n c i d e a t this p o i n t (and a t a lmos t no o ther ) w i t h that

w h i c h s ix t een th -cen tu ry l ea rn ing h a d laid o v e r th ings .

I n fact , B e l o n ' s descr ip t ion has no c o n n e c t i o n w i t h a n y t h i n g b u t the

p o s i t i v i t y w h i c h , in his d a y , m a d e i t poss ib le . I t i s ne i ther m o r e rat ional

n o r m o r e scientific than an obse rva t i on such a s A l d r o v a n d i ' s c o m p a r i s o n

o f m a n ' s baser parts t o the fou le r parts o f the w o r l d , t o H e l l , t o the d a r k ­

ness o f H e l l , t o the d a m n e d souls w h o are l i ke the e x c r e m e n t o f the

U n i v e r s e [ i 3 ] ; i t b e l o n g s to the s a m e ana log ica l c o s m o g r a p h y as the

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23

c o m p a r i s o n , classic in Cro l l i u s ' s t i m e , b e t w e e n a p o p l e x y and tempes ts :

the s t o rm beg ins w h e n the air b e c o m e s h e a v y and agi ta ted , the apop lec t i c

a t tack a t the m o m e n t w h e n o u r t hough t s b e c o m e h e a v y and d i s turbed;

then the c louds pi le up , the be l l y swel l s , the thunder exp lodes and the

b ladder bursts; the l i g h t n i n g flashes and the eyes g l i t te r w i t h a terr ib le

br ightness , the rain falls, the m o u t h foams , the t hunde rbo l t i s unleashed

and the spirits burst o p e n breaches in the sk in ; b u t then the s k y b e c o m e s

clear again , and in the sick m a n reason regains a scendancy [14]. T h e space

o c c u p i e d by ana log ies i s rea l ly a space o f radia t ion . M a n i s su r rounded

by i t on e v e r y side; but , inverse ly , he transmits these resemblances b a c k

in to the w o r l d f r o m w h i c h h e rece ives t h e m . H e i s the g rea t f u l c r u m o f

p ropo r t i ons - the cent re u p o n w h i c h relat ions are concen t ra t ed a n d f r o m

w h i c h t hey are o n c e aga in reflected.

Las t ly , the fou r th f o r m o f r e semblance i s p r o v i d e d b y the p l a y o f

sympathies. A n d here , no pa th has been de t e rmined in a d v a n c e , no

distance laid d o w n , no l inks prescr ibed . S y m p a t h y p lays t h r o u g h the

depths of the un ive r se in a free state. I t can t raverse the vastest spaces in

an instant: i t falls l ike a t h u n d e r b o l t f r o m the distant p lanet u p o n the

m a n ruled by that p lanet ; on the o t h e r hand , i t can be b r o u g h t i n to b e i n g

by a s imple con tac t - as w i t h those ' m o u r n i n g roses that h a v e been used

a t obsequies ' w h i c h , s i m p l y f r o m their f o r m e r ad jacency w i t h dea th , w i l l

render all persons w h o smel l t h e m 'sad and m o r i b u n d ' [ 1 5 ] . B u t such i s

its p o w e r that s y m p a t h y is n o t con t en t to spr ing f r o m a s ingle con t ac t

and speed t h r o u g h space; i t exci tes the th ings o f the w o r l d t o m o v e m e n t

and can d r a w e v e n the m o s t distant of t h e m toge the r . I t i s a p r inc ip le

o f m o b i l i t y : i t attracts w h a t i s h e a v y t o the heaviness o f the earth, w h a t

i s l igh t up t o w a r d s the we igh t l e s s ether; i t d r ives the r o o t t o w a r d s the

w a t e r , and i t m a k e s the g rea t y e l l o w disk o f the sun f lower turn t o f o l l o w

the c u r v i n g pa th o f the sun. M o r e o v e r , b y d r a w i n g th ings t o w a r d s o n e

ano ther in an ex te r io r and v is ib le m o v e m e n t , i t also g i v e s rise to a h i d d e n

interior m o v e m e n t - a d i sp lacement of qualit ies that t ake o v e r f r o m o n e

another in a series of re lays : f ire, because i t i s w a r m and l igh t , rises up

into the air, t o w a r d s w h i c h its f lames un t i r i ng ly s t r ive; b u t in d o i n g so i t

loses its dryness ( w h i c h m a d e i t ak in to the ear th) and so acquires h u m i d i t y

( w h i c h l inks i t to w a t e r and a i r ) ; i t disappears therefore in to l igh t v a p o u r ,

in to b lue s m o k e , in to c l o u d s : i t has b e c o m e air. S y m p a t h y is an instance

of the Same so s t rong and so insistent that i t w i l l n o t rest con t en t to be

m e r e l y o n e o f the f o r m s o f l ikeness; i t has the d a n g e r o u s p o w e r o f

assimilating, o f r ende r ing th ings ident ical t o o n e ano ther , o f m i n g l i n g

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

t h e m , o f caus ing their i nd iv idua l i ty to disappear - and thus o f r ende r ing

t h e m fo re ign t o w h a t t h e y w e r e be fo re . S y m p a t h y t ransforms. I t alters,

bu t i n the d i rec t ion o f ident i ty , so that i f its p o w e r w e r e n o t c o u n t e r ­

ba lanced i t w o u l d reduce the w o r l d to a po in t , to a h o m o g e n e o u s mass,

t o the featureless f o r m o f the S a m e : all its parts w o u l d h o l d t oge the r and

c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h o n e ano the r w i t h o u t a b reak , w i t h n o distance b e ­

t w e e n t h e m , l i ke those meta l chains he ld suspended by s y m p a t h y t o the

a t t ract ion o f a s ingle m a g n e t [ i 6 ] .

T h i s i s w h y s y m p a t h y i s c o m p e n s a t e d for by its t w i n , an t ipa thy .

A n t i p a t h y mainta ins the isolat ion o f th ings and preven ts their ass imila t ion;

i t encloses e v e r y species w i t h i n its impene t r ab l e difference and its p r o ­

pens i ty to c o n t i n u e b e i n g w h a t i t is:

I t i s fair ly w i d e l y k n o w n that the plants h a v e hatreds b e t w e e n t h e m ­

selves . . . i t i s said that the o l i v e and the v i n e hate the c a b b a g e ; the

c u c u m b e r f l ies f r o m the o l i v e . . . S ince t hey g r o w by means of the sun's

w a r m t h and the earth 's h u m o u r , i t i s inev i tab le that a n y th i ck and

o p a q u e tree should be pern ic ious to the o thers , and also the t ree that

.has several r o o t s [ i 7 ] .

A n d s o t o inf ini ty , t h r o u g h all t ime , the w o r l d ' s be ings w i l l ha te o n e

ano the r and prese rve their fe roc ious appeti tes in o p p o s i t i o n to all s y m ­

p a t h y .

T h e rat o f India i s pe rn ic ious to the c r o c o d i l e , since N a t u r e has created

t h e m enemies ; in such w i s e that w h e n that v i o l e n t rept i le takes his

pleasure in the sun, the rat lays an a m b u s h for i t o f mor t a l sub t l e ty ;

p e r c e i v i n g that the c r o c o d i l e , l y i n g u n a w a r e for de l igh t , i s s leep ing w i t h

its j a w s a g a p e , i t m a k e s its w a y t h r o u g h t h e m and slips d o w n the w i d e

th roa t in to the c rocod i l e ' s be l l y , g n a w i n g t h r o u g h the entrails o f w h i c h ,

i t e m e r g e s a t last f r o m the slain beast 's b o w e l .

B u t the rat 's enemies are l y i n g in w a i t for i t in their tu rn : for i t l ives in

d i scord w i t h the spider , and 'ba t t l ing w i t h the aspic i t of t so dies ' . T h r o u g h

this p l a y o f an t ipa thy , w h i c h disperses t h e m , y e t d r a w s t h e m w i t h equal

force in to m u t u a l c o m b a t , m a k e s t h e m into murde re r s and then exposes

t h e m to dea th in their turn , th ings and animals and all the fo rms of the

w o r l d r emain w h a t t h e y are.

T h e ident i ty o f th ings , the fact that t hey can resemble others and be

d r a w n t o t h e m , t h o u g h w i t h o u t b e i n g s w a l l o w e d u p o r los ing thei r

s ingular i ty - this is w h a t is assured by the cons tant coun t e rba l anc ing of

24

T H E P R O S E O F T H E W O R L D

s y m p a t h y and ant ipa thy . I t expla ins h o w th ings g r o w , d e v e l o p , inter­

m i n g l e , disappear , d ie , y e t endlessly f ind themse lves aga in ; i n short , h o w

there can be space ( w h i c h i s never theless n o t w i t h o u t l andmarks or repe t i ­

tions, no t w i t h o u t havens o f s imil i tude) and t ime ( w h i c h never theless

a l l ows the same fo rms , the same species, the same e lements to reappear

indef in i te ly) .

T h o u g h y e t o f themse lves the f o u r bod ies (water , air, f ire, ear th) b e

s imple and possessed of their distinct quali t ies , y e t f o r a smuch as the

C r e a t o r has o rda ined that the e l e m e n t a r y bod ies shall be c o m p o s e d o f

m i n g l e d e lements , therefore are their ha rmon ie s and discordancies

r emarkab le , a s w e m a y k n o w f r o m their quali t ies. T h e e l e m e n t o f fire

i s h o t and d r y ; i t has therefore an an t ipa thy to those of wa te r , w h i c h i s

c o l d and d a m p . H o t air i s h u m i d , c o l d ear th i s d r y , w h i c h i s an an t ipa thy .

T h a t t hey m a y b e b r o u g h t in to h a r m o n y , air has b e e n p laced b e t w e e n

f i re and w a t e r , w a t e r b e t w e e n ear th and air. I n a s m u c h as the air is ho t ,

i t marches w e l l w i t h f i r e and its h u m i d i t y g o e s w e l l w i t h that o f w a t e r .

T h e h u m i d i t y o f w a t e r i s heated b y the heat o f the air and b r ings re l i e f

to the c o l d dryness of the earth [ i 8].

Because o f the m o v e m e n t and the dispersion crea ted by its l a w s , the

sove re ign ty o f the s y m p a t h y - a n t i p a t h y pa i r g i v e s rise t o all the f o r m s o f

resemblance. T h e f i r s t three s imil i tudes are thus all r e sumed and e x p l a i n e d

b y it. T h e w h o l e v o l u m e o f the w o r l d , all the adjacencies o f ' c o n v e n i e n c e ' ,

all the echoes o f emula t i on , all the l inkages o f a n a l o g y , are suppor ted ,

maintained, and d o u b l e d b y this space g o v e r n e d b y s y m p a t h y a n d

ant ipathy, w h i c h are ceaselessly d r a w i n g th ings toge the r and h o l d i n g

t h e m apart . B y means o f this in terplay , the w o r l d remains ident ical ; r e ­

semblances con t inue to be w h a t t hey are, and to resemble o n e ano ther .

T h e same remains the same, r ive ted o n t o itself.

I I S I G N A T U R E S

A n d y e t the sys t em i s n o t c losed . O n e aper ture r emains : and t h r o u g h i t

the w h o l e in te rp lay o f resemblances w o u l d b e i n d a n g e r o f e scap ing

f rom itself, o r o f r ema in ing h i d d e n in darkness , i f there w e r e n o t a further

f o r m of s imi l i tude to c lose the c i rc le - to render i t a t o n c e per fec t and

manifest.

Convenientia, aemulatio, analogy, and sympathy tell us h o w the w o r l d

must fold in u p o n itself, dupl ica te itself, reflect itself, or f o r m a chain w i t h

25

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

i t se l f so that th ings can resemble o n e another . T h e y tell us w h a t the paths

o f s imi l i tude are and the direct ions t h e y take ; b u t n o t w h e r e i t is, h o w

o n e sees it, o r by w h a t m a r k i t m a y be r e c o g n i z e d . N o w there i s a possi­

b i l i ty that w e m i g h t m a k e o u r w a y t h r o u g h all this m a r v e l l o u s t e e m i n g

abundance o f resemblances w i t h o u t e v e n suspect ing that i t has l o n g been

prepared by the order o f the w o r l d , for o u r grea te r benefi t . I n o rde r that

w e m a y k n o w that acon i t e w i l l c u r e o u r e y e disease, o r that g r o u n d

w a l n u t m i x e d w i t h spirits o f w i n e w i l l ease a headache , there m u s t o f

cour se b e s o m e m a r k that w i l l m a k e u s a w a r e o f these th ings : o the rwi se ,

the secret w o u l d r e m a i n indef ini te ly d o r m a n t . W o u l d w e e v e r k n o w that

there i s a re la t ion of t w i n s h i p or r i va l ry b e t w e e n a m a n and his p lanet , i f

there w e r e no s ign u p o n his b o d y o r a m o n g the w r i n k l e s on his face that

he i s an e m u l a t o r o f M a r s o r akin to Saturn? T h e s e bur ied s imil i tudes mus t

be indica ted on the surface o f th ings ; there m u s t be v is ib le marks for the

invis ib le ana log ies . I s no t a n y resemblance , after all , b o t h the m o s t o b ­

v i o u s and the m o s t h idden o f th ings? B e c a u s e i t i s n o t m a d e u p o f j u x t a ­

posed f ragments , s o m e identical and others different, i t is all of a p iece ,

a s imi l i tude that can be seen and y e t n o t seen. I t w o u l d thus lack a n y

cr i te r ion if i t d id no t h a v e w i t h i n i t - or a b o v e i t or bes ide i t - a dec is ive

e l e m e n t to t rans form its uncer ta in g l i m m e r in to b r i g h t cer ta in ty .

T h e r e are n o resemblances w i t h o u t signatures. T h e w o r l d o f s imi lar i ty

can o n l y be a w o r l d o f signs. Paracelsus says:

I t i s n o t G o d ' s w i l l that w h a t he creates fo r m a n ' s benef i t and w h a t he

has g i v e n us should r ema in h idden . . . A n d e v e n t h o u g h he has h idden

cer tain th ings , he has a l l o w e d n o t h i n g to r ema in w i t h o u t ex te r io r and

v is ib le signs in the f o r m of special ma rks - j u s t as a m a n w h o has bu r i ed

a hoa rd of treasure marks the spot that he m a y find i t a g a i n [ i o ] .

A k n o w l e d g e of s imil i tudes i s f o u n d e d u p o n the unea r th ing and dec iphe r ­

m e n t of these s ignatures. I t i s useless to go no further than the skin or

ba rk o f plants i f y o u w i s h t o k n o w their na ture ; y o u m u s t g o s t ra ight

t o their m a r k s - ' t o the s h a d o w and i m a g e o f G o d that t h e y bear o r t o

their internal v i r tue , w h i c h has been g i v e n to t h e m by h e a v e n as a natura l

d o w r y , . . . a v i r t ue , I say, that i s to be r e c o g n i z e d rather by its s igna­

ture'[20]. T h e s y s t e m o f s ignatures reverses the re la t ion o f the v i s ib le

t o the invis ible . R e s e m b l a n c e w a s the invis ib le f o r m o f that w h i c h , f r o m

the depths o f the w o r l d , m a d e th ings v i s ib le ; b u t i n o rde r that this f o r m

m a y be b r o u g h t o u t in to the l igh t in its tu rn there m u s t be a v i s ib le

f igure that w i l l d r a w i t o u t f r o m its p r o f o u n d invis ib i l i ty . T h i s i s w h y

26

T H E P R O S E O F T H E W O R L D

the face o f the w o r l d i s c o v e r e d w i t h b lazons , w i t h characters , w i t h

ciphers and obscure w o r d s - w i t h ' h i e r o g l y p h i c s ' , as T u r n e r ca l led t h e m .

A n d the space inhabi ted by i m m e d i a t e resemblances b e c o m e s l ike a vas t

open b o o k ; i t bristles w i t h w r i t t e n s igns; e v e r y p a g e i s seen to be fd led

w i t h s t range f igures that i n t e r tw ine a n d in s o m e places repeat themse lves .

A l l that remains is to dec iphe r t h e m : 'Is i t n o t t rue that all herbs, plants ,

trees and o the r th ings issuing f r o m the b o w e l s o f the ear th are so m a n y

m a g i c b o o k s and signs?'[2i] T h e g r e a t u n t r o u b l e d m i r r o r i n w h o s e depths

things g a z e d a t themse lves and reflected their o w n i m a g e s b a c k to o n e

another is, i n real i ty , f i l led w i t h the m u r m u r o f w o r d s . T h e m u t e r e ­

f l e c t i o n s all h a v e c o r r e s p o n d i n g w o r d s w h i c h indicate t h e m . A n d b y the

g race o f o n e final f o r m o f resemblance , w h i c h e n v e l o p s all the others and

encloses t h e m w i t h i n a s ingle c i rc le , the w o r l d m a y be c o m p a r e d to a

m a n w i t h the p o w e r o f speech :

Just a s the secret m o v e m e n t s o f his unders tand ing are manifes ted by

his v o i c e , so i t w o u l d s e e m that the herbs speak to the cur ious phys i c i an

t h r o u g h their s ignatures, d i s c o v e r i n g to h i m . . . their inner v i r tues

h i d d e n benea th nature 's ve i l o f silence[22].

B u t we m u s t pause a little he re t o e x a m i n e this language! itself. To

e x a m i n e the signs o f w h i c h i t i s m a d e up and the w a y in w h i c h these

signs refer b a c k to w h a t t h e y indicate .

T h e r e exists a s y m p a t h y b e t w e e n acon i te and o u r eyes . T h i s u n e x p e c t e d

affinity w o u l d r ema in i n obscu r i t y i f there w e r e no t s o m e s ignature o n

the plant , s o m e m a r k , s o m e w o r d , as i t w e r e , te l l ing us that i t i s g o o d fo r

diseases of the e y e . T h i s s ign is easily l eg ib le in its seeds: t hey are t iny

dark g lobes set in w h i t e sk in l ike c o v e r i n g s w h o s e appearance i s m u c h

l ike that o f eye l ids c o v e r i n g an e y e [23]. I t i s the same w i t h the affinity o f

the w a l n u t and the h u m a n head : w h a t cures ' w o u n d s o f the pe r i c r an ium '

is the th ick g r e e n r ind c o v e r i n g the bones - the shell - of the fruit ; b u t

internal head a i lments m a y b e p r e v e n t e d b y use o f the nu t i tself ' w h i c h

i s e x a c t l y l ike the bra in in appearance '[24]. T h e s ign o f affinity, and w h a t

renders i t v i s ib le , i s qu i te s i m p l y a n a l o g y ; the c ipher o f s y m p a t h y resides

in the p r o p o r t i o n .

B u t w h a t s igna ture can the p r o p o r t i o n i tse l f bear i n o rde r t o m a k e i t ­

se l f r ecogn izab l e? H o w i s o n e t o k n o w that the lines o f a hand o r the

fu r rows on a b r o w are t rac ing on a m a n ' s b o d y the tendencies , accidents ,

o r obstacles present i n the w h o l e vas t fabric o f his life? H o w indeed , i f

no t because w e k n o w that s y m p a t h y creates c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n o u r

27

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

bod ies and the heavens , and transmits the m o v e m e n t o f the planets to the

affairs o f m e n . A n d i f no t , t o o , because the shortness o f a l ine reflects

the s imple i m a g e o f a shor t life, the intersect ion o f t w o fu r rows a n o b ­

stacle in one ' s pa th , the u p w a r d d i rec t ion of a w r i n k l e a m a n ' s rise to

success. B r e a d t h i s a s ign of w e a l t h and i m p o r t a n c e ; con t i nu i t y deno tes

g o o d for tune , d i scon t inu i ty ill fortune[25]. T h e grea t a n a l o g y b e t w e e n

b o d y and des t iny has its s ign in the w h o l e s y s t e m o f mi r rors and a t t rac­

t ions. I t is sympa th i e s and emula t ions that indicate ana logies .

E m u l a t i o n m a y be r e c o g n i z e d by a n a l o g y : the eyes are stars because

t h e y spread l i g h t o v e r o u r faces j u s t as stars l i g h t up the darkness, and

because b l ind p e o p l e exis t in the w o r l d l i ke c l a i rvoyan t s in the darkes t

o f n ights . I t can also b e r e c o g n i z e d t h r o u g h convenientia: w e h a v e k n o w n ,

e v e r since the G r e e k s , that the s t rongest and braves t animals h a v e la rge

and w e l l - d e v e l o p e d ex t remi t ies to their l imbs , as t h o u g h their s t r eng th

had c o m m u n i c a t e d i tse l f to the m o s t distant parts o f their bod ies . In

the same w a y , m a n ' s face and hands m u s t r e semble the soul t o w h i c h

t hey are j o i n e d . T h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f the m o s t v is ib le s imil i tudes occurs ,

therefore , against a b a c k g r o u n d of the d i s c o v e r y that th ings in genera l

arc ' c o n v e n i e n t ' a m o n g themse lves . A n d i f o n e then considers that c o n -

v e n i e n c y i s n o t a l w a y s def ined by actual loca l iza t ion , b u t that m a n y

be ings separated in space are also ' c o n v e n i e n t ' (as w i t h a disease and its

r e m e d y , m a n a n d his stars, or a p lant and the soil i t needs) , then aga in a

s ign of their c o n v e n i e n c y i s essential. A n d w h a t o the r s ign i s there that

t w o th ings are l i nked to o n e ano ther unless i t i s that t h e y h a v e a m u t u a l

a t t ract ion for each o ther , as do the sun and the sunf lower , or w a t e r and

a c u c u m b e r shoo t , that there is an affinity and, as it w e r e , a s y m p a t h y

b e t w e e n t h e m ?

A n d so the c i rc le i s c losed . T h o u g h i t i s apparen t w h a t a c o m p l i c a t e d

s y s t e m o f dupl ica t ions w a s necessary t o a c h i e v e this. Resemblances r e ­

qu i r e a s ignature , for n o n e o f t h e m w o u l d e v e r b e c o m e obse rvab le w e r e

i t n o t l e g i b l y m a r k e d . B u t w h a t are these signs? H o w , a m i d all the aspects

o f the w o r l d and s o m a n y in ter lac ing fo rms , does o n e r e c o g n i z e that o n e

i s faced a t a n y g i v e n m o m e n t w i t h a character that shou ld g i v e o n e

pause because i t indicates a secret and essential r e semblance? W h a t f o r m

const i tutes a s ign and e n d o w s i t w i t h its par t icu lar v a l u e as a s ign? - R e ­

semb lance does . I t signifies e x a c t l y in so far as i t resembles w h a t i t is

ind ica t ing (that is, a s imi l i tude) . B u t w h a t i t indicates i s n o t the h o m o l o g y ;

for its dist inct ex is tence as a s igna ture w o u l d then be indis t inguishable

f r o m the face of w h i c h i t is the s i gn ; i t is another r e semblance , an adjacent

28

T H E P R O S E O F T H E W O R L D

29

s imi l i tude, o n e o f ano the r t y p e w h i c h enables u s t o r e c o g n i z e the first,

and w h i c h is r evea l ed in its tu rn by a third. E v e r y r e semblance rece ives

a s ignature ; b u t this s ignature i s no m o r e than an in te rmedia te f o r m of

the same resemblance . As a result , the to ta l i ty o f these m a r k s , s l id ing o v e r

the grea t c i rc le o f s imil i tudes , f o r m s a second c i rc le w h i c h w o u l d be an

exac t dup l i ca t ion o f the first, p o i n t b y po in t , w e r e i t n o t for that t i ny

degree o f d i sp lacement w h i c h causes the s ign o f s y m p a t h y t o reside i n a n

a n a l o g y , that o f a n a l o g y i n e m u l a t i o n , that o f e m u l a t i o n i n c o n v e n i e n c e ,

w h i c h i n turn requires the m a r k o f s y m p a t h y for its r e c o g n i t i o n . T h e

signature and w h a t i t denotes are of e x a c t l y the same na ture ; i t i s m e r e l y

that they o b e y a different l a w o f d i s t r ibu t ion ; the pat tern f r o m w h i c h t h e y

are c u t is the same.

T h e f o r m m a k i n g a s ign and the f o r m b e i n g s ignal ized are resemblances ,

but they do n o t o v e r l a p . A n d i t i s in this respect that r e semblance in

s ix teen th-cen tury k n o w l e d g e i s w i t h o u t d o u b t the m o s t universa l t h i n g

there is: a t the same t ime that w h i c h i s m o s t c lear ly v is ib le , y e t s o m e t h i n g

that o n e mus t never theless search for , since i t is also the m o s t h i d d e n ;

w h a t de te rmines the f o r m o f k n o w l e d g e (for k n o w l e d g e can o n l y f o l l o w

the paths o f s imi l i tude) , and w h a t guarantees its w e a l t h o f con ten t (for the

m o m e n t o n e lifts aside the signs and l o o k s a t w h a t t hey indicate , o n e

a l lows R e s e m b l a n c e i tself t o e m e r g e in to the l igh t o f d a y and shine w i t h

its o w n inner l i gh t ) .

Le t us call the to ta l i ty of the l ea rn ing and skills that enable o n e to m a k e

the signs speak and to d i s c o v e r their m e a n i n g , he rmeneu t i c s ; let us call

the total i ty of the l ea rn ing and skills that enable o n e to dis t inguish the

locat ion o f the signs, t o define w h a t const i tutes t h e m as signs, and to k n o w

h o w and b y w h a t l a w s t hey are l inked , s e m i o l o g y : the s ixteenth c e n t u r y

super imposed he rmeneu t i c s and s e m i o l o g y i n the f o r m o f s imi l i tude .

To search for a m e a n i n g i s to b r i n g to l igh t a resemblance . To search for

the l a w g o v e r n i n g signs i s to d i s cove r the th ings that are a l ike . T h e g r a m ­

mar o f be ings i s a n exeges is o f these th ings . A n d w h a t the l a n g u a g e t hey

speak has to tell us is qu i te s i m p l y w h a t the s y n t a x is that binds t h e m

together . T h e na ture o f th ings , their coex i s t ence , the, w a y i n w h i c h t h e y

are l inked t oge the r and c o m m u n i c a t e i s n o t h i n g o the r than their r e ­

semblance . A n d that r e semblance i s v i s ib le o n l y in the n e t w o r k o f signs

that crosses the w o r l d f r o m o n e end to the o ther . ' N a t u r e ' i s t rapped in

the thin l aye r that ho lds s e m i o l o g y and he rmeneu t i c s o n e a b o v e the

other ; i t is ne i ther mys t e r ious n o r ve i l ed , i t offers i tself to o u r c o g n i t i o n ,

w h i c h i t s o m e t i m e s leads astray, o n l y in so far as this supe r impos i t ion

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

necessari ly includes a s l igh t deg ree o f n o n - c o i n c i d e n c e b e t w e e n the r e ­

semblances . As a result , the g r i d is less easy to see t h r o u g h ; its t ransparency

i s c l o u d e d o v e r f r o m the v e r y f i r s t . A da rk space appears w h i c h m u s t be

m a d e p r o g r e s s i v e l y clearer . T h a t space is w h e r e 'nature* resides, and i t i s

w h a t o n e m u s t a t t emp t t o k n o w . E v e r y t h i n g w o u l d b e manifest and i m ­

m e d i a t e l y k n o w a b l e i f the he rmeneu t i c s o f r e semblance and the s e m i o ­

l o g y o f s ignatures c o i n c i d e d w i t h o u t the s l ightest para l lax . B u t because

the s imil i tudes that f o r m the g raph ics o f the w o r l d are o n e ' c o g ' o u t o f

a l i g n m e n t w i t h those that f o r m its discourse, k n o w l e d g e and the infini te

l abou r i t i n v o l v e s f ind he re the space that is p r o p e r to t h e m : i t is their task

to w e a v e their w a y across this distance, pu r su ing an endless z i g z a g course

f r o m resemblance t o w h a t resembles it.

m T H E L I M I T S O F T H E W O R L D

S u c h , ske tched in its m o s t genera l aspects, is the s ix teen th -cen tu ry

episteme. T h i s c o n f i g u r a t i o n carries w i t h i t a cer ta in n u m b e r of c o n s e ­

quences .

First and fo remos t , the p l e tho r i c y e t abso lu te ly p o v e r t y - s t r i c k e n cha rac ­

ter o f this k n o w l e d g e . P le thor ic because i t i s l imit less. R e s e m b l a n c e n e v e r

remains stable w i t h i n itself; i t can be f ixed o n l y i f i t refers b a c k to ano the r

s imi l i tude , w h i c h then, in turn , refers to o thers ; each resemblance , the re ­

fore , has v a l u e o n l y f r o m the a c c u m u l a t i o n o f all the o thers , and the w h o l e

w o r l d m u s t b e e x p l o r e d i f e v e n the sl ightest o f ana log ies i s t o b e jus t i f ied

and f ina l ly take on the appearance of cer ta in ty . I t i s therefore a k n o w l e d g e

that can , and mus t , p r o c e e d b y the infinite a c c u m u l a t i o n o f con f i rma t ions

all dependen t o n o n e another . A n d fo r this reason, f r o m its v e r y f o u n ­

dat ions , this k n o w l e d g e w i l l b e a t h i n g o f sand. T h e o n l y poss ible f o r m o f

l ink b e t w e e n the e lements o f this k n o w l e d g e i s add i t ion . H e n c e those

i m m e n s e c o l u m n s o f c o m p i l a t i o n , hence their m o n o t o n y . B y pos i t i ng

r e semblance as the l ink b e t w e e n signs and w h a t t h e y indicate (thus

m a k i n g r e semblance b o t h a thi rd fo rce and a so le p o w e r , since i t resides

in b o t h the m a r k and the con t en t in ident ica l fashion) , s ix t een th -cen tu ry

k n o w l e d g e c o n d e m n e d i tself t o n e v e r k n o w i n g a n y t h i n g b u t the same

th ing , and t o k n o w i n g that t h ing o n l y a t the unat ta inable end o f a n e n d ­

less j o u r n e y .

A n d i t i s here that w e f i n d that o n l y t o o w e l l - k n o w n c a t e g o r y , the

m i c r o c o s m , c o m i n g in to p l a y . T h i s ancient n o t i o n w a s n o d o u b t r e v i v e d ,

d u r i n g the M i d d l e A g e s and a t the b e g i n n i n g o f the Renaissance, b y a

30

T H E P R O S E O F T H E W O R L D

certain neo-P la ton i s t t radi t ion. B u t b y the s ix teen th c e n t u r y i t h a d c o m e

to p lay a fundamen ta l ro l e in the f ie ld of k n o w l e d g e . I t ha rd ly mat te rs

w h e t h e r i t w a s o r w a s no t , a s w a s o n c e c l a i m e d , a w o r l d v i e w or Welt­

anschauung. T h e fact i s that i t h a d o n e , or ra ther t w o , precise funct ions

in the ep i s t emo log i ca l con f igu ra t i on of this p e r i o d . As a category of thought,

i t applies the in te rp lay o f dup l ica ted resemblances t o all the rea lms o f

nature ; i t p r o v i d e s all inves t iga t ion w i t h an assurance that e v e r y t h i n g w i l l

f ind its m i r r o r and its m a c r o c o s m i c jus t i f ica t ion on ano the r and la rger

scale; i t affirms, inverse ly , that the v i s ib le o r d e r of the h ighes t spheres

w i l l be f o u n d reflected i n the darkes t depths o f the ear th. B u t , u n d e r ­

s tood as a general configuration of na ture , it poses real and , as it w e r e , t an ­

g ib le l imits t o the indefa t igable to -and- f ro o f s imil i tudes r e l i ev ing o n e

another . I t indicates that there exists a grea te r w o r l d , and that its pe r ime te r

defines the l imi t o f all c rea ted th ings ; that a t the far e x t r e m i t y o f this g rea t

w o r l d there exists a p r i v i l e g e d c rea t ion w h i c h r ep roduces , w i t h i n its

restricted d imens ions , the i m m e n s e o rde r o f the heavens , the stars, the

mounta ins , r ivers , and s to rms ; and that i t is b e t w e e n the effect ive l imits

o f this cons t i tuent a n a l o g y that the in te rp lay o f resemblances takes p lace .

B y this v e r y fact, h o w e v e r i m m e n s e the distance f r o m m i c r o c o s m t o

m a c r o c o s m m a y be , i t c a n n o t be infinite; the be ings that reside w i t h i n

i t m a y be e x t r e m e l y n u m e r o u s , b u t i n the end t h e y can be c o u n t e d ; and,

consequen t ly , the s imil i tudes that, t h r o u g h the ac t ion o f the signs t h e y

require , a l w a y s rest o n e u p o n another , can cease their endless f l igh t . T h e y

have a pe r fec t ly c losed d o m a i n to suppor t and buttress t h e m . N a t u r e ,

l ike the in te rp lay of signs and resemblances , i s c losed in u p o n i tse l f in

c o n f o r m i t y w i t h the dup l ica ted f o r m o f the c o s m o s .

W e m u s t therefore b e careful n o t t o i nve r t the relat ions here . T h e r e i s

n o d o u b t that the idea o f the m i c r o c o s m w a s , a s w e say, ' i m p o r t a n t ' i n

the s ix teenth c e n t u r y ; i t w o u l d p r o b a b l y h a v e been o n e o f the m o s t f re­

quen t ly m e n t i o n e d te rms i n the results o f a n y p o l l t aken a t the t i m e . B u t

w e are n o t c o n c e r n e d he re w i t h a s tudy o f op in ions , w h i c h c o u l d b e

under taken o n l y by a statistical analysis o f c o n t e m p o r a r y records . If, on

the o the r hand , o n e invest igates s ix teen th -cen tu ry k n o w l e d g e a t its

a rchaeo log ica l l eve l - that is, a t the l e v e l of w h a t m a d e i t possible - then

the relat ions of m a c r o c o s m a n d m i c r o c o s m appear as a m e r e surface

effect. I t w a s n o t because p e o p l e be l i eved in such relat ions that t h e y set

a b o u t t r y i n g to h u n t d o w n all the ana logies i n the w o r l d . B u t there w a s a

necessity l y i n g a t the hear t o f their k n o w l e d g e : t h e y h a d to f i nd an adjust­

m e n t b e t w e e n the infinite richness of a r e semblance i n t roduced as a third

3 i

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

t e r m b e t w e e n signs a n d their m e a n i n g , and the m o n o t o n y that i m p o s e d

the same pa t te rn o f r e semblance u p o n the s ign and w h a t i t s ignif ied. In

an episteme in w h i c h signs and s imil i tudes w e r e w r a p p e d a r o u n d o n e

ano the r in an endless spiral, i t w a s essential that the re la t ion of m i c r o c o s m

t o m a c r o c o s m shou ld b e c o n c e i v e d a s b o t h the gua ran tee o f that k n o w ­

l e d g e and the l imi t o f its expans ion .

I t w a s this same necessi ty that o b l i g e d k n o w l e d g e to accep t m a g i c a n d

e rud i t ion on the same l e v e l . To us, i t seems that sixteenth-rcentury l ea rn­

i n g w a s m a d e u p o f a n unstable m i x t u r e o f ra t ional k n o w l e d g e , no t ions

d e r i v e d f r o m m a g i c a l pract ices , and a w h o l e cu l tura l her i tage w h o s e

p o w e r a n d a u t h o r i t y had been vas t ly increased b y the r e d i s c o v e r y o f

G r e e k and R o m a n authors . P e r c e i v e d thus, the l ea rn ing o f that p e r i o d

appears s t ructura l ly w e a k : a c o m m o n g r o u n d w h e r e f idel i ty to the

A n c i e n t s , a taste for the supernatural , and an a l ready a w a k e n e d awareness

o f that s o v e r e i g n ra t ional i ty i n w h i c h w e r e c o g n i z e ourse lves , con f ron ted

o n e ano the r i n equal f r e e d o m . A n d this tr ipart i te p e r i o d w o u l d c o n s e ­

q u e n t l y b e ref lected i n the m i r r o r o f each w o r k and each d i v i d e d m i n d

o c c u r r i n g w i t h i n it. . . . In fact, i t i s no t f r o m an insufficiency of s t ructure

that s ix t een th -cen tu ry k n o w l e d g e suffers. O n the con t r a ry , w e h a v e a l ­

r e a d y seen h o w v e r y me t i cu lous the conf igura t ions are that def ine its

space. I t i s this v e r y r i g o u r that m a k e s the re la t ion of m a g i c to e rud i t ion

inev i tab le - t hey are n o t selected contents b u t requ i red fo rms . T h e w o r l d

i s c o v e r e d w i t h signs that mus t be dec iphered , and those signs, w h i c h re ­

v e a l resemblances and affinities, are themse lves no m o r e than f o r m s o f

s imi l i tude . T o k n o w m u s t therefore b e t o in terpret : t o f ind a w a y f r o m

the v is ib le m a r k to that w h i c h i s b e i n g said by i t and w h i c h , w i t h o u t that

m a r k , w o u l d lie l ike u n s p o k e n speech , d o r m a n t w i t h i n th ings .

B u t we m e n d i scove r all that i s h idden in the moun ta in s by signs and

o u t w a r d co r r e spondences ; and i t i s thus that we f ind o u t all the p r o ­

perties of herbs and all that is in stones. T h e r e is n o t h i n g in the depths

o f the seas, n o t h i n g in the he igh t s o f the f i r m a m e n t that m a n i s no t

capab le o f d i s c o v e r i n g . T h e r e i s no m o u n t a i n so vas t that i t can h ide

f r o m the g a z e o f m a n w h a t i s w i t h i n i t ; i t i s r evea led t o h i m b y c o r ­

r e s p o n d i n g signs [26].

D i v i n a t i o n i s n o t a r iva l f o r m of k n o w l e d g e ; i t i s part o f the m a i n b o d y

o f k n o w l e d g e itself. M o r e o v e r , these signs that mus t be in terpre ted i n ­

dicate w h a t is h idden o n l y in so far as t hey resemble i t ; and i t is no t

possible to act u p o n those marks w i t h o u t a t the same t ime ope ra t i ng u p o n

32

T H E P R O S E O F T H E W O R L D

that w h i c h i s secret ly indica ted by t h e m . T h i s i s w h y the plants that r e ­

present the head , o r the eyes , o r the heart , o r the l ive r , w i l l possess an

efficacity in r e g a r d to that o r g a n ; this i s w h y the animals themse lves w i l l

react to the marks that des ignate t h e m . Paracelsus asks:

T e l l m e , then, w h y snakes i n He lve t i a , A l g o r i a , S w e d l a n d unders tand

the G r e e k w o r d s O s y , O s y a , O s y . . . I n w h a t academies d id t h e y learn

t h e m , so that scarcely h a v e t hey heard the w o r d than t hey i m m e d i a t e l y

tu rn tail in o rde r n o t to hear i t aga in? Sca rce ly do t hey hear the w o r d

w h e n , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g their na ture and their spirit, t hey r emain i m ­

m o b i l e and p o i s o n n o o n e w i t h their v e n o m o u s w o u n d s .

A n d let no o n e say that this i s m e r e l y the effect o f the sound m a d e by the

w o r d s w h e n p r o n o u n c e d : ' I f y o u w r i t e these w o r d s a lone o n v e l l u m ,

p a r c h m e n t o r paper a t a f a v o u r a b l e t ime , then p lace t h e m in f ront o f the

serpent, i t w i l l stay no less mot ion less than i f y o u had p r o n o u n c e d t h e m

a loud . ' T h e pro jec t o f e luc ida t ing the ' N a t u r a l M a g i c s ' , w h i c h occup ies

an i m p o r t a n t p lace a t the end o f the s ix teenth c e n t u r y and surv ives in to

the m i d d l e of the seventeenth , i s n o t a ves t ig ia l p h e n o m e n o n in the

E u r o p e a n consciousness ; i t w a s r e v i v e d - a s C a m p a n c l l a express ly tells

u s [ 2 7 ] - a n d fo r c o n t e m p o r a r y reasons: because the fundamenta l c o n ­

f igura t ion o f k n o w l e d g e consis ted o f the rec iproca l cross-reference o f

signs and simil i tudes. T h e f o r m o f m a g i c w a s inherent i n this w a y o f

k n o w i n g .

A n d by the same t o k e n , so w a s e rud i t ion : for , i n the treasure handed

d o w n to u s by A n t i q u i t y , the v a l u e o f l a n g u a g e lay i n the fact that i t w a s

the s ign of th ings . T h e r e i s no difference b e t w e e n the v is ib le marks that

G o d has s t amped u p o n the surface o f the earth, s o that w c m a y k n o w its

inner secrets, a n d the l eg ib le w o r d s that the Scr iptures , o r the sages o f

A n t i q u i t y , h a v e set d o w n in the b o o k s p rese rved for u s by t radi t ion. T h e

relat ion to these texts is of the same nature as the re la t ion to th ings : in

b o t h cases there are signs that m u s t be d i scovered . B u t G o d , in o rde r to

exercise o u r w i s d o m , m e r e l y s o w e d nature w i t h fo rms for u s t o dec iphe r

(and it is in this sense that k n o w l e d g e shou ld be divinatio), whe rea s the

Anc ien t s h a v e a l ready p r o v i d e d u s w i t h interpretat ions, w h i c h w e need

d o n o m o r e than ga the r t oge the r . O r w h i c h w e w o u l d need o n l y t o

ga ther toge the r , w e r e i t n o t for the necessi ty o f l ea rn ing their l a n g u a g e ,

read ing their texts , and unders tand ing w h a t t hey h a v e said. T h e her i tage

of A n t i q u i t y , l i ke nature itself, is a vas t space r equ i r i ng in terpre ta t ion;

in b o t h cases there arc signs to be d i s cove red and then, little by little,

33

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

34

m a d e to speak. In o the r w o r d s , divinatio and emditio are b o t h part of the

same he rmeneu t i c s ; b u t this deve lops , f o l l o w i n g similar fo rms , o n t w o

different l eve l s : o n e m o v e s f r o m the m u t e s ign to the th ing i tself (and

m a k e s nature speak ) ; the o the r m o v e s f r o m the u n m o v i n g g r a p h i s m

to clear speech (it restores s leeping l anguages to l i fe) . B u t j u s t as natural

signs are l inked t o w h a t t hey indicate b y the p r o f o u n d re la t ion o f r e s e m ­

b lance , so the discourse o f the A n c i e n t s i s in the i m a g e o f w h a t i t expresses;

i f i t has the v a l u e of a p rec ious s ign , that i s because , f r o m the d e p t h of its

b e i n g , and by means o f the l igh t that has n e v e r ceased to shine t h r o u g h

it s ince its o r ig in , it is adjusted to th ings themse lves , it f o rms a m i r r o r

for t h e m and emula tes t h e m ; i t i s to eternal t ru th w h a t signs are to the

secrets o f na ture (it i s the m a r k w h e r e b y the w o r d m a y be d e c i p h e r e d ) ;

and i t possesses an ageless affinity w i t h the th ings that i t unvei l s . I t is

useless therefore to d e m a n d its title to au tho r i t y ; i t is a t reasury of signs

l inked b y s imi l i tude t o that w h i c h t hey are e m p o w e r e d t o deno te . T h e

o n l y difference i s that we are dea l ing w i t h a t reasure-hoard of the s econd

deg ree , o n e that refers to the nota t ions o f nature , w h i c h in their turn

indicate o b s c u r e l y the pu re g o l d o f th ings themse lves . T h e t ru th o f all

these marks - w h e t h e r t h e y are w o v e n in to na ture i tse l f o r w h e t h e r t hey

exis t i n lines on pa rchmen t s and in l i b r a r i e s - i s e v e r y w h e r e the s ame :

c o e v a l w i t h the inst i tut ion o f G o d .

T h e r e i s no difference b e t w e e n marks and w o r d s in the sense that there

i s b e t w e e n obse rva t ion and accep ted au tho r i ty , o r b e t w e e n ver i f iab le

fact and t radi t ion. T h e process i s e v e r y w h e r e the s ame : that o f the s ign

and its l ikeness, and this i s w h y nature and the w o r d can i n t e r t w i n e w i t h

o n e ano ther to inf ini ty , f o r m i n g , for those w h o can read it, o n e vas t s ingle

t ex t .

I V T H E W R I T I N G O F T H I N G S

In the s ix teenth cen tu ry , real l a n g u a g e is no t a to ta l i ty of independen t

s igns, a u n i f o r m and u n b r o k e n ent i ty in w h i c h things c o u l d be reflected

o n e by one , as in a mi r ro r , and so express their par t icular truths. I t is rather

an o p a q u e , mys t e r ious th ing , c losed in u p o n itself, a f r a g m e n t e d mass,

its e n i g m a r e n e w e d in e v e r y in terval , w h i c h c o m b i n e s here a n d there

w i t h the fo rms o f the w o r l d and b e c o m e s i n t e r w o v e n w i t h t h e m : s o

m u c h so that all these e lements , t aken toge the r , f o r m a n e t w o r k o f ma rks

in w h i c h each o f t h e m m a y p l ay , and does in fact p l ay , i n relat ion to all

the others , the role o f con ten t o r o f s ign, that o f secret o r o f indicator .

T H E P R O S E O F T H E W O R L D

35

In its r a w , historical s ix teen th-cen tury b e i n g , l a n g u a g e is n o t an arbi t rary

s y s t e m ; i t has been set d o w n in the w o r l d and fo rms a par t o f it, b o t h

because things themse lves h ide and manifes t their o w n e n i g m a l ike a

l a n g u a g e and because w o r d s offer themse lves to m e n as th ings to be d e ­

c iphered . T h e g rea t m e t a p h o r o f the b o o k that o n e opens , that one pores

o v e r and reads in o rde r to k n o w nature , i s m e r e l y the reverse and v i s ib le

side o f ano ther transference, and a m u c h deeper o n e , w h i c h forces l an­

g u a g e to reside in the w o r l d , a m o n g the plants , the herbs, the stones,

and the animals .

L a n g u a g e par takes i n the w o r l d - w i d e disseminat ion o f s imil i tudes and

signatures. I t mus t , therefore , be s tudied i tself as a t h ing in nature . L i k e

animals, plants, o r stars, its e lements h a v e their l a w s of affinity and c o n ­

ven ience , their necessary analogies . R a m u s d i v i d e d his g r a m m a r in to

t w o parts. T h e first w a s d e v o t e d t o e t y m o l o g y , w h i c h means that o n e

l o o k e d in i t t o d i scover , n o t the o r ig ina l m e a n i n g s o f w o r d s , bu t the i n ­

trinsic 'p roper t ies ' o f letters, syl lables , and, f inal ly , w h o l e w o r d s . T h e

second par t deal t w i t h s y n t a x : its purpose w a s t o teach ' the b u i l d i n g o f

w o r d s toge the r b y means o f their proper t ies ' , and i t consisted ' a lmos t

ent i re ly i n the c o n v e n i e n c e and m u t u a l c o m m u n i o n o f proper t ies , a s o f

the n o u n w i t h the n o u n o r w i t h the v e r b , o f the a d v e r b w i t h all the w o r d s

t o w h i c h i t i s adjoined, o f the con junc t ion in the o rde r o f th ings c o n ­

joined'[28]. L a n g u a g e is n o t w h a t it is because it has a m e a n i n g ; its

representat ive con ten t , w h i c h w a s t o h a v e such i m p o r t a n c e for g r a m ­

marians o f the seven teen th and e igh teen th centur ies that i t p r o v i d e d t h e m

w i t h the g u i d i n g thread o f their analyses, has n o ro le t o p l a y here . W o r d s

g r o u p syllables toge ther , and syllables letters, because there are v i r tues

placed in ind iv idua l letters that d r a w t h e m t o w a r d s each o the r o r k e e p

them apart, e x a c t l y as the marks f o u n d in na ture also repel or attract o n e

another. T h e s tudy o f g r a m m a r in the s ix teenth cen tu ry i s based u p o n the

same ep i s t emolog ica l a r r a n g e m e n t as the science of nature or the esoteric

disciplines. T h e o n l y differences are that there i s o n l y o n e nature and there

are several l anguages ; and that in the esoteric f ield the proper t ies of w o r d s ,

syllables, and letters are d i s cove red by another discourse w h i c h a l w a y s

remains secret, whe rea s in g r a m m a r i t i s the w o r d s and phrases o f e v e r y ­

day life that themse lves express their p roper t ies . L a n g u a g e stands half­

w a y b e t w e e n the v is ib le fo rms o f nature and the secret conven iences o f

esoteric discourse. It is a f r agmen ted nature , d i v i d e d against i tself and

deprived of its o r ig ina l t ransparency by a d m i x t u r e ; i t is a secret that carries

wi th in itself, t h o u g h near the surface, the dec ipherab le signs of w h a t i t

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

is t r y i n g to say. It is at the same t ime a bur ied reve la t ion and a reve la t ion

that i s g r a d u a l l y b e i n g res tored to e v e r grea ter c lar i ty .

I n its o r ig ina l f o r m , w h e n i t w a s g i v e n t o m e n b y G o d himself, l a n g u a g e

w a s an abso lu te ly cer ta in and transparent s ign for th ings , because i t re ­

s e m b l e d t h e m . T h e names o f th ings w e r e l o d g e d i n the th ings t hey de s ig ­

nated, j u s t as s t rength i s w r i t t e n in the b o d y of the l ion , r ega l i ty in the

e y e o f the eag le , j u s t a s the inf luence o f the planets i s m a r k e d u p o n the

b r o w s o f m e n : b y the f o r m o f s imi l i tude . T h i s t ransparency w a s des ­

t r o y e d a t B a b e l as a pun i shmen t for m e n . L a n g u a g e s b e c a m e separated

and i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h o n e ano ther o n l y in so far a s t h e y had p r e v i o u s l y

lost this o r ig ina l r esemblance to the things that had been the p r i m e reason

for the ex is tence o f l a n g u a g e . A l l the l anguages k n o w n t o u s are n o w

s p o k e n o n l y against the b a c k g r o u n d of this lost s imi l i tude , and in the space

that i t left vacan t . T h e r e i s o n l y o n e l a n g u a g e that retains a m e m o r y of

that s imi l i tude , because i t der ives in direct descent f r o m that first v o c a b u ­

la ry w h i c h i s n o w f o r g o t t e n ; because G o d d id no t w i s h m e n t o fo rge t

the p u n i s h m e n t inflicted a t B a b e l ; because this l a n g u a g e had to be used

in o rde r to r ecoun t G o d ' s ancient A l l i a n c e w i t h his p e o p l e ; and lastly,

because i t w a s in this l a n g u a g e that G o d addressed h i m s e l f t o those w h o

listened to h i m . H e b r e w therefore contains , a s i f i n the f o r m o f f ragments ,

the marks o f that o r ig ina l n a m e - g i v i n g . A n d those w o r d s p r o n o u n c e d

by A d a m as he imposed t h e m u p o n the va r ious animals h a v e endured , i n

par t a t least, a n d still c a r ry w i t h t h e m in their densi ty , l ike an e m b e d d e d

f r a g m e n t o f silent k n o w l e d g e , the u n c h a n g i n g proper t ies o f b e i n g s :

T h u s the s tork, so g rea t ly lauded for its cha r i ty t o w a r d s its father and

its m o t h e r , is cal led in H e b r e w Chasida, w h i c h is to say, m e e k , char i t ­

able , e n d o w e d w i t h p i t y . . . T h e horse is n a m e d Sus, t h o u g h t to be

f r o m the v e r b Hasas, unless that v e r b is rather d e r i v e d f r o m the n o u n ,

and i t signifies to rise up , for a m o n g all f o u r - f o o t e d animals the horse

is mos t p r o u d and b r a v e , as J o b depicts it in C h a p t e r 3 9 [29].

B u t these arc no m o r e than f r agmen ta ry m o n u m e n t s ; all o the r l anguages

h a v e lost these radical s imil i tudes, w h i c h h a v e been p rese rved in H e b r e w

o n l y i n o rde r t o s h o w that i t w a s o n c e the c o m m o n l a n g u a g e o f G o d ,

A d a m , and the animals o f the n e w l y crea ted ear th.

B u t t h o u g h l a n g u a g e n o l o n g e r bears a n i m m e d i a t e resemblance t o

the th ings i t names , this does n o t m e a n that i t i s separate f r o m the w o r l d ;

i t still con t inues , in ano the r f o r m , to be the locus of revela t ions and to be

inc luded in the area w h e r e t ru th i s b o t h manifes ted and expressed. T r u e ,

36

T H E P R O S E O F T H E W O R L D

i t is no l o n g e r na ture in its p r i m a l v i s ib i l i ty , bu t nei ther is i t a m y s t e r i o u s

ins t rument w i t h p o w e r s k n o w n o n l y to a f e w p r i v i l e g e d persons . I t i s

rather the f igura t ion of a w o r l d r e d e e m i n g itself, l end ing its ear at last

t o the t rue w o r d . T h i s i s w h y i t w a s G o d ' s w i s h that La t in , the l a n g u a g e

o f his C h u r c h , shou ld spread o v e r the w h o l e o f the terrestrial g l o b e .

A n d i t i s also w h y all the l anguages o f the w o r l d , a s i t b e c a m e poss ible

t o k n o w t h e m t h r o u g h this conques t , m a k e u p toge the r the i m a g e o f the

truth. T h e i r in te r lac ing and the space in w h i c h they are d e p l o y e d free

the s ign o f the r e d e e m e d w o r l d , j u s t a s the a r r a n g e m e n t o f the first n a m e s

b o r e a likeness to the th ings that G o d had g i v e n to A d a m for his use.

C l a u d e D u r e t poin ts o u t that the H e b r e w s , the Canaans , the Samari tans ,

the Cha ldeans , the Syr ians , the E g y p t i a n s , the Car thag in ians , the P h o e ­

nicians, the A r a b s , the Saracens, the T u r k s , the M o o r s , the Persians,

and the Tar tars all w r i t e f r o m r igh t to left, f o l l o w i n g ' the course and

dai ly m o v e m e n t o f the first h e a v e n , w h i c h i s m o s t perfect , a c c o r d i n g to

the o p i n i o n o f the g rea t Ar i s to t l e , t end ing t o w a r d s u n i t y ' ; the G r e e k s ,

the G e o r g i a n s , the Maron i t e s , the Serbians, the Jacobi tes , the C o p t s ,

the Poznan ians , and o f cour se the R o m a n s and all Eu ropeans w r i t e f r o m

left t o r ight , f o l l o w i n g ' the course and m o v e m e n t o f the second h e a v e n ,

h o m e o f the seven planets ' ; the Indians, C a t h a y a n s , C h i n e s e , and Japanese

w r i t e f r o m t o p t o b o t t o m , i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h the ' o rde r o f nature , w h i c h

has g i v e n m e n heads a t the tops of their bod ies and feet a t the b o t t o m ' ;

' in oppos i t i on to the a fo remen t ioned ' , the M e x i c a n s w r i t e ei ther f r o m

b o t t o m to t o p or else in 'spiral lines, such as those m a d e by the sun in

its annual j o u r n e y t h r o u g h the Z o d i a c ' . A n d thus ' b y these f ive d iverse

sorts o f w r i t i n g the secrets and myster ies o f the w o r l d ' s f rame and the

f o r m o f the cross, the uni ty o f the heaven ' s r o tund i ty and that o f the

earth, are p r o p e r l y deno t ed and expressed '[3o]. T h e relat ion o f l anguages

t o the w o r l d i s o n e o f a n a l o g y rather than o f s ignif ica t ion; o r rather,

their v a l u e as s igns and their dup l i ca t ing funct ion are supe r imposed ; t hey

speak the h e a v e n and the earth o f w h i c h t hey are the i m a g e ; t hey r e p r o ­

duce in their m o s t mater ia l a rchi tec ture the cross w h o s e c o m i n g t h e y

announce - that c o m i n g w h i c h establishes its ex is tence in its o w n tu rn

t h r o u g h the Scr iptures and the W o r d . L a n g u a g e possesses a s y m b o l i c

funct ion; bu t since the disaster a t B a b e l we m u s t no l o n g e r seek for i t -

w i t h rare excep t ions [31] - in the w o r d s themselves bu t rather in the v e r y

existence o f l a n g u a g e , in its total re lat ion to the to ta l i ty o f the w o r l d , in

the intersect ing o f its space w i t h the loc i and fo rms o f the c o s m o s .

H e n c e the f o r m of the e n c y c l o p a e d i c pro jec t as i t appears a t the end of

37

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

38

the s ix teenth c e n t u r y o r in the first years o f the seven teen th : n o t to reflect

w h a t o n e k n o w s i n the neutral e l e m e n t o f l a n g u a g e - the use o f the a lpha ­

be t as an arbi t rary b u t efficacious e n c y c l o p a e d i c o r d e r does n o t appear

unt i l the second h a l f of the seven teen th c e n t u r y [3 2] - b u t to reconst i tu te

the v e r y o rde r o f the un iverse b y the w a y i n w h i c h w o r d s are l inked

t oge the r and a r ranged in space. I t i s this p ro jec t that we f ind in G r e g o i r e ' s

Syntaxeon artis mirabilis (1610), and in Als ted ius ' s Encyclopaedia (1630);

or aga in in the Tableau de tous les arts liberaux by C h r i s t o p h e de S a v i g n y ,

w h o con t r ives t o spatial ize acqu i red k n o w l e d g e b o t h i n acco rdance w i t h

the c o s m i c , u n c h a n g i n g , and perfec t f o r m o f the c i rc le and i n a c c o r ­

dance w i t h the sub lunary , per ishable , mul t ip l e , and d i v i d e d f o r m o f the

t ree; i t i s also t o b e f o u n d i n the w o r k o f L a C r o i x d u M a i n e , w h o e n ­

v isages a space that w o u l d be a t o n c e an E n c y c l o p a e d i a and a L i b r a r y ,

and w o u l d p e r m i t the a r r angemen t o f w r i t t e n texts a c c o r d i n g t o the fo rms

o f ad jacency , k inship , a n a l o g y , a n d subord ina t ion prescr ibed b y the

w o r l d itself[33]. B u t i n a n y case, such a n i n t e r w e a v i n g o f l a n g u a g e and

th ings , in a space c o m m o n to b o t h , presupposes an abso lu te p r i v i l e g e on

the par t o f w r i t i n g .

T h i s p r i v i l e g e d o m i n a t e d the ent ire Renaissance, and w a s n o d o u b t o n e

o f the g rea t even t s i n W e s t e r n cu l ture . P r i n t i ng , the arr ival i n E u r o p e o f

Or i en t a l manuscr ip ts , the appearance of a l i terature no l o n g e r crea ted for

the v o i c e o r p e r f o r m a n c e and therefore n o t g o v e r n e d b y t h e m , the p r e ­

cedence g i v e n t o the interpreta t ion o f re l ig ious texts o v e r the t radi t ion

and m a g i s t e r i u m of the C h u r c h - all these th ings bear wi tness , w i t h o u t

its b e i n g possible to indicate causes and effects, to the fundamenta l p lace

a c c o r d e d in the W e s t t o W r i t i n g . Hence fo r th , i t i s the p r ima l na ture o f

l a n g u a g e t o b e wr i t t en . T h e sounds m a d e b y v o i c e s p r o v i d e n o m o r e

than a t ransi tory and precar ious translation o f it. W h a t G o d in t roduced

in to the w o r l d w a s w r i t t e n w o r d s ; A d a m , w h e n h e i m p o s e d their first

names u p o n the animals , d id no m o r e than read those v is ib le and silent

m a r k s ; the L a w w a s entrusted t o the T a b l e s , n o t t o men ' s m e m o r i e s ;

and i t i s in a b o o k that the t rue W o r d m u s t be f o u n d aga in . V i g e n e r e

and Duret[34] b o t h s a i d - a n d i n a lmos t ident ical t e r m s - t h a t the

w r i t t e n had a l w a y s p receded the s p o k e n , cer ta in ly in nature , and perhaps

e v e n i n the k n o w l e d g e o f m e n . Fo r i t w a s v e r y poss ible that be fo re B a b e l ,

be fore the F l o o d , there h a d a l ready exis ted a f o r m o f w r i t i n g c o m p o s e d

o f the marks o f na ture itself, w i t h the result that its characters w o u l d h a v e

had the p o w e r t o ac t u p o n th ings d i rec t ly , t o attract t h e m o r repel t h e m ,

to represent their proper t ies , their v i r tues , and their secrets. A p r i m i t i v e l y

T H E P R O S E O F T H E W O R L D

39

natural w r i t i n g , o f w h i c h certain fo rms o f esoteric k n o w l e d g e , and the

caba la first a n d fo remos t , m a y perhaps h a v e p rese rved the scat tered

m e m o r y and w e r e n o w a t t e m p t i n g t o re t r ieve its l o n g - d o r m a n t p o w e r s .

Eso te r i sm in the s ix teenth c e n t u r y i s a p h e n o m e n o n o f the w r i t t e n w o r d ,

n o t the s p o k e n w o r d . At all events , the latter i s s t r ipped o f all its p o w e r s ;

i t i s m e r e l y the female par t o f l a n g u a g e , V i g e n e r e and D u r e t tell us, j u s t

as its intel lect is pass ive; W r i t i n g , on the o the r hand , is the ac t ive intel lect ,

the ' m a l e p r inc ip le ' o f l a n g u a g e . I t a lone harbours the t ruth.

T h i s p r i m a c y o f the w r i t t e n w o r d expla ins the t w i n presence o f t w o

f o r m s w h i c h , despite their apparen t an t agon i sm, are indissociable in

s ix teen th -cen tu ry k n o w l e d g e . T h e first o f these i s a non-d i s t inc t ion b e ­

t w e e n w h a t i s seen and w h a t i s read, b e t w e e n obse rva t ion and relat ion,

w h i c h results in the cons t i tu t ion o f a s ingle , u n b r o k e n surface in w h i c h

obse rva t ion and l a n g u a g e intersect to inf ini ty . A n d the second , the inverse

o f the first, i s an i m m e d i a t e dissociat ion o f all l a n g u a g e , dupl ica ted , w i t h ­

o u t a n y assignable t e rm, b y the constant re i terat ion o f c o m m e n t a r y .

La ter , B u f f o n w a s to express as ton ishment a t f i nd ing in the w o r k o f a

naturalist l ike A l d r o v a n d i such a n inext r icab le m i x t u r e o f exac t descr ip­

t ions, r epor ted quota t ions , fables w i t h o u t c o m m e n t a r y , r emarks dea l ing

indifferently w i t h an animal ' s a n a t o m y , its use in he ra ld ry , its habi tat , its

m y t h o l o g i c a l va lues , o r the uses to w h i c h i t c o u l d be p u t in m e d i c i n e

o r m a g i c . A n d indeed, w h e n o n e g o e s b a c k to take a l o o k a t the Historia

serpentum et draconum, o n e finds the chapter ' O n the serpent in gene ra l '

a r ranged u n d e r the f o l l o w i n g head ings : e q u i v o c a t i o n ( w h i c h means the

va r ious m e a n i n g s o f the w o r d serpent), s y n o n y m s and e t y m o l o g i e s ,

differences, f o r m and descr ip t ion, a n a t o m y , na ture and habits , t e m p e r a ­

ment , coi tus and genera t ion , v o i c e , m o v e m e n t s , p laces , diet , p h y s i o g ­

n o m y , an t ipa thy , s y m p a t h y , m o d e s o f capture , dea th and w o u n d s caused

b y the serpent, m o d e s and signs o f p o i s o n i n g , remedies , epi thets , d e ­

nomina t ions , p rod ig i e s a n d presages , mons te rs , m y t h o l o g y , g o d s t o

w h i c h i t i s dedica ted , fables, a l legor ies and myster ies , h i e r o g l y p h i c s , e m ­

b lems and s y m b o l s , p r o v e r b s , c o i n a g e , miracles , r iddles, dev ices , hera ldic

signs, historical facts, d reams , s imulacra and statues, use in h u m a n diet , use

in med ic ine , misce l laneous uses. W h e r e u p o n B u f f o n c o m m e n t s : ' L e t i t

be j u d g e d after that w h a t p r o p o r t i o n of natural h i s to ry i s to be found in

such a h o t c h - p o t c h o f w r i t i n g . T h e r e i s no descr ipt ion here , o n l y l egend . '

A n d indeed, f o r A l d r o v a n d i and his con t empora r i e s , i t w a s all legenda -

things to be read . B u t the reason for this w a s n o t that t h e y preferred the

author i ty o f m e n t o the precis ion o f a n unpre jud iced e y e , b u t that nature ,

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

in itself, i s an u n b r o k e n tissue of w o r d s and signs, o f accounts and cha rac ­

ters, o f discourse and fo rms . W h e n o n e i s faced w i t h the task o f w r i t i n g an

animal ' s history, i t is useless and imposs ib le to choose b e t w e e n the profes­

sion o f naturalist and that o f c o m p i l e r : o n e has t o co l l ec t t oge the r in to

o n e and the same f o r m of k n o w l e d g e all that has been seen and heard,

all that has been recounted, ei ther by nature or by m e n , by the l a n g u a g e

o f the w o r l d , b y t radi t ion, o r b y the poets . T o k n o w a n an imal o r a plant ,

or a n y terrestrial th ing w h a t e v e r , i s to ga ther t oge the r the w h o l e dense

layer o f signs w i t h w h i c h i t o r they m a y h a v e been c o v e r e d ; i t i s t o re ­

d i scover also all the constel la t ions o f fo rms f r o m w h i c h t h e y de r ive their

v a l u e as heraldic signs. A l d r o v a n d i w a s nei ther a better no r a w o r s e obse rve r

than B u t t o n ; he w a s nei ther m o r e c redulous than he, n o r less a t tached to

the faithfulness o f the o b s e r v i n g e y e o r t o the ra t ional i ty o f th ings . His

obse rva t ion w a s s i m p l y no t l inked to th ings in acco rdance w i t h the same

sys t em o r by the same a r r a n g e m e n t o f the episteme. Fo r A l d r o v a n d i w a s

m e t i c u l o u s l y c o n t e m p l a t i n g a na ture w h i c h w a s , f r o m top to b o t t o m ,

wr i t t en .

K n o w l e d g e therefore consisted i n re la t ing o n e f o r m o f l a n g u a g e t o

ano ther f o r m o f l a n g u a g e ; i n res tor ing the grea t , u n b r o k e n plain o f w o r d s

and th ings ; in m a k i n g e v e r y t h i n g speak. T h a t is, in b r i n g i n g in to b e i n g ,

a t a l eve l a b o v e that o f all ma rks , the secondary discourse o f c o m m e n t a r y .

T h e funct ion p r o p e r to k n o w l e d g e i s no t seeing or demons t r a t i ng ; i t i s

in terpre t ing . Scr ip tura l c o m m e n t a r y , c o m m e n t a r i e s o n A n c i e n t authors ,

c o m m e n t a r i e s on the accounts o f t ravel lers , commen ta r j e s on legends

and fables: n o n e o f these fo rms of discourse i s r equ i red to j u s t i f y its c l a im

to be express ing a t ruth be fo re it is in terpreted; all that is requ i red of it is

the possibi l i ty o f t a lk ing abou t it. L a n g u a g e contains its o w n inner p r in ­

c ip le o f pro l i fe ra t ion . ' T h e r e i s m o r e w o r k i n in te rpre t ing interpretat ions

than in in terpre t ing th ings ; and m o r e b o o k s a b o u t b o o k s than on a n y

o the r subject ; w e d o n o t h i n g b u t w r i t e glosses o n o n e ano the r ' [ 35 ] .

T h e s e w o r d s are no t a s ta tement o f the b a n k r u p t c y o f a cu l ture bur ied

benea th its o w n m o n u m e n t s ; t h e y are a def ini t ion o f the inev i tab le re ­

la t ion that l a n g u a g e main ta ined w i t h i tself in the s ix teenth cen tu ry . T h i s

relat ion enabled l a n g u a g e to a c c u m u l a t e to infini ty, since i t n e v e r ceased

to d e v e l o p , to revise itself, and to lay its successive fo rms o n e o v e r

another . Perhaps for the first t ime in W e s t e r n cu l ture , we f ind revea led

the abso lu te ly o p e n d imens ion of a l a n g u a g e no l o n g e r ab le to halt itself,

because , n e v e r b e i n g enc losed in a def ini t ive s ta tement , i t can express its

t ruth o n l y in s o m e future discourse and i s w h o l l y intent on w h a t i t w i l l

40

T H E P R O S E O F T H E W O R L D

h a v e said; bu t e v e n this future discourse i tself does no t h a v e the p o w e r to

halt the p rogress ion , and w h a t i t says is enc losed w i t h i n i t l ike a p r o m i s e ,

a bequest to y e t ano ther discourse . . . . T h e task of c o m m e n t a r y can neve r ,

b y def ini t ion, b e c o m p l e t e d . A n d y e t c o m m e n t a r y i s d i rec ted ent i re ly

t o w a r d s the e n i g m a t i c , m u r m u r e d e l e m e n t o f the l a n g u a g e b e i n g c o m ­

m e n t e d o n : i t calls in to b e i n g , b e l o w the ex i s t ing discourse, ano ther

discourse that i s m o r e fundamenta l and, as i t w e r e , ' m o r e p r i m a l ' , w h i c h

i t sets i tself the task of res tor ing . T h e r e can be no c o m m e n t a r y unless,

b e l o w the l a n g u a g e o n e i s r ead ing and dec iphe r ing , there runs the s o v e r ­

e i g n t y o f an o r ig ina l T e x t . A n d i t i s this t ex t w h i c h , by p r o v i d i n g a

founda t ion for the c o m m e n t a r y , offers its u l t imate reve la t ion as the

p romised r e w a r d o f c o m m e n t a r y . T h e necessary pro l i fe ra t ion o f the

exegesis i s therefore measured , idea l ly l imi ted , and y e t ceaselessly an i ­

mated , by this silent d o m i n i o n . T h e l a n g u a g e o f the s ixteenth c e n t u r y -

unders tood n o t as an ep isode in the h i s to ry of a n y o n e t o n g u e , bu t as a

g loba l cul tura l expe r i ence - f o u n d i tself c a u g h t , no d o u b t , b e t w e e n these

interact ing e lements , i n the interstice o c c u r r i n g b e t w e e n the p r ima l T e x t

and the infini ty o f Interpretat ion. O n e speaks u p o n the basis o f a w r i t i n g

that i s par t o f the fabric o f the w o r l d ; o n e speaks a b o u t i t to inf ini ty ,

and each of its signs b e c o m e s in turn w r i t t e n mat te r for further d iscourse ;

but each of these stages of discourse i s addressed to that p r ima l w r i t t e n

w o r d w h o s e re turn i t s imul taneous ly promises and pos tpones .

I t w i l l be seen that the expe r i ence o f l a n g u a g e b e l o n g s to the same

archaeologica l n e t w o r k a s the k n o w l e d g e o f th ings and nature. T o k n o w

those things w a s to b r i n g to l igh t the sys tem o f resemblances that m a d e

t h e m close t o and d e p e n d e n t u p o n o n e ano the r ; bu t o n e c o u l d d i scove r

the s imil i tudes b e t w e e n t h e m o n l y in so far as there exis ted, on their sur­

face, a to ta l i ty o f signs f o r m i n g the t ex t o f an u n e q u i v o c a l message . B u t

then, these signs themse lves w e r e no m o r e than a p l a y o f resemblances ,

and they referred b a c k to the infinite and necessari ly u n c o m p l e t e d task

o f k n o w i n g w h a t i s s imilar . In the same w a y , t h o u g h the a n a l o g y i s in ­

ver ted, l a n g u a g e sets i tself the task of res tor ing an abso lu te ly p r ima l d i s ­

course, bu t i t can express that discourse o n l y by t r y i n g to a p p r o x i m a t e to

it, by a t t e m p t i n g to say th ings a b o u t i t that are s imilar to it, t he reby

b r ing ing in to exis tence the inf ini ty o f adjacent and similar fidelities o f

interpretat ion. T h e c o m m e n t a r y resembles endlessly that w h i c h i t i s

c o m m e n t i n g u p o n and w h i c h i t can n e v e r express ; jus t a s the k n o w l e d g e

o f nature cons tan t ly finds n e w signs for resemblance because resemblance

cannot be k n o w n in itself, e v e n t h o u g h the signs can n e v e r be a n y t h i n g b u t

41

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

s imil i tudes . A n d j u s t as this infinite p l a y w i t h i n nature finds its l ink , its

f o r m , and its l imi ta t ion in the re la t ion o f the m i c r o c o s m to the m a c r o ­

c o s m , so does the infinite task o f c o m m e n t a r y d e r i v e its s t r eng th f r o m the

p r o m i s e o f a n e f fec t ive ly w r i t t e n t ex t w h i c h in terpreta t ion w i l l o n e d a y

revea l in its ent i re ty .

V T H E B E I N G O F L A N G U A G E

E v e r since the Sto ics , the sys t em of signs in the W e s t e r n w o r l d had been a

te rnary o n e , for i t w a s r e c o g n i z e d as c o n t a i n i n g the signif icant , the s i g ­

nif ied, and the ' con junc tu re ' (the xvyyavov). F r o m the seven teen th c e n ­

tu ry , o n the o the r hand, the a r r a n g e m e n t o f s igns w a s t o b e c o m e b ina ry ,

since i t w a s to be def ined, w i t h P o r t - R o y a l , as the c o n n e c t i o n of a s ign i ­

f icant and a s ignif ied. At the Renaissance, the o r g a n i z a t i o n is different,

and m u c h m o r e c o m p l e x : i t i s ternary, since i t requires the f o r m a l d o m a i n

o f marks , the con t en t indicated by t h e m , and the s imil i tudes that l ink

the m a r k s to the th ings des ignated by t h e m ; b u t since r e semblance i s the

f d r m of the signs as w e l l as their con ten t , the three dist inct e lements o f

this ar t icula t ion are r e so lved into a s ingle f o r m .

T h i s a r r angemen t , t o g e t h e r w i t h the in te rp lay i t au thor izes , i s f ound

also, t h o u g h inver ted , i n the expe r i ence o f l a n g u a g e . In fact, l a n g u a g e

exists first o f al l , in its r a w and p r i m i t i v e b e i n g , in the s imple , mater ia l

f o r m of w r i t i n g , a s t igma u p o n th ings , a m a r k impr in t ed across the w o r l d

w h i c h is a par t of its m o s t ineffaceable fo rms . In a senses this l a y e r of

l a n g u a g e i s un ique and absolute . B u t i t also g ives rise to t w o o ther fo rms

of d iscourse w h i c h p r o v i d e i t w i t h a f rame: a b o v e it, there i s c o m m e n t a r y ,

w h i c h recasts the g i v e n signs to serve a n e w purpose , and b e l o w it, the

tex t , w h o s e p r i m a c y i s p resupposed b y c o m m e n t a r y t o exis t h idden b e ­

nea th the m a r k s v i s ib le to all. H e n c e there are three levels o f l a n g u a g e ,

all based u p o n the s ingle b e i n g of the w r i t t e n w o r d . I t i s this c o m p l e x

in terac t ion o f e lements that w a s t o disappear w i t h the end o f the Rena i s ­

sance. A n d i n t w o w a y s : because the fo rms osci l la t ing endlessly b e t w e e n

o n e and three terms w e r e to be f ixed in a b i n a r y f o r m w h i c h w o u l d render

t h e m stable; and because l anguage , instead o f ex i s t ing as the mater ia l

w r i t i n g o f th ings , w a s t o f ind its area o f b e i n g restricted t o the genera l

o rgan i za t i on o f representat ive s igns.

T h i s n e w a r r a n g e m e n t b r o u g h t a b o u t the appearance o f a n e w p r o b l e m ,

u n k n o w n unt i l t hen : i n the s ix teen th c e n t u r y , o n e asked o n e s e l f h o w i t

w a s poss ible to k n o w that a s ign d id in fact des ignate w h a t i t s ignif ied;

42

T H E P R O S E O F T H E W O R L D

f r o m the seven teen th cen tu ry , o n e b e g a n to ask h o w a s ign c o u l d be

l inked to w h a t i t s ignif ied. A ques t ion to w h i c h the Class ical p e r i o d w a s

t o r ep ly b y the analysis o f representa t ion; a n d t o w h i c h m o d e m t h o u g h t

w a s t o r e p l y b y the analysis o f m e a n i n g and s ignif icat ion. B u t g i v e n the

fact itself, l a n g u a g e w a s n e v e r to be a n y t h i n g m o r e than a par t icular case

o f representat ion (for the Classics) o r o f s ignif ica t ion (for us) . T h e p r o ­

found k inship o f l a n g u a g e w i t h the w o r l d w a s thus d isso lved . T h e p r i m a c y

o f the w r i t t e n w o r d w e n t in to a b e y a n c e . A n d that u n i f o r m laye r , i n

w h i c h the seen and the read, the v i s ib le and the express ib le , w e r e endless ly

i n t e r w o v e n , van i shed t o o . T h i n g s a n d w o r d s w e r e t o b e separated f r o m

one another . T h e e y e w a s thence fo r th dest ined to see and o n l y to see,

the ear to hear and o n l y to hear . D i s c o u r s e w a s still to h a v e the task o f

speaking that w h i c h is, bu t i t w a s no l o n g e r t o be a n y t h i n g m o r e than

w h a t i t said.

T h i s i n v o l v e d an i m m e n s e r eo rgan iza t ion o f cu l ture , a r eo rgan i za t i on

o f w h i c h the Classical a g e w a s the first and perhaps the m o s t i m p o r t a n t

stage, since i t w a s responsible for the n e w a r r a n g e m e n t in w h i c h we are

still c a u g h t - s ince it is the Classical a g e that separates us f r o m a cu l tu re

in w h i c h the s ignif icat ion o f signs d id no t exist , because i t w a s reabsorbed

into the s o v e r e i g n t y o f the L i k e ; b u t i n w h i c h their e n i g m a t i c , m o n o t o n ­

ous, s tubborn , and p r i m i t i v e b e i n g shone in an endless dispersion.

T h e r e i s n o t h i n g n o w , ei ther in o u r k n o w l e d g e o r in o u r ref lect ion,

that still recalls e v e n the m e m o r y o f that b e i n g . N o t h i n g , e x c e p t perhaps

literature - and e v e n then in a fashion m o r e a l lus ive and d i agona l than

direct. It m a y be said in a sense that ' l i terature ' , as it w a s cons t i tu ted a n d

so des ignated on the threshold of the m o d e r n a g e , manifests, a t a t ime

w h e n i t w a s least e x p e c t e d , the reappearance , o f the l i v i n g b e i n g o f l an ­

guage . In the seven teen th and e igh teen th centur ies , the pecul ia r ex is tence

and ancient so l id i ty of l a n g u a g e as a t h ing inscr ibed in the fabric of the

w o r l d w e r e d i sso lved i n the func t ion ing o f representa t ion; all l a n g u a g e

had v a l u e o n l y a s discourse . T h e art o f l a n g u a g e w a s a w a y o f ' m a k i n g

a s ign ' - of s imul t aneous ly s ign i fy ing s o m e t h i n g and a r r a n g i n g signs

around that t h i n g ; an art o f n a m i n g , therefore , and then, by means o f a

redupl icat ion b o t h d e m o n s t r a t i v e and deco ra t i ve , o f c a p t u r i n g that n a m e ,

o f enc los ing and concea l i ng it, o f des igna t ing i t i n turn by o the r names

that w e r e the deferred presence of the first n a m e , its s econda ry s ign , its

f igurat ion, its rhe tor ica l p a n o p l y . A n d y e t , t h r o u g h o u t the n ine teen th

century, and r igh t up t o o u r o w n d a y - f r o m H o l d e r l i n t o M a l l a r m e and

on to A n t o n i n A r t a u d - l i terature a c h i e v e d a u t o n o m o u s exis tence , and

43

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

44

separated i tself f r o m all o the r l anguage w i t h a deep scission, o n l y by f o r m ­

i n g a sort o f ' counte r -d i scourse ' , and by f i nd ing its w a y back f r o m the

representat ive o r s ign i fy ing funct ion o f l a n g u a g e to this r a w b e i n g that

had been fo rgo t t en since the s ix teenth cen tu ry .

I t i s possible to be l i eve that o n e has at tained the v e r y essence of l i tera­

ture w h e n o n e i s no l o n g e r in te r roga t ing i t a t the l eve l o f w h a t i t says

bu t o n l y in its s ignif icant f o r m : in d o i n g so, o n e i s l im i t i ng one ' s v i e w of

l a n g u a g e to its Classical status. In the m o d e r n age , l i terature is that w h i c h

compensa tes for (and no t that w h i c h conf i rms) the s ign i fy ing funct ion o f

l anguage . T h r o u g h l i terature, the b e i n g o f l a n g u a g e shines o n c e m o r e

on the frontiers of W e s t e r n cul ture - and at its cent re - for i t is w h a t has

been mos t fo re ign to that cu l ture since the s ix teenth c e n t u r y ; bu t i t has

also, since this same cen tu ry , been a t the v e r y centre o f w h a t W e s t e r n

cu l ture has ove r l a in . T h i s i s w h y li terature i s appea r ing m o r e and m o r e as

that w h i c h mus t be t h o u g h t ; bu t equa l ly , and for the same reason, as that

w h i c h can neve r , i n a n y c i rcumstance , be t h o u g h t i n acco rdance w i t h

a t h e o r y o f s ignif icat ion. W h e t h e r o n e analyses i t f r o m the po in t o f v i e w

of w h a t i s s ignif ied ( o f w h a t i t i s t r y i n g to say, o f its ' ideas ' , o f w h a t i t

p romises , o r o f w h a t i t c o m m i t s o n e to) o r f r o m the po in t o f v i e w o f

that w h i c h signifies ( w i t h the he lp o f pa r ad igms b o r r o w e d f r o m l ingu i s ­

tics or psychoana lys i s ) matters l i t t le: all that is m e r e l y incidental . In b o t h

cases o n e w o u l d be searching for i t ou ts ide the g r o u n d in w h i c h , as r e ­

gards our cu l ture , i t has neve r ceased for the past c e n t u r y and a h a l f to

c o m e into b e i n g and t o impr in t itself. S u c h m o d e s o f d e c i p h e r m e n t b e ­

l o n g to a Class ical si tuation of l a n g u a g e - the situation that p r e d o m i n a t e d

du r ing the seventeenth cen tu ry , w h e n the o rgan iza t ion o f signs b e c a m e

b inary , and w h e n s ignif icat ion w a s reflected in the f o r m o f the representa­

t ion ; for a t that t ime li terature real ly w a s c o m p o s e d of a s i gn i fy ing

e l emen t and a s ignif ied con ten t , so that i t w a s p r o p e r to analyse i t

a c c o r d i n g l y . B u t f r o m the n ineteenth cen tu ry , l i terature b e g a n to b r ing

l a n g u a g e b a c k to l igh t o n c e m o r e in its o w n b e i n g : t h o u g h n o t a s i t

had still appeared a t the end o f the Renaissance. Fo r n o w w e n o l o n g e r

h a v e that p r i m a r y , that abso lu te ly initial, w o r d u p o n w h i c h the infinite

m o v e m e n t o f discourse w a s f o u n d e d and b y w h i c h i t w a s l imi t ed ;

hencefor th , l a n g u a g e w a s t o g r o w w i t h n o p o i n t o f depar ture , n o end , and

no p r o m i s e . I t i s the traversal of this futile y e t fundamenta l space that

the t ex t o f l i terature traces f r o m d a y to d a y .

C H A P T E R 3

Representing

I D O N Q U I X O T E

W i t h all their twis ts and turns, D o n Q u i x o t e ' s adven tu res f o r m the

b o u n d a r y : t hey m a r k the end o f the o l d in te rp lay b e t w e e n r e semblance

and signs and con ta in the beg inn ings o f n e w relat ions. D o n Q u i x o t e i s

n o t a m a n g i v e n to e x t r a v a g a n c e , bu t rather a d i l igen t p i l g r i m b r e a k i n g

his j o u r n e y be fo re all the marks o f s imi l i tude. He i s the he ro o f the S a m e .

He n e v e r m a n a g e s to escape f r o m the famil iar p la in s t re tch ing o u t on all

sides o f the A n a l o g u e , a n y m o r e than h e does f r o m his o w n small p r o ­

v i n c e . He t ravels endlessly o v e r that pla in , w i t h o u t e v e r c ross ing the

c lea r ly def ined frontiers o f difference, o r r each ing the heart o f ident i ty .

M o r e o v e r , he is h i m s e l f l i ke a s ign , a l o n g , th in g r aph i sm, a letter that

has j u s t escaped f r o m the o p e n pages o f a b o o k . H i s w h o l e b e i n g i s n o t h ­

i n g b u t l a n g u a g e , t ex t , pr in ted pages , stories that h a v e a l r e a d y been

w r i t t e n d o w n . H e i s m a d e u p o f i n t e r w o v e n w o r d s ; h e i s w r i t i n g itself,

w a n d e r i n g t h r o u g h the w o r l d a m o n g the resemblances o f th ings . Y e t

n o t ent i re ly s o : for in his real i ty as an i m p o v e r i s h e d h i d a l g o he can b e ­

c o m e a k n i g h t o n l y by l is tening f r o m afar to the a g e - o l d epic that g i v e s

its f o r m to L a w . T h e b o o k i s no t so m u c h his ex is tence as his d u t y . He i s

cons tan t ly o b l i g e d to consu l t i t i n o rde r t o k n o w w h a t t o do o r say, and

w h a t signs he should g i v e h i m s e l f and others i n o rde r t o s h o w that he

rea l ly i s o f the same nature a s the tex t f r o m w h i c h he-springs. T h e ch iva l r i c

r o m a n c e s h a v e p r o v i d e d o n c e and fo r all a w r i t t e n prescr ip t ion for his

adven tures . A n d e v e r y episode, e v e r y decis ion , e v e r y e x p l o i t w i l l b e y e t

ano the r s ign that D o n Q u i x o t e i s a t rue likeness of all the signs that he has

t raced f r o m his b o o k . B u t the fact that he wi shes to be l i ke t h e m means

that he m u s t p u t t h e m to the test, that the ( legible) s igns no l o n g e r

r e semble (visible) p e o p l e . A l l those w r i t t e n texts , all those e x t r a v a g a n t

romances are, qu i te l i teral ly, unpara l le led: no o n e in the w o r l d e v e r d id

46

R E P R E S E N T I N G

r e semble t h e m ; their t imeless l a n g u a g e remains suspended, unfulf i l led

by a n y s imi l i tude ; t h e y c o u l d all be b u r n e d in their ent i re ty and d i e f o r m

o f the w o r l d w o u l d n o t b e c h a n g e d . I f h e i s t o r e semble the texts o f w h i c h

he i s the wi tness , the representat ion, the real ana logue , D o n Q u i x o t e m u s t

a lso furnish p r o o f a n d p r o v i d e the indubi tab le s ign that t hey are te l l ing

the t ruth, that t h e y rea l ly are the l a n g u a g e of the w o r l d . I t i s i n c u m b e n t

u p o n h i m to fulfil the p r o m i s e of the b o o k s . I t i s his task to recreate the

epic , t h o u g h by a reverse process : the epic r e c o u n t e d (or c l a i m e d to r e ­

c o u n t ) real exp lo i t s , offer ing t h e m t o o u r m e m o r y ; D o n Q u i x o t e , o n

the o the r hand , mus t e n d o w w i t h real i ty the s i g n s - w i t h o u t - c o n t e n t o f the

narra t ive . H i s adventures w i l l be a dec iphe r ing of the w o r l d : a d i l igen t

search o v e r the entire surface o f the earth fo r the fo rms that w i l l p r o v e

that w h a t the b o o k s say is true. E a c h e x p l o i t mus t be a p r o o f : i t consists,

n o t in a real t r i u m p h - w h i c h is w h y v i c t o r y is n o t rea l ly i m p o r t a n t - b u t

in an a t t empt to t rans form real i ty in to a s ign . In to a s ign that the signs of

l a n g u a g e rea l ly are i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h th ings themselves . D o n Q u i x o t e

reads the w o r l d i n o rde r t o p r o v e his b o o k s . A n d the o n l y p roofs he g i v e s

h i m s e l f are the g l i t t e r ing reflections o f resemblances .

H i s w h o l e j o u r n e y is a ques t for s imi l i tudes: the sl ightest ana logies

are pressed in to service as d o r m a n t signs that m u s t be r e a w a k e n e d and

m a d e t o speak o n c e m o r e . F locks , s e rv ing gir ls , and inns b e c o m e o n c e

m o r e the l a n g u a g e o f b o o k s t o the i m p e r c e p t i b l e d e g r e e t o w h i c h t h e y

resemble castles, ladies, and armies - a pe rpe tua l ly un tenable r e semblance

w h i c h t ransforms the s o u g h t - f o r p r o o f in to der is ion and leaves the w o r d s

o f the b o o k s f o r e v e r h o l l o w . B u t non- s imi l i t ude i tself has its m o d e l , and

one that i t imitates in the m o s t servi le w a y : i t i s to be f o u n d in the t rans­

format ions p e r f o r m e d b y mag ic ians . S o all the indices o f non - r e semblance ,

all the signs that p r o v e that the w r i t t e n texts are n o t te l l ing the t ruth,

resemble the ac t ion o f sorcery , w h i c h in t roduces difference in to the i n ­

dubi table exis tence o f s imi l i tude b y means o f decei t . A n d since this m a g i c

has been foreseen and descr ibed in the b o o k s , the i l lusory difference that i t

in t roduces can n e v e r be a n y t h i n g bu t an enchan ted s imi l i tude , and , the re ­

fore , y e t ano the r s ign that the signs in the b o o k s rea l ly do resemble the

truth.

Don Quixote is a n e g a t i v e of the Renaissance w o r l d ; w r i t i n g has ceased

t o be the prose o f the w o r l d ; resemblances and signs h a v e d isso lved their

f o rmer a l l iance; s imil i tudes h a v e b e c o m e decep t ive and v e r g e u p o n the

v i s iona ry o r madness ; th ings still r ema in s t ubbo rn ly w i t h i n their i ron ic

ident i ty : t h e y are n o l o n g e r a n y t h i n g bu t w h a t they are; w o r d s w a n d e r

"

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

o f f on their o w n , w i t h o u t conten t , w i t h o u t resemblance t o fill their

empt iness ; t hey are no l o n g e r the marks o f th ings ; they lie s leeping b e ­

t w e e n the pages o f b o o k s and c o v e r e d i n dust. M a g i c , w h i c h pe rmi t t ed

the d e c i p h e r m e n t o f the w o r l d b y r evea l ing the secret resemblances b e ­

nea th its signs, is no l o n g e r of a n y use e x c e p t as an exp lana t ion , in te rms

o f madness , o f w h y analogies are a l w a y s p r o v e d false. T h e e rud i t ion that

o n c e read nature and b o o k s a l ike as parts of a s ingle tex t has been re legated

to the same c a t e g o r y a s its o w n ch imeras : l o d g e d in the y e l l o w e d pages o f

b o o k s , the signs o f l a n g u a g e n o l o n g e r h a v e a n y v a l u e apart f r o m the

slender f ic t ion w h i c h t h e y represent. T h e w r i t t e n w o r d and th ings n o

l o n g e r r e semble o n e another . A n d b e t w e e n t h e m , D o n Q u i x o t e w a n d e r s

o f f o n his o w n . >

Y e t l a n g u a g e has no t b e c o m e en t i re ly i m p o t e n t . I t n o w possesses n e w

p o w e r s , and p o w e r s pecul ia r to i t a lone . In the second par t o f the n o v e l ,

D o n Q u i x o t e mee ts characters w h o h a v e read the first par t o f his s tory

and r e c o g n i z e h i m , the real m a n , a s the he ro o f the b o o k . Ce rvan t e s ' s

t ex t turns b a c k u p o n itself, thrusts i tself back in to its o w n densi ty , and

b e c o m e s the ob jec t o f its o w n narra t ive . T h e first par t o f the he ro ' s

adventures p lays in the second part the role o r ig ina l ly assumed by the

ch iva l r ic r omances . D o n Q u i x o t e mus t r emain faithful t o the b o o k that

he has n o w b e c o m e in real i ty ; he m u s t p ro t ec t i t f r o m errors, f r o m

counterfei ts , f r o m a p o c r y p h a l sequels; he mus t fill in the details that h a v e

been left o u t ; he mus t preserve its t ruth. B u t D o n Q u i x o t e h i m s e l f has

no t read this b o o k , and does no t h a v e to read it, since he i s the b o o k in

f lesh and b l o o d . H a v i n g first read so m a n y b o o k s that he b e c a m e a s ign,

a s ign w a n d e r i n g t h r o u g h a w o r l d that did no t r e c o g n i z e h i m , he has n o w ,

despite h i m s e l f and w i t h o u t his k n o w l e d g e , b e c o m e a b o o k that conta ins

his t ruth, that records e x a c t l y all that he has d o n e and said and seen and

t h o u g h t , and that a t last m a k e s h i m r ecogn i zab l e , so c lose ly does he re ­

semble all those signs w h o s e ineffaceable impr in t he has left beh ind h i m .

B e t w e e n the first and second parts o f the n o v e l , i n the n a r r o w g a p

b e t w e e n those t w o v o l u m e s , and b y their p o w e r a lone , D o n Q u i x o t e has

ach i eved his rea l i ty - a reali ty he o w e s to l a n g u a g e a lone , and w h i c h

resides ent i re ly inside the w o r d s . D o n Q u i x o t e ' s t ruth i s no t in the re ­

lat ion o f the w o r d s to the w o r l d bu t in that s lender and constant re lat ion

w o v e n b e t w e e n themselves b y v e r b a l signs. T h e h o l l o w f ic t ion o f ep ic

explo i t s has b e c o m e the representa t ive p o w e r o f l a n g u a g e . W o r d s h a v e

s w a l l o w e d up their o w n nature as signs.

Don Quixote is the first m o d e r n w o r k of l i terature, because in i t we see

48

R E P R E S E N T I N G

the cruel reason o f identit ies and differences m a k e endless sport o f signs

and s imi l i tudes ; because in i t l a n g u a g e breaks o f f its o ld k insh ip w i t h th ings

and enters in to that l o n e l y s o v e r e i g n t y f r o m w h i c h i t w i l l reappear , in

its separated state, o n l y as l i terature; because i t marks the po in t w h e r e

resemblance enters a n a g e w h i c h is, f r o m the p o i n t o f v i e w o f resemblance ,

o n e o f madness and imag ina t i on . O n c e s imi l i tude and signs are sundered

f r o m each o ther , t w o exper iences can b e established a n d t w o characters

appear face to face. T h e m a d m a n , unde r s tood n o t a s o n e w h o i s sick b u t

as an established and main ta ined devian t , as an indispensable cu l tura l

funct ion, has b e c o m e , i n W e s t e r n expe r i ence , the m a n o f p r i m i t i v e r e ­

semblances . T h i s character , as he i s dep ic ted in the nove l s or p lays of the

B a r o q u e age , and as he w a s g r a d u a l l y ins t i tu t ional ized r igh t up to the

adven t of n ine teen th -cen tu ry psych ia t ry , i s the m a n w h o i s alienated in

analogy. He i s the d isordered p l a y e r o f the S a m e and the O t h e r . He takes

things for w h a t t hey are not , and p e o p l e o n e for ano the r ; he cuts his

friends and r ecogn ize s c o m p l e t e s trangers; he thinks he i s u n m a s k i n g

w h e n , in fact, he is p u t t i n g on a mask . He inver ts all va lues and all

p ropor t ions , because he is cons tan t ly under the impress ion that he is

dec ipher ing s igns : for h i m , the c r o w n m a k e s the k i n g . In the cul tura l

pe rcep t ion o f the m a d m a n that p reva i led u p t o the end o f the e igh teen th

cen tu ry , he is Di f fe ren t o n l y in so far as he is u n a w a r e of Di f fe rence ; he

sees n o t h i n g bu t resemblances and signs o f r e semblance e v e r y w h e r e ; for

h i m all signs r e semble o n e another , and all resemblances h a v e the v a l u e

o f signs. A t the o ther end o f the cul tural area, bu t b r o u g h t c lose b y s y m ­

m e t r y , the p o e t i s he w h o , benea th the n a m e d , cons tan t ly e x p e c t e d

differences, red iscovers the bur ied kinships b e t w e e n th ings , their scattered

resemblances . B e n e a t h the established signs, and in spite of t hem, he hears

another , deeper , discourse, w h i c h recalls the t i m e w h e n w o r d s g l i t te red

in the universal r e semblance o f th ings ; in the l a n g u a g e o f the poe t , the

S o v e r e i g n t y o f the S a m e , so difficult to express , eclipses, the dis t inct ion

exis t ing b e t w e e n signs.

T h i s accounts , n o d o u b t , for the conf ron ta t ion o f p o e t r y and madness

i n m o d e r n W e s t e r n cu l ture . B u t i t i s no l o n g e r the o ld P la ton ic t h e m e o f

inspired madness . I t i s the m a r k o f a n e w expe r i ence o f l a n g u a g e and

things. At the fringes o f a k n o w l e d g e that separates be ings , s igns, a n d

simili tudes, and as t h o u g h to l imi t its p o w e r , the m a d m a n fulfils the

funct ion of homosemanticism: he g r o u p s all signs t oge the r and leads t h e m

w i t h a resemblance that n e v e r ceases to prol i ferate . T h e p o e t fulfils the

opposi te func t ion : his is the allegorical ro le ; benea th the l a n g u a g e of

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

signs and benea th the in te rp lay o f their p rec i se ly de l ineated dis t inct ions,

he strains his ears to ca t ch that ' o the r l a n g u a g e ' , the l a n g u a g e , w i t h o u t

w o r d s o r discourse, o f resemblance . T h e p o e t br ings s imi l i tude t o the

signs that speak it , w h e r e a s the m a d m a n loads all signs w i t h a resemblance

that u l t ima te ly erases t h e m . T h e y share, then, o n the ou t e r e d g e o f o u r

cu l tu re and at the p o i n t nearest to its essential d iv is ions , that ' f ront ier '

s i tuation - a m a r g i n a l pos i t ion and a p r o f o u n d l y archaic s i lhouet te -

w h e r e their w o r d s unceas ing ly r e n e w the p o w e r o f their strangeness and

the s t rength o f their contes ta t ion . B e t w e e n t h e m there has o p e n e d u p

a f ield o f k n o w l e d g e in w h i c h , because o f an essential rup ture i n the

W e s t e r n w o r l d , w h a t has b e c o m e i m p o r t a n t i s n o l o n g e r resemblances

b u t identit ies a n d differences.

ft

I I O R D E R

Establ i sh ing discontinui t ies is n o t an easy task e v e n for h i s tory in genera l .

A n d i t i s cer ta in ly e v e n less s o fo r the h i s tory o f t h o u g h t . W e m a y w i s h

t o d r a w a d iv id ing - l i ne ; bu t a n y l imi t we set m a y perhaps be no m o r e than

a n arbi t rary d iv i s ion m a d e i n a cons tan t ly m o b i l e w h o l e . W e m a y w i s h

t o m a r k o f f a p e r i o d ; b u t h a v e we the r i gh t t o establish s y m m e t r i c a l

breaks a t t w o po in t s i n t i m e in o rde r t o g i v e an appearance o f con t i nu i t y

and u n i t y t o the sys t em w e p lace b e t w e e n t h e m ? W h e r e , i n that case,

w o u l d the cause o f its ex is tence lie? Or that o f its subsequent d isappearance

and fall? W h a t rule c o u l d i t be o b e y i n g by b o t h its ex is tence and its

disappearance? I f i t con ta ins a pr inc ip le of c o h e r e n c e wi th in itself, w h e n c e

c o u l d c o m e the fo r e ign e l e m e n t capable o f r e b u t t i n g it? H o w can a

t h o u g h t m e l t a w a y be fo re a n y t h i n g o the r than i tself? G e n e r a l l y speak ing ,

w h a t does i t m e a n , n o l o n g e r b e i n g able t o t h ink a cer ta in t h o u g h t ? O r

to i n t r o d u c e a n e w t h o u g h t ?

D i s c o n t i n u i t y - the fact that w i t h i n the space of a f e w years a cu l tu re

some t imes ceases to th ink as i t h a d been t h i n k i n g up till then and beg ins

to th ink o the r th ings in a n e w w a y - p r o b a b l y beg ins w i t h an e ros ion

f r o m outs ide , f r o m that space w h i c h is, for t h o u g h t , on the o the r side,

b u t i n w h i c h i t has n e v e r ceased to th ink f r o m the v e r y b e g i n n i n g .

U l t i m a t e l y , the p r o b l e m that presents i tself i s that o f the relat ions b e t w e e n

t h o u g h t and cu l tu re : h o w is i t that t h o u g h t has a p lace in the space of the

w o r l d , that i t has its o r i g i n there, and that i t n e v e r ceases, in this p lace or

that, t o b e g i n a n e w ? B u t perhaps i t i s n o t y e t t i m e to pose this p r o b l e m ;

perhaps w e shou ld w a i t unti l the a r c h a e o l o g y o f t h o u g h t has been

50

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51

established m o r e f i rmly , unti l i t i s bet ter able to g a u g e w h a t i t i s capab le

o f descr ib ing d i rec t ly a n d pos i t i ve ly , unti l i t has def ined the par t icular

systems and internal connec t ions i t has to dea l w i t h , be fo re a t t e m p t i n g

to encompass t h o u g h t and to inves t iga te h o w i t con t r ives to escape itself.

For the m o m e n t , then, let i t suffice that we accep t these discont inui t ies

in the s imul taneous ly manifest and obscure empi r i ca l o rde r w h e r e v e r

t hey posi t t hemse lves .

A t the b e g i n n i n g o f the seven teen th cen tu ry , d u r i n g the p e r i o d that

has been t e rmed , r i g h t l y o r w r o n g l y , the B a r o q u e , t h o u g h t ceases t o

m o v e i n the e l e m e n t o f r e semblance . S imi l i tude i s n o l o n g e r the f o r m o f

k n o w l e d g e b u t rather the occas ion o f error , the d a n g e r t o w h i c h o n e

exposes onese l f w h e n o n e does no t e x a m i n e the obscu re r e g i o n o f c o n ­

fusions. 'I t is a f requent habi t , ' says Descar tes , in the f irst lines of his

Regulae, ' w h e n w e d i scove r several resemblances b e t w e e n t w o th ings ,

t o at t r ibute to b o t h equa l ly , e v e n on po in t s i n w h i c h t h e y are in real i ty

different, that w h i c h w e h a v e r e c o g n i z e d t o b e t rue o f o n l y o n e o f

t h e m ' [ i ] . T h e a g e of resemblance i s d r a w i n g to a c lose . I t i s l e a v i n g n o t h ­

ing beh ind i t b u t g a m e s . G a m e s w h o s e p o w e r s o f enchan tmen t g r o w o u t

o f the n e w kinship b e t w e e n resemblance and i l lus ion; the ch imeras o f

s imil i tude l o o m up on all sides, bu t t hey are r e c o g n i z e d as ch imeras ; i t i s

the p r i v i l e g e d a g e o f trompe-l'oeil pa in t ing , o f the c o m i c i l lusion, o f the

p l ay that dupl icates i tself by represent ing ano the r p l a y , of the quid pro

quo, of d reams and v is ions ; i t i s the a g e of the d e c e i v i n g senses; i t i s the

age i n w h i c h the poe t i c d imens ion o f l a n g u a g e i s def ined b y m e t a p h o r ,

simile, and a l l e g o r y . A n d i t w a s also i n the nature o f th ings that the k n o w ­

l e d g e o f the s ix teenth c e n t u r y should l eave b e h i n d i t the dis tor ted m e m o r y

o f a m u d d l e d and d isordered b o d y o f learn ing i n w h i c h all the th ings i n

the w o r l d c o u l d be l i n k e d ind iscr imina te ly t o men ' s exper iences , t radi ­

t ions, o r creduli t ies . F r o m then o n , the n o b l e , r i g o r o u s , and restr ict ive

f igures o f s imi l i tude w e r e t o b e fo rgo t t en . A n d the signs that des igna ted

t h e m w e r e t o be t h o u g h t o f a s the fantasies and cha rms o f a k n o w l e d g e

that had n o t y e t at tained the a g e o f reason.

We a l ready f i nd a c r i t ique o f resemblance i n B a c o n - an empi r ica l

c r i t ique that concerns , n o t the relat ions o f o rde r and equa l i ty b e t w e e n

things , bu t the types o f m i n d and the fo rms o f i l lusion t o w h i c h t h e y m i g h t

be subject . We are dea l ing w i t h a doc t r ine of the quid pro quo. B a c o n does

no t dissipate s imil i tudes by means o f e v i d e n c e and its a t tendant rules. He

s h o w s t h e m , s h i m m e r i n g be fo re o u r eyes , van i sh ing as o n e d r a w s near,

then r e - f o r m i n g aga in a m o m e n t later, a l i t t le further off. T h e y are idols.

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

T h e idols of the den and the idols of the theatre m a k e us b e l i e v e that th ings

r e semble w h a t w e h a v e learned and the theories w e h a v e f o r m e d for

ourse lves ; o the r idols m a k e us b e l i e v e that th ings are l inked by r e s e m ­

blances b e t w e e n themse lves .

T h e h u m a n Intel lect , f r o m its pecu l ia r nature, easily supposes a grea te r

o rde r and equa l i ty in things than i t ac tua l ly f inds; and, w h i l e there are

m a n y th ings in N a t u r e un ique , and qui te i r fegular , still i t feigns pa ra l ­

lels, cor respondents , and relations that h a v e no exis tence . H e n c e that

f ic t ion , ' that a m o n g the h e a v e n l y bodies all m o t i o n takes p lace by

perfec t c i rc les ' .

S u c h arc the idols of the tribe, spontaneous f ict ions of the m i n d ; to w h i c h

are added - as effects and some t imes as causes - the confus ions of l an­

g u a g e : o n e and the same n a m e b e i n g appl ied indifferently to th ings that

are n o t of the same nature . T h e s e are the idols of the market[2]. O n l y

p r u d e n c e on the part o f the m i n d can dissipate t h e m , i f i t abjures its

natural haste and l e v i t y in o rde r to b e c o m e 'pene t ra t ing ' and u l t ima te ly

p e r c e i v e the differences inherent in nature .

T h e Car tes ian c r i t ique o f resemblance i s o f ano ther t y p e . I t i s no l o n g e r

s ix teen th -cen tu ry t h o u g h t b e c o m i n g t roub led as i t con templa te s i tself

and b e g i n n i n g to j e t t i son its m o s t famil iar f o r m s ; i t i s Classical t h o u g h t

e x c l u d i n g re semblance as the fundamenta l expe r i ence a n d p r i m a r y f o r m

of k n o w l e d g e , d e n o u n c i n g i t as a confused m i x t u r e that m u s t be ana lysed

i n terms o f ident i ty , difference, measu remen t , a n d order . T , h o u g h D e s ­

cartes rejects r esemblance , h e does s o no t b y e x c l u d i n g the act o f c o m ­

par ison f r o m rat ional t h o u g h t , n o r e v e n by seeking to l imi t it, bu t on the

con t r a ry by un iversa l iz ing i t and t he r eby g i v i n g i t its purest f o r m . Indeed,

i t i s b y means o f c o m p a r i s o n that w e d i scove r ' f o r m , ex ten t , m o v e m e n t

and o the r such th ings ' - that is to say, s imple natures - in all subjects in

w h i c h t hey m a y b e present . A n d , m o r e o v e r , i n a d e d u c t i o n o f the t y p e

'all o f A i s B , all o f B i s C , therefore all o f A i s C , i t i s c lear that the m i n d

' m a k e s a c o m p a r i s o n b e t w e e n the t e r m s o u g h t and the t e r m g i v e n , to

w i t A and C , w i t h relat ion t o the k n o w l e d g e that b o t h are B ' . I n c o n ­

sequence , i f o n e m a k e s a n e x c e p t i o n o f the in tu i t ion o n e m a y h a v e o f a s ingle

th ing , o n e can say that all k n o w l e d g e 'is ob t a ined by the c o m p a r i s o n o f

t w o o r m o r e th ings w i t h each o t h e r ' [ 3 ] . B u t i n fact, there can b e n o t rue

k n o w l e d g e e x c e p t by in tui t ion, that is, by a s ingular ac t o f pu re and

a t ten t ive in te l l igence , and b y deduc t ion , w h i c h links the o b s e r v e d e v i ­

d e n c e toge ther . H o w then can c o m p a r i s o n , w h i c h i s required for the

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53

acquis i t ion o f a lmos t all k n o w l e d g e and w h i c h , by def ini t ion, i s nei ther

an isolated obse rva t ion n o r a deduc t ion , stand as an au tho r i t y for a t rue

t h o u g h t ? ' A l m o s t all the l a b o u r accompl i shed by h u m a n reason consists

w i t h o u t d o u b t in r ende r ing this ope ra t ion poss ib le ' [4 ] .

T h e r e exist t w o f o r m s o f c o m p a r i s o n , and o n l y t w o : the c o m p a r i s o n

o f m e a s u r e m e n t and that o f o rder . O n e can measure sizes o r mul t ip l ic i t ies ,

in o ther w o r d s con t inuous sizes or d i scon t inuous sizes; b u t in b o t h cases

the use o f m e a s u r e m e n t presupposes that, un l i ke ca lcu la t ion , w h i c h p r o ­

ceeds f r o m e lements t o w a r d s a to ta l i ty , o n e considers the w h o l e f i r s t and

then d iv ides i t up in to parts. T h i s d iv i s ion results in a n u m b e r of units,

o f w h i c h s o m e are m e r e l y c o n v e n t i o n a l o r ' b o r r o w e d ' (in the case o f

con t inuous size) and others (in the case of mul t ipl ic i t ies or d i scon t inuous

sizes) are the units o f a r i thmet ic . T h e c o m p a r i s o n o f t w o sizes o r t w o

mult ipl ic i t ies requires , in a n y case, that t h e y b o t h be analysed a c c o r d i n g

to a c o m m o n uni t ; so that c o m p a r i s o n effected a c c o r d i n g to m e a s u r e ­

m e n t i s reduc ib le , in e v e r y case, to the a r i thmet ica l relat ions of equa l i ty

and inequal i ty . M e a s u r e m e n t enables us to analyse l ike th ings a c c o r d i n g

t o the ca lculable f o r m o f ident i ty and d i f f e r e n c e ^ ] .

O r d e r , on the o the r hand, i s established w i t h o u t reference to an e x ­

ter ior uni t : T can r e c o g n i z e , in effect, w h a t the o rde r is that exists b e t w e e n

A and B w i t h o u t cons ide r ing a n y t h i n g apart f r o m those t w o ou t e r

t e rms ' ; o n e canno t k n o w the o rde r o f th ings ' in their isolated na ture ' ,

bu t by d i s c o v e r i n g that w h i c h i s the s implest , then that w h i c h i s the n e x t

simplest , o n e can progress inev i t ab ly t o the mos t c o m p l e x th ings o f all .

W h e r e a s c o m p a r i s o n by measu remen t requires a d iv i s ion to b e g i n f r o m ,

then the app l ica t ion o f a c o m m o n unit , here , c o m p a r i s o n and o rde r are

one and the same t h i n g : c o m p a r i s o n by means of o rde r i s a s imple act

w h i c h enables us to pass f r o m o n e t e r m to another , then to a third, etc. ,

b y means o f a n ' abso lu te ly un in te r rupted ' [6] m o v e m e n t . I n this w a y w e

establish series in w h i c h the f i rs t t e r m is a na ture that we m a y intui t

i ndependen t ly o f a n y o the r na ture ; and i n w h i c h the o the r t e rms are

established a c c o r d i n g to increas ing differences.

S u c h , then, are the t w o types o f c o m p a r i s o n : the o n e analyses in to units

in o rde r to establish relations o f equa l i ty and inequa l i ty ; the o ther es tab­

lishes e lements , the simplest that can be found , and arranges differences

a c c o r d i n g to the smallest poss ible degrees . N o w , i t i s possible to use the

measu remen t o f sizes and mult ipl ic i t ies in establ ishing an o rde r ; ar i th­

met ica l va lues can a l w a y s be a r ranged a c c o r d i n g to a scries; a mu l t ip l i c i t y

of units can therefore ' b e a r ranged a c c o r d i n g to an o rde r such that the

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

54

difficulty, w h i c h previously lay in the k n o w i n g of measuremen t , comes

f ina l ly to depend solely on the considerat ion of o r d e r ' [ 7 ] . A n d i t i s p r e ­

cisely in this tha t t he m e t h o d and its 'progress ' consist: the reduc t ion of

all m e a s u r e m e n t (all de te rmina t ion by equal i ty and inequal i ty) to a

serial a r r a n g e m e n t wh ich , beg inn ing f rom the simplest, wil l s h o w up all

differences as degrees of complex i ty . After be ing analysed accord ing to

a g iven un i t and the relations of equal i ty or inequal i ty , the like is analysed

accord ing to its evident ident i ty a n d differences: differences that can be

t h o u g h t in t he o rde r of inferences. H o w e v e r , this o rde r or generalized

f o r m of compar i son can be established on ly accord ing to its posi t ion in

the b o d y o f o u r acquired k n o w l e d g e ; the absolute character we recognize

in w h a t i s s imple concerns n o t the be ing of th ings bu t ra ther the m a n n e r

in w h i c h they can be k n o w n . A th ing can be absolute accord ing to o n e

relat ion ye t relative accord ing to others [8]; o rde r can be a t once neces­

sary and na tura l (in relat ion to t h o u g h t ) and a rb i t ra ry (in relat ion to

th ings) , since, accord ing to the w a y in w h i c h we consider it, the same

th ing m a y be placed a t differing poin ts in o u r o rder .

Al l this was of the greatest consequence to W e s t e r n t h o u g h t . R e s e m ­

blance, w h i c h had for l ong been the fundamenta l ca tegory o f k n o w l e d g e

- b o t h the f o r m and the con ten t of w h a t we k n o w - b e c a m e dissociated in

an analysis based on te rms of ident i ty and difference; m o r e o v e r , w h e t h e r

indirectly by the in te rmedia ry of measuremen t , or direct ly and, as i t

w e r e , on the same foot ing, compar i son became a funct ion of o rde r ; and,

lastly, compar i son ceased to fulfil the function of reveal ing h o w the w o r l d

i s o rdered , since i t was n o w accomplished accord ing to t h e o r d e r laid

d o w n by t h o u g h t , progress ing natura l ly f rom the Simple to the c o m p l e x .

As a result, the entire episteme of W e s t e r n cu l ture found its fundamenta l

a r rangements modif ied. A n d , in part icular , the empir ical d o m a i n w h i c h

s ix teenth-century m a n saw as a c o m p l e x of kinships, resemblances, and

affinities, and in w h i c h l anguage and things w e r e endlessly i n t e r w o v e n -

this w h o l e vast f i e ld was to take on a n e w conf igura t ion . This n e w c o n ­

figurat ion m a y , I suppose, be called ' ra t ional ism' ; one m i g h t say, i f one 's

m i n d i s f i l led w i t h r e a d y - m a d e concepts , t ha t the seventeenth cen tu ry

marks the disappearance of the old superstit ious or magical beliefs and the

en t ry o f na ture , a t long last, in to the scientific order . B u t w h a t we m u s t

grasp and a t t e m p t to reconst i tute a re the modificat ions that affected

k n o w l e d g e itself, a t tha t archaic level w h i c h makes possible b o t h k n o w ­

ledge itself and the m o d e o f be ing o f w h a t i s to be k n o w n .

These modificat ions m a y be s u m m e d up as follows. First, the substi-

R E P R E S E N T I N G

tut ion of analysis for the h ierarchy of analogies: in the s ixteenth cen tury ,

the fundamenta l supposi t ion was that of a total system of cor respondence

(earth and sky, planets and faces, m i c r o c o s m and m a c r o c o s m ) , and each

particular s imil i tude was then lodged w i th in this overal l relation. F r o m

n o w on , every resemblance mus t be subjected to p r o o f by compar i son ,

that is, i t wil l n o t be accepted unt i l its ident i ty and the series of its differ­

ences have been discovered by means of measu remen t w i t h a c o m m o n

unit, or , m o r e radically, by its posi t ion in an order . F u r t h e r m o r e , t he

interplay of similitudes was h i the r to infinite: i t was a lways possible to

discover n e w ones, and the on ly l imitat ion c a m e f r o m the fundamenta l

ordering of things, f rom the finitude of a w o r l d held f i rmly b e t w e e n the

macrocosm and the mic rocosm. A comple t e enumera t i on wil l n o w be

possible: w h e t h e r in the f o r m of an exhaust ive census of all the e lements

consti tut ing the envisaged w h o l e , or in the f o r m of a categorical a r r ange­

ment that wil l art iculate the field of s tudy in its totali ty, or in the f o r m of

an analysis of a certain n u m b e r of poin ts , in sufficient n u m b e r , taken a long

the w h o l e l eng th of a series. C o m p a r i s o n , then, can attain to perfect

certainty: the o ld system of similitudes, never comple te a n d a lways open

to fresh possibilities, could , it is t rue , t h r o u g h successive conf i rmat ions ,

achieve steadily increasing probabi l i ty ; bu t i t was never certain. C o m p l e t e

enumerat ion, and the possibility of assigning at each po in t the necessary

connect ion w i t h the nex t , p e r m i t an absolutely certain k n o w l e d g e of

identities and differences: ' E n u m e r a t i o n alone, w h a t e v e r the quest ion to

which we are apply ing ourselves, wil l pe rmi t us always to deliver a t rue

and certain j u d g e m e n t u p o n i t ' [9 ] . T h e activity of the m i n d - and this is

the four th po in t - wil l therefore no longer consist in drawing things to­

gether, in set t ing ou t on a quest for every th ing that m i g h t reveal some sort

o f kinship, a t t ract ion, o r secretly shared na tu re w i th in t h e m , bu t , on the

contrary, in discriminating, tha t is, in establishing their identities, t hen the

inevitability of the connect ions w i t h all the successive degrees of a series.

In this sense, d iscr iminat ion imposes u p o n compar i son the p r i m a r y and

fundamental invest igat ion of difference: p r o v i d i n g oneself by in tu i t ion

wi th a distinct representat ion of things, and apprehend ing clearly the

inevitable connec t ion be tween one e lement in a series and that w h i c h

immedia te ly follows it. Lastly, a final consequence, since to k n o w is to

discriminate, h is tory and science wil l b e c o m e separated f rom one ano ther .

On the one h a n d there wi l l be erudi t ion , the perusal o f wr i t t en w o r k s ,

the interplay of their au thors ' op in ions ; this interplay m a y well , in some

cases, possess an indicative value, no t so m u c h because of the ag reemen t

55

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

56

it p roduces as because of the d isagreement : ' W h e n the quest ion at issue is

a difficult one , i t is m o r e p robab le that there w e r e few ra ther than m a n y

to discover the t ru th a b o u t it. ' O v e r against this his tory, and lacking any

c o m m o n uni t o f measu remen t w i t h it, are the confident j u d g e m e n t s wc

are able to m a k e by means of intui t ions and their serial connect ion . These

and these a lone are w h a t const i tu te science, and even i f we had ' read all

the a r g u m e n t s of Pla to a n d Aristot le , . . . w h a t we w o u l d have learned

w o u l d n o t be sciences, i t appears, bu t h is tory ' [10]. Th is being so, the

wr i t t en w o r d ceases to be included a m o n g the signs and forms of t ru th ;

language is no longer o n e of the figurations of the w o r l d , or a s ignature

s t amped u p o n th ings since the beg inn ing o f t ime. T h e manifestat ion

and sign of t r u t h are to be found in evident and distinct percept ion . I t is

the task of w o r d s to translate that t r u t h i f they can; b u t they no longer

have the r igh t to be considered a m a r k of it. Language has w i t h d r a w n

f rom the mids t of beings themselves and has entered a per iod of t rans­

parency and neutra l i ty .

This is a general p h e n o m e n o n in scven tccn th-cen tury cul ture - a m o r e

general one than the part icular fortunes of Cartesianism.

We must , i n fact, dist inguish be tween three things. On the one hand,

there was the mechan i sm that , for w h a t was really a fairly shor t per iod

(not qu i te the last fifty years of the seventeenth cen tu ry ) , offered a theore t ­

ical m o d e l to certain fields of k n o w l e d g e such as medic ine or phys io logy.

T h e r e was also an a t t emp t , ra ther diverse in the forms i t t ook , to ma thc -

maticize empir ical k n o w l e d g e ; t h o u g h constant and con t inuous in the

case of a s t r o n o m y and par t of physics, i t was on ly sporadic in o the r fields -

somet imes actually a t t empted (as w i t h C o n d o r c e t ) , some t imes suggested

as a universal ideal and a hor izon for research (as w i t h Condi l lac or D e s -

tu t t ) , and somet imes , t o o , rejected even as a possibility (by Buffon, for

example ) . B u t nei ther this endeavour n o r the a t t empts o f mechan i sm should

be confused w i t h the relat ion that all Classical k n o w l e d g e , in its mos t

general fo rm, maintains w i t h the mathesis, unde r s tood as a universal

science o f measu remen t and order . U n d e r cover o f the e m p t y and o b ­

scurely incanta tory phrases 'Cartesian influence' or ' N e w t o n i a n mode l ' ,

ou r historians of ideas are in the habi t of confusing these three things and

defining Classical ra t ional ism as the tendency to m a k e na ture mechanical

and calculable. O t h e r s are slightly m o r e percept ive , and go to a great deal

of t roub le to discover benea th this rat ionalism a play o f ' c o n t r a r y forces ' :

the forces of na tu re and life refusing to let themselves be reduced either

to algebra or to dynamics , and thus preserving, in the depths of Classicism

R E P R E S E N T I N G

itself, the na tura l resources of the non-ra t ional izable . These t w o forms

of analysis are equally inadequate ; for the fundamenta l e lement of the

Classical episteme is nei ther the success or failure of mechan i sm, n o r the

right to mathemat ic ize or the impossibil i ty of mathemat ic iz ing na tu re ,

but ra ther a l ink w i t h the mathesis w h i c h , unt i l t he end of t he e igh teen th

century, remains constant and unal tered. This link has t w o essential

characteristics. T h e first is tha t relations be tween beings are indeed to be

conceived in t he f o r m of o rde r a n d measu remen t , b u t w i t h this funda­

mental imbalance, that i t is a lways possible to reduce p rob lems of m e a s u r e ­

ment to p r o b l e m s of order . So that the relation of all k n o w l e d g e to t he

mathesis is posi ted as the possibility of establishing an o rdered succession

between things, even non-measu rab le ones. In this sense, analysis was

very quickly to acquire the va lue of a universal m e t h o d ; and the Le ib -

nizian project of establishing a mathemat ics of quali tat ive orders is s i tuated

at the very hear t of Classical t h o u g h t ; its gravi ta t ional centre. B u t , on

the other hand , this relat ion to the mathesis as a general science of o rde r

does no t signify that k n o w l e d g e is absorbed in to mathemat ics , or that the

latter becomes the foundat ion for all possible k n o w l e d g e ; on t he c o n ­

trary, in correlat ion w i t h the quest for a mathesis , we perceive the appear ­

ance of a certain n u m b e r of empir ical fields n o w being fo rmed and

defined for the very first t ime . In n o n e of these fields, or a lmost n o n e , is

i t possible to find any trace of mechan i sm or mathemat ic iza t ion ; a n d

yet they all rely for their founda t ion u p o n a possible science of o rde r .

Al though they w e r e all dependen t u p o n analysis in general , their par t icular

instrument was n o t the algebraic method bu t the system of signs. So there

f i r s t appeared general g r a m m a r , na tura l his tory, and the analysis of weal th ,

all sciences of o rde r in the d o m a i n of words , beings, and needs; and n o n e

of these empir ical studies, n e w in the Classical pe r iod and co-extensive

wi th i t in dura t ion (their chronologica l frontiers are m a r k e d by Lancelot

and B o p p , R a y and Cuvie r , Pe t ty and Ricardo , the first g r o u p w r i t i n g

around 1660 a n d the second a r o u n d 1800-10), could have been founded

wi thou t the relation that t he entire episteme of W e s t e r n cul ture main ta ined

at that t ime w i t h a universal science of o rder .

This relation to Order is as essential to the Classical age as the relat ion

to Interpretation was to the Renaissance. A n d jus t as in terpreta t ion in the

sixteenth cen tury , w i t h its super imposi t ion of a semiology u p o n a

hermeneutics, was essentially a k n o w l e d g e based u p o n simili tude, so t he

order ing of th ings by means of signs constitutes all empir ical forms of

knowledge as k n o w l e d g e based u p o n ident i ty a n d difference. T h e

57

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

s imultaneously endless and closed, full and tautological w o r l d of resem­

blance n o w finds itself dissociated and, as i t were , split d o w n the midd le :

on the one side, we shall find the signs that have b e c o m e tools of analysis,

marks of ident i ty and difference, principles w h e r e b y things can be r e ­

duced to o rder , keys for a t a x o n o m y ; and , on the o ther , the empirical

and m u r m u r i n g resemblance of things, tha t unreac t ing simil i tude that

lies benea th t h o u g h t and furnishes the infinite r a w mater ial for divisions

and distr ibutions. On the o n e hand , the general t heo ry of signs, divisions,

and classifications; on the other , the p r o b l e m of immed ia t e resemblances,

o f t he spontaneous m o v e m e n t o f the imaginat ion , o f nature ' s repeti t ions.

A n d be tween the t w o , the n e w forms o f k n o w l e d g e that occupy the

area opened up by this n e w split.

III T H E R E P R E S E N T A T I O N O F T H E S I G N

W h a t is a sign in the Classical age? For w h a t was altered in the first half

of t he seventeenth cen tury , and for a long t i m e to c o m e - perhaps r igh t

up to ou r o w n day - was the ent i re organiza t ion of signs, the condi t ions

u n d e r w h i c h they exercise their s t range funct ion; i t is this, a m o n g so

m a n y o the r things o n e k n o w s or sees, tha t causes t h e m to emerge sud­

denly as signs; i t is their ve ry be ing . On the threshold of the Classical age,

the sign ceases to be a f o r m of the w o r l d ; a n d i t ceases to be b o u n d

to w h a t i t m a r k s by the solid a n d secret bonds of resemblance or

affinity.

Classical t h o u g h t defines i t accord ing to three v a r i a b l e s [ i i ] . First, the

cer ta inty of the relat ion: a sign m a y be so constant that . 'one can be sure

of its accuracy (in t he sense that brea th ing denotes life), b u t i t m a y also

be s imply p robab le (in the sense that pallor p robab ly denotes p r egnancy ) .

Second, t he t y p e of re lat ion: a sign m a y be long to the w h o l e that i t d e ­

notes (in the sense that a hea l thy appearance is pa r t of the health it denotes)

or be separate f r o m i t (in the sense that the figures of the O l d Tes t amen t

are distant signs of the Incarnat ion and R e d e m p t i o n ) . T h i r d , the or igin

of t he relat ion: a sign m a y be natural (in the sense that a reflection in a

m i r r o r denotes that w h i c h it reflects) or convent ional (in the sense that a

w o r d m a y signify an idea to a g iven g r o u p of m e n ) . N o n e of these forms

of relation necessarily implies resemblance; even the natural sign does

no t requ i re tha t : a cry is a spontaneous sign of fear, bu t no t analogous to

it; or again, as Berkeley puts it, visual sensations are signs of t ouch

established in us by G o d , yet they do no t resemble i t in any way [ i2J.

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59

These three variables replace resemblance in defining the sign's efficacity

in the domains of empir ical k n o w l e d g e .

i . T h e sign, since i t is a lways ei ther certain or p robable , should find

its area of be ing wi th in k n o w l e d g e . In the s ixteenth cen tury , signs w e r e

t hough t to have been placed u p o n things so that m e n m i g h t be able to

uncover their secrets, their na tu re or their v i r tues ; b u t this discovery was

merely the u l t imate pu rpose of signs, the justif ication of their presence;

i t was a possible w a y of using t h e m , and no d o u b t the best; bu t they did

not need to be k n o w n in o rde r to exist: even i f they r ema ined silent, even

i f no one w e r e to perceive t h e m , they w e r e jus t as m u c h there. I t was n o t

k n o w l e d g e tha t gave t h e m their signifying function, b u t the v e r y lan­

guage o f th ings . F r o m the seventeenth cen tu ry o n w a r d , t he w h o l e

domain of t he sign is d iv ided be tween the certain and the p r o b a b l e :

that is to say, there can no longer be an u n k n o w n sign, a m u t e m a r k . This

is no t because m e n are in possession of all t he possible signs, b u t because

there can be no sign unt i l there exists a known possibility of subst i tut ion

be tween t w o known e lements . T h e sign does n o t wa i t in silence for the

c o m i n g of a m a n capable of recogniz ing it : i t can be const i tu ted o n l y by

an act of k n o w i n g .

I t is here tha t k n o w l e d g e breaks off its o ld kinship w i t h divinatio. T h e

latter a lways presupposed signs an ter ior to i t : so that k n o w l e d g e a lways

resided entirely in the open ing up of a discovered, affirmed, or secretly

t ransmit ted, sign. Its task was to uncover a l anguage w h i c h G o d h a d

previously dis t r ibuted across the face of t he ear th ; i t is in this sense tha t i t

was t he d ivinat ion of an essential impl icat ion, and that the object of its

divinat ion was divine. F r o m n o w on , h o w e v e r , i t i s w i th in k n o w l e d g e

itself that t he sign is to p e r f o r m its signifying funct ion; i t is f rom k n o w ­

ledge that i t wi l l b o r r o w its cer ta inty or its p robabi l i ty . A n d t h o u g h

God still employs signs to speak to us t h r o u g h na tu re , he is m a k i n g use

o f ou r k n o w l e d g e , and o f t he relations that are set up be tween o u r i m ­

pressions, in o r d e r to establish in o u r minds a relat ion of signification.

Such is the ro le of feeling in Maleb ranche or of sensation in Berke ley ; in

natural j u d g e m e n t , in feeling, in visual impressions, a n d in the percep t ion

of the thi rd d imens ion , w h a t we are deal ing w i t h are hasty and confused,

bu t pressing, inevi table , a n d ob l iga to ry k inds of k n o w l e d g e serving as

signs for discursive kinds o f k n o w l e d g e w h i c h we h u m a n s , because we

are n o t p u r e intelligences, no longer have t he t i m e o r the permission to

attain to ourselves and by the una ided s t reng th o f o u r o w n m i n d s . In

Malebranche and Berke ley , the sign a r ranged by G o d i s the c u n n i n g and

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

thought fu l super impos i t ion o f t w o kinds o f k n o w l e d g e . T h e r e i s no

longer any divinatio invo lved - no insertion of k n o w l e d g e in the en ig­

mat ic , open , a n d sacred area of signs - bu t a br ief and concent ra ted k ind

of k n o w l e d g e : the cont rac t ion of a long sequence of j u d g e m e n t s into the

rapidly assimilated f o r m of the sign. A n d i t wil l also be seen h o w , by a

reversal of direct ion, k n o w l e d g e , hav ing enclosed the signs w i th in its

o w n space, i s n o w able to a c c o m m o d a t e p robab i l i ty : be tween o n e i m ­

pression and ano the r t he relation wil l be that of sign to signified, in o the r

w o r d s , a relat ion w h i c h , like tha t of succession, wil l progress f rom the

weakest p robabi l i ty t owards the greatest cer ta inty .

T h e connec t ion of ideas does n o t imp ly the relat ion of cause and effect,

b u t only of a m a r k or sign w i t h the th ing signified. The^ i rc w h i c h I see

is n o t the cause of the pain I suffer u p o n my approach ing it, b u t the

m a r k that forewarns me o f it[i3J.

T h e k n o w l e d g e that d iv ined, at random, signs that w e r e absolute and older

than itself has been replaced by a n e t w o r k of signs buil t up step by step

in accordance w i t h a k n o w l e d g e of w h a t is p robab le . H u m e has b e c o m e

possible.

2. T h e second variable of the s ign: the f o r m of its relation w i t h w h a t i t

signifies. By means of the interplay of conveniency , emula t ion , and a b o v e

all s y m p a t h y , s imil i tude was able in the s ixteenth cen tury to t r i u m p h ove r

space and t ime ; for i t was wi th in the p o w e r of the sign to d r a w things

toge ther and uni te t h e m . W i t h the adven t o f Classical t hough t , on the

o the r hand , the sign becomes characterized by its essential dispersion.

T h e circular w o r l d of c o n v e r g i n g signs i s replaced by an infinite p r o ­

gression. W i t h i n this space, the sign can have o n e of t w o posi t ions: ei ther

i t can be claimed, as an e lement , to be par t of that w h i c h i t serves to

designate; or else it is really and actually separated f rom w h a t it serves to

designate. T h e t ru th is, h o w e v e r , that this a l ternat ive is no t a radical one ,

since the sign, in o rde r to function, mus t be s imultaneously an insert ion

in that w h i c h i t signifies and also distinct f rom it. For the sign to be, in

effect, w h a t i t is, i t m u s t be presented as an object of k n o w l e d g e at the

same t ime as that w h i c h it signifies. As Condi l lac points out , a sound

could never b e c o m e the verbal sign of s o m e t h i n g for a child unless the

child had heard i t a t least once at the m o m e n t of perce iv ing the objcct[ i4] .

B u t if one e lement of a pe rcep t ion is to b e c o m e a sign for it, it is n o t

e n o u g h mere ly for that e lement to be par t of the percep t ion ; i t mus t be

differentiated qua c lement and be dist inguished f rom the total impression

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R E P R E S E N T I N G

w i t h w h i c h i t is confusedly l inked; consequent ly , tha t total impression

itself mus t have been d iv ided u p , and a t ten t ion m u s t have been di rected

towards one of the in te rmingled regions c o m p o s i n g it, in o rde r to isolate

one of t hem. T h e const i tu t ion of the sign is thus inseparable f rom analysis.

Indeed, i t is the result of it, since w i t h o u t analysis the sign could no t b e ­

c o m e apparent . B u t i t is also the ins t rument of analysis, since once defined

and isolated i t can be applied to further impressions; and in relation to t h e m

it plays the role of a gr id, as i t we re . Because the m i n d analyses, t he sign

appears. Because the m i n d has signs at its disposal, analysis never ceases.

I t i s unders tandable w h y , f rom Condi l lac to Des tu t t de T r a c y and

Gerando , the general t h eo ry of signs and the definition of the p o w e r

of analysis of t h o u g h t w e r e so exact ly super imposed to f o r m a single and

unbroken t h eo ry o f k n o w l e d g e .

W h e n the Logique de Port-Royal states that a sign can be inherent in

w h a t i t designates or separate f rom it, i t is demons t r a t ing that t he sign,

in the Classical age, is charged no longer w i t h the task of keeping the

wor ld close to itself and inheren t in its o w n forms, bu t , on the cont ra ry ,

wi th that of spreading i t ou t , of j ux t apos ing i t ove r an indefinitely open

surface, and of t ak ing up f rom that po in t the endless d e p l o y m e n t of the

substitutes in w h i c h we conceive of it. A n d it is by this means tha t i t is

offered s imultaneously to analysis and to combina t ion , and can be o rde red

from beg inn ing to end. T h e sign in Classical t h o u g h t does n o t erase d is ­

tances or abolish t ime : on t he con t ra ry , i t enables o n e to unfold t h e m and

to traverse t h e m step by step. I t is the sign that enables things to b e c o m e

distinct, to preserve themselves wi th in their o w n identities, to dissociate

themselves or b ind themselves together . W e s t e r n reason is enter ing the

age o f j u d g e m e n t .

3 . T h e r e remains a th i rd variable: the o n e that can assume the t w o

values of na ture and of conven t ion . I t had long been k n o w n - and well

before Plato 's Cratylus - tha t signs can be either g iven by na ture or

established by m a n . N o r was the sixteenth cen tu ry ignoran t o f this fact,

since i t recognized h u m a n languages to be insti tuted signs. B u t the

artificial signs o w e d their p o w e r only to their fidelity to natural signs.

These latter, even at a r e m o v e , w e r e the founda t ion of all others. F r o m

the seventeenth century-, the values al lot ted to na ture and conven t ion in

this field are inver ted: if natura l , a sign is no m o r e than an e lement

selected f rom the w o r l d of things and const i tu ted as a sign by ou r k n o w ­

ledge. It is therefore strictly l imited, r igid, inconvenient , and impossible

for the m i n d to master . W h e n , on the o the r hand , o n e establishes a

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

convent iona l sign, i t is a lways possible (and indeed necessary) to choose it

in such a w a y tha t i t wi l l be s imple, easy to r e m e m b e r , applicable to an

indefinite n u m b e r of e lements , susceptible of subdivision w i th in itself and

of combina t i on w i t h o the r signs; the m a n - m a d e sign is the sign a t t he

peak of its act ivi ty. I t i s t he m a n - m a d e sign that d raws the d iv iding- l ine

be tween m a n a n d an imal ; tha t t ransforms imagina t ion in to vo lun t a ry

m e m o r y , spontaneous a t ten t ion in to reflection, a n d instinct in to rat ional

knowledge [15 ] . I t i s also w h a t I tard found lacking in t he 'w i ld m a n of

A v e y r o n ' [ i 6 ] . N a t u r a l signs are mere ly r u d i m e n t a r y sketches for these

convent iona l signs, the v a g u e and distant design tha t can be realized on ly

by the establ ishment o f arbitrariness.

B u t this arbitrariness is measured by its funct ion; and has its rules v e r y

exact ly defined by that funct ion. An arbi t rary system of signs mus t p e r ­

m i t t he analysis of things in to their simplest e lements ; i t m u s t be capable

o f decompos ing t h e m in to their v e r y or ig ins ; b u t i t m u s t also d e m o n ­

strate h o w combina t ions o f those elements are possible, and p e r m i t the

ideal genesis of the complex i ty of th ings . 'Arb i t r a ry ' stands in oppos i t ion

to . 'natural ' on ly i f o n e i s a t t emp t ing to designate the m a n n e r in w h i c h

signs have been established. B u t this arbitrariness is also the gr id of analysis

and the combina t i ve space t h r o u g h w h i c h na tu re is to posi t itself as that

w h i c h it is - at t h e level of p r ima l impressions and in all the possible forms

of their combina t ion . In its perfect state, the system of signs is that s imple ,

absolutely t ransparent l anguage w h i c h is capable of n a m i n g w h a t is

e l ementa ry ; i t is also tha t c o m p l e x of opera t ions w h i c h defines all possible

conjunct ions . To o u r eyes, this search for origins and this calculus of

combina t ions appear incompat ib le , a n d we are only too ready to in ­

terpre t t h e m as an amb igu i ty in seventeenth- a n d e igh teen th -cen tu ry

t h o u g h t . T h e same i s t rue of the interact ion b e t w e e n the sys tem and na tu re .

In fact, there is no cont radic t ion at all for t h o u g h t at tha t t ime. M o r e

precisely, there exists a single, necessary a r r a n g e m e n t r u n n i n g t h r o u g h the

w h o l e of the Classical episteme: t he association of a universal calculus and

a search for the e l ementa ry w i th in a system tha t is artificial and is, for that

ve ry reason, able to m a k e na tu re visible f r o m its p r i m a r y elements r igh t

to t he s imultanei ty of all their possible combina t ions . In the Classical age,

to m a k e use of signs is no t , as i t was in p reced ing centuries, to a t t emp t to

rediscover benea th t h e m t h e p r imi t ive text of a discourse sustained, and

retained, forever ; i t i s an a t t e m p t to discover t he a rb i t ra ry l anguage that

will au thor ize t he d e p l o y m e n t of n a t u r e w i th in its space, the final te rms

of its analysis and the laws of its compos i t ion . I t is no longer the task of

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k n o w l e d g e t o d ig ou t the ancient W o r d f rom the u n k n o w n places w h e r e

i t m a y be h i d d e n ; its j o b n o w is to fabricate a language , and to fabricate

i t wel l - so that , as an ins t rument of analysis and combina t ion , i t wi l l

really be the l anguage of calculation.

I t i s n o w possible to define the ins t ruments laid d o w n for t he use of

Classical t h o u g h t by the sign system. I t was this sys tem that in t roduced

into k n o w l e d g e probabi l i ty , analysis, and combina t ion , and the justified

arbitrariness of the system. I t was the sign system tha t g a v e rise s imu l ­

taneously to t he search for origins and to calculability; to the const i tu t ion

of tables that w o u l d fix the possible compos i t ions , and to t he rest i tut ion

of a genesis on the basis of the simplest e lements ; i t was t he sign system

that l inked all k n o w l e d g e to a language , and sough t to replace all languages

w i t h a sys tem of artificial symbols and opera t ions of a logical na tu re . At

the level of t he h is tory of opinions , all this w o u l d appear , no d o u b t , as

a tangled n e t w o r k of influences in w h i c h the individual parts p layed by

Hobbes , Berke ley , Leibniz, Condi l lac , and the ' Ideologues ' w o u l d be r e ­

vealed. B u t i f we quest ion Classical t h o u g h t a t t he level o f w h a t , a rchaeo-

logically, m a d e i t possible, we perceive tha t t he dissociation of t he sign

and resemblance in the early seventeenth cen tu ry caused these n e w forms -

probabi l i ty , analysis, combina t ion , and universal l anguage system - to

emerge , n o t as successive themes engender ing o n e ano the r or d r iv ing o n e

ano the r ou t , b u t as a single n e t w o r k of necessities. A n d i t was this ne t ­

w o r k that m a d e possible the individuals w e t e r m H o b b e s , Berkeley ,

H u m e , o r Condi l lac .

I V D U P L I C A T E D R E P R E S E N T A T I O N

H o w e v e r , the p r o p e r t y of signs m o s t fundamenta l to the Classical

episteme has n o t ye t been men t ioned . Indeed, the ve ry fact that t he sign

can be m o r e or less p robab le , m o r e or less distant f rom w h a t i t signifies,

tha t i t can be ei ther natural or a rb i t rary , w i t h o u t its na tu re or its va lue

as a sign be ing affected - all this shows clearly e n o u g h that the relat ion

of the sign to its conten t i s n o t guaran teed by the o rde r of things in t h e m ­

selves. T h e relat ion of the sign to t he signified n o w resides in a space in

w h i c h there i s no longer any in te rmedia ry f igure to connec t t h e m : w h a t

connects t h e m is a b o n d established, inside k n o w l e d g e , be tween the idea

of one thing and the idea of another. T h e Logique de Port-Royal states this

as fo l lows: ' T h e sign encloses t w o ideas, o n e of t he th ing represent ing, the

o the r of the th ing represented; and its na tu re consists in exci t ing the first

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64

by means of the s e c o n d ' [ 1 7 ] . This dual theory of the sign i s in u n e q u i ­

vocal opposi t ion to t he m o r e c o m p l e x organiza t ion o f the Renaissance;

a t tha t t ime , the theo ry of the sign impl ied three qui te distinct e lements :

tha t w h i c h was m a r k e d , that wh ich did the m a r k i n g , and that w h i c h m a d e

i t possible to see in the first the m a r k of the second; and this last e lement

was , of course, resemblance : the sign p rov ided a m a r k exactly in so far

as it was ' a lmost the same th ing ' as that w h i c h it designated. It is this

un i ta ry and t r iple system that disappears a t the same t i m e as ' t h o u g h t by

resemblance ' , and is replaced by a strictly b ina ry organizat ion.

B u t there is o n e condi t ion that mus t be fulfilled if the sign is indeed

to be this p u r e duali ty. In its s imple state as an idea, or an image , or a p e r ­

cept ion , associated w i t h or substi tuted for ano ther , the signifying e lement

is n o t a sign. It can b e c o m e a sign only oh condi t ion that it manifests, in

addi t ion , the relat ion that links i t to w h a t i t signifies. I t m u s t represent ;

bu t that representat ion, in turn , mus t also be represented wi th in it. This

is a condi t ion indispensable to the b ina ry organiza t ion of the sign, and

one that the Logique de Port-Royal sets forth even before tell ing us w h a t a

sign is: ' W h e n o n e looks at a certain object on ly in so far as it represents

ano ther , the idea one has of it is the idea of a sign, and that first object is

called a sign'[18]. T h e signifying idea becomes double , since supe r im­

posed u p o n the idea that is replacing ano the r there is also the idea of its

representat ive p o w e r . This appears to give us three t e rms : the idea s igni­

fied, the idea signifying, and, wi th in this second t e r m , the idea of its role

as representat ion. W h a t we are faced w i t h here is no t , h o w e v e r , a su r r ep ­

ti t ious re tu rn to a te rnary system, b u t ra ther an inevitable- 'displacement

wi th in the t w o - t e r m figure, w h i c h moves b a c k w a r d iri relat ion to itself

and comes to reside ent i rely wi th in the signifying e lement . In fact, the

signifying c lement has no content , no function, and no de te rmina t ion

o the r than w h a t i t represents: i t is entirely o rde red u p o n and t ransparent

to it. B u t this con ten t is indicated on ly in a representat ion that posits

itself as such, and that w h i c h is signified resides, w i t h o u t r e s iduum and

w i t h o u t opaci ty , w i th in the representat ion of the sign. I t is characteristic

that the first example of a sign g iven by the Logique de Port-Royal is

n o t the w o r d , n o r the cry, no r the symbol , bu t the spatial and g raph ic

representat ion - the d r a w i n g as m a p or p ic ture . This is because t he p i c ­

tu re has no o the r con ten t in fact than that w h i c h i t represents, and ye t

that con ten t is m a d e visible on ly because it is represented by a representa­

t ion. T h e b inary a r r a n g e m e n t of the sign, as i t appears in the seventeenth

cen tury , replaces an organiza t ion wh ich , in different modes , had been

R E P R E S E N T I N G

65

te rnary ever since the t i m e of the Stoics, and even since the first Greek

g rammar i ans ; and this n e w binary a r r a n g e m e n t presupposes that the sign

is a duplicated representat ion doub led over u p o n itself. An idea can be

the sign of ano ther , no t on ly because a b o n d of representat ion can be

established be tween t h e m , bu t also because this representat ion can a lways

be represented wi th in the idea that is represent ing. Or again, because

representat ion in its peculiar essence is a lways perpendicular to itself:

it is at the same t ime indication and appearance; a relat ion to an object and

a manifestat ion of itself. F r o m the Classical age, the sign is the representa-

tivity of the representat ion in so far as it is representable.

This has v e r y considerable consequences. First, the impor t ance of signs

in Classical t h o u g h t . Before, t hey w e r e means of k n o w i n g and the keys

to k n o w l e d g e ; n o w , they are co-extensive w i t h representat ion, that is,

w i t h t h o u g h t as a w h o l e ; they reside wi th in i t bu t they r u n t h r o u g h its

ent i re extent . W h e n e v e r o n e representat ion i s l inked to ano the r and r e p ­

resents that l ink wi th in itself, there is a sign: the abstract idea signifies

the concre te percep t ion f rom w h i c h i t has been fo rmed (Condi l lac) ; the

general idea is no m o r e than a par t icular idea serving as a sign for o the r

par t icular ideas (Berkeley) ; imaginings are signs of the percept ions f rom

w h i c h they arose ( H u m e , Condi l l ac ) ; sensations are signs of one ano the r

(Berkeley, Condi l l ac ) ; and, finally, i t is possible that sensations m a y t h e m ­

selves be (as in Berke ley) signs of w h a t G o d wishes to tell us, w h i c h w o u l d

m a k e t h e m , as i t were , signs for a c o m p l e x of signs. Analysis of represen­

ta t ion and the theo ry of signs in terpenetra te o n e ano the r absolutely;

and w h e n the day came , a t the end of the e igh teen th cen tury , for

Ideo logy to raise the quest ion of w h e t h e r the idea or the sign should

be accorded p r imacy , w h e n Des tu t t could reproach G e r a n d o for hav ing

created a theo ry of signs before defining the i d e a [ i o ] , this m e a n t

that their immed ia t e l ink was already b e c o m i n g confused, and tha t

idea and sign w o u l d soon cease to be perfectly t ransparent to o n e

another .

A second consequence: this universal extension of the sign wi th in the

field of representat ion precludes even the possibility of a t heo ry of

signification. For to ask ourselves questions abou t w h a t signification is p r e ­

supposes that i t is a de te rmina te fo rm in ou r consciousness. B u t if p h e n o ­

m e n a are posi ted on ly in a representat ion that , in itself and because of its

o w n representabil i ty, is w h o l l y a sign, then signification canno t const i ­

tu te a p rob l em. M o r e o v e r , i t is n o t even visible. All representat ions are

in terconnected as signs; all together , they form, as it were , an i m m e n s e

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

n e t w o r k ; each o n e posits itself in its t ransparency as the sign of w h a t i t

represents; and ye t - or ra ther , by this v e r y fact - no specific act ivi ty of

consciousness can ever const i tute a signification. No d o u b t i t is because

Classical t h o u g h t ab o u t representat ion excludes any analysis of significa­

t ion that we today , w h o conceive o f signs on ly u p o n the basis o f such an

analysis, h a v e so m u c h t rouble , despite the evidence, in recogniz ing that

Classical ph i losophy , f rom Malebranche to Ideo logy , was t h r o u g h and

t h r o u g h a ph i losophy of the sign.

No m e a n i n g exter ior o r anter ior to the sign; no implici t presence of a

p rev ious discourse that m u s t be reconst i tuted in o rde r to reveal the a u t o c h ­

t h o n o u s m e a n i n g o f things. N o r , on the o the r hand , any act const i tu t ive

of signification or any genesis in ter ior to consciousness. This is because

there i s no in te rmedia ry e lement , no opac i ty in te rven ing be tween the

sign and its conten t . Signs, therefore, have no o the r laws than those that

m a y g o v e r n their conten ts : any analysis of signs is a t t he same t ime, and

w i t h o u t need for further inqui ry , the dec ipherment o f w h a t t h e y are

t ry ing to say. Inversely, the discovery of w h a t is signified is n o t h i n g m o r e

than a reflection u p o n the signs that indicate it. As in the s ixteenth cen tu ry ,

' s emio logy ' a n d 'hermeneut ics ' are super imposed - b u t in a different

fo rm. In t he Classical age they no longer m e e t and j o i n in the th i rd

e lement of resemblance; their connec t ion lies in that p o w e r p r o p e r to

representa t ion of represent ing itself. T h e r e wi l l therefore be no t heo ry

of signs separate and differing f rom an analysis of mean ing . Y e t the system

does g ran t a certain pr ivi lege to the fo rmer ove r the latter; since i t does n o t

accord that w h i c h is signified a na tu re different f rom that accorded to the

sign, m e a n i n g canno t be any th ing m o r e than the* total i ty of the signs

a r ranged in their progression; i t will be g iven in the comple te table of

signs. But , on the o the r hand , the comple te n e t w o r k of signs is l inked

toge ther and art iculated accord ing to pat terns p r o p e r to mean ing . T h e

table of t he signs will be the image of the th ings . T h o u g h the m e a n i n g

itself is entirely on the side of the sign, its funct ioning is entirely on the

side of that w h i c h is signified. This is w h y the analysis of language , f rom

Lancelot to Des tu t t de Tracy , is conduc ted on the basis of an abstract

t heo ry of verba l signs and in the fo rm of a general g r a m m a r : b u t i t

a lways takes the mean ing of w o r d s as its gu id ing thread; i t is also w h y

natural his tory manifests itself as an analysis of the characters of l iving

beings, and w h y , nevertheless, the t axonomies used, artificial t h o u g h

they m a y be, are always in tended to uni te w i t h the na tura l order , o r a t

least to dissociate it as little as possible; it is also w h y the analysis of wea l th

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R E P R E S E N T I N G

i s conduc ted on the basis of m o n e y a n d exchange , b u t value is a lways

based u p o n need. In the Classical age, the p u r e science of signs has va lue

as t he direct discourse of that w h i c h is signified.

Finally, a th i rd consequence, w h i c h p r o b a b l y extends up to o u r o w n

t ime : the b inary t heo ry o f the sign, the t h e o r y u p o n w h i c h the w h o l e

general science of the sign has been founded since the seventeenth cen tury ,

is l inked accord ing to a fundamenta l re lat ion w i t h a general t h eo ry of

representat ion. I f the sign i s the p u r e a n d s imple connec t ion be tween w h a t

signifies and w h a t is signified (a connec t ion that m a y be arbi t rary or no t ,

vo lun t a ry or imposed , individual o r collective), then the relat ion can be

established on ly w i th in the general e l ement o f representa t ion: t he s ig­

nifying e lement and the signified e lement are l inked o n l y in so far as

they are (or h a v e been or can be) represented, and in so far as the o n e

actually represents the o ther . I t was therefore necessary that the Classical

t heo ry of the sign should p r o v i d e itself w i t h an ' i deo logy ' to serve as its

foundat ion and philosophical justif ication, t ha t is, a general analysis of

all forms of representat ion, f rom e lementa ry sensation to the abstract

and c o m p l e x idea. I t was also necessary that Saussure, rediscover ing the

project of a general semiology , should have g iven the sign a definit ion

that could seem 'psychologis t ic ' (the l inking of a concept and an i m a g e ) :

this is because he was in fact rediscover ing the Classical condi t ion for c o n ­

ceiving of the b inary na tu re o f t he sign.

V T H E I M A G I N A T I O N O F R E S E M B L A N C E

So signs are n o w set free f rom tha t t e e m i n g w o r l d t h r o u g h o u t w h i c h the

Renaissance had dis t r ibuted t hem. T h e y are l odged hencefor th w i th in the

confines of representat ion, in t he interstices of ideas, in that n a r r o w space

in w h i c h t h e y interact w i t h themselves in a perpe tua l state of d e c o m ­

posi t ion and recompos i t ion . As for s imil i tude, i t is n o w a spent force,

outside the r ea lm of k n o w l e d g e . I t i s mere ly empi r ic i sm in its m o s t u n ­

refined fo rm; l ike H o b b e s , o n e can no longer ' r egard i t as be ing a par t

of ph i losophy ' , unless i t has first been erased in its inexact f o r m of r e ­

semblance and t ransformed by k n o w l e d g e in to a relat ionship of equal i ty

or order . A n d ye t s imil i tude is still an indispensable bo rde r of k n o w l e d g e .

For no equal i ty o r relat ion o f o rde r can be established b e t w e e n t w o things

unless their resemblance has a t least occasioned their compar i son . H u m e

placed the relat ion of ident i ty a m o n g those 'phi losophical ' relations tha t

presuppose reflection; whereas , for h i m , resemblance be longed to na tura l

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relat ions, to those that constrain ou r minds by means of an inevitable bu t

' ca lm force ' .

Let the phi losopher pr ide himself on his precision as m u c h as he w i l l . . .

I nevertheless dare defy h i m to m a k e a single step in his progress w i t h o u t

the aid o f resemblance. T h r o w bu t o n e glance u p o n the metaphysical

aspect of the sciences, even the least abstract of t h e m , and then tell

me w h e t h e r the general induct ions that are der ived f rom part icular

facts, or ra ther the kinds themselves, the species and all abstract not ions ,

can be fo rmed o therwise than by means of resemblance[2o].

At the bo rde r of k n o w l e d g e , s imil i tude is that barely sketched form, that

r u d i m e n t a r y relat ion w h i c h k n o w l e d g e mus t over lay to its full extent ,

b u t w h i c h cont inues , indefinitely, to reside b e l o w k n o w l e d g e in the

m a n n e r of a m u t e and ineffaceable necessity.

As in the s ixteenth cen tury , resemblance a n d sign respond inevitably

to o n e another , bu t in a n e w w a y . W h e r e a s s imil i tude once requi red a

m a r k in o rde r for its secret to be uncovered , i t is n o w the undifferentiated,

shifting, unstable base u p o n w h i c h k n o w l e d g e can establish its relations,

its measu remen t s , and its identities. This results in a doub le reversal: first,

because it is the sign - and w i t h it the w h o l e of discursive k n o w l e d g e -

that requires a basis of simili tude, and , second, because it is no longer a

quest ion of m a k i n g a previous con ten t manifest to k n o w l e d g e b u t of

p rov id ing a con ten t that wil l be able to offer a g r o u n d u p o n w h i c h forms

of k n o w l e d g e can be applied. W h e r e a s in the s ixteenth cen tury resem­

blance was the fundamenta l relation of be ing to itself, and the h inge of

the w h o l e w o r l d , in the Classical age i t is the simplest form in wh ich w h a t

is to be k n o w n , and w h a t is furthest f rom k n o w l e d g e itself, appears . I t

i s t h r o u g h resemblance that representat ion can be k n o w n , that is, c o m ­

pared w i t h o the r representat ions that m a y be similar to it, analysed into

elements (elements c o m m o n to i t and o the r representat ions) , c o m b i n e d

w i t h those representat ions that m a y present part ial identities, and finally

laid ou t in to an o rde red table. Simil i tude in Classical ph i losophy (that is,

in a ph i losophy of analysis) plays a role parallel to that w h i c h will be

p layed by diversi ty in critical t h o u g h t and the philosophies of j u d g e m e n t .

In this l imi t ing and condi t ional posit ion (that w i t h o u t w h i c h and b e y o n d

w h i c h one c a n n o t k n o w ) , resemblance i s situated on the side of i m a g i n ­

at ion, or , m o r e exactly, i t can be manifested on ly by v i r tue of imag ina ­

t ion, and imagina t ion , in tu rn , can be exercised on ly w i t h the aid of

resemblance. A n d , in effect, i f we suppose in the un in te r rup ted chain of

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representat ion certain impressions, the very simplest that can be, w i t h o u t

the slightest degree of resemblance be tween t h e m , then there w o u l d be no

possibility wha teve r of the second recalling the first, causing i t to reappear ,

and thus au thor iz ing its representat ion in the imagina t ion ; those i m ­

pressions w o u l d succeed o n e another in the mos t total differentiation - so

total that i t could n o t even be perceived, since no representat ion w o u l d

be able to immobi l i ze itself in o n e place, rean imate a former one , and

jux tapose itself to i t so as to give rise to a compar i son ; even that t iny

over lap of ident i ty necessary for all differentiation w o u l d no t be p rov ided .

Perpetual change w o u l d pass before us w i t h o u t guidelines and in pe r ­

petual m o n o t o n y . I f representat ion did no t possess the obscure p o w e r of

m a k i n g a past impression present once m o r e , then no impression w o u l d

ever appear as ei ther similar to or dissimilar f rom a previous one . This

p o w e r of recall implies a t least the possibility of causing t w o impressions

to appear as quasi-likencsscs (as ne ighbours or con temporar ies , existing in

a lmost the same w a y ) w h e n one of those impressions on ly is present ,

whi le the o the r has ceased, perhaps a long t ime ago , to exist. W i t h o u t

imaginat ion , there w o u l d be no resemblance be tween th ings .

T h e double requisite is pa tent . T h e r e mus t be , in the things represented,

the insistent m u r m u r of resemblance; there mus t be , in the representat ion,

the perpetual possibility of imaginat ive recall. A n d ne i ther of these

requisites can dispense w i t h the o ther , w h i c h comple tes and confronts it.

Hence the t w o directions of analysis fol lowed t h r o u g h o u t the Classical

age, consistently d r a w i n g closer and closer toge ther unti l finally, in the

second half of the e ighteenth cen tury , they w e r e able to express their

c o m m o n t ru th in Ideology. On the o n e hand , we find the analysis that

provides an account of the inversion of the scries of representat ions to fo rm

a non-actual b u t s imultaneous table of compar i sons : the analysis of i m ­

pressions, o f reminiscence, o f imaginat ion , o f m e m o r y , o f all tha t in­

vo lun ta ry b a c k g r o u n d w h i c h is, as i t w e r e , the mechanics of the image

in t ime . A n d , on the o the r hand , there is the analysis that gives an account

of the resemblance be tween things - of their resemblance before their

reduct ion to order , their decompos i t ion in to identical and different ele­

ments , the tabular redis t r ibut ion of their uno rde red similitudes. W h y i s

it, then, that things are given in an over lapp ing mix tu re , in an in te r ­

penetra t ing j u m b l e in w h i c h their essential o rde r is confused, ye t still

visible e n o u g h to s h o w t h r o u g h in the f o r m of resemblances, v a g u e

similitudes, and allusive oppor tuni t ies for a m e m o r y on the alert? T h e

first scries of p rob lems corresponds rough ly w i t h theanalyticof imagination,

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

70

as a posi t ive p o w e r to t ransform the l inear t ime of representat ion

in to a s imul taneous space conta in ing vi r tual e lements ; the second

corresponds rough ly w i t h the analysis of nature, inc luding the lacunae, t he

disorders tha t confuse the tabula t ion of beings a n d scatter i t in to a series

of representat ions that vaguely , and f r o m a distance, resemble o n e

ano the r .

N o w , these t w o oppos ing stages (the first the negat ive o n e of the dis­

o rde r in na tu re and in ou r impressions, the o the r the posi t ive one of the

p o w e r to reconst i tute order ou t of those impressions) are un i ted in the idea

of a 'genesis ' . A n d this in t w o possible ways . E i the r the negat ive stage (that

of disorder and v a g u e resemblance) is a t t r ibuted to the imag ina t ion itself,

w h i c h then exercises a doub le funct ion: if it is able to restore o rde r solely

by dupl icat ing representat ion, i t is able to do so on ly in so far as i t w o u l d

p reven t us f rom perceiving direct ly, and in their analyt ic t ru th , the

identities and differences of things. T h e p o w e r of imagina t ion is on ly the

inverse, the o the r side, of its defect. I t exists w i t h i n m a n , a t t h e suture of

b o d y and soul. I t i s there that Descartes, Malebranche , and Spinoza

analysed it, b o t h as the locus of e r ro r and as t he p o w e r of a t ta ining to

t ru th , even mathemat ica l t r u th ; they recognized in i t the s t igma of

f ini tude, w h e t h e r as the sign of a fall outside the area of intell igibili ty or

as the m a r k of a l imited na tu re . Al ternat ively , the posi t ive stage of i m ­

aginat ion can be a t t r ibuted to shifting resemblances and the v a g u e m u r ­

m u r of similitudes. I t i s the disorder of na tu re d u e to its o w n his tory , to

its catastrophes, or perhaps mere ly to its j u m b l e d plura l i ty , w h i c h is no

longer capable o f p rov id ing representat ion w i t h a n y t h i n g , b u t things tha t

resemble o n e another . So that representat ion, pe rpe tua l ly b o u n d to c o n ­

tents so v e t y close to o n e another , repeats itself, recalls itself, duplicates

itself qui te natural ly , causes a lmost identical impressions to arise again and

again, and engenders imagina t ion . I t was in jus t this prol i ferat ion of a

na tu re that is mul t ip le , ye t obscurely and irrat ionally re-created, in the

en igmat ic fact of a na tu re that p r io r to all o rde r resembles itself, tha t

Condi l lac and H u m e sough t for the l ink be tween resemblance and

imagina t ion . The i r solutions w e r e strictly con t rad ic to ry , b u t they w e r e

b o t h answers to t he same p r o b l e m . I t i s in any case unders tandable that

the second t ype of analysis should have so easily been dep loyed in the

myth ica l f o r m o f the f i r s t m a n (Rousseau), o r that o f the awaken ing

consciousness (Condi l lac) , o r that of the s t ranger suddenly thrust in to t he

w o r l d ( H u m e ) : this genesis funct ioned exact ly instead of and in place of

Genesis itself.

R E P R E S E N T I N G

O n e further r e m a r k . T h o u g h the no t ions o f na tu re a n d h u m a n na tu re

have a certain impor t ance in the Classical age , this is n o t because t he

h idden and inexhaust ibly r ich source o f p o w e r w h i c h we call na tu re h a d

suddenly been discovered as a field for empir ical i nqu i ry ; n o r is i t b e ­

cause a t iny, singular, and c o m p l e x subreg ion called h u m a n na tu re h a d

been isolated w i th in this vast field of na tu re . In fact, these t w o concepts

funct ion in such a w a y as to guaran tee the kinship , t he reciprocal b o n d ,

be tween imag ina t ion and resemblance. I t is t rue tha t imag ina t ion is

apparent ly o n l y o n e o f the proper t ies o f h u m a n na ture , and resemblance

one o f the effects o f na tu re ; b u t i f we fol low the archaeological n e t w o r k

that provides Classical t h o u g h t w i t h its laws, we see qui te clearly tha t

h u m a n na tu re resides in that n a r r o w over lap o f representat ion w h i c h

permi t s i t to represent itself to itself (all h u m a n na tu re is the re : j u s t

e n o u g h outside representat ion for i t to present itself again, in t he b lank

space that separates the presence of representat ion and the ' r e - ' of its

repe t i t ion) ; and that na tu re is n o t h i n g bu t the impalpable confusion w i th in

representat ion that makes the resemblance there percept ib le before the

o rde r of the identities i s ye t visible. N a t u r e and h u m a n na ture , w i th in

t he general conf igura t ion of t he episteme, p e rmi t the reconcil iat ion of

resemblance and imagina t ion that provides a founda t ion for, and makes

possible, all t he empirical sciences of order .

In the s ixteenth cen tury , resemblance was l inked to a system of signs;

and i t was t he in terpre ta t ion of those signs that opened up the field of

concre te k n o w l e d g e . F r o m the seventeenth cen tury , resemblance was

pushed ou t to the boundar ies o f k n o w l e d g e , towards the humbles t and

basest of its frontiers. The re , i t links up w i t h imagina t ion , w i t h doubt fu l

repeti t ions, w i t h misty analogies. A n d instead of open ing up the w a y to a

science of in terpreta t ion, i t implies a genesis that leads f rom those u n ­

refined forms of the Same to the great tables of k n o w l e d g e deve loped

according to t he forms of ident i ty , o f difference, and of o rder . T h e project

of a science of order , w i t h a foundat ion such as it had in the seventeenth

cen tury , carr ied the impl ica t ion that i t had to be paralleled by an a c c o m ­

p a n y i n g genesis of consciousness, as indeed i t was , effectively and

unin te r rupted ly , f rom Locke to the ' Ideologues ' .

V I M A T H E S I S A N D ' T A X I N O M I A '

T h e project of a general science of o rde r ; a t heo ry of signs analysing

representat ion; the a r r angemen t of identities and differences in to o rde r ed

71

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

tables: these cons t i tu ted an area of empi r i c i t y in the Classical a g e that had

n o t exis ted unti l the end o f the Renaissance a n d that w a s dest ined to d i s ­

appear ear ly in the n ine teen th cen tu ry . I t is so difficult fo r us to reinstate

n o w , and s o t h i c k l y ove r l a id b y the sys t em o f posi t ivi t ies t o w h i c h o u r

o w n k n o w l e d g e b e l o n g s , that i t has for l o n g passed unpe rce ived . I t i s

dis tor ted and m a s k e d by the use o f ca tegor ies and patterns that are o u r

o w n . A n a t t e m p t i s appa ren t ly b e i n g m a d e t o reconst i tu te w h a t the

'sciences o f l i fe ' , o f ' n a t u r e ' o r ' m a n ' , w e r e , i n the seventeenth and e i g h t ­

eenth centuries , w h i l e i t i s qui te s i m p l y fo rgo t t en that m a n and life and

nature are n o n e o f t h e m d o m a i n s that present themse lves to the cur ios i ty

o f k n o w l e d g e spon taneous ly and pass ive ly .

W h a t m a k e s the to ta l i ty of the Classical cpisteme possible i s p r i m a r i l y

the relat ion t o a k n o w l e d g e o f o rder . W h e n dea l i ng w i t h the o r d e r i n g o f

s imple natures, o n e has recourse to a mathesis , o f w h i c h the universal

m e t h o d i s a lgebra . W h e n dea l ing w i t h the o r d e r i n g o f c o m p l e x natures

(representations in genera l , as t h e y are g i v e n in e x p e r i e n c e ) , o n e has to

const i tu te a taxinomia, and to do that o n e has to establish a sys t em of s igns.

T h e s e signs are to the o rde r o f c o m p o s i t e natures w h a t a lgeb ra i s to the

o rde r of s imple natures. B u t in so far as empi r ica l representat ions mus t be

analysable in to s imple natures, i t is c lear that the taxinomia relates w h o l l y

to the mathesis ; on the o the r hand, since the pe rcep t i on of p roofs i s o n l y

o n e part icular case o f representat ion in genera l , o n e can equa l l y w e l l say

that mathesis is o n l y o n e par t icular case of taxinomia. S imi la r ly , the signs

established by t h o u g h t i tself const i tute , a s i t w e r e , an a lgcb ra^o f c o m p l e x

representat ions; and a lgebra , inverse ly , i s a m e t h o d of p r o v i d i n g s imple

natures w i t h signs and o f ope ra t ing u p o n those sigrA. We t he re fo re h a v e

the a r r a n g e m e n t s h o w n b e l o w :

B u t that is no t all. Taxinomia also impl ies a certain c o n t i n u u m of th ings

(a non-d i scon t inu i ty , a p len i tude of be ing ) and a certain p o w e r of the

i m a g i n a t i o n that renders apparent w h a t i s no t , b u t m a k e s possible , by

this v e r y fact, the reve la t ion o f that con t inu i ty . T h e poss ibi l i ty o f a sc ience

o f empi r i ca l orders requires , therefore , an analysis o f k n o w l e d g e - an

72

R E P R E S E N T I N G

analysis that m u s t s h o w h o w the h idden (and as i t w e r e confused) c o n ­

t inui ty o f be ing can be reconst i tuted by means o f the t empora l connec t ion

p r o v i d e d by d iscont inuous representat ions. H e n c e the necessity, constant ly

manifested t h r o u g h o u t the Classical age, of ques t ioning the or igin of

k n o w l e d g e . In fact, these empirical analyses are no t in opposi t ion to the

project of a universal mathesis, in t he sense that scepticism is to ra t iona l ­

ism; they w e r e already included in the requisites of a k n o w l e d g e that is

no longer posi ted as experience of the Same b u t as t he establishment of

O r d e r . Thus , a t the t w o extremit ies of the Classical episteme, we have a

mathesis as the science of calculable o rde r and a genesis as the analysis of

the const i tu t ion of orders on the basis of empir ical series. On the o n e hand ,

we have a uti l ization of t he symbols of possible operat ions u p o n identities

and differences; on the o ther , we have an analysis o f the marks p rog re s ­

sively impr in t ed in the m i n d by the resemblances be tween things and the

retrospect ive action of imagina t ion . B e t w e e n the mathesis and the genesis

the re extends the region of signs - of signs that span the w h o l e d o m a i n

of empir ical representat ion, bu t neve r ex tend b e y o n d it. H e d g e d in by

calculus and genesis, we have the area of the table. This k ind of k n o w l e d g e

involves the a l lot t ing of a sign to all that o u r representat ion can present

us w i t h : percept ions , t hough t s , desires; these signs m u s t have a va lue as

characters, tha t is, they m u s t art iculate the representat ion as a w h o l e in to

distinct subregions , all separated f rom one ano the r by assignable charac ter ­

istics; in this w a y they author ize the establ ishment of a s imul taneous

system accord ing to w h i c h the representat ions express their p r o x i m i t y

and their distance, their adjacency and their separateness - and therefore

the n e t w o r k , w h i c h , outs ide ch rono logy , makes pa tent their kinship and

reinstates their relations of o rde r w i th in a p e r m a n e n t area. In this m a n n e r

the table of identities and differences m a y be d r a w n u p .

It is in this area the we encounte r natural history - the science of the

characters that art iculate the con t inu i ty and the tangle of na ture . I t is also

in this area that we encounte r t he theory of money and the theory of value

- t he science of the signs tha t au thor ize exchange and p e r m i t the establish­

m e n t of equivalences be tween men ' s needs or desires. Lastly, i t is also

in this reg ion that we find general grammar - the science of the signs by

means o f w h i c h m e n g r o u p toge the r their individual percept ions and

pa t te rn t he con t inuous f low of their t hough t s . Despi te their differences,

these three domains existed in the Classical age on ly in so far as t he

fundamenta l area of the o rde red table was established be tween the cal­

culat ion of equalities and the genesis of representat ions.

73

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

7 4

It is pa t en t that these three not ions - mathesis, taxinomia, genesis - des ig­

nate n o t so m u c h separate domains as a solid gr id of kinships that defines

the general conf igurat ion of k n o w l e d g e in t he Classical age. Taxinomia

is n o t in oppos i t ion to mathesis: i t resides wi th in it and is dist inguished

f rom it; for it t o o is a science of o rde r - a quali tat ive mathesis. B u t u n d e r ­

s tood in the strict sense mathesis is a science of equalities, and therefore

of a t t r ibut ions and j u d g e m e n t s ; i t is the science of truth. Taxinomia, on

t he o the r hand , treats of identities a n d differences; i t is the science of

art iculations and classifications; it is the k n o w l e d g e of beings. In the same

w a y , genesis is conta ined w i th in taxinomia, or at least finds in it its p r i m a r y

possibility. B u t taxinomia establishes the table of visible differences;

genesis presupposes a progressive series; the first treats of signs in their

spatial s imul tanei ty , as a syntax; the second divides t h e m up in to an

ana logon of t ime , as a ch rono logy . In relat ion to mathesis , taxinomia

functions as an o n t o l o g y confronted by an apophant ics ; confronted by

genesis, it functions as a semio logy confronted by his tory . It defines,

then , t he general l a w of beings, and a t t he same t i m e the condi t ions u n d e r

w h i c h i t i s possible to k n o w them. H e n c e the fact that the t heo ry of signs

in the Classical pe r iod was able to suppor t s imul taneously b o t h a science

w i t h a d o g m a t i c approach , w h i c h p u r p o r t e d to be a k n o w l e d g e of na tu re

itself, and a ph i lo sophy of representat ion, w h i c h , in the course of t ime ,

b e c a m e m o r e and m o r e nominal is t and m o r e and m o r e sceptical. Hence ,

t o o , the fact that such an a r r angemen t has disappeared so comple te ly that

later ages have lost even the m e m o r y of its existence; this is because after

t he Kan t i an cri t ique, and all tha t occur red in W e s t e r n cu l ture a t the end

of t he e igh teen th cen tury , a n e w type of division was Established: on t he

o n e h a n d mathesis was r e g r o u p e d so as to const i tu te an apophant ics and

an o n t o l o g y , a n d i t is in this f o r m that i t has d o m i n a t e d the formal

disciplines r igh t up to o u r d a y ; on the o the r hand , h i s tory and semio logy

(the latter absorbed, m o r e o v e r , by t h e fo rmer ) uni ted to f o r m those

in te rpre ta t ive disciplines w h o s e p o w e r has ex tended f r o m Schleiermacher

to Nie tzsche and Freud.

In any case, the Classical episteme can be defined in its m o s t general

a r r a n g e m e n t in t e rms of the art iculated system of a mathesis, a taxinomia,

and a genetic analysis. T h e sciences a lways car ry w i th in themselves t he

project , h o w e v e r r e m o t e i t m a y be , o f an exhaust ive o rde r ing o f the w o r l d ;

t h e y are a lways directed, t o o , t owards the discovery of s imple e lements

and their progress ive c o m b i n a t i o n ; and at their centre they f o r m a table

on w h i c h k n o w l e d g e is displayed in a sys tem c o n t e m p o r a r y w i t h itself.

R E P R E S E N T I N G

75

T h e centre o f k n o w l e d g e , in the seventeenth and e ighteenth centuries,

is the table. As for t he great controversies that occupied men ' s minds ,

these are a c c o m m o d a t e d qui te natura l ly in the folds of this organizat ion.

I t is qu i te possible to w r i t e a his tory of t h o u g h t in the Classical pe r iod

using these controversies as s tar t ing-points or themes . B u t one w o u l d

then be w r i t i n g on ly a his tory of opinions , tha t is, of the choices opera ted

accord ing to individuals, env i ronment s , social g roups ; and a w h o l e

m e t h o d of inqu i ry i s thereby impl ied . I f one wishes to under t ake an

archaeological analysis of k n o w l e d g e itself, i t is n o t these celebrated

controversies tha t o u g h t to be used as the guidelines and art iculat ion of

such a project . O n e mus t reconst i tute the general system of t h o u g h t whose

n e t w o r k , in its posi t ivi ty, renders an interplay of s imul taneous and a p ­

paren t ly con t rad ic to ry opinions possible. I t is this n e t w o r k that defines

the condi t ions that m a k e a con t roversy or p r o b l e m possible, a n d that

bears the historici ty o f k n o w l e d g e . I f the W e s t e r n w o r l d did bat t le w i t h

itself in o rde r to k n o w w h e t h e r life was n o t h i n g bu t m o v e m e n t o r w h e t h e r

na tu re was sufficiently wel l o rde red to p r o v e the existence of G o d , i t was

n o t because a p r o b l e m had been opened u p ; i t was because, after dispersing

the undefined circle of signs and resemblances, and before o rgan iz ing

the series of causality and his tory, the episteme of W e s t e r n cu l tu re h a d

opened up an area to f o r m a table over w h i c h i t w a n d e r e d endlessly,

f rom the calculable forms of o rde r to the analysis o f the m o s t c o m p l e x

representat ions. A n d we see the marks o f this m o v e m e n t on the historical

surface of the themes , controversies , p rob lems , and preferences of op in ion .

Acqui red learning spanned f rom one end to the o the r a 'space of k n o w ­

ledge ' wh ich had suddenly appeared in the seventeenth cen tu ry and w h i c h

was n o t to be closed again until a h u n d r e d and fifty years later.

We mus t n o w unde r t ake the analysis o f this tabulated space, i n those

subregions in w h i c h it is visible in its clearest fo rm, tha t is, in the theories

of l anguage , classification, and m o n e y .

I t m a y be objected that t he m e r e fact of a t t emp t ing to analyse general

g r a m m a r , na tura l his tory, and economics s imul taneously and en bloc - by

relat ing t h e m to a general t heo ry of signs and representat ion - presupposes

a quest ion that could or iginate on ly in ou r o w n cen tury . I t is t rue that the

Classical age was no m o r e able than any o the r cul ture to c i rcumscr ibe

o r n a m e its o w n general system of k n o w l e d g e . B u t tha t sys tem was in

fact sufficiently constr ic t ing to cause t he visible forms of k n o w l e d g e to

trace their kinships u p o n i t themselves, as t h o u g h m e t h o d s , concepts ,

types of analysis, acquired experiences, minds , and finally m e n themselves ,

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

7 6

had all been displaced at the behest of a fundamenta l n e t w o r k defining

the implici t bu t inevitable uni ty of k n o w l e d g e . His tory has p r o v i d e d us

w i t h i nnumerab l e examples o f these displacements. T h e connec t ing paths

b e t w e e n the theories o f k n o w l e d g e , o f signs, and o f g r a m m a r w e r e

t r o d d e n so m a n y t imes: P o r t - R o y a l p r o d u c e d its Grammaire as a c o m p l e ­

m e n t and natural sequel to its Logique, the fo rmer being connected to the

latter by a c o m m o n analysis of signs; Condi l lac , Des tu t t de Tracy , and

G e r a n d o art iculated one u p o n the o the r the decompos i t ion o f k n o w l e d g e

in to its condi t ions or ' e lements ' , and the reflection u p o n those signs of

w h i c h language forms on ly the m o s t visible appl icat ion and use. T h e r e

is also a we l l - t rodden connec t ion be tween the analysis of representat ion

and signs and the analysis o f wea l th : Q u e s n a y the physiocra t w r o t e t he

article on 'Ev idence ' for the Encyclopedic; Condi l l ac and Des tu t t included

in their t h e o r y of k n o w l e d g e and language that of t rade and economics ,

w h i c h for t h e m possessed political and also m o r a l va lue ; i t is well k n o w n

that T u r g o t w r o t e the article on ' E t y m o l o g i e ' for the Encyclopedic and the

first systematic parallel be tween m o n e y and w o r d s ; tha t A d a m Smi th ,

in 'addi t ion to his great w o r k on economics , w r o t e a treatise on the

or ig in of languages . T h e r e is a connec t ing pa th be tween the t h e o r y of

natural classifications and theories of l anguage : Adanson did n o t mere ly

a t t e m p t to create, in the botanical field, a n o m e n c l a t u r e that was b o t h

artificial a n d coheren t ; he a imed at (and in par t carried ou t ) a w h o l e

reorganiza t ion of wr i t i ng in t e rms of the phone t i c data of l anguage ;

Rousseau left a m o n g his p o s t h u m o u s w o r k s some rud iments o f b o t a n y

and a treatise on the or ig in of languages. / /

Such, t raced ou t , as i t w e r e , in do t t ed lines, was trie g^eat gr id of e m p i r i ­

cal k n o w l e d g e : that o f non-quan t i t a t ive orders . A n d perhaps t he d e ­

ferred bu t insistent un i ty of a Taxinomia universalis appeared in all clari ty

in the w o r k o f Linnaeus, w h e n he conceived the project o f d iscover ing in

all t he concre te domains of na ture or society t he same dis tr ibut ions and

the same o rde r [21]. T h e l imit o f k n o w l e d g e w o u l d be the perfect t rans­

parency of representat ions to the signs by w h i c h they are o rdered .

N O T E S

[1] Descartes, CEuvres philosophiques (Paris, 1963 edn., 1 . 1 , p. 77) .

[2] F. Bacon, Novum Organum (1620, book I, xlv and lix).

[3] Descartes, Regulae, XIV, p. 168.

[4] Ibid., XIV, p. 168.

[5] Ibid., XIV, p. 182.

C H A P T E R 4

Speaking

I C R I T I C I S M A N D C O M M E N T A R Y

T h e existence of l anguage in the Classical age is b o t h p re - eminen t and

unobt rus ive .

P re -eminen t , because w o r d s have been al lot ted the task and the p o w e r

of ' represent ing t h o u g h t ' . B u t represent ing in this case does n o t m e a n

translating, g iv ing a visible version of, fabricating a mater ial doub le tha t

wil l be able, on t he external surface o f the b o d y , to r e p r o d u c e t h o u g h t

in its exact i tude. Represen t ing m u s t be unde r s tood in the strict sense:

l anguage represents t h o u g h t as t h o u g h t represents itself. To const i tute

language or give i t life f rom wi th in , there is no essential and pr imi t ive

act o f signification, b u t on ly , a t t he hear t o f representat ion, the p o w e r

that i t possesses to represent itself, that is, to analyse itself by j ux t apos ing

itself to itself, pa r t by par t , u n d e r the eye of reflection, and to delegate i t ­

self in the f o r m of a substi tute that will be an extension of it. In the Classi-

cal age , n o t h i n g is g iven that is n o t g iven to representat ion;"but , by tha t

ve ry fact, no sign ever appears , no w o r d is spoken, n* propos i t ion is ever

directed at a n y con ten t except by the action of a representat ion that stands

back f rom itself, that duplicates and reflects itself in ano ther representa­

t ion tha t is its equivalent . Representat ions are n o t roo ted in a w o r l d that

gives t h e m m e a n i n g ; they open of themselves on to a space that is their

o w n , w h o s e internal n e t w o r k gives rise to m e a n i n g . A n d language exists

in the gap that representat ion creates for itself. W o r d s do no t , then, f o r m

a th in fi lm tha t duplicates t h o u g h t on the outs ide; they recall t h o u g h t ,

they indicate it, b u t inwards first of all, a m o n g all those representat ions

tha t represent o the r representat ions. T h e l anguage of the Classical age is

m u c h closer to t he t h o u g h t i t i s charged w i t h expressing than is general ly

supposed; b u t i t is n o t parallel to it; i t is caugh t in the gr id of t h o u g h t ,

w o v e n into the v e r y fabric i t is unrol l ing . I t is n o t an exter ior effect of

t h o u g h t , b u t t h o u g h t itself.

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S P E A K I N G

79

A n d , because of this, i t makes itself invisible, or a lmost so. In a n y case,

i t has b e c o m e so t ransparent to representa t ion tha t its v e r y existence

ceases to be a p r o b l e m . T h e Renaissance c a m e to a hal t before t he b r u t e

fact that l anguage existed: in the densi ty of t he w o r l d , a g raph i sm m i n g l i n g

w i t h th ings o r f l o w i n g benea th t h e m ; marks m a d e u p o n manuscr ip ts o r

t he pages of books . A n d all these insistent m a r k s s u m m o n e d up a secon­

d a r y l anguage - that of c o m m e n t a r y , exegesis, e rudi t ion - in o rde r to

stir the l anguage tha t lay d o r m a n t w i th in t h e m and to m a k e i t speak a t

last; the existence of l anguage preceded , as if by a m u t e s tubbornness ,

w h a t o n e cou ld read in i t and the w o r d s tha t gave i t sound . F r o m the

seventeenth cen tu ry , i t is this massive and in t r igu ing existence of l anguage

that i s e l iminated. I t no longer appears h idden in the en igma of the m a r k ;

i t has n o t ye t appeared in t he t h e o r y of signification. F r o m an e x t r e m e

p o i n t of v i e w , o n e m i g h t say tha t l anguage in the Classical era does n o t

exist. B u t tha t i t funct ions: its w h o l e existence is located in its represen­

tat ive role , is l imi ted precisely to tha t role a n d finally exhausts it. L a n g u a g e

has no o the r locus, no o t h e r value, t han in representa t ion; in the h o l l o w

i t has been able to fo rm.

In this w a y , Classical l anguage discovers a certain relat ion w i t h itself

w h i c h h a d h i the r to been ne i ther possible n o r conceivable . In relat ion to

itself, the l anguage of the s ixteenth cen tu ry was in a pos i t ion of pe rpe tua l

c o m m e n t a r y ; b u t this c o m m e n t a r y can take place on ly i f there is l an ­

g u a g e - l a n g u a g e that silently pre-exists w i th in the discourse by w h i c h

o n e tries to m a k e that l anguage speak; there can be no c o m m e n t a r y

w i t h o u t the absolute p recond i t ion of the text ; and, inversely, i f the w o r l d

is a n e t w o r k of marks a n d w o r d s , h o w else i s o n e to speak of t h e m b u t

in t he fo rm of c o m m e n t a r y ? F r o m the Classical age, l anguage is dep loyed

w i t h i n representa t ion and in that dupl icat ion of itself w h i c h ho l lows itself

out . Hencefor th , the p r i m a r y T e x t i s effaced, a n d w i t h it, the ent ire , i n ­

exhaustible founda t ion o f the w o r d s w h o s e m u t e be ing was inscribed in

th ings; all tha t remains is representat ion, unfo ld ing in the verba l signs

that manifest it, and hence b e c o m i n g discourse. For the en igma of a speech

w h i c h a second language m u s t in terpret is subst i tuted t he essential dis-

cursivi ty of representa t ion: the open possibility, as ye t neutra l a n d u n ­

differentiating, b u t w h i c h i t wil l be t he task of discourse to fulfil and to

de te rmine . W h e n this discourse becomes in t u rn an object o f l anguage ,

i t is n o t quest ioned as if i t w e r e saying s o m e t h i n g w i t h o u t actually saying

it, as if i t w e r e a language enclosed u p o n itself; o n e no longer a t t empts

to uncove r t he great en igmat ic s ta tement that lies h idden benea th its

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

signs; one asks h o w i t functions: w h a t representat ions i t designates, w h a t

e lements i t cuts o u t and r emoves , h o w i t analyses and composes , w h a t

p lay of substi tut ions enables i t to accomplish its role of representat ion.

Commentary has yie lded to criticism.

This n e w relat ion that language establishes w i t h itself is nei ther a s imple

no r a unilateral one . Cr i t ic ism w o u l d appear to contrast w i t h c o m m e n t a r y

in the same w a y as the analysis of a visible f o r m w i t h the discovery of a

h idden content . B u t since this fo rm is that of representat ion, crit icism

can analyse language on ly in te rms of t ru th , precision, appropriateness ,

or expressive value . Hence the c o m b i n e d role of crit icism and a m b i g u i t y -

the fo rmer neve r succeeding in freeing itself f rom the latter. Cr i t ic i sm

questions language as if language was a pure function, a total i ty of m e c h ­

anisms, a great a u t o n o m o u s play of signs; bu t , at the same t ime , i t c a n n o t

fail to quest ion it as to its t ru th or falsehood, its t ransparency or opaci ty ,

and therefore as to exactly h o w w h a t i t says is present in the w o r d s by

w h i c h it represents it. It is on the basis of this doub le , fundamenta l necessity

that the oppos i t ion be tween con ten t and fo rm gradual ly emerged and

finally assumed the impor t ance we k n o w i t to have . B u t no d o u b t this

opposi t ion was consolidated only at a relatively late date , w h e n , in the

n ineteenth cen tury , the critical relation had itself been weakened . In the

Classical per iod , crit icism was applied, w i t h o u t dissociation and, as it

w e r e , en bloc, to the representat ive role of language. It then assumed four

forms, wh ich , t h o u g h distinct, w e r e in te rdependen t and art iculated u p o n

each o ther . I t was deployed first, in the reflexive o rde r , as/a cr i t ique of

words: the impossibil i ty of cons t ruc t ing a science ^r ^ar'philosophy w i t h

the received vocabu la ry ; a denuncia t ion in general t c ims w h i c h confused

w h a t was distinct in representat ion w i t h the abstract te rms w h i c h separ­

ated w h a t should remain uni ted; the need to bui ld up the vocabula ry of a

perfectly analyt ic language. I t was also expressed in the g rammat ica l o rde r

as an analysis of the representat ive values of syntax , w o r d order , and sen­

tence const ruct ion. Is a language in a h igher state of perfect ion w h e n it

has declensions or a sys tem of preposit ions? Is it preferable for the w o r d

order to be free or strictly de te rmined? W h a t system of tenses best e x ­

presses relations of sequence? Cri t ic ism also examines the forms oirhetoric:

the analysis of f igures, tha t is, the types of discourse, w i t h the expressive

value of each, the analysis of tropes, that is, t he different relations that

w o r d s m a y h a v e w i t h the same representat ive con ten t (designation by a

par t or the w h o l e , the essential or the accessory, the event or the c i r cum­

stance, the th ing itself or its analogues) . Lastly, faced w i t h existing and

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S P E A K I N G

already wr i t t en language , criticism sets ou t to define its relation w i t h w h a t

i t represents; hence the impor t ance assumed, since t he seventeenth

cen tury , by critical m e t h o d s in the exegesis of religious texts; i t was no

longer a quest ion, in fact, of repeat ing w h a t had already been said in t h e m ,

bu t o f defining t h r o u g h w h a t figures and images, by fo l lowing w h a t order ,

to w h a t expressive ends, and in o rde r to declare w h a t t ru th , G o d or

the Prophe t s had given a discourse the par t icular f o r m in w h i c h i t was

c o m m u n i c a t e d to us.

Such is the diversi ty of the critical d imens ion that is necessarily es tab­

lished w h e n language questions itself on the basis of its function. Since

the Classical age, c o m m e n t a r y and crit icism have been in p r o f o u n d o p p o ­

sition. By speaking of l anguage in te rms of representat ions and t ru th ,

crit icism j u d g e s i t and profanes it. N o w as language in the i r rup t ion of

its be ing, and ques t ioning it as to its secret, c o m m e n t a r y halts before the

precipice of the original text , and assumes the impossible and endless

task of repeat ing its o w n b i r th w i th in itself: i t sacralizes language. These

t w o ways by w h i c h l anguage establishes a re la t ion w i t h itself w e r e n o w to

enter in to a r ivalry f rom w h i c h we have n o t ye t emerged - and w h i c h

m a y even be sharpening as t ime passes. This is because since Mal l a rme ,

l i terature, the pr ivi leged object of criticism, has d r a w n closer and closer

to the ve ry be ing of language , and requires therefore a secondary l anguage

w h i c h i s no longer in the fo rm of criticism, bu t of c o m m e n t a r y . A n d in

fact every critical l anguage since the n ine teenth cen tu ry has b e c o m e i m ­

bued w i t h exegesis, j u s t as the exegeses of the Classical pe r iod w e r e i m ­

bued w i t h critical m e t h o d s . H o w e v e r , unt i l the connec t ion b e t w e e n

language and representat ion is b roken , or at least t ranscended, in o u r

cul ture, all secondary languages wil l be impr i soned wi th in the al ternat ive

of criticism or c o m m e n t a r y . A n d in their indecision they wi l l proliferate

ad infinitum.

I I G E N E R A L G R A M M A R

O n c e the existence of l anguage has been el iminated, all that remains is

its function in representa t ion: its na ture and its vir tues as discourse. Fo r

discourse is mere ly representat ion itself represented by verbal signs. B u t

wha t , then, is the par t icular i ty of these signs, and this s t range p o w e r that

enables t h e m , bet ter than any others , to signalize representat ion, to analyse

it, and to reccombine it? W h a t is the peculiar p r o p e r t y possessed by l anguage

and n o t by any o the r system of signs?

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

At first sight, i t is possible to define w o r d s accord ing to their a rb i t rar i ­

ness or their collective character . At its p r i m a r y roo t , l anguage is m a d e u p ,

as H o b b e s says, of a system of no ta t ions tha t individuals first chose for

themselves ; by means of these marks they are able to recall representat ions,

l ink t h e m toge the r , dissociate t h e m , a n d opera te u p o n t h e m . I t i s these

no ta t ions tha t by covenan t o r v io lence w e r e imposed u p o n the collect­

iv i ty ; b u t the m e a n i n g o f the w o r d s does n o t per ta in , in any case, to a n y ­

th ing b u t each individual ' s representat ion, and even t h o u g h i t m a y be

accepted by eve ryone i t has no o the r existence than in the t h o u g h t of

individuals t aken separately: ' T h a t then w h i c h w o r d s a re the marks of,'

says Locke , 'are t h e ideas of the speaker: n o r can any o n e app ly t h e m as

marks , immedia t e ly , to a n y t h i n g else h u t the ideas tha t he h imsel f

h a t h ' [ i ] . W h a t distinguishes l anguage f rom all o the r signs a n d enables i t

to p lay a decisive ro le in representa t ion is, therefore, n o t so m u c h tha t i t is

individual or collective, na tura l or a rb i t rary , b u t t ha t i t analyses represen­

ta t ion accord ing to a necessarily successive o rde r : the sounds , in fact, can

be ar t iculated on ly o n e by o n e ; l anguage canno t represent t h o u g h t ,

instantly, in its to ta l i ty ; i t is b o u n d to a r range it, pa r t by par t , in a l inear

o rde r . N o w , such an o rde r is foreign to representa t ion. I t is t rue that

t hough t s succeed o n e ano the r in t ime , b u t each o n e forms a un i ty , w h e t h e r

o n e agrees w i t h Condil lac[2] tha t all t he e lements of a representa t ion are

g iven in an instant and that on ly reflection is able to unro l l t h e m o n e by

one , o r w h e t h e r o n e agrees w i t h Des tu t t de T r a c y [3] that they succeed

o n e ano the r w i t h a rapid i ty so great tha t i t is n o t practical ly possible to

observe or to retain their o rder . I t is these representa t ions /pressed in on

o n e ano the r in this w a y , tha t mus t be sor ted o u t in to f tnear p ropos i t ions :

to my gaze, ' t he brightness i s w i th in t he rose ' ; in my discourse, I canno t

avo id i t c o m i n g ei ther before or after i t [4]. I f the m i n d had the p o w e r to

express ideas 'as i t perceives t h e m ' , the re can be no d o u b t that 'it w o u l d

express t h e m all a t the s ame t i m e ' [ s ] . B u t tha t is precisely w h a t is n o t

possible, for, t h o u g h ' t h o u g h t is a s imple opera t ion ' , ' i ts expression is a

successive o p e r a t i o n ' [ 6 ] . I t i s here that t he pecul iar p r o p e r t y of l anguage

resides, tha t w h i c h distinguishes i t b o t h f rom representa t ion (of w h i c h ,

in its t u rn , i t is nevertheless the representa t ion) a n d f rom signs (to w h i c h

i t be longs w i t h o u t any o the r par t icular pr iv i lege) . I t does n o t stand in

oppos i t ion to t h o u g h t as the exter ior does to t he inter ior , or expression

to reflection; i t does n o t s tand in oppos i t ion to all the o the r signs - ges­

tures, m i m e , translat ion, paint ings , emb lems [7] - as the a rb i t ra ry to t he

na tura l or the collective to t he singular. B u t i t does stand in relat ion to all

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S P E A K I N G

that as the successive to t he con temporaneous . I t is to t h o u g h t and to signs

w h a t algebra i s to g e o m e t r y : i t replaces the s imul taneous compar i son of

parts (or magni tudes ) w i t h an o rde r w h o s e degrees m u s t be traversed o n e

after the o ther . It is in this strict sense tha t l anguage is an analysis of

t h o u g h t : n o t a s imple pa t t e rn ing , b u t a p r o f o u n d establishment of o rde r

in space.

I t is here that we find that n e w epistemological d o m a i n that the Classical

age called 'general g r a m m a r ' . I t w o u l d be nonsense to see this pure ly

a n d s imply as the appl icat ion of a logic to the theo ry of language . B u t

i t w o u l d be equal ly nonsensical to a t t e m p t to in terpre t i t as a sort of p r e -

f igurat ion of a linguistics. General grammar is the study of verbal order in its

relation to the simultaneity that it is its task to represent. Its p r o p e r object is

therefore ne i ther t h o u g h t n o r any individual language , b u t discourse,

unders tood as a sequence of verbal signs. Th i s sequence is artificial in

relat ion to the s imul tanei ty of representat ions, and in so far as this is so

language mus t be in oppos i t ion to t h o u g h t , as w h a t is reflected u p o n is to

w h a t is immedia te . A n d yet the sequence is n o t the same in all languages :

s o m e of t h e m place t he act ion in the m i d d l e o f the sentence; others a t t he

end ; some n a m e the principal object of t he representa t ion first, o thers

the accessory c i rcumstances; as t he Encyclopedie points ou t , w h a t renders

foreign languages o p a q u e to o n e another , and so difficult to translate, is

n o t so m u c h the differences be tween the w o r d s as t he incompat ib i l i ty

of their sequences[8] . In relation to t he evident , necessary, universal

o rde r in t roduced in to representat ion by science, and by algebra in p a r ­

ticular, language is spontaneous and u n - t h o u g h t - o u t ; it is, as it w e r e , na tura l .

I t i s equally, accord ing to the po in t of v i e w f rom w h i c h o n e looks a t it,

an already analysed representat ion and a reflection in t he p r imi t ive state.

In fact, it is the concre te l ink be tween representa t ion and reflection. It is

n o t so m u c h the ins t rument o f men ' s i n t e r commun ica t i on as the p a t h by

w h i c h , necessarily, representa t ion communica t e s w i t h reflection. This is

w h y general grammar assumed so m u c h i m p o r t a n c e for ph i losophy d u r i n g

the e igh teen th cen tu ry : i t was , a t one and the same t ime , the spontaneous

f o r m of science - a k ind of logic n o t cont ro l led by the m i n d [9] - a n d the

f i r s t reflective decompos i t ion o f t h o u g h t : o n e o f t he m o s t p r imi t i ve

breaks w i t h t he immed ia t e . I t const i tuted, as i t were , a ph i losophy in ­

heren t in the m i n d - metaphysics , A d a m Smi th po in t ed out , was an

essential ingredien t in the fo rmat ion of even the least of adjectives [10] -

and o n e tha t any ph i losophy had to w o r k t h r o u g h i f i t was to rediscover,

a m o n g so m a n y diverse choices, t he necessary and evident o rde r o f

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

84

representat ion. Language is the original fo rm of all reflection, the p r i m a r y

t h e m e of any cr i t ique. I t is this a m b i g u o u s th ing , as b road as k n o w l e d g e ,

ye t a lways inter ior to representat ion, that general grammar takes as its object.

B u t a certain n u m b e r of consequences mus t a t once be d r a w n here .

1. T h e first is tha t i t is easy to see h o w the sciences of l anguage are

divided up in the Classical pe r iod : on the one hand , rhe tor ic , w h i c h deals

w i t h f igures and tropes, tha t is, w i t h the m a n n e r in w h i c h language is

spatialized in verbal signs; on the o ther , g r a m m a r , w h i c h 1 deals w i t h

ar t iculat ion and order , tha t is, w i t h the m a n n e r in w h i c h the analysis of

representat ion is a r ranged in accordance w i t h a sequential series. Rhe tor ic

defines the spatiality of representat ion as i t comes in to be ing w i t h l anguage ;

g r a m m a r defines in t he case of each individual l anguage the o rde r that

distributes that spatiality in t ime . Th i s is w h y , as we shall see, g r a m m a r

presupposes languages, even the mos t p r imi t ive and spontaneous ones, to

be rhetorical in na ture .

2. On the o the r hand , g r a m m a r , as reflection u p o n language in general ,

expresses the relat ion main ta ined by the latter w i t h universali ty. This r e ­

lat ion can take t w o forms, accord ing to w h e t h e r o n e takes into considera­

t ion t he possibility of a universal language or that of a universal discourse.

In the Classical per iod , w h a t was deno ted by the t e r m universal l anguage

was n o t the p r imi t ive , pure , and un impa i red speech that w o u l d be able,

i f i t w e r e rediscovered b e y o n d the p u n i s h m e n t of obl iv ion , to restore

the unders tand ing that re igned before Babel . I t refers to a t o n g u e that

w o u l d have the abil i ty to p rov ide every representat ion, and e^ery e lement

of every representat ion, w i t h the sign by w h i c h i t could be* m a r k e d in a

univocal m a n n e r ; i t w o u l d also be capable of indicat ing iri w h a t m a n n e r

the e lements in a representat ion are c o m p o s e d and h o w they are l inked

to o n e ano ther ; and since i t w o u l d possess the necessary ins t ruments w i t h

w h i c h to indicate all the possible relationships be tween the var ious seg­

men t s of representat ion, this l anguage w o u l d also, by that ve ry fact, be

able to a c c o m m o d a t e itself to all possible orders . At once characteristic

and combina t ive , the universal l anguage does n o t re-establish the o rde r

of days g o n e b y : i t invents signs, a syntax, and a g r a m m a r , in w h i c h all

conceivable o rde r mus t find its place. As for universal discourse, tha t t o o

is by no means the un ique text that preserves in the c ipher of its secret

the key to un lock all k n o w l e d g e ; i t is ra ther the possibility of defining

the na tura l and necessary progress of the m i n d f rom the simplest r e p r e ­

sentations to t he m o s t refined analyses o r t he mos t c o m p l e x c o m b i n a ­

t ions: this discourse is k n o w l e d g e ar ranged in accordance w i t h the un ique

S P E A K I N G

orde r laid d o w n for i t by its or igin . I t traverses the w h o l e f ie ld of k n o w ­

ledge, t h o u g h as i t w e r e in a subterranean manne r , in o rde r to reveal , on

the basis of representat ion, the possibility of tha t k n o w l e d g e , to reveal

its or igin, and its natural , linear, and universal link. This c o m m o n d e ­

n o m i n a t o r , this foundat ion under ly ing all k n o w l e d g e , this or igin expressed

in a cont inuous discourse is Ideology, a l anguage that duplicates the spon ­

taneous thread of k n o w l e d g e a long the w h o l e of its l eng th :

M a n , by his na ture , a lways tends t owards the nearest and mos t pressing

result. He thinks f i rs t of his needs, then of his pleasures. He occupies

himself w i t h agr icul ture , w i t h medic ine , w i t h w a r , w i t h practical

politics, then w i t h poe t ry and the arts, before t u rn ing his t hough t s to

ph i losophy; and w h e n he turns back u p o n himself and begins to reflect,

he prescribes rules for his j u d g e m e n t , w h i c h is logic, for his discourse,

w h i c h is g r a m m a r , for his desires, wh ich is ethics. He then believes

himself t o have reached the s u m m i t o f t h e o r y . . . ;

b u t he perceives that all these operat ions have 'a c o m m o n source ' and

tha t ' this sole centre of all t ruths is the k n o w l e d g e of his intellectual

faculties '[i i ].

T h e universal characteristic and ideo logy stand in t he same oppos i t ion

to o n e ano ther as do the universali ty of l anguage in general (which

arranges all possible orders in the s imultanei ty of a single fundamenta l

table) a n d the universali ty of an exhaust ive discourse (which reconsti tutes

the single genesis, c o m m o n to the w h o l e sequence of all possible branches

of k n o w l e d g e ) . B u t their a im and their c o m m o n possibility reside in a

p o w e r that the Classical age at t r ibutes to l anguage : tha t of p rov id ing

adequate signs for all representat ions, w h a t e v e r they m a y be, and of

establishing possible links be tween t h e m . In so far as l anguage can r ep re ­

sent all representat ions i t is w i t h g o o d reason the e lement of the universal .

T h e r e mus t exist w i th in i t at least the possibility of a l anguage tha t wi l l

gather in to itself, b e tween its w o r d s , the total i ty of the w o r l d , and,

inversely, the wor ld , as the total i ty of w h a t is representable, mus t be able

to become , in its total i ty, an Encyclopaedia . A n d Charles Bonne t ' s great

d r e a m merges a t this po in t w i t h w h a t l anguage is in its connec t ion and

kinship w i t h representat ion:

I del ight in envisaging the innumerab le mul t i t ude of W o r l d s as so

m a n y books wh ich , w h e n collected toge ther , c o m p o s e the i m m e n s e

Library of t he Unive r se or the t rue Universa l Encyclopaedia . I c o n ­

ceive that the marvel lous gradat ion that exists be tween these different

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

w o r l d s facilitates in super ior intelligences, to w h o m i t has been g iven

to traverse o r ra ther to read t h e m , the acquisi t ion o f t ruths o f every k ind ,

w h i c h i t encompasses, and instils in their unders tand ing tha t o rde r a n d

that concatenat ion w h i c h are its pr incipal beau ty . B u t these celestial

Encyclopaedists do n o t all possess t he Encyclopaedia of the Un ive r se

to t he same degree ; s o m e possess on ly a few branches of it, o thers

possess a greater n u m b e r , others grasp even m o r e still; bu t all. have

e terni ty in w h i c h to increase and perfect their learning and develop

all their faculties [ 1 2 ] .

Against this b a c k g r o u n d of an absolute Encyclopaedia , h u m a n beings

const i tu te i n t e rmed ia ry forms of a compos i t e a n d l imi ted universal i ty:

alphabetical encyclopaedias, w h i c h a c c o m m o d a t e the greatest possible

quan t i ty of learning in t he arb i t rary o rde r p r o v i d e d by letters; pasi-

graphies , w h i c h m a k e i t possible to t ranscribe all the languages of the

w o r l d by means of a single system of f igures[ i3]; po lyva len t lexicons,

w h i c h establish synonymies be tween a greater or lesser n u m b e r of lan­

guages ; and, finally, rat ional encyclopaedias, w h i c h c la im to ' exhibi t as

far as is possible the o rde r and concatenat ion of h u m a n learning ' by

e x a m i n i n g ' their genea logy and their f i l ia t ion , t he causes that mus t have

g iven rise to t h e m and the characteristics tha t dist inguish t h e m ' [ 1 4 ] .

W h a t e v e r the part ial character of these projects, w h a t e v e r the empir ical

circumstances of such under tak ings , the founda t ion of their possibility in

t he Classical episteme is that , t h o u g h language had been ent i rely reduced

to its funct ion w i th in representat ion, representat ion, 04a the o the r hand , had

no relat ion w i t h the universal except t h r o u g h the in te rmedia ry o f language.

3. K n o w l e d g e and l anguage are r igorous ly i n t e r w o v e n . T h e y share, in

representat ion, t he same or igin and the same functional pr inciple ; they

suppor t one ano ther , c o m p l e m e n t one another , and criticize o n e ano the r

incessantly. In their m o s t general fo rm, b o t h k n o w i n g and speaking consist

f i rs t of all in the s imul taneous analysis of representat ion, in the discr imina­

t ion of its e lements , in the establishing of t he relations that c o m b i n e those

e lements , and the possible sequences accord ing to w h i c h they can be u n ­

folded. I t i s in o n e and t h e same m o v e m e n t that the m i n d speaks and

k n o w s : ' I t i s by t he same processes that o n e learns to speak and tha t o n e

discovers ei ther t h e principles of the w o r l d ' s sys tem or those of the h u m a n

m i n d ' s opera t ions , tha t is, all that is subl ime in o u r k n o w l e d g e ' [ 1 5 ] . B u t

language is k n o w l e d g e on ly in an unreflecting f o r m ; i t imposes itself on

individuals f r o m the outs ide, gu id ing t h e m , wi l ly nilly, t owards no t ions

86

S P E A K I N G

tha t m a y be concre te o r abstract, exact o r w i t h little foundat ion . K n o w ­

ledge, on the o the r hand , is like a language w h o s e every w o r d has been

examined and every relation verified. To k n o w i s to speak correct ly ,

and as the steady progress of the m i n d dictates; to speak is to k n o w as far

as o n e is able, and in accordance w i t h the m o d e l imposed by those w h o s e

b i r th o n e shares. T h e sciences are w e l l - m a d e languages, j u s t as languages

are sciences ly ing fallow. All languages m u s t therefore be r e n e w e d ; in

o the r words , explained and j u d g e d accord ing to that analyt ic o rde r w h i c h

n o n e of t h e m n o w follows exact ly; and readjusted i f necessary so tha t the

chain of k n o w l e d g e m a y be m a d e visible in all its clarity, w i t h o u t a n y

shadows or lacunae. I t i s thus pa r t o f the v e r y na tu re of g r a m m a r to be

prescript ive, n o t by any means because i t i s an a t t emp t to impose the

n o r m s of a beautiful language obed ien t to the rules of taste, bu t because

i t refers the radical possibility of speech to the o rde r ing system of r ep re ­

sentation. Des tu t t de T r a c y once observed tha t the best treatises on logic ,

in the e igh teen th cen tury , w e r e wr i t t en by g r ammar i ans : this is because

the prescript ions o f g r a m m a r a t tha t t ime w e r e o f an analytic and n o t an

aesthetic o rder .

A n d this l ink be tween language and k n o w l e d g e opens up a w h o l e

historical field that had n o t existed in previous per iods . S o m e t h i n g like a

his tory of k n o w l e d g e becomes possible; because, if l anguage is a spon ­

taneous science, obscure to itself a n d unpract ised, this also means , in

re turn , that i t wil l be b r o u g h t nearer to perfect ion by k n o w l e d g e , w h i c h

canno t lodge itself in the w o r d s i t needs w i t h o u t leaving its i m p r i n t

in t h e m , and, as i t w e r e , the e m p t y m o u l d of its conten t . Languages ,

t h o u g h imperfect k n o w l e d g e themselves, are t he faithful m e m o r y of the

progress o f k n o w l e d g e t owards perfection. T h e y lead in to error , b u t they

record w h a t has been learned. In their chaotic o rder , t h e y give rise to false

ideas; bu t t rue ideas leave in t h e m the indelible m a r k of an o rde r tha t

chance on its o w n could never have created. W h a t civilizations and peoples

leave us as the m o n u m e n t s of their t h o u g h t is n o t so m u c h their texts as

their vocabularies, their syntaxes, t he sounds of their languages ra ther than

the w o r d s they spoke ; no t so m u c h their discourse as the e lement that

m a d e i t possible, the discursivity of their l anguage .

T h e language of a peop le gives us its vocabula ry , and its vocabu la ry is

a sufficiently faithful and author i ta t ive record of all t he k n o w l e d g e of

that people ; s imply by c o m p a r i n g the different states of a na t ion ' s

vocabula ry at different t imes o n e could f o r m an idea of its progress ,

87

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

E v e r y science has its n a m e , every n o t i o n wi th in a science has its n a m e

too , eve ry th ing k n o w n in na tu re is designated, as is every th ing in­

ven ted in the arts, as wel l as p h e n o m e n a , manua l tasks, and too l s [16 ] .

H e n c e the possibility of wr i t i ng a his tory of f reedom and slavery based

u p o n l anguages [ i7 ] , or even a h is tory of opinions , prejudices, super­

stitions, and beliefs of all kinds, since w h a t is wr i t t en on these subjects

is a lways of less va lue as evidence than are the w o r d s themse lves [ i8 ] .

Hence , t oo , the project of creat ing an encyclopaedia ' o f the sciences and

arts ' , w h i c h w o u l d n o t fo l low the connec t ing links of k n o w l e d g e itself

bu t w o u l d be a c c o m m o d a t e d in the f o r m of the language, wi th in the

space opened up in w o r d s themselves; for that is w h e r e future ages w o u l d

have to look to find w h a t we have k n o w n o r t h o u g h t , since w o r d s , i n

their r o u g h l y h e w n state, are distr ibuted a long that m i d - w a y line that

marks the adjacency of science to percept ion and of reflection to images.

I t i s in t h e m tha t w h a t we imagine becomes w h a t we k n o w , and, on the

o ther hand , that w h a t w e k n o w becomes w h a t w e represent t o ourselves

every day. T h e old relation to the text, w h i c h was the Renaissance defini­

t ion of e rudi t ion , has n o w been t ransformed: i t has b e c o m e , in the Classical

age, the relation to the p u r e e lement of the language.

T h u s we see g l o w i n g in to life the luminous e lement in wh ich language

and learning, correct discourse and k n o w l e d g e , universal language and

analysis of t h o u g h t , the his tory of m a n k i n d and the sciences of l anguage

freely c o m m u n i c a t e . E v e n w h e n i t was in tended for publ icat ion, the

k n o w l e d g e of the Renaissance was a r ranged wi th in an enclosed space.

T h e ' A c a d e m y ' was a closed circle wh ich projected the' essentially secret

f o r m of k n o w l e d g e o n t o the surface of social configurat ions. For the

p r i m a r y task of that k n o w l e d g e was to d r a w speech f rom m u t e signs: i t

had to recognize their forms, in terpret t h e m , and retranscribe t h e m by-

means of o the r graphic signs w h i c h then had to be deciphered in their

t u r n ; so that even the discovery of the secret d id n o t escape this a r ray of

obstacles, w h i c h had rendered i t at once so difficult and yet so precious.

In t he Classical age, k n o w i n g and speaking are i n t e rwoven in the same

fabric; in the case of b o t h k n o w l e d g e and language , i t is a quest ion of

p r o v i d i n g representat ion w i t h the signs by means of w h i c h i t can unfold

itself in obedience to a necessary and visible order . E v e n w h e n stated,

k n o w l e d g e in t he sixteenth cen tu ry was still a secret, albeit a shared one .

E v e n w h e n h idden , k n o w l e d g e in the seventeenth and e ighteenth centuries

is discourse w i t h a veil d r a w n o v e r it. This is because it is of the ve ry

88

S P E A K I N G

na tu re of science to enter in to t he system of verbal communica t ions [19],

and of the v e r y na ture of language to be k n o w l e d g e f rom its ve ry first

w o r d . Speaking, enl ightening, and k n o w i n g are, in the strict sense of

t he t e rm , of the same order. T h e interest s h o w n by the Classical age in

science, the publ ic i ty accorded to its controversies , its ex t remely exoter ic

character , its o p e n i n g up to the unini t iated, Fontenelle 's popular iza t ion

of a s t r o n o m y , Volta i re reading N e w t o n , all this is doubtless n o t h i n g

m o r e than a sociological p h e n o m e n o n . I t did n o t p r o v o k e the slightest

al terat ion in the his tory o f t h o u g h t , o r modify the deve lopmen t o f k n o w ­

ledge one j o t . I t explains n o t h i n g , except o f course on the doxograph i c

level w h e r e i t should be situated; bu t its condi t ion of possibility is neve r ­

theless there , in that reciprocal kinship be tween k n o w l e d g e and language .

T h e n ine teen th cen tu ry was to dissolve that link, and to leave beh ind it,

in confronta t ion, a k n o w l e d g e closed in u p o n itself and a p u r e l anguage

that had b e c o m e , in na tu re and function, en igmat ic - some th ing that has

been called, since that t ime , Literature. B e t w e e n the t w o , the in te rmedia ry

languages - descendants of, or outcasts f rom, b o t h k n o w l e d g e and lan­

guage - w e r e to proliferate to infinity.

4. Because i t had b e c o m e analysis and order , l anguage entered in to

relations w i t h t ime unpreceden ted h i the r to . T h e s ixteenth cen tu ry ac ­

cepted that languages succeeded o n e ano the r in h is tory and w e r e capable

o f engender ing one another . T h e oldest w e r e the m o t h e r languages. T h e

m o s t archaic of all, since i t was the t o n g u e of the Eternal w h e n he ad­

dressed himsel f t o m e n , was H e b r e w , and H e b r e w was t h o u g h t to have

g iven rise to Syriac and Arab ic ; then came Greek, f rom w h i c h b o t h C o p t i c

and Egyp t i an w e r e der ived; Latin was the c o m m o n ancestor o f Italian,

Spanish, and French; lastly, 'Teu ton ic ' had g iven rise to G e r m a n , Engl ish,

and Flemish [20]. In the seventeenth cen tury , the relat ion of l anguage to

t ime is inver ted : i t is no longer t i m e that allots languages their places,

one by one , in w o r l d h is tory; i t is languages that unfold representat ions

and w o r d s in a sequence of w h i c h they themselves define the laws. I t is

by means of this internal order , and the posi t ions i t allots to its w o r d s ,

tha t each l anguage defines its specificity, and no longer by means of its

place in a historical series. For language , t i m e is its inter ior m o d e of ana­

lysis, n o t its place of b i r th . H e n c e t he pauci ty of interest s h o w n by t h e

Classical age in chronologica l filiation, to t he po in t of deny ing , con t r a ry

to all the ' ev idence ' - o u r evidence, that is - the kinship of Italian or

French w i t h Lat in [2i ] . T h e kinds of series that existed in the sixteenth

cen tury , and w e r e to reappear in the n ine teen th , w e r e replaced by

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

typologies , typologies of o rder . T h e r e is the g r o u p of languages that places

the subject be ing dealt w i t h first; nex t the act ion under taken or u n d e r ­

g o n e by tha t subject; and last the object u p o n w h i c h i t is exercised: as

witness, French, Engl ish, Spanish. O p p o s e d to these is the g r o u p of

languages that places ' somet imes the act ion, somet imes the object, s o m e ­

times the modif icat ion or c i rcumstance first ' : for example Latin, or

'S lavonian ' , in w h i c h the function of w o r d s i s indicated, n o t by their

posit ions, b u t by their inflections. Finally, there i s the th i rd g r o u p m a d e up

of mixed languages (such as Greek or Teu ton i c ) , ' w h i c h have some th ing

of b o t h the o the r g roups , possessing an article as well as cases '[22]. B u t

i t mus t be unde r s tood that i t is n o t the presence or absence of inflections

that defines the possible or necessary o rde r of the w o r d s in each language .

It is o rde r as analysis and a sequential a l ignment of representat ions that

constitutes the pre l iminary f o r m and prescribes the use of declensions or

articles. T h o s e languages that fol low the o rde r ' o f imagina t ion and interest '

do n o t de te rmine any constant posi t ion for w o r d s : t hey are obl iged to

emphasize t h e m by means of inflections (these are t he ' t ransposi t ive '

languages) . If, on the o the r hand , they fol low the un i fo rm order of r e ­

f l ec t ion , t hey need on ly indicate the n u m b e r and gender o f substantives

by means of an article; posi t ion in the analyt ic o rde r ing of the sentence

has a functional va lue in itself: these are t he 'analogical ' languages [23] .

Languages are related to and dist inguished f rom one ano ther accord ing

to a table of possible types of w o r d order . T h e table shows t h e m all

s imultaneously, bu t suggests w h i c h w e r e t h e mos t ancient languages;

i t m a y be admi t t ed , in fact, tha t the mos t spontaneous order (that of

images and passions) mus t have preceded the m o w considered (that of

log ic ) ; external da t ing is de te rmined by t h e internal forms of analysis

and order . T i m e has b e c o m e inter ior to language .

T h e history of the var ious languages i s no longer any th ing m o r e than

a quest ion of eros ion or accident, in t roduc t ion , meet ings , and the ming l ing

of var ious e lements ; i t has no law, no progress , no necessity p rope r to it.

H o w , for instance, was the Greek l anguage formed?

I t was Phoenic ian merchan ts , adventurers f r o m Phryg ia , f rom M a c e ­

donia and Illyria, Galatians, Scythians, and bands of exiles or fugitives

w h o loaded the first s t r a tum of the Greek l anguage w i t h so m a n y kinds

of i nnumerab l e particles and so m a n y dialects [24].

F rench i s m a d e up of Lat in a n d Goth ic n o u n s , Gallic construct ions ,

Arabic articles and numera ls , w o r d s b o r r o w e d f rom the Engl ish and the

90

S P E A K I N G

Italians - as j o u r n e y s , wars , or t rade agreements d i c t a t e d ^ ] . This is b e ­

cause languages evolve in accordance w i t h t he effects of migra t ions ,

victories and defeats, fashions, a n d c o m m e r c e ; b u t n o t u n d e r the i m p u l ­

sion of any historici ty possessed by the languages themselves. T h e y do n o t

o b e y any internal pr inciple o f d e v e l o p m e n t ; t h e y s imply unfold r e p r e ­

sentations and their e lements in a linear sequence. If there does exist a

t ime for languages that is posit ive, t hen i t m u s t n o t be looked for outs ide

t h e m , in t he sphere o f his tory, b u t in the o rde r ing of their w o r d s , in

the f o r m left by discourse.

I t is n o w possible to c i rcumscr ibe t he epis temological f ield of general

grammar, w h i c h appeared du r ing the second half of the seventeenth

cen tu ry and faded a w a y again d u r i n g the last years of the fo l lowing

cen tury . General g r a m m a r is no t at all the same as compara t ive g r a m m a r :

the compar isons i t makes be tween different languages are n o t its object;

they are mere ly e m p l o y e d as a m e t h o d . This is because its general i ty does

n o t consist in t he discovery of peculiar ly g rammat i ca l laws, c o m m o n to

all l inguistic domains , w h i c h could then be used to display the s t ruc ture

of any possible language in an ideal and constr ic t ing un i ty ; i f i t is indeed

general , then i t is so to t he extent that i t a t t empts to m a k e visible, b e l o w

the level of g rammat i ca l rules, b u t at the same level as their foundat ion ,

the representa t ive funct ion of discourse - w h e t h e r i t be the ver t ical

function, w h i c h designates w h a t is represented, or the hor izonta l funct ion,

w h i c h links w h a t is represented to t he same m o d e as t h o u g h t . Since i t

makes l anguage visible as a representa t ion that is t he ar t iculat ion of

ano the r representat ion, i t is indisputably 'genera l ' ; w h a t i t treats of is

the in ter ior dupl icat ion existing w i th in representa t ion. B u t since tha t

ar t iculat ion can be accomplished in m a n y different ways , there m u s t be ,

paradoxical ly , var ious general g r a m m a r s : French, English, Latin, G e r m a n ,

etc. [26]. General g r a m m a r does n o t a t t emp t to define t he laws of all

languages, bu t to examine each part icular l anguage , in tu rn , as a m o d e of

t he art iculat ion of t h o u g h t u p o n itself. In eve ry language , taken in isola­

t ion, representat ion p rov ides itself w i t h 'characters ' . General g r a m m a r is

in tended to define the system of identities and differences tha t these

spontaneous characters presuppose and e m p l o y . I t m u s t establish t he

taxonomy of each language . In o the r w o r d s , t he basis, in each of t h e m , for

the possibility of discourse.

H e n c e the t w o direct ions tha t i t necessarily takes. Since discourse links

its parts t oge the r in the same w a y as representa t ion does its e lements ,

eneral g r a m m a r m u s t s tudy the representa t ive funct ion o f w o r d s in

9 i

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

relat ion to each o ther ; w h i c h presupposes in the first place an analysis

o f the links that connec t w o r d s toge ther ( theory of the propos i t ion and in

par t icular o f t he ve rb ) , t hen an analysis o f the var ious types of w o r d s

and of the w a y in w h i c h they pa t te rn the representa t ion and are dist in­

guished f rom each o the r ( theory of ar t icula t ion) . H o w e v e r , since discourse

is n o t s imply a representat ive w h o l e , b u t a dupl icated representat ion that

denotes ano the r representat ion - the o n e that it is in fact represent ing -

general g r a m m a r mus t also s tudy the w a y in w h i c h w o r d s designate

w h a t they say, first of all in their p r imi t ive va lue ( theory of origins and

of the r o o t ) , then in their p e r m a n e n t capacity for displacement , extension,

and reorganiza t ion ( theory o f rhe tor ic and of der iva t ion) .

III T H E T H E O R Y O F T H E V E R B

T h e propos i t ion is to language w h a t representat ion is to t h o u g h t , a t once

its m o s t general and m o s t e lementary form, since as soon as it is b r o k e n

d o w n we no longer encoun te r the discourse b u t on ly its e lements , in the

f o r m o f s o m u c h scattered r a w mater ia l . B e l o w the propos i t ion w e d o

indeed find w o r d s , bu t it is no t in t h e m that l anguage is created. It is t rue

that in the beg inn ing m a n emi t ted on ly s imple cries, bu t these did n o t

begin to be language unti l t hey conta ined - i f o n l y w i t h i n their m o n o ­

syllable - a relat ion that was of the o rde r of a propos i t ion . T h e yell of t he

p r imi t ive m a n in a s t ruggle becomes a t rue w o r d o n l y w h e n i t is no

longer the lateral expression of his pain, and w h e n it has ^validity as a

j u d g e m e n t or as a s ta tement of t he t ype ' I am choking^[2v7*]. W h a t c o n ­

stitutes a w o r d as a w o r d and raises it a b o v e the level of cries and noises

i s t he p ropos i t ion concealed wi th in it. I f t he wi ld m a n of A v e y r o n did

n o t attain to speech, i t was because w o r d s r ema ined for h i m mere ly the

vocal marks o f things and of the impressions tha t those things m a d e u p o n

his m i n d ; they had acquired no proposi t ional va lue . He could, i t i s t rue ,

p r o n o u n c e the w o r d 'mi lk ' w h e n a b o w l o f m i l k was p u t i n f ront o f h i m ;

bu t that was mere ly ' t he confused expression of that a l imenta ry l iquid,

o f t he vessel conta in ing it, a n d of the desire p r o d u c e d by it ' [28 ] ; t h e w o r d

neve r became a sign represent ing t he th ing , for a t no po in t d id he ever

wish to say that the m i l k was ho t , or ready, or expected. I t is in fact the

proposi t ion that detaches t he vocal sign f r o m its i m m e d i a t e expressive

values and establishes its sup reme linguistic possibility. For Classical

t h o u g h t , l anguage begins n o t w i t h expression, b u t w i t h discourse. W h e n

o n e says ' n o ' , o n e is no t t ranslat ing one 's refusal in to a m e r e c ry ; o n e is

92

S P E A K I N G

93

cont rac t ing in to the f o r m of a single w o r d 'an entire p ropos i t ion : . . . I

do n o t feel that , or I do n o t believe tha t ' [29 ] .

'Let us go direct ly to the proposi t ion, the essential object of g r a m ­

m a r ' [ 3 0 ] . In the propos i t ion , all the functions of l anguage are led back

to the three elements that a lone axe indispensable to the fo rmat ion of a

p ropos i t ion : the subject, the predicate , and the l ink be tween t hem. E v e n

then , the subject and predicate are of the same na ture , since the p r o ­

position affirms that the o n e is identical to or akin to the o the r ; i t is the re ­

fore possible for t h e m , unde r certain condi t ions , to exchange functions.

T h e on ly difference, t h o u g h it is a decisive one , is that manifested by the

irreducibil i ty of the v e r b : as H o b b e s [ 3 1 ] says:

In every propos i t ion three things are to be considered, viz. t he t w o

names , w h i c h are the subject and the predicate, and their copulation; b o t h

wh ich names raise in ou r m i n d the t h o u g h t o f o n e and the same th ing ;

b u t the copula t ion makes us th ink of the cause for w h i c h those names

w e r e imposed on that th ing .

T h e ve rb is the indispensable condi t ion for all discourse; and w h e r e v e r i t

does no t exist, at least by implicat ion, it is n o t possible to say that there is

language. All nomina l proposi t ions conceal the invisible presence of a ve rb ,

and A d a m Smi th [32] thinks that , in its p r imi t ive form, language was c o m ­

posed only of impersonal verbs (such as ' i t is ra in ing ' or ' i t is t h u n d e r i n g ' ) ,

and that all the o the r parts of discourse became detached f rom this or iginal

verbal core as so m a n y der ived and secondary details. T h e threshold

of language lies a t the po in t w h e r e the ve rb first appears . This ve rb mus t

therefore be treated as a compos i t e ent i ty, at the same t ime a w o r d a m o n g

o ther words , subjected to the same rules of case and agreement as o the r

w o r d s , and yet set apar t f r o m all o the r w o r d s , in a region w h i c h is n o t that

of the spoken, b u t ra ther that f rom w h i c h o n e speaks. I t i s on the fringe of

discourse, at the connec t ion be tween w h a t is said and-what is saying itself,

exactly at that po in t w h e r e signs are in the process of b e c o m i n g language .

I t i s this function that we mus t n o w examine - by s t r ipping the v e r b

of all that has constant ly overlaid and obscured it. We m u s t n o t s top, as

Aristot le did, at the fact that the ve rb signifies tenses (there are m a n y

o the r w o r d s , adverbs , adjectives, nouns , tha t can carry t empora l sig­

nifications). N o r m u s t we s top, as Scaliger did, at the fact that i t expiesses

actions or passions, whereas nouns deno te th ings - and p e r m a n e n t things

(for there i s precisely the v e r y n o u n 'ac t ion ' to be considered) . N o r mus t

we a t tach impor tance , as B u x t o r f did, to the different persons of the v e r b ,

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

94

for these can also be designated by certain p r o n o u n s . W h a t we m u s t do

before all else is to reveal, in all clarity, the essential function of the v e r b :

t he ve rb affirms, i t indicates ' tha t the discourse in w h i c h this w o r d is

e m p l o y e d i s the discourse of a m a n w h o does n o t mere ly conceive of

n o u n s , b u t j u d g e s t hem ' [3 3 ] . A propos i t ion e x i s t s - a n d discourse t o o -

w h e n we affirm the existence o f an a t t r ibut ive l ink b e t w e e n t w o things,

w h e n we say tha t this i s tha t [3 4 ] . T h e ent i re species of t he v e r b m a y be

reduced to the single ve rb that signifies to be. All t he others secretly m a k e

use of this un ique function, bu t they have h i d d e n i t benea th a layer of

de te rmina t ions : at tr ibutes have been added to it, and instead of saying

' I am singing ' , we say ' I s ing ' [35] ; indications of t ime have been added ,

and instead of saying 'before n o w I am s inging ' , we say ' I sang ' ; lastly,

certain languages have integrated the subject itself in to their verbs, and

thus we find the R o m a n s saying, n o t ego vivit, bu t vivo. All of this is

mere ly accret ion and sedimenta t ion a r o u n d a n d over a v e r y slight ye t

essential verbal function, ' there is o n l y the v e r b to be . . . tha t has r e ­

m a i n e d in this state of s impl ic i ty ' [36] . T h e ent i re essence of l anguage is

concent ra ted in that singular w o r d . W i t h o u t it, eve ry th ing w o u l d have

remained silent, and t h o u g h m e n , like certain animals, w o u l d have been

able to m a k e use of their voices wel l e n o u g h , ye t no t o n e of those cries

hu r l ed t h r o u g h the j u n g l e w o u l d ever have p r o v e d to be the f i r s t l ink in

t he great chain o f language.

In the Classical per iod, l anguage in its r a w state - tha t mass of signs

impressed u p o n the w o r l d in o rde r to exercise ou r power s o f in te r ­

roga t ion - vanished f rom sight, b u t l anguage itself entenecLihto n e w rela­

tions w i t h be ing , ones m o r e difficult to grasp, since h i s 'by means of a

w o r d that l anguage expresses being and is un i ted to it; i t affirms be ing

f rom wi th in itself; and ye t i t could no t exist as l anguage i f tha t w o r d , on

its o w n , w e r e no t , in advance , sustaining all possibility of discourse. W i t h ­

ou t a w a y of designat ing be ing , the re w o u l d be no language a t all; bu t

w i t h o u t language , there w o u l d be no ve rb to be, w h i c h is on ly o n e par t

of language . Th i s s imple w o r d is the representa t ion of be ing in l anguage ;

b u t i t is equal ly the representat ive be ing of l anguage - that w h i c h , by

enabl ing l anguage to affirm w h a t i t says, renders i t susceptible of t r u t h or

er ror . In this respect i t is different f r o m all the signs that m a y or m a y n o t

be consistent w i t h , faithful t o , o r wel l adapted t o , w h a t they designate,

b u t that are neve r t rue or false. Language is, w h o l l y a n d entirely, dis­

course; and i t is so by v i r tue of this singular p o w e r of a w o r d to leap

across the system of signs t owards the be ing of tha t w h i c h is signified.

S P E A K I N G

B u t f rom w h e r e does this p o w e r derive? A n d w h a t i s this m e a n i n g ,

w h i c h , by over f lowing the w o r d s conta in ing it, forms the basis of t he

proposi t ion? T h e g rammar ians of Port-Royal said that t he m e a n i n g of the

v e r b to be was affirmation - w h i c h indicated wel l e n o u g h in w h a t reg ion

of l anguage its absolute pr ivi lege lay, b u t n o t at all in w h a t i t consisted.

We m u s t n o t imag ine that the v e r b to he contains the idea of affirmation,

for t he w o r d affirmation itself, and also the w o r d yes, conta in it equally

w e l l [ 3 7 ] ; w h a t t he ve rb to be provides is ra ther the affirmation of t he idea.

B u t is the affirmation of an idea also the expression of its existence? This

is in fact w h a t Bauzee thinks, and he also takes i t to be one reason w h y

variat ions o f t i m e h a v e been concent ra ted in to the f o r m of the v e r b : for

the essence of th ings does n o t change , i t is on ly their existence that

appears and disappears, it is on ly their existence that has a past and a

future [3 8]. To w h i c h Condi l lac can observe in reply that i f existence can

be w i t h d r a w n f rom things, this m u s t m e a n that i t i s no m o r e than an

a t t r ibute , and tha t the ve rb can affirm death as wel l as existence. T h e on ly

th ing that the v e r b affirms is the coexistence of t w o representat ions: for

example , those of a t ree and greenness, or of m a n and existence or dea th ;

this i s w h y the tenses of verbs do n o t indicate the t i m e w h e n things

existed in the absolute, bu t a relative system of anter ior i ty or s imultanei ty

b e t w e e n different things [3 9 ] . Coexis tence is no t , in fact, an a t t r ibute of

the th ing itself; i t is no m o r e than a f o r m of the representa t ion: to say that

the greenness and the tree coexist is to say that they are l inked toge ther

in all, or mos t of, t he impressions I receive.

So that the essential funct ion of t he ve rb to be is to relate all l anguage

to t he representat ion tha t i t designates. T h e be ing towards w h i c h i t spills

over its signs is ne i ther m o r e n o r less than the be ing of t hough t . C o m ­

par ing language to a p ic ture , o n e la te-e ighteenth-century g r a m m a r i a n

defines nouns as forms, adjectives as colours , and the v e r b as the canvas

itself, u p o n w h i c h the colours are visible. An invisible canvas, ent i rely

overlaid by the brightness and design of the w o r d s , bu t o n e that provides

language w i t h the site on w h i c h to display its pa in t ing . W h a t the ve rb

designates, then , is the representat ive character of language , the fact that

i t has its place in t h o u g h t , and that the only w o r d capable of crossing the

frontier of signs and p rov id ing t h e m w i t h a founda t ion in t r u t h neve r

attains to any th ing o ther than representat ion itself. So tha t the funct ion of

the ve rb i s found to be identified w i t h t he m o d e of existence of language ,

w h i c h i t traverses t h r o u g h o u t its l eng th : to speak is at t he same t i m e to

represent by means of signs and to g ive signs a synthet ic f o r m gove rned

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

by the ve rb . As Des tu t t says, the ve rb is a t t r ibu t ion , the sustaining p o w e r ,

and the f o r m of all a t t r ibutes:

T h e ve rb to be is found in all proposi t ions , because we c a n n o t say

that a t h ing is in such and such a w a y w i t h o u t at the same t ime saying

tha t it is . . . B u t this w o r d is w h i c h is in all proposi t ions is a lways a

pa r t of the a t t r ibu te [predicate] in those proposi t ions , i t is a lways t he

beg inn ing a n d the basis of the a t t r ibu te , i t i s the general and c o m m o n

a t t r ibute [40].

I t wil l be seen h o w the function of the ve rb , once i t had reached this

po in t of general i ty , had no o the r course bu t to b e c o m e dissociated, as soon

as the uni tary d o m a i n of general g r a m m a r itself disappeared. W h e n the

d imens ion o f the pu re ly g rammat ica l was o p e n e d u p , the p ropos i t ion was

to b e c o m e no m o r e t h a n a syntactical uni t . T h e ve rb was mere ly to f igure

in i t a long w i t h all the o the r w o r d s , w i t h its o w n system of ag reement ,

inflections, and cases. A n d a t the o the r ex t r eme , the p o w e r o f m a n i ­

festation of l anguage was to reappear in an a u t o n o m o u s quest ion, m o r e

archaic than g r a m m a r . A n d t h r o u g h o u t the n ine teen th cen tu ry , l anguage

was to be examined in its en igmat ic na tu re as verb: in tha t r eg ion w h e r e

i t i s nearest to be ing , m o s t capable of n a m i n g it, of t r ansmi t t ing or g iv ing

effulgence to its fundamenta l m e a n i n g , of r ender ing i t absolutely m a n i ­

fest. F r o m Hege l to Mal l a rme , this as tonishment in the face of the relations

o f be ing a n d l anguage was to counterba lance the re in t roduc t ion o f the

ve rb in to the h o m o g e n e o u s o rde r o f g rammat i ca l functions.^

I V A R T I C U L A T I O N

T h e ve rb to be, a m i x t u r e of a t t r ibut ion and affirmation, the j u n c t i o n of

discourse w i t h the p r i m a r y and radical possibility of speech, defines the

first constant of the propos i t ion , and also the mos t fundamenta l . Beside it,

on ei ther side, a re e lements : parts of discourse or ' o ra t ion ' . These sites are

still neut ra l , and de te rmined solely by the slender, a lmost impercept ib le ,

ye t central f igure designat ing be ing ; they function, on ei ther side of this

jud ica to r ' as the th ing to be j u d g e d - the judicandum - and the th ing

j u d g e d - the judicatum [41]. H o w can this p u r e design of the propos i t ion

be t ransformed in to distinct sentences? H o w can discourse express the

w h o l e con ten t of a representat ion?

Because i t is m a d e up of w o r d s that name, pa r t by par t , w h a t is g iven to

representat ion.

96

S P E A K I N G

T h e w o r d designates, tha t is, in its very na tu re it is a n o u n or n a m e . A

p r o p e r n o u n , since it is directed a lways towards a par t icular representat ion,

a n d towards no o ther . So, in contras t to the un i fo rmi ty o f the ve rb ,

w h i c h i s never m o r e than the universal expression of a t t r ibut ion , nouns

proliferate in endless differentiation. T h e r e o u g h t to be as m a n y of t h e m

as there are things to n a m e . B u t each n a m e w o u l d then be so s t rongly

a t tached to the single representat ion i t designated that o n e could never

formula te even the slightest a t t r ibu t ion ; and language w o u l d fall back to a

l o w e r level:

I f we had no o ther substantives bu t p r o p e r nouns , i t w o u l d be necessary

to create an infinite mul t ip l ic i ty o f t h e m . These w o r d s , w h o s e great

n u m b e r w o u l d o v e r b u r d e n our memor i e s , w o u l d p r o d u c e n o o rde r i n

the objects of ou r learning, nor , consequent ly , in o u r ideas, and all

o u r discourse w o u l d be in the greatest state of confusion [42].

N o u n s canno t funct ion in a sentence and p e r m i t a t t r ibu t ion unless one

of the t w o (the a t t r ibute a t least) designates some e lement c o m m o n to

several representat ions. T h e general i ty of the n o u n is as necessary to the

parts of discourse as is the designat ion of be ing to the fo rm of the p r o ­

posi t ion.

This general i ty m a y be acquired in t w o ways . E i ther by a hor izonta l

ar t iculat ion, g r o u p i n g toge ther individuals that have certain identities in

c o m m o n and separat ing those that a re different; such an ar t iculat ion then

forms a sequential general izat ion of g roups g r o w i n g gradual ly larger and

larger (and less and less n u m e r o u s ) ; i t m a y also subdivide t h e m a lmost to

infinity by means of fresh distinctions, and thus re tu rn to the p r o p e r n o u n

f r o m w h i c h i t began [43]; the entire o rde r of the result ing coord ina t ions

and subordinat ions is covered by a g r id of l anguage , and each one of these

points wil l be found u p o n i t toge ther w i t h its n a m e : f rom the individual

to the species, then f rom the species to the genus and on to the class,

l anguage is ar t iculated precisely u p o n the d imens ion of increasing general i ­

ties; this t a x o n o m i c function is manifested in language by the substantives:

we say an an imal , a quadruped , a dog , a spaniel [44]. Or else by a vertical

ar t iculat ion, l inked to the first, for each is indispensable to the o the r ; this

second art iculat ion distinguishes the things that subsist by themselves f rom

those - modif icat ions, features, accidents, or characteristics - that o n e can

never mee t in an independen t state: deep d o w n , substances; on the surface,

qualities; this division - this metaphys ic , as A d a m Smi th called it - is

manifested in discourse by the presence of adjectives, w h i c h designate

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

every th ing in representa t ion that c a n n o t subsist by itself. T h e p r i m a r y

ar t iculat ion of l anguage (if we leave aside t he v e r b to be, w h i c h is as m u c h

a condi t ion of discourse as it is a pa r t of it) is thus a l igned a long t w o

o r t h o g o n a l axes: o n e p roceed ing f rom the individual un i t to the general ;

the o the r p roceed ing f rom the substance to t he qual i ty . At their po in t o f

intersection stands the c o m m o n n o u n ; a t o n e e x t r e m i t y the p r o p e r n o u n ,

a t the o the r the adjective.

B u t these t w o types o f representat ion can dis t inguish w o r d s f rom one

ano the r on ly to precisely that degree to w h i c h representa t ion is analysed

according to this same m o d e l . As the au thors of Port-Royal p u t i t : w o r d s

' tha t signify things are called substantival n o u n s , such as earth, sun. Those

that signify manner s , whi le a t the same t i m e indica t ing t he subject w i t h

w h i c h the m a n n e r s agree , are called adjectival n o u n s , such as good, just,

round'[4$]. H o w e v e r , there does exist a certain a m o u n t of p lay be tween

the art iculat ion o f l anguage and that o f representa t ion. W h e n we speak

of 'whi teness ' , we are cer tainly des ignat ing a qual i ty , b u t we are desig­

na t ing i t by means o f a substant ive; w h e n we speak o f ' h u m a n s ' we are

e m p l o y i n g an adjective to designate individuals t ha t subsist by themselves.

This displacement is n o t an indicat ion tha t l anguage obeys o the r laws

than those of representat ion, bu t , on the con t r a ry , that i t has relations,

w i t h itself and in its o w n densi ty, tha t are identical w i t h those of r e p r e ­

sentat ion. For is i t no t , in fact, a dupl ica ted k ind of representa t ion, and

thus able to c o m b i n e w i t h the elements of its representa t ion ano the r

representat ion distinct f r o m the first, even t h o u g h the o n l y funct ion and

m e a n i n g of the second representat ion is the representa t ion the first? If

discourse seizes u p o n the adjective des ignat ing a modification and gives it

w i th in the sentence the va lue of the v e r y substance o f the p ropos i t ion , then

tha t adjective becomes substant ival ; t he n o u n , on the o t h e r hand , w h i c h

behaves wi th in the sentence like an accident , becomes adjectival, even

t h o u g h it is designat ing substances, as h i t he r to .

Because substance is that w h i c h subsists of itself, the t e r m substantive

has been g iven to all those w o r d s that subsist by themselves in dis­

course, even t h o u g h they m a y signify accidents. A n d , on the o the r

hand , the t e r m adjective has been g iven to those w o r d s that signify

substances w h e n , in their m a n n e r o f signifying, t h e y m u s t be j o i n e d in

discourse to o the r nouns [46].

T h e relations be tween the elements o f the p ropos i t i on are identical w i t h

those of representat ion; b u t this ident i ty is n o t carefully a r ranged po in t

98

S P E A K I N G

by po in t , so that every substance is designated by a substantive and every

accident by an adjective. T h e ident i ty here is total and a ma t t e r of n a t u r e :

the p ropos i t ion is a representa t ion; it is art iculated according to the same

m o d e s as representat ion; b u t i t possesses the p o w e r to art iculate the r e p r e ­

sentat ion i t t ransforms in to discourse in m o r e than o n e w a y . I t is, in

itself, a representat ion p rov id ing the art iculat ion for ano ther , w i t h a possi­

bil i ty of displacement that constitutes a t the same t i m e the f reedom of

discourse and the differences be tween languages.

Such is the first s t r a tum of ar t iculat ion - the mos t superficial or in any

case the mos t apparent . O n c e this has been established, eve ry th ing can

b e c o m e discourse; b u t in the f o r m of a still ra ther undifferentiated lan­

g u a g e : we still have n o t h i n g bu t the m o n o t o n y of the ve rb to be and its

a t t r ibut ive function to l ink ou r n o u n s together . N o w , the elements o f

representat ion are art iculated accord ing to a w h o l e n e t w o r k of c o m p l e x

relations (succession, subordina t ion , consequence) that mus t be b r o u g h t

over in to l anguage i f i t is to b e c o m e t ru ly representat ive. Hence all the

w o r d s , syllables, even letters, wh ich , circulat ing a m o n g the n o u n s and

the verbs , are g iven the task of designat ing those ideas tha t in Port-Royal

w e r e t e rmed ' accessory ' [47] ; there m u s t be preposi t ions and conjunct ions;

there mus t be syntactical signs indicat ing the relations of ident i ty or ag ree ­

men t , and those of dependence or case [48]: marks of plural i ty and

gender , declension endings ; and, finally, there mus t be w o r d s relat ing

c o m m o n nouns to the individuals they designate - the articles or d e m o n s ­

tratives that Lemerc ier called 'concret izers ' or 'd isabstractors ' [4o] . Such a

scattering of w o r d s constitutes an art iculat ion inferior to the un i ty of the

n a m e (whether substantival or adjectival) as requi red by the naked f o r m

of t he p ropos i t ion : n o n e of t h e m possesses in its o w n r igh t , and in an

isolated state, a f ixed and de te rmina te representat ive con ten t ; t hey canno t

cover an idea - even an accessory o n e - unt i l t hey have been l inked

together w i t h o the r w o r d s ; whereas n o u n s and verbs are 'absolute s igni­

f i can t s ' , these w o r d s , on the o the r hand , have no p o w e r o f signification

except in a relative m o d e . It is t rue that they are addressed to r e p r e ­

sentation; they exist on ly in so far as t he latter, in the process of analysing

itself, makes the in ter ior n e t w o r k of these relationships visible; b u t t h e y

themselves have value on ly t h r o u g h the g rammat ica l w h o l e o f w h i c h they

are a par t . T h e y establish a n e w art iculat ion in language , one of a c o m ­

posite na ture , a t once representat ive and g rammat ica l , t h o u g h w i t h o u t

either of these t w o orders be ing able to f i t exact ly over the o ther .

At this stage, then , the sentence is peopled w i t h syntactical e lements cut

99

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

ou t accord ing to m u c h m o r e delicate pat terns than the b road figures o f

the propos i t ion . This n e w and m o r e compl ica ted pa t t e rn ing presents

general g r a m m a r w i t h a necessary- choice: e i ther to pursue its analysis at

a l o w e r level than n o m i n a l uni ty , and to b r ing in to p r o m i n e n c e , before

signification, the insignificant e lements of w h i c h i t is cons t ructed , or to

reduce that n o m i n a l un i ty by means of a regressive process, to recognize

its existence w i th in m o r e restricted units, and to find its efficacity as

representa t ion b e l o w the level of w h o l e w o r d s , in particles, in syllables,

and even in single letters themselves. These possibilities are presented -

indeed, they are prescr ibed - as soon as the theo ry of languages takes as

its object discourse and the analysis of its representat ive values. T h e y

define the point of heresy tha t splits all e igh teen th -cen tu ry g r a m m a r .

Shall we suppose, Harr is asks, that all "signification is, like the b o d y ,

divisible in to an infinity of o the r significations, themselves divisible to

infinity? T h a t w o u l d be an absurdi ty ; we mus t therefore necessarily a d m i t

that there are significant sounds of w h i c h no pa r t can possess signification

of itself [50]. Signification disappears as soon as the representat ive values of

w o r d s are dissociated or suspended: instead, there appear , in their i n d e ­

pendence , r a w materials that are n o t art iculated u p o n t h o u g h t and w h o s e

links canno t be reduced to those of discourse. T h e r e is a 'mechanics '

p r o p e r to agreements , to cases, to inflections, to syllables, and to sounds ,

and no representat ive va lue can p rov ide us w i t h an account of that

mechanics . Language mus t be treated like a mechanical cons t ruc t ion sus­

ceptible of g radua l i m p r o v e m e n t ^ 1 ] : in its s implest fo rm, the sentence is

c o m p o s e d on ly of a subject, a ve rb , and a predicate ; and every addi t ion

of m e a n i n g requires a fresh and entire p ropos i t ion ; in the same w a y , the

m o s t r u d i m e n t a r y machines presuppose principles o f m o v e m e n t that

differ for each of their organs . B u t as they are perfected, so they s u b ­

ord ina te all their organs to one and the same pr inciple , of w h i c h the

organs are then on ly the intermediar ies , the means of t ransformat ion, the

points of appl icat ion; similarly, as languages perfect themselves, they

t ransmi t the sense of a propos i t ion by means of g rammat ica l organs that

do n o t in themselves possess any representat ive value, b u t p e r f o r m the

tasks of m a k i n g i t m o r e specific, of l inking its e lements together , of in ­

dicat ing its actual de te rmina t ions . In a single con t inuous sentence it is

possible to indicate relations of t ime , of consequence , of possession, and of

localization, all of w h i c h certainly enter in to the subject-verb-predicate

series, b u t canno t be p inned d o w n by so b r o a d a dist inction. H e n c e the

i m p o r t a n c e accorded since Bauzee[s2] to the theories of the c o m p l e m e n t ,

100

S P E A K I N G

of subordina t ion . Hence , t oo , the g r o w i n g role o f syntax; a t the t i m e of

Por t -Roya l , syn tax was identified w i t h the const ruct ion and o rde r ing o f

w o r d s , and thus w i t h the inter ior d e v e l o p m e n t o f the p ropos i t i on [53 ] ;

w i t h Sicard i t became independen t : i t is syntax ' tha t de termines the p r o p e r

f o r m of each w o r d ' [ 5 4 ] . These w e r e the p re l iminary sketches for the

g rammat ica l a u t o n o m y to be defined later, a t the very end of the cen tury ,

by Sylvestre de Saci, w h e n he became the first - toge ther w i t h Sicard - to

dist inguish be tween the logical analysis of the p ropos i t ion and the g r a m ­

matical analysis of the sen tence[55] .

I t is unders tandable w h y analyses of this k ind should have remained in

suspense as long as discourse remained the object of g r a m m a r ; as soon as a

s t r a tum of ar t iculat ion was reached w h e r e representat ive values c r u m b l e d

a w a y , there was a m o v e m e n t f rom the o the r side of g r a m m a r , w h e r e

g r a m m a r no longer had any p o w e r , in to the d o m a i n o f usage and his tory

- syntax, in the e ighteenth cen tury , was t h o u g h t of as the locus of the

arbi t rary in w h i c h the habits of each people w e r e deployed accord ing to

w h i m [56] .

In any case, such analyses could not , in the e ighteenth cen tury , be a n y ­

th ing m o r e than abstract possibilities; n o t prefigurat ions o f w h a t was to be

ph i lo logy , bu t the non-pr iv i leged b ranch of a choice. Oppos i t e , and w i t h

the same po in t of heresy as its s tar t ing-point , we see deve lop ing a reflec­

t ion, wh ich , for us and the science of language we have const ructed since

the n ine teen th cen tury , is vo id of all value, bu t w h i c h at tha t t ime enabled

all analysis of verbal signs to be retained w i th in discourse itself. A n d

w h i c h , by means of this exact over laying , c ame to be included in the

posit ive figures of k n o w l e d g e . T h e r e was a search for the obscure n o m i n a l

function that was t h o u g h t to be invested and concealed in those w o r d s ,

in those syllables, in those inflections, in those letters that the o v e r -

generalized analysis of the propos i t ion was a l lowing to pass t h r o u g h its

net. Because, after all, as the authors of Port-Royal po in ted out , all c o n ­

nect ive particles mus t have a certain content , since they represent the

m a n n e r in w h i c h objects are l inked together , and in w h i c h they are c o n ­

nected in o u r representat ions [57] . M a y one n o t suppose that they have

been names like all the others? B u t that instead of subst i tut ing themselves

for objects they have taken the place of those gestures by w h i c h m e n

indicated t h e m or s imulated their connect ions and their s u c c e s s i o n ^ ] ? I t

is these w o r d s that have either gradual ly lost their o w n part icular m e a n i n g

(which was no t always visible, in any case, since i t was l inked to the ges­

tures, the b o d y , and the si tuation of the speaker) or incorpora ted themselves

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

in to o the r w o r d s , in w h i c h they found a stable suppor t , and to

w h i c h they gave in r e tu rn a w h o l e system of modif icat ions [59] . So that

all w o r d s , o f w h a t e v e r k ind , are d o r m a n t n a m e s : verbs have j o i n e d

adjectival names to the ve rb to be ; conjunct ions and preposi t ions are the

names of gestures n o w frozen in to i m m o b i l i t y ; declensions and conjuga­

tions are no m o r e than names that have been absorbed. W o r d s , n o w , can

open up and restore their f r eedom of f l igh t to all the names that have

been lodged wi th in t h e m . As Le Bel said, s tat ing it as a fundamenta l

pr inciple of analysis, ' the re i s no g r o u p of w h i c h the parts have n o t

existed separately before be ing g r o u p e d together '[60]; this enabled h i m

to reduce all w o r d s to syllabic elements in w h i c h the old forgot ten names

at last m a d e their reappearance - the o n l y vocables tha t possessed the

possibility of existing side by side w i t h the v e r b to b e : Romulus, for

example [6 i ] , comes f r o m Roma and moliri (to bu i ld ) ; and Roma comes

f rom ro, w h i c h deno ted s t rength (robur) and ma, w h i c h deno ted m a g n i ­

t ude (magnus). In the same w a y , Th iebau l t discovers three latent sig­

nifications in ahandonner: a, w h i c h 'presents the idea of the tendency or

dest inat ion of o n e th ing towards ano the r ' ; ban, w h i c h 'gives the idea of

the total i ty of the social b o d y ' , and do, w h i c h indicates ' the act w h e r e b y

o n e relinquishes something '[62] .

A n d i f o n e is forced to descend b e l o w the level of individual syllables to

t he v e r y letters of t he w o r d s , o n e can still f ind the values of a r ud i ­

m e n t a r y f o r m of nomina t i on . A task to w h i c h , to his grea ter - t h o u g h

even m o r e perishable - g lory , C o u r t de Gebel in really applied himself:

' t he labial contact , the easiest to b r i n g in to p lay , the gentlest , the mos t

gracious, served to designate the f i r s t beings m a n comes to k n o w , those

w h o s u r r o u n d h i m and t o w h o m h e owes eve ry th ing ' (papa, m a m a ) . O n

the o the r hand , ' t he tee th are as f irm as the lips are m o b i l e and f lexible;

the in tonat ions that p roceed f rom t h e m are s t rong , sonorous , noisy . . . '

I t is by means of dental contact that o n e expresses the ideas tha t lie beh ind

such verbs as tonner (to t h u n d e r ) , retentir ( to r e sound) , etonner (to astonish);

i t is by this means t o o tha t o n e denotes tambours (d rums) , timbales ( t im­

pan i ) , and trompettes ( t rumpets ) . Vowel s , t oo , in isolation, are able to

unfold the secret of the age-old names that usage has bur ied wi th in t h e m :

A for possession (avoir, to have) , E for existence, I for puissance ( power ) ,

O for etonnement (astonishment, eyes opened w i d e ) , U for humidite

(humidi ty) and therefore for humeur ( m o o d ) [63]. A n d perhaps, in the

ve ry oldest s t r a tum of ou r his tory, consonants a n d vowels , differentiated

on ly as t w o still vague groups , fo rmed as i t w e r e the t w o sole names u p o n

102

S P E A K I N G

103

w h i c h h u m a n speech is u l t imate ly ar t iculated: the s inging vowels speaking

o u r passions; t he r o u g h consonants ou r needs[64] . I t is still possible to

distinguish the rocky tongues of the N o r t h - a forest of gut tura ls , of

h u n g e r and cold - f r o m the Sou the rn tongues that are all vowels , b o r n

of early m o r n i n g encounters b e t w e e n shepherds w h e n ' the first fires of

love w e r e burs t ing f rom the p u r e crystal o f the spr ings ' .

T h r o u g h o u t its density, even d o w n to the m o s t archaic of those sounds

tha t first rescued it f rom its state as p u r e cry, language preserves its r e p r e ­

sentat ive funct ion; in each one of its art iculations, f rom the depths of

t ime , it has a lways named. It is n o t h i n g in itself b u t an i m m e n s e rust l ing

o f denomina t ions that are over ly ing one another , con t rac t ing in to o n e

ano ther , h id ing one another , and ye t preserv ing themselves in existence

in o rde r to p e r m i t the analysis o r the compos i t ion o f the mos t c o m p l e x

representat ions. W i t h i n sentences, in that v e r y dep th w h e r e signification

seems to be re lying u p o n the m u t e suppor t o f insignificant syllables, there

is a lways a d o r m a n t nomina t i on , a f o r m tha t holds impr i soned wi th in its

vocal walls the reflection of an invisible and ye t indelible representat ion.

For n ine teen th -cen tu ry ph i lo logy , such analyses remained , in the literal

sense of the w o r d , ' a dead letter ' . B u t no t so for a w h o l e w a y of exper i ­

enc ing language - at first esoteric and myst ic at the t i m e of Sa in t -Marc ,

Reve ron i , Fabre d 'Ol ive t , O e g g e r , then l i terary w h e n the en igma o f the

w o r d r e -emerged in all its density of be ing, w i t h M a l l a r m e , Roussel ,

Leiris, or P o n g e . T h e idea that , w h e n we des t roy w o r d s , w h a t is left is

ne i ther m e r e noise n o r arbi t rary, p u r e elements , bu t o the r words , w h i c h ,

w h e n pulver ized in tu rn , will set free still o the r w o r d s - this idea is at

once the nega t ive of all the m o d e r n science of languages and the m y t h in

w h i c h we n o w transcribe the m o s t obscure and the mos t real p o w e r s o f

language. It is p r o b a b l y because it is arbi t rary , and because o n e can define

the condi t ion u p o n w h i c h i t attains its p o w e r of signification, tha t l an ­

g u a g e can b e c o m e the object of a science. B u t i t is because i t has never

ceased to speak wi th in itself, because it is penet ra ted as far as we can reach

wi th in i t by inexhaustible values, tha t we can speak wi th in i t in that e n d ­

less m u r m u r in w h i c h l i terature is b o r n . B u t in the Classical per iod the

relat ion was n o t a t all the same; the t w o figures fitted over each o the r

exact ly: in o rde r that l anguage cou ld be ent i rely compr ised w i th in the

general f o r m of the propos i t ion , each w o r d , d o w n to the least o f its

molecules, had to be a met iculous f o r m of nomina t i on .

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

V D E S I G N A T I O N

A n d yet , the theo ry of 'generalized n o m i n a t i o n ' reveals a t the ex t remi ty

of l anguage a certain relat ion to things that is of an entirely different

na tu re f rom that of the proposi t ional form. If, fundamental ly , the function

of l anguage is to n a m e , that is, to raise up a representat ion or po in t i t ou t ,

as t h o u g h w i t h a finger, then it is indicat ion and n o t j u d g e m e n t . It is

l inked to things by a mark , a no ta t ion , an associated figure, a gesture of

designat ion: n o t h i n g that could be reduced to a relation of predicat ion.

T h e principle of pr imal nomina t ion , of the or igin of words , i s balanced by

the formal p r imacy of j u d g e m e n t . As t h o u g h , on either side of language ,

unfolded in all its art iculations, there lay its be ing, in its verbal ro le as

a t t r ibut ion , and its or igin, in its role as p r i m a r y designation. T h e latter

permi ts the subst i tut ion of a sign for that w h i c h is indicated, the fo rmer

makes possible the l inking o f one con ten t to another . A n d thus we

encounter once again, in their opposi t ion ye t also in their affinity, the t w o

functions of connec t ion and substi tut ion that have been allotted to the

sign in general w i t h its p o w e r of analysing representat ion.

To b r ing the or igin of language back into the l ight o f day means also

to rediscover the pr imi t ive m o m e n t in w h i c h i t was p u r e designation.

A n d one o u g h t , by this means , to p rov ide a t the same t i m e an explanat ion

for its arbitrariness (since that wh ich designates can be as different f rom

that w h i c h it indicates as a gesture f rom the object t o w a r d s w h i c h it is

di rected) , and for its p ro found relation w i t h that w h i c h i t names (since

a part icular syllable or w o r d has a lways been chosen to designate a pa r t i ­

cular th ing) . T h e first of these requ i rements is fulf i l led by the analysis of

the language of action, the second by the s tudy of roots . B u t these t w o

things are no t in opposi t ion to o n e ano the r in t he same w a y as, in the

Cratylus, are explanat ion in te rms of ' na tu re ' and explanat ion in t e rms of

' l a w ' ; on the con t ra ry , they are absolutely indispensable to one ano the r ,

since the f i rs t gives an account of the subst i tut ion of the sign for the th ing

designated and the second justifies the p e r m a n e n t p o w e r of designation

possessed by that sign.

T h e language of act ion is spoken by the b o d y ; and yet , i t i s n o t s o m e ­

th ing given f r o m the v e r y f i rs t . All tha t na ture permi ts is tha t m a n , in the

var ious situations in w h i c h he f inds himself, should be able to m a k e

gestures; his face is agi ta ted by m o v e m e n t s ; he emits inart iculate cries - in

o the r w o r d s , cries that are 'coined nei ther by the t o n g u e n o r by the

lips'[65]. All this is no t yet either l anguage or even sign, bu t the effect and

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S P E A K I N G

consequence of ou r animal i ty . This manifest agitat ion nevertheless has the

v i r tue of be ing universal, since i t depends solely u p o n the confo rmat ion of

o u r organs . H e n c e the possibility for m a n to observe tha t i t is identical in

h imsel f and his compan ions . He is therefore able to associate the c ry he

hears f rom another ' s m o u t h , the g r imace he sees u p o n that o ther ' s face,

w i t h the same representat ions that have , on several occasions, a c c o m ­

panied his o w n cries and m o v e m e n t s . He is able to accept this mimesis as

the m a r k and substi tute of the o ther ' s t h o u g h t . As a sign. C o m p r e h e n s i o n

is beg inn ing . He can also, in re turn , e m p l o y this mimesis that has b e c o m e

a sign in o r d e r to excite in his compan ions the idea that he h imsel f is

exper iencing, the sensations, the needs, the difficulties that are ordinar i ly

associated w i t h certain gestures and certain sounds : a cry expressly directed

in another ' s presence and towards an object, a p u r e interjection [66]. W i t h

this concer ted use of the sign (which is a l ready expression), someth ing like

a l anguage is in the process of being bo rn .

I t is evident , f rom these analyses c o m m o n to Condi l lac and Des tu t t ,

that the language of act ion does indeed link language to na ture by means

of a genesis - b u t in o rde r to detach it f rom na tu re ra ther than to give it

roots there , to emphasize its indelible difference f rom the cry and to p r o ­

v ide a basis for that w h i c h consti tutes its artifice. As long as it is a s imple

extension of the b o d y , act ion has no p o w e r to speak: i t i s n o t language .

I t becomes language , bu t on ly a t the end of definite and c o m p l e x o p e r a ­

t ions : the no ta t ion of an ana logy of relations (the o ther ' s c ry is to w h a t he

is exper iencing - that w h i c h is u n k n o w n - w h a t my c ry is to my appet i te

or my fear); inversion of t ime and vo lun ta ry use of the sign before the

representat ion it designates (before exper ienc ing a sensation of h u n g e r

s t rong e n o u g h to m a k e me c ry out , I emi t the cry that is associated w i t h

i t ) ; lastly, the purpose of arousing in the o the r the representat ion c o r r e ­

spond ing to the cry or gesture (but w i t h this part iculari ty, that , by e m i t ­

t ing a cry, I do n o t arouse, and do n o t in tend to arouse, the sensation of

hunge r , b u t t he representat ion o f the relation be tween this sign and my

o w n desire to eat) . Language is possible o n l y u p o n the basis of this

en tang lement . I t rests no t u p o n a natural m o v e m e n t of comprehens ion or

expression, bu t u p o n the reversible and analysable relations of signs and

representat ions. Language does no t c o m e in to be ing w h e n representat ion is

exter ior ized, b u t only w h e n , in a concer ted fashion, it detaches a sign f rom

itself and causes itself to be represented by that sign. It is no t , therefore,

because he functions as a speaking subject, or f rom wi th in a language already

m a d e , that m a n discovers, all a r o u n d h i m , signs that m i g h t be taken as so

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

many mute words to be deciphered and rendered audible again; it is because

representation provides itself with signs that words can come into being,

and with them a whole language that is no more than the ulterior organiza­

tion of vocal signs. Despite its name, the 'language of action' calls into exist­

ence the irreducible network of signs that separates language from action.

And in this way it bases its artifice in nature. For the elements of which

this language of action is composed (sounds, gestures, grimaces) are sug­

gested successively by nature, and yet they have no identity of content -

for the most part - with what they designate, but above all relations of

simultaneity or succession. The cry does not resemble fear, nor the out­

stretched hand the sensation of hunger. Once they have become con­

certed, these signs wil l remain without 'fantasy and without caprice'[67],

since they have been established once and for all by nature; but they wil l

not express the nature of what they designate, for they are in no way its

image. And from this starting-point men wil l be able to establish a lan­

guage of convention: they now have at their disposal enough signs as

marks for things to enable them to invent further signs that wil l analyse

and combine the primary ones. In his Discours sur I'origine de l'incgalitc[68],

Rousseau made the point that no language can have an agreement between

men as its basis, since such an agreement presupposes that some estab­

lished, recognized, and practised language already exists; we would there­

fore have to imagine it as having been received by men, not built by

them. In fact, the language of action con f i rms this necessity and renders

this hypothesis futile. Man receives from nature the material to make

signs, and those signs serve him first of all as a means of-teaching agree­

ment with other men as to the choice of those that shall be retained, the

values that they shall be recognized as possessing, and the rules for

employing them; after that, they serve him as a means of forming new

signs on the model of the primary ones. The first form of agreement con­

sists in selecting the vocal signs (which are easier to recognize from a

distance and the only ones that can be used when it is dark), the second in

composing, in order to designate representations still left without signs,

sounds close to those indicating neighbouring representations. It is in this

way that language, properly speaking, is constituted, by a series of

analogies that are a lateral extension of the language of action or at least of

its vocal element: language resembles this vocal element, and 'it is this

resemblance that facilitates the understanding of it. We term it analogy

. . . Y o u observe that analogy, which gives us law, does not permit us

to choose signs at random or arbitrarily.' [69]

106

S P E A K I N G

T h e genesis of language in the language of act ion ent i rely avoids the

alternatives of na tura l imi ta t ion a n d arb i t rary conven t ion . In tha t w h i c h

is na tura l - in t he signs that arise spontaneously t h r o u g h the m e d i u m of

o u r bodies - there is no resemblance; and w h e r e there is e m p l o y m e n t of

resemblances it is after a v o l u n t a r y ag reemen t has been reached b e t w e e n

m e n . N a t u r e jux taposes the differences and binds t h e m toge the r by force;

reflection discovers the resemblances, and analyses and develops t h e m . T h e

first phase makes artifice possible, b u t w i t h mater ia l imposed u p o n all

m e n in identical fashion; the second excludes a rb i t ra ry choice b u t opens

up channels for analysis that wil l n o t be exact ly super imposable in the

case of all m e n and all peoples. T h e l a w of na tu re is const i tu ted by the

difference b e t w e e n w o r d s and things - the vert ical division b e t w e e n lan­

g u a g e and that lying benea th i t w h i c h i t is the task of l anguage to desig­

na te ; the rule prescribed by conven t ions is the resemblance that exists

b e t w e e n w o r d s , the great hor izonta l n e t w o r k that forms w o r d s f rom

o t h e r w o r d s and propaga tes t h e m ad infinitum.

I t n o w becomes comprehens ib le w h y the t h e o r y o f roots i n n o w a y

contradicts the analysis of the l anguage of act ion, b u t i s to be found

w i th in it. Roo t s are those r u d i m e n t a r y w o r d s that are to be found, a lways

identical, in a great n u m b e r of languages - perhaps in all; they have been

imposed u p o n language by na ture in the f o r m of invo lun ta ry cries s p o n ­

taneously e m p l o y e d by the language of act ion. I t was there tha t m e n

sought t h e m o u t in o rde r to g ive t h e m a place in their convent iona l

languages. A n d if all peoples , in all climates, chose these same e lementa ry

sounds f rom a m o n g the r a w mater ial o f the language of act ion, that i s

because they discerned in t h e m , t h o u g h in a secondary and reflective

manne r , a resemblance w i t h the object they designated, or t he possibility

o f app ly ing i t to an analogous object . T h e resemblance o f the r o o t to

w h a t i t names assumes its value as a verbal sign on ly t h r o u g h the agency of

t he conven t ion that b r o u g h t m e n toge the r and regulated their l anguage

of act ion so as to create a language. In this w a y , f rom w i t h i n representa­

t ion , signs are uni ted w i t h the v e r y na tu re o f w h a t they designate, and

the p r imi t ive t reasury of vocables is imposed , in identical fashion, on all

languages.

R o o t s m a y be fo rmed in several ways . By o n o m a t o p o e i a , o f course ,

w h i c h is n o t a spontaneous expression, bu t the deliberate ar t iculat ion of a

sign that is also a resemblance: ' t o m a k e the same sound w i t h one 's voice

as t he object tha t one wishes to n a m e ' [ 7 0 ] . By e m p l o y i n g a resemblance

exper ienced in one 's sensations: ' t he impression m a d e by the co lour red,

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

w h i c h is vivid, rap id , harsh to the eye, will be ve ry well rendered by the

sound R, w h i c h makes an analogous impression u p o n the e a r ' [ 7 1 ] . By

impos ing m o v e m e n t s u p o n the organs o f the voice analogous to those

one wishes to signify: 'so that the sound resul t ing f rom the fo rm and

natura l m o v e m e n t of the o rgan w h e n placed in this state becomes the

n a m e of the object ' ; the th roa t rasps to designate the r u b b i n g of one b o d y

against ano ther , i t ho l lows itself inside to indicate a concave surface [72] .

Finally, by e m p l o y i n g the sounds an o rgan natural ly produces to desig­

na te that o r g a n : the glot tal s top de te rmined the n a m e of the th roa t in

w h i c h it occurs , and the dentals (d and r) are used to designate the

teeth [73] . Us ing these convent iona l art iculat ions of resemblance, every

language is able to p rov ide itself w i t h its pack of pr imi t ive roots . T h e pack

is a small one , since the roots are a lmost all monosyl lab ic and exist on ly in

ve ry small n u m b e r s - t w o h u n d r e d for H e b r e w , accord ing to Bergier ' s

est imate [74] ; and even smaller w h e n o n e r e m e m b e r s that (because of the

relations of resemblance that they establish) they are c o m m o n to a lmost

all of o u r languages: de Brosses thinks that all of t h e m together , f rom all

the dialects of E u r o p e and the Or i en t , w o u l d n o t fill ' a single sheet of

wr i t ing paper ' . B u t i t i s on the basis of t h e m that each language develops

its o w n par t icular i ty: ' the i r deve lopmen t is p rod ig ious . Just as o n e e lm

seed produces a great tree, w h i c h by g r o w i n g n e w shoots f rom each roo t

p roduces in the end an entire fores t ' [75] .

Language can n o w reveal its genea logy, the genea logy that de Brosses

a t t empted to display in a d imension of con t inuous filiation that he called

the 'Universa l Archaeo log is t ' [76] . At the t o p of this spacji, one w o u l d

wr i t e the r o o t s - v e r y few in n u m b e r - e m p l o y e d in a l l E u r o p e a n and

Or ien ta l languages; be low each r o o t one could place the m o r e compl ica ted

w o r d s der ived f rom it, bu t taking care to place first those that are nearest

to the roots , and to fol low t h e m in a sequence sufficiently t ight for there

to be as small a distance as possible be tween each w o r d in the series. In

this w a y one w o u l d be able to const i tute a n u m b e r of perfect a n d e x ­

haust ive series, of absolutely con t inuous chains in w h i c h the breaks, i f

there w e r e any , w o u l d indicate the place of a w o r d , a dialect, or a lan­

guage no longer in existence [77 ] . O n c e this vast, seamless expanse had

been const i tuted, one w o u l d have a two-d imens iona l space that one cou ld

cross ei ther on abscissae or on ordinates : vert ically, one w o u l d have the

comple t e filiation o f each r o o t ; hor izontal ly , o n e w o u l d have the w o r d s

e m p l o y e d in a n y given language ; the further a w a y one m o v e d f rom the

p r imi t ive roo ts , the m o r e compl ica ted - and no d o u b t m o r e recent -

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S P E A K I N G

w o u l d the l anguages def ined by a n y transversal l ine b e c o m e , bu t , a t the

same t ime , the m o r e subt le and efficacious w o u l d the w o r d s be as instru­

ments for the analysis o f representat ions. A n d thus super imposed , the

historical space and the g r i d o f t h o u g h t w o u l d b e e x a c t l y co inc identa l .

T h i s quest for the roots o f l a n g u a g e m a y w e l l appear to be a re turn to

the historical hypo thes i s and to the t h e o r y o f m o t h e r - l a n g u a g e s that

Class ic i sm seemed, for a t ime , to h a v e suspended. In real i ty , an analysis

of its roots does no t replace l a n g u a g e in a h i s tory that is, as i t w e r e , the

e n v i r o n m e n t in to w h i c h i t w a s b o r n and in w h i c h i t d e v e l o p e d . Ra ther ,

i t m a k e s h i s to ry a j o u r n e y , a ccompl i shed in successive stages, across the

s imul taneous pa t t e rn ing o f representat ion and w o r d s . In the Classical

pe r iod , l a n g u a g e i s no t a f r agmen t of h is tory au tho r i z ing a t a n y g i v e n

m o m e n t a definite m o d e of t h o u g h t and ref lect ion; i t i s an area of analysis

u p o n w h i c h t i m e and h u m a n k n o w l e d g e pursue their j o u r n e y . A n d the

fact that l a n g u a g e does n o t b e c o m e - or b e c o m e o n c e again - t h r o u g h

the a g e n c y of the r o o t t h e o r y a historical en t i ty i s p r o v e d qui te easily by

the w a y i n w h i c h e t y m o l o g i e s w e r e s o u g h t for i n the e igh teen th c e n t u r y .

T h e g u i d i n g thread used for such inves t iga t ions w a s n o t the mater ia l

t ransformat ions u n d e r g o n e b y the w o r d , b u t the cons t ancy o f its s igni f ica­

t ions.

T h i s search had t w o aspects: def ini t ion o f the roo t , and isolat ion o f the

inflect ional end ings and pref ixes . To define the r o o t w a s t o d i scover an

e t y m o l o g y . I t w a s an art w i t h codi f ied rules [78] ; o n e had to strip the

w o r d o f all the subsequent traces that m i g h t h a v e been left u p o n i t by

c o m b i n a t i o n s and inflect ions; a r r ive a t a m o n o s y l l a b i c e l emen t ; f o l l o w

that e l emen t t h r o u g h the entire past o f the l anguage , t h r o u g h all the

ancient 'charts and glossaries ' ; then f o l l o w i t b a c k in to o the r and m o r e

p r imi t i ve l anguages . A n d i t mus t also be accepted that a t a n y po in t a l o n g

this b a c k w a r d j o u r n e y the m o n o s y l l a b l e m a y c h a n g e : all the v o w e l s m a y

replace o n e ano the r in the h i s tory of a roo t , for the v o w e l s are the v o i c e

itself, w h i c h k n o w s no d i scont inu i ty o r rup tu re ; the consonants , on the

o the r hand, are mod i f i ed a c c o r d i n g to certain p r i v i l e g e d channels : g u t ­

turals, l inguals , palatals, dentals, labials, and nasals all m a k e up families of

h o m o p h o n o u s consonants w i t h i n w h i c h changes o f p ronunc ia t ion are

m a d e for preference , t h o u g h w i t h o u t a n y ob l iga t ion [79] . T h e o n l y i n ­

del ib le cons tant gua ran tee ing the con t inu i ty o f the r o o t t h r o u g h o u t its

h i s tory is the u n i t y of m e a n i n g : the representat ive area that persists in ­

def ini te ly . T h i s i s because ' n o t h i n g perhaps can l imi t induct ions and

e v e r y t h i n g can serve as a basis for t h e m , f r o m total resemblance to the

109

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

very slightest of resemblances ' : the m e a n i n g of w o r d s is ' t he surest source

o f en l igh tenment we can consult'[80].

V I D E R I V A T I O N

H o w is i t tha t w o r d s , w h i c h in their p r i m a r y essence are names and

designations, and w h i c h are art iculated jus t as representat ion itself is

analysed, can m o v e irresistibly a w a y f r o m their or iginal signification and

acquire either a b roade r or m o r e l imited adjacent mean ing? H o w can

they change no t on ly their forms b u t their field o f applicat ion? H o w can

they acquire n e w sounds, and also n e w contents , to such an ex ten t that

var ious languages, equ ipped in the first place w i t h a n u m b e r of p robab ly

identical roots , h a v e fo rmed different sounds , to say n o t h i n g of w o r d s

w h o s e meanings are lost to us?

T h e modif icat ions of f o r m obey no rule, are m o r e or less endless, and

never stable. All their causes are ex terna l : ease of p ronunc ia t ion , fashions,

habits , c l imate - cold w e a t h e r encourages ' unvo iced labials' , ho t wea the r

' gu t tu ra l aspi ra tes ' [81] . T h e alterations o f m e a n i n g , o n the o the r h a n d -

since they are so l imited as to justify an e tymologica l science, w h i c h , if

n o t absolutely exact , is at least ' p robable ' [82] - do obey fixed principles.

These principles, w h i c h foment the internal h i s tory of languages, are all

of a spatial o rde r . S o m e concern the visible resemblance or adjacency

b e t w e e n th ings ; o thers concern the area in w h i c h language and the fo rm

it uses to preserve itself coexist. Figures and wr i t i ng .

W e k n o w o f t w o b road types o f w r i t i n g : tha t w h i c h retraces the m e a n ­

ing of w o r d s , and that w h i c h analyses and reconsti tutes their sounds .

B e t w e e n these t w o there is a strict d ividing- l ine , w h e t h e r one accepts that

the second t o o k ove r f rom the first a m o n g certain peoples as the result of

a veri table ' s t roke of genius ' [83] , or w h e t h e r o n e accepts - so different are

they f rom o n e ano the r - tha t t hey b o t h appeared m o r e or less s imu l ­

taneously, t he first a m o n g graphical ly or iented peoples , the second a m o n g

song-or ien ted peoples [84]. To represent the m e a n i n g o f w o r d s graphical ly

i s or iginal ly to m a k e an exact d r a w i n g of the th ing to be designated. In

fact, it is scarcely w r i t i n g at all - at the ve ry m o s t a pictorial r ep roduc t ion

w i t h the aid o f w h i c h o n e can scarcely t ranscribe a n y t h i n g m o r e than the

mos t concre te f o r m o f narra t ive . A c c o r d i n g t o W a r b u r t o n , the Mexicans

scarcely k n e w o f a n y o the r m e t h o d [ 8 5 ] . T r u e w r i t i n g began w h e n the

a t t e m p t was m a d e to represent , no longer t he t h i n g itself, bu t o n e o f

its const i tuent elements , or one of the circumstances that habi tual ly a t tend

110

S P E A K I N G

it, o r again s o m e o the r t h ing that i t resembles. These three m e t h o d s p r o ­

duced three techniques : the curiological w r i t i n g of t he Egypt ians - t he

crudest of the three - w h i c h employs ' the pr incipal c i rcumstance of a s u b ­

j ec t in lieu of the w h o l e ' (a b o w for a bat t le , a ladder for a siege); then

the ' t ropa l ' h ieroglyphics - s o m e w h a t m o r e perfected - w h i c h e m p l o y

some notab le c i rcumstance (since G o d is a l l -powerful he k n o w s every ­

th ing and sees all tha t m e n d o : he is therefore represented by an eye) ;

finally, symbol ic w r i t i n g , w h i c h makes use of m o r e or less concealed

resemblances (the rising sun is expressed by the head of a crocodi le w h o s e

r o u n d eyes are jus t level w i t h the surface o f the water ) [86]. We can

recognize here the three great figures of rhe to r ic : synecdoche, m e t o n y m y ,

catachresis. A n d i t is by fo l lowing the ne rvu re laid d o w n by these figures

that those languages paralleled w i t h a symbol ic f o r m of w r i t i n g wil l be

able to evolve . T h e y b e c o m e e n d o w e d , little by little, w i t h poet ic p o w e r s ;

their p r i m a r y nomina t ions b e c o m e the s tar t ing-points for l ong m e t a p h o r s ;

these me tapho r s b e c o m e progressively m o r e compl ica ted , and are soon

so far f r o m their points of or igin that it is difficult to recall t h e m . This is

h o w superstit ions arise w h e r e b y peop le believe that the sun is a crocodi le ,

or that G o d is a great eye keeping w a t c h on the w o r l d ; i t is also h o w

esoteric forms of k n o w l e d g e arise a m o n g those (the priests) w h o pass on

t he me taphor s to their successors f rom genera t ion to genera t ion ; and i t is

h o w allegorical discourse (so frequent in the m o s t ancient l i teratures)

comes in to be ing , as wel l as t he illusion that k n o w l e d g e consists in

unders tand ing resemblances.

B u t the his tory of a l anguage e n d o w e d w i t h a f igurat ive w r i t i n g soon

comes to a halt . For it is hard ly possible to achieve m u c h progress in such

a language . Its signs do n o t mu l t ip ly w i t h the met iculous analysis of

representat ions bu t w i t h the mos t distant analogies; so that i t is the

imagina t ion of the peoples using t h e m that is encouraged ra ther than their

powers o f reflection, their credul i ty ra ther than science. M o r e o v e r , k n o w ­

ledge necessitates t w o kinds of apprent iceship: first in w o r d s (as w i t h all

languages) , t hen w i t h wr i t t en signs that have no bear ing u p o n the p r o ­

nuncia t ion of the w o r d s ; a h u m a n life-span is n o t t oo l ong for this doub le

educat ion; and i f one has had, in addi t ion, the leisure to m a k e some

discovery, one has no signs at one 's disposal to h a n d i t on . Inversely, since

i t bears no intrinsic relat ion to t he w o r d i t represents, a t ransmi t ted sign

always remains dub ious : f r o m o n e age to the nex t one can never be sure

that the same sound resides in the same figure. Innovat ions are therefore

impossible, and tradi t ions compromised . W i t h the result tha t t he on ly

i n

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

concern of the learned is to mainta in 'a superstit ious respect ' for the learn­

ing handed d o w n by their ancestors and for the institutions preserv ing

that her i tage : ' t hey feel that any change in m a n n e r s will b r ing change in

the language , a n d that any change in the l anguage will confound and

annul all their k n o w l e d g e ' [ 8 7 ] . W h e n a people possesses n o t h i n g bu t a

f igurative fo rm of wr i t ing , its politics m u s t exclude his tory, or at least all

his tory o ther than pure and simple conservat ion. I t is here , according

to Volney[88] , in this relation of space to language , that the essential

difference be tween East and W e s t is situated. As t h o u g h the spatial

a r r angemen t of the language prescribed the l a w of t i m e ; as t h o u g h their

part icular l anguage did no t c o m e to m e n via his tory, bu t that , inversely,

their on ly means of access to his tory was via their sys tem of signs. I t is in

this nexus of representat ion, words , and space (the w o r d s represent ing the

space of the representat ion, and in t u rn represent ing themselves in t ime)

that the destiny of peoples is silently fo rmed .

W i t h alphabetic wr i t i ng , in fact, the h is tory of m e n is ent i rely changed .

T h e y transcribe in space, n o t their ideas bu t sounds, and f rom those

sounds they extract the c o m m o n elements in o rde r to fo rm a small

n u m b e r of un ique signs whose combina t ion will enable t h e m to fo rm all

possible syllables and w o r d s . W h e r e a s symbol ic wr i t i ng , in a t t e m p t i n g to

spatialize representat ions themselves, obeys the confused l aw of simili­

tudes, and causes language to slip ou t of the forms of reflective t h o u g h t ,

alphabetical wr i t i ng , by abandon ing the a t t e m p t t o d r a w the r e p r e ­

sentat ion, transposes in to its analysis of sounds the rules that, are valid for

reason itself. So that i t does no t ma t t e r that letters do no (t represent ideas,

since they can be c o m b i n e d toge ther in the same way as ideas, and ideas

can be l inked toge ther and disjoined jus t like the letters of the a lphabet [89].

T h e d is rupt ion o f the exact parallelism be tween representat ion and

graphic signs makes i t possible to b r ing language , even wr i t t en language ,

as a total i ty , in to the general d o m a i n of analysis, thus a l lowing the p r o ­

gress o f wr i t i ng and that o f t h o u g h t to p rov ide each o the r w i t h m u t u a l

suppor t [90]. T h e same graphic signs can break d o w n all n e w w o r d s , and

hand on each n e w discovery, as soon as i t is m a d e , w i t h o u t fear of its

be ing forgot ten ; the same alphabet can be used to transcribe different

languages, and thus to convey the ideas of o n e people to another . Since

i t is v e r y easy to learn this alphabet , because of its very small n u m b e r of

elements , eve ryone is able to devo te to reflection and to the analysis of

ideas the t i m e tha t the h ieroglyphic peoples wasted in learning h o w to

wr i t e . A n d so i t is wi th in language itself, exact ly in that fold of w o r d s

1 1 2

S P E A K I N G

" 3

w h e r e analysis and space meet , that the first b u t endless possibility of

progress arises. In its roo t , progress, as defined in the e ighteenth cen tury ,

is n o t a m o v e m e n t wi th in his tory, bu t the result of a fundamenta l relat ion

be tween space and l anguage :

T h e a rb i t ra ry signs o f language and w r i t i n g p rov ide m e n w i t h the

means of ensur ing the possession of their ideas and of c o m m u n i c a t i n g

t h e m to o thers in the m a n n e r of an inheri tance, constant ly a u g m e n t e d

w i t h the n e w discoveries o f each age ; and the h u m a n race, considered

f rom its or igin , appears to the eyes of the phi losopher as an i m m e n s e

w h o l e that itself possesses, like every individual , its ch i ldhood and its

progress [ 9 1 ] .

Language gives the perpe tua l d isrupt ion of t ime the con t inu i ty o f space,

and i t is to t he degree tha t i t analyses, articulates, and pat terns r e p r e ­

sentation that i t has the p o w e r to link ou r k n o w l e d g e of things toge the r

across the d imens ion o f t ime . W i t h the adven t o f language , the chaot ic

m o n o t o n y of space is f ragmented , whi le a t the same t i m e the diversity of

t empora l successions is unified.

T h e r e remains one last p r o b l e m , h o w e v e r . For t h o u g h w r i t i n g is in ­

deed the buttress and ever-watchful guard ian of these progressively m o r e

refined analyses, i t is nei ther their pr inciple n o r even their initial m o v e ­

m e n t . This latter is a s l ipping m o v e m e n t c o m m o n to a t tent ion, to signs,

and to w o r d s . In a n y representat ion, the m i n d can at tach itself, and at tach

a verbal sign, to o n e e lement of that representa t ion, to a c i rcumstance

a t tending it, to some other , absent, t h ing that is similar to it and is recalled

to m e m o r y on account of i t [92]. T h e r e is no d o u b t that this i s h o w lan­

guage developed and gradual ly drifted a w a y f r o m p r i m a r y designat ions.

Or iginal ly , eve ry th ing had a n a m e - a p rope r or peculiar n a m e . T h e n the

n a m e became at tached to a single e lement of the th ing , and b e c a m e

applicable to all the o the r individual things that also conta ined tha t cle­

m e n t : it is no longer a par t icular oak tha t is called tree, b u t a n y t h i n g that

includes at least a t r u n k and branches. T h e n a m e also b e c a m e at tached to a

conspicuous c i rcumstance : night c ame to designate, n o t the end of this

part icular day , b u t the pe r iod of darkness separat ing all sunsets f rom all

dawns . Finally, it a t tached itself to analogies: eve ry th ing was called a leaf

that was as th in and flexible as t he leaf of a t ree[93] . T h e progressive

analysis and m o r e advanced ar t iculat ion of language , w h i c h enable us to

give a single n a m e to several things, w e r e deve loped a long the lines of

these three fundamenta l f igures so wel l k n o w n to rhe to r ic : synecdoche ,

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

m e t o n y m y , and catachresis (or m e t a p h o r , i f the ana logy is less i m m e ­

diately percept ib le ) . For these th ings are n o t the effect of a ref inement of

style; on the con t ra ry , t hey reveal the mob i l i t y peculiar to all l anguage

w h e n e v e r i t i s spon taneous : 'La Hal le p roduces m o r e figures of speech in

o n e m a r k e t day t h a n o u r academic assemblies do in a w e e k ' [ 9 4 ] . I t is v e r y

p robab l e that this mob i l i t y was even greater in the beginnings of l anguage

than i t is n o w : today , t he analysis is so detailed, the gr id so fine, the rela­

tions of coord ina t ion a n d subord ina t ion are so f i rmly established, tha t

w o r d s scarcely h a v e any o p p o r t u n i t y to m o v e f r o m their places. B u t a t

the b e g i n n i n g o f h u m a n h i s to ry , w h e n w o r d s w e r e few, w h e n r e p r e ­

sentations w e r e still confused a n d n o t wel l analysed, w h e n the passions

b o t h modif ied t h e m a n d p r o v i d e d t h e m w i t h a basis, w o r d s had grea ter

mobi l i ty . O n e m i g h t even say t h a t w o r d s w e r e f igurat ive before be ing

p r o p e r : in o the r w o r d s , t ha t t h e y had scarcely at tained their status as

par t icular names before t h e y w e r e be ing scattered over representat ions by

the force o f spontaneous rhe to r i c . As Rousseau says, we p r o b a b l y talked

abou t giants before des ignat ing m e n [ 9 5 ] . Boats w e r e original ly desig­

na ted by their sails, a n d the soul , the ' psyche ' , was initially g iven the

f igurat ive f o r m o f the m o t h [96] .

So tha t a t the base o f spoken l anguage , as w i t h wr i t i ng , w h a t we dis­

cover i s the rhetor ical d imens ion of w o r d s : that f r eedom of the sign to

alight, accord ing to the analysis o f representa t ion, u p o n some internal

e lement , u p o n s o m e adjacent p o i n t , u p o n s o m e analogous figure. A n d i f

languages possess the d ivers i ty we observe in t h e m ; i f f r o m , t h e s tar t ing-

po in t o f their p r imi t ive des ignat ions , w h i c h w e r e d o u b t l e s s c o m m o n t o

t h e m all o w i n g to the universa l i ty o f h u m a n na tu re , t hey have n o t ceased

to deve lop accord ing to t h e dictates of differing fo rms ; i f t hey h a v e all

h a d their o w n his tory , fashions, cus toms , a n d per iods of ob l iv ion; this i s

because w o r d s h a v e the i r locus, n o t in time, b u t in a space in w h i c h they

are able to find the i r or ig ina l site, c h a n g e their posi t ions, t u r n back u p o n

themselves , and s lowly unfo ld a w h o l e deve lop ing cu rve : a topological

space. A n d in this w a y o n e r e tu rns once m o r e to w h a t had served as a

s t a r t ing-po in t for reflection u p o n l anguage . L a n g u a g e was of all signs the

o n e h a v i n g the p r o p e r t y of b e i n g sequent ial : n o t because i t was itself par t

of a c h r o n o l o g y , bu t because i t d r e w ou t in to sequential sounds the

s imul tanei ty of represen ta t ion . B u t this succession, w h i c h analyses dis­

con t inuous e lements a n d b r ings t h e m in to v i e w o n e after the o ther ,

traverses t he space offered by representa t ion to t he m i n d ' s eye. So that

l anguage mere ly ar ranges i n t o a l inear o rde r the scattered f ragments

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S P E A K I N G

represented. T h e propos i t ion unfolds and makes audible the f igure tha t

rhe tor ic makes visible. W i t h o u t this t ropologica l space, l anguage w o u l d

n o t be fo rmed of all those c o m m o n names that m a k e i t possible to es tab­

lish a predicat ive relat ion. A n d w i t h o u t this analysis of the w o r d s , the

figures w o u l d have r ema ined m u t e and m o m e n t a r y ; a n d since they w o u l d

have been perceived on ly in the incandescence of the instant, t hey w o u l d

have fallen fo r thwi th in to a darkness in w h i c h there is n o t even any

t ime .

F r o m the t heo ry of the p ropos i t ion to that o f der ivat ion, all Classical

reflection u p o n language - all tha t was called 'genera l g r a m m a r ' - is

mere ly a detailed c o m m e n t a r y u p o n the simple phrase : ' l anguage analyses' .

I t was u p o n this po in t , in the seventeenth cen tu ry , that the w h o l e W e s t e r n

exper ience of l anguage foundered - the exper ience tha t had a lways led

m e n to believe, unt i l then , tha t language spoke.

V I I T H E Q U A D R I L A T E R A L O F L A N G U A G E

A few conc lud ing r emarks . T h e four theories - of t he propos i t ion , of

ar t iculat ion, of designat ion, and of der iva t ion - fo rm, as i t w e r e , the seg­

ments of a quadri lateral . T h e y conf ron t each o the r in pairs and reinforce

each o the r in pairs. Ar t icula t ion gives con ten t to the p u r e and still e m p t y

verbal f o r m of the p ropos i t ion ; i t f i l l s tha t f o rm, yet i s in oppos i t ion to

it, as a n o m i n a t i o n that differentiates th ings is in oppos i t ion to t he p r e ­

dication tha t links t h e m toge ther . T h e t heo ry o f designat ion reveals the

poin t o f a t t a ch men t o f all t he n o m i n a l forms cu t ou t by ar t iculat ion; b u t

they are in oppos i t ion to ar t iculat ion, jus t as t he instantaneous, gestural ,

perpendicular designat ion is in opposi t ion to pat terns based on genera l i ­

ties. T h e t h e o r y o f der ivat ion indicates t he con t inuous m o v e m e n t o f

w o r d s f rom their source o f or igin , b u t the sl ipping tha t occurs on the

surface of representat ion is in oppos i t ion to the single stable b o n d tha t

links one r o o t to one representat ion. Finally, der ivat ion leads back to the

proposi t ion , since w i t h o u t i t all designat ion w o u l d r emain folded in on

itself and could never acquire the general i ty that a lone can au thor ize a

predicat ing l ink; ye t der ivat ion is created by means of a spatial f igure,

whereas the propos i t ion unfolds in obedience to a sequential and linear

order .

I t should be no ted that there also exist d iagonal relations, as i t w e r e ,

be tween the oppos ing corners of this rec tangle . First of all, b e t w e e n

art iculation and der iva t ion : i f the existence of an art iculated language is

115

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

possible, w i t h w o r d s in jux tapos i t ion , in ter locking, or a r r ang ing t h e m ­

selves in relation to one another , then it is so o n l y in so far as the w o r d s

of that l anguage - start ing f rom their original values and f rom the s imple

act of designat ion that was their basis - have never ceased to m o v e further

and further away , by a process of der ivat ion, thus acqui r ing a variable

extension; hence an axis that cuts across the w h o l e quadri lateral of lan­

guage ; and it is a long this line that the state of a l anguage is m a r k e d off:

its art iculative capacities are de t e rmined by the distance i t has m o v e d

a long the line of der iva t ion; such a reading defines b o t h its historical

pos ture and its p o w e r of discr iminat ion. T h e o the r d iagonal runs f rom the

propos i t ion back to the or igin , that is, f rom the affirmation at the hear t

o f every act o f j u d g e m e n t to the designat ion impl ied by any act o f

n o m i n a t i o n ; i t i s a long this axis that the relation of w o r d s to w h a t t h e y

represent is established: here i t becomes apparen t that words never speak

any th ing o the r than the be ing of representat ion, bu t that t hey a lways

n a m e some th ing represented. T h e first d iagonal marks the progress of a

language f rom the poin t of v i e w of its specification; the second the end­

less inter leaving of l anguage and representat ion - the dupl ica t ing process

wh ich is the reason w h y the verbal sign is a lways represent ing a r e p r e ­

sentation. On this latter l ine, the w o r d functions as a substi tute (wi th its

p o w e r to represent ) ; on the former , as an e lement (wi th its p o w e r to

m a k e combina t ions and break t h e m d o w n ) .

At the po in t w h e r e these t w o diagonals intersect, a t t he centre of the

quandri lateral , w h e r e the dupl icat ing process of representation, is revealed

as analysis, w h e r e the substi tute has the p o w e r of d is t r ibut ion and w h e r e ,

in consequence, there resides the possibility and the pVrYciple of a general

t a x o n o m y of representat ion, there is the name. To n a m e is at the same t ime

to give the verbal representat ion of a representat ion, and to place it in a

general table. T h e entire Classical t heo ry of l anguage is organized a r o u n d

this central and pr ivi leged ent i ty . All the var ious functions of l anguage

intersect wi th in it, since i t is by n o m i n a t i o n that representat ions are

enabled to enter as figures in to a propos i t ion . It is therefore also t h r o u g h

nomina t i on that discourse i s art iculated u p o n k n o w l e d g e . O n l y the j u d g e ­

men t , of course, can be t rue or false. B u t i f all names w e r e exact, i f the

analysis u p o n w h i c h they are based had been perfectly t h o u g h t out , i f the

l anguage in quest ion had been 'wel l m a d e ' , there w o u l d be no difficulty

in p r o n o u n c i n g t rue j u d g e m e n t s , and error , should i t occur , w o u l d be as

easy to uncover and as evident as in a calculation in algebra. B u t the

imperfect ion of analysis, and all the slight shifts caused by der ivat ion, have

1 1 6

S P E A K I N G

caused names to be a t tached to analyses, abstractions, and combina t ions

that are in fact i l legit imate. T h e r e w o u l d be no disadvantage in this (any

m o r e than in g iv ing names to fabulous monsters) i f w o r d s did n o t posit

themselves as be ing representat ions of representat ions: w i t h the result tha t

we cannot th ink of a w o r d - h o w e v e r abstract, general , and e m p t y i t m a y

be - w i t h o u t affirming the possibility of w h a t i t represents. This is w h y ,

in the midd le of the quadri lateral of language , the n a m e appears b o t h as

the po in t u p o n w h i c h all the structures of a l anguage converge (for the

n a m e is its mos t secret, mos t closely gua rded f igure, the pure internal

result of all its convent ions , rules, a n d h is tory) , and as the po in t f rom

w h i c h all l anguage in general can enter in to a relat ion w i t h t he t r u t h

accord ing to w h i c h i t will be j u d g e d .

This is the nexus of the ent i re Classical experience of l anguage : the

reversible character of g rammat ica l analysis, w h i c h is at one and the same

t ime science and prescript ion, a s tudy of words and a rule for cons t ruc t ing

t h e m , e m p l o y i n g t h e m , and r e m o u l d i n g t h e m in to their representat ive

function; the fundamenta l nomina l i sm of ph i losophy f rom H o b b e s to

Ideology, a nomina l i sm that is inseparable f rom a cr i t ique of language and

f rom all tha t mistrust w i t h regard to general and abstract words that we

f ind in Malebranche , Berkeley, Condi l lac , and H u m e ; the great Utopia of

a perfectly t ransparent language in w h i c h things themselves cou ld be

n a m e d w i t h o u t any p e n u m b r a of confusion, ci ther by a totally arb i t rary

bu t precisely t h o u g h t - o u t system (artificial language) , or by a language so

natural that it w o u l d translate t h o u g h t like a face expressing a passion (it

was this l anguage of immedia te sign that Rousseau d reamed of in t he f i rs t

of his Dialogues). O n e m i g h t say that i t is the N a m e that organizes all

Classical discourse; to speak or to wr i t e is n o t to say th ings or to express

oneself, i t is no t a ma t t e r of p lay ing w i t h language , it is to m a k e one 's

w a y towards the sovere ign act o f n o m i n a t i o n , to m o v e , t h r o u g h lan­

guage , t owards the place w h e r e th ings and w o r d s are conjoined in their

c o m m o n essence, and w h i c h makes i t possible to give t h e m a n a m e . B u t

once that n a m e has been spoken, all the language that has led up to it, or

that has been crossed in o rde r to reach it, is reabsorbed in to it and dis­

appears. So tha t Classical discourse, in its p r o f o u n d essence, tends a lways

towards this b o u n d a r y ; bu t , in surv iv ing it, pushes the b o u n d a r y further

away . I t cont inues on its w a y in the perpetual ly main ta ined suspension of

the N a m e . This is w h y , in its v e r y possibility, i t is l inked w i t h rhe tor ic ,

that is, w i t h all the space that sur rounds the n a m e , causes i t to oscillate

a r o u n d w h a t i t represents, and reveals the elements , or the adjacency, or

1 1 7

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

the analogies of w h a t i t names . T h e figures t h r o u g h w h i c h discourse

passes act as a de ter rent to the n a m e , w h i c h then arrives at the last m o m e n t

to fulfil and abolish t h e m . T h e n a m e is the end of discourse. A n d possibly

all Classical l i terature resides in this space, in this s tr iving to reach a n a m e

that remains a lways formidable because i t exhausts , and the reby kills, the

possibility of speech. I t is this s tr iving m o v e m e n t that carr ied the e x ­

per ience of l anguage o n w a r d s f rom the restrained confession of La

Princesse de Cleves to the immed ia t e violence of Juliette. In the latter,

n o m i n a t i o n is at last posi ted in its starkest nud i ty , and the rhetorical

figures, w h i c h unt i l then h a d been ho ld ing i t in suspense, collapse and

b e c o m e the endless figures of desire - and the same names , cons t andy

repeated, exhaust themselves in their effort to cross those figures, w i t h o u t

ever be ing able to reach their end.

All Classical l i terature resides in the m o v e m e n t that proceeds f rom the

figure of the n a m e to the n a m e itself, passing f r o m the task of n a m i n g the

same th ing ye t again by means of n e w figures (which i s preciosi ty) to that

of f inding w o r d s that wil l a t last n a m e accurately that w h i c h has neve r

been n a m e d before or that w h i c h has remained d o r m a n t in the enve lop ing

folds of w o r d s t o o far r e m o v e d f r o m it: of this latter k ind are those

secrets of the soul, those impressions b o r n a t the frontier of th ings a n d the

b o d y for w h i c h the language of t he Cinquieme Reverie m a d e itself spon ­

taneously t ransparent . Later , Roman t i c i sm was to believe that i t h a d

b r o k e n w i t h the previous age because i t had learned to n a m e things by

their n a m e . In fact all Classicism tended towards this end : H u g o was the

fulfilment of Voi ture ' s p romise . Bu t , by this v e r y fact, t h e name ceases to

be the r e w a r d of l anguage ; i t becomes instead its enigmat ic mater ial .

T h e on ly m o m e n t - a n intolerable one , for l o n g bur ied i n s e c r e c y - a t

w h i c h the n a m e was a t the same t i m e the fulfilment and the substance of

language , its p romise and its r a w material , was w h e n , w i t h Sade, i t was

traversed t h r o u g h o u t its w h o l e expanse by desire, of w h i c h i t was a t once

the place of occurrence , t he satisfaction, and the perpe tua l recurrence .

H ence the fact tha t Sade's w o r k s p lay t he role of an incessant p r imord ia l

m u r m u r in ou r cul ture . W i t h this violence o f the n a m e be ing u t te red a t

last for its o w n sake, l anguage emerges in all its b ru t e be ing as a t h ing ;

the o the r 'parts o f o ra t ion ' assume in t u rn their a u t o n o m y , escaping f rom

the sovere ignty of the n a m e , and ceasing to f o r m a r o u n d i t an accessory

circle of o r n a m e n t s . A n d since there i s no longer any part icular beau ty

in ' re ta in ing ' l anguage a r o u n d the frontiers of the n a m e , in m a k i n g i t

s h o w w h a t i t does no t say, the result wil l be a non-discurs ive discourse

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w h o s e role will be to manifest language in its b ru te being. This p r o p e r

be ing of l anguage i s w h a t the n ine teen th cen tu ry was to call the W o r d

(le Verbe), as opposed to the Classical ' v e rb ' , whose function is to p in

language , discreetly b u t cont inuous ly , to the be ing o f representat ion. A n d

the discourse that contains this be ing and frees it for its o w n sake is

l i terature.

A r o u n d the pr ivi leged posi t ion occupied by the n a m e in the Classical

per iod , the theoret ical segments (proposi t ion, ar t iculat ion, designat ion,

and der ivat ion) const i tute the frontiers of w h a t the experience of l anguage

was a t tha t t ime . O u r s tep-by-s tep analysis o f these segments was n o t

under taken in o rde r to p rov ide a history of g rammat i ca l concept ions in

the seventeenth and e ighteenth centuries, o r to establish the general o u t ­

line o f w h a t m e n m i g h t have t h o u g h t abou t l anguage a t that t ime . T h e

in tent ion was to de te rmine in w h a t condi t ions language could b e c o m e the

object of a pe r iod ' s k n o w l e d g e , and be tween w h a t limits this ep i s t emo-

logical d o m a i n developed. N o t t o calculate the c o m m o n d e n o m i n a t o r o f

men ' s opin ions , bu t to define w h a t m a d e i t possible for opinions abou t

language - w h a t e v e r the opinions m a y have been - to exist at all. This is

w h y ou r rectangle defines a pe r iphe ry ra ther than provides an in ter ior

f igure, and i t shows h o w language in ter twines w i t h w h a t i s exter ior and

indispensable to it. We have seen that l anguage existed o n l y by v i r tue o f

the propos i t ion : w i t h o u t at least the impl ic i t presence of the ve rb to be, and

of t he predicat ive relat ion for w h i c h i t p rovides au thor i ty , i t w o u l d no t be

language tha t we w e r e deal ing w i t h a t all, b u t a collection of signs l ike

any others . T h e propos i t ional f o r m posits as a condi t ion of l anguage the

affirmation of a relation of ident i ty or difference: we can speak on ly in so

far as this relat ion is possible. B u t the o the r th ree theoret ical segments

enclose a qui te different r equ i r emen t : if i t is to be possible to derive w o r d s

f rom their first source, if an original k inship is to be a l ready in existence

be tween a roo t and its signification, if there is to be an art iculated pa t t e rn ­

ing of representat ions, there mus t be a m u r m u r of analogies rising f rom

things, percept ible even in the mos t immed ia t e exper ience; there m u s t be

resemblances that posit themselves f rom the v e r y start. I f eve ry th ing w e r e

absolute diversity, t h o u g h t w o u l d be d o o m e d to singulari ty, and like

Condil lac 's statue before i t began to r e m e m b e r and m a k e compar isons , i t

w o u l d be d o o m e d also to absolute dispersion and absolute m o n o t o n y .

Ne i the r m e m o r y n o r imagina t ion , nor , therefore, reflection, w o u l d be

possible. A n d i t w o u l d be impossible to c o m p a r e things w i t h each o ther ,

to define their identical characteristics, and to establish a c o m m o n n a m e

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for t h e m . T h e r e w o u l d be no language. If l anguage exists, i t is because

b e l o w the level of identities and differences there is the foundat ion p r o ­

vided by continuit ies , resemblances, repeti t ions, and natural criss-crossings.

Resemblance, exc luded f rom k n o w l e d g e since the early seventeenth cen ­

tury , still consti tutes the ou te r edge of l anguage : the r ing su r round ing the

d o m a i n o f that w h i c h can be analysed, reduced to order , and k n o w n .

Discourse dissipates the m u r m u r , bu t w i t h o u t i t i t could no t speak.

I t i s n o w possible to grasp h o w solid and t ight ly kn i t the un i ty of

l anguage is in the Classical experience. It is this uni ty that , t h r o u g h the

play of an art iculated designat ion, enables resemblance to enter the p r o -

posit ional relat ion, that is, a sys tem of identities and differences as based

u p o n the ve rb to be and manifested by the n e t w o r k of names. T h e funda­

menta l task of Classical 'discourse ' is to ascribe a name to things, and in that

name to name their being. For t w o centuries, W e s t e r n discourse was the

locus of o n t o l o g y . W h e n i t n a m e d the be ing of all representat ion in

general , i t was ph i losophy : theory of k n o w l e d g e and analysis of ideas.

W h e n i t ascribed to each th ing represented the n a m e that was fitted to

it, and laid o u t the gr id of a we l l -made language across the w h o l e field of

representat ion, then i t was science - nomenc la tu re and t a x o n o m y .

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C H A P T E R 5

Classifying

I W H A T T H E H I S T O R I A N S S A Y

Histories of ideas or of the sciences - by wh ich is m e a n t here an average

cross-section of t h e m - credit the seventeenth cen tury , and especially the

eighteenth, w i t h a n e w curiosi ty: the curiosi ty that caused t h e m , i f n o t to

discover the sciences of life, at least to give t h e m a h i the r to unsuspected

scope and precision. A certain n u m b e r of causes and several essential

manifestations are t radi t ional ly a t t r ibuted to this p h e n o m e n o n .

On the side o f origins o r mot ives , we place the n e w privileges accorded

to observat ion: t he power s a t t r ibuted to i t since Bacon and the technical

improvemen t s in t roduced in i t by the inven t ion of the microscope .

Alongside these is set the then recently at tained prest ige of the physical

sciences, w h i c h p r o v i d e d a m o d e l of ra t ional i ty ; since i t had p r o v e d p o s ­

sible, by means of exper imen ta t ion and theory , to analyse the laws of

m o v e m e n t or those gove rn ing the reflection of l ight beams , was i t no t

normal to seek, by means of exper iments , observat ions , or calculations,

the laws that m i g h t g o v e r n the m o r e c o m p l e x bu t adjacent r ea lm of

living beings? Cartesian mechan i sm, w h i c h subsequent ly p r o v e d an

obstacle, was used at first, t he historians tell us, as a sort of ins t rument of

transference, and led, ra ther in spite of itself, f r o m mechanical rat ional i ty

to the discovery of that o the r rat ionali ty w h i c h is that of the l iving be ing .

Still on the side of causes, and in a s o m e w h a t pel l -mell fashion, the his­

torians of ideas place a var ie ty of n e w interests: the e c o n o m i c a t t i tude

towards agr icul ture - the Physiocrats ' beliefs w e r e evidence of this, b u t

so t oo w e r e t he f i rs t efforts to create an a g r o n o m y ; then , ha l f -way

between husbandry and theory , a curiosity w i t h regard to exot ic plants

and animals, w h i c h a t t empts w e r e m a d e to acclimatize, and o f w h i c h the

great voyages of inqu i ry or explora t ion - that of Tou rne fo r t to the

Middle East, for example , or that of Adanson to Senegal - b r o u g h t back

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descript ions, e n g r a v i n g s , and spec imens ; and then, a b o v e all, the e thical

va lo r i za t i on o f na ture , t oge the r w i t h the w h o l e o f that m o v e m e n t ,

a m b i g u o u s i n its p r inc ip le , b y means o f w h i c h - w h e t h e r o n e w a s a n

aristocrat or a b o u r g e o i s - o n e ' i nves ted ' m o n e y and fee l ing in to a land

that earlier per iods had for so l o n g left f a l l o w . Rousseau , a t the heart o f

the e igh teen th cen tu ry , w a s a s tudent o f b o t a n y .

In their list o f manifesta t ions , the historians then inc lude the va r i ed

f o r m s that w e r e t aken by these n e w sciences o f life, a n d the 'spiri t ' , a s

t h e y p u t it, that d i rec ted t h e m . A p p a r e n t l y , under the inf luence o f D e s ­

cartes, t h e y w e r e mechanis t ic t o b e g i n w i t h , a n d con t i nued t o be so t o

the e n d o f the seven teen th c e n t u r y ; then the first efforts o f an infant

chemis t ry m a d e its impr in t u p o n t h e m , b u t t h r o u g h o u t the e igh teen th

cen tu ry the vi tal is t t hemes are t h o u g h t to h a v e attained o r re turned to

their p r i v i l e g e d status, f inal ly coa lesc ing to f o r m a un i ta ry doc t r ine - that

' v i t a l i sm ' w h i c h i n s l igh t ly differing fo rms w a s professed b y B o r d e u and

B a r t h e z i n M o n t p e l l i e r , b y B l u m e n b a c h i n G e r m a n y , and b y D i d e r o t

then B i c h a t in Paris . U n d e r these different theore t ica l r eg imens , quest ions

w e r e asked that w e r e a lmos t a l w a y s the same b u t w e r e g i v e n each t ime

a different so lu t ion : the possibi l i ty of c lassifying l i v i n g be ings - s o m e ,

l ike Linnaeus , h o l d i n g that all o f na ture can be a c c o m m o d a t e d w i t h i n

a t a x o n o m y , o thers , h k e B u f f o n , h o l d i n g that i t i s t o o r i ch and va r ious

to be fit ted w i t h i n so r ig id a f r a m e w o r k ; the g e n e r a t i v e process , w i t h

the m o r e mechanis t ica l ly m i n d e d i n f a v o u r o f p r e fo rma t ion , and others

b e l i e v i n g i n the specific d e v e l o p m e n t o f g e r m s ; analysis o f funct ions

(c i rculat ion after H a r v e y , sensation, m o t i v i t y , and, t owards the end o f

the cen tu ry , respira t ion) .

A f t e r e x a m i n i n g these p r o b l e m s and the discussions t h e y g i v e rise to ,

i t i s s imple e n o u g h for the historians to recons t ruc t the g rea t con t rovers ies

that are said to h a v e d i v i d e d m e n ' s op in ions and passions, as w e l l as their

reason ing . By these means t hey be l i eve that t h e y can d i s c o v e r the traces

o f a ma jo r confl ic t b e t w e e n a t h e o l o g y that sees the p r o v i d e n c e o f G o d

and the s impl ic i ty , m y s t e r y , and fores ight o f his w a y s res id ing benea th

each f o r m and in all its m o v e m e n t s , a n d a science that is a l ready a t t emp t ­

i n g t o define the a u t o n o m y o f nature . T h e y also r e c o g n i z e the con t r a ­

d ic t ion b e t w e e n a science still t o o a t tached to the o l d p r e - e m i n e n c e o f

a s t r o n o m y , mechan ics , and opt ics , and another science that a l ready sus­

pects all the i r reduc ib le and specific contents there m a y be in the rea lms

of life. Las t ly , the historians see the e m e r g e n c e , as t h o u g h be fo re their

v e r y eyes , o f a n oppos i t i on b e t w e e n those w h o be l i eve i n the i m m o b i l i t y

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of na tu re - in t he m a n n e r of Tourne fo r t , and above all Linnaeus - and

those w h o , w i t h Bonne t , Beno i t de Mail let , and D i d e r o t , a l ready have

a p resen t iment of life's creat ive p o w e r s , of its inexhaust ible p o w e r of

t ransformat ion, o f its plasticity, and o f that m o v e m e n t by means o f w h i c h

it envelops all its p roduc t ions , ourselves included, in a t ime of w h i c h no

o n e i s master . L o n g before D a r w i n a n d long before Lamarck , the great

deba te on evo lu t ion w o u l d appear to have been opened by the Telliamed,

the Palingenesie and the Rive de d'Alembert. M e c h a n i s m and theo logy ,

suppor t ing o n e ano ther o r ceaselessly conflicting w i t h o n e ano the r ,

t ended to keep the Classical age as close as possible to its or igin - on the

side of Descartes and Malebranche ; whereas , opposi te t h e m , irrel igion

and a w h o l e confused in tui t ion of life, conflicting in t u rn (as in B o n n e t )

or act ing as accomplices (as w i t h D i d e r o t ) , are said to be d r a w i n g i t

t owards its i m m i n e n t future - t owards the n ine teen th cen tury , w h i c h is

supposed to h a v e p r o v i d e d the still obscure and fettered endeavours of

the e ighteenth w i t h their posi t ive and rat ional fulfilment in a science of

life w h i c h did n o t need to sacrifice rat ionali ty in o rde r to preserve in t he

v e r y quick of its consciousness the specificity of l iving things, a n d that

s o m e w h a t subter ranean w a r m t h w h i c h circulates b e t w e e n t h e m - t h e

object o f o u r k n o w l e d g e - and us, w h o are here to k n o w t h e m .

I t w o u l d be pointless to go back over the presupposi t ions inherent in

such a m e t h o d . Let i t suffice here to po in t o u t its consequences: the diffi­

cul ty of a p p r e h e n d i n g the n e t w o r k that is able to l ink toge ther such

diverse invest igations as a t t empts to establish a t a x o n o m y and m i c r o ­

scopic observat ions; the necessity of r eco rd ing as observed facts the c o n ­

f l i c t s be tween those w h o w e r e fixists and those w h o w e r e no t , o r b e t w e e n

the experimental is ts and the partisans of the system; the obl igat ion to

divide k n o w l e d g e in to t w o i n t e r w o v e n fabrics w h e n in fact t hey w e r e

alien to one ano the r - the first be ing defined by w h a t was k n o w n al ready

and f rom elsewhere (the Aristotel ian or scholastic inher i tance, the w e i g h t

o f Cartes ianism, the prest ige o f N e w t o n ) , the second by w h a t still

remained to be k n o w n (evolut ion, the specificity o f life, the no t i on o f

o rgan i sm) ; and above all the appl icat ion of categories tha t are strictly

anachronist ic in relat ion to this k n o w l e d g e . Obv ious ly , the mos t i m p o r ­

tant of all these refers to life. Historians w a n t to wr i t e histories of b io logy

in the e ighteenth cen tu ry ; b u t they do no t realize that b io logy d id n o t

exist then, and tha t the pa t te rn of k n o w l e d g e that has been familiar to

us for a h u n d r e d and fifty years is n o t valid for a previous per iod. A n d

that , i f b io logy was u n k n o w n , there was a v e r y s imple reason for it: tha t

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life itself d id no t exist. All that existed was l iving beings, w h i c h w e r e

v i e w e d t h r o u g h a gr id of k n o w l e d g e const i tu ted by natural history.

I I N A T U R A L H I S T O R Y

H o w was the Classical age able to define this rea lm of 'na tura l h is tory ' ,

the proofs and even the un i ty of w h i c h n o w appear to us so distant, and

as t h o u g h already blurred? W h a t is this field in w h i c h na tu re appeared

sufficiently close to itself for the individual beings it conta ined to be

classified, a n d ye t so far r e m o v e d f rom itself tha t they had to be so by the

m e d i u m of analysis and reflection?

O n e has the impression - and it is often expressed - that the h is tory of

na tu re mus t have appeared as Cartesian mechan i sm ebbed. W h e n i t had

at last b e c o m e clear that i t was impossible to f i t the entire w o r l d in to the

laws o f rectil inear m o v e m e n t , w h e n the complex i ty o f the vegetable and

an imal k i n g d o m s had sufficiently resisted the simple forms of ex tended

substance, then it became necessary for na ture to manifest itself in all its

s t range richness; and the met iculous observat ion of l iving beings was thus

b o r n u p o n the e m p t y s t rand f rom w h i c h Car tes ianism had jus t w i t h ­

d r a w n . Unfo r tuna te ly , th ings do n o t happen as s imply as that . I t is qui te

possible - t h o u g h it w o u l d be a ma t t e r requi r ing careful scrut iny - that

o n e science can arise o u t of ano ther ; b u t no science can be generated by

the absence of another , o r f rom another ' s failure, o r even f rom some

obstacle ano ther has encountered . In fact, the possibility of natural his tory,

w i t h Ray , Jons ton , Chr i s tophorus K n a u t h , i s con t emporaneous w i t h

Car tes ianism itself, and n o t w i t h its failure. Mechanism f r o m Descartes

t o d ' A l e m b e r t and natural his tory f rom Tourne fo r t t o D a u b e n t o n w e r e

au thor ized by the same episteme.

For natural h is tory to appear , i t was no t necessary for na ture to b e c o m e

denser and m o r e obscure , to mul t ip ly its mechanisms to the po in t of

acqui r ing the o p a q u e w e i g h t of a his tory that can only be retraced and

described, w i t h o u t a n y possibility of measur ing it, calculat ing it, or

expla in ing it; it was necessary - and this is ent i rely the oppos i te - for

H i s to ry to b e c o m e Na tu ra l . In the sixteenth cen tury , and r igh t up to the

midd le of the seventeenth, all that existed was histories: Be lon had wr i t t en

a History of the nature of birds; D u r e t , an Admirable history of plants; A l d r o -

vand i , a History of serpents and dragons. In 1657, Jons ton published a Natural

history of quadrupeds. This date of b i r th is no t , of course, absolutely

definit ive[1]; i t is there on ly to symbol ize a l andmark , and to indicate,

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f rom afar, the apparen t en igma of an event . This even t is the sudden

separat ion, in the rea lm of Historia, of t w o orders of k n o w l e d g e hence ­

fo rward to be considered different. U n t i l the t i m e of Ald rovand i , H i s to ry

was the inextricable and comple te ly uni ta ry fabric of all tha t was visible

of things and of the signs that had been discovered or lodged in t h e m :

to wr i t e the his tory of a plant or an an imal was as m u c h a ma t t e r of des­

cr ib ing its e lements or organs as of describing the resemblances that cou ld

be found in it, the vir tues that i t was t h o u g h t to possess, the legends and

stories w i t h w h i c h i t had been involved , its place in hera ldry , the med ica ­

men t s that w e r e concoc ted f rom its substance, the foods i t p rov ided , w h a t

the ancients recorded of it, and w h a t travellers m i g h t have said of it. T h e

his tory of a l iving be ing was that be ing itself, w i th in the w h o l e semant ic

n e t w o r k that connec ted i t to the w o r l d . T h e division, so evident to us,

be tween w h a t we see, w h a t others have observed and handed d o w n , a n d

w h a t others imagine or naively believe, the great t r ipar t i t ion, apparen t ly

so s imple and so immed ia t e , in to Observation, Document, and Fable, d id

no t exist. A n d this was no t because science was hesitating be tween a

rat ional voca t ion and the vast we igh t of naive t radi t ion, bu t for the m u c h

m o r e precise a n d m u c h m o r e constraining reason that signs w e r e then

par t of things themselves, whereas in the seventeenth cen tury they

b e c o m e m o d e s o f representat ion.

W h e n J o n s t o n w r o t e his Natural history of quadrupeds, did he k n o w any

m o r e abou t t h e m than Ald rovand i did, a half-century earlier? N o t a great

deal m o r e , the historians assure us. B u t that is n o t the quest ion. O r , i f

we mus t pose i t in these t e rms , then we mus t reply that Jons ton k n e w

a great deal less than Ald rovand i . T h e latter, in the case of each an imal

he examined , offered the reader, and on the same level, a descript ion of

its a n a t o m y a n d of the m e t h o d s of cap tur ing it; its allegorical uses a n d

m o d e of genera t ion ; its habi ta t and legendary mans ions ; its food and the

best ways of c o o k i n g its f lesh. J o n s t o n subdivides his chapter on the horse

under twe lve headings : n a m e , anatomical par ts , habi ta t , ages, genera t ion ,

voice, m o v e m e n t s , s y m p a t h y and an t ipa thy , uses, medic inal uses[2]. N o n e

of this was omi t t ed by Ald rovand i , and he gives us a great deal m o r e

besides. T h e essential difference lies in w h a t is missing in Jons ton . T h e

w h o l e of an imal semantics has disappeared, like a dead a n d useless l i m b .

T h e words that had been i n t e rwoven in the v e r y be ing of the beast have

been unravel led and r e m o v e d : and the l iving be ing , in its a n a t o m y , its

form, its habits , its b i r th and death , appears as t h o u g h str ipped naked .

Na tura l his tory finds its locus in the gap that is n o w opened up be tween

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things and w o r d s - a silent g a p , p u r e of all verbal sedimenta t ion , and yet

art iculated accord ing to the elements of representat ion, those same

elements that can n o w w i t h o u t let o r h indrance be n a m e d . Th ings touch

against the banks of discourse because they appear in the h o l l o w space of

representat ion. I t i s no t therefore a t the m o m e n t w h e n o n e gives up cal­

culat ion that one finally begins to observe. We mus t n o t see the const i tu­

t ion of na tura l his tory, w i t h the empir ical c l imate in w h i c h i t develops,

as an expe r imen t forcing en t ry , wil ly-nil ly, in to a k n o w l e d g e that was

keep ing w a t c h on the t ru th of na tu re e lsewhere; na tura l h is tory - and

this is w h y it appeared at precisely this m o m e n t - is the space opened up

in representat ion by an analysis w h i c h is ant ic ipat ing t he possibility of

n a m i n g ; it is the possibility o£ seeing w h a t o n e will be able to say,but w h a t

o n e could n o t say subsequently, or see at a distance, if things and w o r d s ,

distinct f rom o n e another , did not , f rom the very first, c o m m u n i c a t e in

a representat ion. T h e descriptive o rde r p roposed for na tura l h is tory by

Linnaeus, long after Jons ton , is v e r y characteristic. Acco rd ing to this

o rder , every chapter deal ing w i t h a given an imal shou ld fo l low the

fo l lowing p lan : n a m e , theory , k ind , species, at t r ibutes, use, and, to c o n ­

clude, Litteraria. All the language deposi ted u p o n things by t i m e is

pushed back in to the ve ry last ca tegory , like a sort of supp lemen t in

w h i c h discourse is a l lowed to recoun t itself and record discoveries, t r a ­

dit ions, beliefs, and poet ical figures. Before this l anguage of language , i t

is the th ing itself tha t appears , in its o w n characters, bu t w i th in the reality

that has been pa t te rned f rom the v e r y outset by the n a m e . T h e cons t i tu­

t ion of a natural science in the classical age is no t the e S e ^ , ei ther direct

or indirect , of the transference of a ra t ional i ty formed elsewhere (for

geometr ica l or mechanical purposes) . It is a separate fo rmat ion , o n e that

has its o w n archaeology, even t h o u g h it is l inked ( t hough in a correlat ive

and s imul taneous m o d e ) to the general t heo ry of signs and to the project

for a universal mathesis .

T h u s the old w o r d 'h is tory ' changes its va lue , and perhaps rediscovers

o n e of its archaic significations. In a n y case, t h o u g h i t is t rue that the

historian, for t he Greeks, was indeed the individual w h o sees a n d w h o

recounts f rom the s ta r t ing-poin t of his sight, i t has no t a lways been so in

ou r cul ture . Indeed, i t was at a relatively late date, on the threshold of

the Classical age, that he assumed - or r e sumed - this role . U n t i l the m i d -

seventeenth cen tury , the historian 's task was to establish the great c o m ­

pilat ion of d o c u m e n t s and signs - of eve ry th ing , t h r o u g h o u t the w o r l d ,

tha t m i g h t fo rm a mark , as i t were . It was the historian 's responsibili ty to

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restore to language all the w o r d s that had been bur ied . His existence was

defined n o t so m u c h by w h a t he saw as by w h a t he re told, by a secondary

speech w h i c h p r o n o u n c e d afresh so m a n y w o r d s that had been muffled.

T h e Classical age gives history a qui te different m e a n i n g : that of u n d e r ­

taking a met icu lous examina t ion of things themselves for the first t ime ,

and then of t ranscr ibing w h a t i t has ga thered in s m o o t h , neutral ized, and

faithful w o r d s . I t is unders tandable tha t the first f o rm of his tory const i ­

tu ted in this pe r iod of 'purif icat ion ' should have been the h is tory of

na ture . For its cons t ruc t ion requires on ly w o r d s applied, w i t h o u t in te r ­

media ry , to th ings themselves. T h e d o c u m e n t s o f this n e w his tory are

no t o the r w o r d s , texts o r records , b u t u n e n c u m b e r e d spaces in w h i c h

things are j u x t a p o s e d : he rba r iums , collections, gardens ; the locus of this

his tory is a n o n - t e m p o r a l rectangle in w h i c h , s t r ipped of all c o m m e n t a r y ,

of all enve lop ing language , creatures present themselves o n e beside

another , their surfaces visible, g r o u p e d accord ing to their c o m m o n

features, and thus a l ready vir tually analysed, and bearers of n o t h i n g bu t

their o w n individual names . I t i s often said that the establ ishment of

botanical gardens and zoological collections expressed a n e w curiosi ty

about exot ic plants a n d animals . In fact, these had already claimed m e n ' s

interest for a l o n g whi le . W h a t had changed was t he space in w h i c h i t

was possible to see t h e m a n d f rom w h i c h i t was possible to describe t h e m .

To the Renaissance, the strangeness of animals was a spectacle: i t was

featured in fairs, in t o u r n a m e n t s , in fictitious or real comba t s , in r econ -

stitutions of legends in w h i c h the bestiary displayed its ageless fables. T h e

natural his tory r o o m and the ga rden , as created in the Classical per iod ,

replace the circular procession o f the ' s h o w ' w i t h the a r r a n g e m e n t o f

things in a ' table ' . W h a t c a m e surrept i t iously in to be ing be tween the age

of the theat re and that o f t he ca ta logue was n o t the desire for k n o w l e d g e ,

bu t a n e w w a y of connec t ing th ings b o t h to the eye and to discourse. A

n e w w a y o f m a k i n g his tory .

W e also k n o w w h a t me thodo log ica l impor t ance these 'na tura l ' alloca­

tions assumed, a t the end of the e igh teen th cen tury , in the classification

of w o r d s , languages, roots , documen t s , records - in shor t , in the c o n ­

sti tution of a w h o l e e n v i r o n m e n t of h is tory (in the n o w familiar sense of

the w o r d ) in w h i c h the n ine teen th cen tu ry was to rediscover, after this

pu re tabulat ion of things, the r enewed possibility o f ta lking abou t w o r d s .

A n d of ta lking abou t t h e m , n o t in the style of c o m m e n t a r y , b u t in a

m o d e that was to be considered as posit ive, as object ive, as that of na tura l

history.

1 3 1

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

T h e ever m o r e comple te preservat ion o f w h a t was wr i t t en , the es tab­

l i shment of archives, then of f i l ing systems for t h e m , the reorganiza t ion

of libraries, the d r a w i n g up of catalogues, indexes, and inventories , all

these th ings represent , a t the end of the Classical age, n o t so m u c h a n e w

sensitivity to t ime , to its past, to the density of his tory, as a w a y of i n t r o ­

duc ing into the language already impr in ted on things, and in to the traces

i t has left, an o rde r of the same type as that w h i c h was be ing established

b e t w e e n l iving creatures. A n d it is in this classified t ime, in this squared

and spatialized deve lopmen t , tha t the historians of the n ine teenth cen tu ry

w e r e to under t ake the creat ion of a his tory that could at last be ' t rue ' - in

o the r w o r d s , l iberated f rom Classical rat ional i ty, f rom its o rder ing and

theodicy : a h is tory restored to the i r rupt iye violence of t ime .

I l l S T R U C T U R E

T h u s a r ranged a n d unders tood , natural his tory has as a condi t ion of its

possibility the c o m m o n affinity o f things a n d language w i t h representa­

t ion ; b u t it exists as a task on ly in so far as things and language happen to

be separate. I t m u s t therefore reduce this distance be tween t h e m so as to

b r i n g l anguage as close as possible to t he observ ing gaze, and the th ings

observed as close as possible to w o r d s . Na tu ra l his tory is n o t h i n g m o r e

than the n o m i n a t i o n of the visible. Hence its apparen t simplici ty, and that

air of naivete it has f rom a distance, so s imple does it appear and so

obvious ly imposed by th ings themselves. O n e has the impression that

w i t h T o u r n e f o r t , w i t h Linnaeus or Buffon, s o m e o n e has a t last taken on

the task of s tat ing someth ing that had been visible f rom the beg inn ing of

t ime , b u t had r ema ined m u t e before a sort of invincible distraction of

men ' s eyes. In fact, i t was n o t an age-old inattentiveness be ing suddenly

dissipated, bu t a n e w field of visibility be ing const i tu ted in all its density.

Na tu ra l h i s tory did n o t b e c o m e possible because m e n looked harder

and m o r e closely. O n e m i g h t say, strictly speaking, that the Classical age

used its ingenu i ty , if n o t to see as little as possible, at least to restrict

deliberately the area of its experience. Observa t ion , f rom the seventeenth

cen tu ry o n w a r d , is a percept ible k n o w l e d g e furnished w i t h a series of

systematically negat ive condi t ions . Hearsay is excluded, that goes w i t h o u t

saying; b u t so are taste and smell, because their lack of cer ta inty and their

variabil i ty render impossible any analysis in to distinct e lements that

cou ld be universally acceptable. T h e sense of t ouch is very n a r r o w l y

l imi ted to the designat ion of a few fairly evident distinctions (such as that

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be tween s m o o t h and r o u g h ) ; wh ich leaves sight w i t h an almost exclusive

privi lege, be ing the sense by w h i c h we perceive extent and establish

proof, and, in consequence, the means to an analysis partes extra partes

acceptable to eve ryone : the blind m a n in the e ighteenth cen tury can p e r ­

fectly wel l be a geometr ic ian , bu t he canno t be a naturalist [3]. A n d , even

then, eve ry th ing that presents itself to ou r gaze is no t utilizable: colours

especially can scarcely serve as a foundat ion for useful compar isons . T h e

area of visibility in w h i c h observat ion is able to assume its power s is thus

on ly w h a t is left after these exclusions: a visibility freed f rom all o the r

sensory burdens and restricted, moreove r , to black and whi te . This area,

m u c h m o r e than the receptivi ty and at tent ion a t last be ing g ran ted to

things themselves, defines natural history's condi t ion of possibility, and

the appearance of its screened objects: lines, surfaces, forms, reliefs.

I t m a y perhaps be claimed that the use of the microscope compensates

for these restrictions; and that t h o u g h sensory experience was being

restricted in the direct ion of its m o r e doubtful frontiers, i t was n e v e r t h e ­

less being ex tended towards the n e w objects of a technically control led

fo rm of observat ion. In fact, i t was the same c o m p l e x of negat ive c o n ­

ditions that l imited the rea lm of experience and m a d e the use of optical

ins t ruments possible. To a t t empt to i m p r o v e one 's p o w e r o f observat ion

by look ing t h r o u g h a lens, one mus t r enounce the a t t emp t to achieve

k n o w l e d g e by means of the o the r senses or f rom hearsay. A change of

scale in the visual sphere mus t have m o r e value than the correlat ions

be tween the var ious kinds of evidence that m a y be p r o v i d e d by one 's

impressions, one ' s reading, or learned compi la t ions . T h o u g h indefinite

conf inement of the visible wi th in its o w n ex ten t is m a d e m o r e easily

percept ible to the eye by a microscope, i t is nevertheless no t freed f rom

it. A n d the best p r o o f of this is p robab ly that optical ins t ruments w e r e

used above all as a means of resolving p rob l ems of generat ion. In o the r

words , as a means of discovering h o w the forms, a r rangements , a n d

characteristic p ropor t ions of individual adults, and of their species, cou ld

be handed on d o w n the centuries whi le preserving their strictly defined

identi ty. T h e mic toscope was called u p o n no t to go b e y o n d the frontiers

o f the fundamenta l d o m a i n o f visibility, bu t to resolve o n e o f the p rob lems

i t posed: the main tenance of specific visible forms f rom genera t ion to

generat ion. T h e use of the microscope was based u p o n a non- ins t ru ­

menta l relation be tween things and the h u m a n eye - a relation that defines

natural his tory. It was Linnaeus, after all, w h o said that Naturalia-zs

opposed to Coelestia and Elementa - w e r e in tended to be t ransmi t ted

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134

directly to the senses [4]. A n d Tourne fo r t t h o u g h t that , in o rde r to gain

a k n o w l e d g e of plants , ' ra ther than scrutinize each of their variat ions w i t h

a religious scruple ' , i t was bet ter to analyse t h e m 'as they fall benea th the

gaze ' f s ] -

To observe , then , i s to be con ten t w i t h s e e i n g - w i t h seeing a few

things systematically. W i t h seeing w h a t , in the ra ther confused w e a l t h of

representat ion, can be analysed, recognized by all, and thus g iven a n a m e

that eve ryone wil l be able to unders tand: 'Al l obscure simili tudes, ' said

Linnaeus, 'are in t roduced o n l y to the shame of a r t ' [ 6 ] . Displayed in t h e m ­

selves, empt ied of all resemblances, cleansed even of their colours , visual

representat ions wil l n o w a t last be able to p r o v i d e natural his tory w i t h

w h a t constitutes its p rope r object, w i t h precisely w h a t i t wil l convey in

the we l l -made l anguage i t intends to construct . This object is the extension

of w h i c h all natural beings are const i tu ted - an extension that m a y be

affected by four variables. A n d by four variables on ly : the fo rm of the

e lements , the quan t i ty of those elements , t he m a n n e r in w h i c h they are

distr ibuted in space in relat ion to each o ther , a n d the relative m a g n i t u d e

o f ' e a c h e lement . As Linnaeus said, in a passage of capital impor t ance ,

' eve ry no te should be a p roduc t o f n u m b e r , o f fo rm, of p r o p o r t i o n , o f

si tuation' [ 7 ] . For example , w h e n o n e studies the r ep roduc t ive organs of

a p lant , it is sufficient, bu t indispensable, to enumera t e the s tamens and

pistil (or to r eco rd their absence, according to the case), to define the

f o r m they assume, accord ing to w h a t geometr ica l f igure they are dis­

t r ibu ted in the flower (circle, hexagon , t r iangle) , and w h a t their size is

in relation to t he o ther organs . These four variables, which can be applied

in the same w a y to the five parts of the plant - roots* stem* leaves, f lowers,

fruits - specify the extension available to representat ion wel l e n o u g h for

us to art iculate i t in to a description acceptable to eve ryone : confronted

w i t h the same individual ent i ty, everyone wil l be able to g ive the same

descript ion; and , inversely, g iven such a descript ion eve ryone wil l be

able to recognize the individual entities tha t cor respond to it. In this

fundamenta l ar t iculat ion of the visible, the first confronta t ion of language

and things can n o w be established in a m a n n e r that excludes all uncer ­

ta in ty .

Each visibly distinct par t of a p lan t or an an imal is thus describable in

so far as four series of values are applicable to it. These four values affect­

ing, and de te rmin ing , any g iven e lement o r o r g a n are w h a t botanists

t e r m its structure. ' B y the s t ructure of a plant 's parts we m e a n the c o m ­

posit ion and a r r a n g e m e n t of the pieces that m a k e up its body . ' [8 ] St ruc-

C L A S S I F Y I N G

t u r e also makes possible the descript ion of w h a t o n e sees, a n d this in t w o

w a y s w h i c h are nei ther con t rad ic to ry n o r mutua l ly exclusive. N u m b e r

and m a g n i t u d e can a lways be assigned by means of a c o u n t or a measure ;

t hey can therefore be expressed in quant i ta t ive t e rms . F o r m s and a r r a n g e ­

ments , on the o the r hand , mus t be described by o the r m e t h o d s : ei ther by

identification w i t h geometr ica l figures, or by analogies tha t mus t all be

' o f t he u t m o s t c la r i ty ' [9] . In this w a y i t becomes possible to describe

certain fairly c o m p l e x forms on the basis of their v e r y visible resemblance

to the h u m a n b o d y , w h i c h serves as a sort of reservoir for mode ls of

visibility, and acts as a spontaneous l ink b e t w e e n w h a t o n e can see a n d

w h a t one can s a y [ i o ] .

By l imi t ing and fil tering the visible, s t ruc ture enables i t to be t r an ­

scribed in to language . I t permi t s the visibility of the an imal or p lan t to

pass over in its ent i rety in to the discourse tha t receives it. A n d u l t imate ly ,

perhaps, i t m a y m a n a g e to reconst i tute itself in visible f o r m by means of

w o r d s , as w i t h the botanical call igrams d r e a m e d of by Linnaeus [11]. His

wish was that the o rde r of the descript ion, its division in to paragraphs ,

and even its typographica l modules , should r ep roduce the fo rm of t he

plant itself. T h a t the p r in ted text , in its variables of fo rm, a r r angemen t ,

and quant i ty , should have a vegetable s t ructure . ' I t is beautiful to fo l low

na tu re : to pass f rom the R o o t to the Stems, to the Petioles, to the Leaves,

to the Peduncles , to the Flowers . ' T h e descript ion w o u l d have to be

divided in to the same n u m b e r of paragraphs as there are parts in the plant ,

every th ing concern ing its pr incipal parts be ing pr in ted in large type , and

the analysis of the 'parts of par ts ' be ing conveyed in small type . O n e w o u l d

then add w h a t o n e k n e w of the plant f rom o ther sources in t he same w a y

as an artist completes his sketch by in t roduc ing the in terplay of l ight and

shade: ' t he A d u m b r a t i o n w o u l d exactly conta in t he w h o l e his tory o f the

plant , such as its names , its s t ructure , its external assemblage, its na tu re ,

its use. ' T h e p lan t is thus engraved in the mater ia l of the l anguage in to

which i t has been transposed, a n d recomposes its p u r e f o r m before the

reader 's v e r y eyes. T h e b o o k becomes the h e r b a r i u m of l iving s tructures.

A n d let no one reply that this is mere ly the reverie of a systematizer and

does no t represent the w h o l e of na tura l his tory. Buffon was a constant

adversary of Linnaeus, ye t the same s t ructure exists in his w o r k and plays

the same ro le : ' T h e m e t h o d o f examina t ion wil l be directed t o w a r d s

form, m a g n i t u d e , the different parts , their n u m b e r , their posi t ion, a n d

the ve ry substance of the th ing ' [12] . Buffon and Linnaeus e m p l o y the

same gr id; their gaze occupies the same surface of contac t u p o n th ings ;

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

there are the same black squares left to a c c o m m o d a t e the invisible; the

same o p e n a n d distinct spaces to a c c o m m o d a t e w o r d s .

By means of s t ructure , w h a t representat ion provides in a confused a n d

s imultaneous f o r m is analysed and the reby rendered suitable to the linear

u n w i n d i n g of language . In effect, descript ion is to the object o n e looks at

w h a t the p ropos i t ion is to the representat ion i t expresses: its a r r a n g e m e n t

in a series, e lements succeeding e lements . B u t i t will be r e m e m b e r e d

that l anguage in its empir ical fo rm impl ied a theo ry of the propos i t ion

and a theo ry of ar t iculat ion. In itself, the p ropos i t ion r ema ined e m p t y ;

and the ability of ar t iculat ion to give fo rm to au thent ic discourse was

condi t ional u p o n its be ing l inked toge the r by the pa ten t or secret

function of the v e r b to be. Na tu ra l his tory is a science, that is, a language ,

bu t a securely based and wel l -cons t ruc ted o n e : its proposi t ional unfolding

is indisputably an ar t icula t ion; the a r r a n g e m e n t of its e lements in to a

linear series pat terns representat ion accord ing to an evident a n d universal

m o d e . "Whereas o n e and the same representat ion can g ive rise to a c o n ­

siderable n u m b e r of proposi t ions , since the names that e m b o d y i t a r t icu­

la te i t accord ing to different modes , one and the same animal , or o n e and

the same plant , will be described in the same w a y , in so far as their s t ruc­

tu re governs their passage f rom representa t ion in to language. T h e t h eo ry

of structure, w h i c h runs r igh t t h r o u g h natura l h is tory in the Classical age,

super imposes the roles p layed in language by the proposition and articula­

tion in such a w a y that they pe r fo rm one and the same funct ion.

A n d it is by this means tha t s t ructure links the possibility of a natural

his tory to the mathesis . In fact, i t reduces the w h o l e area o p t h e visible to

a system of variables all of whose values can be designated, if n o t by a

quant i ty , at least by a perfectly clear and a lways finite descript ion. It is

therefore possible to establish the system of identities and the o rde r of

differences exist ing be tween natural entities. A d a n s o n was of the op in ion

that one day i t w o u l d be possible to treat b o t a n y as a r igorous ly m a t h e ­

matical science, and that i t w o u l d p r o v e permissible to pose botanical

p rob l ems in the same w a y as one does algebraic or geometr ica l ones : 'find

the m o s t obv ious po in t that establishes the line of separation or discussion

b e t w e e n the scabious family and the honeysuckle family ' ; or again, find

a k n o w n genus of plants (whe the r natural or artificial is u n i m p o r t a n t )

tha t stands exact ly ha l f -way be tween D o g ' s - b a n e and B o r a g e [ i 3 ] . By

v i r tue of s t ructure , the great proliferat ion of beings occupy ing the surface

of t he g lobe is able to enter b o t h in to the sequence of a descript ive lan­

g u a g e and in to the field of a mathesis that w o u l d also be a general science

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C L A S S I F Y I N G

137

of order . A n d this const i tuent relat ion, c o m p l e x as it is, is established

wi th in the apparen t simplici ty of a description of the visible.

All this is of great impor t ance for the definit ion of natural h is tory in

t e rms of its object. T h e latter is p rov ided by surfaces and lines, no t by

functions or invisible tissues. T h e plant and the an imal are seen no t so

m u c h in their organic un i ty as by the visible pa t t e rn ing of their organs .

T h e y are paws and hoofs, f lowers and fruits, before be ing respira tory

systems or internal l iquids. N a t u r a l his tory traverses an area of visible,

s imul taneous , concomi t an t variables, w i t h o u t any internal relat ion of

subord ina t ion or organizat ion. In the seventeenth and e ighteenth cen­

turies a n a t o m y lost the leading role that i t had played d u r i n g the Renais ­

sance and that i t was to resume in Cuvie r ' s day ; i t was n o t that curiosi ty

had diminished in the m e a n t i m e , or that k n o w l e d g e had regressed, bu t

ra ther that the fundamenta l a r r angemen t of the visible and the expressible

no longer passed t h r o u g h the thickness o f the b o d y . H e n c e the ep i s t emo-

logical precedence enjoyed by b o t a n y : t he area c o m m o n to w o r d s and

things const i tuted a m u c h m o r e a c c o m m o d a t i n g , a m u c h less 'b lack ' gr id

for plants than for an imals ; in so far as there are a great m a n y const i tuent

organs visible in a p lan t tha t are no t so in animals , t a x o n o m i c k n o w l e d g e

based u p o n immedia te ly percept ible variables was r icher and m o r e cohe r ­

ent in the botanical o rde r than in the zoological . We mus t therefore

reverse w h a t is usually said on this subject: it is n o t because there was a

great interest in b o t a n y du r ing the seventeenth and e ighteenth centuries

tha t so m u c h invest igat ion was unde r t aken in to m e t h o d s of classification.

B u t because i t was possible to k n o w and to say on ly wi th in a t a x o n o m i c

area o f visibility, the k n o w l e d g e o f plants was b o u n d to p r o v e m o r e

extensive than that of animals .

At the insti tutional level, the inevitable correlatives of this pa t t e rn ing

were botanical gardens and natural his tory collections. A n d their i m p o r t ­

ance, for Classical cul ture , does no t lie essentially in w h a t they m a k e i t

possible to see, bu t in w h a t they h ide and in w h a t , by this process of

obl i terat ion, t hey a l low to e m e r g e : they screen off a n a t o m y and funct ion,

they conceal the o rgan i sm, in o rde r to raise up before the eyes of those

w h o awai t the t r u t h the visible relief o f forms, w i t h their e lements , their

m o d e o f dis t r ibut ion, and their measurements . T h e y are books furnished

w i t h structures, the space in w h i c h characteristics c o m b i n e , and in w h i c h

classifications are physically displayed. O n e day , t owards the end of t he

e ighteenth cen tury , C u v i e r was to t o p p l e the glass j a r s o f the M u s e u m ,

smash t h e m open and dissect all the forms of animal visibility that t he

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

Classical age h a d preserved in t h e m . This iconoclastic gesture , w h i c h

L a m a r c k could neve r b r i n g h imsel f to m a k e , does n o t reveal a n e w

curiosi ty directed t o w a r d s a secret tha t no one had the interest or cou rage

to uncover , or the possibility of uncover ing , before. I t i s ra ther , and m u c h

m o r e seriously, a m u t a t i o n in the na tura l d imens ion of W e s t e r n cu l tu re :

the end of history in the sense in w h i c h i t was unders tood by Tourne fo r t ,

Linnaeus, Buffon, and A d a n s o n - and in the sense in w h i c h i t was u n d e r ­

s tood by Boissier de Sauvages also, w h e n he opposed historical k n o w l e d g e

of the visible to philosophical k n o w l e d g e of t he invisible, of w h a t is

h idden and of causes[ i4] . A n d i t was also to be the beg inn ing of w h a t ,

by subst i tut ing a n a t o m y for classification, o rgan i sm for s t ructure , internal

subord ina t ion for visible character , the series for tabulat ion, was to m a k e

possible the precipi ta t ion in to the old f la t w o r l d of animals and plants,

engraved in black on wh i t e , a w h o l e p r o f o u n d mass of t i m e to wh ich

m e n w e r e to give the r enewed n a m e of history.

I V C H A R A C T E R

Struc ture is that designat ion of the visible w h i c h , by means of a k ind

of pre-l inguist ic sifting, enables i t to be t ranscribed in to language . B u t the

description thus ob ta ined is n o t h i n g m o r e than a sort of p r o p e r n o u n : i t

leaves each be ing its strict individual i ty and expresses nei ther the table to

w h i c h i t be longs , n o r the area su r round ing it, n o r the site i t occupies. I t

i s designat ion p u r e and simple. A n d for na tura l h is tory to b e c o m e lan­

guage , the descript ion mus t b e c o m e a ' c o m m o n n o u n ' . I t has heen seen

h o w , in spontaneous language , the p r i m a r y des igna t ions w h i c h c o n ­

cerned on ly individual representat ions, after hav ing or ig inated in the lan­

guage of act ion and the resultant p r imi t ive roots , had little by little,

t h r o u g h the m o m e n t u m o f der ivat ion, acquired m o r e general values. B u t

na tura l his tory is a wel l -cons t ruc ted l anguage : it should no t accept the

constraint imposed by der ivat ion and its fo rms; i t should n o t lend credit

to any e t y m o l o g y f i s ] . I t should uni te in one and the same opera t ion w h a t

eve ryday language keeps separate: no t on ly m u s t i t designate all natural

entities v e r y precisely, bu t i t mus t also situate t h e m wi th in the system of

identities and differences that unites t h e m to and distinguishes t h e m f rom

all t he others . N a t u r a l h is tory mus t p rov ide , s imultaneously, a certain

designation and a cont ro l led derivation. A n d jus t as the t h eo ry of s t ruc­

tu re super imposed art iculat ion and the propos i t ion so tha t they became

o n e and the same, so the theo ry of character m u s t identify the values

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C L A S S I F Y I N G

tha t designate and the area in w h i c h they are der ived. T o u r n e f o r t

says:

To k n o w plants i s t o k n o w w i t h precision the names that h a v e been

g iven to t h e m in relation to the s t ructure of some of their par ts . . .

T h e idea of the character that essentially distinguishes plants f rom o n e

ano the r o u g h t invariably t o be o n e w i t h t he n a m e o f each p l a n t [ i 6 ] .

Establishing character is at the same t i m e easy a n d difficult. Easy,

because na tura l his tory does no t have to establish a system of names based

u p o n representat ions that are difficult to analyse, bu t on ly to der ive i t

f rom a l anguage that has a l ready been unfolded in the process of descr ip­

t ion. T h e process o f n a m i n g wi l l be based, n o t u p o n w h a t one sees, b u t

u p o n elements that have a l ready been in t roduced in to discourse by s t ruc­

ture . It is a ma t t e r of cons t ruc t ing a secondary l anguage based u p o n that

p r i m a r y , bu t certain and universal , l anguage . B u t a major difficulty appears

immedia te ly . In o rde r to establish the identities and differences exist ing

be tween all na tura l entities, i t w o u l d be necessary to take in to account

every feature that m i g h t have been listed in a g iven descript ion. Such an

endless task w o u l d push the adven t of natural his tory back in to an inac­

cessible never -never land, unless there existed techniques that w o u l d

avoid this difficulty a n d l imit the l abour of m a k i n g so m a n y compar isons .

It is possible, a priori, to state that these techniques are of t w o types. E i the r

that o f m a k i n g total compar isons , bu t on ly wi th in empir ical ly c o n ­

sti tuted g roups in which the n u m b e r of resemblances is manifestly so h igh

that the enumera t i on of the differences will n o t take l ong to comple t e ;

and in this w a y , step by step, the establishment of all identities and d is ­

tinctions can be guaranteed . Or that of selecting a f ini te and relatively

l imited g r o u p of characteristics, w h o s e variat ions and constants m a y be

studied in any individual ent i ty that presents itself. This last p r o c e d u r e

was t e r m e d the System, the f i r s t the M e t h o d . T h e y are usually contrasted,

in t he same w a y as Linnaeus is contras ted w i t h Buffon, Adanson , or

Anto ine-Lauren t de Jussieu - or as a r igid a n d s imple concep t ion of

na ture is contras ted w i t h the detailed and immed ia t e percep t ion of its

relations, or as the idea of a motionless na tu re is contras ted w i t h that of

a t eeming con t inu i ty of beings all c o m m u n i c a t i n g w i t h o n e ano the r ,

ming l ing w i t h o n e ano ther , and perhaps be ing t ransformed in to o n e

another . . . . A n d ye t the essential does n o t lie in this conflict b e t w e e n

the great intui t ions of na ture . I t lies ra ther in t he n e t w o r k of necessity

which a t this po in t rendered the choice be tween t w o way s o f cons t i tu t ing

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

natural his tory as a language b o t h possible and indispensable. T h e rest is

mere ly a logical and inevitable consequence.

F r o m the elements that the System jux taposes in great detail by means

of descript ion, it selects a part icular few. These define the pr ivi leged and,

in fact, exclusive s t ructure in relation to w h i c h identities or differences

as a w h o l e are to be examined . A n y difference n o t related to one of these

elements will be considered irrelevant. If, like Linnaeus, o n e selects as the

characteristic e lements 'all the different parts related to f ruc t i f ica t ion ' [17] ,

then a difference of leaf or s t em or roo t or petiole mus t be systematically

ignored . Similarly, any ident i ty n o t occur r ing in one of these selected

e lements wil l have no value in the definit ion o f the character . On the

o the r hand , w h e n these elements are similar in t w o individuals they

receive a c o m m o n denomina t ion . T h e s t ructure selected to be the locus

of per t inen t identities and differences is w h a t is t e r m e d the character.

Accord ing to Linnaeus, the character should be c o m p o s e d of ' the mos t

careful descript ion of the fructification of the f i rs t species. All the o the r

species of the genus are c o m p a r e d w i t h the f i rs t , all d iscordant notes be ing

e l iminated; finally, after this process, t he character e m e r g e s ' [ 1 8 ] .

T h e system is a rb i t rary in its basis, since it deliberately ignores all

differences and all identities no t related to the selected s t ructure . B u t there

is no l aw that says that i t will no t be possible to arr ive o n e day , t h r o u g h

a use of this technique , at the discovery of a natural sys tem - o n e in wh ich

all the differences in the character w o u l d cor respond to differences of the

same value in t he plant 's general s t ruc ture ; and in wh ich , inversely, all

the individuals or all the species g r o u p e d toge ther unde r a c o m m o n

character w o u l d in fact have the same relat ion of resemblance in all and

each of their par ts . B u t o n e canno t f ind the w a y to this natural system

unless one has first established w i t h cer ta inty an artificial system, at least

in certain of the vegetable or animal domains . This i s w h y Linnaeus does

n o t seek to establish a natural sys tem immedia te ly , 'before a comple te

k n o w l e d g e has been at ta ined of eve ry th ing that is r e l evan t ' [19 ] to his

system. I t is t rue that the na tura l m e t h o d consti tutes ' the f i rs t and last

wish of botanis ts ' , and that all its ' f ragments should be searched for w i th

the greatest care ' [20] , as Linnaeus himself searches for t h e m in his Classes

Plantarum; bu t until this natural m e t h o d appears in its certain and finished

fo rm, 'artificial systems are absolutely necessary ' [21] .

M o r e o v e r , the system is relat ive: it is able to function accord ing to

a desired degree of precision. If the selected character is c o m p o s e d of a

large s t ructure , hav ing a large n u m b e r of variables, then as soon as one

140

C L A S S I F Y I N G

141

passes f rom o n e individual to ano ther , even if i t is immedia te ly adjacent,

the differences will appear at o n c e : the character in this case is v e r y close

to p u r e descript ion [22] . If, on the o the r hand , the selected s t ructure is

l imi ted in ex ten t , and its variables few, then the differences will be ra re

a n d the individuals g r o u p e d in compac t masses. T h e character is chosen

accord ing to t he degree of detail requi red in the classification. In o rde r to

establish genera , T o u r n e f o r t chose the combina t i on of f lower a n d fruit

as his character . N o t , as w i t h Cesalpino, because these w e r e the m o s t

useful parts of the plant , bu t because they pe rmi t t ed a numer ica l ly

satisfying combinab i l i ty : the e lements that w o u l d be taken f r o m the

o the r th ree parts (roots , s tems, and leaves) were , in effect, ei ther t o o

n u m e r o u s i f t reated toge the r or t o o few if taken separately [23]. Linnaeus

calculated tha t the th i r ty -e igh t o rgans of r ep roduc t ion , each compr i s ing

the four variables o f n u m b e r , fo rm, si tuat ion, and p r o p o r t i o n , w o u l d

p roduce 5 ,776 configurat ions, or sufficient to define the genera [24] . I f

o n e wishes t o obta in g roups m o r e n u m e r o u s than genera , then o n e m u s t

m a k e use of m o r e l imi ted characters ('factitious characters agreed u p o n

be tween botanis ts ' ) , as, for example , the s tamens a lone, or t he pistil

a lone. In this w a y one w o u l d be able to distinguish classes or o rde r s [25] .

In this w a y , a g r id can be laid o u t over the entire vegetable or an imal

k i n g d o m . E a c h g r o u p can be g iven a n a m e . W i t h the result tha t a n y

species, w i t h o u t hav ing to be described, can be designated w i t h the

greatest accuracy by means of the names of the different g roups in w h i c h

i t is included. Its comple te n a m e wil l cross the ent i re n e t w o r k of cha r ­

acters that o n e has established, r ight up to the largest classifications of all.

Bu t for convenience , as Linnaeus points ou t , pa r t of this n a m e should

remain 'silent ' (one does no t n a m e the class and o rde r ) , whi le the o the r

par t should be ' sounded ' (one mus t n a m e the genus , the species, and the

var ie ty [26]. T h e plant thus recognized in its essential character and des ig­

nated u p o n that basis will express a t the same t i m e that w h i c h accurate ly

designates i t a n d the relat ion l inking i t to those plants that resemble i t and

be long to the same genus (and thus to the same family and the same

o rde r ) . I t will have been g iven a t the same t ime its p r o p e r n a m e and the

w h o l e series of c o m m o n names (manifest or h idden) in w h i c h i t resides.

T h e generic n a m e is, as i t w e r e , t he official cur rency of ou r botanical

r epubl ic ' [27] . N a t u r a l h is tory will have accompl ished its fundamenta l

task, wh ich is that of ' a r r angemen t and des ignat ion ' [28] .

T h e Method is ano the r technique for resolving the same p r o b l e m .

Instead of selecting, f rom the total i ty described, the e lements - w h e t h e r

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

few or n u m e r o u s - tha t are to be used as characters, the m e t h o d consists

in deduc ing t h e m stage by stage. D e d u c t i o n i s to be t aken he re in the

sense of subtrac t ion. O n e begins - as Adanson did in his examina t ion of

t he plants of Senegal [29] - w i t h a species ei ther arbi t rar i ly chosen or

encoun te red by chance . O n e describes i t in its ent i re ty , leaving o u t n o n e

of its par ts a n d d e t e r m i n i n g all the values that the variables have der ived

f rom it. This process is r epea ted w i t h the nex t species, also g iven by the

a rb i t ra ry na tu re of representa t ion ; the descript ion should be as total as

in the first instance, b u t w i t h t he o n e difference that n o t h i n g that has been

m e n t i o n e d in the first descr ip t ion should be repeated in the second. O n l y

the differences are listed. A n d similarly w i t h the th i rd species in relat ion

to the first t w o , a n d so on indefinitely. So that , a t the v e r y end, all the

different features of all t he plants have been listed once , b u t never m o r e

than once . A n d by a r r a n g i n g the later and progressively m o r e sparse des­

cr ipt ions a r o u n d the earlier ones , we shall be able to perceive, t h r o u g h the

or iginal chaos, the e m e r g e n c e of the general table o f relations. T h e cha r ­

acter tha t distinguishes each species or each genus is t he on ly feature

p icked o u t f rom the b a c k g r o u n d of tacit identities. Indeed , such a t ech­

n ique w o u l d p r o b a b l y be t h e mos t reliable, o n l y the n u m b e r o f existing

species is so great that i t w o u l d be impossible to deal w i t h t h e m all.

Never theless , the e x a m i n a t i o n of such species as we do m e e t w i t h reveals

the existence of grea t ' famil ies ' , o f ve ry b r o a d g roups in w h i c h the species

and the genera h a v e a considerable n u m b e r of identities. So considerable,

indeed, tha t t hey signalize themselves by a v e r y large n u m b e r of cha r ­

acteristics, even to t he least analyt ic eye ; the resemblance be jween all the

species of Ranuncu lus , or b e t w e e n all the species of Aeoni te , is i m m e d i ­

ately apparen t to the senses. At this po in t , in o rde r to p r even t the task

b e c o m i n g infinite, o n e i s ob l iged to reverse t he process. O n e admi ts the

existence of the grea t families that are manifestly recognizable , and w h o s e

general features h a v e been defined, as i t w e r e bl indfold, by the f i rs t

descriptions o f t h e m . T h e s e are the c o m m o n features that w e n o w es tab­

lish in a posi t ive w a y ; t hen , w h e n e v e r we m e e t w i t h a genus or species

that is manifest ly con ta ined by t h e m , i t wi l l suffice to indicate w h a t

difference distinguishes it f r o m the others that serve it as a sort of na tura l

en tourage . A k n o w l e d g e of each species can be acquired easily u p o n the

basis of this general character iza t ion: ' W e shall d ivide each of the three

k i n g d o m s in to several families wh ich wi l l g r o u p toge the r all those beings

that are s t r ikingly related, a n d we shall r ev i ew all the general and par ­

ticular characters of the be ings conta ined wi th in those families ' ; in this w a y

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143

we shall be assured of re la t ing all these beings to their na tura l families;

and thus , beg inn ing w i t h the ferret and the wolf, the d o g and the bear,

we shall c o m e to k n o w sufficient abou t the l ion, the t iger, and the

hyena , w h i c h are animals of the same family [30].

I t i s immedia te ly apparen t in w h a t w a y the m e t h o d and the sys tem are

opposed . T h e r e can be on ly o n e m e t h o d ; b u t one can inven t a n d app ly

a considerable n u m b e r of systems: Adanson a lone set ou t s ix ty - f ive [31] .

T h e system is a rb i t ra ry t h r o u g h o u t its deve lopmen t , bu t once the sys tem

of variables - t he character - has been defined at the outset , it is no longer

possible to modi fy it, t o a d d o r subtract even o n e e lement . T h e m e t h o d

is imposed f rom w i t h o u t , by the total resemblances tha t relate th ings

toge ther ; i t immedia te ly transcribes pe rcep t ion in to discourse; i t r emains ,

in its po in t of depar tu re , v e r y close to descr ipt ion; bu t i t is a lways possible

to apply to the general character i t has defined empir ical ly such modi f ica­

tions as m a y be imposed : a feature o n e h a d t h o u g h t essential to a w h o l e

g r o u p o f plants o r animals m a y very wel l p r o v e to be no m o r e than a

par t icular i ty of a few of t h e m , i f one discovers o thers that , w i t h o u t

possessing that feature, be long qui te obvious ly to the same family; the

m e t h o d m u s t a lways be ready to rectify itself. As Adanson says, the

sys tem is like ' t he trial and e r ro r m e t h o d in ma thema t i c s ' : i t is the result

of a decision, b u t i t m u s t be absolutely cohe ren t ; the m e t h o d , on the

o ther hand , is

a g iven a r r a n g e m e n t of objects or facts g r o u p e d toge the r accord ing to

certain g iven conven t ions or resemblances, w h i c h o n e expresses by a

general n o t i o n applicable to all those objects, w i t h o u t , h o w e v e r ,

r ega rd ing that fundamenta l no t ion or pr inciple as absolute or invariable,

or as so general that it c anno t suffer any except ion . . . T h e m e t h o d

differs f rom the system on ly in the idea that the a u t h o r attaches to his

principles, r ega rd ing t h e m as variables in the m e t h o d and as absolutes

in the sys tem[32] .

M o r e o v e r , t he system can recognize o n l y relations o f coord ina t ion

be tween an imal or vegetable s tructures. Since the character is selected,

no t on account o f its functional impor t ance bu t on account o f its c o m ­

binative efScacity, there i s no p r o o f that in the internal h ierarchy of any

individual p lan t such and such a f o r m of pistil or a r r a n g e m e n t of s tamens

necessarily entails such a n d such a s t ruc ture : i f the g e r m of t he A d o x a is

placed be tween the calyx and the corolla, or if, in the a r u m , the s tamens

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

144

are a r ranged be tween the pistils, these are n o t h i n g m o r e or less than

's ingular s t ruc tures ' [33] ; their slight i m p o r t a n c e is a p r o d u c t of their

rar i ty a lone, whereas the equal division of ca lyx and corolla derives its

va lue on ly f rom its f requency[34] . T h e m e t h o d , on the o the r h a n d ,

because i t proceeds f rom identities and differences of the m o s t general k ind

to those that are less so, is capable of b r ing ing o u t vertical relations of

subord ina t ion . I t enables us, in fact, to see w h i c h characters are i m p o r t a n t

e n o u g h never to be nega ted w i th in a g iven family. In relat ion to the

system, the reversal is v e r y i m p o r t a n t : the mos t essential characters m a k e

i t possible to dist inguish the largest and mos t visibly distinct families,

whereas , for Tou rne fo r t or Linnaeus, t he essential character defined the

genus ; and it was sufficient for the naturalists ' ' ag r eemen t ' to select a

factitious character that w o u l d distinguish b e t w e e n classes or orders . In

the m e t h o d , general organiza t ion and its internal dependencies are m o r e

i m p o r t a n t than the lateral appl icat ion of a constant apparatus of variables.

Despi te these differences, b o t h system and m e t h o d rest u p o n the same

epistemological base. I t can be defined briefly by saying that , in Classical

t e rms , a k n o w l e d g e of empir ical individuals can be acquired on ly f rom

the con t inuous , o rdered , and universal tabula t ion of all possible differ­

ences. In the s ixteenth cen tury , t he ident i ty of plants or animals was

assured by the posi t ive m a r k (sometimes h idden , often visible) w h i c h they

all b o r e : w h a t dist inguished the various species of birds, for instance, was

no t the differences that existed between t h e m b u t the fact that this one

h u n t e d its food a t n ight , that ano the r l ived on the water , tha t yet ano the r

fed o n l iving fleshes]. E v e r y be ing b o r e a m a r k , and..the* species was

measured by the extent of a c o m m o n e m b l e m . So tha t each species

identified itself by itself, expressed its individual i ty independent ly of all

the o thers : i t w o u l d have been perfectly possible for all those others no t

to exist, since the criteria of definition w o u l d n o t t he reby have been

modif ied for those that r ema ined visible. B u t , f rom the seventeenth cen­

tu ry , there can no longer be any signs except in the analysis of representa­

t ions accord ing to identities and differences. T h a t is, all designat ion must

be accompl ished by means of a certain relat ion to all o the r possible

designat ions. To k n o w w h a t p rope r ly appertains to o n e individual i s to

have before o n e the classification - or the possibility of classifying - all

o thers . Ident i ty and w h a t marks i t are defined by the differences that

r emain . An an imal or a p lant is n o t w h a t is indicated - or be t rayed - by

t he s t igma that is to be found impr in t ed u p o n it; i t is w h a t the others are

n o t ; it exists in itself on ly in so far as it is b o u n d e d by w h a t is dist inguish-

C L A S S I F Y I N G

145

able f rom it. M e t h o d and system are s imply t w o ways of defining iden ­

tities by means of the general gr id of differences. Later on , beg inn ing

w i t h Cuvie r , the ident i ty o f species was to be de te rmined in the same w a y

by a set of differences, bu t the differences w e r e in this case to e m e r g e

f rom the b a c k g r o u n d of the great o rganic unities possessing their o w n

internal systems of dependencies (skeleton, respirat ion, c i rcula t ion) ; t he

invertebrates w e r e to be defined, n o t on ly by their lack of ver tebrae , bu t

also by a certain m o d e of respirat ion, by the existence of a t ype of circula­

t ion, and by a w h o l e organic cohesiveness ou t l in ing a posi t ive un i ty . T h e

internal laws of the o rgan i sm w e r e to replace differential characters as

the object of the natural sciences. Classification, as a fundamenta l and

const i tuent p r o b l e m of natural his tory, t ook up its posi t ion historically,

and in a necessary fashion, be tween a theo ry of the mark and a theo ry of

the organism.

V C O N T I N U I T Y A N D C A T A S T R O P H E

At the heart of this wel l -const ructed language that natural his tory has

become , o n e p r o b l e m remains . I t is possible after all tha t the t ransforma­

tion of s t ructure in to character m a y neve r be possible, and that the

c o m m o n n o u n m a y never b e able t o emerge f rom the p rope r n o u n .

W h o can guaran tee that the descriptions, once m a d e , are n o t g o i n g to

display elements that va ry so m u c h f rom o n e individual to the nex t , o r

f rom one species to the nex t , tha t any a t t emp t to use t h e m as the basis

for a c o m m o n n o u n w o u l d be d o o m e d in advance? W h o can be certain

that each s t ruc ture is n o t strictly isolated f rom every o the r s t ructure , and

that i t wil l no t function as an individual m a r k ? In o rde r that the simplest

character can b e c o m e apparent , i t is essential tha t at least o n e e lement in

the s t ructure examined first should be repeated in another . For the general

order of differences that makes i t possible to establish the a r r angemen t of

species implies a certain n u m b e r of similarities. T h e p r o b l e m here is iso­

m o r p h i c w i t h the one we have already m e t in relation to language [36] :

for a c o m m o n n o u n to be possible, there h a d to be an immed ia t e r e sem­

blance be tween things that pe rmi t t ed the signifying e lements to m o v e

along the representat ions, to slide across the surface of t h e m , to cling to

their similarities and thus, finally, to f o r m collective designations. B u t in

order to out l ine this rhetorical space in w h i c h nouns gradual ly t o o k on

their general value, there was no need to de te rmine the status of that

resemblance, or w h e t h e r i t was founded u p o n t ru th ; i t was sufficient for

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

i t to strike the imagina t ion w i t h sufficient force. In na tura l his tory,

h o w e v e r , w h i c h is a wel l -cons t ruc ted l anguage , these analogies of the

imag ina t ion canno t have the value of guarantees ; and since natural h is tory

i s th rea tened , like all l anguage , by the radical d o u b t that H u m e b r o u g h t

to bear u p o n the necessity for repet i t ion in exper ience , i t m u s t find a w a y

o f avo id ing that threat . T h e r e m u s t be con t inu i ty in na tu re .

This r e q u i r e m e n t that na tu re should be con t inuous does n o t take exact ly

the same f o r m in the systems as i t does in the m e t h o d s . For the sys tem-

atician, con t inu i ty consists on ly o f the u n b r o k e n jux tapos i t ion o f the

different regions that can be clearly dist inguished by means of char ­

acters; all tha t is requi red is an un in te r rup ted g rada t ion of the values that

t he s t ruc ture selected as a character can assume in the species as a w h o l e ;

s tar t ing f r o m this pr inciple , i t wil l b e c o m e apparen t that all these values

are occupied by real beings, even t h o u g h they m a y n o t yet be k n o w n .

' T h e sys tem indicates the plants , even those i t has no t m e n t i o n e d ; w h i c h

is some th ing tha t the enumera t i on of a ca ta logue can never d o ' [ 3 7 ] . A n d

the categories wil l n o t s imply be a rb i t ra ry conven t ions laid o u t ove r this

con t inu i ty of j ux tapos i t i on ; they wi l l co r respond (if they have been

p rope r ly established) to areas that have a distinct existence on this uninter­

rupted surface of na tu re ; t hey wil l be areas that are larger than individuals

b u t j u s t as real. In this w a y , accord ing to Linnaeus, the r ep roduc t ive

sys tem m a d e i t possible to establish the existence of indisputably we l l -

founded genera : ' K n o w tha t i t i s n o t the character that consti tutes the

genus , b u t the genus that consti tutes the character , tha t the character

derives f r o m the genus , n o t the genus f rom the charac ter ' [38] . In the

m e t h o d s , on the o the r hand , since resemblances in the i r massive and

clearly evident f o r m - are posi ted to start w i t h , t he con t inu i ty of na tu re

wi l l n o t be this pure ly negat ive postula te (no b lank spaces b e t w e e n dis­

t inct categories) , b u t a posi t ive r e q u i r e m e n t : all na tu re forms one great

fabric in w h i c h beings resemble o n e ano the r f rom one to the nex t , in

w h i c h adjacent individuals are infinitely similar to each o the r ; so that any

dividing- l ine that indicates, n o t the m i n u t e difference of the individual , bu t

b roade r categories, is a lways unreal . T h e r e is a con t inu i ty p r o d u c e d

by fusion in w h i c h all genera l i ty is n o m i n a l . O u r general ideas, says

Buffon,

are relative to a con t inuous scale of objects of w h i c h we can clearly

perceive on ly the m i d d l e rungs and w h o s e extremit ies increasingly

f lee f rom and escape o u r cons ide ra t i ons . . . T h e m o r e we increase the

146

C L A S S I F Y I N G

H 7

n u m b e r o f divisions in the p roduc t ions o f na ture , the closer we shall

app roach to the t rue , since n o t h i n g really exists in na tu re except ind i ­

viduals , and since genera , orders , and classes exist o n l y in o u r i m a g i n a ­

t i o n ^ ] .

A n d Bonne t , m e a n i n g m u c h the same th ing , said:

T h e r e are no leaps in n a t u r e : eve ry th ing in i t is g radua ted , shaded. If

there w e r e an e m p t y space be tween any t w o beings , w h a t reason w o u l d

there be for p roceed ing f rom the o n e to the o ther? T h e r e i s thus no

be ing a b o v e and b e l o w w h i c h there are n o t o the r beings that are

uni ted to i t by some characters and separated f r o m i t by others .

I t is therefore a lways possible to discover ' in te rmedia te p roduc t ions ' , such

as the p o l y p b e t w e e n the an imal and the vegetable , the f ly ing squirrel

be tween the b i rd and the q u a d r u p e d , the m o n k e y be tween the q u a d r u p e d

and m a n . Consequen t ly , o u r divisions in to species and classes 'are p u r e l y

n o m i n a l ' ; t hey represent no m o r e than 'means relat ive to o u r needs and

to the l imitat ions o f ou r k n o w l e d g e ' [ 4 0 ] .

In the e igh teen th cen tury , the con t inu i ty of na ture is a r e q u i r e m e n t of

all natural h is tory , that is, of any effort to establish an o r d e r in na tu re and

to discover genera l categories wi th in it, w h e t h e r they be real a n d p r e ­

scribed by obvious distinctions or a ma t t e r of convenience a n d qu i t e

s imply a pa t t e rn p r o d u c e d by o u r imagina t ion . O n l y con t inu i ty can

guarantee that na tu re repeats itself and that s t ruc ture can, in consequence ,

b e c o m e character . B u t this r equ i r emen t immedia te ly becomes a d o u b l e

one . For i f i t w e r e g iven to exper ience, in its un in t e r rup t ed m o m e n t u m ,

to traverse exact ly, step by step, t he great con t inu i ty compr i s ing ind i ­

viduals, varieties, species, genera , and classes, there w o u l d be no need to

const i tute a science; descript ive designations w o u l d attain to genera l i ty

qui te freely, a n d the language of things w o u l d be const i tu ted as scientific

discourse by its o w n spontaneous m o m e n t u m . T h e identities o f na tu re

w o u l d be presented to the imagina t ion as t h o u g h spelled ou t letter by

letter, and the spontaneous shift of w o r d s w i th in their rhetor ical space

w o u l d r ep roduce , w i t h perfect exact i tude, the ident i ty o f beings w i t h

their increasing general i ty . N a t u r a l his tory w o u l d b e c o m e useless, o r

ra ther i t w o u l d already have been wr i t t en by man ' s eve ryday l anguage ;

general g r a m m a r w o u l d a t the same t ime be t he universal taxonomy o f

beings. B u t i f a na tura l h i s tory perfect ly distinct f r o m the analysis of

words is indispensable, tha t is because exper ience does n o t reveal the

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

cont inu i ty of na tu re as such, bu t gives i t to us b o t h b roken up - since

there are a great m a n y gaps in the series of values effectively occupied by

the variables ( there are possible creatures whose place in the gr id o n e can

no t e w i t h o u t ever hav ing h a d the o p p o r t u n i t y to observe t h e m ) - a n d

b lur red , since the real, geograph ic and terrestrial space in w h i c h we find

ourselves confronts us w i t h creatures that are i n t e r w o v e n w i t h o n e

ano ther , in an o rde r wh ich , in relat ion to the great n e t w o r k of taxonomies,

i s n o t h i n g m o r e than chance, disorder, or turbulence . Linnaeus po in ted

ou t that , by associating the h y d r a (which is an animal) and the conferva

(which is an alga) , or the sponge and the coral , in the same localities,

na ture is no t , as the o rde r of ou r classifications w o u l d have it, l inking

toge ther ' the mos t perfect plants w i t h the animals t e r m e d v e r y imperfect ,

b u t c o m b i n i n g imperfect animals w i t h imperfect plants '[4i] . A n d A d a n -

son r emarked that na ture is

a confused ming l i ng of beings that seem to have been b r o u g h t toge ther

by chance: here , go ld i s m i x e d w i t h ano the r meta l , w i t h s tone, w i t h

ear th ; there , the violet g r o w s side by side w i t h an oak. A m o n g these

plants , t oo , w a n d e r t he quadruped , the reptile, and the insect; the fishes

are confused, o n e m i g h t say, w i t h the aqueous e lement in w h i c h they

s w i m , and w i t h the plants that g r o w in the depths of the waters . . .

This m i x t u r e is indeed so general and so mult i far ious that i t appears to

be o n e of nature ' s laws [42].

N o w , this great m i x t u r e is the result of a chronologica l series of events .

A n d these events have their po in t o f or igin and their p r imary locus of

application, n o t in the l iving species themselves, b u t in the space in w h i c h

those species reside. T h e y are p roduced in the relat ion of the E a r t h to the

Sun, in cl imatic condi t ions , in the m o v e m e n t s of the earth 's crust; w h a t

they affect first are the oceans and the cont inents , the surface of the g lobe ;

l iving beings are affected on ly indirect ly and in a secondary w a y : they are

at t racted or dr iven a w a y by heat ; volcanoes des t roy t h e m ; they disappear

w i t h the land that c rumbles a w a y benea th t h e m . I t is possible, as Buffon,

for example , supposed [43], tha t the ear th was original ly incandescent,

before gradual ly g r o w i n g colder ; the animals, accus tomed to l iving in

very h i g h tempera tures , t hen r e g r o u p e d themselves in the on ly reg ion

that still remains tor r id , whereas the t empera te or cold lands w e r e peop led

by species that h a d n o t h a d the o p p o r t u n i t y to appear unt i l tha t t ime .

W i t h the revolu t ions in the h is tory of the ear th , the t a x o n o m i c area (in

w h i c h adjacencies are of the o rde r ofcharacter and no t ofmodus vivendi) was

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C L A S S I F Y I N G

1 4 °

d iv ided up in to a concre te and geographica l area that j u m b l e d i t all u p .

M o r e o v e r , i t was p r o b a b l y b r o k e n up in to f ragments , and m a n y species,

adjacent t o those we k n o w o r in te rmedia ry b e t w e e n t a x o n o m i c squares

familiar to us, mus t have disappeared, leaving n o t h i n g behind t h e m b u t

traces difficult to decipher . In any case, this historical series of events is an

addi t ion to the expanse of beings: i t does n o t p rope r ly apper ta in to i t ;

its d e v e l o p m e n t lies in t he real d imens ion of the w o r l d , n o t the analyt ic

o n e of classifications; w h a t it calls in to ques t ion is the w o r l d as a locus for

beings, n o t t he beings themselves in so far as they have t he p r o p e r t y of

be ing alive. T h e r e is a historicity, symbol ized by the biblical accounts ,

w h i c h affects o u r a s t ronomic system direct ly a n d the t a x o n o m i c g r id o f

species indirect ly; and apar t f rom Genesis and the Flood, i t is v e r y possible

that

o u r g lobe u n d e r w e n t o the r revolut ions that have n o t been revealed to

us . I t i s connected to the w h o l e a s t ronomic system, and the links tha t

j o i n this g lobe to the o the r celestial bodies , in par t icular to the Sun and

the comets , could have been the source o f m a n y revolut ions tha t h a v e

left no traces percept ible to us, b u t o f w h i c h the inhabitants o f n e i g h ­

b o u r i n g wor lds m a y perhaps have some k n o w l e d g e [44].

To be able to exist as a science, natural h is tory mus t , then , p resuppose

t w o g roup ings . O n e o f t h e m i s const i tu ted by the con t inuous n e t w o r k

of beings; this cont inu i ty m a y take var ious spatial fo rms; Charles B o n n e t

thinks of i t somet imes as a great linear scale of w h i c h o n e ex t r emi ty is

ve ry s imple, the o the r v e r y compl ica ted , w i t h a n a r r o w in te rmedia ry

reg ion - the on ly one that is visible to us - in the cent re ; somet imes as a

central t r unk f rom w h i c h there is a b ranch forking o u t on one side (that

of the shellfish, w i t h the crabs and crayfish as supp lementa ry ramif ica­

tions) and the series of insects on the o ther , b r anch ing ou t to include the

frogs [45] ; Buffon defines this same con t inu i ty 'as a w i d e w o v e n str ip, or

ra ther a b u n d l e wh ich every so often puts ou t side branches that j o i n i t

up w i t h the bundles of ano ther o r d e r ' [ 4 6 ] ; Pallas sees i t as a po lyhedr i c

f igure [47] ; H e r m a n n wished to const i tu te a three-dimensional m o d e l

composed of threads all s tar t ing f r o m a c o m m o n po in t of or igin , separa­

t ing f rom o n e another , ' spreading o u t t h r o u g h a v e r y great n u m b e r o f

lateral b ranches ' , then c o m i n g toge the r aga in[48] . T h e series o f events ,

h o w e v e r , is qu i te distinct f rom these spatial configurat ions, each of w h i c h

describes the t a x o n o m i c con t inu i ty in its o w n w a y ; the series of events is

discont inuous, and different in each of its episodes; bu t , as a w h o l e , it can

T H B O R D E R O F T H I N G S

be d r a w n on ly as a s imple l ine, wh ich is that of t i m e itself (and w h i c h can

be conceived as straight , b r o k e n , or circular) . In its concre te fo rm, and in

t he d e p t h that i s p r o p e r to it, na tu re resides w h o l l y b e t w e e n the fabric of

the taxinomia and the l ine of revolu t ions . T h e tabulat ions that i t forms in

the eyes of m e n , and tha t i t i s the task of the discourse of science to t ra ­

verse, are the f ragments of t he great surface of l iving species that are

apparen t accord ing to t he w a y i t has been pa t t e rned , burs t open , and

frozen, be tween t w o t empora l revolu t ions .

I t wil l be seen h o w superficial i t is to oppose , as t w o different op in ions

conf ron t ing o n e ano the r in their fundamenta l op t ions , a ' f ixism' t ha t is

con ten t to classify t he beings of na tu re in a p e r m a n e n t tabula t ion, and a

sort of ' evo lu t ion i sm ' tha t is supposed to believe in an i m m e m o r i a l h is ­

t o ry of na tu re and in a deep- roo ted , o n w a r d u r g e of all beings t h r o u g h o u t

its con t inu i ty . T h e solidity, w i t h o u t gaps, of a n e t w o r k of species and

genera, and the series of events that have b lu r red that n e t w o r k , b o t h

be long , a t the same level, to the epis temological founda t ion tha t m a d e a

b o d y of k n o w l e d g e like na tura l h is tory possible in t he Classical age. T h e y

are n o t t w o ways o f perce iv ing na ture , radically opposed because deeply

roo t ed in phi losophical choices older and m o r e fundamenta l than any

science; they are t w o s imul taneous requ i rements in t he archaeological

n e t w o r k tha t defines t he k n o w l e d g e of na tu re in the Classical age . B u t

these t w o requ i rement s are c o m p l e m e n t a r y , and therefore i r reducible .

T h e t e m p o r a l series canno t be in tegra ted in to the g rada t ion o f beings.

T h e eras of na tu re do n o t prescribe the internal time o f beings and their

con t inu i ty ; t hey dictate the intemperate in te r rupt ions that have constant ly

dispersed t h e m , des t royed t h e m , ming led t h e m , separated t h e m , and

i n t e r w o v e n t h e m . T h e r e i s n o t and canno t be even the suspicion of an

evolu t ion ism or a t ransformism in Classical t h o u g h t ; for t i m e is neve r

conceived as a pr inciple of d e v e l o p m e n t for l iv ing beings in their internal

o rgan iza t ion ; it is perceived on ly as the possible bearer of a revo lu t ion in

the external space in w h i c h they live.

V I M O N S T E R S A N D F O S S I L S

I t wil l be objected that , l o n g before Lamarck , there already existed a

w h o l e b o d y o f t h o u g h t o f t he evolut ionis t type . T h a t its i m p o r t a n c e was

considerable in t he m i d d l e o f the e igh teen th cen tu ry , and up to the sudden

hal t m a r k e d b y the w o r k o f Cuv ie r . T h a t B o n n e t , Mauper tu i s , D i d e r o t ,

Rob ine t , and Beno i t de Mail let all v e r y clearly art iculated the idea that

150

C L A S S I F Y I N G

151

l iving forms m a y pass f r o m o n e in to ano ther , tha t the present species are

no d o u b t the result o f former t ransformat ions , and tha t the w h o l e o f the

l iving w o r l d is perhaps in m o t i o n t o w a r d s a future po in t , so tha t o n e

canno t guaran tee of any l iving f o r m that i t has been definitively acqui red

and is n o w stabilized forever. In fact, such analyses are incompa t ib le w i t h

w h a t w e unders tand today b y evo lu t ionary t h o u g h t . T h e y are concerned ,

in fact, w i t h l inking the table of identities and differences to the series of

successive events . A n d in o rde r to conceive of the un i ty of that table and

that series they have on ly t w o means a t the i r disposal.

T h e first consists in in tegra t ing the series of successions w i t h t he c o n ­

t inui ty of the beings and their d is t r ibut ion ove r the table. All the creatures

that t a x o n o m y has a r ranged in an un in t e r rup t ed s imul tanei ty are then

subjected to t ime . N o t in the sense tha t the t empora l series w o u l d g ive

rise to a mul t ip l ic i ty of species tha t a hor izonta l ly or ien ted eye cou ld then

a r range accord ing to the requ i rements of a classifying gr id , b u t in the

sense that all the points of the t a x o n o m y are affected by a t empora l index ,

w i t h the result tha t ' evo lu t ion ' i s n o t h i n g m o r e than the in te rdependen t

and general d isplacement of the w h o l e scale f r o m the first of its e lements

to the last. This system is that of Char les B o n n e t . He implies in t he first

place that t he chain of be ing, s t re tching up t h r o u g h an i nnumerab l e series

of l inks t o w a r d s the perfect ion of G o d , does n o t a t present a t ta in to i t

[49 ] ; that the distance be tween G o d and the least defective of his creatures

is still infinite; and that across this, pe rhaps unbr idgeab le , distance t he

w h o l e un in t e r rup ted fabric of beings is ceaselessly advanc ing t o w a r d s a

greater perfect ion. He implies further that this ' evo lu t ion ' keeps intact t he

relat ion that exists b e t w e e n the different species: i f o n e of t h e m , in t he

process of perfect ing itself, should attain the degree of c o m p l e x i t y p o s ­

sessed beforehand by the species o n e step h igher , this does n o t m e a n that

the latter has the reby been over t aken , because, carr ied o n w a r d by the

same m o m e n t u m , i t c anno t avo id perfect ing itself to an equiva lent

deg ree :

T h e r e wil l be a cont inua l a n d m o r e or less s low progress of all t he

species t o w a r d s a super ior perfect ion, w i t h the result tha t all the degrees

of the scale wil l be cont inual ly var iable w i t h i n a de t e rmined and c o n ­

stant relat ion . . . M a n , once t ranspor ted to an abode m o r e suited to

t he eminence of his faculties, wil l leave to the m o n k e y and the e lephant

tha t foremost place tha t he occupied before a m o n g the animals o f o u r

planet . . . T h e r e will be N e w t o n s a m o n g the m o n k e y s and Vaubans

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

a m o n g the beavers . T h e oysters and the po lyps wil l s tand in the same

relat ion to the species at the top of the scale as t he birds and the q u a d ­

rupeds d o n o w t o man[5o] .

This ' evo lu t ion i sm ' i s n o t a w a y of conceiv ing of the emergence of beings

as a process of o n e g iv ing rise to ano the r ; in reality, i t is a w a y of genera l ­

izing the pr inciple of con t inu i ty and the law tha t requires that all beings

f o r m an un in t e r rup ted expanse. It adds, in a Leibnizian s tyle[5i] , the

cont inu i ty o f t i m e to t he con t inu i ty o f space, and the infiniteness o f the

progress of beings towards perfect ion to their infinite mul t ip l ic i ty . I t is

n o t a ma t t e r of progress ive hierarchizat ion, b u t of the constant and total

force exer ted by an a l ready established h ierarchy. In the end this p r e ­

supposes that t ime , far f r o m be ing a pr inciple of taxinomia, is mere ly one

of its factors, a n d tha t i t is pre-established, like all t he o the r values assumed

by all the o the r variables. B o n n e t mus t , therefore, be a preformat ionis t -

and as far r e m o v e d as possible f r o m w h a t we unders tand , since the n i n e ­

teen th cen tury , by ' evo lu t ion i sm ' ; he m u s t suppose that the upheavals

o r catastrophes of the g lobe w e r e a r ranged in advance as so m a n y o p p o r ­

tunities for the infinite chain of be ing to con t inue its progress in the

di rect ion of infinite amel iora t ion : 'These evolu t ions w e r e foreseen and

inscribed in the g e r m s of animals u p o n the v e r y first day of creat ion. For

these evolu t ions are l inked w i t h revo lu t ions in t he w h o l e solar sys tem

that w e r e a r ranged by G o d in advance . ' T h e universe in its ent i re ty has

been a larva; n o w it is a chrysalis; o n e day it wil l , no d o u b t , b e c o m e a

butterfly [52]. A n d every species will be caugh t up in t he / f eme w a y in

that great m u t a t i o n . Such a system, it is clear, is n o t an* evolu t ion ism

beg inn ing to o v e r t h r o w the old d o g m a of fixism; it is a taxinomia that

includes t i m e in addi t ion - a generalized classification.

T h e o the r f o r m of ' evo lu t ion i sm ' consists of g iv ing t i m e a comple te ly

opposi te ro le to play. I t i s used no longer to m o v e the classifying table

as a w h o l e a long the finite or infinite line leading to perfect ion, b u t to

reveal , o n e after the o ther , t he squares that , w h e n v i ewed toge ther , will

f o r m the con t inuous n e t w o r k of the species. I t causes the variables of the

l iving w o r l d to assume all possible values successively: i t is the immed iacy

of a character izat ion that is accomplished little by little and , as it were ,

e l ement after e lement . T h e partial identities or resemblances that m a k e a

taxinomia possible w o u l d then be t he marks , revealed in the present , of

o n e and the same l iving be ing , persist ing t h r o u g h all the upheavals of

na tu re and the reby filling all t he vacant possibilities offered by the

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C L A S S I F Y I N G

153

t a x o n o m i c table. I f birds have wings in the w a y that f i shes have f ins ,

Benoi t de Mail let points ou t , i t is because they w e r e once , at the t ime

w h e n the or iginal waters o f the ear th w e r e ebb ing , dehydra ted gil theads

or dolphins that passed over , once for all, in to an aerial h o m e .

T h e seed o f these f i shes , carried in to swamps , m a y perhaps have p r o ­

duced the f i rs t t ransmigra t ion of the species f rom its mar ine to its ter ­

restrial h o m e . E v e n t h o u g h a h u n d r e d mill ions m a y have perished

w i t h o u t hav ing been able to g r o w accus tomed to it, i t was sufficient

for t w o of t h e m to arr ive a t tha t po in t to give rise to the species[53].

Changes in the condi t ions of life of l iving beings seem here , as in certain

forms of evolu t ionism, to be the necessary cause of the appearance of

n e w species. B u t the m o d e in w h i c h the air, the water , the cl imate, or

the ear th acts u p o n animals is no t that of an e n v i r o n m e n t u p o n a funct ion

and u p o n the organs in wh ich that function takes place; here , the ex ter ior

elements in te rvene on ly in so far as they occasion the emergence of a

character. A n d that emergence , t h o u g h i t m a y be chronological ly de te r ­

mined by such and such a global event , is r endered possible a priori by

the general table of variables that defines all the possible forms of the

l iving wor ld . T h e quas i -evolut ionism of the e ighteenth cen tu ry seems

to presage equal ly well the spontaneous variat ion of character , as i t was

later to be found in D a r w i n , and the posi t ive action of the e n v i r o n m e n t ,

as i t was to be described by Lamarck . Bu t this is an illusion of h inds ight :

for this fo rm of t h o u g h t , in fact, the sequence of t ime can never be a n y ­

thing bu t the line a long w h i c h all the possible values of the pre-established

variables succeed one another . Consequen t ly , a pr inciple of modif icat ion

must be defined wi th in the l iving being, enabl ing i t to take on a n e w

character w h e n a natural revolu t ion occurs .

We are presented, then , w i t h ano the r choice : ei ther to presuppose a

spontaneous ap t i tude in l iving beings to change their forms (or at least

to acquire - w i t h succeeding generat ions - a slightly different character

f rom that originally g iven, so that i t will change gradual ly f rom o n e to

the nex t and finally b e c o m e unrecognizable) , o r to a t t r ibu te to t h e m

some obscure u rge towards a te rminal species that will possess the cha r ­

acters of all those that have preceded it, bu t in a h igher degree of c o m ­

plexity and perfect ion.

T h e first sys tem is that of errors to infinity - as it is to be in Mauper tu i s .

According to this system, the table of species that it is possible for na tura l

history to establish has been built up piecemeal by the balance, constant ly

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

1 5 4

present in na ture , b e t w e e n a m e m o r y that guarantees its con t inu i ty (main­

tenance of the species in t i m e and their resemblance to o n e ano ther ) and

a t endency towards devia t ion that s imul taneously guarantees the existence

of his tory, differences, and dispersion. Mauper tu i s supposes that the p a r ­

ticles o f ma t t e r are e n d o w e d w i t h act ivi ty and m e m o r y . W h e n at t racted

to one another , the least active f o r m minera l substances; the mos t active

f o r m the m o r e c o m p l e x bodies o f animals. These forms, w h i c h are the

result of a t t ract ion and chance, disappear i f t hey are unable to survive.

Those that do r emain in existence g ive rise to n e w individuals in w h i c h

the characters o f the paren t couple are preserved by m e m o r y . A n d this

process cont inues unti l a devia t ion of the particles - a chance h a p p e n i n g -

br ings in to be ing a n e w species, w h i c h the s tubborn force of m e m o r y

mainta ins in existence in t u r n : ' B y dint of repeated deviat ions, the infinite

diversi ty of the animals c ame to pass ' [54] . T h u s , progress ing f rom one to

the nex t , l iving beings acquired by successive variat ions all the characters

we n o w recognize in t h e m , and, w h e n one considers t h e m in the d i m e n ­

sion of t ime , the coherent , solid expanse they f o r m is mere ly the frag­

m e n t a r y result of a m u c h m o r e t ight ly kni t , m u c h finer, con t inu i ty : a

con t inu i ty tha t has been w o v e n f rom an incalculable n u m b e r o f t iny,

forgot ten , or miscarried differences. T h e visible species tha t n o w present

themselves for o u r analysis have been separated ou t f r o m the ceaseless

b a c k g r o u n d of monstrosi t ies that appear , g l i m m e r , sink in to the abyss,

and occasionally survive. A n d this is the fundamenta l po in t : na tu re has

a his tory on ly in so far as it is susceptible of con t inu i ty . It is because it

takes on all possible characters in t u rn (each va lue of all t he variables)

that it is presented in the f o r m of a succession.

T h e same can be said for the inverse system of the p r o t o t y p e and the

te rmina l species. In this case it is necessary to suppose, w i t h J - B . Robine t ,

tha t con t inu i ty is assured, n o t by m e m o r y , b u t by a project - the project

of a c o m p l e x be ing t owards w h i c h na ture makes its w a y f r o m the s tar t ing-

po in t of s imple elements w h i c h i t gradual ly combines and arranges:

'First of all, the e lements c o m b i n e . A small n u m b e r of s imple principles

serves as a basis for all bod ies ' ; these are the ones that g o v e r n exclusively

the organiza t ion of minera ls ; then ' t he magnif icence of n a t u r e ' cont inues

to increase w i t h o u t a b reak ' u p to the level of the beings that m o v e u p o n

the surface of the g lobe ' ; ' t he var ia t ion of the organs in n u m b e r , in size,

in ref inement , in internal t ex ture , and in external fo rm, p roduces species

w h i c h are d iv ided and subdivided to infinity by n e w a r r a n g e m e n t s ' [ 5 5 ] .

A n d so on , unt i l we reach the m o s t c o m p l e x a r r a n g e m e n t we k n o w of.

C L A S S I F Y I N G

155

So that the ent i re con t inu i ty of na ture resides b e t w e e n an absolutely

archaic p r o t o t y p e , bur ied deeper than a n y his tory, and the e x t r e m e

compl ica t ion of this m o d e l as i t is n o w possible to observe it, at least on

this ear thly g lobe , in the person of the h u m a n being [56] . B e t w e e n these

t w o ext remes there lie all the possible degrees of complex i ty and c o m ­

binat ion - like an i m m e n s e series of exper iments , of w h i c h s o m e have

persisted in t he fo rm of con t inu ing species and s o m e have sunk in to

obl iv ion . Mons te rs are no t of a different ' na tu re ' f rom the species t h e m ­

selves:

We should believe that the mos t apparen t ly bizarre forms . . . b e long

necessarily and essentially to the universal p lan of be ing ; that t h e y are

m e t a m o r p h o s e s of the p r o t o t y p e jus t as na tura l as the o thers , even

t h o u g h they present us w i t h different p h e n o m e n a ; that they serve as

means of passing to adjacent fo rms; that t h e y p repare and b r ing ab o u t

t he combina t ions that fo l low t h e m , jus t as they themselves w e r e

b r o u g h t a b o u t by those that p receded t h e m ; tha t far f r o m dis turb ing

the o rde r of things, t hey con t r ibu te to it. I t i s on ly , perhaps , by d int

of p r o d u c i n g mons t rous beings that na tu re succeeds in p r o d u c i n g

beings of greater regular i ty and w i t h a m o r e symmet r ica l s t ruc ture [57] .

In Robine t , as in Mauper tu i s , succession and his tory are for na ture mere ly

means of t ravers ing the infinite fabric of variat ions of w h i c h i t is capable.

I t is no t , then , that t i m e or dura t ion ensures the con t inu i ty and specifica­

t ion of l iving beings t h r o u g h o u t the diversi ty of successive env i ronment s ,

bu t that against the con t inuous b a c k g r o u n d of all the possible variat ions

t ime traces ou t an i t inerary u p o n w h i c h climates and g e o g r a p h y p ick o u t

only certain pr iv i leged regions destined to survive. C o n t i n u i t y is n o t the

visible w a k e of a fundamenta l his tory in w h i c h o n e same l iv ing pr inc ip le

struggles w i t h a variable e n v i r o n m e n t . For con t inu i ty precedes t ime . I t

is its condi t ion . A n d h is tory can play no m o r e than a negat ive ro le in

relation to it: i t ei ther picks o u t an ent i ty and al lows i t to survive, or

ignores i t and al lows i t to disappear.

This has t w o consequences. First, t he necessity of i n t roduc ing mons te rs

into the scheme - f o rming the b a c k g r o u n d noise, as i t w e r e , the endless

m u r m u r of na tu re . Indeed, if i t is necessary for t ime , w h i c h is l imited,

to r u n t h r o u g h - or perhaps to have already r u n t h r o u g h - the w h o l e

cont inu i ty of na tu re , o n e is forced to a d m i t that a considerable n u m b e r of

possible variat ions have been encoun te red and then erased; jus t as the

geological ca tas t rophe was necessary to enable us to w o r k back f rom the

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

t a x o n o m i c table to the c o n t i n u u m , t h r o u g h a b lur red , chaotic , and frag­

m e n t e d exper ience, so the prol iferat ion of mons te r s w i t h o u t a future is

necessary to enable us to w o r k d o w n again f rom the c o n t i n u u m , t h r o u g h

a t empora l series, to the table. In o the r w o r d s , w h a t mus t be const rued,

as we m o v e in o n e direct ion, as a d r a m a of the ear th and waters mus t

be const rued, in t he o the r direct ion, as an obv ious aberra t ion of forms.

T h e mons t e r ensures in t ime , and for ou r theoret ical k n o w l e d g e , a

con t inu i ty that , for o u r eve ryday exper ience , f loods , volcanoes, and

subsiding cont inents confuse in space. T h e o the r consequence is that the

signs of con t inu i ty t h r o u g h o u t such a h is tory can no longer be of any

o rde r o the r than that of resemblance. Since this his tory is n o t defined by

any relation of o rgan i sm to envi ronment [58] , the l iving forms wil l be

subjected in i t to all possible me tamorphoses and leave beh ind t h e m no

trace of the p a t h they have fo l lowed o the r than the reference poin ts

represented by simili tudes. H o w , for example , are we to recognize that

na ture , start ing f rom a pr imi t ive p r o t o t y p e , has never ceased to w o r k

t o w a r d s the provis ional ly te rminal f o r m that is man? By the fact that i t

has . abandoned on the w a y thousands of forms that p rov ide us w i t h

a p ic ture of the r u d i m e n t a r y m o d e l . H o w m a n y fossils are there , for

man ' s ear, or skull, or sexual parts, like so m a n y plaster statues, fashioned

o n e day and d r o p p e d the nex t in favour of a m o r e perfected form?

T h e species that resembles the h u m a n hear t , and for that reason is

n a m e d An th ro p o ca rd i t e . . . i s w o r t h y o f par t icular a t tent ion . Its sub ­

stance is flint inside. T h e fo rm of a hear t is imi ta ted as perfectly as p o s ­

sible. O n e can distinguish in i t the s t u m p of the vena cava, toge the r

w i t h a po r t i on of its t w o cross-sections. O n e can also see the s t u m p of

the great a r te ry e m e r g i n g f r o m the left ventr ic le , t oge the r w i t h its

l o w e r or descending b ranch [59].

T h e fossil, w i t h its m i x e d an imal and minera l na ture , is the pr iv i leged

locus of a resemblance requi red by the his tor ian of the c o n t i n u u m ,

whereas the space of the taxinomia d ecomposed i t w i t h r igour .

T h e mons te r and the fossil b o t h play a v e r y precise role in this c o n ­

f igurat ion. On the basis o f the p o w e r o f the c o n t i n u u m held by na ture ,

the m o n s t e r ensures the emergence of difference. This difference is still

w i t h o u t l a w and w i t h o u t any well-defined s t ruc ture ; the mons t e r i s the

roo t - s tock of specification, b u t it is on ly a sub-species itself in the s tub ­

b o r n l y s low s t ream of h is tory . T h e fossil i s w h a t pe rmi t s resemblances to

subsist t h r o u g h o u t all the deviat ions traversed by na tu re ; i t functions as

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C L A S S I F Y I N G

157

a distant and a p p r o x i m a t i v e f o r m of ident i ty ; i t marks a quasi-character

in the shift of t ime . A n d this is because the mons t e r and the fossil are

mere ly the b a c k w a r d project ion of those differences a n d those identit ies

that p rov ide taxinomia first w i t h s t ructure , t hen w i t h character . B e t w e e n

table and c o n t i n u u m they f o r m a shady, mob i l e , w a v e r i n g reg ion in

w h i c h w h a t analysis is to define as ident i ty is still on ly m u t e ana logy ; and

w h a t it wil l define as assignable and constant difference is still o n l y free

and r a n d o m var ia t ion. Bu t , in t ru th , it is so impossible for natural history

to conceive of the history of nature, the epis temological a r r a n g e m e n t

delineated by the table and the c o n t i n u u m is so fundamenta l , tha t b e c o m ­

ing can occupy n o t h i n g b u t an in te rmedia ry place measured ou t for i t

solely by the requ i rements of the w h o l e . This i s w h y i t occurs o n l y in

order to b r ing abou t the necessary passage f r o m o n e to the o the r - ei ther

as a total i ty of destruct ive events alien to l iv ing beings and occur r ing

only f rom outs ide t h e m , or as a m o v e m e n t ceaselessly be ing out l ined,

then hal ted as soon as sketched, and percept ible on ly on the fringes of the

table, in its uncons idered marg ins . T h u s , against the b a c k g r o u n d of the

c o n t i n u u m , the mons t e r provides an account , as t h o u g h in caricature, of

the genesis of differences, and the fossil recalls, in the uncer ta in ty of its

resemblances, the first budd ings of ident i ty .

VII T H E D I S C O U R S E O F N A T U R E

T h e theory of na tura l h i s tory canno t be dissociated f rom that o f l anguage .

A n d yet i t is n o t a quest ion of a transference of m e t h o d , f rom one to the

o ther ; no r of a c o m m u n i c a t i o n of concepts ; n o r of the prest ige of a m o d e l

which , because i t has ' succeeded ' in o n e field, has been tr ied ou t in the

one nex t to it. N o r is i t a ques t ion of a m o r e general rat ional i ty impos ing

identical forms u p o n g rammat i ca l th ink ing and u p o n taxinomia. Ra ther ,

i t concerns a fundamenta l a r r a n g e m e n t of k n o w l e d g e , w h i c h orders the

k n o w l e d g e of beings so as to m a k e i t possible to represent t h e m in

a system of names . T h e r e w e r e doubtless, in this reg ion we n o w t e r m life,

m a n y inquiries o the r than a t tempts a t classification, m a n y kinds of

analysis o the r than that of identities and differences. B u t they all rested

upon a sort of historical a priori, w h i c h au thor ized t h e m in their dispersion

and in their singular and d ivergen t projects, a n d rendered equally possible

all the differences of op in ion of w h i c h they w e r e the source. This a priori

does no t consist of a set of constant p rob l ems un in te r rup ted ly presented

to men ' s curiosi ty by concre te p h e n o m e n a as so m a n y en igmas ; n o r is i t

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

m a d e up of a cer ta in state of acquired k n o w l e d g e laid d o w n in the course

of the p reced ing ages and p r o v i d i n g a g r o u n d for t he m o r e or less i r r egu­

lar, m o r e or less rapid , progress of ra t ional i ty ; i t is doubtless n o t even

de te rmined by w h a t i s called t he men ta l i ty o r the ' f r a m e w o r k o f t h o u g h t '

o f any g iven pe r iod , i f we are to unders tand by tha t the historical out l ine

of the speculative interests, beliefs, o r b r o a d theoret ical op t ions of t he

t ime. This a priori is w h a t , in a g iven per iod , delimits in the total i ty

of exper ience a field of k n o w l e d g e , defines the m o d e of be ing of the

objects that appear in that field, p rovides man ' s eve ryday percep t ion w i t h

theoret ical p o w e r s , and defines the condi t ions in w h i c h he can sustain

a discourse abou t things that is recognized to be t rue . In the e ighteenth

cen tu ry , the historical a priori that p rov ided the basis for inqu i ry in to or

con t roversy a b o u t the existence of genera , the stability of species, a n d the

transmission of characters f r o m genera t ion to genera t ion , was the exist­

ence of a na tura l h i s tory : the organiza t ion of a certain visible existence as

a d o m a i n of k n o w l e d g e , the definition of the four variables of descript ion,

the cons t i tu t ion of an area of adjacencies in w h i c h any individual be ing

w h a t e v e r can find its place. Na tu ra l h is tory in the Classical age is n o t

m e r e l y the discovery of a n e w object of cur iosi ty; i t covers a series of

c o m p l e x opera t ions tha t in t roduce the possibility of a constant o rde r in to

a total i ty of representat ions. I t const i tutes a w h o l e d o m a i n of empir ic i ty

as at the same t i m e describable and orderable. W h a t makes i t akin to

theories o f l anguage also distinguishes i t f rom w h a t we h a v e unders tood ,

since the n ine teen th cen tu ry , by b io logy , a n d causes i t to p lay a certain

critical ro le in Classical t h o u g h t .

N a t u r a l h i s tory is c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s w i t h l anguage : i t is on t he same

level as the spontaneous play that analyses representat ions in the m e m o r y ,

de te rmines their c o m m o n elements , establishes signs u p o n the basis of

those e lements , and f inal ly imposes names . Classification and speech have

their place of or igin in the same space that representa t ion opens up w i th in

itself because i t i s consecrated to t ime , to m e m o r y , to reflection, to c o n ­

t inui ty . B u t na tura l h i s tory canno t and should no t exist as a l anguage

independen t of all o the r languages unless it is a wel l -cons t ruc ted language

- and a universally valid one . In spontaneous and 'bad ly const ructed '

l anguage , t he four e lements (proposi t ion, ar t iculat ion, designat ion, de ­

r ivat ion) leave interstices open be tween t h e m : individual experiences,

needs or passions, habits , prejudices, a m o r e or less a w a k e n e d concen t ra ­

t ion , have established hundreds of different languages - languages that

differ f rom o n e ano ther n o t on ly in the fo rm of their w o r d s , b u t a b o v e all

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C L A S S I F Y I N G

159

in the w a y in w h i c h those w o r d s pa t te rn representat ion. Na tu ra l h is tory

can be a wel l -const ructed language on ly if the a m o u n t of p lay in i t is

enclosed: i f its descript ive exact i tude makes every propos i t ion in to an

invariable pa t te rn of real i ty (if o n e can a lways attribute to the representa­

t ion w h a t is articulated in it) and if the designation of each be ing indicates

clearly the place it occupies in the general arrangement of the w h o l e . In

language, the function of the ve rb is universal and v o i d ; i t mere ly p r e ­

scribes the mos t general f o r m of the p ropos i t ion ; and i t is w i th in the latter

that the names b r ing their system of ar t iculat ion in to p lay; na tura l

his tory regroups these t w o functions in to the un i ty of the structure, w h i c h

articulates toge ther all the variables that can be a t t r ibuted to a be ing .

A n d whereas in language the designat ion, in its individual funct ioning, is

exposed t o the hazard o f der ivat ions, w h i c h e n d o w the c o m m o n names

wi th their scope and extension, the character, as established by na tura l

history, makes i t possible b o t h to indicate the individual and to situate

it in a space of generalities that fit inside o n e another . So that above the

ord inary , eve ryday w o r d s (and by means of t h e m , since i t i s of course

necessary to use t h e m for the initial descriptions) there is raised the edifice

of a language in the second degree in w h i c h the exact N a m e s of th ings

finally ru le :

T h e m e t h o d , the soul of science, designates a t first sight any b o d y in

na tu re in such a w a y that the b o d y in quest ion expresses the n a m e

that is p r o p e r to it, and that this n a m e recalls all the k n o w l e d g e that

m a y , in the course o f t ime , have been acquired abou t the b o d y thus

n a m e d : so that in the mids t of ex t r eme confusion there is revealed

the sovereign o rde r of na ture [60].

B u t this essential n o m i n a t i o n - this transit ion f rom the visible s t ruc ture

to the t a x o n o m i c character - leads back to a costly r equ i rement . In o rde r

to fulfil and enclose the figure that proceeds f rom the m o n o t o n o u s

function of the ve rb to be to der iva t ion and traversal of rhetor ical space,

spontaneous l anguage had no need o f any th ing b u t the p lay o f imag ina ­

t ion: that is, of immed ia t e resemblances. For taxonomy to be possible, on

the o the r hand , na tu re m u s t be t ru ly con t inuous , and in all its p len i tude .

W h e r e language requi red the similari ty of impressions, classification

requires the pr inciple of the smallest possible difference be tween th ings .

N o w , this c o n t i n u u m , w h i c h appears therefore a t the ve ry basis of

nomina t ion , in the o p e n i n g left be tween descript ion and a r rangemen t , is

presupposed well before language , as its condi t ion . A n d n o t only because

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

i t can p rov ide the basis for a wel l -const ructed language , bu t because it

accounts for all l anguage in general . I t is w i t h o u t d o u b t the cont inu i ty

of na tu re tha t gives m e m o r y the o p p o r t u n i t y of exercising itself, as

w h e n a representat ion, t h r o u g h some confused and i l l-perceived ident i ty ,

recalls ano the r and makes i t possible to apply to b o t h t he a rb i t ra ry sign

of a c o m m o n n a m e . W h a t was presented in the imagina t ion as a b l ind

s imil i tude was m e r e l y t he b lu r red and unreflected t race of the great

un in t e r rup ted fabric of identities a n d differences. Imag ina t ion (which , by

m a k i n g compar i son possible, justifies language) fo rmed , w i t h o u t its

then be ing k n o w n , the a m b i g u o u s locus in w h i c h the shat tered bu t

insistent con t inu i ty o f na tu re was uni ted w i t h the e m p t y bu t a t tent ive

con t inu i ty of consciousness. I t w o u l d n o t have been possible to speak,

there w o u l d have been no place for even the meres t n a m e , i f na tu re , in

t he v e r y d e p t h o f things, before all representa t ion, h a d n o t been c o n ­

t inuous . To establish the great , unflawed table of the species, genera , and

classes, na tura l h is tory had to e m p l o y , criticize, and finally reconst i tute

a t n e w expense a l anguage w h o s e condi t ion of possibility resided p r e ­

cisely in that c o n t i n u u m . Th ings and w o r d s are v e r y strictly i n t e r w o v e n :

n a t u r e is posi ted on ly t h r o u g h the gr id of denomina t ions , and - t h o u g h

w i t h o u t such n a m e s i t w o u l d r ema in m u t e and invisible - i t g l immers

far off b e y o n d t h e m , con t inuous ly present on t he far side of this gr id,

w h i c h nevertheless presents i t to o u r k n o w l e d g e and renders i t visible

o n l y w h e n w h o l l y spanned b y language .

This , no d o u b t , i s w h y natura l his tory, in the Classical per iod , canno t

be established as b io logy . Up to the end o f the e igh teen th cen tury , in

fact, life does n o t exist: o n l y l iving beings. These beings f o r m one class,

or ra ther several classes, in the series of all the th ings in the w o r l d ; and

if it is possible to speak of life it is on ly as of o n e character - in the t a x o n ­

o m i c sense of tha t w o r d - in the universal d is t r ibut ion of beings. I t is

usual to divide the th ings in na tu re in to three classes: minerals , w h i c h are

recognized as capable o f g r o w t h , b u t n o t o f m o v e m e n t o r feeling;

vegetables , w h i c h are capable of g r o w t h and susceptible to sensation; and

animals , w h i c h are capable of spontaneous m o v e m e n t [61]. As for life

a n d the threshold i t establishes, these can be m a d e to slide f rom o n e end

of t he scale to the o ther , accord ing to the criteria o n e adopts . If, w i th

Mauper tu i s , o n e defines life by the mob i l i t y and relations of affinity that

d r a w elements t o w a r d s o n e ano the r and keep t h e m toge the r , t hen one

m u s t conceive of life as residing in the simplest particles of ma t t e r . B u t

o n e m u s t si tuate i t m u c h h ighe r in the series i f o n e defines i t by means of

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C L A S S I F Y I N G

a c r o w d e d and c o m p l e x character , as Linnaeus did w h e n he set up as his

criteria b i r th (by seed or b u d ) , nu t r i t ion (by intussusception), age ing ,

exter ior m o v e m e n t , internal p ropu l s ion of fluids, diseases, death , and

presence of vessels, g lands , ep iderms , and utricles [62]. Life docs n o t c o n ­

sti tute an obv ious threshold b e y o n d w h i c h entirely n e w forms o f k n o w ­

ledge are requi red . It is a ca tegory of classification, relat ive, like all the

o the r categories, to the criteria o n e adopts . A n d also, like t h e m , subject

to certain imprecisions as soon as the quest ion of deciding its frontiers

arises. Just as the z o o p h y t e stands on the a m b i g u o u s frontier b e t w e e n

animals and plants , so the fossils, as well as the metals , reside in that

uncer ta in frontier r eg ion w h e r e one does no t k n o w w h e t h e r one o u g h t

to speak of life or not . B u t the d iv id ing- l ine be tween the l iving and the

non- l iv ing is neve r a decisive p r o b l e m [63]. As Linnaeus says, the naturalist

- w h o m he calls Historicns naturalis - 'distinguishes the parts of na tura l

bodies w i t h his eyes, describes t h e m appropr ia te ly accord ing to their

n u m b e r , fo rm, posi t ion, and p r o p o r t i o n , and he names t h e m ' [ 6 4 ] . T h e

naturalist i s the m a n concerned w i t h the s t ruc ture of the visible w o r l d

and its denomina t i on accord ing to characters. N o t w i t h life.

We mus t therefore n o t connec t natural his tory, as i t was manifested

dur ing the Classical per iod , w i t h a ph i losophy of life, albeit an obscure

and still faltering one . In reality, i t is i n t e r w o v e n w i t h a t h e o r y of w o r d s .

Na tu ra l h i s tory is situated b o t h before and after l anguage ; i t decomposes

the language of everyday life, b u t in o rde r to r ecompose i t and discover

w h a t has m a d e i t possible t h r o u g h the bl ind resemblances of imag ina t ion ;

i t criticizes language , bu t in o r d e r to reveal its foundat ion . If na tura l

his tory r e w o r k s language and a t t empts to perfect it, this is because it also

delves d o w n in to the or ig in of language . I t leaps over the eve ryday

vocabulary that p rovides i t w i t h its i m m e d i a t e g r o u n d , and b e y o n d that

g r o u n d it searches for that w h i c h cou ld have const i tu ted its raison d'etre;

but, inversely, it resides in its ent i re ty in the area of language , since it is

essentially a concer ted use of names and since its u l t imate a i m is to g ive

things their t rue denomina t i on . Be tween language and the t h e o r y o f

na ture there exists therefore a relat ion that is of a critical t ype ; to k n o w

nature is, in fact, to bui ld u p o n the basis of language a t rue language , o n e

that will reveal the condi t ions in w h i c h all l anguage is possible and the

limits w i th in w h i c h i t can have a d o m a i n of val idi ty. T h e critical ques t ion

did exist in the e ighteenth cen tury , b u t l inked to the f o r m of a de te r ­

minate k n o w l e d g e . For this reason i t could n o t acquire e i ther a u t o n o m y

or the value of radical ques t ion ing : i t p r o w l e d endlessly t h r o u g h a reg ion

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

w h e r e w h a t ma t t e red w a s resemblance , the s t rength o f the i m a g i n a ­

t ion , na ture and h u m a n nature , and the v a l u e o f genera l and abstract ideas

- in short , the relat ions b e t w e e n the pe rcep t i on of s imi l i tude and the

va l id i ty o f the c o n c e p t . In the Classical a g e - L o c k e and Linnaeus , B u f f o n

and H u m e are o u r e v i d e n c e of this - the cri t ical ques t ion c o n c e r n e d the

basis for r e semblance and the exis tence o f the genus .

In the late e igh teen th cen tu ry , a n e w con f igu ra t i on w a s to appear that

w o u l d def in i t ive ly b lur the o l d space o f natural h i s tory for m o d e r n eyes .

O n the o n e hand , w e see cr i t ic i sm d isp lac ing i tse l f and de t ach ing i tse l f

f r o m the g r o u n d w h e r e i t had first arisen. W h e r e a s H u m e m a d e the

p r o b l e m o f causal i ty o n e case i n the genera l i n t e r roga t ion o f r e s e m ­

blances [65], K a n t , by i so la t ing causal i ty , reverses the ques t ion ; whe rea s

before i t w a s a ques t ion o f establ ishing relations o f ident i ty o r difference

against the c o n t i n u o u s b a c k g r o u n d o f s imil i tudes , K a n t br ings in to

p r o m i n e n c e the inverse p r o b l e m o f the synthesis o f the d iverse . T h i s

s imul taneous ly transfers the cri t ical ques t ion f r o m the c o n c e p t to the

j u d g e m e n t , f r o m the ex is tence o f the genus (obta ined b y the analysis o f

representat ions) t o the poss ibi l i ty o f l i n k i n g representat ions toge ther ,

f r o m the r igh t to n a m e to the basis for a t t r ibut ion , f r o m n o m i n a l ar t icula­

t ion to the p ropos i t i on itself, and to the v e r b to be that establishes it.

W h e r e u p o n i t b e c o m e s abso lu te ly genera l i zed . Instead o f h a v i n g v a l i d i t y

so le ly w h e n appl ied t o the relations o f na ture and h u m a n nature , i t

quest ions the v e r y poss ibi l i ty o f all k n o w l e d g e .

On the o the r hand , h o w e v e r , and d u r i n g the same pe r iod , life assumes

its a u t o n o m y in re la t ion to the concep t s of classification. It^escapes f r o m

that cri t ical re la t ion w h i c h , i n the e igh teen th c e n t u r y was cons t i tu t ive o f

the k n o w l e d g e o f nature . I t escapes - w h i c h means t w o th ings : life

b e c o m e s o n e ob jec t o f k n o w l e d g e a m o n g others , and i s answerab le , i n

this respect , to all c r i t ic ism in genera l ; b u t i t also resists this cri t ical j u r i s ­

d ic t ion , w h i c h i t takes o v e r on its o w n a c c o u n t and b r ings to bear, in its

o w n n a m e , o n all possible k n o w l e d g e . S o that t h r o u g h o u t the n i n e ­

teenth cen tu ry , f r o m K a n t t o D i l t h e y and t o B e r g s o n , cri t ical fo rms o f

t h o u g h t and ph i losoph ies o f life f ind themse lves in a pos i t ion o f rec iproca l

b o r r o w i n g and contes ta t ion .

C H A P T E R 6

Exchanging

I T H E A N A L Y S I S O F W E A L T H

T h e r e is no life in the Classical per iod , no r any science of life; n o r any

ph i lo logy either. B u t there is natural his tory, and general g r a m m a r . In

the same w a y , there i s no political e c o n o m y , because, in the o rde r of

k n o w l e d g e , p roduc t ion does n o t exist. On the o the r hand , there does

exist in the seventeenth and e ighteenth centuries a no t ion that is still

familiar to us today , t h o u g h it has lost its essential precision for us. B u t

' n o t i o n ' is n o t really the w o r d we should apply to it, since i t does no t occur

wi th in an in terplay of economic concepts that i t m i g h t displace to some

slight extent by t ak ing over a little of their m e a n i n g or eat ing in to their

sphere of applicat ion. It is m o r e a quest ion of a general d o m a i n : a v e r y

coheren t and v e r y well-stratified layer that comprises a n d contains, like

so m a n y part ial objects, the no t ions of value, price, t rade , circulat ion,

i n c o m e , interest. This d o m a i n , the g r o u n d and object o f ' e c o n o m y ' in

the Classical age, is tha t of wealth. It is useless to apply it questions

der iv ing f rom a different type of economics - one organized a r o u n d p r o ­

duc t ion or w o r k , for example ; useless also to analyse its var ious concepts

(even, and a b o v e all, i f their names have been perpe tua ted in succeeding

ages w i t h s o m e w h a t analogous meanings) , w i t h o u t t ak ing in to account

the system f r o m wh ich they d r a w their posi t ivi ty. O n e m i g h t as well

t ry to analyse t he Linnaean genus outside the d o m a i n of natural his tory,

or Bauzee 's t h e o r y of tenses w i t h o u t taking in to account the fact that

general g r a m m a r was its historical condi t ion of possibility.

We mus t therefore avo id a re t rospect ive reading of these th ings that

w o u l d mere ly e n d o w the Classical analysis o f wea l th w i t h the ul ter ior

un i ty of a political e c o n o m y in the tenta t ive process of const i tu t ing itself.

Yet i t i s in this w a y that historians of ideas do go abou t their recons t ruc­

tions o f the en igmat ic b i r th o f this k n o w l e d g e , wh ich , accord ing to them,

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E X C H A N G I N G

sprang up in W e s t e r n t h o u g h t , fully a r m e d and already full of danger , a t

the t i m e of R ica rdo and J - B . Say. T h e y presuppose tha t a scientific

economics had for l ong been rendered impossible by a pu re ly m o r a l

problemat ics of profi t and i n c o m e ( theory of the fair price, justif ication

or c o n d e m n a t i o n of interest) , t hen by a systematic confusion b e t w e e n

m o n e y and weal th , va lue and m a r k e t pr ice : and of this assimilation they

take mercant i l i sm to be o n e of the pr inciple causes and the mos t s t r iking

manifestat ion. B u t then the e ighteenth cen tu ry i s supposed to have p r o ­

v ided the essential distinctions and out l ined some of the great p r o b l e m s

that positivist economics subsequent ly treated w i t h tools bet ter adap ted

to t he task: m o n e y is supposed to h a v e revealed in this w a y its c o n v e n ­

t ional - t h o u g h n o t a rb i t ra ry - character (as a consequence of the l ong

discussion b e t w e e n bullionists and anti-bull ionists: a m o n g the first w o u l d

have to be inc luded Chi ld , Pe t ty , Locke , Cant i l lon , Galiani ; a m o n g the

latter, B a r b o n , Boisguil lebert , and , above all, L a w ; then , to a lesser

degree , after the disaster of 1720 , Mon te squ ieu and M e l o n ) ; a beg inn ing

is t h o u g h t to h a v e been m a d e , t o o - in the w o r k of Cant i l lon - on the

task of d isentangl ing the theo ry of intrinsic va lue f rom that o f m a r k e t

va lue ; and the great ' p a r a d o x of value* was dealt w i t h , by oppos ing the

useless dearness of the d i a m o n d to the cheapness of the wa te r w i t h o u t

w h i c h we canno t live (it is possible, in fact, to find this p r o b l e m r i g o r ­

ously fo rmula ted in Gal iani ) ; a start is supposed to have been m a d e , thus

pref igur ing the w o r k of J evons and M e n g e r , a t connec t ing va lue to a

general t heo ry of uti l i ty (which we find sketched o u t in Galiani , in

Graslin, and in T u r g o t ) ; an unders tand ing o f the i m p o r t a n c e o f h igh

prices to the d e v e l o p m e n t of t rade was supposedly reached (this is the

'Becher pr inc ip le ' , t aken up in France by Boisgui l lebert and Q u e s n a y ) ;

lastly - and he re we m e e t the Physiocrats - a start was m a d e on the

analysis o f the mechanics of p roduc t i on . A n d thus, in f ragments he re a n d

there , political e c o n o m y is t h o u g h t to have been silently b r ing ing in to

posi t ion its essential themes , unt i l t he m o m e n t w h e n , t ak ing up the

analysis of p roduc t i on again in ano the r di rect ion, A d a m Smi th is supposed

to h a v e b r o u g h t to l ight the process of the increasing division of labour ,

Ricardo the role p layed by capital, and J - B . Say some of the fundamenta l

laws o f the m a r k e t e c o n o m y . F r o m this m o m e n t on , political e c o n o m y

is supposed to have b e g u n to exist w i t h its o w n p rope r object and its

o w n inner coherence .

In fact, the concepts of m o n e y , pr ice , va lue , circulat ion, and m a r k e t

were n o t regarded , in the seventeenth and e ighteenth centuries, in t e rms

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

of a s h a d o w y future, bu t as par t of a r igorous and general epis temological

a r r angement . I t is this a r r a n g e m e n t that sustains the 'analysis of wea l th '

in its overal l necessity. T h e analysis of wea l th is to political e c o n o m y w h a t

general g r a m m a r is to ph i lo logy and w h a t natural his tory is to b io logy .

A n d jus t as i t i s n o t possible to unders tand the theo ry of v e r b and n o u n ,

the analysis o f the language of act ion, and that o f roots and their d e ­

ve lopmen t , w i t h o u t referr ing, t h r o u g h the s tudy o f general g r a m m a r ,

to the archaeological n e t w o r k that makes those th ings possible and neces­

sary; ju s t as one canno t unders tand , w i t h o u t exp lo r ing the d o m a i n of

natural his tory, w h a t Classical descript ion, characterizat ion, and t a x o n o m y

w e r e , any m o r e than the opposi t ion be tween system and m e t h o d , o r

' f ixism' and ' evo lu t ion ' ; so, in the same w a y , i t w o u l d n o t be possible

to discover the l ink of necessity that connects the analysis of m o n e y ,

prices, value, and t rade i f o n e did no t first clarify this d o m a i n of wea l th

wh ich is the locus of their s imul tanei ty .

I t is t rue that t he analysis of wea l th is no t const i tu ted accord ing to the

same curves or in obedience to the same r h y t h m as general g r a m m a r or

natural his tory. This is because reflection u p o n m o n e y , t rade , and ex ­

change is l inked to a pract ice and to insti tutions. A n d t h o u g h pract ice

and p u r e speculat ion m a y be placed in oppos i t ion to o n e another , t hey

nevertheless rest u p o n one a n d the same fundamenta l g r o u n d o f k n o w ­

ledge. A m o n e y re form, a bank ing cus tom, a t rade pract ice can all be

rat ionalized, can all deve lop , main ta in themselves or disappear accord ing

to appropr ia te fo rms ; they are all based u p o n a certain g r o u n d of k n o w ­

ledge: an obscure k n o w l e d g e that does n o t manifest itself fonAts o w n sake

in a discourse, b u t whose necessities are exactly the same as for abstract

theories or speculations w i t h o u t apparen t relation to reality. In any g iven

cul ture and at any g iven m o m e n t , there is a lways o n l y one episteme tha t d e ­

fines the condi t ions of possibility of all k n o w l e d g e , w h e t h e r expressed in a

theory or silently invested in a practice. T h e m o n e t a r y r e fo rm prescribed

by the States General o f 1 5 7 5 , mercanti l ist measures , o r Law ' s expe r imen t

and its l iquidat ion, all have the same archaeological basis as the theories

of Davanza t t i , B o u t e r o u e , Pe t ty , or Cant i l lon . A n d i t i s these fundamenta l

necessities of k n o w l e d g e that we mus t give voice to .

I I M O N E Y A N D P R I C E S

In the s ixteenth cen tury , e c o n o m i c t h o u g h t is restricted, or a lmost so,

to the p r o b l e m of prices and that o f the best m o n e t a r y substance. T h e

168

E X C H A N G I N G

quest ion of prices concerns the absolute or relative character of the in ­

creasing clearness of commodi t i e s and the effect that successive devaluat ions

o r the influx o f Amer ican metals m a y have had u p o n prices. T h e p r o b l e m

of m o n e t a r y substance i s that of the na ture of the s tandard, of the price

relation be tween the various metals employed , and of the d is tor t ion

be tween the weights of coins and their n o m i n a l values. B u t these t w o

scries of p rob l ems w e r e l inked, since the meta l appeared on ly as a sign,

and as a sign for measur ing weal th , in so far as it was itself weal th . It

possessed the p o w e r to signify because i t was itself a real mark . A n d jus t

as w o r d s had the same reality as w h a t they said, j u s t as the marks of l iving

beings w e r e inscribed u p o n their bodies in the m a n n e r of visible and

posit ive marks , similarly, the signs that indicated wea l th and measured

i t w e r e b o u n d to car ry the real m a r k in themselves. In o rde r to represent

prices, t hey themselves h a d to be precious. T h e y had to be rare, useful,

desirable. M o r e o v e r , all these qualities had to be stable i f the m a r k they

impr in ted u p o n things was to be an authent ic and universally legible

s ignature. Hen ce the correlat ion be tween the p r o b l e m of prices and the

na ture of m o n e y , w h i c h constitutes the pr ivi leged object of all reflection

u p o n weal th f r o m Copern icus to Bod in and Davanza t t i .

T h e t w o functions o f m o n e y , as a c o m m o n measure be tween c o m m o d ­

ities and as a substi tute in the mechan i sm of exchange, are based u p o n its

material reality. A measure is stable, recognized as valid by everyone and

in all places, if it has as a s tandard an assignable reality that can be c o m ­

pared to the diversi ty of things that one wishes to measure : as is the case,

Copern icus points ou t , w i t h the f a thom and the bushel, whose mater ial

l ength and v o l u m e serve as u n i t s [ i ] . In consequence, m o n e y does n o t

t ru ly measure unless its uni t is a reality that really exists, to w h i c h any

c o m m o d i t y w h a t e v e r m a y be referred. In this sense, the s ixteenth cen tu ry

re turns to the theo ry accepted du r ing a t least pa r t of the M i d d l e Ages ,

w h i c h gave ei ther the pr ince or popu la r consent the r ight to f ix t he valor

impositus of m o n e y , to modi fy its rate, to w i t h d r a w any ca tegory of coins

o r any part icular meta l . T h e value o f m o n e y m u s t be de te rmined by the

quan t i ty of meta l i t contains; that is, i t re turns to w h a t i t was before, w h e n

princes had n o t ye t s t amped their effigy or seal u p o n pieces of me ta l ;

a t tha t t i m e 'ne i ther copper , no r gold , n o r silver w e r e min ted , b u t on ly

valued accord ing to their w e i g h t ' [ 2 ] ; arbi t rary signs w e r e n o t accorded

the value of real ma rks ; m o n e y was a fair measure because i t signified

n o t h i n g m o r e than its p o w e r to s tandardize wea l th on the basis of its o w n

mater ia l real i ty as wea l th .

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

It is u p o n this epistemological foundation that reforms w e r e effected

in the s ixteenth cen tury , and that the controversies of the age assumed their

par t icular d imensions . T h e r e was an a t t e m p t to b r ing m o n e t a r y signs

back to their exact i tude as measures : the n o m i n a l values s t amped on the

coins had to be in con fo rmi ty w i t h the quan t i ty of meta l chosen as a

s tandard and incorpora ted in to each coin; m o n e y w o u l d then signify

n o t h i n g m o r e than its measur ing value . In this sense, the a n o n y m o u s

au thor of the Compendious insists that all the m o n e y actually cu r r en t shou ld

cease to be so after a certain date , since t he ' f o r c ing u p ' o f its nomina l value

has long since vit iated its functions of measu remen t ; all co inage already

m i n t e d should then be accepted on ly in accordance w i t h the a m o u n t of

meta l i t is es t imated to conta in ; as for n e w m o n e y , that wil l have its o w n

w e i g h t as its n o m i n a l value, so that henceforward on ly the n e w and the

old m o n e y will be current , each in accordance w i t h o n e and the same

value, w e i g h t and denomina t ion , so that all m o n e y will be re-established

at its fo rmer rate and regain its fo rmer goodness [3]. I t is n o t k n o w n

w h e t h e r the Compendious, w h i c h was n o t publ ished before 1 5 8 1 , bu t was

certainly in existence and circulat ing in manuscr ip t for th i r ty years b e ­

forehand, inspired Eng land ' s m o n e t a r y pol icy u n d e r Elizabeth. O n e th ing

is cer tain: that after a series o f ' f o r c i n g s u p ' (devaluations) be tween 1544

and 1 5 5 9 , the p roc lamat ion o f M a r c h 1 5 6 1 ' b r o u g h t d o w n ' the n o m i n a l

value o f m o n e y and m a d e i t equal once m o r e to the quan t i ty o f meta l

each coin conta ined. Similarly, in France, the States General of 1575

asked for and ob ta ined the suppression of account ing ^jinits (which

in t roduced a th i rd definit ion of m o n e y , a pure ly* ar i thmetical one , in

addi t ion to the definit ion by w e i g h t and tha t by n o m i n a l va lue : this

supp lemen ta ry relat ion concealed the sense of m o n e t a r y operat ions f rom

those w h o did n o t unders tand i t ) ; the edict o f Sep tember 1 5 7 7 established

the gold ecu as b o t h a real coin and an account ing uni t , decreed the

subord ina t ion of all o the r metals to go ld - in part icular , silver, w h i c h r e ­

tained its legality as t ender bu t lost its legal immutab i l i t y . T h e coinage

was thus restandardized on the basis of its metal l ic we igh t . T h e sign the

coins b o r e - the valor impositus - was mere ly the exact and t ransparent

m a r k o f the measure they const i tuted.

B u t a t the same t ime as this res tandardizat ion was be ing d e m a n d e d ,

and occasionally accomplished, a certain n u m b e r of p h e n o m e n a came

to l ight w h i c h are peculiar to the m o n e y - s i g n and perhaps definitively

c o m p r o m i s e d its role as a measure . First, the fact that co inage circulates

all the quicker for be ing less g o o d , whereas coins w i t h a h igh percentage

1 7 0

E X C H A N G I N G

of meta l are hoa rded and do n o t take par t in t rade : this i s w h a t was called

Gresham's l aw [4], and b o t h Copern icus [5] and the a u t h o r of the Com­

pendious^] w e r e already aware of it. Second, and a b o v e all, there was the

relation be tween the m o n e t a r y facts and the m o v e m e n t of prices: i t was

this that revealed m o n e y as a c o m m o d i t y l ike any o the r - n o t an absolute

s tandard for all equivalences, b u t a c o m m o d i t y w h o s e capacity for e x ­

change , and consequent ly w h o s e value as a subst i tute in exchange , are

modif ied accord ing to its abundance or rar i ty : m o n e y t o o has its pr ice .

Malcstroit[7] had po in ted ou t that , despite appearances, there h a d been

no increase in prices d u r i n g the sixteenth c e n t u r y : since c o m m o d i t i e s are

a lways w h a t they are, and since m o n e y , in its par t icular na ture , is a c o n ­

stant s tandard, the increased dearness of c o m m o d i t i e s can be d u e o n l y

to the augmen ta t i on o f the n o m i n a l values b o r n e by an u n c h a n g i n g

metall ic mass: bu t , for the same quan t i ty of whea t , one still gives t he same

w e i g h t in silver or go ld . So that ' n o t h i n g has b e c o m e dearer ' : since t he

go lden ecu was w o r t h t w e n t y sols toumois in account ing m o n e y u n d e r

Phi l ippe VI , and since i t is n o w w o r t h fifty, i t is inevitable that an ell of

velvet , w h i c h former ly cost four livres, should n o w be w o r t h ten. ' T h e

increasing dearness o f things does no t c o m e f r o m hav ing to deliver m o r e

bu t f rom receiving a lesser quant i ty of go ld or fine silver than o n e was

accus tomed to before. ' B u t once this identification has been established

be tween the role of m o n e y and the mass of metal i t causes to circulate,

i t becomes clearly apparen t that i t is subjected to the same var ia t ions

as all o ther merchandise . A n d t h o u g h Malest roi t implici t ly admi t t ed tha t

the quant i ty and marke tab le value of metals r emained stable, B o d i n ,

on ly a v e r y few years later [8], observes that there has been an increase

in the stock o f meta l i m p o r t e d f rom the N e w W o r l d , and in consequence

a real increase in the price of commodi t i e s , since princes, n o w possessing

ingots in larger quan t i ty or receiving m o r e f rom pr ivate persons, h a v e

been m i n t i n g m o r e and be t te r -qual i ty coins; for the same a m o u n t of a

c o m m o d i t y o n e is therefore g iv ing a larger quan t i ty of meta l . T h e rise

in prices therefore has a 'pr incipal cause, a n d that a lmost the o n l y o n e

that no o n e has touched u p o n h i t he r t o ' : ' the abundance o f go ld a n d

silver', ' t he abundance of that w h i c h gives th ings est imat ion and pr ice ' .

T h e s tandard of equivalences is itself invo lved in the system of e x ­

changes, a n d the b u y i n g p o w e r o f m o n e y signifies n o t h i n g b u t t he

marke tab le va lue o f the meta l . T h e m a r k that distinguishes m o n e y ,

de termines it, renders it certain and acceptable to all, is thus reversible,

and m a y be cons t rued in either di rect ion: i t refers to a quant i ty of me ta l

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

that is a constant measure (which is the cons t ruc t ion Malestroi t puts u p o n

i t ) ; bu t i t also refers to certain commodi t i e s , variable in quant i ty and pr ice ,

called metals (which i s Bod in ' s reading of the ma t t e r ) . We are, then ,

presented w i t h an a r r angemen t analogous to that w h i c h characterizes the

general organiza t ion of signs in the s ixteenth cen tu ry : signs, i t will be

r e m e m b e r e d , w e r e const i tu ted by resemblances wh ich , in tu rn , neces­

sitated further signs in o rde r to be recognized. H e r e , the m o n e t a r y sign

canno t define its exchange value, and can be established as a m a r k on ly

on a metall ic mass w h i c h in turn defines its value in the scale of o the r

commodi t i e s . I f o n e admits that exchange , in the system of needs, cor ­

responds to s imil i tude in the system of acquired k n o w l e d g e , then o n e

sees that k n o w l e d g e of na ture , and reflection or practices concern ing

m o n e y , w e r e control led du r ing the Renaissance by one and the same

conf igurat ion of the episteme.

A n d jus t as the relat ion of the mic rocosm to the m a c r o c o s m was in­

dispensable in o rde r to arrest the indefinite oscillation be tween resem­

blance and sign, so i t was necessary to lay d o w n a certain relat ion be tween

m ; t a l and merchandise w h i c h , w h e n i t c ame to it, m a d e i t possible to f ix

the total marke tab le value of the precious metals , and consequent ly to

standardize the price of all commodi t i e s in a certain and definitive fashion.

This relat ion is the one that was established by Prov idence w h e n i t bur ied

gold and silver mines u n d e r the ear th , and caused t h e m to g r o w , jus t as

plants g r o w and animals mul t ip ly on the surface of the ear th . Be tween

all the things that m a n m a y need or desire, and the gl i t ter ing, h idden

veins w h e r e those metals g r o w in darkness, there is an absolute co r respon­

dence. As Davanza t t i says:

N a t u r e m a d e all terrestrial things g o o d ; the s u m of these, by v i r tue

of the ag reemen t conc luded by m e n , is w o r t h all the go ld that is w o r k e d ;

all m e n therefore desire every th ing in o rde r to acquire all things . . .

In o rde r to ascertain each day the rule and mathemat ica l p ropor t ions

that exist be tween things and be tween t h e m and gold , we should have

to be able to con templa te , f rom the he igh t of heaven or some v e r y tall

observa tory , all the th ings that exist or are d o n e on ear th , or ra ther

their images r ep roduced and reflected in the sky as in a faithful mi r ro r .

We w o u l d then a b a n d o n all o u r calculations and we w o u l d say: there

i s u p o n ear th so m u c h gold , so m a n y th ings , so m a n y m e n , so m a n y

needs; and to the degree that each th ing satisfies needs, its value shall

be so m a n y things, o r so m u c h go ld [9 ] .

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E X C H A N G I N G

This celestial and exhaust ive calculation can be accomplished by n o n e

o the r than G o d : i t corresponds to that o the r calculation that br ings each

and every e lement of the mic rocosm in to relation w i t h a co r respond ing

e lement in the m a c r o c o s m - w i t h this one difference, that the latter unites

the terrestrial to the celestial, go ing f rom things , f r o m animals, or f rom

m a n , up to the stars; whereas the fo rmer links the ear th to its caves and

mines ; i t makes those things that are b r o u g h t into be ing by the hands

of m e n cor respond w i t h the treasures bur ied in the ear th since the creat ion

o f the w o r l d . T h e marks o f s imil i tude, because they are a gu ide to k n o w ­

ledge, are addressed to the perfection of heaven ; the signs of exchange ,

because they satisfy desire, are sustained by the dark , dangerous , and

accursed gl i t ter of meta l . An equivocal gli t ter , for i t reproduces in the

depths of the ear th that o the r gli t ter that sings a t the far end of t he n igh t :

i t resides there like an inver ted p romise of happiness, and, because meta l

resembles the stars, the k n o w l e d g e of all these peri lous treasures is at the

same t ime k n o w l e d g e of the w o r l d . A n d thus reflection u p o n wea l th has

its p ivo t in the broadest speculat ion u p o n the cosmos, ju s t as, inversely,

p r o f o u n d k n o w l e d g e o f the o rde r o f the w o r l d mus t lead to the secret

o f metals and the possession o f wea l th . I t becomes apparen t h o w t ight ly

kn i t is t he n e t w o r k of necessities that , in the s ixteenth cen tu ry , links

toge ther all the e lements o f k n o w l e d g e : h o w the c o s m o l o g y o f signs p r o ­

vides a dupl icat ion, and finally a foundat ion , for reflection u p o n prices

and m o n e y ; h o w i t also authorizes theoret ical and practical speculat ion

u p o n metals; h o w i t p rovides a c o m m u n i c a t i n g link be tween the promises

of desire and those of k n o w l e d g e , in the same w a y as the metals and the

stars c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h o n e ano the r and are d r a w n toge ther by secret

affinities. On the confines of k n o w l e d g e , in that reg ion w h e r e i t becomes

all powerfu l and quasi-divine, th ree great functions mee t - those of the

Basileus, of the Philosophos, and of the Metallkos. B u t ju s t as this k n o w ­

ledge is g iven on ly in f ragments and in the a t tent ive l ightning-flash of

the divinatio, so, in the case of the singular and partial relations of things

w i t h metal , o f desire w i t h prices, d ivine k n o w l e d g e , o r that w h i c h o n e

m i g h t acquire f rom ' s o m e very tall observa tory ' , i s n o t g iven to m a n .

Excep t for br ief instants, and as t h o u g h at r a n d o m , to those minds tha t

k n o w h o w t o w a t c h for i t - i n o the r w o r d s , t o merchants . W h a t t he

soothsayers w e r e to the undefined interplay of resemblances and signs,

the merchants a re to the interplay, also forever open , of exchange and

m o n e y .

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

1 7 4

F r o m here b e l o w , we have difficulty in perce iv ing the few things tha t

su r round us, a n d we g ive a pr ice to t h e m accord ing to w h e t h e r we

perceive t h e m to be m o r e or less in d e m a n d in each place and a t each

t ime . T h e merchan t s are p r o m p t l y and v e r y wel l advised o f these

th ings , and that i s w h y they have an admirab le k n o w l e d g e of the pr ice

o f th ings [10] .

I l l M E R C A N T I L I S M

In o rde r that the d o m a i n of wea l th cou ld be const i tu ted as an object of

reflection in Classical t h o u g h t , the conf igura t ion established in the s ix­

teenth cen tu ry had to be dissolved. For the Renaissance ' economis ts ' , and

r igh t up t o Davanza t t i himself, the abil i ty o f m o n e y to measure c o m ­

modi t ies , as wel l as its exchangeabi l i ty , rested u p o n its intrinsic va lue :

they w e r e wel l a w a r e that the precious metals had little usefulness o the r

than as co inage ; b u t i f t hey had been chosen as s tandards, i f they had

been e m p l o y e d as a means of exchange , if, in consequence , t hey fetched a

h i g h pr ice , tha t was because they possessed, b o t h in the na tura l scale of

things and in themselves, an absolute a n d fundamenta l pr ice , h igher than

a n y o ther , t o w h i c h the va lue o f any and every c o m m o d i t y cou ld be

r e f e r r e d [ n ] . Fine meta l was , of itself, a m a r k of wea l th ; its bu r i ed

br ightness was sufficient indicat ion that i t was at the same t i m e a h idden

presence and a visible s ignature of all the wea l th of the w o r l d . I t is for this

reason tha t it had a price; for this reason t oo tha t it was a measure of all

prices; and for this reason, finally, tha t o n e cou ld exchange i t for a n y t h i n g

else tha t had a pr ice . I t was precious a b o v e all o the r things. In the seven­

teen th cen tu ry , these three proper t ies a re still a t t r ibu ted to m o n e y , b u t

they are all th ree m a d e to rest, no t on the first (possession of pr ice) , b u t

on the last (substi tut ion for that w h i c h possesses pr ice) . W h e r e a s t he

Renaissance based the t w o functions of co inage (measure and subst i tut ion)

on the d o u b l e na tu re of its intrinsic character (the fact that i t was precious) ,

the seventeenth cen tu ry turns the analysis upside d o w n : i t is the e x c h a n g ­

ing funct ion that serves as a founda t ion for the o t h e r t w o characters

(its abil i ty to measure and its capacity to receive a pr ice thus appear ing as

qualities der iv ing f r o m tha t function).

This reversal is t he w o r k of a c o m p l e x of reflections and practices

that occur red t h r o u g h o u t t he seventeenth c e n t u r y ( f rom Scipion de

G r a m m o n t t o Nicolas B a r b o n ) and that are g r o u p e d toge the r u n d e r the

s o m e w h a t a p p r o x i m a t e t e r m 'mercant i l i sm' . I t is usual to character ize this

E X C H A N G I N G

175

ra the r hastily as an absolute ' m o n e t a r i s m ' , tha t is, a systematic (or s t u b ­

b o r n ) confusion be tween wea l th and coinage. In fact, i t is n o t an ident i ty -

m o r e or less confused - that 'mercant i l i sm' established be tween these t w o

th ings , b u t a considered art iculat ion that makes m o n e y the ins t rument of

the representat ion and analysis of weal th , and makes wea l th , conversely ,

in to the con ten t represented by m o n e y . Jus t as the old circular conf igura­

t ion of simili tudes and marks h a d unravel led itself so tha t i t cou ld be

redep loyed to f o r m the t w o correlat ive fabrics o f representat ion a n d signs,

so t he circle of 'preciousness ' i s b r o k e n w i t h the c o m i n g of mercant i l i sm,

and wea l th becomes w h a t e v e r is t he object of needs and desires; i t is

split in to e lements that can be substi tuted for o n e ano the r by the in te r ­

p lay of the co inage that signifies t h e m ; and the reciprocal relations of

m o n e y and wea l th are established in the f o r m of circulat ion and exchange .

I f i t was possible to believe that mercant i l i sm confused wea l th and m o n e y ,

this is p r o b a b l y because m o n e y for the mercantil ists had the p o w e r of

represent ing all possible weal th , because i t was the universal i n s t rumen t

for the analysis and representa t ion of weal th , because i t covered the ent i re

ex ten t of its d o m a i n leaving no res iduum. All wea l th is coinable; and it is

by this means that i t enters in to circulation - in the same w a y tha t a n y

na tura l be ing was characterizable, and cou ld the reby find its place in a

taxonomy; tha t any individual was nameable and could find its place in an

articulated language; tha t any representat ion was signifiable and could find

its place, in o rde r to be knotim, in a system of identities and differences.

B u t this m u s t be examined m o r e closely. A m o n g all t he th ings tha t

exist in the w o r l d , w h i c h ones will mercant i l i sm be able to include in the

t e r m 'wea l th ' ? All those that , be ing representable, are also objects of

desire - tha t is, m o r e o v e r , those that are m a r k e d by 'necessity, or ut i l i ty,

or pleasure, or rar i ty ' [12] . N o w , can one say that the metals used in the

manufac tu re o f coinage (we are n o t concerned here w i t h copper co inage ,

w h i c h is used as small change on ly in certain countr ies , b u t w i t h coins

that are used in foreign t rade) are par t of wea l th? Go ld and silver h a v e

v e r y little u t i l i t y - ' a s far as their use in t he house goes ' ; and, h o w e v e r

rare they m a y be , their abundance still exceeds w h a t i s requi red by the i r

uti l i ty. I f t h e y are sough t after, i f m e n find tha t they neve r have e n o u g h

of t h e m , i f they d ig mines and m a k e w a r on o n e ano the r in o rde r to ge t

ho ld of t h e m , i t i s because the process of m i n t i n g t h e m in to go ld and

silver co inage has g iven t h e m a util i ty and a rar i ty tha t those metals do

n o t possess of themselves. ' M o n e y does n o t d r a w its value f r o m the mater ia l

of w h i c h i t is composed , bu t ra ther f rom its f o rm, w h i c h is the i m a g e

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

or m a r k of the P r i n c e ' [ 1 3 ] . Go ld is precious because i t is m o n e y - n o t the

converse . T h e relat ion so strictly laid d o w n in the s ixteenth cen tu ry is

fo r thwi th reversed: m o n e y (and even the meta l of w h i c h i t i s m a d e )

receives its va lue f rom its p u r e function as sign. This entails t w o conse­

quences . First, the va lue of th ings wil l no longer p roceed f rom the meta l

itself; i t establishes itself by itself, w i t h o u t reference to the coinage, acco rd ­

ing to the criteria of ut i l i ty, pleasure, or rar i ty . Th ings take on value,

then , in relat ion to o n e ano the r ; the meta l mere ly enables this value to be

represented, as a n a m e represents an image or an idea, yet does no t c o n ­

stitute i t : 'Go ld is mere ly the sign and the ins t rument c o m m o n l y used

to convey the va lue of things in pract ice; bu t the t rue est imat ion of that

value has its source in h u m a n j u d g e m e n t and in that faculty t e r m e d the

e s t ima t ive ' [14 ] . W e a l t h is wea l th because we est imate it, j u s t as ou r ideas

are w h a t they are because we represent t hem. M o n e t a r y o r verbal signs

are addi t ional to this.

B u t w h y have gold and silver, w h i c h are scarcely wea l th a t all in t h e m ­

selves, received o r taken on this signifying p o w e r ? No d o u b t one cou ld

v e r y wel l e m p l o y some o the r c o m m o d i t y to this effect ' h o w e v e r vile and

base i t m i g h t b e ' [ 1 5 ] . C o p p e r , w h i c h in m a n y countr ies is still a cheap

c o m m o d i t y , becomes precious in others on ly w h e n i t is t u rned in to

c o i n a g e [ i 6 ] . B u t in a general fashion we use go ld and silver because they

conta in h idden wi th in themselves 'a peculiar perfect ion ' . A perfect ion

that is no t of the o rde r of price, bu t is dependen t u p o n their endless

capacity for representa t ion. T h e y are hard , imperishable , uncor rodab lc ;

they can be d iv ided in to m i n u t e pieces; t hey can concentrate a grea t

we igh t in to a little v o l u m e ; they can be easily t r anspor ted ; they arc easily

pierced. All these factors m a k e gold and silver into a pr ivi leged ins t rument

for the representat ion of all o the r kinds of wea l th , and for strict c o m ­

parisons be tween t h e m by means of analysis. I t i s in this w a y that the

relat ion of m o n e y to wea l th has c o m e to be defined. I t i s an arb i t rary

relat ion because i t is no t the intrinsic va lue of the meta l that gives th ings

their prices; any object , even o n e that has no price, can serve as m o n e y ;

bu t i t mus t , nevertheless, possess peculiar proper t ies of representat ion and

capacities for analysis that wil l pe rmi t i t to establish relations of equali ty

and difference be tween different kinds of wea l th . I t is apparent , then ,

that the use of go ld and silver for this purpose has a justifiable basis. As

B o u t e r o u e says, m o n e y 'is a po r t i on of ma t t e r to w h i c h publ ic au thor i ty

has g iven a certain value and w e i g h t so that it m a y serve as a price and

m a k e the inequal i ty of all th ings equal in t r a d e ' [ i 7 ] . 'Mercant i l i sm ' freed

1 7 6

E X C H A N G I N G

m o n e y f rom the postula te of the intrinsic value of me ta l - the folly of

those w h o 'say that m o n e y is a c o m m o d i t y like o the r things ' [ i8] - and

at the same t i m e established be tween i t and weal th a strict relat ion of

representat ion and analysis. M o n e y , says Ba rbon , is tha t by w h i c h m e n

'es t imate the va lue of all o the r th ings ; hav ing regard m o r e to the s t amp

and cur rency of the m o n e y than to the quan t i ty of fine silver in each

p i ece ' [ 19 ] .

T h e usual a t t i tude t owards w h a t i t has been agreed to call 'mercant i l i sm'

is doub ly unjust: either it is d e n o u n c e d for compr i s ing a no t ion it c o n ­

tinually criticized (the intrinsic value of precious meta l as the pr inciple

of wea l th ) , or it is revealed as a series of immed ia t e cont radic t ions : it is

accused of defining m o n e y in its p u r e function as a sign whi le insisting

u p o n its accumula t ion as a c o m m o d i t y ; of recogniz ing the impor t ance of

quant i ta t ive fluctuations in specie, whi le misunders tand ing their ac t ion

u p o n prices; of be ing protect ionis t whi le basing its mechan i sm for t he

increase of wea l th u p o n exchange . In fact, these contradic t ions or hesi ta­

tions exist on ly i f one confronts mercant i l i sm w i t h a d i l e m m a that could

have no m e a n i n g for it: tha t of m o n e y as c o m m o d i t y or as sign. For

Classical t h o u g h t in its format ive phase, m o n e y is tha t w h i c h permi t s

wea l th to be represented. W i t h o u t such signs, wea l th w o u l d remain i m ­

mobi le , useless, and as it w e r e silent; in this sense, go ld and silver are the

creators of all tha t m a n can covet . B u t in o rde r to p lay this role as r e p ­

resentat ion, m o n e y mus t offer proper t ies (physical and n o t e c o n o m i c

ones) that r ender i t adequa te to its task, and in consequence precious .

It is in its qual i ty as a universal sign that it becomes a rare and unequal ly

distr ibuted c o m m o d i t y : ' T h e rate and value imposed u p o n all m o n e y i s

its t rue intrinsic goodness ' [20] . Jus t as in t he o rde r of representat ions the

signs that replace and analyse t h e m mus t also be representat ions t h e m ­

selves, so m o n e y canno t signify wea l th w i t h o u t itself be ing wea l th . B u t

it becomes wea l th because it is a sign; whereas a representat ion m u s t first

be represented in o rde r subsequent ly to b e c o m e a sign.

H e n c e the apparen t contradic t ions be tween the principles o f accumula ­

t ion and the rules o f circulat ion. At any g iven m o m e n t o f t ime , t he

n u m b e r of coins in existence i s de t e rmined ; Co lbe r t even t h o u g h t , d e ­

spite the exploi ta t ion of mines , despite the impor t s o f meta l f rom Amer ica ,

that ' t he quan t i t y of m o n e y circulat ing in E u r o p e is cons tant ' . N o w i t i s

this m o n e y tha t i s needed to represent weal th , in o the r w o r d s to at t ract

it, to m a k e i t appear by b r i n g i n g i t in f r o m abroad or manufac tu r ing

i t at h o m e ; i t is this m o n e y , too , that is needed in o rde r to m a k e wea l th

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

pass f rom h a n d to h a n d in the process of exchange . I t is necessary, t h e r e ­

fore, to i m p o r t meta l by tak ing i t f rom n e i g h b o u r i n g states: ' T r a d e a lone,

and all tha t depends on it, is capable of p r o d u c i n g this great effect ' [21] .

T h e legislature m u s t therefore take care to do t w o th ings :

Forbid the transfer of meta l abroad , or its ut i l ization for o ther ends

than that of coinage, and impose cus toms duties such that they enable

the balance o f t rade to be always posi t ive; encourage the impor t a t i on o f

r a w materials , p reven t as far as possible that of manufac tu red goods ,

expo r t manufac tured p roduc t s ra ther than the commodi t i e s themselves

w h o s e disappearance leads to famine and causes the rise of prices [22].

N o w , the me ta l accumula ted is n o t in tended to sleep and g r o w fat; i t i s

a t t racted in to a state on ly so that i t m a y be c o n s u m e d by the process of

exchange . As Becher said, eve ry th ing that is expense for o n e of the p a r t ­

ners i s i ncome for the o ther [23] ; and T h o m a s M u n identified ready m o n e y

w i t h wea l th [24]. This is because m o n e y becomes real wea l th on ly to

exactly the same degree to w h i c h i t fulfils its representat ive funct ion:

w h e n i t replaces commod i t i e s , w h e n i t enables t h e m to be m o v e d or to

wai t , w h e n i t p rovides r a w materials w i t h the o p p o r t u n i t y o f b e c o m i n g

consumable , w h e n i t r emunera tes w o r k . T h e r e i s therefore no reason to

fear tha t t he accumula t ion of m o n e y in a state wil l cause prices to rise

in i t ; a n d the pr inciple established by B o d i n that the great dearness p r e ­

valent in the s ixteenth cen tu ry was caused by the influx of go ld f rom

Amer ica is n o t val id; t h o u g h it is t rue that an increase in specie causes

prices to r ise at first, i t also st imulates t rade and manufac tu r ing ; the

quan t i ty o f wea l th g r o w s and the n u m b e r o f e lements a m o n g wh ich the

coinage is to be d iv ided increases by the same a m o u n t . Rising prices are

n o t to be feared: on the con t ra ry , n o w that the n u m b e r o f precious objects

has increased, n o w that t he midd le classes, as Scipion de G r a m m o n t puts

it, can wea r 'satin and ve lve t ' , the va lue of th ings , even of the rarest

th ings , could fall on ly in relation to the total i ty of the o thers ; similarly,

each piece of me ta l loses some of its va lue w i t h regard to the others as the

mass of coinage in circulat ion increases [25] .

T h e relations b e t w e e n wea l th and m o n e y , then , are based on circulat ion

and exchange , and n o longer o n the 'preciousness ' o f meta l . W h e n goods

can circulate (and this thanks to m o n e y ) , t hey mul t ip ly , a n d wea l th

increases; w h e n coinage becomes m o r e plentiful, as a result of a g o o d

circulation and a favourable balance, o n e can at t ract fresh merchandise and

increase b o t h agr icul ture and manufac tur ing . As H o r n e c k puts it, gold

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E X C H A N G I N G

and silver 'are the purest par t o f ou r b lood , the m a r r o w of o u r s t rength ' ,

' t he mos t indispensable ins t ruments o f h u m a n activi ty and o f o u r exist­

ence ' [26] . We mee t once m o r e w i t h the old m e t a p h o r o f a co inage that

is to society w h a t b lood is to the b o d y [27] . B u t for Davanza t t i , specie

had no o the r role than tha t o f i r r igat ing the various parts o f the na t ion .

N o w that m o n e y and wea l th are b o t h included wi th in the area o f e x ­

change and circulation, mercant i l i sm can adjust its analysis in te rms of the

m o d e l recent ly p rov ided by H a r v e y . Acco rd ing to H o b b e s [ 2 8 ] , the

venous circulat ion of m o n e y is that of duties and taxes, w h i c h levy a

certain mass of bul l ion u p o n all merchandise t ranspor ted , b o u g h t , o r

sold; the bul l ion levied is conveyed to the hear t of Man-Lev ia than - in

o the r words , in to the coffers of the state. I t is there that t he meta l is ' m a d e

vi ta l ' : the state can, in effect, mel t i t d o w n or send i t back in to circulat ion.

B u t at all events i t is the state's au thor i ty a lone that can g ive i t cu r r ency ;

and redis t r ibuted a m o n g pr iva te persons (in the fo rm of pensions, salaries,

or r enumera t ion for provisions b o u g h t by the state), i t wil l s t imulate , in

its second, arterial circuit , exchanges of weal th , manufactures , a n d ag r i ­

cul ture . T h u s circulation becomes o n e of the fundamenta l categories o f

analysis. B u t t he transference of this physiological m e t a p h o r was m a d e

possible on ly by the m o r e p ro found open ing up of a space c o m m o n to b o t h

m o n e y and signs, t o b o t h wea l th and representat ions. T h e m e t a p h o r o f

the city and the b o d y , so assiduously p u t to w o r k in ou r W e s t e r n cul ture ,

der ived its imag ina ry power s on ly f rom the m u c h deeper foundat ion of

archaeological necessities.

T h r o u g h the mercanti l ist experience, the d o m a i n o f wea l th was c o n ­

st i tuted in the same m o d e as that o f representat ions. We have seen that

these latter h a d the p o w e r to represent themselves w i t h themselves as

the basis of that representat ion: to open w i t h i n themselves a space in

w h i c h they could analyse themselves, and to f o r m substitutes for t h e m ­

selves o u t of their o w n elements , thus m a k i n g i t possible to establish

b o t h a system of signs and a table of identities and differences. Similarly,

wea l th has the p o w e r to be exchanged ; to analyse itself in to elements that

author ize relations of equali ty or inequal i ty ; to signify itself by means of

those comple te ly comparab le e lements of w e a l t h called precious metals .

A n d jus t as t he entire w o r l d of representat ion covers itself w i t h r e p ­

resentations w h i c h , a t o n e r e m o v e , represent it, in an un in t e r rup ted

sequence, so all the kinds of wea l th in the w o r l d are related one to ano the r

in so far as they are all pa r t of a sys tem of exchange . F r o m one representa­

tion to another , there is no a u t o n o m o u s act of signification, bu t a s imple

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

and endless possibility of exchange . W h a t e v e r its economic de te rmina t ions

and consequences, mercant i l i sm, w h e n quest ioned a t the level of the

episteme, appears as the s low, long effort to b r ing reflection u p o n prices

and m o n e y in to a l ignment w i t h the analysis of representat ions. I t was

responsible for the emergence of a d o m a i n of 'wea l th ' connected to that

which , a t abou t the same t ime , was opened up to natural his tory, and l ike­

wise to that w h i c h unfolded before general g r a m m a r . B u t whereas in

these last t w o cases the m u t a t i o n came abou t ab rup t ly (a certain m o d e of

be ing e m e r g i n g suddenly for l anguage in the Grammaire de Port-Royal,

a certain m o d e of being for individuals in na tu re manifest ing itself a lmost

s imultaneously w i t h Jons ton and Tourne fo r t ) , the m o d e o f be ing for

m o n e y and weal th , on the o the r hand , because i t was l inked to an ent i re

praxis, to a w h o l e inst i tut ional complex , had a m u c h h igher degree of

historic viscosity. Ne i the r natural beings n o r l anguage needed the

equivalent of the l ong mercanti l ist process in o rde r to enter the d o m a i n

of representat ion, subject themselves to its laws, and receive f rom it their

signs and their principles of order .

I V T H E P L E D G E A N D T H E P R I C E

T h e Classical t heo ry of m o n e y and prices was elaborated d u r i n g a we l l -

k n o w n series of historical experiences. First of all, there was the grea t

crisis of m o n e t a r y signs that began in E u r o p e fairly early in t he seventeenth

cen tury . Possibly we o u g h t to cons t rue Colber t ' s s ta tement , that the

quan t i ty of bul l ion is stable in E u r o p e and that impor t s f r o m Amer ica

can be ignored , as a first, t h o u g h still marg ina l and allusive, sign of a w a r e ­

ness as to w h a t was happen ing . At the end of the cen tury , a t all events,

the shor tage of coin became an acute and direct exper ience: recession of

t rade, l ower ing of prices, difficulties in pay ing debts , rents, and duties, a

fall in the value of land. H e n c e the great series of devaluat ions that t ook

place in France du r ing the first fifteen years of the e ighteenth cen tu ry in

o rde r to increase the quan t i ty of specie; the eleven ' d iminu t ions ' ( re­

valuations) that w e r e spaced o u t at regular intervals be tween i D e c e m b e r

1 7 1 3 a n d 1 Sep tember 1 7 1 5 , and w e r e in tended - t h o u g h the a t t e m p t

failed - to d r a w h o a r d e d bul l ion back in to circulat ion; a w h o l e series of

measures that d iminished the rate of inves tment i n c o m e and reduced

n o m i n a l capital; the appearance o f paper m o n e y in 1 7 0 1 , soon to be

replaced by g o v e r n m e n t bonds . A m o n g its m a n y o the r consequences,

Law's expe r imen t m a d e possible the reappearance of meta l m o n e y , price

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E X C H A N G I N G

increases, the revaluat ion of land, and the revival of t rade . T h e edicts

of J a n u a r y and M a y 1 7 2 6 established a co inage that was to r emain stable

t h r o u g h o u t the e igh teen th cen tu ry : they decreed the m i n t i n g of a louis-d'or

w o r t h t w e n t y - f o u r livres toumois - a value it re ta ined r igh t up to the

Revo lu t ion .

I t is usual to const rue these experiences, their theoret ical con tex t , a n d

the discussions to w h i c h t h e y have g iven rise, as the confronta t ion of the

money-as - s ign faction w i t h the upho lders o f m o n e y - a s - c o m m o d i t y . In the

f i r s t g r o u p we f i nd Law, o f course, toge ther w i t h Terrasson [29] , D u t o t [30],

M o n t e s q u i e u [ 3 i ] , and the Cheval ier de J a u c o u r t [ 3 2 ] ; on the oppos ing

side we f ind Pa r i s -Duve rney [33 ] , the Chancel ier d 'Aguesseau[34] ,

Condi l lac , and Des tu t t ; b e tween the t w o factions, on the ha l f -way line

as i t w e r e , o n e w o u l d have to place M e l o n [ 3 5 ] and Gras l in[36] . A n d i t

w o u l d cer tainly be interest ing to w o r k ou t a detailed accoun t of these

opinions and discover h o w they w e r e dis t r ibuted a m o n g the var ious

social g roups . B u t i f we investigate the k n o w l e d g e tha t m a d e all those

var ious opin ions s imultaneously possible, we perceive that the oppos i t ion

b e t w e e n t h e m is superficial; and that , t h o u g h it is logically necessary, it

is so on the basis of a single a r r angemen t tha t s imply creates, at a g iven

po in t , the alternatives of an indispensable choice.

This single a r r a n g e m e n t is that w h i c h defines m o n e y as a p ledge . It is

a definit ion we find in Locke and , slightly earlier, in V a u g h a n [ 3 7 ] ; t hen

in M e l o n - ' go ld and silver are, by general ag reement , the p ledge , t he

equivalent , or the c o m m o n measure of all that w h i c h serves for m e n ' s

use ' [38] ; in D u t o t - ' w e a l t h of credit o r op in ion i s o n l y representat ive,

as are gold , silver, b ronze , and copper ' [39] ; in For tbonnais - ' t h e i m ­

por t an t po in t ' in convent iona l wea l th lies ' in the confidence of the o w n e r s

o f m o n e y and c o m m o d i t i e s that t hey can exchange t h e m w h e n they wil l

. . . on the foot ing established by cus tom ' [40 ] . To say that m o n e y i s a

p ledge is to say that i t is no m o r e than a t oken accepted by c o m m o n

consent - hence , a p u r e fiction; bu t it is also to say that it has exact ly t he

same value as that for w h i c h i t has been g iven, since i t can in tu rn be e x ­

changed for tha t same quan t i ty o f merchandise o r the equivalent . C o i n a g e

can always b r ing back in to the hands of its o w n e r that w h i c h has j u s t

been exchanged for it, j u s t as, in representat ion, a sign mus t be able to

recall to t h o u g h t that w h i c h it represents. M o n e y is a mater ia l m e m o r y , a

self-duplicating representat ion, a deferred exchange . As Le Trosne says,

t rade that makes use of m o n e y is an i m p r o v e m e n t in so far as i t is ' a n

imperfect t r a d e ' [ 4 1 ] , an act that lacks, for a t ime , that w h i c h recompenses

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

it, a demi -ope ra t ion that promises and expects the converse exchange

w h e r e b y the p l edge wil l be reconver ted in to its effective conten t .

B u t h o w can the m o n e t a r y p ledge p r o v i d e this assurance? H o w can

i t escape f r o m the d i l e m m a of the valueless sign as opposed to the c o m ­

m o d i t y ana logous to all o the r commodi t i es? I t is here , for the Classical

analysis of m o n e y , tha t the p o i n t of heresy occurs - t he choice that divides

the followers of L a w f r o m his opponen t s . I t is conceivable , in fact, tha t

the opera t ion tha t pledges t he m o n e y i s guaran teed by the marke tab le

va lue of the mater ia l f r o m w h i c h i t i s m a d e ; o r , on the o the r hand , by

ano the r quan t i ty o f merchandise , ex ter ior to it, b u t l inked to i t by co l ­

lective consent or the wi l l of the pr ince . I t is this second solut ion that L a w

chose, on account of the rar i ty of precious meta l and the f luc tua t ions in

its m a r k e t va lue . He t h o u g h t tha t o n e could circulate pape r m o n e y

backed by landed p r o p e r t y : in w h i c h case i t was s imply a ma t t e r of issuing

' bankno tes m o r t g a g e d against lands a n d due to be r edeemed by annual

p a y m e n t s . . . , these notes wi l l be exchanged , like m i n t e d coin , for the

va lue p r in ted on them'[42] . As we k n o w , L a w was obl iged t o r enounce

this technique in his French expe r imen t and subsequent ly p r o v i d e d surety

for his m o n e y by means of a t r ad ing c o m p a n y . T h e failure of his en te r ­

prise in no w a y affected the val idi ty o f the m o n e y - p l e d g e t h e o r y that h a d

m a d e i t possible, b u t that h a d also m a d e possible all reflection of any k ind

on m o n e y , even that opposed to Law ' s concept ions . A n d w h e n a stable

metal l ic m o n e y was established in 1726, the p ledge was requi red to be

p r o v i d e d by the actual substance o f the coins. W h a t ensured the exchange ­

ability of m o n e y , i t was decided, was the m a r k e t va lue of the meta l to

be found in i t ; a n d T u r g o t was to criticize L a w for hav ing believed that

m o n e y is on ly a sign of weal th , a sign w h o s e credit is based u p o n the

m a r k of the pr ince . T h a t m a r k i s on each coin on ly in o r d e r to certify

its w e i g h t and title . . . I t i s therefore as merchandise that m o n e y is,

n o t the sign, b u t the c o m m o n measure of all o the r merchandise . . .

G o l d derives its pr ice f rom its rar i ty , and far f rom its be ing an evil that

i t shou ld be e m p l o y e d a t the same t i m e as b o t h merchand i se and

measure , these t w o uses ma in ta in its price [43].

L a w , t oge the r w i t h his partisans, does n o t s tand in opposi t ion to his age

as the bril l iant - or i m p r u d e n t - p recursor of f iduciary cur rency . He d e ­

fines m o n e y , as his opponen t s did, as a p ledge . B u t he t h o u g h t that i t

w o u l d be bet ter guaran teed (more a b u n d a n t as we l l as m o r e stable) i f i t

w e r e based u p o n some merchandise ex ter ior to m o n e t a r y specie itself;

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E X C H A N G I N G

183

whereas his opponen t s t h o u g h t that i t w o u l d be bet ter guaran teed ( m o r e

secure and less subject to speculat ion) if based u p o n the metal l ic substance

const i tu t ing the mater ia l reality o f m o n e y . T h e conflict b e t w e e n L a w

and his critics concerns on ly the distance be tween the p ledge and w h a t i t

is p l edg ing . In the one case, m o n e y , rel ieved of all marke tab le va lue ,

bu t guaran teed by a va lue ex ter ior to it, i s tha t ' b y means of w h i c h ' o n e

exchanges merchandise [44]; in the o the r case, since m o n e y has a pr ice

in itself, i t is a t the same t i m e that ' b y means of w h i c h ' a n d that ' for w h i c h '

one exchanges wea l th . B u t in b o t h cases i t is m o n e y that makes i t possible

to fix the price of things, thanks to a certain relat ion of proportion w i t h

various forms of wea l th and a certain p o w e r to m a k e t h e m circulate.

As a p ledge , m o n e y designates a certain wea l th (actual or n o t ) : i t

establishes its pr ice. B u t the relat ion be tween m o n e y and commod i t i e s ,

and thus the pr ice system, is modif ied as soon as the quan t i ty of m o n e y

or the quan t i ty of c o m m o d i t i e s a t any m o m e n t of t ime i s also modif ied .

If m o n e y is in shor t supply w i t h relat ion to goods , t hen i t wil l have a

h igh value, and prices will be l o w ; i f i t increases in quan t i ty to the po in t

of b e c o m i n g a b u n d a n t in relat ion to weal th , then i t wi l l have a l o w

value, and prices will be h igh . T h e p o w e r o f m o n e y to represent a n d

analyse varies w i t h the quant i ty o f specie on the o n e h a n d and w i t h the

quant i ty o f wea l th on the o the r : i t w o u l d be constant o n l y i f b o t h quan t i ­

ties w e r e stable, or var ied toge ther in the same p r o p o r t i o n .

T h e 'quant i ta t ive l aw ' was no t ' i nven ted ' by Locke . B o d i n and D a v a n -

zatti already k n e w , in the s ixteenth cen tury , that an increase in the mass

of meta l in circulat ion caused the price of commodi t i e s to rise; b u t this

mechan i sm seemed to t h e m to be l inked to an intrinsic devalor izat ion

of the meta l itself. In the late seventeenth cen tu ry , this same mechan i sm

was defined on the basis o f t he representa t ive function of m o n e y , ' t he

quant i ty o f m o n e y be ing i n p r o p o r t i o n t o the w h o l e o f t rade ' . M o r e

meta l - and immedia te ly any c o m m o d i t y exist ing in the w o r l d will have

slightly m o r e representat ive elements a t its disposal; m o r e m e r c h a n d i s e -

and each metal l ic uni t wil l be sl ightly m o r e heavi ly m o r t g a g e d . O n e need

on ly take any g iven c o m m o d i t y as a stable reference po in t and this

p h e n o m e n o n of f luctuation is clearly revealed. As Locke says:

T h a t suppos ing whea t a s tanding measure , tha t is, tha t there is constant ly

the same quan t i ty of i t in p r o p o r t i o n to its ven t , we shall find m o n e y

to r u n the same var ie ty of changes in its va lue , as all o the r c o m m o d i t i e s

do . . . T h e reason w h e r e o f is this, that there be ing ten t imes as m u c h

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

silver n o w in t he w o r l d , (the discovery of the West - Indies hav ing

m a d e the p l en ty ) as there was then , it is T̂ O less w o r t h n o w than it was

at tha t t i m e ; that is, i t will exchange for 1% less of any c o m m o d i t y n o w ,

w h i c h bears the same p r o p o r t i o n to its ven t as i t d id 200 years since [45] .

T h e d r o p in the va lue o f precious me ta l invoked here does n o t concern

a certain precious qual i ty w h i c h it is t h o u g h t of as possessing in itself,

b u t its general p o w e r o f representa t ion. M o n e y and w e a l t h are to be

t h o u g h t of as t w i n masses, w h i c h necessarily co r respond w i t h one

ano the r :

As the total of the o n e is to the total of the o ther , so pa r t of the o n e is

t o pa r t o f the o the r . . . I f there w e r e on ly one c o m m o d i t y , divisible

as go ld is, then half of that c o m m o d i t y w o u l d cor respond to hal f of

its total on the o the r side [46].

Suppos ing that there w e r e on ly one f o r m of goods in the w o r l d , all the

gold on ear th w o u l d be there to represent it; and, inversely, i f m e n

possessed on ly o n e coin be tween t h e m , then all the wea l th p r o d u c e d by

na ture or by their o w n hands w o u l d have to share in its subdivisions.

Given these l imi t ing circumstances, if there is an influx of m o n e y - wh i l e

c o m m o d i t i e s r ema in unchanged in quan t i ty - ' t he value of each division

o f the cu r ren t specie wil l d iminish by the same a m o u n t ' ; on the o the r

hand ,

i f indus t ry , the arts and the sciences in t roduce n e w objects in to the

circle o f e x c h a n g e . . . it wil l be necessary t o apply a, portion o f the

signs represent ing values to the n e w value of those new p roduc t ions ;

since this p o r t i o n wil l be taken f r o m the w h o l e mass of signs, i t will

d iminish the relat ive quan t i ty of that mass and increase its representat ive

value by the same a m o u n t in o rde r to cover t he increase in values, its

function be ing to represent t h e m all, in the p ropo r t i ons appropr ia te

to t h e m [47] .

T h e r e can therefore be no fair p r ice : n o t h i n g in any g iven c o m m o d i t y

indicates by any intrinsic character the quan t i ty of m o n e y that should be

paid for it. Cheapness is ne i ther m o r e n o r less exact than dearness. T h o u g h

there do exist rules of conven t ion that m a k e i t possible to fix the quant i ty

of m o n e y by means of w h i c h i t i s desirable to represent weal th . In the

last resort , eve ry th ing exchangeable should have its equivalent - 'its

des ignat ion ' - in specie; a state of affairs that w o u l d entail no d rawbacks

184

E X C H A N G I N G

185

i f the m o n e y used were of paper (which w o u l d be pr in ted or des t royed,

as L a w proposed , in accordance w i t h the needs of exchange) , b u t that

w o u l d be t roub lesome , o r even impossible, i f the m o n e y w e r e metall ic .

N o w , as i t circulates, one and the same m o n e t a r y uni t acquires the p o w e r

to represent several th ings ; w h e n i t changes hands i t is somet imes p a y m e n t

to an en t repreneur for some object, somet imes p a y m e n t to a w o r k e r of

his w a g e , somet imes p a y m e n t to a m e r c h a n t for some c o m m o d i t y , s o m e ­

times p a y m e n t to a farmer for his p r o d u c e , somet imes p a y m e n t to a

l a n d o w n e r of his rent . A single piece of meta l can, in the course of t i m e and

according to the individuals that receive it, represent several equivalent

things (an object , w o r k , a measure of whea t , a p o r t i o n of income) - j u s t

as a c o m m o n n o u n has the p o w e r to represent several things, or a t a x o n o ­

mic character has the p o w e r to represent several individuals, several

species, several genera , etc. B u t whereas the character can cover a larger

general i ty on ly by b e c o m i n g simpler, m o n e y can represent m o r e kinds

of wea l th on ly by circulat ing faster. T h e extension of a character is

defined by the n u m b e r of species i t includes (therefore by the area i t

occupies in the table) ; speed of circulation is defined by the n u m b e r of

hands t h r o u g h w h i c h m o n e y passes d u r i n g the t i m e i t takes to r e tu rn

to its s tar t ing-point (this is w h y p a y m e n t to agr icul ture for the p roduc t s

of its harvest is taken as a first source, because there o n e has absolutely

reliable annual cycles to deal w i t h ) . I t will be seen, therefore, tha t the

speed of m o n e t a r y m o v e m e n t d u r i n g a set t i m e corresponds to the t a x o ­

n o m i c extension of a character w i th in the s imul taneous space of the table.

This speed is l imited in t w o direct ions: an infinitely rap id speed w o u l d

imp ly an immed ia t e exchange in wh ich m o n e y w o u l d have no role t o

play, and an infinitely s low speed w o u l d m e a n that every e lement o f

wea l th possesses its p e r m a n e n t m o n e t a r y doub le . B e t w e e n these t w o

extremes there are var iable speeds to w h i c h the quanti t ies o f m o n e y tha t

m a k e t h e m possible co r respond . N o w , the cycles o f circulat ion are

de te rmined by the year ly occur rence of t he harvests : i t i s possible, t he re ­

fore, g iven the harvests and tak ing in to account the n u m b e r of individuals

mak ing up the popu la t ion of a state, to define t he necessary and sufficient

quant i ty of m o n e y there mus t be i f i t i s to pass t h r o u g h everyone ' s hands

and to represent at least t he means of subsistence to t h e m all. I t is thus

unders tandable h o w , in the e ighteenth cen tury , analyses of the circulat ion

o f m o n e y based u p o n agricul tural revenue w e r e l inked to the p r o b l e m of

popula t ion g r o w t h and to calculation o f the o p t i m u m quan t i ty o f coinage.

A triple quest ion that is posited in a n o r m a t i v e fo rm: for the p r o b l e m is

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

n o t to discover by w h a t mechanisms m o n e y circulates or fails to circulate,

h o w i t is expended or accumula ted (such questions are possible o n l y in

an e c o n o m y that poses p rob l ems o f p roduc t i on o r capital) , b u t w h a t the

necessary quan t i ty of m o n e y is in a g iven c o u n t r y that wil l p r o v i d e a

sufficiently rapid circulat ion and pass t h r o u g h a sufficiently large n u m b e r

of hands . T h u s prices wil l n o t be intrinsically 'fair ' , bu t exact ly regula ted:

the divisions of the m o n e t a r y mass wil l analyse wea l th accord ing to an

ar t iculat ion that wil l be nei ther too loosely n o r t oo t ight ly kni t . T h e ' tab le '

wil l be wel l m a d e .

This o p t i m u m p r o p o r t i o n is n o t t he same w h e t h e r we consider a

c o u n t r y in isolation or the m o v e m e n t of its foreign t rade. I f we suppose

a state capable of l iving on itself, the quan t i ty of m o n e y i t w o u l d be

necessary to p u t in to circulat ion w o u l d depend u p o n several variables:

t he quan t i ty o f merchandise enter ing the exchange system; the po r t i on

of that merchandise wh ich , be ing nei ther dis t r ibuted n o r paid for by

bar ter , m u s t a t s o m e m o m e n t d u r i n g its j o u r n e y be represented by m o n e y ;

the quan t i ty o f meta l for w h i c h signed paper m a y be subst i tuted; and,

finally, the r h y t h m accord ing to w h i c h p a y m e n t s mus t be m a d e : i t i s

no t a ma t t e r of indifference, as Cant i l lon points ou t [48 ] , w h e t h e r worke r s

are pa id by the w e e k or the day, or w h e t h e r rents fall d u e a t the end of

every year ra ther than , as is cus tomary , at the end of every quar ter . Since

the values of these four variables are de te rminab le for any g iven coun t ry ,

the o p t i m u m quan t i ty of coinage for that c o u n t r y can be l ikewise de te r ­

mined . In o rde r to m a k e a calculation of this k ind , Cant i l lon begins w i t h

w h a t is p r o d u c e d by the land, f rom w h i c h all wea l th is direct ly or in ­

direct ly der ived. This p r o d u c t is d iv ided into three revenues in the hands

of the farmer : the r evenue paid to the l a n d o w n e r ; that w h i c h is used for

t he main tenance of t he fa rmer himself and that o f his m e n and horses;

and, lastly, 'a th i rd w h i c h should r emain in o rde r to m a k e his enterprise

prof i table ' [49] . N o w , on ly t he first o f these and r o u g h l y half o f the thi rd

have to be pa id in specie; the rest can be pa id in the f o r m of direct

exchanges o f goods . T a k i n g in to account t he fact that one-ha l f o f the

popu la t ion lives in t o w n s and mus t therefore expend m o r e on upkeep

than do peasants, i t is apparen t that the m o n e t a r y mass in circulation

should be a lmost equal to two- th i rds of p roduc t i on - if, that is, all p a y ­

ments w e r e m a d e once a year ; bu t , in fact, g r o u n d rent falls due every

quar te r ; i t is therefore sufficient if the quan t i ty of co inage is equivalent

t o one-s ix th o f p roduc t i on . M o r e o v e r , m a n y o the r paymen t s are m a d e

daily or week ly ; the quan t i ty of coin requ i red is therefore of the o rde r of

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E X C H A N G I N G

a n in th par t of p ro d u c t i o n - in o the r w o r d s , one- th i rd of the l a n d o w n e r s '

revenue f rom g r o u n d ren t [50] .

B u t this calculation is exact on ly on condi t ion that o u r imag ina ry

na t ion is w h o l l y isolated. N o w , the major i ty of states main ta in a t rade

wi th one ano the r in w h i c h the on ly means o f p a y m e n t are barter , meta l

est imated accord ing to its w e i g h t (and no t in the fo rm of coins w i t h their

nomina l va lue) , and, on occasion, bankers ' drafts. In this case also it is

possible to calculate the relative quan t i ty of m o n e y that i t is desirable to

pu t in to c i rculat ion: h o w e v e r , this est imate should n o t be arr ived a t w i t h

reference to t he p r o d u c t i o n of the land bu t ra ther w i t h reference to a

certain relat ion of wages and prices w i t h those in force in foreign c o u n ­

tries. In fact, in a c o u n t r y w h e r e prices are relatively l o w (because the

quant i ty of m o n e y in circulation is small) , foreign m o n e y is a t t rac ted

by the greater b u y i n g p o w e r i t acquires there : the quan t i ty o f meta l

increases. T h e state, as we say, becomes ' r ich and power fu l ' ; i t is able to

mainta in a f leet and an a r m y , achieve conquests , and enrich itself further .

T h e quan t i ty of coinage in circulat ion causes prices to rise, wh i l e a t the

same t ime affording pr iva te persons t he resources to b u y abroad , w h e r e

prices are l o w e r : little by little, the meta l disappears, and the state becomes

p o o r once again. Such is the cycle that Cant i l lon described and formula ted

into a general pr inc ip le : ' T h e excessive abundance of m o n e y , wh ich makes

the p o w e r of states whi le i t lasts, thrusts t h e m impercept ib ly and natura l ly

back in to i n d i g e n c e ' [ 5 1 ] .

I t w o u l d , no d o u b t , be impossible to avoid these f luc tua t ions did there

no t exist in the o rde r of things a con t r a ry tendency , w h i c h ceaselessly

aggravates the p o v e r t y of nat ions that are a l ready p o o r and, on the o the r

hand , increases the prosper i ty of states that are r ich. For popu la t ion tends

to m o v e in the con t ra ry direct ion to m o n e y . T h e lat ter m o v e s o u t f rom

the prosperous states into the regions w h e r e prices are l o w ; whereas m e n

are at t racted t owards h i g h wages , therefore towards countr ies tha t have

an a b u n d a n t co inage at their disposal. T h e p o o r e r countr ies thus have a

tendency to b e c o m e depopu la ted ; their agr icul ture and industries de te r ­

iorate and p o v e r t y increases. In r ich countr ies , in contrast , the influx of

labour makes possible the exploi ta t ion of n e w wea l th , the sale o f w h i c h

p ropor t iona te ly increases the a m o u n t of meta l in circulation [52] . G o v e r n ­

menta l pol icy should therefore a t t e m p t to c o m e to t e rms w i t h these

t w o con t ra ry m o v e m e n t s o n the pa r t o f popu la t ion and cur rency . T h e

n u m b e r o f inhabitants m u s t g r o w , gradual ly b u t un in te r rupted ly , so tha t

manufac tur ing industries wi l l a lways have an abundance o f w o r k e r s to d r a w

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

o n ; then wages will n o t increase at a greater rate than weal th , no r prices

w i t h t h e m ; and the balance of t rade wil l be able to r emain favourable :

o n e recognizes in all this the foundat ion of the populat ionis t theses [53] .

B u t , on the o the r hand , i t is also necessary that the quan t i ty of specie

should be sl ightly bu t constant ly on the rise: the on ly means of m a k i n g

sure tha t the p roduc ts of the land or of indus t ry wil l be wel l r emune ra t ed ,

tha t wages wil l be sufficient, and that the popu l a t i on wil l no t be p o v e r t y

str icken in the mids t of the wea l th i t is c rea t ing: hence all the measures

in tended to encourage foreign t rade and main ta in a posi t ive balance.

W h a t ensures the equ i l ib r ium of the e c o n o m y , therefore, and prevents

p r o f o u n d f luctuat ions b e t w e e n wea l th and p o v e r t y , is n o t a certain and

definitively acquired e c o n o m i c const i tu t ion, bu t the balanced interact ion -

at once natural and deliberately main ta ined - of t w o tendencies. T h e r e is

p rosper i ty wi th in a state, n o t w h e n coin is plentiful and prices are h igh ,

b u t w h e n the coinage has reached that stage of a u g m e n t a t i o n - w h i c h

mus t be m a d e to con t inue indefinitely - that makes i t possible to mainta in

wages w i t h o u t increasing prices any further: this be ing so, the popu la t ion

g r o w s at a s teady rate, its w o r k constant ly produces m o r e , and, since

each consecut ive increase in the coinage is d iv ided up (in accordance w i t h

the l a w of representat ivi ty) be tween small quanti t ies o f weal th , prices

wil l n o t increase in relat ion to those in force abroad . It is on ly be tween

an increase in the quan t i ty of go ld and a rise in prices that an increasing

quan t i ty of go ld and silver encourages indust ry . A na t ion w h o s e coinage

is in process of d i m i n u t i o n is, a t any g iven m o m e n t of compar i son ,

weake r and p o o r e r than ano the r na t ion w h i c h has no grea&cr possessions

b u t w h o s e coinage is in process of g r o w t h . This is the explanat ion of the

Spanish disaster: its m i n i n g possessions had, in fact, increased the na t ion ' s

co inage - and, consequent ly , prices - to a massive degree , w i t h o u t g iv ing

indus t ry , agr icul ture , and popu la t ion the t ime, be tween cause and effect,

to deve lop p ropor t i ona t e ly : i t was inevitable that Amer ican go ld should

spread t h r o u g h o u t E u r o p e , b u y c o m m o d i t i e s there , cause manufac tu r ing

to deve lop , and enr ich its farms, wh i l e leaving Spain m o r e p o v e r t y

str icken than i t h a d ever been. Eng land , on the o the r hand , t h o u g h i t

a t t rac ted bul l ion t o o , d id so always for the profi t of labour and n o t mere ly

to p r o v i d e its inhabi tants w i t h luxury , that is, in o rde r to increase the

n u m b e r of its w o r k e r s and the quan t i ty of its p roduc t s before any

increase in prices occur red [54.].

Such analyses are i m p o r t a n t because they in t roduce the no t i on of p r o ­

gress in to the o rde r o f h u m a n activi ty. B u t they are still m o r e i m p o r t a n t

188

E X C H A N G I N G

in tha t they p r o v i d e t he interplay of signs a n d representat ions w i t h a

t empora l index that gives progress a definit ion of its condi t ion of possi­

bility. An index n o t to be found in a n y o the r area o f the t h eo ry o f o rde r .

M o n e y , as conceived by Classical t h o u g h t , cannot , in fact, represent

wea l th w i t h o u t that p o w e r be ing modif ied , f r o m wi th in , b y t i m e -

w h e t h e r a spontaneous cycle augmen t s , after hav ing first d iminished, its

capacity for represent ing weal th , o r w h e t h e r g o v e r n m e n t a l pol icy , by

dint of concer ted efforts, keeps its representat ivi ty constant . In the o rde r

of natural his tory, the characters (the g roups of identities selected to r e p ­

resent and distinguish a n u m b e r of species or a n u m b e r of genera) resided

wi th in the con t inuous area of na ture , w h i c h they d iv ided in to a t a x o n o m i c

table; t ime in te rvened on ly f rom w i t h o u t , in o rde r to upset the con t inu i ty

of the ve ry smallest differences and to scatter t h e m in accordance w i t h the

f ragmented localities o f g e o g r a p h y . H e r e , on the con t ra ry , t i m e be longs

to t he inner l a w of the representat ions and is pa r t of it; i t follows and

modifies w i t h o u t in te r rup t ion the p o w e r possessed by wea l th to represent

itself and so analyse itself by means of a m o n e t a r y system. W h e r e na tura l

his tory revealed squares of identities separated by differences, the analysis

of wea l th reveals 'differentials' - tendencies t o w a r d s increase and t o w a r d s

d iminu t ion .

I t was inevi table tha t this funct ion of t i m e wi th in wea l th should b e ­

c o m e apparen t as soon as m o n e y was defined (as i t was at the end of t he

seventeenth cen tu ry ) as a p ledge and assimilated in to credi t : i t t hen b e ­

came necessary that t he dura t ion o f t he credit , t he rapidi ty w i t h w h i c h

r epaymen t fell due , the n u m b e r of hands t h r o u g h w h i c h i t passed in a

given t ime, should b e c o m e characteristic variables of its representat ive

p o w e r . B u t all this was mere ly the consequence of a f o r m of reflection

that placed the m o n e t a r y sign, w i t h relat ion to wea l th , in a pos tu re of

representation in t he full sense of the t e r m . It is, therefore, the same a rchaeo­

logical n e t w o r k that suppor ts t he t heo ry of money-as-representation in the

analysis of wea l th and the t heo ry of character-as-representation in na tura l

history. T h e character designates natural beings by s i tuat ing t h e m in

their su r round ings ; m o n e t a r y price designates wea l th , bu t in the m o v e m e n t

of its g r o w t h or d iminu t ion .

T H E C R E A T I O N O F V A L U E

T h e theo ry o f m o n e y and t rade responds to the ques t ion: h o w , in the

m o v e m e n t of exchange , can prices characterize things - h o w can m o n e y

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

establish a system of signs and designat ion be tween kinds of weal th? T h e

t h eo ry of va lue responds to a ques t ion that intersects this first o n e , a

quest ion that p robes , as i t w e r e vertically a n d in dep th , the hor izonta l

area in w h i c h exchange is cont inuous ly tak ing place: w h y are there th ings

that m e n seek t o exchange ; w h y are some o f t h e m w o r t h m o r e than

others , w h y do some o f t h e m , tha t have no uti l i ty, have a h i g h va lue ,

whereas o thers , t ha t are indispensable, have no value at all? I t is thus no

longer a quest ion of k n o w i n g in accordance w i t h w h a t mechan i sm kinds

of wea l th can represent each o the r (and represent themselves by means of

that universally representat ive wea l th const i tu ted by precious meta l ) , b u t

w h y objects o f desire and need h a v e to be represented, h o w o n e posits

the va lue of a th ing , and w h y o n e can affirm tha t i t i s w o r t h this or

that .

To be w o r t h , for Classical t h o u g h t , i s first of all to be w o r t h some th ing ,

to be substi tutable for tha t t h ing in a process of exchange . M o n e y was

invented , prices w e r e fixed and can modi fy themselves, o n l y in so far as

that process of exchange exists. N o w , exchange is o n l y apparen t ly a

s imple process. In fact, exchange by bar ter is possible o n l y i f each of the

t w o parties concerned recognizes a value in w h a t the o the r possesses. In

o n e sense, therefore, these exchangeable th ings , t oge the r w i t h their pa r ­

t icular values, should exist in advance in the hands of each pa r ty so that

the doub le cession and d o u b l e acquisi t ion can finally take place. But ,

f rom ano the r p o i n t o f v i ew, w h a t each person eats and dr inks , w h a t he

needs in o rde r to l ive, has no value as l ong as he does n o t rel inquish

it; and w h a t he does n o t need is equal ly devo id of value as long as he does

n o t e m p l o y i t to acquire s o m e t h i n g he does need . In o the r w o r d s , in

o rde r that o n e th ing can represent ano the r in an exchange , they mus t b o t h

exist as bearers of va lue ; a n d ye t va lue exists o n l y w i t h i n the representa­

t ion (actual or possible) , tha t is, w i th in t he exchange or t he exchange ­

abili ty. H e n c e t w o s imul taneously possible ways o f cons t ru ing the ma t t e r :

the o n e analyses va lue in t he act of exchange itself, a t the po in t w h e r e the

g iven and the received intersect; the o the r analyses i t as anter ior to the

exchange and as a p r i m a r y cond i t ion w i t h o u t w h i c h tha t exchange cou ld

n o t take place. T h e first o f these t w o readings corresponds to an analysis

that places a n d encloses t he w h o l e essence of l anguage w i th in the p r o p o ­

sit ion; the second cor responds to an analysis tha t reveals this same essence

of l anguage as residing in t he reg ion of p r imi t ive designations ( language

of act ion or roo t s ) ; in the first case, l anguage does, in fact, f ind its field of

possibility in a predica t ion p r o v i d e d by the v e r b - tha t is, by t he e lement

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191

of l anguage tha t i s set apar t f rom all o t h e r w o r d s , yet relates t h e m to o n e

ano the r ; t he v e r b , w h i c h renders all the w o r d s o f l anguage possible on

the basis of their proposi t ional connec t ion , corresponds to t he exchange ,

w h i c h , as an act an teda t ing the o thers , provides a basis for the va lue of the

th ings exchanged and for the pr ice for w h i c h they are re l inquished; in

the o t h e r f o r m of analysis, l anguage is r oo t ed outs ide itself and , as i t

w e r e , in the na tu re or the analogies of th ings ; the roo t , the first c ry tha t

gave rise to w o r d s even before l anguage itself was b o r n , cor responds to

the i m m e d i a t e fo rma t ion o f va lue p r io r to exchange and the reciprocal

measuremen t s o f need .

For g r a m m a r , h o w e v e r , these t w o forms of analysis - based on the

propos i t ion or based on roo ts - are perfectly distinct, because g r a m m a r is

deal ing w i t h l anguage , tha t is, w i t h a sys tem of representat ion requ i red

b o t h to designate and to j u d g e , or again, related to b o t h an object and a

t r u t h . In the e c o n o m i c sphere this dis t inct ion does n o t exist, since, for

desire, the re la t ion to its object and the affirmation that i t is desirable are

one and the same t h i n g ; to designate i t i s a l ready to posit the connec t ion .

So that , whereas g r a m m a r had t w o separate and reciprocal ly adjusted

theoret ical segments at its disposal, f o rming f i rs t of all an analysis of t he

propos i t ion (or the j u d g e m e n t ) , t hen an analysis of designat ion (the

gesture or the r o o t ) , the e c o n o m y k n o w s on ly a single theoret ical s eg ­

m e n t , bu t o n e that i s s imul taneously susceptible of t w o readings m a d e in

con t r a ry direct ions. T h e o n e analyses va lue in t e rms o f t he exchange

of objects of need - of useful objects; t he o the r in t e rms of the fo rma t ion

and or ig in of objects w h o s e exchange wil l later define their va lue - in

t e rms o f na ture ' s p ro l ix i ty . B e t w e e n these t w o possible readings we

recognize a p o i n t of heresy that is by n o w familiar: i t separates w h a t is

t e r m e d the 'psychological t heo ry ' o f Condi l lac , Galiani, and Grasl in,

f rom tha t o f the Physiocrats , w i t h Q u e s n a y and his school. T h e doctr ines

o f the Physiocrats m a y n o t really possess t he i m p o r t a n c e a t t r ibu ted to

t h e m by economis ts o f the early n ine teen th cen tury , w h e n the lat ter

w e r e seeking in t h e m the founda t ion s tone o f poli t ical e c o n o m y ; b u t i t

w o u l d be equal ly va in to a t t r ibu te t he same role - as t he marginal is ts

in fact did - to t he 'psychological school ' . T h e r e are no differences b e ­

t w e e n these t w o m o d e s o f analysis o the r than the po in t o f or igin a n d the

di rect ion chosen to traverse a n e t w o r k of necessity that remains identical

in b o t h .

In o rde r tha t there m a y be values and wea l th , say t he Physiocrats , an

exchange mus t be possible: tha t is, o n e should have at one 's disposal a

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

superfluity that the o the r pa r ty needs. T h e fruit I am h u n g r y for, w h i c h

I p ick and eat, is a commodity presented to me by na tu r e ; there can be

no wealth unless t he fruits on my tree are sufficiently n u m e r o u s to exceed

my appet i te . E v e n then , s o m e o n e else mus t be h u n g r y and requi re those

fruit o f m e . ' T h e air w e brea the , ' says Q u e s n a y , ' t he wa te r w e d r a w f rom

the s t ream, and all the o the r superabundan t g o o d s o r forms of wea l th

c o m m o n to all m e n , are n o t marke t ab l e : t hey are commod i t i e s , n o t

w e a l t h ' [ 5 5 ] . Before exchange , there i s n o t h i n g b u t that rare or abundan t

reali ty p r o v i d e d by na tu re ; d e m a n d on the o n e h a n d and re l inquishment

on t he o the r are a lone capable o f p r o d u c i n g value . N o w , the pu rpose o f

exchange is precisely tha t of d is t r ibut ing w h a t e v e r is in excess in such a

m a n n e r that i t wi l l be passed on to those w h o need it. I t i s therefore

' w e a l t h ' o n l y provis ional ly , d u r i n g the t i m e w h e n , possessed by some

a n d needed by o thers , i t begins and comple tes t he trajectory that wil l

c o n v e y it to the consumers and thus restore i t to its or iginal na tu re as a

c o m m o d i t y . ' T h e a im of exchange , ' says Merc ie r de La Riviere , 'is en ­

j o y m e n t , c o n s u m p t i o n . T r a d e , then, can be s u m m a r i z e d as the exchange

of eve ryday th ings in o rde r to achieve their d is t r ibut ion in to the hands

o f their consumers ' [56] . N o w , this cons t i tu t ion o f va lue by means o f

t r ade [57] canno t be achieved w i t h o u t a subt rac t ion of g o o d s : t rade , in

fact, t ransports goods , and entails car tage, s torage, processing, and selling

costs[58]: in shor t , it costs a certain c o n s u m p t i o n o£ goods for the goods

themselves to be conver t ed in to wealth. T h e o n l y sort of t rade that w o u l d

cost n o t h i n g w o u l d be s imple bar ter , since in that case the goods are

wea l th and have v a l u e o n l y for the br ief instant d u r i n g w h i c h / h e exchange

i s m a d e : ' I f the exchange could be m a d e immedia te ly and w i t h o u t cost,

i t cou ld be on ly the m o r e advan tageous to the t w o exchangers : i t i s

therefore a g r ievous mis take to take for t rade itself those in te rmedia ry

opera t ions that serve as the means of t r a d e ' [ 5 9 ] . T h e Physiocrats a l low

themselves to posi t on ly the mater ia l reality of goods , w h i c h means that

the fo rma t ion of va lue in exchange becomes a process costly in itself

and m u s t be debi ted against existing goods . T h e creat ion of va lue i s

therefore n o t a means of satisfying a greater n u m b e r of needs ; i t is the

sacrifice of a certain quan t i t y of goods in o rde r to exchange others .

Values thus f o r m the negat ive o f g o o d s .

B u t h o w is i t tha t va lue can be fo rmed in this w a y ? W h a t is the or ig in

of this excess tha t makes i t possible for goods to be t ransformed in to

wea l th w i t h o u t be ing effaced and finally disappearing a l together as a

result of successive exchanges and cont inual circulation? H o w is i t that

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the cost of this con t inuous creat ion of value does no t exhaust the goods

that m e n have a t their disposal?

Is it that t rade is able to fmd this necessary supp lemen t in itself? Cer ta in ly

no t , since its a i m is to exchange value for value in accordance w i t h the

greatest possible equali ty. ' In o rde r to receive m u c h , o n e mus t give m u c h ;

and in o rde r to give m u c h , one mus t receive m u c h . T h a t i s the w h o l e ar t

o f t rade. T r a d e , by its v e r y na tu re , exchanges toge ther on ly th ings of

equal va lue ' [60] . It is t rue that a c o m m o d i t y taken to a distant m a r k e t

can be exchanged for a pr ice h igher than that w h i c h i t w o u l d c o m m a n d

in its place of or ig in ; bu t this increase corresponds to the real expense of

t ranspor t ing it; and the on ly reason i t does no t lose any th ing because of

this fact is that the s ta t ionary merchandise for w h i c h it is exchanged loses

those freightage charges ou t o f its o w n pr ice . O n e m a y haul one 's m e r ­

chandise f rom one end of the w o r l d to the o ther , bu t the cost of its

exchange is a lways levied on the goods exchanged . I t is n o t t rade that

has p roduced the superfluity of g o o d s : the excess mus t a l ready have existed

in o rde r for t rade to be possible.

N o r i s indus t ry capable of compensa t ing for the cost of the creat ion of

value. In fact, manufac tured produc ts m a y be sold in accordance w i t h

t w o different systems. I f prices are free, compe t i t i on tends to lower t h e m

to t he po in t w h e r e , apar t f rom the cost o f the r a w materials , they cover

n o m o r e than the w o r k o f the w o r k e r w h o m a d e the p r o d u c t ; accord ing

to Cant i l lon 's definition, this w a g e corresponds to the w o r k e r ' s subsis­

tence du r ing the t ime he takes to do the w o r k ; and doubtless one should

also add the subsistence and profits of the en t repreneur ; bu t in any case,

the increase in va lue due to the manufac tu r ing process represents the c o n ­

sumpt ion of those w h o m i t r emunera tes ; so that in o rde r to p r o d u c e

weal th i t has been necessary to sacrifice some g o o d s : ' T h e artisan destroys

as m u c h in subsistence as he produces by his w o r k ' [ 6 1 ] . W h e n prices are

control led by a m o n o p o l y , the selling price of objects can rise considerably.

B u t this does n o t m e a n that the l abour of the w o r k e r s wil l be bet ter

r emunera t ed : the compe t i t ion existing be tween t h e m tends to mainta in

their wages at the level that is j u s t indispensable for their subsistence[62];

as for the profits of the ent repreneurs , i t is t rue that monopol i s t i c prices

increase t h e m to the degree that the value of the objects p u t on the m a r k e t

is increased; b u t this increase is mere ly the p ropor t i ona l d r o p in the

exchange value of o the r merchandise : 'All these ent repreneurs m a k e

fortunes on ly because others incur expenses ' [63] . Indust ry appears to in­

crease values; in fact, i t deducts the cost of one or several subsistences f rom

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t he exchange itself. Value is created, or increased, n o t by p r o d u c t i o n , bu t

by c o n s u m p t i o n - w h e t h e r i t be that of the w o r k e r in o rde r to subsist,

tha t o f the en t repreneur tak ing his profi t , o r that o f the n o n - w o r k e r

w h o buys . ' T h e increase in m a r k e t value w h i c h is d u e to the sterile class

is the effect of t he w o r k e r ' s expend i tu re , n o t of his w o r k . For the idle

m a n w h o expends w i t h o u t w o r k i n g p roduces the same effect in this

respect ' [64]. Va lue arises on ly w h e r e goods have disappeared; and w o r k

functions as an expend i tu r e : i t turns the subsistence w h i c h it has itself

c o n s u m e d in to a pr ice.

This i s even t rue o f agricul tural w o r k . T h e status o f the w o r k e r w h o

p loughs i s in no w a y different f rom that o f the w o r k e r w h o weaves or

carts; he is on ly o n e o f ' t h e tools of w o r k or cu l t iva t ion ' [65] - a too l that

requires a subsistence, and deducts i t f rom w h a t t he land produces . As

in all t he o the r cases, t he r e m u n e r a t i o n of agricul tural l abour tends to

regula te itself so as to p r o v i d e that subsistence exact ly. Y e t agr icul tural

l abour does possess one privi lege, n o t an e c o n o m i c one , in the system of

exchanges , b u t a physical one , in the sphere of the p roduc t i on of g o o d s :

the land, w h e n w o r k e d , provides a possible quan t i ty of subsistence m u c h

greater than tha t actually needed by the labourer w h o w o r k s it. As r e ­

m u n e r a t e d w o r k , therefore, the agricul tural w o r k e r ' s l abour is j u s t as

negat ive and wasteful as tha t of factory w o r k e r s ; bu t , as 'physical c o m ­

merce ' w i t h na tu re [66], i t i s the source of an i m m e n s e fecundity. A n d

t h o u g h it is t rue that this lavishness is r e m u n e r a t e d in advance by the

costs o f p lough ing , sowing , and an imal fodder, eve ryone k n o w s that

w h e r e y o u s o w a grain of w h e a t y o u reap an ear; and that he jds and f locks

g r o w fatter every day even whi le they rest, w h i c h cannot be said of a

bale of silk or w o o l in s to rage ' [67] . Agr icu l tu re is the on ly sphere in w h i c h

the increase in va lue due to p roduc t i on is n o t equivalent to the m a i n ­

tenance of the p roduce r . This is because there is really an invisible p r o ­

ducer w h o does n o t require any r e m u n e r a t i o n ; i t i s w i t h h i m that the

farmer is, w i t h o u t k n o w i n g it, in par tnersh ip ; a n d whi l e t he labourer

consumes an a m o u n t equal to his w o r k , that same w o r k , by v i r tue of the

labourer ' s C o - A u t h o r , p roduces all the goods f r o m w h i c h the creat ion

of values wil l be deduc ted : 'Agr icu l tu re is a manufac tu re of d ivine in­

s t i tut ion in w h i c h the manufac ture r has as his par tner the A u t h o r of

na ture , the P r o d u c e r of all goods and all wea l th ' [68 ] .

I t is unders tandable , therefore, w h y the Physiocrats accorded such

theoretical and practical impor t ance to g r o u n d r en t - and n o t to agr icul ­

tural labour . This is because the latter is r emunera t ed by consumpt ion ,

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E X C H A N G I N G

whereas g r o u n d rent represents, o r o u g h t to represent , the net p r o d u c t :

the quan t i ty o f goods p rov ided by na tu re over and a b o v e the subsistence

i t yields to the w o r k e r and the r emune ra t i on i t demands for itself in o rde r

to go on p roduc ing . I t i s this rent t ha t permi t s the t ransformat ion of goods

in to values or in to wea l th . I t p rovides the r emunera t ion for all o the r kinds

o f w o r k and all the c o n s u m p t i o n co r respond ing to t h e m . H en ce t w o

major concerns : to have a large quant i ty of specie at one 's disposal, so

that labour , t rade , a n d indus t ry can be adequate ly supplied w i t h it; and

to see to i t tha t absolute p ro tec t ion is g iven to tha t par t of the w o r k i n g

capital tha t m u s t r e tu rn to the land in o rde r to a l low i t to go on p r o d u c i n g .

T h e Physiocrats ' e c o n o m i c and political p r o g r a m m e m u s t therefore i n ­

c lude : an increase in agricul tural prices, b u t n o t in the wages of those w h o

w o r k the land; the levying of all taxes on g r o u n d rent itself; the abol i t ion

of monopo l i s t i c prices and all t rade preferences (so that indus t ry and

t rade , regula ted by compe t i t i on , wil l be forced to main ta in fair pr ices) ;

a vast re inves tment of m o n e y in the land for the advances necessary for

future p roduc t i on .

T h e w h o l e system o f exchanges , t he w h o l e costly creat ion o f values,

is referred back to the unbalanced, radical, a n d p r imi t ive exchange

established be tween the advances m a d e by the l a n d o w n e r and the g e n e r ­

osity of na tu re . This exchange a lone is absolutely profi table, a n d i t is

f r o m wi th in this ne t prof i t that deduct ions of goods can be m a d e to cover

the costs necessitated by each exchange , and thus by the appearance of

each n e w e lement o f wea l th . I t w o u l d be u n t r u e to say tha t na tu re s p o n ­

taneously p roduces values ; b u t i t i s the inexhaust ible source of the goods

that exchange t ransforms in to values, t h o u g h n o t w i t h o u t expend i tu re

and consumpt ion . Q u e s n a y and his disciples analyse wea l th on the basis

of w h a t is g iven in exchange - that is, on the basis of the superfluity that

exists w i t h o u t any value, b u t that becomes value by tak ing pa r t in a

circuit of subst i tut ions, in w h i c h i t m u s t r e m u n e r a t e each of its m o v e m e n t s ,

each of its t ransformat ions , w i t h wages , food, and subsistence, in short ,

w i t h a par t of that surplus of w h i c h it is itself a par t . T h e Physiocrats

begin their analysis w i t h t he th ing itself w h i c h is designated in va lue ,

bu t w h i c h exists p r io r to the system of wea l th . T h e same i s t rue o f g r a m ­

marians w h e n t h e y analyse w o r d s on the basis o f their roots , o f t he i m ­

media te relat ion that unites a sound and a th ing , and of the successive

abstractions by means of w h i c h tha t r o o t becomes a n a m e in a l anguage .

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

V I U T I L I T Y

T h e analysis of Condi l lac , Galiani, Graslin, and Des tu t t corresponds to

the g rammat ica l t heo ry of the propos i t ion . I t selects as its p o i n t of depar ­

ture , n o t w h a t is g iven in an exchange , bu t w h a t is received: the same

th ing , in fact, b u t seen f rom the p o i n t o f v i e w of the person w h o needs

it, w h o wants it, and w h o agrees to give up w h a t he possesses in o rde r to

obta in this o ther t h ing w h i c h in his es t imat ion is m o r e useful and to

w h i c h he attaches greater va lue . T h e Physiocrats and their opponen t s are

in fact t ravers ing the same theoretical segment , b u t in opposi te direct ions:

the fo rmer are asking themselves on w h a t condi t ion - and at w h a t cost -

an article can b e c o m e a value in a system of exchanges ; the latter, on w h a t

condi t ion a j u d g e m e n t of appraisal can be t ransformed in to a pr ice in

that same system of exchanges. I t is unders tandable , then , w h y the analyses

of the Physiocrats and those of the utilitarians are often so close, and s o m e ­

times c o m p l e m e n t a r y ; w h y Cant i l lon could be c la imed by the fo rmer

- for his t h e o r y of the three fundamenta l revenues and the impor t ance he

gives to land - as wel l as by the latter - for his analysis of circulat ion and

the role he gives to m o n e y [69]; w h y T u r g o t was able to be faithful to

Physiocrat doc t r ine in Reflexions sur la formation et la distribution des

richesses, and ye t v e r y close to Galiani in Valeur et monnaie.

Let us imag ine the mos t rud imen ta ry of all exchange si tuations: a m a n

w h o has n o t h i n g b u t co rn o r whea t confronted w i t h ano the r w h o has

n o t h i n g bu t w i n e or w o o d . As yet, there i s no fixed price, no equivalence,

no c o m m o n measure . Ye t i f these m e n have g o n e to the t roub le to collect

the w o o d , to s o w and harvest the corn o r the whea t , i t i s b e c a u s e they

have passed a certain j u d g e m e n t on these th ings ; w i t h o u t hav ing to c o m ­

pare i t w i t h any th ing else, they j u d g e d that this w h e a t or that w o o d was

able to satisfy o n e of their n e e d s - t h a t i t w o u l d be useful to t h e m : ' T o

say that a t h ing has value is to say that it is, or tha t we esteem it, g o o d for

some use. T h e value of th ings is thus founded on their uti l i ty, or , w h a t

a m o u n t s to the same th ing , on the use we can m a k e o f t h e m ' [ 7 0 ] . This

j u d g e m e n t i s the foundat ion of w h a t T u r g o t t e rms the 'es t imative va lue '

of th ings [ 7 1 ] . A value that is absolute, since i t concerns each c o m m o d i t y

individual ly and w i t h o u t its be ing c o m p a r e d w i t h any o the r ; ye t i t is

also relative and chang ing , since it is modif ied in accordance w i t h men ' s

appet i te , desires, and need.

H o w e v e r , the exchange achieved u p o n the basis o f these p r i m a r y

utilities is n o t their s imple reduc t ion to a c o m m o n d e n o m i n a t o r . It is

196

E X C H A N G I N G

197

in itself a c rea tor of uti l i ty, since it presents for the appraisal of o n e pa r ty

w h a t unti l t hen had possessed on ly slight util i ty for the o ther . At this

po in t , three possibilities exist. I t m a y be that the 'surplus of each ' , as

Condi l l ac [72] puts i t - tha t w h i c h he has no t utilized or does n o t expec t

to utilize immedia te ly - corresponds in qual i ty and in quant i ty to t he

needs of the o the r : the w h o l e surplus of the w h e a t - o w n e r is revealed, in

the exchange si tuat ion, as be ing useful to the w i n e - o w n e r , and vice versa;

in this case, w h a t was useless becomes totally useful, t h r o u g h a creat ion

of s imul taneous and equal values on each side; w h a t was es t imated as

null by the o n e becomes posi t ive in the est imat ion of the o the r ; a n d since

the si tuation is symmet r ica l , the est imative values thus created are a u t o ­

matically equivalent ; ut i l i ty and price cor respond exactly, w i t h no resi­

d u u m ; the appraisal adjusting itself au tomat ica l ly to the est imate. Or i t

m a y be that the surplus of the one pa r ty is n o t sufficient for the needs of

the o ther , and that the latter will refrain f rom g iv ing all tha t he possesses;

he wil l keep s o m e par t of i t in o rde r to ob ta in f rom a thi rd p a r t y t he

addi t ional quan t i ty indispensable to his need ; this deduc ted p o r t i o n -

w h i c h the second pa r ty wil l t ry to reduce to a m i n i m u m , since he needs

all the first's surplus - gives rise to pr ice : i t is no longer an excess of w h e a t

that is be ing exchanged for an excess of w ine , bu t , as the result of an

al tercation, so m a n y hogsheads of w i n e for so m a n y bushels o f w h e a t .

Shall we say, then , that the pa r ty w h o gives the mos t i s losing s o m e of

the value of w h a t he possessed in this exchange? N o t at all, for the surplus

is of no use to h i m , or at all events, since he has agreed to exchange it,

he mus t be accord ing a greater va lue to w h a t he receives than to w h a t he

relinquishes. Or i t m a y be, and this is the th i rd hypothesis , tha t there is

no th ing absolutely superfluous to ei ther par ty , since each of t h e m k n o w s

that he can use, sooner or later, t he total i ty of w h a t he possesses: the state

of need i s therefore general , and every i t e m of goods o w n e d becomes

wea l th . In this case, the t w o parties m a y v e r y wel l exchange n o t h i n g a t

all; b u t equal ly , each one of t h e m m a y calculate that a po r t i on of t he

o ther ' s c o m m o d i t y w o u l d be m o r e useful to h i m than a po r t i on of his

o w n . T h e y b o t h establish - bu t each for himself, and therefore in acco rd ­

ance w i t h differing calculations - a m i n i m u m inequal i ty : so m a n y

measures of the co rn I do no t have , one of t h e m says, wil l be w o r t h a

little m o r e to me than so m a n y measures o f my w o o d ; such and such a

quan t i ty o f w o o d , says the other , wil l be m o r e valuable to me than such

and such a quan t i ty of corn . These t w o est imative inequalities define

for each pa r ty the relative value he gives to w h a t he possesses and to w h a t

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

the first, in the o the r . T h e 'ut i l i tarians ' base their attribution of a certain

value to th ings u p o n the articulation of exchanges ; the Physiocrats explain

the progress ive patterning of values by the existence of weal th . B u t in b o t h

in terpreta t ions the t h e o r y of value, like that of structure in na tura l his tory,

links the m o m e n t of attribution and that ofarticulation.

Perhaps i t w o u l d have been s impler to say that the Physiocrats r e p ­

resented the l andowner s and the 'ut i l i tarians ' the merchan t s a n d e n t r e ­

preneurs . T h a t the latter, in consequence , believed tha t the va lue of w h a t

the land p r o d u c e d was increased w h e n i t was t ransformed or t ranspor ted ;

that t hey w e r e p reoccupied , by force of c i rcumstance , w i t h a m a r k e t

e c o n o m y in w h i c h needs a n d desires created the laws. A n d tha t the Phys io ­

crats, on the o the r hand , believed on ly in agricul tural p r o d u c t i o n , and

c la imed that its r e m u n e r a t i o n should be h igher ; that , be ing l andowners ,

they a t t r ibu ted a na tura l basis to g r o u n d rent , and that , since they w e r e

c la iming polit ical p o w e r , they wan ted to be t he o n l y ones subject to

taxa t ion , and thus in exclusive en joymen t of the r ights taxat ion conferred.

A n d the re i s no d o u b t that the b road e c o n o m i c choices of b o t h sides can

be perceived b e y o n d their coherence o f interests. B u t t h o u g h m e m b e r ­

ship of a social g r o u p can a lways explain w h y such and such a person chose

one system of t h o u g h t ra ther than another , the condi t ion enabl ing that

sys tem to be t h o u g h t neve r resides in the existence o f the g r o u p . We

mus t be careful to dist inguish here be tween t w o forms and t w o levels o f

invest igat ion. T h e first w o u l d be a s tudy of op in ions in o rde r to discover

w h o in the e igh teen th cen tu ry was a Physiocra t and w h o an An t iphys io -

crat ; w h a t interests w e r e a t s take; w h a t w e r e the points and a rgumen t s

o f the p o l e m i c ; h o w the s t ruggle for p o w e r deve loped . The o ther , w h i c h

takes no accoun t of the persons involved , or their his tory, consists in

defining the condi t ions on the basis of w h i c h i t was possible to conceive

o f b o t h 'phys iocra t ic ' and 'ut i l i tarian' k n o w l e d g e in in te r lock ing and

s imul taneous forms. T h e first analysis w o u l d be the p rov ince of a d o x -

o logy . A r c h a e o l o g y can recognize and practise on ly the second.

V I I G E N E R A L T A B L E

T h e genera l organiza t ion o f the empir ical spheres can n o w be sketched

o u t as a w h o l e , (see p. 2 0 1 ) .

T h e first t h ing we observe is that analysis of wealth obeys the same con ­

f igura t ion as natural history and general grammar. T h e t h eo ry of va lue

makes i t possible, in fact, to explain (whe the r by dear th and need or by

200

Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

GG: General grammar NH: Natural history AW: Analysis ol wealth

Nineteenth Century

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

202

the superabundance o f na tu re ) h o w certain objects can be in t roduced in to

the system of exchanges , h o w , by means o f the pr imi t ive process o f bar ter ,

o n e th ing can be posi ted as the equivalent o f another , h o w the est imate

of t he first can be related to the est imate of t he second in accordance w i t h

a relat ion of equal i ty (A a n d B have the same value) or o n e of ana logy

(the va lue o f A , possessed by my counte rpar t , i s t o my need w h a t the

value of B, w h i c h I possess, i s to h i m ) . Value corresponds , then, to the

a t t r ibut ive function w h i c h , (or general grammar, is pe r fo rmed by the ve rb ,

and w h i c h , g iv ing rise to t he propos i t ion , consti tutes the initial threshold

b e y o n d w h i c h there i s l anguage . B u t w h e n appreciat ive value becomes

est imative va lue , that is, w h e n i t is defined and l imited wi th in the system

const i tu ted by all possible exchanges , then each value finds itself posi t ioned

and pa t te rned by all the o thers : w h e n this happens , value assumes the

ar t iculatory ro le recognized by general grammar in all the non-verba l

e lements of the p ropos i t ion (that is, in nouns , and in all w o r d s that ,

w h e t h e r visibly or in secret, conta in a n o m i n a l funct ion) . In the system of

exchanges , in the interplay that pe rmi t s each po r t i on of wea l th to signify

the o thers or to be signified by t h e m , value is at the same t ime verb and

noun, p o w e r to connec t and principle of analysis, a t t r ibu t ion , and pa t te rn .

Value, then, occupies exactly the same posi t ion in the analysis of weal th as

structure does in na tura l h is tory; like s t ructure , i t unites in o n e and the same

opera t ion the function that permi t s the a t t r ibu t ion of o n e sign to ano the r

sign, o f o n e representa t ion to ano ther , and the function that permi t s the

ar t iculat ion of t he elements that c o m p o s e the total i ty o f representat ions

or the signs that d e c o m p o s e t h e m . *

For its par t , the t heo ry o f m o n e y and t rade expiai^s h o w any given

f o r m of ma t t e r can take on a signifying function by be ing related to an

object and serving as a p e r m a n e n t sign for i t ; it also explains (by the

in teract ion o f t r ade and the increase and d i m i n u t i o n o f the quan t i ty o f

specie) h o w this relat ion of sign to the th ing signified can be modif ied

w i t h o u t ever disappear ing, h o w the same m o n e t a r y e lement can signify

m o r e or less wea l th , h o w i t can shift, dilate, and shrink in relat ion to the

values i t has the task of represent ing. T h e t heo ry of m o n e t a r y prices

corresponds , therefore , to w h a t in general grammar appears in the f o r m of

an analysis of roo ts and of the language of act ion (the funct ion of desig­

nation) and to w h a t appears in the f o r m of t ropes and shifts of m e a n i n g

(the funct ion o£ derivation). M o n e y , like w o r d s , has the role of designat ing,

ye t neve r ceases to f luc tuate a r o u n d that vertical axis: var iat ions of pr ice

are to the initial es tabl ishment of the relation be tween meta l and weal th

E X C H A N G I N G

w h a t rhetor ical displacements are to the original value of verbal signs

M o r e o v e r , by ensur ing, on the basis of its o w n possibilities, the designa­

t ion of weal th , the establishment o f prices, the modif icat ion of n o m i n a l

values, and the impove r i shmen t and en r i chmen t o f nat ions, m o n e y func­

tions in relat ion to wea l th in the same w a y as character does in relation to

natural be ings : i t makes i t possible b o t h to impose a part icular m a r k

u p o n it a n d to indicate a place for it - no d o u b t a provisional o n e - in

the area actually defined by the total i ty of things and of the signs a t one 's

disposal. T h e theo ry of m o n e y and prices occupies the same posi t ion in

the analysis of wea l th as the theo ry of character does in natural his tory.

Like the latter, i t unites in to o n e and the same function the possibility

of g iv ing things a sign, of represent ing one th ing by another , and the

possibility of causing a sign to shift in relat ion to w h a t it designates.

T h e four functions that define the verbal sign in its part icular proper t ies ,

and dist inguish i t f rom all o the r signs that representat ion can p rov ide for

itself, are thus to be found in the theoretical signalization of natural h is tory

a n d in the practical uti l ization o f m o n e t a r y signs. T h e o rde r o f wea l th and

the o rde r of natural beings are established a n d revealed in so far as there

are established be tween objects of need, and be tween visible individuals,

systems of signs w h i c h m a k e possible the designat ion of representat ions

o n e by ano the r , the der ivat ion of signifying representat ions in relat ion to

those signified, the art iculat ion of w h a t is represented, and the a t t r ibu t ion

of certain representat ions to certain others . In this sense, i t can be said

that , for Classical t h o u g h t , systems of na tura l h is tory a n d theories of

m o n e y or t rade have the same condi t ions of possibility as language itself.

This means t w o th ings : first, tha t o rde r in na tu re and o rde r in the d o m a i n

of wea l th have the same m o d e of be ing, for the Classical exper ience, as

the o rde r of representat ions as manifested by w o r d s ; second, that w o r d s

f o r m a system of signs sufficiently pr ivi leged, w h e n it is a quest ion of

reveal ing the o rde r of things, for na tura l h is tory - if it is wel l organized -

and m o n e y - if i t is wel l regula ted - to funct ion in the same w a y as l an ­

guage . W h a t algebra is to mathesis, signs, and words in part icular , are to

taxinomia: a const i tu t ion and evident manifestat ion of the o rde r of things.

T h e r e does exist, h o w e v e r , a ma jo r difference that prevents classifica­

t ion f rom be ing the spontaneous language of na tu re and prices f rom be ing

the na tura l discourse o f weal th . Or ra ther there exist t w o differences: o n e

makes i t possible to distinguish the domains of verbal signs f rom that

of wea l th or that of na tura l beings; the o the r makes i t possible to dist in­

guish the theo ry of natural his tory f r o m that o f value or prices.

203

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

T h e four m o m e n t s that define the essential functions of l anguage

(at t r ibut ion, ar t iculat ion, designat ion, der iva t ion) are solidly l inked to

one another , since they requi re one ano the r as soon as, w i t h the adven t

of the ve rb , o n e has crossed the threshold b e y o n d w h i c h l anguage exists.

B u t in the real genesis of actual languages, the process does n o t take place

either in the same direct ion or w i t h the same r i gou r : on the basis of

p r imi t ive designations, men ' s imaginat ions (according to the climates

they live in, the condi t ions of their existence, their feelings and their

passions, their experiences) g ive rise to derivat ions w h i c h differ f r o m

people to people , a n d wh ich doubtless explain, in addi t jon to the diversi ty

o f languages, the relative instability o f each o f t h e m . At any g iven m o m e n t

of this der ivat ion, and wi th in any part icular l anguage , m e n have a t their

disposal a total i ty o f w o r d s , o f names w h i c h a re ar t iculated o n e u p o n

ano ther and p rov ide the pa t t e rn of their representat ions; b u t this analysis

is so imperfect , i t a l lows so m a n y imprecisions and over lappings to pe r ­

sist, that m e n e m p l o y various w o r d s and fo rmula te different propos i t ions

w i t h the same representa t ions: their reflection is n o t w h o l l y p ro tec ted

against er ror . B e t w e e n designat ion and der ivat ion, shifts of the imag ina ­

t ion mul t ip ly ; be tween art iculat ion and a t t r ibut ion , errors of reflection

proliferate. This i s w h y , on t he perhaps endlessly pos tponed ho r i zon of

language , there is projected the idea of a universal l anguage in w h i c h the

representat ive va lue of w o r d s w o u l d be sufficiently clearly fixed, suffi­

ciently securely based, sufficiently clearly recognized for reflection to be

able to c o m e to a decision w i t h total clari ty a b o u t a n y p ropos i t ion

w h a t e v e r - by means of this l anguage 'peasants could be t te r j u d g e of

the t ru th of th ings than phi losophers n o w d o ' [ 7 8 ] ; a perfectly distinct

l anguage w o u l d m a k e possible an entirely clear discourse: this l anguage

w o u l d be an Ars combinatoria in itself. It is also w h y the pract ice of any

real language should be reinforced by an Encyclopaedia w h i c h defines the

progress of w o r d s , prescribes the mos t natural routes for t h e m to take,

traces o u t the legi t imate shifts of k n o w l e d g e , and codifies the re la t ion­

ships of adjacency and resemblance. T h e Dic t iona ry is created as a means

of cont ro l l ing the play of derivat ions on the basis o f the p r i m a r y designa­

t ion of w o r d s , j u s t as the Universa l Language is created in o rde r to

con t ro l the errors of reflection - w h e n it is fo rmula t ing a j u d g e m e n t -

on the basis of a well-established ar t iculat ion. T h e Ars combinatoria and

the Encyclopaedia toge ther compensa te for the imperfect ion of real

languages .

Na tu ra l his tory, since i t mus t of necessity be a science, and the circulat ion

204

E X C H A N G I N G

of weal th , since i t is an inst i tut ion created by m e n and also cont ro l led

by t h e m , are b o u n d to escape the perils inherent in spontaneous languages .

T h e r e i s no e r ro r possible b e t w e e n ar t iculat ion a n d a t t r ibu t ion in the

o rde r of na tura l h is tory , since the s t ructure is g iven in its i m m e d i a t e

visibil i ty; no imag ina ry shifts ei ther, no false resemblances, no i n c o n g r u ­

ous jux tapos i t ions p lac ing a correct ly designated natural be ing in a space

n o t its o w n , since character is established ei ther by the coherence of the

sys tem or by the exactness of the m e t h o d . In na tura l his tory, s t ruc ture

a n d character ensure the theoret ical closing of w h a t remains o p e n in

l anguage and gives rise on its frontiers to the projects of essentially u n ­

comple t ed arts . Similarly, value, w h i c h automat ica l ly changes f r o m be ing

est imative t o be ing appreciat ive, and m o n e y , w h i c h by g r o w t h o r d i m i n u ­

t ion of its quan t i ty causes yet a lways limits f luctuat ions of prices, ensure

in the sphere of wea l th the cong ru i t y of a t t r ibu t ion and art iculat ion, and

that of designat ion and der ivat ion. Value and prices ensure the vir tual

closing of those segments tha t r ema in open in l anguage . S t ruc ture enables

na tura l h i s tory to find itself immed ia t e ly in the e lement of a combina t i on ,

a n d character a l lows i t to establish an exact a n d definit ive poetics w i t h

regard to beings and their resemblances. Va lue combines the forms of

wea l th o n e w i t h ano ther , m o n e y permi ts their real exchange . W h e r e the

d isordered o rde r o f l anguage implies the con t inuous re la t ion to an ar t and

its endless tasks, the orders of na tu re and wea l th are expressed in the m e r e

existence o f s t ruc ture and character , value and m o n e y .

It should be no ted , h o w e v e r , that the natural o rde r is fo rmula ted in a

t heo ry that has value as the correct in terpre ta t ion of a real series or table :

m o r e o v e r , the s t ructure of beings i s b o t h the immed ia t e f o r m of the

visible and its ar t icula t ion; similarly, character designates and localizes in

o n e and the same m o v e m e n t . On the o the r hand , est imative va lue b e ­

comes appreciat ive on ly by means of a t rans format ion ; and the initial

re la t ion be tween meta l and merchandise becomes on ly gradual ly a pr ice

subject to variat ions. In the first case, there is an exact super impos i t ion

of a t t r ibu t ion and ar t iculat ion, designat ion and der iva t ion ; in the second,

a t ransi t ion l inked to the na tu re of things and to h u m a n activi ty. W i t h

language , the system of signs is passively accepted in its imperfec t ion , and

o n l y an ar t can rectify i t : the t heo ry of l anguage is immedia te ly p r e ­

scriptive. N a t u r a l h is tory establishes of itself a system of signs for d e n o t i n g

beings, and tha t is w h y it is a theory . W e a l t h is a system of signs tha t are

created, mul t ip l ied , and modif ied by m e n ; the theo ry of wea l th i s l inked

t h r o u g h o u t to politics.

205

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

H o w e v e r , t he o the r t w o sides o f the fundamenta l quadri lateral r emain

open . H o w can designat ion (a single, precise act) m a k e possible an ar t icu­

lat ion o f na tu re , wea l th , and representat ions? H o w , general ly speaking,

can the t w o oppos i te segments (those of j u d g e m e n t a n d signification for

l anguage , of s t ruc ture and character for na tura l h is tory , of va lue and prices

for the t heo ry of wea l th ) relate to each o the r in such a w a y as to m a k e

possible a language , a sys tem of na ture , and the un in t e r rup t ed f low of

weal th? It is here that i t becomes really necessary to suppose tha t r e p ­

resentations resemble one ano the r and suggest o n e ano the r in the imag ina ­

t ion ; that na tura l beings are in relations of adjacency and resemblance to

one ano ther ; a n d tha t m e n ' s needs cor respond to o n e ano the r and are

capable o f satisfaction. T h e in te rconnec t ion o f representat ions, the u n ­

b r o k e n expanse of beings , and the prol iferat ion of na tu re are still r e ­

qui red if there is to be l anguage , if there is to be a natural h is tory , and if

i t i s to be possible for there to be wea l th and use of wea l th . T h e c o n t i n u u m

of representa t ion and be ing , an o n t o l o g y defined negat ive ly as an absence

of noth ingness , a general representabi l i ty of be ing , and be ing as expressed

in the , presence of representa t ion - all this is inc luded in the total c o n ­

figurat ion of the Classical epistcme. O n e can see in this pr inciple of c o n ­

t inui ty the metaphysical ly s t rong m o m e n t o f seventeenth- and e igh teen th -

cen tu ry t h o u g h t (that w h i c h enables the fo rm of the p ropos i t ion to h a v e

an effective m e a n i n g , s t ruc ture to be o rde red as character , and the va lue

of th ings to be calculated as pr ices) ; whereas the relations be tween ar t icu­

lation a n d a t t r ibu t ion , designat ion and der iva t ion (that w h i c h prov ides

a foundat ion for j u d g e m e n t on the o n e hand and for m e a n / h g on the

o ther , s t ruc ture and character , value and prices) def ine the scientifically

s t rong m o m e n t o f that t h o u g h t (that w h i c h makes possible g r a m m a r ,

na tura l h is tory , and the science o f wea l t h ) . T h e o rde r ing o f empir ic i ty

is thus l inked to the o n t o l o g y that characterizes Classical t h o u g h t ; indeed,

f r o m the v e r y outset , this t h o u g h t exists w i th in an o n t o l o g y rendered

t ransparent by the fact that be ing is offered to representa t ion w i t h o u t

in te r rup t ion ; and w i th in a representat ion i l luminated by the fact that i t

releases the con t inu i ty of be ing .

I t is n o w possible, f rom a distance, to character ize the m u t a t i o n that

occur red in t he ent i re W e s t e r n episteme t owards the end of the e igh teen th

cen tu ry by saying that a scientifically s t rong m o m e n t was created in jus t

tha t area w h e r e t he Classical episteme was metaphysical ly s t rong ; and

that , on t he o the r hand , a phi losophical space e m e r g e d in that v e r y area

w h e r e Classicism had mos t f i rmly established its epistemological g r ip .

206

E X C H A N G I N G

In fact, the analysis o f p r o d u c t i o n , as the n e w project o f t he n e w 'poli t ical

e c o n o m y ' , has as its essential ro le the analysis of the re la t ion b e t w e e n value

a n d prices; the concepts o f organisms and o rgan ic s t ructure , the m e t h o d s

of compara t i ve a n a t o m y - in shor t , all the themes of the n e w ' b i o l o g y ' -

explain h o w structures observable in individuals can have val idi ty as

genera l characters for genera , families, s u b - k i n g d o m s ; a n d lastly, in o r d e r

to unify the fo rmal a r r angement s of a l anguage (its abil i ty to establish

proposi t ions) and the m e a n i n g be long ing t o w o r d s , ' ph i lo logy ' w o u l d n o

l onge r s tudy the representat ive functions of discourse, bu t a to ta l i ty of

morpho log ica l constants subject to a h is tory . Ph i lo logy , b io logy , a n d

polit ical e c o n o m y w e r e established, no t in the places fo rmer ly occupied

by general grammar, natural history, and the analysis of wealth, b u t in an

area w h e r e those forms of k n o w l e d g e did n o t exist, in the space they left

b lank , in the deep gaps that separated their b road theoret ical segments

a n d that w e r e filled w i t h the m u r m u r o f t he onto logica l c o n t i n u u m . T h e

object of k n o w l e d g e in the n ine teen th cen tu ry is fo rmed in the v e r y place

w h e r e the Classical p len i tude of be ing has fallen silent.

Inversely, a n e w phi losophical space was to e m e r g e in the place w h e r e

t he objects o f Classical k n o w l e d g e dissolved. T h e m o m e n t o f a t t r ibu t ion

(as a f o r m of j u d g e m e n t ) and tha t of ar t iculat ion (as a genera l pa t t e rn ing

o f beings) separated, and thus created t he p r o b l e m o f the relations b e ­

t w e e n a formal apophant ics and a formal o n t o l o g y ; the m o m e n t of

p r imi t ive designat ion and that o f der iva t ion t h r o u g h t i m e also separated,

o p e n i n g up a space in w h i c h the re arose the quest ion of the relat ions

be tween or iginal m e a n i n g and his tory. T h u s t he t w o great fo rms o f

m o d e r n phi losophic reflection w e r e established. T h e first quest ions t h e

relations b e t w e e n logic a n d o n t o l o g y ; i t p roceeds by the paths o f f o r m a ­

lization a n d encounters , in a n e w form, the p r o b l e m of mathesis. T h e

second questions the relations of signification and t ime ; i t under takes an

unvei l ing w h i c h i s n o t a n d p r o b a b l y neve r can be comple ted , a n d i t

b r ings back in to p r o m i n e n c e the themes a n d m e t h o d s of interpretation.

P r o b a b l y t he m o s t fundamenta l quest ion tha t can present itself to p h i l o ­

sophy , then, concerns the relat ion b e t w e e n these t w o forms of reflection.

I t i s cer tainly n o t w i th in t he p rov ince of a rchaeo logy to say w h e t h e r this

relat ion is possible, or h o w i t cou ld be p r o v i d e d w i t h a founda t ion ; b u t

a rchaeo logy can designate the reg ion in w h i c h that relat ion seeks to exist,

in w h a t area of the episteme m o d e r n ph i losophy a t t empts to f ind its

un i ty , in w h a t p o i n t of k n o w l e d g e i t discovers its broades t d o m a i n : in

such a place the formal (in apophant ics and o n t o l o g y ) w o u l d m e e t t he

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significative as i l luminated in in terpre ta t ion. T h e essential p r o b l e m of Clas ­

sical t h o u g h t lay in t he relations be tween name and order: h o w to discover a

nomenclature tha t w o u l d be a taxonomy, or again, h o w to establish a sys tem

o f signs tha t w o u l d be t ransparent t o the con t inu i ty o f being. W h a t m o d e r n

t h o u g h t is to t h r o w fundamenta l ly in to quest ion is the relat ion of m e a n i n g

w i t h the f o r m o f t r u t h and the fo rm o f be ing : i n the f i rmamen t o f o u r

reflection there reigns a discourse - a perhaps inaccessible discourse -

w h i c h w o u l d a t the same t ime be an o n t o l o g y and a semantics. S t ruc tura l ­

ism is n o t a n e w m e t h o d ; i t is the a w a k e n e d and t roubled consciousness

o f m o d e r n t h o u g h t .

V I I I D E S I R E A N D R E P R E S E N T A T I O N

T h e m e n o f the seventeenth and e ighteenth centuries d o n o t th ink o f

weal th , na ture , or languages in te rms that had been bequea thed to t h e m

by preceding ages or in forms that presaged w h a t was soon to be dis­

covered ; they th ink of t h e m in te rms of a general a r r a n g e m e n t that n o t

on ly prescribes their concepts and me thods , bu t also, m o r e fundamenta l ly ,

defines a certain m o d e of be ing for l anguage , na tura l individuals, and the

objects of need and desire; this m o d e of be ing is tha t of representa t ion.

As a result, a w h o l e c o m m o n g r o u n d appears u p o n wh ich the his tory of

the sciences figures as a surface effect. This does n o t m e a n that i t can n o w

be left to one side; bu t that a reflection u p o n the h is tory of a par t icular

b r anch o f k n o w l e d g e can no longer con ten t itself w i t h fo l lowing the

d e v e l o p m e n t of that b o d y of k n o w l e d g e in a t empora l sequence; such a

b o d y of k n o w l e d g e is no t , in fact, a p h e n o m e n o n of hered i ty and t rad i ­

t ion ; and o n e does no t explain h o w i t c ame a b o u t s imply by describing

the state of k n o w l e d g e that p receded i t and w h a t i t has p r o v i d e d by w a y

o f - as we say - 'or ig inal con t r ibu t ions ' . T h e h is tory of k n o w l e d g e can

be wr i t t en on ly on the basis o f w h a t was c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s w i t h it, and

cer tainly no t in t e rms of reciprocal influence, b u t in t e rms of condi t ions

and a prioris established in t ime . It is in this sense that a rchaeo logy can g ive

an account of the existence of a general g r a m m a r , a na tura l his tory, and an

analysis of weal th , and thus o p e n up a free, und iv ided area in w h i c h the

h is tory of the sciences, the h is tory of ideas, and the h is tory of op in ions

can, if they wish , frolic at ease.

T h o u g h the analyses o f representat ion, l anguage , na tura l o rders ,

and wea l th are perfectly coheren t and h o m o g e n e o u s w i t h regard to

one ano the r , there exists, nevertheless, a p r o f o u n d disequi l ibr ium. For

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E X C H A N G I N G

representat ion governs the m o d e of being of language, individuals, na tu re ,

a n d need itself. T h e analysis of representat ion therefore has a de t e rmin ing

value for all the empir ical domains . T h e w h o l e Classical sys tem of o rder ,

t he w h o l e of that great taxinomia tha t makes i t possible to k n o w things

by means of the system of their identities, i s unfolded wi th in the space

tha t is opened up inside representat ion w h e n representat ion represents

itself, tha t area w h e r e be ing and the Same reside. Language is s imply the

representa t ion of w o r d s ; na tu re i s s imply the representa t ion of beings;

need is s imply the representat ion of needs. T h e end of Classical t h o u g h t -

and of the episteme tha t m a d e general g r a m m a r , na tu ra l h is tory , a n d the

science of wea l th possible - wil l coincide w i t h the decline of representa­

t ion , o r r a the r w i t h the emanc ipa t ion o f l anguage , o f the l iving being, and

o f need, w i t h regard t o representa t ion. T h e obscure b u t s t u b b o r n spirit o f

a peop le w h o talk, the violence and the endless effort of life, the h i d d e n

ene rgy of needs, w e r e all to escape f rom the m o d e of be ing of representa­

t ion. A n d representat ion itself was to be paralleled, l imited, c i rcumscr ibed,

m o c k e d perhaps , bu t in any case regulated f rom the outs ide , by the e n o r ­

m o u s thrust of a f reedom, a desire, or a wil l , posi ted as the metaphysical

converse of consciousness. S o m e t h i n g like a wil l or a force was to arise in

the m o d e r n exper ience - const i tu t ing i t perhaps , bu t in any case indicat ing

that the Classical age was n o w over , and w i t h i t the re ign of representat ive

discourse, the dynas ty of a representat ion signifying itself and g iv ing

voice in the sequence of its w o r d s to the o rde r that lay d o r m a n t wi th in

th ings .

This reversal i s con t emporaneous w i t h Sade. Or ra ther , tha t inexhaus t ­

ible b o d y of w o r k manifests the precar ious balance be tween the l aw

w i t h o u t l aw of desire and the met icu lous o rde r ing o f discursive represen t ­

a t ion. H e r e , the o rde r of discourse finds its L imi t and its L a w ; b u t i t is

still s t rong e n o u g h to r emain coexistensive w i t h t he v e r y th ing that

governs it. H e r e , w i t h o u t doub t , i s the principle of that ' l iber t inage ' w h i c h

was the last in the W e s t e r n w o r l d (after i t the age of sexuality begins) :

t he l ibertine is he w h o , whi le y ie ld ing to all the fantasies of desire and to

each of its furies, can, b u t also must , i l lumine their slightest m o v e m e n t

w i t h a lucid and deliberately elucidated representa t ion. T h e r e is a strict

o r d e r g o v e r n i n g the life of the l ibert ine: every representat ion m u s t be

immed ia t e ly e n d o w e d w i t h life in the l iving b o d y of desire, every desire

m u s t be expressed in the p u r e l ight of a representat ive discourse. H e n c e

that r igid sequence of ' scenes ' ( the scene, in Sade, is profligacy subjected to

the o rde r of representa t ion) and, w i th in the scenes, the met iculous balance

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be tween the conjugat ion of bodies and the conca tena t ion of reasons.

Possibly Justine and Juliette a re in the same posi t ion on the threshold of

m o d e r n cul ture as tba t occupied by Don Quixote b e t w e e n the Renaissance

and Classicism. Cervantes ' s h e r o , cons t ru ing the relations o f w o r l d and

language as peop le h a d d o n e in the s ixteenth cen tury , decod ing inns i n to

castles and fa rm girls in to ladies w i t h no o the r key than the play of r e ­

semblance, was impr i son ing himsel f w i t h o u t k n o w i n g i t in the m o d e of

p u r e representa t ion; bu t since this representa t ion had no o the r l aw b u t

s imil i tude, i t could n o t fail to b e c o m e visible in the absurd f o r m of m a d ­

ness. N o w , in the second pa r t o f the nove l , D o n Q u i x o t e received his

t r u t h and his l a w f r o m that represented w o r l d ; he h a d n o t h i n g m o r e to

expect f rom the b o o k in w h i c h he was bo rn , w h i c h he had n o t read b u t

whose course he was b o u n d to fol low, bu t a fate hencefor th imposed u p o n

h i m by others . He h a d on ly to a l low h imsel f to l ive in a castle in wh ich he

himself, hav ing pene t ra ted by means o f his madness in to the w o r l d o f

p u r e representat ion, finally became a m e r e character in the artifice of a

representa t ion. Sade's characters co r respond to h i m a t the o the r end of the

Classical age, a t the m o m e n t of its decline. I t i s no longer the i ronic

t r i u m p h of representa t ion ove r resemblance; i t is the obscure and repeated

violence of desire ba t te r ing a t the limits of representa t ion. Justine w o u l d

cor respond to the second pa r t of Don Quixote: she is the unat ta inable

object of the desire of w h i c h she i s t he p u r e or ig in , j u s t as D o n Q u i x o t e

is, despite himself, the object of the representat ion w h i c h he also is in

the dep th of his be ing . In Jus t ine , desire and representat ion c o m m u n i c a t e

o n l y t h r o u g h the presence o f A n o t h e r w h o represents t h e he ro ine t o

h imsel f as an object of desire, whi le she herself k n o w s n o t h i n g of desire

o the r than its d iaphanous , distant, exter ior , and icy f o r m as representa­

t ion. Such is her mis for tune : he r innocence acts as a perpetua l chape rone

be tween desire a n d its representa t ion. Jul iet te , on the o the r hand , i s no

m o r e than the subject of all possible desires; b u t those desires are carr ied

over , w i t h o u t a n y re s iduum, in to t he representa t ion that p rovides t h e m

w i t h a reasonable founda t ion in discourse and t ransforms t h e m spon tan ­

eously in to scenes. So that the great nar ra t ive of Jul iet te 's life reveals,

t h r o u g h o u t the desire, violence, savagery, and death , the gl i t ter ing table

of representa t ion. B u t this table is so thin, so t ransparent to all the figures

of desire that un t i r ing ly accumula te w i th in i t and mu l t i p ly there s imply

by the force of their combina t ion , tha t i t is jus t as lacking in reason as that

o f D o n Q u i x o t e , w h e n he believed h imsel f t o be progress ing, f rom simili­

tude to s imil i tude, a long the c o m m i n g l e d paths o f the w o r l d and books ,

2 1 0

E X C H A N G I N G

b u t w a s i n fact g e t t i n g m o r e and m o r e en t ang led i n the l aby r in th o f his

o w n representat ions. Juliette thins o u t this inspissation o f the represented

so that, w i t h o u t the sl ightest b l emish , the sl ightest re t icence , the sl ightest

v e i l , all the possibili t ies o f desire m a y rise to the surface.

W i t h that, this s to ry closes the Class ical a g e u p o n itself, j u s t as Don

Quixote h a d o p e n e d it. A n d t h o u g h i t is t rue that this is the last l a n g u a g e

still c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s w i t h Rousseau and R a c i n e , t h o u g h i t i s the last

discourse that under takes to ' represent ' , t o name, we are w e l l e n o u g h a w a r e

that i t s imul t aneous ly reduces this c e r e m o n y to the u t m o s t prec is ion (it

calls th ings by their strict n a m e , thus e l imina t ing the space o c c u p i e d by

rhe tor ic ) and ex tends i t t o inf ini ty ( b y n a m i n g e v e r y t h i n g , i n c l u d i n g the

sl ightest o f possibil i t ies, for t hey are all t raversed in acco rdance w i t h the

U n i v e r s a l Charac te r i s t i c o f D e s i r e ) . Sade attains the end o f Classical d i s ­

course and t h o u g h t . H e ho lds s w a y prec ise ly u p o n their f ront ier . A f t e r

h i m , v i o l e n c e , life and death , desire, and sexua l i ty w i l l e x t e n d , b e l o w the

l e v e l o f representa t ion, a n i m m e n s e expanse o f shade w h i c h w e are n o w

a t t e m p t i n g to r e c o v e r , as far as we can , in o u r discourse , in o u r f r e e d o m ,

in o u r t h o u g h t . B u t o u r t h o u g h t i s so brief, o u r f r e e d o m so ens laved, o u r

d iscourse so repe t i t ive , that we mus t face the fact that that expanse o f

shade b e l o w is rea l ly a bo t tomles s sea. T h e prosperi t ies of Juliette are still

m o r e sol i tary - and endless.

P A R T 2

C H A P T E R 7

The Limits of Representation

I T H E A G E OF H I S T O R Y

T h e last years of the e ighteenth cen tu ry are b r o k e n by a d iscont inui ty

similar to that w h i c h des t royed Renaissance t h o u g h t a t the beg inn ing of

the seventeenth; then, the great circular forms in w h i c h simil i tude was

enclosed w e r e dislocated and opened so that the table of identities cou ld

be unfo lded; and that table i s n o w abou t to be des t royed in tu rn , wh i l e

k n o w l e d g e takes up residence in a n e w space - a discont inui ty as en ig ­

mat ic in its pr inciple , in its or iginal r up tu r e , as that w h i c h separates the

Paracelsian circles f rom the Cartesian order . W h e r e d id this unexpec ted

mob i l i t y o f epis temological a r r a n g e m e n t suddenly c o m e f rom, o r the drift

of positivities in relat ion to one ano ther , or , deeper still, the al terat ion in

their m o d e of being? H o w is i t tha t t h o u g h t detaches itself f r o m the

squares it inhabi ted before - general g r a m m a r , na tura l his tory, wea l th -

a n d al lows w h a t less than t w e n t y years before had been posited and

affirmed in the luminous space of unders t and ing to topp le d o w n in to

e r ror , into the r ea lm o f fantasy, in to n o n - k n o w l e d g e ? W h a t event , w h a t

l aw do they obey , these muta t ions that suddenly decide that things are no

longer perceived, describes, expressed, characterized, classified, and k n o w n

in t he same w a y , and that i t i s no longer wea l th , l iving beings, a n d dis­

course that are presented to k n o w l e d g e in the interstices of w o r d s or

t h r o u g h their t ransparency, b u t beings radically different f rom them? For

an a rchaeo logy of k n o w l e d g e , this p r o f o u n d breach in the expanse of

continuit ies , t h o u g h i t m u s t be analysed, and minu te ly so, canno t be

'explained* or even s u m m e d up in a single w o r d . It is a radical event that

is d is t r ibuted across the ent i re visible surface of k n o w l e d g e , and w h o s e

signs, shocks, and effects i t is possible to fo l low step by step. O n l y t h o u g h t

r e -apprehend ing itself a t t he r o o t of its o w n his tory could p rov ide a

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

foundat ion , entirely free of doubt, for w h a t the solitary t r u t h of this

event was in itself.

Archaeo logy , h o w e v e r , m u s t examine each event in te rms of its o w n

evident a r r a n g e m e n t ; i t wi l l r ecoun t h o w the conf igurat ions p r o p e r to

each posi t ivi ty w e r e modif ied (in the case of g r a m m a r , for example , i t

wil l analyse the eclipse of the ma jo r ro le h i the r to accorded to the n a m e ,

and the n e w i m p o r t a n c e o f systems o f inflection; or , ano ther example , the

subord ina t ion of character to funct ion in l iving be ings ) ; i t wil l analyse the

al terat ion of the empir ical entities wh ich inhabi t t he positivities (the s u b ­

st i tut ion of languages for discourse, of p r o d u c t i o n for w e a l t h ) ; i t wi l l

s tudy the displacement of the positivities each in relat ion to the others (for

example , the n e w relat ion b e t w e e n b io logy , the sciences o f l anguage , and

economics ) ; lastly, and above all, i t wi l l s h o w tha t t he general area of

k n o w l e d g e i s no longer tha t of identities and differences, that of n o n -

quant i ta t ive orders , tha t of a universal character izat ion, of a general taxi­

nomia, of a non-measu rab le mathesis, b u t an area m a d e up of o rganic

structures, that is, of internal relations be tween elements w h o s e total i ty

per forms a funct ion; i t wil l s h o w that these o rgan ic structures are d iscon­

t inuous , that t hey do no t , therefore, f o r m a table of u n b r o k e n s imul ­

taneities, b u t that certain of t h e m are on the same level whereas others

fo rm series or linear sequences. So that we see emerg ing , as the o rgan iz ing

principles of this space of empiricit ies, Analogy and Succession: the l ink

be tween o n e organic s t ructure and ano the r can no longer , in fact, be t he

ident i ty o f one o r several e lements , bu t m u s t be the ident i ty o f the relat ion

be tween the elements (a relat ion in w h i c h visibility no longer plays a role)

and of the functions they p e r f o r m ; m o r e o v e r , i f these organic structures

happen to be adjacent to o n e ano ther , on account of a par t icular ly h i g h

density of analogies, i t is no t because they o c c u p y p r o x i m a t e places

wi th in an area of classification; i t is because they have b o t h been fo rmed at

the same t ime , and the o n e immedia te ly after the o the r in the emergence

of the successions. W h e r e a s in Classical t h o u g h t the sequence of c h r o n o ­

logies mere ly scanned the p r io r and m o r e fundamenta l space of a table

w h i c h presented all possibilities in advance , f rom n o w on , the c o n t e m ­

poraneous and s imul taneously observable resemblances in space wil l be

s imply t he fixed fo rms of a succession w h i c h proceeds f r o m ana logy to

analogy. T h e Classical o rde r dis t r ibuted across a p e r m a n e n t space the n o n -

quant i ta t ive identities a n d differences that separated and un i ted th ings : i t

was this o rde r that held sovereign sway - t h o u g h in each case in accord­

ance w i t h slightly differing forms and laws - ove r men ' s discourse, t he

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T H E L I M I T S O F R E P R E S E N T A T I O N

table o f na tura l beings , and the exchange o f wea l th . F r o m the n ine teen th

cen tu ry , H i s to ry was to dep loy , in a t e m p o r a l series, t he analogies that

connec t distinct o rganic s tructures to o n e ano ther . This same Hi s to ry wil l

also, progressively, impose its laws on the analysis of p r o d u c t i o n , the

analysis of organical ly s t ruc tured beings, and , lastly, on t he analysis of

l inguistic g roups . His to ry gives place to analogical o rgan ic s tructures, jus t

as O r d e r opened the w a y to successive identities and differences.

Obv ious ly , H i s to ry in this sense is n o t to be unde r s tood as the c o m ­

pilat ion of factual successions or sequences as they m a y h a v e occur red ; i t

i s the fundamenta l m o d e of be ing of empiricit ies, u p o n the basis o f w h i c h

t h e y are affirmed, posi ted, a r ranged , and dis t r ibuted in the space of k n o w ­

ledge for the use of such disciplines or sciences as m a y arise. Jus t as O r d e r

in Classical t h o u g h t was n o t the visible h a r m o n y of things, o r their

observed a r r angemen t , regular i ty , o r s y m m e t r y , b u t the part icular space

of their be ing, tha t w h i c h , p r io r to all effective k n o w l e d g e , established

t h e m in the field of k n o w l e d g e , so His tory , f rom the n ine teen th cen tu ry ,

defines the b i r thplace of the empir ical , tha t f r o m w h i c h , p r io r to all

established c h r o n o l o g y , i t derives its o w n be ing . I t i s no d o u b t because of

this tha t H i s to ry becomes so soon divided, in accordance w i t h an a m b i ­

gu i ty that i t is p r o b a b l y impossible to cont ro l , in to an empirical science of

events and that radical m o d e of be ing that prescribes their dest iny to all

empir ical beings , to those par t icular beings that we are. His to ry , as we

k n o w , i s cer ta inly the m o s t erudi te , the mos t a w a r e , the mos t conscious,

and possibly the m o s t c lut tered area of o u r m e m o r y ; b u t i t i s equal ly the

depths f rom w h i c h all beings e m e r g e in to their precar ious, g l i t ter ing

existence. Since i t is t he m o d e of be ing of all tha t is g iven us in exper ience,

H i s to ry has b e c o m e the unavoidab le e lement in o u r t h o u g h t : in this

respect, i t is p r o b a b l y n o t so v e r y different f r o m Classical O r d e r . Classical

O r d e r , t oo , cou ld be established as a f r a m e w o r k for acquired k n o w l e d g e ,

b u t i t was m o r e fundamenta l ly the space in w h i c h every be ing approached

m a n ' s consciousness; and the Classical metaphys ic resided precisely in tha t

g a p b e t w e e n o r d e r a n d O r d e r , b e t w e e n classifications a n d Ident i ty , b e ­

t w e e n natural be ings and N a t u r e ; in short , b e t w e e n men ' s percept ion (or

imag ina t ion) a n d the unders t and ing and will o f G o d . In the n ine teen th

cen tu ry , ph i losophy was to reside in the gap b e t w e e n h is tory and His to ry ,

b e t w e e n events a n d the Or ig in , b e t w e e n evo lu t ion and the first r end ing

o p e n o f the source, b e t w e e n ob l iv ion and the R e t u r n . I t wil l be M e t a ­

physics, therefore , on ly in so far as it is M e m o r y , and it wi l l necessarily

lead t h o u g h t back to t he quest ion of k n o w i n g w h a t i t means for t h o u g h t

2 1 9

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

to have a his tory. This quest ion was to bear d o w n u p o n ph i losophy ,

heavily and tirelessly, f rom Hege l to Nie tzsche and b e y o n d . B u t we m u s t

no t see this as the end of an a u t o n o m o u s philosophical reflection that

c ame too early, and was t oo p r o u d to lean, exclusively, u p o n w h a t was

said before it and by o thers ; let us n o t use this as a pre tex t for d isparaging

a t h o u g h t powerless to s tand on its o w n feet, and a lways forced to find

suppor t by w i n d i n g itself a r o u n d a previous ly established b o d y of t h o u g h t .

It is e n o u g h to recognize here a ph i losophy depr ived of a certain m e t a ­

physics because i t has been separated off f rom the space of o rder , ye t

d o o m e d to T i m e , to its f lux and its re turns , because i t is t r apped in the

m o d e o f be ing o f His to ry .

B u t we mus t r e tu rn in a little m o r e detail to w h a t happened a t the e n d

o f the e igh teen th and the beg inn ing o f the n ine teen th c e n t u r y : to that t o o

sketchily out l ined m u t a t i o n o f O r d e r in to His to ry , and to the fundamenta l

modif icat ion of those positivities w h i c h , for near ly a cen tu ry and a half,

had g iven place to so m a n y adjacent kinds of k n o w l e d g e - analysis of

representat ions, general g r a m m a r , natural h is tory , reflections on wea l th and

t rade. H o w w e r e these w a y s of o rde r ing empir ic i ty - discourse, the table,

exchange - eclipsed? In w h a t n e w space, and in accordance w i t h w h a t

forms, have w o r d s , beings, a n d objects of need taken their places and

ar ranged themselves i n relat ion to o n e another? W h a t n e w m o d e o f be ing

mus t they have received in o rde r to m a k e all these changes possible, and

to enable to appear , after scarcely m o r e than a few years, those n o w

familiar forms of k n o w l e d g e that we have called, since the n ine teen th

cen tury , philology, biology, and economics? We tend to imag ine t h a t if these

n e w domains w e r e defined d u r i n g the last cen tury , i t was s imply that a

slight increase in the object ivi ty of k n o w l e d g e , in the precision of observa­

t ion, in the r i gou r of o u r reasoning, in the organiza t ion of scientific

research and in fo rmat ion - tha t all this, w i t h t he aid of a few for tunate

discoveries, themselves helped by a little g o o d luck or genius, enabled us

to e m e r g e f rom a prehis tor ic age in w h i c h k n o w l e d g e was still s t a m m e r i n g

ou t the Grammaire de Port-Royal, the classifications of Linnaeus, and the

theories o f t rade o r agr icul ture . B u t t h o u g h w e m a y indeed talk o f p r e ­

his tory f rom the p o i n t o f v i e w o f the ra t ional i ty o f learning, f rom the

po in t o f v i e w o f positivities we can speak, qu i te s imply , o f h is tory . A n d

i t t o o k a fundamenta l event - cer tainly o n e of the m o s t radical tha t ever

occur red in W e s t e r n cu l tu re - to b r i n g abou t the dissolution of the

posi t ivi ty of Classical k n o w l e d g e , and to const i tu te ano the r posi t ivi ty

f rom which , even n o w , we have doubtless no t entirely emerged .

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This event , p r o b a b l y because we are still caugh t inside it, is largely

b e y o n d o u r comprehens ion . Its scope, the dep th of the strata i t has

affected, all the positivities i t has succeeded in dis integrat ing and r e c o m -

pos ing , the sovereign p o w e r that has enabled it, in o n l y a few years , to

traverse t he ent i re space of ou r cul ture , all this cou ld be appraised and

measured on ly after a quasi-infinite invest igat ion concerned w i t h n o t h i n g

m o r e no r less than the ve ry be ing o f ou r m o d e r n i t y . T h e const i tu t ion o f

so m a n y posi t ive sciences, the appearance of l i terature, the folding back

of ph i losophy u p o n its o w n deve lopmen t , the emergence of h is tory as

b o t h k n o w l e d g e and the m o d e o f be ing o f empir ic i ty , are on ly so m a n y

signs of a deeper rup tu re . Signs scattered t h r o u g h the space of k n o w l e d g e ,

since they a l low themselves to be perceived in the format ion , he re of

ph i lo logy , there o f economics , there again o f b io logy . T h e y are c h r o n o ­

logically scattered t o o : t rue , the p h e n o m e n o n as a w h o l e can be si tuated

be tween easily assignable dates (the ou te r l imits are the years 1 7 7 5 and

1 8 2 5 ) ; bu t in each of the domains s tudied we can perceive t w o successive

phases, w h i c h are art iculated one u p o n the o the r m o r e or less a r o u n d the

years 1 7 9 5 - 1 8 0 0 . In t he first of these phases, the fundamenta l m o d e of

be ing of the positivities does n o t change ; men ' s riches, the species of

na tu re , and the w o r d s w i t h w h i c h languages are peopled, still r emain w h a t

they w e r e in t he Classical age : d o u b l e representat ions - representat ions

w h o s e role i s to designate representat ions, to analyse t h e m , to c o m p o s e

and decompose t h e m in o rde r to b r i n g in to be ing wi th in t h e m , toge the r

w i t h the system of their identities and differences, the general pr inciple of

an order . I t is o n l y in the second phase that w o r d s , classes, and wea l th

wil l acqui re a m o d e of be ing no longer compa t ib l e w i t h that o f r e p r e ­

sentation. On the o the r hand , w h a t i s modif ied ve ry early on , beg inn ing

w i t h the analyses o f A d a m Smi th , A - L . de Jussieu, o r Vicq d 'Azyr , a t

the t ime of Jones or A n q u e t i l - D u p e r r o n , i s the conf igurat ion of posi t ivi ­

ties: the w a y in w h i c h , w i th in each one , the representat ive elements func­

t ion in relat ion to o n e ano ther , in w h i c h they p e r f o r m their doub le ro le

as designat ion and art iculat ion, in w h i c h they succeed, ,by means of the

interplay of compar isons , in establishing an o rde r . It is this first phase that

will be invest igated in the present chapter .

I I T H E M E A S U R E O F L A B O U R

I t is often asserted that A d a m Smi th founded m o d e r n political e c o n o m y -

one m i g h t say economics tout court - by in t roduc ing the concept of labour

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

in to a d o m a i n of reflection n o t previous ly aware of it: all the old analyses

of m o n e y , t rade , and exchange w e r e relegated a t a single b l o w to a

prehistoric age of k n o w l e d g e - w i t h t he o n e possible except ion of t he

Physiocrat ic doc t r ine , w h i c h is accorded the mer i t of h a v i n g at least

a t t emp ted the analysis of agr icul tural p r o d u c t i o n . I t i s t rue tha t f rom the

v e r y outset A d a m Smi th relates the no t i on o f wea l th to tha t o f l abour :

T h e annual l abour of every na t ion i s the fund w h i c h or iginal ly supplies

i t w i t h all the necessaries and conveniences of life w h i c h i t annual ly c o n ­

sumes, and w h i c h consist a lways ei ther in the i m m e d i a t e p r o d u c e of that

l abour , o r in w h a t i s purchased w i t h that p r o d u c e f rom o ther nat ions [ i ] ;

i t is also t rue that Smi th relates the ' va lue in use ' of things to men ' s needs,

and their 'va lue in exchange ' to the quan t i ty of l abour applied to its

p r o d u c t i o n :

T h e value o f any c o m m o d i t y , therefore, t o t he person w h o possesses it,

and w h o means n o t to use or c o n s u m e i t himself, b u t to exchange i t

for o the r commodi t i e s , i s equal to the quan t i ty of l abour w h i c h i t

enables h i m to purchase o r c o m m a n d [ 2 ] .

In fact, the difference b e t w e e n Smi th ' s analyses a n d those of T u r g o t or

Cant i l lon is less than is supposed; or , ra ther , it does n o t lie w h e r e it is

general ly bel ieved to lie. F r o m the t ime of Cant i l lon , and even before

h i m , t he dist inction be tween value in use a n d value in exchange was

be ing clearly m a d e ; and again, f rom Cant i l lon , quan t i ty o f l abour was

be ing used as a m e a s u r e m e n t of the latter. B u t t he quan t i ty of l abour

inscribed in the pr ice of th ings was no m o r e than a relative and reducible

too l of measu remen t . A man ' s l abour was in fact equal to t he va lue of the

quan t i ty of n o u r i s h m e n t necessary to main ta in h i m and his family for as

l ong as a g iven task las ted [3J. So tha t in the last resort , n e e d - f o r food,

c lo th ing, hous ing - defined the absolute measure of m a r k e t price. All

t h r o u g h the Classical age , i t was necessity that was the measure of e q u i ­

valences, and va lue in use that served as absolute reference for exchange

values; the gauge of prices was food, w h i c h resulted in the general ly

recognized pr ivi lege accorded in this respect to agr icul tural p r o d u c t i o n ,

w h e a t and land.

A d a m Smi th did no t , therefore, inven t l abour as an e c o n o m i c concept ,

since i t can be found in Cant i l lon , Quesnay , a n d Condi l l ac ; he does no t

even g ive i t a n e w role to play, since he t o o uses i t as a measure of ex­

change va lue : 'Labour , therefore, is the real measure of t he exchangeable

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value of all commodi t ies ' [4 . ] . B u t he does displace i t : he mainta ins its

function as a means of analysing exchangeable wea l th ; bu t that analysis

is no longer s imply a w a y of expressing exchange in t e rms of need (and

t rade in te rms of p r imi t ive ba r te r ) ; i t reveals an i r reducible , absolute un i t

o f measu remen t . At the same t ime, wea l th no longer establishes the

internal o rde r of its equivalence by a compar i son of the objects to be

exchanged, o r by an appraisal o f the p o w e r peculiar to each represent

an object of need (and, in the last resort , the m o s t fundamenta l of all,

f ood ) ; i t i s b r o k e n d o w n accord ing to the units of l abour that have in

reali ty p r o d u c e d it. W e a l t h is a lways a funct ioning representat ive e lement :

bu t , in the end, w h a t i t represents is no longer the object of desire; i t is

l abour .

B u t t w o object ions immedia te ly present themselves: h o w can labour be

a fixed measure of t he na tura l pr ice of things w h e n it has itself a pr ice -

and a variable price? H o w can labour be an absolute uni t w h e n i t changes

its fo rm, and w h e n industrial progress i s constant ly m a k i n g i t m o r e p r o ­

duc t ive by in t roduc ing m o r e and m o r e divisions i n to it? N o w , i t i s

precisely t h r o u g h these objections, and t h r o u g h their spokesman, as i t

w e r e , that i t is possible to reveal the irreducibil i ty of l abour and its

p r i m a r y character . T h e r e are, in fact, countr ies in the w o r l d , and , in a

par t icular c o u n t r y , t imes, in w h i c h l abour is dear : w o r k e r s are few, wages

are h igh ; e lsewhere , or at o the r t imes, m a n p o w e r is plentiful, i t is bad ly

r emunera t ed , and labour is cheap . B u t w h a t is modif ied in these al ter­

na t ing states is the quan t i ty of food that can be p rocu red w i t h a day 's

w o r k ; i f c o m m o d i t i e s are in shor t supply and there are m a n y consumers ,

each uni t of l abour wil l be r emune ra t ed w i t h on ly a small quan t i ty of

subsistence; bu t if, on the o the r hand , commodi t i e s are in g o o d supply ,

i t wil l be wel l paid. These are mere ly the consequences of a m a r k e t

s i tuat ion; the l abour itself, the hour s spent at it, the toil and t rouble , are

in every case the same; and the grea ter the n u m b e r of units requi red , the

m o r e costly the p roduc ts wil l be . 'Equa l quanti t ies of l abour , a t all t imes

and places, m a y be said to be of equal value to the l a b o u r e r ' [ 5 ] .

A n d yet one could say that this uni t is n o t a fixed one , since to p r o d u c e

the self-same object wil l require m o r e or less labour accord ing to the

perfection of the manufac tu r ing process (that is, accord ing to the degree

of the division of l abour ) . B u t i t i s n o t really t he l abour itself tha t has

changed ; i t i s the relat ion of the l abour to the p r o d u c t i o n of w h i c h i t is

capable. Labour , in the sense of a day ' s w o r k , toil and t rouble , is a fixed

n u m e r a t o r : on ly the d e n o m i n a t o r (the n u m b e r of objects p roduced ) i s

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capable o f var ia t ions . A single w o r k e r w h o had to p e r f o r m on his o w n

the e ighteen distinct opera t ions requi red in the manufac tu re of a p in

w o u l d certainly n o t p r o d u c e m o r e than t w e n t y pins in t he course of a

w h o l e day . B u t ten w o r k e r s w h o each h a d t o p e r f o r m on ly o n e o r t w o

o f those opera t ions could p r o d u c e b e t w e e n t h e m m o r e than for ty-e ight

thousand pins in a d a y ; thus each of those w o r k e r s , p r o d u c i n g a t en th par t

of the total p r o d u c t , can be considered as m a k i n g four thousand e ight

h u n d r e d pins d u r i n g his w o r k i n g day [6]. T h e p roduc t i ve p o w e r o f l abour

has been mul t ip l ied ; w i th in a single uni t (a wage-earner ' s day ) , the objects

manufac tu red h a v e been increased in n u m b e r ; their exchange value

wil l therefore fall, tha t is, each of those objects wil l be able to b u y on ly

a p ropo r t i ona t e ly smaller a m o u n t of w o r k in t u rn . L a b o u r has n o t

d iminished in relat ion to the th ings ; i t is the th ings that have , as i t w e r e ,

sh runk in relation to the uni t of labour .

I t i s t rue that we exchange because we have needs ; w i t h o u t t h e m , t rade

w o u l d n o t exist, n o r l abour either, no r , a b o v e all, the division that

renders i t m o r e p roduc t ive . Inversely, i t is needs, w h e n they are satisfied,

tha t l imit l abour and its i m p r o v e m e n t : 'As i t i s t he p o w e r of exchange

that gives occasion to the division of labour , so the ex ten t of this division

m u s t a lways be l imited to the extent o f that p o w e r , o r in o the r w o r d s , by

the ex ten t o f the m a r k e t ' [ 7 ] . Needs , and the exchange o f p roduc ts tha t

can answer to t h e m , are still the pr inciple of the e c o n o m y : they are its

p r i m e m o t i v e and c i rcumscr ibe it; l abour and the division that organizes

i t are mere ly its effects. B u t w i th in exchange , in the o rde r of equivalences,

the measure that establishes equalities and differences is of*1 a different

na ture f rom need. I t is n o t l inked solely to individual cteshres,* modif ied by

t h e m , or variable like t h e m . I t is an absolute measure , i f o n e takes tha t

to m e a n that i t i s n o t dependen t u p o n men ' s hearts , or u p o n their appet i tes;

i t is imposed u p o n t h e m f r o m outs ide : i t is their t ime a n d their toi l . In

relat ion to that of his predecessors, A d a m Smi th ' s analysis represents an

essential hia tus: i t distinguishes be tween the reason for exchange and the

m e a s u r e m e n t o f tha t w h i c h i s exchangeable , b e t w e e n the na tu re o f w h a t

i s exchanged and the uni ts that enable i t to be b r o k e n d o w n . Peop le

exchange because they have needs, and they exchange precisely the

objects that they need ; b u t the o rde r of exchanges , their h ie ra rchy and the

differences expressed in that h ierarchy, are established by the uni ts of

l abour that have been invested in the objects in quest ion. As m e n

exper ience things - at t he level of w h a t wil l soon be called p sycho logy -

w h a t they a re exchang ing is w h a t is ' indispensable, c o m m o d i o u s or

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pleasurable ' to t h e m , bu t for the economis t , w h a t is actually circulat ing

in the fo rm of things is l abour - n o t objects of need represent ing o n e

ano ther , b u t t i m e and toil, t ransformed, concealed, fo rgo t ten .

Th i s hiatus is of great impor t ance . I t is t rue that A d a m Smi th is still,

l ike his predecessors, analysing the field of posi t iv i ty that the e igh teen th

cen tu ry t e r m e d 'wea l th ' ; and by that t e r m he t oo means objects o f need -

and thus t he objects of a certain fo rm of representat ion - represent ing

themselves in the m o v e m e n t s and m e t h o d s of exchange . B u t w i th in this

dupl icat ion, and in o rde r to regula te its laws - the units and measures of

exchange - he formulates a principle of o rde r that is i r reducible to the

analysis of representa t ion: he unear ths labour , tha t is, toil and t ime, the

w o r k i n g - d a y that a t once pat terns and uses up man ' s life. T h e equivalence

of the objects of desire i s no longer established by the in te rmedia ry of

o the r objects a n d o the r desires, b u t by a transi t ion to that w h i c h is rad ic ­

ally he te rogeneous to t h e m ; i f there is an o rde r regula t ing the forms of

wea l th , if this can b u y that , if go ld is w o r t h twice as m u c h as silver, i t

is n o t because m e n have comparab le desires; i t is n o t because they ex ­

perience the same h u n g e r in their bodies , or because their hearts are all

swayed by the same passions; i t is because they are all subject to t ime , to

toil, to weariness, and, in the last resort , to dea th itself. M e n exchange

because they exper ience needs and desires; b u t they are able to exchange

and to order these exchanges because they are subjected to t ime and to the

great exter ior necessity. As for the fecundi ty of labour , i t is no t so m u c h

d u e to personal ability or to calculations of self-interest; i t is based u p o n

condi t ions tha t are also exter ior to its representa t ion: industrial progress ,

g r o w i n g division of tasks, accumula t ion of capital, division of p roduc t i ve

l abour and n o n - p r o d u c t i v e labour . I t i s thus apparen t h o w , w i t h A d a m

Smi th , reflection u p o n wea l th begins to overf low the space assigned to i t

in the Classical age; then, i t was lodged wi th in ' i deo logy ' - inside the

analysis of representa t ion; f rom n o w on , i t is referred, d iagonal ly as i t

w e r e , to t w o domains w h i c h b o t h escape the forms and laws o f the d e c o m ­

posi t ion of ideas: on the o n e hand , i t is a l ready p o i n t i n g in the di rect ion

of an a n t h r o p o l o g y that will call in to quest ion man ' s ve ry essence (his

f ini tude, his relation w i t h t ime , the i m m i n e n c e of death) and the object in

w h i c h he invests his days of t ime and toil w i t h o u t be ing able to recognize

in i t the object of his immed ia t e need ; on the o ther , i t indicates the still

unfulfilled possibility of a political e c o n o m y whose object w o u l d no

longer be the exchange of wea l th (and the interplay of representat ions

w h i c h is its basis), bu t its real p r o d u c t i o n : forms of l abour and capital. I t is

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unders tandable h o w , b e t w e e n these n e w l y fo rmed positivities - an a n t h r o ­

p o l o g y deal ing w i t h a m a n rendered alien to h imsel f and an economics

dealing w i t h mechanisms exter ior to h u m a n consciousness - Ideo logy , or

the Analysis of representat ions, was soon to find itself reduced to be ing no

m o r e than a psycho logy , whereas opposi te , in oppos i t ion , and soon to

d o m i n a t e ideo logy f rom its full height , there was to e m e r g e the d imens ion

of a possible h is tory . F r o m Smi th o n w a r d , the t i m e of economics was no

longer to be the cyclical t i m e of a l ternat ing i m p o v e r i s h m e n t and wea l th ;

n o r the linear increase achieved by astute policies, constant ly in t roduc ing

slight increases in the a m o u n t of circulat ing specie so that they accelerated

p roduc t ion at a faster rate than they raised prices; i t was to be the inter ior

t ime of an organic s t ructure w h i c h g r o w s in accordance w i t h its o w n

necessity and develops in accordance w i t h au toch thonous laws - the t ime

of capital and p roduc t i on .

I l l T H E O R G A N I C S T R U C T U R E O F B E I N G S

In the d o m a i n of natural his tory, the modif icat ions observable be tween

the years 1 7 7 5 and 1795 are of the same type . T h e principle of classifica­

tions is no t called in ques t ion: their a im is still to de te rmine the 'character '

tha t g roups individuals and species in to m o r e general units, tha t dist in­

guishes those units one f rom another , and that enables t h e m to fit toge ther

to f o r m a table in w h i c h all individuals and all g roups , k n o w n or u n ­

k n o w n , will have their appropr ia te place. These characters are d r a w n

f rom the total representa t ion of the individuals concerned ; d i ey are the

analysis of that representat ion and m a k e i t possible, bv represent ing those

representat ions, to const i tute an o rder ; the general principles of taxinomia

- the same principles that had de te rmined the systems of Tou rne fo r t and

Linnaeus and the m e t h o d of Adanson - preserve the same k ind of val idi ty

for A-L . de Jussieu, Vicq d 'Azyr , Lamarck , a n d Cando l le . Y e t the t ech­

nique that makes i t possible to establish the character , the relat ion be tween

visible s t ructure and criteria of ident i ty , are modif ied in jus t the same w a y

as A d a m Smi th modif ied the relations of need or pr ice. T h r o u g h o u t the

e ighteenth cen tury , classifiers had been establishing character by c o m ­

par ing visible s tructures, tha t is, by correla t ing elements that were h o m o ­

geneous (since each e lement , accord ing to the o rde r ing principle selected,

could be used to represent all the o thers ) : the o n l y difference lay in the

fact that for t he systematicians the representat ive elements w e r e fixed f r o m

the outset , whereas for the methodis ts they w e r e the gradual result of a

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progressive confronta t ion . Bu t , the transi t ion f r o m described s t ructure to

classifying character t o o k place w h o l l y a t the level of the representat ive

functions exercised by the visible w i t h r ega rd to itself. F r o m Jussieu,

Lamarck , and Vicq d ' A z y r o n w a r d , character , o r ra ther the t rans forma­

t ion of s t ruc ture in to character , was to be based u p o n a pr inciple alien to

the d o m a i n of the visible - an internal pr inciple no t reducible to the r e ­

ciprocal in teract ion of representat ions. This pr inciple (which corresponds

to l abour in the e c o n o m i c sphere) is organic structure. A n d as a basis for

t axonomies , o rgan ic s t ructure appears in four different ways .

I . First, in the f o r m of a h ie ra rchy of characters . I f o n e does not , in

fact, a r range the species side by side in all their vast diversity, bu t , in

o rde r to l imit the field of invest igat ion fo r thwi th , i f o n e accepts the

b r o a d g roup ings evident at a first glance - such as the Gramineae , t he

Compos i t ae , t he Cruciferae, and the Leguminosae for plants ; o r w o r m s ,

fishes, birds, and quadrupeds , for animals - i t becomes apparen t that

certain characters are absolutely constant and occur in all the genera and

all the species i t is possible to dist inguish: for example , t he insert ion of t he

s tamens, their pos i t ion in relat ion to the pistil, the insert ion of the corolla

w h e n i t bears the s tamens, the n u m b e r of lobes su r round ing the e m b r y o in

the seed. O t h e r characters are v e r y frequent t h r o u g h o u t a family, bu t do

n o t attain the same degree of cons tancy; this is because they are fo rmed by

less essential organs (number of petals, presence or absence of the corol la ,

respective posi t ion of the calyx or the pisti l) ; these are the ' secondary

sub -un i fo rm ' characters. Finally, the ' ter t iary semi -un i fo rm ' characters

are somet imes constant and somet imes variable (unifoliate or polyfol iate

calyx, n u m b e r of cells in the fruit, posi t ion of f lowers and leaves, na tu re

of the s t e m ) : w i t h these semi -un i fo rm characters i t is n o t possible to

define families or orders - n o t because they are n o t capable, i f applied to all

the species, o f f o rming general entities, bu t because they do n o t concern

w h a t is essential in a g r o u p of l iving beings. Each great na tura l family has

requisites that define it, and the characters that m a k e i t recognizable are

the nearest to these fundamenta l condi t ions : thus, r ep roduc t ion be ing the

major funct ion of the plant , the e m b r y o wil l be its m o s t i m p o r t a n t par t ,

and i t becomes possible to divide the vegetable k i n g d o m in to three

classes: acotyledons , m o n o c o t y l e d o n s , and dicotyledons . Agains t the back­

g r o u n d of these essential a n d ' p r i m a r y ' c h a r a c t e r s , the others can appear and

in t roduce m o r e detailed distinctions. I t wil l be seen that character is no

longer d r a w n direct ly f rom the visible s t ructure , and w i t h o u t any

cr i ter ion o the r than its presence or absence; i t is based u p o n the existence

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of functions essential to the l iving be ing , and u p o n relations of impor t ance

that are no longer mere ly a ma t t e r of descr ipt ion.

2. Charac ters are l inked, therefore, to functions. In one sense, there has

been a r e tu rn to t he old theo ry of signatures or marks , w h i c h supposed

that each be ing b o r e the sign of w h a t was mos t essential in i t u p o n the

mos t visible po in t of its surface. B u t here the relations of impor t ance are

relations of functional subord ina t ion . I f the n u m b e r of co ty ledons is

decisive in the classification of plants , tha t is because they play a par t icular

ro le in the r ep roduc t ive funct ion, and because they are for that v e r y

reason l inked to the plant 's ent ire internal o rganic s t ruc ture ; they indicate

a function that governs the individual 's ent i re a r r a n g e m e n t [8]. In the same

w a y , V i c q d 'Azy r s h o w e d that in the case of animals i t is the a l imenta ry

functions that are w i t h o u t d o u b t the mos t i m p o r t a n t ; i t is for this reason

that ' there exist constant relations b e t w e e n the s t ruc ture of the carnivores '

teeth a n d that of their muscles, toes, claws, tongues , s tomachs , and in ­

t e s t i n e s ' ^ ] . Cha rac t e r is no t , then , established by a relation of the visible

to itself; i t is n o t h i n g in itself bu t the visible p o i n t of a c o m p l e x and

hierarchized o rgan ic s t ructure in wh ich function plays an essential g o v e r n ­

ing and de t e rmin ing role. It is n o t because a character occurs f requent ly

in the s tructures observed that it is i m p o r t a n t ; it is because it is funct ion­

ally i m p o r t a n t that i t is often encounte red . As C u v i e r was to p o i n t ou t ,

s u m m i n g up the w o r k o f the century ' s last g rea t methodis t s , the h ighe r

we m o v e towards the m o r e generalized classes,

the m o r e the proper t ies that remain c o m m o n are c o n s t a n t , and as the

m o s t constant relations are those that per ta in to the q ip i t i m p o r t a n t

par ts , so the characters of the h ighe r divisions wil l be found to be

d r a w n f rom the mos t i m p o r t a n t parts . . . I t i s in this w a y that the

m e t h o d will be na tura l , since i t takes in to accoun t the i m p o r t a n c e of

the organs [10].

3. G iven these condi t ions , i t i s unders tandable h o w the no t ion of life

could b e c o m e indispensable to the o rde r ing of na tura l beings. I t became

so for t w o reasons: first, i t was essential to be able to app rehend in the

depths of the b o d y the relations that l ink superficial organs to those w h o s e

existence and h idden forms p e r f o r m the essential functions; thus S tor r

proposes classifying m a m m a l s accord ing to the fo rma t ion of their hoofs ;

the reason be ing that this i s l inked to m e t h o d s of l o c o m o t i o n and to the

animal ' s possibilities o f m o v e m e n t ; n o w , these m e t h o d s o f l o c o m o t i o n

can be correla ted in tu rn w i t h the fo rm of a l imenta t ion and the different

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T H E L I M I T S O F R E P R E S E N T A T I O N

organs o f the digestive s y s t e m [ n j . F u r t h e r m o r e , the mos t i m p o r t a n t

characters m a y also be the mos t h idden ; i t h a d already p r o v e d possible to

observe in the vegetable k i n g d o m that i t is n o t flowers and fruits - the

m o s t easily visible parts of the plant - that are the significant e lements , b u t

the e m b r y o n i c organiza t ion and such organs as the co ty ledon . This p h e n o ­

m e n o n is even m o r e frequent in animals . S tor r t h o u g h t that the b roade r

classifications o u g h t to be defined accord ing to the forms of circulat ion; a n d

Lamarck , t h o u g h he h imsel f did n o t practise dissection, rejects any principle

of classification for the l o w e r animals based solely u p o n visible f o r m :

Cons idera t ion of the art iculations of the bodies and l imbs of the c rus ­

taceans has led all naturalists to r ega rd t h e m as t rue insects, and I myse l f

l o n g fol lowed the general op in ion in this regard . B u t since i t is r e c o g ­

nized that o rganic s t ructure is of all considerat ions t he m o s t essential as

a gu ide in a methodica l and natural dis t r ibut ion of animals, as wel l as

in de t e rmin ing the t rue relations be tween t h e m , i t follows tha t the

crustaceans, w h i c h brea the solely by means of gills in the same w a y as

molluscs, and like t h e m have a muscular heart , o u g h t to be placed

immedia te ly after t h e m , before the arachnids and the insects, w h i c h do

n o t have a like organic s t ructure [ 1 2 ] .

To classify, therefore, will no longer mean to refer the visible back to

itself, whi le a l lot t ing one of its e lements the task of represent ing the o thers ;

i t wi l l mean , in a m o v e m e n t that makes analysis p ivo t on its axis, to relate

t he visible to t he invisible, to its deeper cause, as i t w e r e , then to rise

upwards once m o r e f r o m that h idden archi tecture towards the m o r e

obv ious signs displayed on the surfaces of bodies . As Pinel said, in his

w o r k as a naturalist , ' to restrict oneself to the exter ior characters assigned

by nomenc la tu res , is this n o t to ignore the m o s t fertile source of i n fo rma­

t ion , and to refuse to open , as i t w e r e , the great b o o k of na ture w h i c h is

precisely w h a t o n e has set ou t to k n o w ? ' [ 1 3 ] Hencefor th , character r e ­

sumes its fo rmer role as a visible sign direct ing us t owards a bur ied d e p t h ;

bu t w h a t it indicates is no t a secret text , a muffled w o r d , or a resemblance

t o o precious to be revealed; i t is the coheren t total i ty of an organic

s t ruc ture that weaves back into the un ique fabric of its sovere ignty b o t h

the visible and the invisible.

4 . T h e parallelism be tween classification and nomenc l a tu r e is thus, by

this v e r y fact, dissolved. As long as classification consisted of a pa t te rn of

progressively smaller areas fitted in to a visible space, it was qui te c o n ­

ceivable that the del imitat ion and denomina t ion of the resultant g roups

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THB ORDER OF THINGS

could b e accomplished s imultaneously. T h e p r o b l e m o f the n a m e a n d the

p r o b l e m o f the genus w e r e i somorphic . B u t n o w that character can

classify on ly by means of p r io r reference to the o rgan ic s t ruc ture o f

individuals , 'd is t inct ion ' can no longer be achieved in accordance w i t h the

same criteria, or by means of the same opera t ions , as ' d e n o m i n a t i o n ' . In

o rde r to discover the fundamenta l g roups in to w h i c h na tura l beings can

be divided, i t has b e c o m e necessary to explore in d e p t h the space tha t lies

be tween their superficial organs a n d their m o s t concealed ones, and b e ­

t w e e n these latter and the b r o a d functions that they pe r fo rm. A n y g o o d

nomenc la tu re , on the o the r hand , wil l con t inue to be dep loyed in the

hor izonta l d imens ion of the table: s tar t ing f rom the visible characters of

the individual , o n e mus t find one 's w a y to that precise square in w h i c h is

to be found the n a m e of its genus and its species. T h e r e is a fundamenta l

d is tor t ion b e t w e e n the space o f o rgan ic s t ruc ture and that o f n o m e n ­

cla ture : o r ra ther , instead of be ing exact ly super imposed , they are n o w

perpendicular t o o n e ano the r ; and a t the po in t w h e r e they m e e t we find

the manifest character , w h i c h indicates a funct ion in the vert ical plane and

makes i t possible to discover a n a m e in the hor izon ta l one . This dis t inc­

t ion, w h i c h w i th in a few years wil l r ender na tura l his tory and the p r e ­

eminence of taxinomia obsolescent, we o w e to the genius o f L a m a r c k : in

the Pre l iminary Discourse to La Flore frangaise he set o u t the t w o tasks of

b o t a n y as t w o radically distinct entities: ' de t e rmina t ion ' , w h i c h applies the

rules of analysis and makes i t possible to discover the n a m e of an individual

by the s imple use of a b ina ry m e t h o d (either such and such a character is

present in the individual be ing examined , in w h i c h case o n e must l ook for

its locat ion in t he r ight-hand par t of the table ; or I t i s n o t present , in

w h i c h case o n e mus t look in the left-hand par t ; and so on unt i l the n a m e

has finally been d e t e r m i n e d ) ; and the discovery of the real relations of

resemblance, w h i c h presupposes an examina t ion of the ent i re o rganic

s t ruc ture of species[ i4] . N a m e s and genera , designat ion and classification,

l anguage and na ture , cease to be automat ica l ly in ter locked. T h e o rde r o f

w o r d s and the o r d e r o f beings no longer intersect except a long an ar t i ­

ficially defined l ine. The i r o ld affinity, w h i c h had been the founda t ion of

natural h is tory in t he Classical age, and wh ich had led s t ruc ture to char ­

acter, representa t ion to denomina t ion , and the visible individual to the

abstract genus, all w i t h o n e and the same m o v e m e n t , i s beg inn ing to

dissolve. T h e r e is talk of th ings that take place in ano the r space than that

of w o r d s . By m a k i n g such a dist inction, and by m a k i n g i t so early on ,

Lamarck b r o u g h t the era of natural his tory to a close and p rov ided a

230

T H E L I M I T S O F R E P R E S E N T A T I O N

231

m u c h clearer, a m u c h m o r e certain and radical g l impse of the era of

b io logy than he did t w e n t y years later by tak ing up once m o r e the a l ready

w e l l - k n o w n t h e m e of the single series of species and their progress ive

t rans format ion .

T h e concept o f o rgan ic s t ruc ture already existed in e igh teen th -cen tu ry

na tura l his tory - j u s t as, in the sphere of the analysis of wea l th , the n o t i o n

of l abour was n o t inven ted a t the end of the Classical age ; bu t i t was a

concept that served a t that t i m e to define a certain m o d e of compos i t i on

o f c o m p l e x individuals , on the basis o f m o r e e l ementa ry mater ia ls ;

Linnaeus, for example , dist inguished b e t w e e n jux tapos i t ion ' , w h i c h causes

g r o w t h in minerals , and ' intussuscept ion ' , w h i c h enables the vege tab le

k i n g d o m to deve lop by feeding i t se l f [ i5] . B o n n e t contras ted the ' a g g r e ­

ga t ion ' o f 'unref ined solids' w i t h t he ' compos i t ion o f o rganic solids ' ,

w h i c h 'weaves toge ther an a lmost infinite n u m b e r o f par ts , some f lu id ,

o thers solid'[16]. N o w , this concept o f o rgan ic s t ruc ture had never been

used before the end of the cen tu ry as a foundat ion for o rde r ing na tu re ,

as a means of defining its space or de l imi t ing its forms. It is t h r o u g h the

w o r k s of Jussieu, Vicq d 'Azyr , and L a m a r c k that i t begins to function for

the first t ime as a m e t h o d of character iza t ion: i t subordinates characters

o n e to ano ther ; i t links t h e m to functions; i t arranges t h e m in accordance

w i t h an archi tec ture that is internal as wel l as external , and no less i n ­

visible than visible; i t distributes t h e m t h r o u g h o u t a space that is o the r

than that of names , discourse, and language . I t i s thus no longer con t en t

to designate o n e ca tegory o f beings a m o n g o the r categories; i t no longer

mere ly indicates a d ividing- l ine r u n n i n g t h r o u g h the t a x o n o m i c space; i t

defines for cer ta in beings the internal l a w tha t enables a par t icular o n e of

their s tructures to take on the va lue of a character . O r g a n i c s t ruc ture

intervenes b e t w e e n the ar t icula t ing structures and the des ignat ing cha r ­

acters - creat ing be tween t h e m a p ro found , in ter ior , and essential space.

This i m p o r t a n t m u t a t i o n further exerts its influence u p o n the e l ement

of na tura l h i s to ry ; i t modifies the m e t h o d s a n d the techniques of a taxi­

nomia; bu t i t does n o t refute its fundamenta l condi t ions of possibili ty; i t

has n o t yet t ouched the m o d e of be ing of a na tura l o rde r . I t does, h o w ­

ever, entail o n e major consequence : the radicalization of the d iv id ing- l ine

b e t w e e n o rgan ic and inorganic . In the table o f beings unfolded by na tura l

his tory, the t e rms organized and n o n - o r g a n i z e d defined mere ly t w o ca te ­

gories; these t w o categories over lapped , bu t d id n o t necessarily coincide

w i th , the antithesis o f l iving and non- l iv ing . F r o m the m o m e n t w h e n

organic s t ructure becomes a basic concept of na tura l character izat ion, and

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

makes possible the t ransi t ion f rom visible s t ructure to designat ion, i t m u s t

of course cease to be no m o r e than a character itself; i t su r rounds the

t a x o n o m i c space in wh ich i t lay before , a n d in t u rn provides the g r o u n d

for a possible classification. This be ing so, the oppos i t ion b e t w e e n organic

and inorganic becomes fundamenta l . I t is, in fact, f rom the per iod 1 7 7 5 - 9 5

o n w a r d that the old ar t iculat ion of t he three or four k i n g d o m s disappears;

the oppos i t ion of the t w o k i n g d o m s - o rganic a n d inorganic - does n o t

replace that ar t iculat ion exact ly ; bu t ra ther , by impos ing ano ther division,

a t ano the r level a n d in ano the r space, i t makes the old art iculat ion i m ­

possible. Pallas a n d L a m a r c k [ i 7 ] formula te this great d i c h o t o m y - a

d i c h o t o m y w i t h w h i c h the oppos i t ion o f the l iv ing and the non- l iv ing

coincides. ' T h e r e are on ly t w o k i n g d o m s in na tu re , ' w r o t e V icq d ' A z y r in

1786 , ' o n e enjoys life a n d the o the r i s depr ived of i t ' [ i 8 ] . T h e organic

becomes the l iving and the l iving is that w h i c h p roduces , g r o w s , and

reproduces ; the inorgan ic is t he non- l iv ing , that w h i c h ne i ther develops

n o r reproduces ; i t lies at t he frontiers of life, the inert , the unfruitful -

death . A n d a l t h o u g h it is in te rming led w i t h life, i t is so as tha t e lement

wi th in i t tha t destroys and kills it. ' T h e r e exist in all l iving beings t w o

power fu l forces, w h i c h are ve ry distinct and a lways in oppos i t ion to each

o ther , so m u c h so that each perpe tua l ly destroys the effects that the o the r

succeeds in p r o d u c i n g ' [ 1 9 ] . I t can be seen h o w , by f ragment ing in dep th

the great table of na tura l his tory, some th ing resembl ing a b io logy was to

b e c o m e possible; and also h o w , in the analyses of Bichat , the fundamenta l

oppos i t ion of life and dea th was able to e m e r g e . W h a t was to take place

was n o t the m o r e or less precarious t r i u m p h of a vi tal ism ove r a m e c h a n ­

ism; vi tal ism and its a t t emp t to define the specificity of l i fe are mere ly the

surface effects of those archaeological events .

I V W O R D I N F L E C T I O N

T h e exact coun te rpa r t of these events i s to be found in t he area of lan­

guage analysis. T h o u g h i t is t rue that t hey take a m o r e discreet f o r m and

obey a s lower c h r o n o l o g y than in the field of na tura l his tory. T h e r e is an

easily discoverable reason for this; it is that , t h r o u g h o u t t he Classical age,

l anguage was posi ted a n d reflected u p o n as discourse, tha t is, as the spon ­

taneous analysis o f representat ion. Of all the forms of non-quan t i t a t ive

o rde r i t was the m o s t immed ia t e , the least del iberate, the mos t p ro found ly

l inked to the m o v e m e n t of representat ion itself. A n d to that ex tent i t was

m o r e f i rmly roo ted in representat ion and in the m o d e of be ing of r ep re -

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sentation than w e r e the m o r e intellectual orders - disinterested or in ­

terested - based u p o n the classification of beings or the exchange of

weal th . Technical modificat ions such as those that affected the measure ­

m e n t of exchange values, o r the m e t h o d s of ar r iv ing a t 'characters ' , w e r e

sufficient to change considerably the analysis of wea l th or natural h is tory .

In o rde r that t he science of l anguage could u n d e r g o muta t ions as i m p o r ­

tant as these, even p ro founder events were necessary, events capable of

chang ing the v e r y be ing of representations in W e s t e r n cul ture . Jus t as, in

the seventeenth and e igh teen th centuries, the theo ry of the n a m e had its

place as near as possible to representat ion and thus gove rned , to a certain

degree , the analysis of structures and character in l iving beings, and that

of pr ice and value in the sphere of weal th , so in the same w a y , a t the end

of the Classical age, i t was this t heo ry dia t subsisted longest , b reak ing up

on ly late in the day , a t the m o m e n t w h e n representat ion itself was m o d i ­

fied at the deepest level of its archaeological organiza t ion .

U n t i l the beg inn ing of the n ine teen th cen tury , analyses o f l anguage

s h o w little change . W o r d s are still invest igated on the basis of their r ep re ­

sentative values, as vir tual e lements of discourse wh ich prescribes o n e and

the same m o d e of being for t h e m all. A n d yet , these representat ive c o n ­

tents are no longer analysed on ly in the d imens ion that br ings r e p r e ­

sentation near to an absolute or igin , w h e t h e r mythica l or no t . In general

grammar, in its pures t fo rm, all the w o r d s of a l anguage w e r e bearers of a

m o r e or less h idden , m o r e or less derived, signification whose original

raison d'etre lay in an initial designat ion. E v e r y language , h o w e v e r c o m ­

plex, was si tuated in the open ing that h a d been created, once and for all,

by archaic cries. Lateral resemblances w i t h o the r languages - similar

sounds applied to analogous significations - w e r e no ted and listed o n l y in

order to conf i rm the vert ical relat ion of each to these deeply bur ied ,

silted over , a lmost m u t e values. In the last quar te r of the e ighteenth

century , the hor izonta l compar i son of languages acquires ano the r func­

t ion: i t no longer makes i t possible to k n o w w h a t each language m a y still

preserve o f its ancestral m e m o r y , w h a t marks f r o m before Babel have

been preserved in the sounds of its w o r d s ; b u t i t should m a k e i t possible

to measure the ex ten t to w h i c h languages resemble o n e another , the

density of their simili tudes, the limits w i th in w h i c h they are t ransparent to

one another . H e n c e those great confrontat ions be tween var ious languages

that we see appear ing at the end of the cen tu ry - in some cases b r o u g h t

about by the pressure of political mot ives , as w i t h the a t t empts m a d e in

Russia[20] to establish an abstract of all the languages of the E m p i r e ; in

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

1787 there appeared in Pe te rsburg the first v o l u m e of the Glossarium

comparativum totius orbis; it h a d to inc lude references to 279 languages :

1 7 1 in Asia, 55 in E u r o p e , 30 in Africa, 23 in A m e r i c a [ 2 i ] . T h e c o m ­

parisons are still m a d e exclusively on the basis of a n d in te rms of r e p r e ­

sentat ive con ten t s : a single kernel of signification - w h i c h is used as an

invariable - is related to the w o r d s by means of w h i c h the various lan­

guages are able to designate i t (Ade lung[22] gives 500 different versions of

Pater in different languages a n d dialects); or o n e r o o t is selected as a c o n ­

stant e lement r u n n i n g t h r o u g h a var ie ty of sl ightly differing forms, and

the full a r ray of mean ings that i t can take on is progressively de te rmined

(these are the first a t t empts at Lex icography , such as that of B u t h e t de

La Sar the) . All these analyses always refer back to t w o principles, w h i c h

w e r e already those of general grammar: tha t of an original and c o m m o n

language w h i c h supposedly p r o v i d e d the initial ba tch of roo t s ; and that

of a series of historical events , foreign to language , w h i c h , f rom outside,

bend it, w e a r i t a w a y , refine it, m a k e i t m o r e f lexible , by mul t ip ly ing or

c o m b i n i n g its forms (invasions, migra t ions , advances in learning, political

f r eedom or slavery, e tc . ) .

N o w , the confronta t ion o f languages a t the end o f the e ighteenth

cen tu ry br ings to l ight a f o r m in te rmedia ry be tween the art iculat ion of

contents and the value of roo t s : name ly , inflection. I t i s t rue that g r a m ­

marians had l ong been familiar w i t h inflectional p h e n o m e n a (just as, in

natural his tory, the concept of organic s t ructure was familiar before Pallas

o r L a m a r c k ; and, in economics , the concept o f l abour was k n o w n before

A d a m S m i t h ) ; b u t inflections had been analysed on ly for' their r ep re ­

sentative value - w h e t h e r they w e r e considered as accessory representa­

t ions, or w e r e seen as a w a y of l inking representat ions toge ther (rather like

ano the r k ind o f w o r d o rde r ) . B u t w h e n one compares , a s C o e u r d o u x [ 2 3 ]

and W i l l i a m Jones [24] d id , the different forms of t he v e r b to be in

Sanskrit and Lat in or Greek , one discovers a relat ion of cons tancy the

reverse of the o n e usually admi t t ed : i t is the r o o t that is modif ied , a n d the

inflections that are ana logous . T h e Sanskrit series asmi, asi, asti, smas, stha,

santi corresponds exactly, b u t by inflectional ana logy, w i t h the Latin

series sum, es, est, sumus, estis, sunt. It is t rue that C o e u r d o u x and Anque t i l -

D u p e r r o n r ema ined at the level of analysis as practised in general grammar,

w h e n the fo rmer saw this parallelism as evidence of t he remains of an

or iginal c o m m o n language , and the latter saw i t as t he result of the

historic m i x t u r e that m a y have occurred b e t w e e n H indus and M e d i ­

ter ranean peoples a t the t ime of t he Bact r ian k i n g d o m . B u t w h a t was a t

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235

stake in this compar i son of conjugat ions was no longer the l ink be tween

original syllable and p r i m a r y mean ing ; i t was already a m o r e c o m p l e x

relat ion b e t w e e n the modificat ions of the radical and the functions of

g r a m m a r ; i t was be ing discovered that in t w o different languages there

was a constant relation be tween a de te rmina te series of formal modif ica­

t ions and an equally de te rmina te series of g rammat i ca l functions, syn ­

tactical values, or modif icat ions of mean ing .

For this v e r y reason, general grammar begins to change its conf igura t ion:

its var ious theoretical segments are no longer l inked toge the r in exact ly the

same w a y ; and the n e t w o r k that jo ins t h e m already suggests a s l ighdy

different rou te . At the t ime of Bauzee or Condi l lac , the relation be tween

roots , w i t h their great lability o f form, and the m e a n i n g pa t t e rned o u t o f

representat ions, or again, the link be tween the p o w e r to designate and

the p o w e r t o articulate, was assured by the sovere ignty o f the N a m e . N o w

a n e w e lement intervenes: on the o n e hand , on the side of m e a n i n g or

representat ion, i t indicates on ly an accessory and necessarily secondary

value (it is a quest ion of the role p layed by the individual or t h ing des ig­

na ted as e i ther subject or c o m p l e m e n t ; i t is a quest ion of the t ime of the

ac t ion) ; b u t on the o the r hand , on the side of fo rm, i t consti tutes the solid,

constant , a lmost unal terable total i ty whose sovereign l aw is so far imposed

u p o n the representat ive roots as to modi fy even those roo ts themselves.

M o r e o v e r , this e lement , secondary in its significative value, p r i m a r y in its

formal consistence, is no t itself an isolated syllable, like a sort of cons tant

r o o t ; i t is a system of modificat ions of w h i c h the var ious segments are

in te rdependen t : the letter s does n o t signify the second person in the w a y

tha t the letter e , according to C o u r t de Gebelin, signified b rea th ing , life,

and existence; it is the total i ty of the modificat ions m, s, t tha t gives t he

verba l roo t the values of the first, second, and th i rd person .

U n t i l the end of the e ighteenth cen tury , this n e w analysis has its place

in the search for the representat ive values of language . It is still a ques t ion

of discourse. B u t a l ready, t h r o u g h the inflectional system, the d imens ion

of the pure ly g rammat i ca l i s appear ing : l anguage no longer consists on ly

of representat ions and of sounds that in t u r n represent the representat ions

and are o rde red a m o n g t h e m as the links of t h o u g h t r equ i re ; i t consists

also of formal e lements , g r o u p e d in to a system, w h i c h impose u p o n the

sounds , syllables, and roots an organiza t ion tha t is n o t that of r ep re ­

sentat ion. T h u s an e l ement has been in t roduced in to the analysis of lan­

guage that is n o t reducible to i t (as l abour was in t roduced in to the analysis

of exchange , or o rganic s t ruc ture in to that of characters) . As a p r i m a r y

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

consequence of this, one m a y no te the appearance a t the end of the

e ighteenth cen tu ry of a phonet ics that is no longer an invest igat ion of

p r imary expressive values, bu t an analysis of sounds, of their relations, and

of their possible t ransformat ion o n e in to ano the r ; in 1 7 8 1 , we find

H e l w a g defining the vocalic t r iangle[25] . O n e can no t e also the beg in ­

nings of a compara t ive g r a m m a r : the object selected for compar i son in

the various languages is no longer the couple fo rmed by a g r o u p of

letters and a mean ing , b u t g roups of modif icat ions of a g rammat i ca l

na ture (conjugations, declensions, suffixes, and prefixes). Languages are

no longer contrasted in accordance w i t h w h a t their w o r d s designate, b u t

in accordance wi th the means w h e r e b y those w o r d s are l inked toge ther ;

f rom n o w on they wil l c o m m u n i c a t e , n o t via the in te rmediary o f that

a n o n y m o u s and general t h o u g h t they exist to represent , bu t directly f rom

one to the o ther , thanks to these delicate ins t ruments , so fragile in appear ­

ance yet so constant and so irreducible, by w h i c h w o r d s are a r ranged in

relation to each o the r . As M o n b o d d o said:

T h e art of a l anguage is less a rb i t rary and m o r e de te rmined by rule than

either the sound or sense of the w o r d s , i t is o n e of the principal things

by w h i c h the connec t ion of languages w i t h one ano the r i s to be d is ­

covered . A n d , therefore, w h e n we find that t w o languages practise the

three great arts of language , der ivat ion, compos i t ion , and f lexion, in the

same w a y , we m a y conc lude that the one language i s the original of

the o ther , or that they are b o t h dialects of the same language [26].

As long as language was defined as discourse, i t cou ld have no o the r

history than that of its representat ions: i f ideas, things, k n o w l e d g e , or

feelings happened to change , then and on ly then did a g iven language

u n d e r g o modif icat ion, and in exactly the same p r o p o r t i o n as the changes

in quest ion. B u t f rom n o w on there is an inter ior 'mechan i sm ' in languages

which de termines n o t on ly each one 's individual i ty bu t also its r esem­

blances to the o thers : i t is this mechan i sm, the bearer of ident i ty and

difference, the sign of adjacency, the m a r k of kinship, that i s n o w to

b e c o m e the basis for his tory. By its means , historici ty wil l be able to

in t roduce itself in to the density of the spoken w o r d itself.

V I D E O L O G Y A N D C R I T I C I S M

T h e r e took place therefore, t owards the last years of the e ighteenth

century , in general grammar, in natural history, and in the analysis of wealth,

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237

an event that is of the same type in all these spheres. T h e signs w h o s e

representat ions w e r e affected, the analysis of identities and differences that

i t was possible to establish at tha t r ime, the con t inuous , yet ar t iculated,

table that was set up in the t e e m i n g profusion of simili tudes, t he clearly

defined o rde r a m o n g the empir ical multiplicit ies, n o n e of these can hence ­

for th be based solely u p o n the dupl icat ion of representat ion in relat ion to

itself. F r o m this event o n w a r d , w h a t gives va lue to the objects of desire

is n o t solely the o the r objects that desire can represent to itself, b u t an

e lement that canno t be reduced to that representa t ion: labour; w h a t makes

i t possible to characterize a na tura l be ing is no longer the elements that

we can analyse in the representat ions we m a k e for ourselves of i t and

o the r beings, i t is a certain relat ion wi th in this be ing , wh ich we call its

organic structure; w h a t makes it possible to define a language is n o t the

w a y in w h i c h i t represents representat ions, b u t a certain internal a rchi tec­

tu re , a certain m a n n e r of modi fy ing the w o r d s themselves in accordance

w i t h the g rammat i ca l posit ion they take up in relation to one ano the r ;

in o the r w o r d s , its inflectional system. In all these cases, the relat ion of

representa t ion to itself, and the relations of o rde r i t becomes possible to

d e t e r m i n e apar t f rom all quant i ta t ive forms of measurement , n o w pass

t h r o u g h condi t ions exter ior to the actuali ty of the representat ion itself.

In o rde r to l ink the representat ion of a m e a n i n g w i t h that of a w o r d , i t is

necessary to refer t o , and to have recourse t o , the pure ly g rammat i ca l

laws of a l anguage w h i c h , apar t f rom all p o w e r of represent ing r e p r e ­

sentations, is subjected to the r igorous system of its phone t ic modif icat ions

and its synthet ic subord ina t ions ; in the Classical age, languages had a

g r a m m a r because they had the p o w e r t o represent ; n o w they represent

on the basis of that g r a m m a r , w h i c h is for t h e m a sort of historical

reverse side, an inter ior and necessary v o l u m e whose representat ive values

are no m o r e than the gl i t ter ing, visible exter ior . In o rde r to link toge ther ,

in a defined character , a partial s t ructure and the visible total i ty of a l iving

be ing , i t is n o w necessary to refer to the pu re ly biological laws, wh ich ,

apar t f rom all descript ive signs and as i t we re set back f rom t h e m , o rgan ize

the relations be tween functions and organs ; l iving beings no longer define

their resemblances, their affinities, and their families on the basis of their

displayed descriptabil i ty; t hey possess characters w h i c h language can scan

and define because they have a s t ructure that is, in a w a y , the dark ,

concave , inner side of their visibility: i t is on the clear and discursive

surface of this secret bu t sovereign mass that characters emerge , a sort of

s torehouse exter ior t o the pe r iphery o f organisms n o w b o u n d in u p o n

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

themselves. Finally, w h e n i t is a ma t t e r of l inking the representat ion of

some object of need to all the o thers that can confront i t in the act of

exchange , i t is necessary to have recourse to the f o r m and quan t i ty of a

piece of w o r k , w h i c h de t e rmine its va lue ; w h a t creates a h ie ra rchy a m o n g

things in the con t inuous circulat ion of the m a r k e t i s n o t o the r objects or

o the r needs; i t is t he act ivi ty that has p r o d u c e d t h e m a n d has silently

lodged itself w i th in t h e m ; i t is the days and hour s requi red for their

manufac tu re , ex t rac t ion , o r t ranspor ta t ion that const i tu te their p r o p e r

we igh t , their marke tab le solidity, their internal law, and thus w h a t o n e

can call their real p r ice ; it is on the basis of this essential nucleus that

exchanges can be accompl ished a n d that m a r k e t prices, after hav ing

fluctuated, can find their po in t of rest.

This s o m e w h a t en igmat i c event , this event rising up f rom b e l o w w h i c h

occur red t owards the end of the e igh teen th cen tu ry in these three domains ,

subject ing t h e m a t o n e b l o w to o n e and the same break, can n o w be

located w i t h i n the un i ty that forms a foundat ion for its diverse forms.

Q u i t e obvious ly , i t w o u l d be superficial to seek this un i ty in s o m e progress

m a d e in rat ional i ty , o r in the discovery of a n e w cultural t h e m e . T h e

c o m p l e x p h e n o m e n a o f b io logy , o f the his tory o f languages, o r o f indus ­

trial p roduc t ion , w e r e no t , in the last years of the e igh teen th cen tury ,

in t roduced in to forms of rat ional analysis to w h i c h unti l then they had

r ema ined entirely fore ign; n o r was there a sudden interest - p r o v o k e d by

the ' influence' of a b u d d i n g ' roman t i c i sm ' - in the c o m p l e x forms of life,

h is tory, and society; there was no de tachment , u n d e r the pressure of its

p rob l ems , f rom a ra t ional ism subjected to the m o d e l of mechanics , to t he

rules of analysis and the laws of unders tand ing . Or ra ther , all this d id in

fact happen , b u t as a surface m o v e m e n t : a modif icat ion and shifting of

cul tural interests, a redis t r ibut ion of opinions and j u d g e m e n t s , the appear ­

ance of n e w forms in scientific discourse, wr inkles t raced for the first t i m e

u p o n the en l igh tened face of k n o w l e d g e . In a m o r e fundamenta l fashion,

and at the level w h e r e acquired k n o w l e d g e is r oo t ed in its posi t ivi ty, the

event concerns , n o t the objects a imed at, analysed, and expla ined in

k n o w l e d g e , n o t even the m a n n e r o f k n o w i n g t h e m o r rat ional iz ing t h e m ,

bu t the relat ion of representa t ion to that w h i c h is posi ted in it. W h a t c ame

in to be ing w i t h A d a m Smi th , w i t h t he first philologists, w i t h Jussieu, Vicq

d 'Azyr , or Lamarck , is a minuscule b u t absolutely essential d isplacement ,

w h i c h topp led the w h o l e o f W e s t e r n t h o u g h t : representa t ion has lost the

p o w e r to p rov ide a founda t ion - w i t h its o w n be ing , its o w n d e p l o y m e n t

and its p o w e r of d o u b l i n g ove r on itself - for the links that can j o i n its

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var ious elements toge ther . N o compos i t ion , n o decompos i t ion , n o analysis

in to identities and differences can n o w just i fy the connec t ion o f r e p r e ­

sentations o n e to ano the r ; order , the table in w h i c h i t is spatialized, the

adjacencies it defines, t he successions it authorizes as so m a n y possible

routes b e t w e e n the poin ts on its surface - n o n e of these is any longer in a

posi t ion to l ink representat ions or the elements of a par t icular r e p r e ­

sentat ion toge ther . T h e cond i t ion of these links resides hencefor th outside

representa t ion , b e y o n d its i m m e d i a t e visibility, in a sort of b e h i n d - t h e -

scenes w o r l d even deeper and m o r e dense than representat ion itself. In

o rde r to find a w a y back to the po in t w h e r e the visible forms of beings

are j o i n e d - the s t ructure of l iving beings, the va lue of weal th , the syn tax

of w o r d s - we m u s t direct o u r search t owards that peak, that necessary

b u t always inaccessible po in t , w h i c h drives d o w n , b e y o n d o u r gaze, t o ­

wards the v e r y hear t o f th ings . W i t h d r a w n in to their o w n essence, t ak ing

up their place a t last w i th in t he force that animates t h e m , wi th in the

o rgan ic s t ruc ture that mainta ins t h e m , wi th in the genesis that has never

ceased to p r o d u c e t h e m , things, in their fundamenta l t ru th , h a v e n o w

escaped f r o m the space o f the table; instead o f be ing no m o r e than the

cons tancy that distributes their representat ions always in accordance w i t h

the same forms, they t u rn in u p o n themselves, posit their o w n v o l u m e s ,

a n d define for themselves an internal space w h i c h , to o u r representat ion, is

on the exterior. I t is f r o m the s ta r t ing-poin t of t he archi tec ture they

conceal , of t he cohesion that maintains its sovereign a n d secret s w a y

ove r each o n e of their par ts , i t i s f r o m the depths of the force that b r o u g h t

t h e m into be ing and that remains in t h e m , as t h o u g h motionless ye t still

qu iver ing , that th ings - in f ragments , outl ines, pieces, shards - offer t h e m ­

selves, t h o u g h v e r y part ial ly, to representa t ion. A n d f r o m their inaccessible

store, representat ion can d r a w ou t , piece by piece, on ly t enuous e lements

w h o s e uni ty , w h o s e po in t o f connec t ion , a lways remains h idden in that

b e y o n d . T h e space of o rder , w h i c h served as a common place for r e p r e ­

sentat ion a n d for things, for empirical visibility a n d for the essential rules,

w h i c h uni ted the regularities o f na tu re and the resemblances o f i m a g i n a ­

t ion in the gr id of identities and differences, w h i c h displayed the empir ica l

sequence of representat ions in a s imul taneous table, and m a d e i t possible to

scan step by step, in accordance w i t h a logical sequence, the total i ty of

nature ' s e lements thus rendered c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s w i t h o n e ano the r - this

space of o rde r i s f rom n o w on shat tered: the re wi l l be th ings , w i t h their

o w n organ ic s t ructures , their h idden veins, the space that articulates t h e m ,

the t ime that p roduces t h e m ; and then representat ion, a pure ly t empora l

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succession, in w h i c h those th ings address themselves (always part ial ly) to a

subjectivity, a consciousness, a s ingular effort of cogni t ion , to the ' p s y c h o ­

logical ' individual w h o f r o m the dep th o f his o w n his tory, o r on the

basis of the t radi t ion handed on to h i m , i s t ry ing to k n o w . Representa­

t ion is in the process of losing its p o w e r to define the m o d e of be ing

c o m m o n to th ings and to k n o w l e d g e . T h e v e r y be ing o f that w h i c h i s

represented is n o w g o i n g to fall outside representa t ion itself.

Ye t that p ropos i t ion is i m p r u d e n t . At a n y rate, i t anticipates an a r r ange ­

m e n t of the field of k n o w l e d g e that i s n o t yet definitively established by

the end of the e igh teen th cen tury . I t mus t n o t be forgo t ten that , t h o u g h

Smi th , Jussieu, and W . J o n e s m a d e use o f the no t ions o f labour , o rganic

s t ructure , and g rammat i ca l system, their a im in d o i n g so was n o t to b reak

o u t of the tabular space laid o u t by Classical t h o u g h t , or to find a w a y

a r o u n d the visibility o f things and to escape f r o m the play of r e p r e ­

sentat ion represent ing itself; i t was s imply to establish w i th in it a f o r m of

connec t ion that w o u l d be a t the same t i m e analysable, constant , and wel l

founded. I t was still a ma t t e r of discovering the general o rde r of identities

and differences. T h e great de tour , t he great quest, b e y o n d representa t ion,

for the v e r y be ing of w h a t i s represented has no t yet been m a d e ; on ly the

place f r o m w h i c h that quest wil l b e c o m e possible has so far been es tab­

lished. B u t this place still figures a m o n g the in ter ior a r r angemen t s of

representat ions. A n d there i s no d o u b t that there exists, co r respond ing to

this a m b i g u o u s epis temological conf igurat ion, a phi losophic dual i ty

w h i c h indicates its i m m i n e n t dissolution.

T h e coexistence of Ideo logy and critical ph i losophv a t the end of the

e ighteenth cen tu ry - of Des tu t t de T r a c y and K a n t - divides, into t w o

forms of t h o u g h t , exter ior to one ano ther , yet s imul taneous , w h a t scien­

tific forms of reflection, on the o the r hand , ho ld toge ther in a un i ty

d o o m e d to i m m i n e n t dissociation. In Des tu t t o r G e r a n d o , Ideo logy posits

itself b o t h as the on ly rat ional and scientific f o r m that ph i losophy can

assume and as the sole phi losophic founda t ion that can be p roposed for

the sciences in general and for each part icular sphere of k n o w l e d g e . B e i n g

a science of ideas, Ideo logy should be a k ind of k n o w l e d g e of the same

t y p e as those that take as their object the beings of na ture , the w o r d s of

language , or the laws of society. B u t precisely in so far as its object is

ideas, the m a n n e r in w h i c h they are expressed in w o r d s and l inked t o ­

ge ther in reasoning, i t has val idi ty as the G r a m m a r and the Logic of all

possible science. Ideo logy does n o t quest ion the foundat ion , the l imits, or

the r o o t of representa t ion; i t scans the d o m a i n of representat ions in

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genera l ; i t de termines the necessary sequences that appear there ; i t defines

the links that p rov ide its connect ions ; i t expresses the laws of compos i t ion

a n d decompos i t ion that m a y rule it. I t situates all k n o w l e d g e in the space

of representat ions, and by scanning that space i t formulates the k n o w l e d g e

of the laws that p rov ide its organiza t ion . It is in a sense the k n o w l e d g e of

all k n o w l e d g e . B u t this dupl icat ion u p o n w h i c h i t is based does no t cause

i t to e m e r g e f rom the field of representa t ion; the a i m of that dupl icat ion

is to super impose all k n o w l e d g e u p o n a representat ion f rom w h o s e

i m m e d i a c y o n e never escapes:

H a v e y o u ever unde r s tood a t all precisely w h a t t h ink ing is, w h a t y o u

exper ience w h e n y o u think, any th ing at all? . . . Y o u say to yourself:

/ think that, w h e n y o u have an op in ion , w h e n y o u fo rm a j u d g e m e n t .

In fact, to pass a j u d g e m e n t , t rue or false, is an act of t h o u g h t ; this act

consists in feeling that there is a connec t ion , a relat ion . . . To think, as

y o u see, is always to feel, and is n o t h i n g o the r than to feel [27] .

We should no t e , h o w e v e r , that , i n defining the t h o u g h t o f a relation by

the sensation of that relat ion, or , in briefer te rms , t h o u g h t in general by

sensation, Des tu t t i s indeed cover ing , w i t h o u t e m e r g i n g f r o m it, the w h o l e

d o m a i n of representa t ion; bu t he reaches the frontier w h e r e sensation as

the p r imary , comple te ly s imple f o r m of representat ion, as the m i n i m u m

con ten t o f w h a t can be g iven to t h o u g h t , topples over in to the d o m a i n o f

the physiological condi t ions that can p rov ide an awareness of it. T h a t

w h i c h , w h e n read in o n e sense, appears as the m o s t tenuous general i ty of

t h o u g h t , appears , w h e n deciphered in ano the r direct ion, as the c o m p l e x

result o f a zoological s ingular i ty: ' W e have o n l y an incomple te k n o w ­

ledge of an an imal i f we do no t k n o w its intellectual faculties. Ideo logy is

a pa r t of zoo logy , and it is above all in m a n that this par t is i m p o r t a n t

and meri ts de lv ing in to ' [28 ] . Analysis o f representat ion, a t the m o m e n t

w h e n i t attains its greatest degree of extension, brushes w i t h its v e r y

o u t e r m o s t edge a d o m a i n that is m o r e or less - or ra ther , that wil l be

m o r e or less, for i t does n o t exist as yet - tha t of a na tura l science of m a n .

Different as they are in form, style, and a im, the Kant ian quest ion and

the quest ion o f the ' Ideologues ' have the same po in t o f appl icat ion: t he

relat ion of representat ions to each o ther . B u t Kan t does n o t seek this

relat ion - w h a t gives i t its founda t ion and j u s t i f i c a t i o n - o n the level of

representat ion, even a t tenuated in its con ten t so far as to be n o t h i n g m o r e ,

on the confines of passivity and consciousness, than m e r e sensation; he

quest ions it as to w h a t renders it possible in general . Instead of basing the

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

connec t ion be tween representat ions on a founda t ion arr ived at by a sort

o f internal h o l l o w i n g - o u t process, w h i c h gradual ly whit t les i t a w a y unt i l

there is n o t h i n g left bu t the p u r e impression, he establishes i t on the c o n ­

ditions that define its universally val id fo rm. By direct ing his inqui ry in

this direct ion, K a n t avoids representat ion itself and w h a t is g iven w i th in

it, in o rde r to address h imsel f to tha t on the basis of w h i c h all r ep re ­

sentat ion, w h a t e v e r its fo rm, m a y be posi ted. I t i s therefore n o t r ep re ­

sentations themselves that , in accordance w i t h their o w n laws, could be

deployed and, in o n e and the same m o v e m e n t , d e c o m p o s e d (by analysis)

a n d recomposed (by synthesis): on ly j u d g e m e n t s der ived f rom exper ience

or empirical observat ions can be based u p o n the contents of representa­

t ion. A n y o the r connec t ion , i f i t is to be universal , m u s t have its founda­

t ion b e y o n d all exper ience, in the a priori tha t renders i t possible. N o t that

i t is a quest ion of ano the r w o r l d , bu t of the condi t ions in accordance w i t h

w h i c h any representa t ion of the w o r l d in general can exist.

T h e r e is thus a definite cor respondence be tween the Kant ian cr i t ique

and w h a t in the same per iod was posited as the first a lmost comple te f o r m

of ideological analysis. B u t Ideology , by ex tend ing its reflection ove r

the w h o l e field of k n o w l e d g e - f rom p r i m a r y impressions to polit ical

e c o n o m y , by w a y o f logic, a r i thmet ic , the sciences o fna tu re , and g r a m m a r

- t r ied to resume in the f o r m of representat ion precisely w h a t was be ing

fo rmed and re - fo rmed outs ide representat ion. This r e sumpt ion could be

accomplished on ly in the quas i -mythica l fo rm of a s imul taneously sin­

gular a n d universal genesis: an isolated, e m p t y , and abstract consciousness

mus t , beg inn ing w i t h the m o s t tenuous fo rm o f representat ion, build up

little by little the great table of all tha t is representable . fn this sense,

Ideo logy is the last of the Classical phi losophies - ra ther as Juliette is the

last of the Classical narrat ives . Sade's scenes and reasoning recapture all

the fresh violence of desire in the d e p l o y m e n t of a representat ion tha t is

t ransparent and w i t h o u t f law; the analyses of Ideo logy recapture in their

nar ra t ive of a b i r th all the forms of representat ion, even the mos t c o m p l e x

ones. C o n f r o n t i n g Ideo logy , the Kant ian cr i t ique, on the o the r hand ,

marks t he threshold of o u r m o d e r n i t y ; i t quest ions representat ion, n o t in

accordance w i t h the endless m o v e m e n t that proceeds f r o m the s imple

e lement to all its possible combina t ions , b u t on the basis of its r ightful

limits. T h u s i t sanctions for t he first t i m e that even t in E u r o p e a n cul ture

w h i c h coincides w i t h the end o f the e igh teen th cen tu ry : the w i t h d r a w a l

o f k n o w l e d g e and t h o u g h t outs ide the space o f representat ion. T h a t space

is b r o u g h t in to ques t ion in its foundat ion , its o r ig in , and its l imits: and

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T H E L I M I T S O F R E P R E S E N T A T I O N

b y this v e r y fact , the un l imi t ed f ield o f representa t ion, w h i c h Class ica l

t h o u g h t h a d established, w h i c h I d e o l o g y h a d a t t e m p t e d t o scan i n a c c o r d ­

ance w i t h a s t ep-by-s tep , d iscurs ive, scientific m e t h o d , n o w appears as a

me taphys ics . B u t as a me taphys ic s that h a d n e v e r s tepped outs ide itself,

that had pos i ted i tse l f in an u n i n f o r m e d d o g m a t i s m , and that had n e v e r

b r o u g h t o u t in to the l igh t the ques t ion of its r igh t . In this sense, C r i t i c i s m

br ings o u t the me taphys i ca l d imens ion that e igh t een th -cen tu ry p h i l o ­

s o p h y had a t t emp ted t o r e d u c e so le ly b y means o f the analysis o f r ep re ­

sentat ion. B u t i t opens up a t the same t i m e the poss ib i l i ty o f ano the r

me taphys i c s ; o n e w h o s e pu rpose w i l l b e t o ques t ion , apar t f r o m rep re ­

sentat ion, all that i s the source and o r i g i n of representa t ion; i t m a k e s

possible those ph i losoph ies o f L i fe , o f the W i l l , and o f the W o r d , that

the n ine teen th c e n t u r y i s t o d e p l o y in the w a k e o f c r i t ic i sm.

V I O B J E C T I V E S Y N T H E S E S

F r o m this, there spr ings an a lmos t infinite series o f consequences - o f u n ­

l imi ted consequences , a t least, since o u r t h o u g h t t o d a y still b e l o n g s to the

same dynas ty . I n the f i r s t rank, we m u s t u n d o u b t e d l y p lace the s i m u l ­

taneous e m e r g e n c e o f a t ranscendental t h e m e and n e w empi r i ca l f i e l d s

- o r , i f n o t n e w , a t least d is t r ibuted and f o u n d e d i n a n e w w a y . W e h a v e

seen h o w , in the seven teen th cen tu ry , the appearance of the mathesis as a

genera l science o f o rde r n o t o n l y p l a y e d a f o u n d i n g ro le i n the m a t h e ­

mat ica l disciplines b u t w a s co r re la t ive i n the f o r m a t i o n o f va r ious p u r e l y

empi r ica l d o m a i n s , such as genera l g r a m m a r , natural h i s tory , and the

analysis o f w e a l t h ; these latter w e r e n o t cons t ruc ted in acco rdance w i t h a

' m o d e l ' supposed ly prescr ibed for t h e m b y the ma thema t i c i za t i on o r

m e c h a n i z a t i o n o f na ture ; t h e y w e r e cons t i tu ted and a r r anged against the

b a c k g r o u n d o f a genera l poss ib i l i ty : that w h i c h m a d e i t poss ible t o

establish an o r d e r e d table o f identit ies and differences b e t w e e n r ep re ­

sentations. I t w a s the d issolut ion o f this h o m o g e n e o u s f i e l d o f o rde rab le

representat ions, in the last years o f the e igh teen th cen tu ry , that b r o u g h t

a b o u t the co r re la t ive appearance o f t w o n e w fo rms o f t h o u g h t . T h e f i r s t

quest ions the cond i t ions o f a re la t ion b e t w e e n representat ions f r o m the

p o i n t o f v i e w o f w h a t i n genera l m a k e s t h e m poss ib le : i t thus u n c o v e r s a

t ranscendental f i e l d i n w h i c h the subject , w h i c h i s n e v e r g i v e n t o e x ­

per ience (since i t i s n o t empi r i ca l ) , b u t w h i c h is finite (since there is no

intel lectual in tu i t ion) , de termines in its re la t ion to an ob jec t = x al l the

f o r m a l cond i t ions o f expe r i ence in gene ra l ; i t i s the analysis o f the

243

THE ORDER OF THINGS

244

transcendental subject that isolates the foundation of a possible synthesis

b e t w e e n representat ions. O p p o s i t e this open ing to the t ranscendental , and

symmet r ica l to it, ano the r form of t h o u g h t quest ions the condi t ions of a

relat ion be tween representat ions f rom the po in t o f v i e w o f the be ing

itself tha t is represented: w h a t is indicated, on the ho r i zon of all actual

representat ions, as the foundat ion of their un i ty , is found to be those never

objectifiable objects, those never entirely representable representat ions,

those s imul taneously ev ident and invisible visibilities, those realities that

are r e m o v e d f rom reali ty to the degree to w h i c h they are the foundat ion

of w h a t i s g iven to us and reaches us: t he force of labour , the ene rgy of

life, the p o w e r of speech. I t is on the basis of these forms, w h i c h p r o w l

a r o u n d the ou te r boundar ies o f ou r experience, that the va lue o f things,

the organic s t ruc ture of l iving beings, the g rammat i ca l s t ruc ture and h is ­

torical affinities of languages , at tain o u r representat ions and u r g e us on to

the perhaps infinite task of k n o w i n g . In this cr.se, the condi t ions of possi­

bil i ty of experience are be ing sought in the condi t ions of possibility of the

object and its existence, whereas in t ranscendental reflection the c o n ­

dit ions of possibility of the objects of experience are identified w i t h the

condi t ions o f possibili ty o f exper ience itself. T h e n e w posi t ivi ty o f the

sciences of life, l anguage , and economics is in cor respondence w i t h the

founding of a t ranscendental ph i losophy .

Labour , life, and l anguage appear as so m a n y ' t ranscendentals ' w h i c h

m a k e possible the object ive k n o w l e d g e o f l iving beings, o f the laws o f

p roduc t ion , and of the forms of language. In their be ing , they are outs ide

k n o w l e d g e , b u t by that v e r y fact they are condi t ions o f k n o w l e d g e ; they

cor respond to Kan t ' s d iscovery of a t ranscendental f ie ld and ye t they

differ f r o m i t in t w o essential po in t s : they are situated w i t h the object ,

and, in a w a y , b e y o n d i t ; like the Idea in the t ranscendental Dialect ic, they

totalize p h e n o m e n a and express the a priori coherence of empir ical m u l t i ­

plicities; b u t they p r o v i d e t h e m w i t h a founda t ion in the f o r m of a be ing

whose en igmat ic reali ty consti tutes, p r io r to all k n o w l e d g e , the o rde r and

the connec t ion o f w h a t i t has to k n o w ; m o r e o v e r , t hey concern the

d o m a i n of a posteriori t ru ths and the principles of their synthesis - and n o t

the a priori synthesis of all possible exper ience. T h e first difference (the

fact tha t the transcendentals are situated w i t h the object) explains the

or ig in of those metaphysical doctr ines that , despite their pos t -Kant ian

ch rono logy , appear as 'pre-cr i t ical ' : they d o , in fact, avoid any analysis of

the condi t ions of k n o w l e d g e as they m a y be revealed a t the level of

t ranscendental subject ivi ty; b u t these metaphysics deve lop on the basis of

T H E L I M I T S O F R E P R E S E N T A T I O N

t ranscendental objectives (the W o r d o f G o d , W i l l , Life) w h i c h are

possible o n l y in so far as the d o m a i n of representa t ion has been prev ious ly

l imi ted ; they therefore h a v e the s ame archaeological subsoil as Cr i t ic i sm

itself. T h e second difference (the fact that these transcendentals conce rn

a posteriori syntheses) explains t he appearance of a 'pos i t iv ism' : there is a

w h o l e layer o f p h e n o m e n a g iven t o exper ience w h o s e ra t ional i ty a n d

in te rconnec t ion rest u p o n an object ive founda t ion w h i c h i t i s n o t possible

to b r ing to l ight ; i t i s possible to k n o w p h e n o m e n a , b u t n o t substances;

laws, b u t n o t essences; regularit ies, b u t n o t t he beings tha t o b e y t h e m .

T h u s , on the basis of cri t icism - or ra ther on t he basis of this d isplacement

of be ing in relat ion to representa t ion , o f w h i c h Kan t i an doc t r ine i s the

first phi losophical s t a tement - a fundamenta l corre la t ion is established: on

the one h a n d there are metaphysics o f the object , or , m o r e exact ly, m e t a ­

physics o f tha t neve r objectifiable d e p t h f r o m w h i c h objects rise up

t owards o u r superficial k n o w l e d g e ; and, on t he o t h e r hand , there are

philosophies tha t set themselves no o the r task than the observa t ion of

precisely that w h i c h i s g iven to posi t ive k n o w l e d g e . I t wi l l be seen h o w

the t w o t e rms o f this oppos i t ion lend o n e ano the r s u p p o r t and reinforce

o n e ano ther ; i t i s in the t reasury of posi t ive branches of k n o w l e d g e (and

a b o v e all o f those tha t b io logy , economics , or ph i lo logy are able to

release) that the metaphysics o f the ' dep ths ' o r o f the object ive ' t r a n ­

scendentals ' wi l l find their po in t of a t tack; and , inversely, i t is in the

division b e t w e e n the u n k n o w a b l e depths a n d the ra t ional i ty o f the k n o w -

able that t he posit ivisms wil l f ind their just if icat ion. T h e cr i t ic ism-

posi t iv ism-mctaphysics t r iangle o f the object was const i tu t ive o f E u r o p e a n

t h o u g h t f r o m the beg inn ing o f the n ine teen th cen tu ry t o Bergson .

Such a s t ruc ture is l inked, in its archaeological possibility, to t he e m e r ­

gence of those empir ical fields o f w h i c h m e r e internal analysis o f r e p r e ­

sentat ion can n o w no longer p r o v i d e an account . I t i s thus correlat ive

w i t h a certain n u m b e r of a r r angemen t s p r o p e r to the m o d e r n episteme.

To beg in w i t h , a t h e m e comes to l ight w h i c h unt i l this p o i n t had

r ema ined unfo rmula ted , n o t to say non-ex is ten t . I t m a y seem st range that

no a t t e m p t was m a d e d u r i n g the Classical era to mathemat ic ize t he

sciences o f observa t ion , o r g r ammat i ca l learning, o r the e c o n o m i c e x ­

perience. As t h o u g h the Galilean mathemat ic iza t ion of na tu re and the

found ing o f mechanics w e r e e n o u g h o n their o w n t o accompl ish t he p r o ­

j e c t of a mathesis . T h e r e is n o t h i n g paradoxica l in th is : the analysis of

representat ions in accordance w i t h their identities a n d differences, their

o rde r ing in to p e r m a n e n t tables, au tomat ica l ly si tuated the sciences of the

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

quali tat ive in the f ie ld of a universal mathesis . At the end of the e igh teen th

cen tury , a n e w and fundamenta l division arises: n o w that the l ink be tween

representat ions i s no longer established in the v e r y m o v e m e n t that d e c o m ­

poses t h e m , the analyt ic disciplines are found to be epis temological ly d is ­

t inct f r o m those tha t are b o u n d to m a k e use of synthesis. T h e result i s tha t

on t he o n e h a n d we have a f ie ld of a priori sciences, p u r e fo rmal sciences,

deduc t ive sciences based on logic and mathemat ics , a n d on the o the r h a n d

we see t h e separate fo rma t ion of a d o m a i n of a posteriori sciences, e m p i r i ­

cal sciences, w h i c h e m p l o y the deduc t ive forms o n l y in f ragments a n d in

strictly localized regions . N o w , this division has as its consequence an

epis temological concern to discover a t s o m e o the r level the un i t y that has

been lost w i t h t he dissociation of the mathesis a n d the universal science of

o rder . H e n c e a certain n u m b e r of efforts tha t character ize m o d e r n reflec­

t ion on the sciences: the classification o f t he d o m a i n s o f k n o w l e d g e on the

basis of ma themat i c s , and the h ie ra rchy established to p r o v i d e a p r o ­

gression t o w a r d s t h e m o r e c o m p l e x and the less exact ; reflection on

empir ical m e t h o d s o f induc t ion , a n d the effort m a d e t o p r o v i d e t h e m

w i t h b o t h a phi losophical founda t ion a n d a fo rmal just if icat ion; t he

e n d e a v o u r to pur i fy , formalize, and possibly ma themat i c i ze the d o m a i n s

of economics , b io logy , and f inal ly linguistics itself. In coun te rpo in t to

these a t t empts to reconst i tu te a unified epis temological f ield, we f ind at

regular intervals t he affirmation of an impossibi l i ty: this was t h o u g h t to

be d u e ei ther to the i r reducible specificity of life (which there is an a t t e m p t

to isolate especially in the ear ly n ine teen th cen tu ry ) or to the par t icular

character o f t he h u m a n sciences, w h i c h w e r e supposedly resistant to all

me thodo log ica l r educ t ion (the a t t e m p t to define and measure this r e ­

sistance occur red mos t ly in t he second ha l f o f t he n ine teen th cen tu ry ) . In

this d o u b l e affirmation - a l te rnat ing or s imul taneous - of be ing able a n d

n o t be ing able to formalize t he empir ical , perhaps we should recognize

the g r o u n d - p l a n o f tha t p r o f o u n d event w h i c h , t o w a r d s t he e n d o f t he

e igh teen th cen tury , de tached the possibility of synthesis f r o m the space of

representat ions. I t is this even t tha t places formal izat ion, or ma thema t i c i za -

t ion, a t the v e r y hear t of a n y m o d e r n scientific pro jec t ; i t i s this event , t o o ,

that explains w h y all hasty mathemat ic iza t ion o r na ive formal izat ion o f

the empir ical seems like 'pre-cr i t ical ' d o g m a t i s m and a r e t u r n to the

plat i tudes o f Ideo logy .

We should also e v o k e a second characteristic of the m o d e r n episteme.

D u r i n g the Classical age, t he constant , fundamenta l relat ion o f k n o w l e d g e ,

even empir ical k n o w l e d g e , to a universal mathesis justified t he project

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T H E L I M I T S O F R E P R E S E N T A T I O N

- constant ly r e sumed in var ious forms - of a finally unified corpus of learn­

i n g ; this projec t assumed in tu rn , t h o u g h w i t h o u t its founda t ion u n d e r ­

g o i n g any modif icat ion, the aspect of a general science of m o v e m e n t , tha t

of a universal characteristic, tha t of a l anguage reflected u p o n and r e c o n ­

st i tuted in all its analyt ic values and all its syntactical possibilities, and ,

finally, tha t o f an alphabetical o r analytical Encyc lopaedia o f k n o w l e d g e ;

i t i s of little i m p o r t a n c e tha t these endeavours d id n o t reach fulfilment or

tha t they d id n o t ent i rely accompl ish the pu rpose that had b r o u g h t t h e m

in to be ing : t h e y all expressed, on the visible surface of events or texts , the

p r o f o u n d un i t y that t he Classical age h a d established by posi t ing the

analysis of identities and differences, and the universal possibility of t a b u ­

lated o rder , as the archaeological basis of k n o w l e d g e . So tha t Descartes ,

Leibniz, D i d e r o t , a n d d ' A l e m b e r t , even i n w h a t m a y be t e r m e d their

failure, in their unfinished or deflected achievements , r ema ined as close as

possible to w h a t const i tu ted Classical t h o u g h t . A t the beg inn ing o f t he

n ine teen th cen tury , the un i ty o f t he mathesis was fractured. D o u b l y

f ractured: first, a long the l ine d iv id ing the p u r e forms of analysis f r o m the

laws of synthesis, second, a long the l ine tha t separates, w h e n i t is a ma t t e r

o f establishing syntheses, t ranscendental subjectivity a n d the m o d e o f

be ing o f objects. These t w o forms o f fracture g ive rise t o t w o series o f

endeavours w h i c h a certain s t r iving t o w a r d s universal i ty w o u l d seem to

categorize as echoes of the Cartesian or Leibnizian under tak ings . B u t , i f we

l o o k m o r e closely, the unification o f the field o f k n o w l e d g e does n o t and

canno t h a v e t he same forms, t he same claims, o r t he same foundat ions in

the n ine teen th cen tu ry as in the Classical pe r iod . At the t i m e of Descartes

o r Leibniz, the reciprocal t ransparency o f k n o w l e d g e and ph i losophy was

total , to the p o i n t that the universal izat ion of k n o w l e d g e in a phi losophical

sys tem of t h o u g h t d id n o t requ i re a specific m o d e o f reflection. F r o m

K a n t o n w a r d , the p r o b l e m i s qu i te different; k n o w l e d g e can no l onge r be

dep loyed against t he b a c k g r o u n d of a unified and unifying mathesis . On

the o n e hand , there arises t he p r o b l e m of the relations b e t w e e n the formal

field and the t ranscendental field (and at this level all the empir ica l c o n ­

tents o f k n o w l e d g e are placed b e t w e e n parentheses and r ema in suspended

f r o m all va l id i ty) ; and, on the o the r hand , there arises the p r o b l e m of the

relations b e t w e e n the d o m a i n o f empir ic i ty and the t ranscendental founda ­

t ion of k n o w l e d g e (in w h i c h case the p u r e o rde r of the formal is set apar t

as n o n - p e r t i n e n t to a n y accoun t of that r eg ion in w h i c h all exper ience ,

even that o f t he p u r e forms o f t h o u g h t , has its founda t ion) . B u t in b o t h

these cases the phi losophical t h o u g h t concerned w i t h universal i ty is on a

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

different level f r o m that of the field of real k n o w l e d g e ; i t is cons t i tu ted

ei ther as p u r e reflection capable of providing a foundation, or as a r e s u m p ­

t ion capable of revealing. T h e first of these forms of ph i losophy m a n i ­

fested itself initially in Fichte 's unde r t ak ing to deduce genetical ly the

total i ty o f the t ranscendental d o m a i n f r o m the p u r e , universal , and e m p t y

laws of t h o u g h t ; diis opened up a field of i nqu i ry in w h i c h an a t t e m p t is

m a d e ei ther to reduce all t ranscendental reflection to t he analysis of

formalisms, or to discover , in t ranscendental subjectivi ty, a basis for t he

possibility of all formal ism. T h e second phi losophical pa th appeared first

o f all w i t h Hege l i an p h e n o m e n o l o g y , w h e n the total i ty o f the empir ical

d o m a i n was taken back in to t h e inter ior of a consciousness reveal ing itself

to itself as spirit, in o the r w o r d s , as an empir ical and a t ranscendental field

s imul taneously .

I t i s thus appa ren t h o w the phenomeno log i ca l task tha t Husserl was

later to set h imsel f is l inked, in its p ro foundes t possibilities and imposs i ­

bilities, to the dest iny of W e s t e r n ph i losophy as i t was established in the

n ine teen th cen tu ry . I t is t r y ing , in effect, to anchor the r ights and l imi ta ­

t ions of a formal logic in a reflection of the t ranscendental type , and also

to l ink t ranscendental subjectivity to t he implici t h o r i z o n of empir ica l

contents , w h i c h i t a lone contains the possibili ty of cons t i tu t ing , m a i n t a i n ­

ing , and o p e n i n g up by means o f infinite explici tat ions. B u t perhaps i t

does n o t escape t he dange r that , even before p h e n o m e n o l o g y , threatens

every dialectical u n d e r t a k i n g and causes i t to topp le ove r , wi l ly-ni l ly ,

in to an a n t h r o p o l o g y . I t is p r o b a b l y impossible to g ive empir ica l contents

t ranscendental va lue , or to displace t h e m in the d i rec t ion of a-const i tuent

subjectivity, w i t h o u t g iv ing rise, at least silently, to an a n t h r o p o l o g y -

that is, to a m o d e of t h o u g h t in w h i c h the r ightful l imitat ions of acquired

k n o w l e d g e (and consequent ly of all empir ical k n o w l e d g e ) are a t the same

t ime the concre te forms of existence, precisely as they are g iven in tha t

same empir ical k n o w l e d g e .

T h e m o s t distant consequences - and the m o s t difficult ones for us to

evade - of the fundamenta l even t tha t occur red in the W e s t e r n episteme

t o w a r d s the end o f the e igh teen th cen tu ry m a y be s u m m e d up as fo l lows:

negat ively , the d o m a i n o f the p u r e forms o f k n o w l e d g e becomes isolated,

a t ta ining b o t h a u t o n o m y a n d sovere ign ty in relat ion to all empir ica l

k n o w l e d g e , causing the endless b i r th a n d reb i r th of a project to formalize

the concre te and to const i tu te , in spite of eve ry th ing , p u r e sciences;

posi t ively, the empir ical d o m a i n s b e c o m e l inked w i t h reflections on s u b ­

jec t iv i ty , the h u m a n be ing , and finitude, assuming the va lue and function

248

C H A P T E R 8

Labour, Life, Language

I T H E N E W E M P I R I C I T I E S

W e have n o w advanced a l o n g w a y b e y o n d the historical even t w e w e r e

conce rned w i t h si tuat ing - a l o n g w a y b e y o n d the chronologica l edges of

the rift tha t divides in d e p t h the episteme of the W e s t e r n w o r l d , and isolates

for us the beg inn ing of a cer ta in modem m a n n e r of k n o w i n g empirici t ies.

This is because t he t h o u g h t tha t i s c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s w i t h us, and w i t h

w h i c h , wi l ly-ni l ly , we th ink , i s still largely d o m i n a t e d by the impossibi l i ty,

b r o u g h t to l ight t owards the end o f the e igh teen th cen tury , o f basing

syntheses in the space of representa t ion, and by the correlat ive obl iga t ion -

s imul taneous b u t immed ia t e ly d iv ided against itself - to o p e n up the

t ranscendental f ie ld of subjectivity, and to const i tu te inversely, b e y o n d

the object , w h a t are for us the 'quasi- t ranscendentals ' of Life, Labour , and

Language . In o rde r to b r ing abou t the emergence o f this obl iga t ion and

this impossibil i ty in all the harshness of their historical i r rup t ion , i t was

necessary to let analysis r u n r igh t t h r o u g h the t h o u g h t that f inds its source

in such a chasm; i t was necessary that verba l fo rmula t ion should waste no

t i m e in t ravers ing the dest iny o r slope o f m o d e r n t h o u g h t in o rde r to

reach a t last t he p o i n t w h e r e i t cou ld t u rn back : this clari ty of ou r day ,

still pale b u t perhaps decisive, tha t enables us, i f n o t to avo id entirely, a t

least to d o m i n a t e by f ragments , and to mas ter to s o m e ex ten t w h a t , f r o m

that t h o u g h t f o r m e d on the threshold of the m o d e r n age, still reaches us,

invests us, and serves as a con t inuous g r o u n d for o u r discourse. A n d yet the

o the r ha l f of the event - p r o b a b l y the m o r e impor t an t , for i t concerns in

their v e r y be ing , in their roo ts , the positivities by w h i c h o u r empir ical

forms of k n o w l e d g e are sustained - has r ema ined in suspense; and it is this

o the r ha l f that w e m u s t n o w analyse.

In a first phase - w h i c h extends chronologica l ly f rom 1775 to 1795,

and w h o s e conf igura t ion we can indicate by means o f the w o r k s o f Smi th ,

250

L A B O U R , L I F E , L A N G U A G E

2 5 1

Jussieu, and Wi lk in s - the concepts of l abour , o rgan i sm, and g rammat i ca l

sys tem had been in t roduced - or r e in t roduced w i t h a par t icular status -

in to the analysis of representat ions and in to the tabula ted space in w h i c h

that analysis h a d h i the r to been dep loyed . No d o u b t their funct ion was

still on ly to p rov ide au thor i ty for this analysis, to a l low the es tabl ishment

of identities and differences, and to p rov ide the too l - a sort of qual i ta t ive

yardst ick - for the o rde r ing of na tu re . B u t ne i ther labour , n o r the g r a m ­

matical system, n o r o rgan ic s t ructure cou ld be defined, o r established, by

the s imple process w h e r e b y representa t ion was decomposed , analysed,

and recomposed , thus represent ing itself to itself in a p u r e dupl ica t ion ;

the space of analysis could n o t fail, therefore, to lose its a u t o n o m y . H e n c e ­

forth, the table, ceasing to be the g r o u n d of all possible orders , t he m a t r i x

of all relations, t he f o r m in accordance w i t h w h i c h all beings are dis tr i ­

bu ted in their s ingular individual i ty , forms no m o r e than a th in surface

f i lm for k n o w l e d g e ; t he adjacencies i t expresses, the e l ementa ry identities

i t c ircumscribes and w h o s e repet i t ion i t shows , the resemblances i t dis­

solves by displaying t h e m , the constants i t makes i t possible to scan - these

are n o t h i n g m o r e than the effects of certain syntheses, o r s tructures, o r

systems, w h i c h reside far b e y o n d all t he divisions that can be o rde red on

the basis of the visible. T h e visible o rde r , w i t h its p e r m a n e n t g r id of dis t inc­

tions, is n o w on ly a superficial gl i t ter a b o v e an abyss.

T h e space of W e s t e r n k n o w l e d g e i s n o w abou t to topp le : the taxinomia,

w h o s e great , universal expanse ex tended in corre la t ion w i t h the possibility

of a mathesis , and w h i c h const i tu ted the d o w n - b e a t of k n o w l e d g e - a t

once its p r i m a r y possibility and the end of its perfect ion - is n o w a b o u t to

o rde r itself in accordance w i t h an obscure vert ical i ty: a vert ical i ty tha t is

to define the l a w of resemblances, prescribe all adjacencies and d iscont in­

uities, p rov ide t he foundat ion for percept ible a r rangements , a n d displace

all the great hor izonta l dep loymen t s of the taxinomia t o w a r d s the s o m e ­

w h a t accessory reg ion of consequences. T h u s , E u r o p e a n cul ture i s i nven t ­

ing for itself a d e p t h in w h i c h w h a t mat te r s is no longer identities,

distinctive characters , p e r m a n e n t tables w i t h all their possible paths and

routes , b u t great h idden forces deve loped on the basis o f their p r imi t ive

and inaccessible nucleus , or ig in , causality, a n d his tory . F r o m n o w on

things will be represented o n l y f rom the depths of this densi ty w i t h d r a w n

into itself, p e r h a p s b lu r red and da rkened by its obscur i ty , b u t b o u n d

t ight ly to themselves , assembled or d iv ided, inescapably g r o u p e d by

the v i g o u r that i s h idden d o w n b e l o w , in those depths . Visible forms ,

their connect ions , the b lank spaces tha t isolate t h e m and s u r r o u n d their

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

outl ines - all these wil l n o w be presented to o u r gaze on ly in an a l ready

c o m p o s e d state, a l ready art iculated in that ne ther darkness that is f o m e n t ­

ing t h e m w i t h t i m e .

T h e n - a n d this is the second phase of the even t - k n o w l e d g e in its

posi t ivi ty changes its na tu re a n d its fo rm. I t w o u l d be false - and a b o v e

all inadequate - to a t t r ibu te this m u t a t i o n to the d iscovery of h i the r to

u n k n o w n objects, such as t he g rammat i ca l sys tem of Sanskrit , o r the

re la t ion b e t w e e n ana tomica l a r r angement s and o rgan ic functions in

l iving beings , o r t he e c o n o m i c role o f capital. A n d i t w o u l d be no m o r e

accurate to imag ine tha t general g r a m m a r b e c a m e ph i lo logy , na tura l

h i s tory b io logy , a n d the analysis of wea l th poli t ical e c o n o m y , because all

these m o d e s o f k n o w l e d g e cor rec ted their m e t h o d s , c ame closer to their

objects, rat ional ized their concepts , selected be t te r mode ls of formal iza­

t ion - in shor t , because they freed themselves f r o m their prehistories

t h r o u g h a sort of auto-analysis achieved by reason itself. W h a t changed

a t the t u rn of the cen tury , a n d u n d e r w e n t an i r remediable modif icat ion,

was k n o w l e d g e itself as an an ter ior and indivisible m o d e of be ing be tween

the k n o w i n g subject a n d the object o f k n o w l e d g e ; i f there w e r e those w h o

began to s tudy the cost o f p r o d u c t i o n , and i f the ideal and p r imi t ive

bar te r s i tuat ion was no l onge r e m p l o y e d as a means of analysing the crea­

t ion of va lue , i t i s because, a t t he archaeological level, exchange h a d been

replaced as a fundamenta l f igure in the space of k n o w l e d g e by p r o d u c t i o n ,

b r i n g i n g in to v i e w on the o n e h a n d n e w k n o w a b l e objects (such as

capital) and prescr ib ing, on the o ther , n e w concepts and n e w m e t h o d s

(such as the analysis of fo rms of p r o d u c t i o n ) . Similarly, if, after Cuv ie r ,

research was directed t o w a r d s t he internal organic s t ructure of l iving

beings , and i f in o rde r to m a k e this possible the m e t h o d s of compara t i ve

a n a t o m y w e r e used, i t is because Life, as a fundamenta l f o r m of k n o w ­

ledge, had also p r o d u c e d n e w objects (such as the relat ion of character to

funct ion) and n e w m e t h o d s (such as the search for analogies) . Finally, i f

G r i m m and B o p p a t t e m p t e d t o define the laws o f v o w e l g rada t ion o r

consonan t m u t a t i o n , i t is because Discourse as a m o d e of k n o w l e d g e had

been replaced by Language , w h i c h defines objects n o t h i t he r to apparen t

(such as families of languages w h o s e g r a m m a t i c a l systems are analogous)

and prescribes m e t h o d s that had n o t previous ly been e m p l o y e d (analysis

o f the rules g o v e r n i n g the modif icat ions o f consonants and vowe l s ) .

P r o d u c t i o n , life, l anguage - we m u s t n o t seek to cons t rue these as objects

tha t imposed themselves f r o m the outs ide, a s t h o u g h by their o w n w e i g h t

and as a result of some a u t o n o m o u s pressure, u p o n a b o d y of learning

252

L A B O U R , L I F E , L A N G U A G E

253

tha t h a d i gno red t h e m for t oo l o n g ; n o r m u s t we see t h e m as concepts

g radua l ly bui l t u p , o w i n g t o n e w m e t h o d s , t h r o u g h the progress o f

sciences advanc ing towards their o w n rat ional i ty . T h e y are fundamenta l

m o d e s of k n o w l e d g e w h i c h sustain in their flawless un i t y t he secondary

and der ived corre la t ion o f n e w sciences a n d techniques w i t h u n p r e c e ­

d e n t e d objects. T h e const i tu t ion of these fundamenta l m o d e s i s doubt less

bur ied deep d o w n in the dense archaeological layers: o n e can, n e v e r t h e ­

less, discern s o m e signs of t h e m in the w o r k s of Ricardo , in the case of

economics , o f Cuv ie r , in the case o f b io logy , and of B o p p , in the case o f

ph i lo logy .

I I R I C A R D O

In A d a m Smi th ' s analysis, l abour o w e d its pr iv i leged posi t ion to the p o w e r

i t was recognized to possess to establish a cons tant measure be tween the

values of th ings ; i t m a d e i t possible to achieve equivalence in the exchange

o f objects o f need w h o s e s tandardizat ion w o u l d o therwise have been

exposed to change , o r subjected to an essential relat ivi ty. B u t i t co u l d

assume such a ro le o n l y a t t he pr ice of o n e cond i t ion : i t was necessary to

suppose that t he quan t i ty of l abour indispensable for the p r o d u c t i o n of a

th ing was equal to the quan t i ty o f l abour tha t the th ing , in re tu rn , cou ld

b u y in the process o f exchange . N o w , h o w could this ident i ty be justified?

On w h a t cou ld i t be based, i f n o t on a certain assimilation accepted as

tak ing place in the m o r e than i l lumined s h a d o w ly ing b e t w e e n l abour as

p roduc t ive act ivi ty and l abour as a c o m m o d i t y that can be b o u g h t a n d

sold? In the second sense, l abour canno t be used as a constant measure ,

since i t 'is subject to as m a n y fluctuations as the c o m m o d i t i e s c o m p a r e d

w i t h i t ' [ i ] . In A d a m Smi th , this confusion or ig ina ted in the precedence

accorded to representa t ion: all merchandise represented a certain labour ,

and all l abour cou ld represent a certain quan t i ty of merchandise . M e n ' s

act ivi ty and the va lue of things w e r e seen as c o m m u n i c a t i n g in t he

cransparent e lement of representa t ion. I t is here that Ricardo ' s analysis

finds its place a n d the reason for its decisive impor t ance . It is n o t t he

f i r s t to give l abour an i m p o r t a n t place in t he e c o n o m i c process; b u t i t

explodes the un i t y of that no t ion , and singles o u t in a radical fashion, for

the f i r s t t ime , the w o r k e r ' s energy , toil, and t i m e that are b o u g h t and sold,

and the act ivi ty that i s a t the or ig in of the va lue of th ings . On the o n e

hand, then , we are left w i t h the l abour con t r ibu ted by the w o r k e r s ,

accepted o r d e m a n d e d by the en t repreneurs , and r emune ra t ed by w a g e s ;

T H B O R D E R O F T H I N G S

on the o ther , we h a v e the l abour tha t extracts metals, p roduces c o m ­

modi t ies , manufac tures objects , t ranspor ts merchandise , a n d thus fo rms

exchangeable values w h i c h d id n o t exist before i t and w o u l d never h a v e

arisen w i t h o u t it .

I t is t r u e that , for R ica rdo as for Smi th , l abour can measure t he

equivalence o f merchandise w h i c h takes pa r t in the circulat ion o f

exchanges :

In the early stages of society, the exchangeable va lue of these c o m m o d i ­

ties, o r the ru le w h i c h de te rmines h o w m u c h o f o n e should be g iven in

exchange for ano the r , depends a lmos t exclusively on the compara t i ve

quan t i ty of l abou r expended on each [2].

B u t the difference b e t w e e n Smi th a n d Rica rdo is th is : for t he first, l abour ,

because it is analysable i n to days of subsistence, can be used as a un i t

c o m m o n to all o t h e r merchandise ( including even t h e c o m m o d i t i e s

necessary to subsistence themselves) ; for t he second, the quan t i t y of l abour

makes i t possible to d e t e r m i n e the va lue of a th ing , n o t o n l y because t he

th ing is representable in uni ts of w o r k , b u t first and foremost because

l abour as a p r o d u c i n g act ivi ty is ' t h e source of all va lue ' . Va lue can no

longer be defined, as in the Classical age , on the basis of a total sys tem of

equivalences, a n d o f the capaci ty tha t c o m m o d i t i e s have o f represent ing

o n e ano ther . Va lue has ceased to be a sign, i t has b e c o m e a p r o d u c t . If

th ings are w o r t h as m u c h as t he l abour d e v o t e d to t h e m , or i f their va lue

is at least p r o p o r t i o n a t e to tha t l abour , i t is n o t tha t l abour is a f ixed a n d

cons tant va lue exchangeable as such in all places a n d a11 t imes , it is because

any va lue , w h a t e v e r i t m a y be , has its or ig in in l abour . A n d the best

p r o o f o f this i s tha t the va lue of th ings increases w i t h t he quan t i t y o f

l abour that m u s t b e d e v o t e d t o t h e m i f w e wish t o p r o d u c e t h e m ; b u t i t

does n o t change w i t h the increase o r decrease o f the wages for w h i c h

labour , l ike all o the r c o m m o d i t i e s , is exchanged [3]. As they circulate

t h r o u g h the marke t , wh i l e they are be ing exchanged for o n e ano ther ,

values still h a v e a p o w e r of representa t ion. B u t this p o w e r i s d r a w n f r o m

elsewhere - f r o m the l abou r tha t i s m o r e p r imi t i ve and m o r e radical than

all representa t ion, and tha t cannot , in consequence , be defined by exchange .

W h e r e a s in Classical t h o u g h t t rade and exchange serve as an indispensable

basis for t he analysis of wea l th (and this is still t rue of Smi th ' s analysis, in

w h i c h the division of l abou r i s g o v e r n e d by the criteria of ba r te r ) , after

R ica rdo , the possibility of exchange i s based u p o n l abour ; a n d hencefor th

the theo ry o f p r o d u c t i o n m u s t a lways precede tha t o f circulat ion.

254

LABOUR, LIFE, LANGUAGE

255

H e n c e three consequences to be b o r n e in m i n d . T h e f i r s t i s t he es tab­

lishing of a causal series w h i c h is radically n e w in its fo rm. T h e e igh teen th

cen tu ry was n o t i gnoran t - far f rom i t - of the play of e c o n o m i c de te r ­

mina t ions : i t h a d p r o v i d e d explanat ions o f h o w m o n e y could f low in to a

c o u n t r y o r o u t o f it, h o w prices rose o r fell, h o w p r o d u c t i o n g r e w ,

s tagnated, o r d imin ished ; bu t all these m o v e m e n t s w e r e defined on the

basis of a tabula ted space in w h i c h all values w e r e able to represent o n e

ano the r ; prices increased w h e n the represent ing elements increased faster

t h a n the e lements represented; p r o d u c t i o n d iminished w h e n the ins t ru­

m e n t s o f representa t ion d iminished in relat ion to the th ings to be r e p r e ­

sented, etc . It was a lways a quest ion of a circular and surface causality,

since i t was neve r conce rned w i t h a n y t h i n g b u t the reciprocal p o w e r s o f

tha t w h i c h was analysing and tha t w h i c h was analysed. F r o m Rica rdo on ,

l abour , h a v i n g been displaced in its re lat ion to representat ion, a n d in ­

stalled in a r eg ion w h e r e representa t ion has no p o w e r , is o rgan ized in

accordance w i t h a causality pecul iar to itself. T h e quan t i t y of l abou r

necessary for t he manufac tu re (or harves t ing , or t ranspor t ing) of a th ing ,

and d e t e r m i n i n g its va lue , depends u p o n the forms o f p r o d u c t i o n :

p r o d u c t i o n wi l l be modif ied accord ing to the degree o f division o f l abour ,

the quan t i ty a n d na tu re o f the tools used, t he mass o f capital the e n t r e ­

p r e n e u r has a t his disposal, and the a m o u n t he has invested in the f i t t ing

o u t of his fac tory; in certain cases i t wi l l be cost ly; in o thers i t wil l be less

so [4] . B u t since this cost (wages, capital a n d income , profits) is in eve ry

case d e t e r m i n e d by l abour a l ready accompl ished and applied to this n e w

p r o d u c t i o n , we see t h e e m e r g e n c e of a great l inear, h o m o g e n e o u s series,

w h i c h is tha t of p r o d u c t i o n . All l abour gives a result w h i c h , in o n e f o r m or

ano the r , is appl ied to a further l abour w h o s e cost i t defines; and this n e w

l abou r part icipates in t u r n in t he creat ion of a va lue , etc . This a c c u m u l a ­

t ion in series breaks for t he f i r s t t i m e w i t h the reciprocal de te rmina t ions

that w e r e t he sole act ive factors in the Classical analysis of wea l th . I t

in t roduces , by its v e r y existence, t he possibili ty of a con t inuous historical

t ime , even i f in fact, as we shall see, R ica rdo conceives of the evo lu t ion

ahead on ly as a s lowing d o w n and , at mos t , a total suspension of h is tory .

At t he level o f t he condi t ions o f possibili ty pe r ta in ing to t h o u g h t , R ica rdo ,

by dissociating the creat ion o f va lue f r o m its representat ivi ty , m a d e

possible the ar t iculat ion o f economics u p o n h is tory . ' W e a l t h ' , instead o f

be ing dis t r ibuted over a table and the reby cons t i tu t ing a sys tem of equ iva ­

lences, is o rgan ized and accumula ted in a t e m p o r a l sequence: all va lue is

de te rmined , n o t accord ing to the ins t ruments that p e r m i t its analysis, b u t

THE ORDER OF THINGS

accord ing to the condi t ions o f p r o d u c t i o n that h a v e b r o u g h t i t in to be ing ;

and , even p r io r to that , the condi t ions in ques t ion are d e t e r m i n e d by the

quanti t ies o f l abou r applied in p r o d u c i n g t h e m . E v e n before e c o n o m i c

reflection was l inked to the h is tory of events or societies in an explicit

discourse, t he m o d e o f be ing o f economics h a d been pene t ra ted , and

p r o b a b l y for a l o n g whi le , by historici ty. T h e m o d e o f be ing o f economics

is no longer l inked to a s imul taneous space of differences and identit ies,

b u t t o the t i m e o f successive p roduc t ions .

T h e second, no less decisive, consequence i s concerned w i t h the n o t i o n

of scarcity. For Classical analysis, scarcity was defined in relat ion to need :

i t was accepted tha t scarcity b e c a m e m o r e p r o n o u n c e d , o r was displaced,

a s needs increased o r t o o k on n e w fo rms ; for those w h o are h u n g r y ,

w h e a t i s scarce; bu t for t he r ich w h o m a k e up society, d i a m o n d s are

scarce. T h e economis ts of t he e ighteenth cen tu ry - w h e t h e r Physiocrats

or n o t - t h o u g h t tha t land, or l abour applied to t he land, m a d e i t possible

to o v e r c o m e this scarcity, a t least in pa r t : this was because the land had the

marve l lous p r o p e r t y of be ing able to account for far m o r e needs than

those, of the m e n cul t ivat ing it . In Classical t h o u g h t , scarcity comes a b o u t

because m e n represent t o themselves objects tha t they do n o t h a v e ; b u t

there is w e a l t h because t he land produces , in s o m e abundance , objects that

are n o t immed ia t e ly c o n s u m e d and that can therefore represent o thers in

the processes o f exchange and the circulat ion of wea l th . R ica rdo inverts

t he t e rms of this analysis: t he apparen t generos i ty of the land is due , in

fact, to its g r o w i n g avar ice; w h a t is p r i m a r y is n o t need a n d the represen­

ta t ion of need in m e n ' s m i n d s , i t is mere ly a fundamenta l insufficiency.

In fact, l abour - tha t is, e c o n o m i c act ivi ty - d id n o t make its appearance

in w o r l d h is tory unt i l m e n became t oo n u m e r o u s to be able to subsist on

t he spontaneous fruits o f the land. S o m e , lacking the means of subsistence,

died, a n d m a n y o thers w o u l d have died had t h e y n o t b e g u n t o w o r k the

land. A n d as the popu l a t i on increased, n e w areas of forest h a d to be felled,

cleared, and b r o u g h t u n d e r cul t ivat ion. At every m o m e n t o f its h is tory ,

h u m a n i t y i s hencefor th l abour ing u n d e r the threa t o f dea th : a n y p o p u l a ­

t ion that canno t find n e w resources i s d o o m e d to ex t inc t ion ; and, inversely,

t o the degree that m e n mul t ip ly , so they under t ake m o r e n u m e r o u s , m o r e

distant, m o r e difficult, and less immed ia t e ly fruitful labours . Since the

prospect of dea th becomes p ropor t iona t e ly m o r e fearful as the necessary

means of subsistence b e c o m e m o r e difficult of access, so, inversely,

l abou r m u s t g r o w in intensi ty and e m p l o y all possible means to m a k e

itself m o r e prolific. W h a t makes economics possible, and necessary, then ,

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257

is a perpe tua l and fundamenta l s i tuat ion of scarcity: conf ron ted by a

na tu re that in itself is inert and, save for one v e r y small par t , bar ren , m a n

risks his life. I t is no longer in the interplay of representa t ion that economics

finds its pr inciple , bu t near that per i lous reg ion w h e r e life is in conf ron ta ­

t ion w i t h dea th . A n d thus economics refers us to that o r d e r o f s o m e w h a t

a m b i g u o u s considerat ions w h i c h m a y be t e r m e d an th ropo log ica l : i t i s

related, in fact, to the biological proper t ies of a h u m a n species, w h i c h , as

Mal thus s h o w e d in the same per iod as Ricardo , tends a lways to increase

unless p reven ted by some r e m e d y or const ra int ; i t is related also to t he

si tuat ion of those l iving beings that r u n the risk of n o t f inding in their

na tura l e n v i r o n m e n t e n o u g h to ensure their existence; lastly, i t designates

in labour , and in the v e r y hardship o f that l abour , the on ly means o f

o v e r c o m i n g the fundamenta l insufficiency o f na tu re and o f t r i u m p h i n g

for an instant o v e r death . T h e posi t iv i ty of economics is si tuated in that

an thropolog ica l h o l l o w . Homo oeconomicus is n o t the h u m a n be ing w h o

represents his o w n needs to himself, and the objects capable of satisfying

t h e m ; he is the h u m a n be ing w h o spends, wears ou t , and wastes his life in

evad ing the i m m i n e n c e of death . He is a finite be ing : and jus t as, since

Kan t , the ques t ion o f f ini tude has b e c o m e m o r e fundamenta l than the

analysis of representat ions (the lat ter n o w be ing necessarily a der ivat ion of

the fo rmer ) , since Ricardo , economics has rested, in a m o r e or less explici t

fashion, u p o n an a n t h r o p o l o g y tha t a t t empts to assign concre te forms to

finitude. E igh t een th -cen tu ry economics s tood in relat ion to a mathesis as

to a general science of all possible o rde r s ; n ine teen th -cen tu ry economics

wil l be referred to an a n t h r o p o l o g y as to a discourse on m a n ' s na tura l

f ini tude. By this v e r y fact, need and desire w i t h d r a w t o w a r d s the s u b ­

jec t ive sphere - tha t sphere w h i c h , in t he same per iod , is b e c o m i n g an

object of psychology . I t i s precisely he re that in the second half of t he

n ine teenth cen tu ry the marginalists wil l seek the no t i on of uti l i ty. T h e

belief wil l then arise tha t Condi l lac , or Graslin, or For tbonnais , was

' a l ready ' a 'psychologis t ' , since he analysed value in t e rms of need ;

similarly, i t wil l be believed that the Physiocrats w e r e t he first ancestors

o f an economics wh ich , f rom Rica rdo o n w a r d s , analysed va lue in t e rms of

p roduc t ion costs. W h a t wil l have happened , in fact, i s tha t the conf igura­

t ion tha t m a d e Q u e s n a y and Condi l lac s imul taneously possible wil l h a v e

been left beh ind ; the re ign of the episteme tha t based k n o w l e d g e u p o n

the o r d e r i n g of representat ions wil l have been b r o k e n ; and a n e w

cpistemological a r r a n g e m e n t will have replaced it, an a r r a n g e m e n t

that distinguishes, t h o u g h n o t w i t h o u t referring t h e m to one ano the r ,

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

be tween a p sycho logy of needs represented and an a n t h r o p o l o g y of na tu ra l

f ini tude.

Finally, the last consequence concerns t he evo lu t ion of economics .

R ica rdo shows tha t we should no t in te rpre t as a sign of na ture ' s fruitfulness

tha t w h i c h indicates, a n d in an ever m o r e insistent m a n n e r , its essential

avarice. T h e ' r en t o f land ' , w h i c h all economis ts , up to a n d inc lud ing

A d a m Smi th himself [5], saw as the sign of a fruitfulness p r o p e r to land,

exists precisely in so far as agr icul tural l abou r becomes increasingly h a r d

and less and less ' r en tab le ' . As one is forced by the un in t e r rup t ed g r o w t h

of the popu la t ion to clear a n d cul t ivate less fertile tracts of land, so the

harves t ing o f these n e w units o f w h e a t requires m o r e and m o r e l abour :

ei ther because t he land m u s t be p l o u g h e d m o r e deeply, or because a

grea ter surface m u s t be s o w n , or because m o r e fertilizer i s needed ; the

cost of p r o d u c t i o n is thus m u c h h ighe r for these later harvests than i t was

for t he first ones , w h i c h w e r e ob ta ined or iginal ly f r o m r ich and fertile

lands. N o w , these commod i t i e s , t h o u g h so difficult to p r o d u c e , a re no

less indispensable than the o thers i f one does n o t wish a certain p o r t i o n of

h u m a n i t y to die of h u n g e r . I t i s therefore the cost o f p r o d u c t i o n of w h e a t

g r o w n on the m o s t ba r ren o f the available land tha t wi l l de t e rmine the

price o f w h e a t i n general , even t h o u g h i t m a y have been ob ta ined w i t h

t w o or three t imes less l abour . This leads to an increased profi t for the

easily cult ivable lands, w h i c h wil l enable the o w n e r s of those lands to

lease t h e m o u t in r e tu rn for considerable rents . G r o u n d r en t is the effect,

n o t of a prolific na ture , b u t of the avarice of the land. N o w , this avarice

becomes m o r e percept ib le every day : the popu la t ion , in fact, increases;

progressively p o o r e r land is b r o u g h t u n d e r cul t ivat ion; the costs of

p roduc t i on increase; the prices of agr icul tural p roduc t s increase, and

g r o u n d rents w i t h t h e m . U n d e r this pressure, i t is v e r y possible - indeed

necessary - tha t the n o m i n a l w a g e of the labourers will also beg in to rise,

in o rde r to cove r the m i n i m u m costs of their subsistence; bu t , for the

same reason, their real w a g e can neve r rise in pract ice a b o v e the s u m that

i s indispensable to p rov ide t h e m w i t h c lo th ing , shelter, a n d food. A n d

finally, the profi t of the ent repreneurs wil l decrease in exact ly the same

p r o p o r t i o n as g r o u n d r en t increases, and as the labourers ' r e m u n e r a t i o n

remains fixed. I t w o u l d con t inue to decrease indefinitely, unt i l i t dis­

appeared a l together , w e r e it n o t tha t there is a l imi t to t he process: after a

certain po in t , in fact, industrial profits wil l be so l o w that i t wil l b e c o m e

impossible to p r o v i d e w o r k for n e w w o r k e r s ; for lack o f addi t ional wages ,

the l abour force wil l no longer be able to g r o w , and the popu la t ion wil l

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r ema in constant ; i t wil l no longer be necessary to clear and cul t ivate

fresh tracts of land even m o r e infertile than the previous ones; g r o u n d

ren t wi l l reach a ceiling and wil l cease to exer t its cus tomary pressure u p o n

industr ial profi ts , w h i c h wi l l then b e c o m e stabilized. T h e t ide o f H i s t o ry

wi l l at last b e c o m e slack. M a n ' s f initude wil l have been defined - once and

for all, tha t is, for an indefinite t ime .

Paradoxical ly , i t i s the historici ty in t roduced in to economics by R ica rdo

tha t makes i t possible to conceive of this immobi l i za t ion of H i s to ry .

Classical t h o u g h t , o f course , conce ived of the e c o n o m y as possessing

an ever open , eve r -chang ing future ; b u t t he t ype o f modif ica t ion in q u e s ­

t ion was , in fact, spatial: the table tha t w e a l t h was supposed to f o r m as

i t was displayed, exchanged , a n d a r ranged in o rder , co u l d v e r y wel l be

en larged; in w h i c h case i t r ema ined the same table, w i t h each e l emen t

losing some of its relat ive surface, b u t en te r ing in to relations w i t h n e w

e lements . On t h e o the r hand , i t i s t he cumula t ive t ime o f popu la t ion and

p r o d u c t i o n , t h e un in t e r rup ted h is tory of scarcity, tha t makes i t possible

f r o m the n ine teen th cen tu ry t o conceive o f t he i m p o v e r i s h m e n t o f

H i s to ry , its progress ive inertia, its petrif ication, and, u l t imate ly , its s tony

i m m o b i l i t y . We see w h a t roles H i s to ry and a n t h r o p o l o g y are p lay ing

in relat ion to o n e another . H i s to ry exists (that is, l abour , p r o d u c t i o n ,

accumula t ion , and g r o w t h of real costs) o n l y in so far as m a n as a na tura l

be ing is finite: a f ini tude that is p r o l o n g e d far b e y o n d the or iginal l imits

of t he species and its i m m e d i a t e bod i ly needs , bu t tha t neve r ceases to

a c c o m p a n y , a t least in secret, the w h o l e d e v e l o p m e n t of civilizations.

T h e m o r e m a n makes h imsel f a t h o m e i n the hear t o f the w o r l d , t he

fur ther he advances in his possession of na tu re , the m o r e s t rongly also

does he feel t he pressure of his f ini tude, and the closer he comes to his o w n

dea th . H i s to ry does n o t a l l ow m a n to escape f rom his initial l imi ta t ions -

except in appearance , and i f we take t he w o r d l imi ta t ion in its superficial

sense; b u t i f w e consider t he fundamenta l f i n i t u d e o f m a n , w e perceive

tha t his an th ropo log ica l s i tuat ion neve r ceases its progress ive d ramat iza t ion

of his His to ry , neve r ceases to r ender i t m o r e per i lous , and to b r i n g i t

closer, as i t w e r e , to its o w n impossibi l i ty . T h e m o m e n t H i s t o ry reaches

such boundar ies , i t can do n o t h i n g b u t s top , qu ive r for an instant u p o n

its axis, and immob i l i z e itself forever . B u t this can occur in t w o different

w a y s : ei ther i t can m o v e gradual ly , and w i t h increasing slowness, t o w a r d s

a state of stability tha t justifies, in the indefiniteness of t ime, w h a t i t has

a lways been advanc ing t o w a r d s , w h a t i t has neve r really ceased to be

f r o m the start ; or i t m a y at tain a po in t of reversal a t w h i c h i t becomes

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fixed o n l y in so far as it suppresses w h a t it had a lways and con t inuous ly

been beforehand.

In the first solut ion (represented by Ricardo ' s 'pess imism') , H i s to ry

functions w i t h regard to an thropolog ica l de te rmina t ions as a sort of vast

compensa t ing mechan i sm; t rue , i t i s si tuated w i th in h u m a n finitude, bu t

its aspect is tha t of a posi t ive form, appear ing in relief; it enables m a n to

o v e r c o m e the scarcity to w h i c h he is d o o m e d . As this scarcity becomes

daily m o r e const r ic t ing, so l abour becomes m o r e intense; p r o d u c t i o n

increases in absolute figures, bu t , a t the same t ime , and d r iven by the

same forces, the costs of p r o d u c t i o n - that is, the quanti t ies of l abour

necessary to p r o d u c e the same object - also increase. So that there m u s t

inevi tably c o m e a t i m e w h e n labour i s no longer suppor ted by the

c o m m o d i t y i t p roduces (the latter cost ing no m o r e than the food of t he

labourer p r o d u c i n g i t ) . P r o d u c t i o n can no longer m a k e g o o d the deficit.

In w h i c h case scarcity will l imit itself (by a process of d e m o g r a p h i c

stabilization) and l abour wil l adjust itself exact ly to needs (by a de te r ­

m i n e d dis t r ibut ion o f wea l th ) . F r o m then on , f ini tude and p r o d u c t i o n

wil l be exact ly super imposed to fo rm a single f igure. A n y addi t ional

agr icul tural l abour w o u l d be useless; any excess popu la t ion w o u l d perish.

Life and dea th wil l fit exact ly one against the o ther , surface to surface,

b o t h immobi l i zed and as i t w e r e reinforced by their reciprocal an tagon i sm.

His to ry wil l have led man ' s f ini tude to that b o u n d a r y - p o i n t a t w h i c h i t

wil l appear a t last in its p u r e f o r m ; i t wil l have no m o r e m a r g i n p e r m i t t i n g

i t to escape f rom itself, i t wil l have no m o r e effort to m a k e to p rov ide a

future for itself, and no n e w lands to open up for future m e n ; subjected to

the great erosion o f Hi s to ry , m a n will gradual ly be s t r ipped o f eve ry th ing

that m i g h t h ide h i m f r o m his o w n eyes; he wil l have exhausted all t he

possible e lements tha t tend to b lur and disguise benea th the promises of

t i m e his an thropolog ica l nakedness ; by long , bu t inevitable and tyrannical

paths , His to ry wil l h a v e led m a n to the t ru th tha t br ings h i m to a halt ,

face to face w i t h himself.

In the second solut ion (represented by M a r x ) , the relat ion of His to ry to

an thropologica l f ini tude is cons t rued in the opposi te direct ion. His to ry ,

in this case, plays a nega t ive ro le : it is H i s to ry itself, in fact, tha t a u g m e n t s

the pressures o f need , that causes w a n t to increase, ob l ig ing m e n c o n ­

stantly t o w o r k and t o p r o d u c e m o r e and m o r e , a l t h o u g h they receive n o

m o r e than w h a t is indispensable to t h e m to subsist, and somet imes a little

less. So that , w i t h t ime , the p r o d u c t of l abour accumulates , wh i l e cease­

lessly e luding those w h o accomplish that l abour : these latter p r o d u c e

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infinitely m o r e than the share o f va lue that re turns to t h e m in the f o r m o f

wages , and thus p rov ide capital w i t h the possibility o f b u y i n g further

l abour . In this w a y the n u m b e r o f those main ta ined by Hi s to ry a t t he

l imit o f their condi t ions of existence ceaselessly g r o w s ; and because of

this, those condi t ions b e c o m e increasingly m o r e precar ious unt i l t hey

approach the po in t w h e r e existence itself wil l be impossible; the a c c u m u ­

lat ion o f capital , the g r o w t h o f enterprises a n d o f the i r capacities, the

constant pressure on wages , the excess of p r o d u c t i o n , all cause the l abou r

m a r k e t to shr ink, l ower ing wages and increasing u n e m p l o y m e n t .

T h r u s t back by p o v e r t y to the v e r y b r ink o f death , a w h o l e class o f m e n

exper ience , naked ly , as i t w e r e , w h a t need, h u n g e r , and labour are. W h a t

o thers a t t r ibu te to na tu re o r to the spontaneous o rde r o f things, these m e n

are able to recognize as the result of a h is tory and the al ienation of a

f ini tude that does n o t have this fo rm. For this reason they are able - t hey

a lone are able - to r e -apprehend this t r u t h of the h u m a n essence and so

restore it. B u t this can be achieved on ly by the suppression, or a t least the

reversal, of H i s to ry as i t has deve loped up to the present : then a lone wi l l

a t i m e begin w h i c h wil l have ne i ther the same form, n o r the same laws,

n o r the same m o d e o f passing.

B u t the al ternatives offered by Ricardo ' s 'pessimism' and M a r x ' s

r evo lu t ionary p romise are p r o b a b l y of little impor t ance . Such a sys tem

o f op t ions represents n o t h i n g m o r e than the t w o possible w ay s o f e x a m i n ­

ing the relations of a n t h r o p o l o g y and His to ry as they are established by

economics t h r o u g h the no t ions o f scarcity and labour . For R ica rdo ,

H i s to ry fills the vo id p r o d u c e d by an th ropo log ica l f ini tude and expressed

in a perpetua l scarcity, unt i l t he m o m e n t w h e n a p o i n t of definit ive

stabilization is a t ta ined; accord ing to the Marx is t in terpre ta t ion, H i s to ry ,

by dispossessing m a n of his labour , causes the posi t ive f o r m of his f ini tude

to spr ing in to r e l i e f - h i s mater ial t r u t h is finally l iberated. T h e r e is

cer tainly no difficulty in unders tand ing , on the level o f op in ion , h o w such

real choices w e r e dis t r ibuted, and w h y some op t ed for the first t ype o f

analysis and o thers for the second. B u t these are mere ly der ived differences

w h i c h s tem first and last f r o m a doxologica l invest igat ion and t r ea tmen t .

A t the deepest level o f W e s t e r n k n o w l e d g e , M a r x i s m in t roduced no real

d iscont inui ty ; it found its place w i t h o u t difficulty, as a full, quiet , c o m ­

fortable and, goodness k n o w s , satisfying f o r m for a t i m e (its o w n ) ,

w i th in an epis temological a r r a n g e m e n t that w e l c o m e d i t g ladly (since i t

was this a r r a n g e m e n t that was in fact m a k i n g r o o m for it) and tha t it, in

r e tu rn , had no in ten t ion o f d is turbing and, above all, no p o w e r t o mod i fy ,

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J

even o n e jot, since i t rested entirely u p o n it. M a r x i s m exists in n ine teen th -

cen tu ry t h o u g h t l ike a fish in w a t e r : that is, i t is unable to b rea the a n y ­

w h e r e else. T h o u g h i t i s in oppos i t ion to t he ' bou rgeo i s ' theories of

economics , and t h o u g h this oppos i t ion leads i t to use the project of a

radical reversal of H i s to ry as a w e a p o n against t h e m , tha t conflict a n d

tha t project nevertheless have as their cond i t ion of possibili ty, n o t t he

r e w o r k i n g of all His to ry , b u t an event t ha t a n y a rchaeo logy can situate

w i t h precision, and tha t prescr ibed s imul taneously , a n d accord ing to t he

same m o d e , b o t h n ine teen th -cen tu ry bourgeois economics and n ine t een th -

cen tu ry r evo lu t iona ry economics . The i r controvers ies m a y have stirred

up a few waves a n d caused a few surface r ipples; b u t they are no m o r e

than s torms in a chi ldren 's padd l ing poo l .

W h a t is essential is tha t at the beg inn ing of the n ine teen th cen tu ry a

n e w a r r a n g e m e n t o f k n o w l e d g e was const i tu ted, w h i c h a c c o m m o d a t e d

s imul taneously the historici ty o f economics (in relat ion to t he fo rms of

p r o d u c t i o n ) , the f ini tude of h u m a n existence (in relat ion to scarcity a n d

l abour ) , and the fulfilment of an end to H i s to ry - w h e t h e r in the f o r m of

an indefinite decelerat ion or in tha t of a radical reversal . H i s to ry , a n t h r o ­

p o l o g y , and the suspension of deve lopmen t are all l inked toge the r in

accordance w i t h a f igure tha t defines o n e of the ma jo r n e t w o r k s of

n ine teen th -cen tu ry t h o u g h t . W e k n o w , for e x a m p l e , the ro le that this

a r r a n g e m e n t p layed i n r ev iv ing the w e a r y g o o d in tent ions o f the h u m a n ­

isms; we k n o w h o w i t b r o u g h t the Utopias o f u l t ima te d e v e l o p m e n t back

to life. In Classical t h o u g h t , t he Utopia funct ioned ra ther as a fantasy of

or igins : this was because the freshness o f the w o r l d h a d to p rov ide t he

ideal unfo ld ing of a table in w h i c h eve ry th ing w o u l d be present and in

its p r o p e r place, w i t h its adjacencies, its pecul iar differences, and its

i m m e d i a t e equivalences; in this p r ima l l ight , representat ions cou ld n o t

ye t h a v e been separated f r o m the l iving, sharp, percept ib le presence of

w h a t t h e y represent . In t he n ine teen th cen tu ry , the Utopia is concerned

w i t h t he final decl ine of t ime ra ther than w i t h its m o r n i n g : this i s because

k n o w l e d g e is no l onge r const i tu ted in the f o r m of a table b u t in that of

a series, o f sequential connec t ion , and of d e v e l o p m e n t : w h e n , w i t h t he

p romised even ing , the s h a d o w of the denouement comes , t he s low erosion

o r v io len t e rup t ion o f H i s t o r y wil l cause m a n ' s an th ropo log ica l t r u t h t o

spr ing for th in its s tony i m m o b i l i t y ; calendar t i m e wi l l be able to c o n ­

t inue; b u t i t wi l l be , as i t w e r e , vo id , for historici ty wil l have been super­

imposed exact ly u p o n the h u m a n essence. T h e f l o w o f d e v e l o p m e n t , w i t h

all its resources of d r a m a , obl iv ion , alienation, wil l be he ld w i t h i n an

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anthropologica l f initude w h i c h finds in t h e m , in turn , its o w n i l luminated

expression. Finitude, w i t h its t ru th , is posi ted in time; and time is therefore

f in i te . T h e grea t d r e a m of an end to His to ry is the Utopia of causal systems

of t h o u g h t , j u s t as the d r e a m of the w o r l d ' s beginnings was the Utopia o f

the classifying systems of t hough t .

This a r r a n g e m e n t main ta ined its f i rm g r ip on t h o u g h t for a l ong

wh i l e ; and Nietzsche , a t the end of the n ine teen th cen tury , m a d e i t g l o w

in to brightness again for the last t ime by set t ing fire to it. He t o o k the

end o f t ime and t ransformed i t in to the dea th o f G o d and the odyssey o f

the last m a n ; he t o o k up anthropologica l f ini tude once again, b u t in

o rde r to use i t as a basis for the prodig ious leap of the supe rman ; he t o o k

up once again t he great con t inuous chain o f His to ry , b u t in o rde r to b e n d

i t r o u n d in to the infinity of the eternal re tu rn . I t is in vain that the dea th

o f G o d , t he i m m i n e n c e o f the superman , and the p romise and t e r ro r o f

the great year take up once m o r e , as i t w e r e t e r m by t e rm , the elements

that are a r ranged in n ine teen th-cen tury t h o u g h t and f o r m its a r chaeo­

logical f r amework . T h e fact remains that t hey sent all these stable forms

up in f lames , tha t t hey used their charred remains to d r a w s t range and

perhaps impossible faces; and by a l ight that m a y be ei ther - we do n o t

yet k n o w w h i c h - the rev iv ing f lame of the last great fire or an indicat ion

o f t he d a w n , we see the emergence o f w h a t m a y perhaps be the space o f

c o n t e m p o r a r y t hough t . I t was Nietzsche, in any case, w h o b u r n e d for us,

even before we w e r e b o r n , the in te rming led promises o f the dialectic and

a n t h r o p o l o g y .

I l l C U V I E R

In his project for establishing a classification tha t w o u l d be as faithful as a

m e t h o d and as strict as a system, Jussieu had discovered the rule of t he

subord ina t ion of characters, j u s t as Smi th h a d used the constant va lue of

l abour to establish the na tura l pr ice of things in the p lay of equivalences.

A n d jus t as Ricardo freed l abour f r o m its ro le as a measure in o rde r to

in t roduce it, p r io r to all exchange , in to the genera l forms of p r o d u c t i o n ,

so C u v i e r freed the subord ina t ion of characters f r o m its t a x o n o m i c func­

t ion in o rde r to in t roduce it, p r io r to any classification tha t m i g h t occur ,

i n to the var ious organic s t ructural plans o f l iving beings. T h e internal

l ink by w h i c h structures are dependen t u p o n o n e ano the r i s no longer

si tuated solely a t the level of f requency; i t becomes the v e r y founda t ion of

all corre la t ion. It is this displacement and this invers ion tha t Geoffroy

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Saint-Hilaire expressed w h e n he said: ' O r g a n i c s t ructure is b e c o m i n g an

abstract be ing . . . capable of assuming n u m e r o u s fo rms ' [6 ] . T h e space of

l iving beings pivots a r o u n d this no t ion , and every th ing that unti l t hen

had been able to m a k e itself visible t h r o u g h the gr id o f na tura l h is tory

(genera, species, individuals , s t ructures , o rgans) , eve ry th ing that had been

presented to v i e w , n o w takes on a n e w m o d e o f be ing .

First and foremost are those distinct g roups of e lements that the eye is

able to art iculate as i t scans the bodies of individuals, and that are called

organs. In Classical analysis, t he o r g a n was defined by b o t h its s t ruc ture

and its funct ion; i t was like a doub l e - en t ry system w h i c h could be read

exhaust ively ei ther f rom the p o i n t o f v i e w of t he ro le i t p layed ( rep ro ­

duc t ion , for example ) , or f r o m that of its morpho log ica l variables ( form,

m a g n i t u d e , a r r angemen t , and n u m b e r ) : the t w o m o d e s o f dec iphe rmen t

coincided exact ly, bu t they w e r e nevertheless independen t o f o n e ano the r

- the first expressing the utilizable, the second the identifiable. It is this

a r r angemen t that C u v i e r o v e r t h r o w s : d o i n g a w a y w i t h the postulates o f

b o t h their coincidence and their independence , he gives funct ion p r o m i n ­

ence ove r the o rgan - and to a large ex ten t - a n d subjects t he a r r a n g e m e n t

o f the o rgan to the sovere ignty o f function. He rejects, i f n o t the in ­

dividual i ty of the o rgan , at least its independence : i t is an e r ro r to believe

that ' eve ry th ing i s i m p o r t a n t in an i m p o r t a n t o r g a n ' ; o u r a t tent ion m u s t

be directed ' r a ther u p o n the functions themselves than u p o n the o rgans ' [ 7 ] ;

before defining organs by their variables, we m u s t relate t h e m to the

functions they pe r fo rm. N o w , these functions are relatively few in n u m ­

ber : respirat ion, digest ion, circulat ion, l o c o m o t i o n . . . S o the visible

diversi ty of structures no longer emerges f rom the b a c k g r o u n d of a table

of variables, b u t f r o m the b a c k g r o u n d of a few great functional units

capable of be ing realized and of accompl ishing their aims in var ious w a y s :

W h a t i s c o m m o n in all animals to each k ind of o rgan considered r e ­

duces itself to v e r y little indeed, and often organs resemble o n e ano the r

on ly in the effect they p r o d u c e . This mus t have been especially s tr iking

as regards respirat ion, w h i c h operates in the different classes by means

of o rgans so var ious tha t their s tructures offer no points in c o m m o n [ 8 ] .

W h e n we consider the o r g a n in relat ion to its function, we see, therefore,

the emergence of ' resemblances ' w h e r e there is no ' identical ' e l ement ; a

resemblance that i s const i tu ted by the transi t ion of the funct ion in to

ev ident invisibility. I t mat te rs little, after all, tha t gills and lungs m a y have

a few variables of fo rm, m a g n i t u d e , or n u m b e r in c o m m o n : they resemble

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o n e ano the r because they are t w o varieties o f that non-exis tent , abstract,

unreal , unassignable o rgan , absent f rom all describable species, ye t present

in the an imal k i n g d o m in its ent i re ty , w h i c h serves for respiration in

general. T h u s there is a r e tu rn in the analysis of l iving beings to Ar is ­

totel ian analogies: the gills are to respirat ion in wa t e r w h a t the lungs are

to respirat ion in air. T r u e , such relations w e r e perfectly wel l k n o w n in the

Classical age ; b u t they w e r e used on ly to de t e rmine functions; t hey w e r e

n o t used to establish the o rde r o f things w i th in the space o f na tu re . F r o m

C u v i e r o n w a r d , funct ion, defined accord ing to its non-percep t ib le f o r m

as an effect to be at ta ined, is to serve as a constant m i d d l e t e r m and to

m a k e i t possible to relate toge the r totalities o f e lements w i t h o u t the

slightest visible ident i ty . W h a t to Classical eyes w e r e mere ly differences

j ux t aposed w i t h identities m u s t n o w be o rde red and conceived on the

basis of a functional h o m o g e n e i t y w h i c h is their h idden founda t ion . W h e n

the Same and the O t h e r b o t h be long to a single space, there is natural

history; s o m e t h i n g like biology becomes possible w h e n this un i ty of level

begins to break up , and w h e n differences stand ou t against the b a c k g r o u n d

of an ident i ty that is deeper and, as i t w e r e , m o r e serious than tha t uni ty .

This reference to function, and this uncoup l ing of the level of identities

f r o m that of differences, g ive rise to n e w relat ions: those of coexistence, of

internal hierarchy, and of dependence w i t h regard to the level of organic

structure. Coexistence designates the fact that an o rgan or system of organs

c a n n o t be present in a l iv ing be ing unless ano the r o r g a n or ano the r system

of o rgans , of a par t icular na tu re and form, is also present :

Al l the o rgans of o n e and the same animal fo rm a single system of

w h i c h all the parts ho ld toge ther , act, and react u p o n each o the r ; and

there can be no modif icat ions in any o n e o f t h e m tha t will n o t b r ing

abou t ana logous modif icat ions in t h e m all [9] .

W i t h i n the digest ive system, t he f o r m of the teeth (whe ther they are

incisors o r molars) varies w i t h the ' length , convo lu t ions , and dilations of

the a l imenta ry sys tem' ; or again, as an e x a m p l e of coexistence b e t w e e n

different systems, the digestive organs canno t v a r y independen t ly of the

m o r p h o l o g y of the l imbs (and especially o f the fo rm of the nails); accord­

ing to w h e t h e r they wil l be p rov ided w i t h c laws or hoofs - and therefore

w h e t h e r t he an imal wi l l be able to grasp and tear up its food or n o t - so

the a l imenta ry canal, the 'dissolving juices ' , and the f o r m of the tee th wil l

also diflfer[io]. These are lateral correlat ions tha t establish relations of

concomi tance , based u p o n functional necessities, be tween elements on the

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same level: since it is necessary tha t the an imal should feed itself, the na tu re

o f its p rey and its m o d e of cap ture canno t r ema in i r re levant to the

mast ica tory and digestive systems (and vice versa) .

Never theless , the re i s a hierarchy of levels. We k n o w h o w Classical

analysis had been b r o u g h t to the po in t o f suspending the pr iv i leged

posi t ion of the mos t i m p o r t a n t organs in o rde r to concent ra te a t tent ion on

their t a x o n o m i c efficacity. N o w that w e are n o longer deal ing w i t h i n d e ­

p e n d e n t variables, b u t w i t h systems g o v e r n e d by o n e another , we are

confronted once again w i t h the p r o b l e m o f reciprocal impor t ance . T h u s

the a l imenta ry canal of m a m m a l s is n o t mere ly in a relat ion of possible

covar ia t ion w i t h the organs of l o c o m o t i o n and prehens ion ; i t i s also de te r ­

mined , a t least in pa r t , by the m o d e of r ep roduc t ion . Indeed, in its v iv i ­

parous fo rm, r ep roduc t ion does no t mere ly i m p l y t he presence o f those

organs immedia te ly connec ted w i t h it; i t also requires the existence of

organs of lactat ion, and the possession of lips and a f leshy t o n g u e ; on the

o the r hand , i t prescribes the existence of w a r m , circulat ing b lood and the

bi loculari ty o f the h e a r t [ n ] . T h e analysis o f organisms , and the possibility

of resemblances and distinctions be tween t h e m , presupposes, therefore , a

table, c o m p o s e d n o t o f the e lements , w h i c h m a y v a r y f r o m species t o

species, b u t of the functions, w h i c h , in l iving beings in general , gove rn ,

c o m p l e m e n t , and o r d e r o n e ano the r : n o t a p o l y g o n o f possible m o d i ­

fications, bu t a hierarchical p y r a m i d of impor t ance . At first, C u v i e r

t h o u g h t that the functions of existence preceded those of relationships

('for t he animal is first, t hen it feels and acts'): he supposed, therefore, tha t

r ep roduc t ion and circulat ion m u s t in the first place de t e rmine a certain

n u m b e r o f o rgans t o w h o s e a r r a n g e m e n t o thers w o u l d find themselves

subject; the fo rmer organs w o u l d f o r m the p r i m a r y characters , and the

latter t he secondary ones [ i2] . T h e n he subord ina ted circulat ion to

digest ion, because the lat ter exists in all animals (the po lyp ' s ent i re b o d y

is no m o r e than a sort of digestive appara tus) , whereas b l o o d and b l o o d

vessels are found ' on ly in t he h ighe r animals and progressively disappear

in those of the l o w e r classes'[13]. Later still, i t was the ne rvous system

( together w i t h t he presence or absence of a spinal cord) tha t seemed to

h i m the de t e rmin ing factor in all o rgan ic a r r a n g e m e n t s : ' I t is really the

w h o l e an ima l : the o the r systems are there o n l y to serve and main ta in

i t ' [ H ] .

This p re -eminence o f o n e function ove r t he o thers implies tha t the

o rgan i sm, in its visible a r r angement s , obeys a plan. Such a plan ensures

t he con t ro l o f t he essential functions and br ings u n d e r tha t con t ro l ,

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t h o u g h w i t h a greater degree of f reedom, the organs that p e r f o r m less

vital functions. As a hierarchical principle, this p lan defines the m o s t

i m p o r t a n t functions, arranges the ana tomica l e lements that enable i t to

opera te , a n d places t h e m in the appropr ia te parts o f t he b o d y ; thus ,

w i th in the vast g r o u p of the Art iculata , the class of Insects reveals the

p a r a m o u n t impor t ance o f the l o c o m o t i v e functions and the o rgans o f

m o v e m e n t ; in the o the r three classes, on the o the r hand , i t i s t he vi tal

functions that are mos t i m p o r t a n t [ i 5 ] . In the regional con t ro l i t exercises

ove r the less fundamenta l organs , the plan of o rganic s t ruc ture plays a less

d e t e r m i n i n g ro le ; i t becomes m o r e liberal, as i t w e r e , as i t m o v e s further

a w a y f rom the centre , p e r m i t t i n g of modif icat ions, al terat ions, changes in

t he possible f o r m or uti l ization. I t is still there , b u t i t has b e c o m e m o r e

f l e x i b l e , and m o r e pe rmeab le t o o the r forms o f de te rmina t ion . This p r o ­

cess is easily observed in the l ocomot ive sys tem of m a m m a l s . T h e four

propuls ive l imbs be long to the plan of the organic s t ruc ture , b u t o n l y as a

secondary character ; t hey are therefore neve r e l iminated, or absent or

replaced, b u t they a r e ' masked somet imes as in the w ings o f the ba t and

the poster ior fins of seals'; i t m a y even happen that t hey are ' dena tu red

by use as in the pectoral fins of the ce t aceans . . . N a t u r e has m a d e a fin

o u t of an a r m . Y o u perceive that there is a lways a sort of cons tancy in t he

secondary characters in accordance w i t h their d i sgu i se ' [ i6 ] . I t is u n d e r ­

standable, then , h o w the species can a t the same t ime resemble one ano the r

(so as to fo rm groups such as the genera , the classes, and w h a t C u v i e r calls

the sub -k ingdoms) and b e distinct f r o m o n e ano ther . W h a t d r aws t h e m

toge ther is n o t a certain quan t i ty of coincident e lements ; it is a sort of

focus of ident i ty w h i c h canno t be analysed in to visible areas because i t

defines the reciprocal i m p o r t a n c e of the var ious functions; on the basis of

this impercept ib le cent re of identities, the organs are a r ranged in the b o d y ,

and the further they are f rom the centre , the m o r e they gain in f lex ib i l i ty ,

in possibilities of var ia t ion, and in distinctive characters . A n i m a l species

differ at their peripheries , and resemble each o the r at their centres ; t hey

are connec ted by the inaccessible, and separated by the apparent . T h e i r

general i ty lies in that w h i c h is essential to their life; their s ingulari ty in

tha t wh ich i s mos t accessory to it. T h e m o r e extensive t he g roups o n e

wishes to find, the deeper m u s t o n e penet ra te in to the o rgan ism 's inner

darkness, t o w a r d s the less and less visible, in to tha t d imens ion that eludes

percep t ion ; t he m o r e o n e wishes to isolate the individual i ty o f t he

o rgan i sm, t he further m u s t o n e go t o w a r d s its surface, and a l low the

percept ible forms to shine in all their visibility; for mult ipl ic i ty is apparen t

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and un i ty is h idden . In short , l iving species 'escape' f rom the t eeming

profusion of individuals and species; they can be classified o n l y because

they are alive and on the basis of w h a t they conceal .

I t m u s t n o w be apparen t w h a t an i m m e n s e reversal all this presupposes

in relat ion to the Classical taxonomy. This t a x o n o m y was cons t ructed

entirely u p o n the basis of the four variables of descript ion (forms, n u m b e r ,

a r r angemen t , m a g n i t u d e ) , w h i c h cou ld be scanned, as i t w e r e in one and

the same m o v e m e n t , by l anguage and by the eye ; and in this d e p l o y m e n t

of the visible, life appeared as the effect of a pa t t e rn ing process - a m e r e

classifying b o u n d a r y . F r o m C u v i e r o n w a r d , i t is life in its non-percep t ib le ,

pu re ly functional aspect that p rovides the basis for the exter ior possibili ty

of a classification. T h e classification of l iv ing beings is no longer to be

found in the great expanse of o rde r ; the possibili ty o f classification n o w

arises f rom the depths of life, f rom those e lements mos t h idden f r o m

v iew. Before, the l iv ing be ing was a locality of na tura l classification; n o w ,

the fact of be ing classifiable is a p r o p e r t y of the l iving be ing . So the

project of a general taxinomia disappears; the possibili ty of dep loy ing a

great na tura l o rde r w h i c h w o u l d ex tend con t inuous ly f rom the simplest

and mos t inert o f things to the mos t l iving and the mos t c o m p l e x d is ­

appears ; and the search for o rde r as the g r o u n d and foundat ion of a

general science of na tu re also disappears. ' N a t u r e ' , t oo , disappears - i t

be ing under s tood that na ture , t h r o u g h o u t the Classical age, d id n o t exist

in the first place as a ' t h e m e ' , as an ' idea ' , as an endless source of k n o w ­

ledge, b u t as a h o m o g e n e o u s space of orderable identities and differences.

This space has n o w been dissociated and as i t w e r e opened up in dep th .

Instead of a un i ta ry field of visibility and order , whoSe elements have a

dist inctive va lue in relat ion to each o ther , we have a series of opposi t ions ,

o f w h i c h the t w o te rms are never on the same level: on the o n e hand ,

there are the secondary organs , w h i c h are visible on the surface of the

b o d y and offer themselves w i t h o u t in te rvent ion to i m m e d i a t e percep t ion ,

and, on the o ther , the p r i m a r y organs , w h i c h are essential, central ,

h idden , and unreachable except by dissection - tha t is, by mater ia l ly r e ­

m o v i n g the co loured enve lope fo rmed by the secondary o rgans . T h e r e i s

also, at an even deeper level, the opposi t ion be tween the organs in general ,

w h i c h are spatial, solid, direct ly or indirect ly visible, and the functions,

w h i c h are n o t percept ible , bu t de te rmine , as t h o u g h f rom be low, the

a r r a n g e m e n t o f w h a t we do perceive. Lastly, and a t the furthest ex t r eme ,

there is the oppos i t ion b e t w e e n identities and differences: t hey are no

longer of the same fabric, they are no longer established in relat ion to each

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269

o t h e r on a h o m o g e n e o u s surface: the differences proliferate on the sur­

face, bu t deeper d o w n they fade, m e r g e , and ming le , as they approach

the great , myster ious , invisible focal un i ty , f rom w h i c h the mul t ip le

seems to der ive , as t h o u g h by ceaseless dispersion. Life is no longer that

w h i c h can be dist inguished in a m o r e or less certain fashion f r o m the

mechan ica l ; i t is tha t in w h i c h all the possible distinctions be tween l iving

beings have their basis. I t is this transi t ion f rom the t a x o n o m i c to the

synthet ic no t i on of life w h i c h is indicated, in the c h r o n o l o g y of ideas and

sciences, by t he recrudescence, in the early n ine teenth cen tury , of vitalist

themes . F r o m the archaeological p o i n t of v i e w , w h a t i s be ing established

at this par t icular m o m e n t is the condi t ions of possibility of a biology.

In any case, this series of opposi t ions , dissociating the space of na tura l

his tory, has h a d i m p o r t a n t consequences . In practice, this means the

appearance o f t w o correla ted techniques which are connected and suppor t

each o ther . T h e first of these techniques is const i tuted by compara t i ve

a n a t o m y : this discipline gives rise to an inter ior space, b o u n d e d on the

o n e hand by the superficial s t r a tum of t egumen t s and shells, and on the

o the r by the quasi-invisibili ty of that w h i c h i s infinitely small . For c o m ­

parat ive a n a t o m y is n o t mere ly a deepen ing of the descript ive techniques

e m p l o y e d in the Classical age ; i t i s n o t con t en t w i t h seeking to look

undernea th , m o r e precisely and m o r e closely; i t establishes a space w h i c h

i s nei ther that of visible characters n o r that of microscopic e lements [ 1 7 ] .

W i t h i n that space i t reveals the reciprocal a r r a n g e m e n t of the o rgans ,

their correlat ion, and the w a y in w h i c h the principal stages of any func­

t ion are b r o k e n d o w n , spatialized, and o rde red in relation to o n e ano ther .

A n d thus, in contras t w i t h the m e r e gaze, w h i c h by scanning organisms in

their wholeness sees unfo ld ing before i t the t e e m i n g profusion of their

differences, a n a t o m y , by really cu t t ing up bodies in to pa t te rns , by d iv id ing

t h e m up in to distinct por t ions , by f ragment ing t h e m in space, discloses

the great resemblances that w o u l d o therwise have r ema ined invisible; i t

reconsti tutes t he unities that underl ie the great dispersion of visible dif­

ferences. T h e creat ion of the vast t a x o n o m i c unities (classes and orders) in

the seventeenth and e ighteenth centuries was a p r o b l e m of linguistic pat­

terning: a n a m e had to be found that w o u l d be b o t h general and just if ied;

n o w , it is a m a t t e r of an anatomic disarticulation; the ma jo r functional

sys tem has to be isolated; i t is n o w the real divisions of a n a t o m y tha t wi l l

m a k e i t possible to f o r m the great families of l iving beings.

T h e second techn ique is based on a n a t o m y (since i t is a result of i t ) , b u t

is in opposi t ion to it (because it makes it possible to dispense w i t h i t ) ;

THE ORDER OF THINGS

this technique consists in establishing indicative relations be tween super ­

ficial, and therefore visible, e lements and o thers that are concealed in t he

depths o f the b o d y . T h r o u g h the l a w o f t he in te rdependence o f t he par ts

o f an o rgan i sm, we k n o w tha t such and such a per ipheral a n d accessory

o r g a n implies such a n d such a s t ructure in a m o r e essential o r g a n ; thus ,

i t is possible ' t o establish t he cor respondence b e t w e e n exter ior and i n ­

ter ior forms w h i c h are all in tegral parts of the animal ' s essence ' [ i8 ] .

A m o n g insects, for example , the locat ion of the an tennae has no dist inctive

va lue because i t i s n o t in corre la t ion w i t h any of the ma in internal s t ruc­

tures ; the f o r m of t he l o w e r j a w , on the o the r hand , can p lay a leading

ro le in a r r ang ing t h e m accord ing to their resemblances and differences;

for i t is connec ted w i t h t he insect's food a n d digest ion, and thus w i t h its

essential funct ions: ' t h e organs o f mast icat ion m u s t be related to those o f

digest ion, consequent ly to t he w h o l e m o d e o f life, and consequent ly to

the w h o l e o rgan ic s t ructure ' [19] . As a ma t t e r of fact, this t echn ique of

indications does n o t necessarily w o r k o n l y f rom the visible pe r i phe ry to

the g r e y forms of o rgan ic in ter ior i ty : i t can establish necessary n e t w o r k s

connec t ing a n y p o i n t in the b o d y w i t h any o the r : thus , in certain cases,

a single e l ement m a y be e n o u g h to suggest the genera l archi tec ture of an

o rgan i sm; an ent i re an imal m a y be recognized ' f r o m a single b o n e , f r o m

a single facet of a b o n e : a m e t h o d tha t has g iven such cur ious results

w h e n appl ied to fossilized animals'[20]. W h e r e a s for e igh teen th -cen tu ry

t h o u g h t t he fossil was a pref igura t ion of existing forms, a n d thus an

indicat ion o f t he grea t con t inu i ty o f t ime , i t w a s hencefor th to be t he

indicat ion o f t he f o r m to w h i c h i t once really be longed . A n a t o m y has n o t

on ly shattered the tabular and h o m o g e n e o u s space or identi t ies; i t has

b r o k e n the supposed con t inu i ty o f t ime .

This i s because, f r o m the theoret ical p o i n t of v i e w , Cuv ie r ' s analyses

entirely r ecompose the organiza t ion of na tura l continuit ies a n d d iscon­

tinuities. C o m p a r a t i v e a n a t o m y makes i t possible, in effect, to establish

t w o qui te distinct forms o f con t inu i ty in the l iv ing w o r l d . T h e first c o n ­

cerns the grea t functions to be found in the major i ty of species (respira­

t ion, digest ion, circulat ion, r ep roduc t ion , l o c o m o t i o n . . . ) : i t establishes

in the w h o l e l iv ing w o r l d a vast resemblance w h i c h can be a r ranged in a

scale o f decreasing complex i ty , f rom m a n d o w n to the z o o p h y t e ; i n the

h ighe r species all these functions are present ; b u t as we m o v e d o w n the

scale, so we see t h e m disappear o n e after the o the r , unt i l f inal ly , in t he

zoophy t e , the re i s ' n o cent re o f circulat ion, no nerves , no cen t re o f sensa­

t ion ; each p o i n t seems to feed itself by suct ion ' [21] . B u t this m o d e of

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con t inu i ty i s w e a k and relatively loose, fo rming , by m e a n s of the r e ­

stricted n u m b e r of essential functions, a s imple table of presences a n d

absences. T h e o the r con t inu i ty i s m u c h m o r e closely kn i t : i t deals w i t h

the greater or lesser perfect ion of the organs . B u t o n e can establish o n l y

l imi ted series on this basis, regional cont inui t ies w h i c h are soon in ter ­

rup t ed and w h i c h , m o r e o v e r , i n t e r twine w i t h o n e ano the r in different

direct ions; this is because, in t he var ious species, ' t he organs do n o t all

fo l low the same o rde r of degrada t ion : o n e o r g a n i s a t its highest degree of

perfect ion in o n e species, whi le ano the r reaches that same degree of p e r ­

fection in a different species'[22]. We are left, therefore, w i t h w h a t m i g h t

be called 'micro-ser ies ' , l imi ted and part ial series w h i c h relate n o t so

m u c h to the species themselves as to a par t icular o r g a n ; and , a t t he o the r

ex t r eme , w i t h a 'macro-ser ies ' , a d iscont inuous , loose series w h i c h relates

n o t so m u c h to the organisms themselves as to the grea t fundamen ta l

g a m u t o f funct ions.

B e t w e e n these t w o continui t ies , w h i c h are nei ther super imposed n o r

fit ted toge ther , we find grea t d iscont inuous masses be ing dis t r ibuted.

These masses o b e y different s t ructura l plans, the same functions be ing

o rde r ed in accordance w i t h v a r y i n g hierarchies, and realized by organs o f

var ious types . I t is easy, for example , to discover in the oc topus 'all the

functions that occur in fishes, and ye t there is no resemblance , no ana logy

of a r rangement ' [23] . Each of these g roups m u s t therefore be analysed in

itself. W e m u s t consider n o t the n a r r o w thread o f resemblances tha t m a y

a t tach i t to ano the r g r o u p , bu t the cohesive force that folds i t so t ight ly

in u p o n itself. We shall n o t seek to k n o w w h e t h e r r e d - b l o o d e d animals

are par t o f the same series as w h i t e - b l o o d e d animals , w i t h n o t h i n g m o r e

than supp lemen ta ry i m p r o v e m e n t s ; we shall establish the fact tha t a n y

an imal w i t h red b l o o d - and i t is in this tha t i t is based on an a u t o n o m o u s

p l a n - a l w a y s has a b o n y head, a ver tebra l c o l u m n , l imbs (wi th the

except ion of snakes), arteries, veins, a liver, a pancreas, a spleen, and

kidneys [24]. Ver tebra tes and inver tebrates form absolutely isolated s u b -

areas, be tween w h i c h i t is impossible to find in te rmedia te forms p r o v i d i n g

a t ransi t ion in ei ther d i rec t ion:

W h a t e v e r a r r a n g e m e n t one at t r ibutes t o animals w i t h ver tebrae and

those w i t h o u t ver tebrae , i t wil l neve r p r o v e possible to find a t t he end

o f o n e o f these great classes, o r a t the head o f the o the r , t w o animals

tha t resemble o n e ano the r sufficiently to serve as a l ink b e t w e e n

t h e m [25].

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

I t i s thus apparen t tha t the theo ry of s u b - k i n g d o m s does no t s imply add

a supp lementa ry t a x o n o m i c f rame to the prev ious t radi t ional classifica­

t ions; i t is l inked to t he const i tu t ion of a n e w space of identities and dif­

ferences. A space w i t h o u t essential con t inu i ty . A space tha t is posi ted

f rom the ve ry outset in the fo rm of f ragmenta t ion . A space crossed by

lines w h i c h somet imes d iverge and somet imes intersect. In o rde r to des ig­

nate its genera l fo rm, then , i t is necessary to substi tute for the i m a g e of the

con t inuous scale w h i c h had been t radi t ional in the e igh teen th cen tu ry ,

f rom B o n n e t to Lamarck , that of a radia t ion, or ra ther of a g r o u p of

centres f r o m w h i c h there spreads o u t w a r d s a mul t ip l ic i ty of beams; thus

each be ing could be placed ' in this vast n e t w o r k , w h i c h consti tutes

organized na tu re . . . bu t ten or t w e n t y beams w o u l d n o t suffice to express

these innumerab le relations'[26].

W h e r e u p o n i t is the ent i re Classical exper ience of difference that

topples and falls, and w i t h i t the relat ion be tween be ing a n d na tu re . In

the seventeenth and e igh teen th centuries, i t was the funct ion of difference

to connec t all the species toge ther , and thus to fill in the hiatus b e t w e e n

the extremit ies of be ing ; difference p layed a ' conca tena t ing ' ro le : i t was

as restricted and as t enuous as possible; it was si tuated in the v e r y t ightest

possible g r id ; i t was a lways divisible, and could occur even b e l o w the

threshold o f percept ion . F r o m C u v i e r o n w a r d , on the o ther hand , i t

mult ipl ies itself, adds up diverse forms, reverberates and is diffused

t h r o u g h o u t the o rgan i sm, isolating i t f rom all the o thers in var ious s imul ­

taneous w a y s ; for i t no longer resides in the interstices be tween beings in

o rde r to connect t h e m toge the r ; i t functions in relat ion to the o rgan i sm

itself, so that it can ' in tegra te ' w i t h itself and main ta in itself in life; i t does

n o t fill up the interval be tween beings w i t h successive tenuit ies; i t makes

i t deeper by m a k i n g itself deeper , in o rde r to define in isolation the

great types of compat ib i l i ty . N ine t een th - cen tu ry na tu re is d iscont inuous

exactly in so far as it is alive.

T h e impor t ance of this upheaval can be apprecia ted; in the Classical

per iod , na tura l beings fo rmed a con t inuous total i ty because they w e r e

beings and because there was no reason for any in te r rup t ion in their

d e p l o y m e n t . I t was n o t possible to represent w h a t separated the be ing

f rom itself; the con t inu i ty of representat ion (signs and characters) and the

con t inu i ty o f beings (the e x t r e m e p r o x i m i t y o f structures) w e r e thus c o r ­

relative. It is this fabric, ontological and representat ive at the same t ime ,

that is definitively to rn apar t w i t h C u v i e r : l iving beings , because they are

alive, can no longer fo rm a tissue of progressive and g radua ted differences;

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t hey mus t g r o u p themselves a round nuclei o f coherence w h i c h are total ly

distinct f rom o n e another , and wh ich are like so m a n y different plans for

the main tenance of life. Classical be ing was w i t h o u t f law; life, on the

o t h e r hand , is w i t h o u t edges or shading. Be ing was spread ou t over an

i m m e n s e table; life isolates forms that are b o u n d in u p o n themselves.

B e i n g was posi ted in the perpetual ly analysable space of representa t ion;

life w i t h d r a w s into the en igma of a force inaccessible in its essence,

apprehendab le on ly in the efforts i t makes here and there to manifest and

main ta in itself. In short , t h r o u g h o u t the Classical age, life was the p ro v i n ce

of an o n t o l o g y wh ich dealt in the same w a y w i t h all mater ia l beings, all

o f w h i c h w e r e subject to extension, we igh t , and m o v e m e n t ; and i t was in

this sense that all the sciences of na ture , and especially tha t of l iving beings,

had a p ro found mechanist ic voca t ion ; f rom C u v i e r o n w a r d , l iving beings

escape, in the first instance at least, the general laws of extensive be ing ;

biological be ing becomes regional and a u t o n o m o u s ; life, on the confines

of be ing, is w h a t is ex ter ior to i t and also, a t t he same t ime , w h a t m a n i ­

fests itself w i th in it. A n d t h o u g h the quest ion of its relations w i t h the

non- l iv ing , or that of its physico-chemical de te rmina t ions , does arise, i t

docs so n o t a long the lines of a 'mechan i sm ' s tubborn ly c l inging to its

Classical modali t ies , b u t in an entirely n e w w a y , in o r d e r to ar t iculate

t w o natures o n e u p o n the o ther .

B u t since the discontinuities mus t be explained by the main tenance o f

life and its condi t ions , we see the emergence of an unexpec ted con t inu i ty

- or at least a p lay of as yet unanalysed interactions - be tween the o rgan i sm

a n d that w h i c h enables i t to live. I f the R u m i n a n t s are distinct f rom the

Roden t s , and if tha t dist inction rests u p o n a w h o l e sys tem of massive

differences that there can be no quest ion of a t tenuat ing , i t is because they

possess different kinds of dent i t ion , different digestive systems, differently

fo rmed extremit ies and nails; i t is because they canno t cap ture the same

kinds of food, or deal w i t h i t in the same w a y ; i t i s because they do n o t

h a v e to digest the same forms o f nour i shmen t . T h e l iv ing be ing m u s t

therefore no longer be unde r s tood mere ly as a certain combina t i on of

particles bear ing definite characters ; i t provides the out l ine of an o rgan ic

s t ructure , w h i c h maintains un in te r rup ted relations w i t h ex ter ior e lements

that i t utilizes (by b rea th ing and eat ing) in o rde r to main ta in or deve lop

its o w n s t ruc ture . A r o u n d the l iving being, o r ra ther t h r o u g h i t a n d by

means of the filtering action of its surface, there is effected 'a cont inual

c i rculat ion f r o m the outs ide to the inside, and f rom the inside to the

outs ide , constant ly main ta ined and yet fixed wi th in certain limits. T h u s ,

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

l iving bodies should be considered as kinds of furnaces in to w h i c h dead

substances are successively in t roduced in o r d e r to be c o m b i n e d toge the r

in var ious ways ' [27] . T h e l iving being, by the act ion and sovere ign ty o f

the same force that keeps i t in d iscont inui ty w i t h itself, finds itself s u b ­

jec ted to a con t inuous relat ion w i t h all tha t sur rounds it. In o rde r that t he

l iving be ing can live, there m u s t exist several functional s t ructures , all

i r reducible o n e to ano the r , and also an un in t e r rup t ed m o v e m e n t b e t w e e n

each o n e of those s t ructures and the air i t breathes , the wa t e r i t dr inks , the

food i t absorbs. Break ing the o ld Classical con t inu i ty of be ing and na tu re ,

the d iv ided force of life wil l reveal forms tha t are scattered, ye t all l inked

to the condi t ions of existence. In a few years, a t the e n d of t he e igh teen th

cen tu ry and the beg inn ing o f the n ine teen th , E u r o p e a n cul ture comple t e ly

changed the fundamenta l spatialization o f t he l iving b e i n g : fo r the

Classical exper ience , t he l iving be ing was a square , or a series of squares,

in the universal taxinomia of be ing ; if geographica l localization h a d a ro le

(as i t d id in Buffon) , i t was tha t of reveal ing variat ions that w e r e a l ready

possible. F r o m C u v i e r o n w a r d , the l iving be ing wraps itself in its o w n

existence, breaks off its t a x o n o m i c links of adjacency, tears itself free f r o m

the vast, tyrannica l p lan of continui t ies , and consti tutes itself as a n e w

space: a doub le space, in fact - since it is b o t h the in ter ior o n e of a n a t o m i ­

cal coherences a n d physiological compatibi l i t ies , and the ex ter ior o n e of

the elements in w h i c h i t resides and of w h i c h i t fo rms its o w n b o d y . B u t

b o t h these spaces are subject to a c o m m o n con t ro l : i t i s no longer that of

the possibilities of be ing , i t is tha t of the condi t ions of life.

T h e w h o l e historical a priori of a science of l iv ing beings is thus o v e r ­

t h r o w n and then r e n e w e d . Seen in its archaeological dep th , and n o t a t t he

m o r e visible level of discoveries, discussion, theories , or phi losophical

opt ions , Cuv ie r ' s w o r k domina tes f r o m afar w h a t was to be t he future

of b io logy . An oppos i t ion i s often set up b e t w e e n Lamarck ' s ' t r ans -

formis t ' in tui t ions , w h i c h seem to 'p ref igure ' w h a t was to be evo lu t ion i sm,

and the old fixism, i m p r e g n a t e d t h r o u g h and t h r o u g h w i t h t radi t ional

prejudices and theological postulates, in w h i c h C u v i e r s t u b b o r n l y p e r ­

sisted. A n d t h r o u g h a w h o l e series of ama lgams , m e t a p h o r s , and inade ­

quate ly tested analogies, the out l ine emerges of a ' r eac t ionary ' sys tem of

t h o u g h t w h i c h clings passionately to the i m m o b i l i t y o f th ings in o rde r to

preserve the precar ious o r d e r of h u m a n life; this, i t is c la imed, is the

ph i losophy of C u v i e r , t he m a n possessed of all the p o w e r s ; oppos i te i s

depic ted the difficult dest iny of a progress ive system of t h o u g h t w h i c h

believes in the e n e r g y of m o v e m e n t , in ceaseless renewal , in the vi tal i ty of

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adap ta t ion : Lamarck , the revo lu t ionary , i s supposed to be in this c a m p .

T h u s , unde r p re t ex t of w r i t i n g the h is tory of ideas in a s t r icdy historical

sense, a fine example of s imple-mindedness is pe rpe tua ted . For w h a t

counts , in the historicity o f k n o w l e d g e , i s n o t op in ions , n o r the r e sem­

blances that can be established b e t w e e n t h e m f rom per iod to pe r iod ( there

is indeed a ' r esemblance ' b e t w e e n L a m a r c k and a certain k ind of e v o l u ­

t ionism, as there is be tween the lat ter and the ideas of D i d e r o t , or Rob ine t ,

o r Beno i t de Mai l le t ) ; w h a t i s i m p o r t a n t , w h a t makes i t possible to

art iculate the h is tory of t h o u g h t w i th in itself, is its in ternal condi t ions of

possibility. N o w , o n e has on ly to a t t e m p t an analysis o f his w o r k to

perceive immed ia t e ly that L a m a r c k conceived o f the t ransformat ions o f

species on ly u p o n the basis o f onto logica l con t inu i ty , w h i c h was that o f

Classical na tura l h is tory . He presupposed a progress ive grada t ion , an

u n b r o k e n process o f i m p r o v e m e n t , an un in t e r rup ted c o n t i n u u m o f beings

w h i c h cou ld f o r m themselves u p o n o n e ano ther . W h a t makes Lamarck ' s

t h o u g h t possible is n o t the distant apprehens ion of a future evo lu t ion i sm;

i t is the con t inu i ty of beings as d iscovered and presupposed by the

' m e t h o d s ' of na tura l his tory. L a m a r c k i s a c o n t e m p o r a r y of A - L . de

Jussieu, n o t of Cuv ie r . For the lat ter in t roduced a radical d iscont inui ty

in to the Classical scale of beings; and by that v e r y fact he gave rise to

such not ions as biological incompat ib i l i ty , relations w i t h external e le­

ments , and condi t ions of existence; he also caused the e m e r g e n c e of a

cer ta in energy , necessary to main ta in life, and a certain threat , w h i c h

imposes u p o n i t the sanction of dea th ; here , we find ga the red toge the r

several of the condi t ions that m a k e possible s o m e t h i n g like the idea of

evolu t ion . T h e discont inui ty of l iving forms m a d e i t possible to conce ive

of a great t empora l cu r ren t for w h i c h the con t inu i ty of s t ructures a n d

characters, despi te the superficial analogies, cou ld n o t p r o v i d e a basis. W i t h

spatial d iscont inui ty , the b reak ing up of t he great table, and the f rag­

men ta t i on of the surface u p o n w h i c h all na tura l beings h a d taken their

o rde r ed places, i t b e c a m e possible to replace na tura l h is tory w i t h a

'h i s tory ' of na tu re . I t is t rue that the Classical space, as we have seen, d id

n o t exclude the possibility o f d e v e l o p m e n t , b u t that d e v e l o p m e n t did no

m o r e than p r o v i d e a means of t ravers ing the discreetly p reo rda ined table

o f possible variat ions. T h e b reak ing up of that space m a d e i t possible to

reveal a historici ty p r o p e r to life itself: tha t of its ma in tenance in its c o n ­

dit ions of existence. Cuv ie r ' s ' f ixism' , as the analysis of such a m a i n ­

tenance, was the earliest m o d e of reflecting u p o n that historici ty, w h e n i t

first e m e r g e d in W e s t e r n k n o w l e d g e .

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

Histor ic i ty , then , has n o w been in t roduced in to na tu re - or ra ther in to

the r ea lm of l iv ing be ings ; b u t i t exists there as m u c h m o r e than a p r o b ­

able f o r m of succession; i t consti tutes a sort of fundamenta l m o d e of

be ing . I t i s no d o u b t t rue tha t in Cuv ie r ' s t i m e there did n o t ye t exist a

his tory of l iving beings such as was to be described by evolu t ion ism; b u t

f r o m the outset the l iving be ing i s conceived of in t e rms of the c o n ­

dit ions tha t enable i t to have a h is tory . Similarly, a t the t i m e of R ica rdo ,

wea l th was accorded a status of historicity w h i c h had n o t yet been f o r m u ­

lated as e c o n o m i c his tory . T h e approach ing stabili ty of industrial i n ­

comes , popu la t ion , and rent , as predic ted by Rica rdo , and the fixity of

an imal species, as affirmed by Cuvie r , m i g h t pass, on a superficial e x a m i n a ­

t ion, as a rejection of h is tory; in fact, R icardo and C u v i e r w e r e rejecting

o n l y the modal i t ies of chronologica l succession as conceived in the

e igh teen th cen tu ry ; they w e r e b reak ing the l ink be tween t i m e and the

hierarchical o r classifying o rde r o f representat ions. On the o the r hand , t he

actual o r future i m m o b i l i t y they described or hera lded cou ld be c o n ­

ceived on ly on the basis of the possibility of a h i s tory ; and that h i s tory

was p rov ided for t h e m ei ther by the condi t ions o f existence o f the l iving

be ing , o r by the condi t ions o f the p roduc t i on o f value. Paradoxical ly ,

Ricardo 's pessimism and Cuv ie r ' s fixism can arise o n l y against a historical

b a c k g r o u n d : they define the stability o f beings, w h i c h hencefor th h a v e

the r ight , a t the level of their p r o f o u n d moda l i ty , to possess a h i s to ry ;

whereas the Classical idea, that wea l th could g r o w in a con t inuous p r o ­

cess, or tha t species could , w i t h t ime, t ransform themselves in to o n e

ano the r , defined the mob i l i t y o f beings, wh ich , even before a n y k ind o f

his tory, a l ready obeyed a system of variables, identities, or equivalences.

I t t o o k the suspension, and , as i t w e r e , the p lac ing b e t w e e n parentheses,

o f that k ind o f h is tory to g ive the beings o f na tu re and the p roduc t s o f

l abour a historici ty that w o u l d enable m o d e r n t h o u g h t to encompass

t h e m , a n d subsequent ly to dep loy the discursive science of their suc ­

cession. For e igh teen th -cen tu ry t h o u g h t , chronologica l sequences are

mere ly a p r o p e r t y and a m o r e or less b lur red expression of the o rde r of

be ings ; f r o m the n ine teen th cen tury , they express, in a m o r e or less direct

fashion, and even in their in ter rupt ions , the p r o f o u n d l y historical m o d e

o f be ing o f th ings and m e n .

In a n y case, the cons t i tu t ion of a l iving historici ty has h a d vast conse­

quences for E u r o p e a n t h o u g h t . Q u i t e as vast, w i t h o u t any d o u b t , as those

b r o u g h t a b o u t by t he fo rmat ion o f an e c o n o m i c historici ty. A t the super ­

ficial level of t he grea t imagina t ive values, life, hencefor th p ledged to

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277

his tory, i s expressed in the f o r m of animal i ty . T h e an imal , whose great

threat or radical strangeness had been left suspended and as i t w e r e dis­

a r m e d a t the end of the M i d d l e Ages, or a t least a t the end of the Renais­

sance, discovers fantastic n e w p o w e r s in the n ine teen th cen tury . In the

interval , Classical na tu re had g iven precedence to vegetable values - since

the plant bears u p o n its visible f o r m the ove r t m a r k of every possible

o rde r ; w i th all its forms on display, f rom s tem to seed, f r o m r o o t to fruit,

w i t h all its secrets generous ly m a d e visible, the vegetable k i n g d o m

f o r m e d a p u r e and t ransparent object for t h o u g h t as tabula t ion. B u t w h e n

characters and structures are a r ranged in vert ical steps t owards life - tha t

sovereign vanish ing-poin t , indefinitely distant b u t const i tuent - then it is

the animal that becomes the pr ivi leged fo rm, w i t h its h idden s tructures ,

its bur ied organs , so m a n y invisible functions, and that distant force, at

the foundat ion of its be ing, w h i c h keeps i t alive. I f l iving beings

are a classification, the plant is best able to express its l impid essence;

b u t if they are a manifestat ion of life, the an imal is bet ter equ ipped

to m a k e its en igma percept ible . Ra the r than the ca lm image of characters ,

i t shows us the incessant transi t ion f rom the inorganic to the organic

by means of respirat ion or digest ion, and the inverse t ransformat ion,

b r o u g h t abou t by death , of the great functional s tructures in to lifeless

dus t :

D e a d substances are b o r n e t owards l iving bodies in o rde r to take up a

place and exer t an act ion wi th in t h e m de te rmined by the na ture o f the

combina t ions in to w h i c h they have entered, and in o rde r to escape

f r o m t h e m again o n e day so as to fall once m o r e u n d e r the laws of

inan imate na tu re [28].

T h e plant held sway on the frontiers o f m o v e m e n t and immobi l i ty , o f the

sentient and the non-sent ien t ; whereas the an imal maintains its existence

on the frontiers of life and death . D e a t h besieges i t on all sides; fur ther ­

m o r e , i t threatens i t also f rom wi th in , for on ly the o rgan i sm can die , and

i t is f rom the dep th of their lives that dea th over takes l iving beings.

Hence , no d o u b t , the a m b i g u o u s values assumed by animal i ty t owards the

end of the e igh teen th cen tu ry : the an imal appears as the bearer of tha t

dea th to w h i c h i t is, at the same t ime , subjected; i t contains a perpe tua l

d e v o u r i n g of life by life. I t be longs to na tu re on ly a t the pr ice of con ta in ­

ing wi th in itself a nucleus of ant i -na ture . Transfer r ing its mos t secret

essence f r o m the vegetable to the animal k i n g d o m , life has left the t a b u ­

lated space o f o rde r and b e c o m e wild once m o r e . T h e same m o v e m e n t

T H B ORDER OF THINGS

tha t d o o m s it to dea th reveals i t as m u r d e r o u s . I t kills because i t lives.

N a t u r e can no longer be g o o d . T h a t life can no longer be separated f r o m

m u r d e r , na tu re f r o m evil, o r desires f r o m ant i -na ture , Sade p roc la imed

to t he e igh teen th cen tu ry , w h o s e l anguage he dra ined d r y , and to t he

m o d e r n age , w h i c h has for so l ong a t t emp ted to stifle his vo ice . I h o p e

the insolence (for w h o m ? ) is excusable, bu t Les 120 Joume'es is the ve lve ty ,

marve l lous obverse of the Lecons d'anatomie comparee. At all events , in o u r

archaeological calendar , t hey are the same age.

B u t this imagina t ive status o f animal i ty b u r d e n e d w i t h d i s turb ing and

noc tu rna l p o w e r s refers m o r e p ro found ly to the mul t ip le and s imul ta ­

neous functions of life in n ine teen th -cen tu ry t h o u g h t . Perhaps for the first

t i m e in W e s t e r n cu l ture , life is escaping f r o m the general laws of be ing as

i t is posi ted and analysed in representa t ion. On the o the r side of all the

th ings tha t are , even b e y o n d those tha t can be , suppor t i ng t h e m to m a k e

t h e m visible, a n d ceaselessly des t roy ing t h e m w i t h the violence o f dea th ,

life becomes a fundamenta l force, and o n e that is opposed to be ing in the

same w a y as m o v e m e n t to immobi l i t y , as t ime to space, as the secret wish

to t he visible expression. Life is the r o o t of all existence, and the n o n ­

l iving, n a t u r e in its iner t f o rm, is mere ly spent life; m e r e be ing is the

n o n - b e i n g of life. For life - a n d this is w h y it has a radical va lue in n i n e ­

t een th -cen tu ry t h o u g h t - i s a t t he same t i m e the nucleus of be ing and of

n o n - b e i n g : there is be ing o n l y because there is life, and in that funda­

men ta l m o v e m e n t tha t d o o m s t h e m to death , the scattered beings , stable

for an instant, are fo rmed , halt , ho ld life i m m o b i l e - and in a sense kill it

- b u t are then i n t u r n des t royed b y tha t inexhaust ible force. T h e e x ­

per ience of life is thus posi ted as the m o s t general l aw of beings, t he

revelat ion of tha t p r imi t ive force on the basis of w h i c h they are; i t

functions as an u n t a m e d o n t o l o g y , o n e t r y ing to express the indis-

sociable be ing and n o n - b e i n g of all beings. B u t this o n t o l o g y discloses n o t

so m u c h w h a t gives beings their founda t ion as w h a t bears t h e m for an

instant t o w a r d s a precar ious f o r m and ye t is a l ready secretly sapping t h e m

f r o m wi th in in o r d e r to des t roy t h e m . In relat ion to life, beings are no

m o r e than t rans i tory figures, and the be ing that t hey main ta in , d u r i n g the

br ie f pe r iod of their existence, i s no m o r e than their p r e sumpt ion , their

wil l to survive . A n d so, for k n o w l e d g e , t he be ing of th ings is an illusion,

a veil tha t m u s t be t o r n aside in o rde r to reveal the m u t e and invisible

violence that i s d e v o u r i n g t h e m in the darkness. T h e o n t o l o g y of the

annihi la t ion of beings assumes therefore val idi ty as a cr i t ique of k n o w ­

ledge : b u t i t is n o t so m u c h a quest ion of g iv ing the p h e n o m e n o n a

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foundat ion , of expressing b o t h its l imit a n d its law, of relat ing i t to the

f ini tude that renders i t possible, as of dissipating it and des t roy ing it in

the same w a y as life itself destroys be ings : for its w h o l e be ing is m e r e

appearance .

T h u s a sys tem of t h o u g h t is be ing fo rmed tha t is opposed in a lmost all

its t e rms to the system tha t was l inked to t he fo rma t ion of an e c o n o m i c

his tor ic i ty . T h e latter, as we h a v e seen, t o o k as its founda t ion a t r ip le

t heo ry o f i r reducible needs, t he object ivi ty o f l abour , and the end o f

h is tory . H e r e , on the con t ra ry , a sys tem of t h o u g h t i s be ing deve loped

in w h i c h individual i ty , w i t h its forms, limits, and needs, i s no m o r e than

a precar ious m o m e n t , d o o m e d to des t ruct ion , f o rming first and last a

s imple obstacle that m u s t be r e m o v e d f r o m the pa th o f that annihi la t ion;

a sys tem of t h o u g h t in w h i c h the object ivi ty of things is m e r e appearance ,

a ch imera of the percept ions , an illusion tha t m u s t be dissipated and

r e tu rned t o t he p u r e wil l , w i t h o u t p h e n o m e n o n , tha t b r o u g h t those

th ings in to be ing and main ta ined d i e m the re for an instant; lastly, a

sys tem of t h o u g h t for w h i c h the r e c o m m e n c e m e n t of life, its incessant

resumpt ions , and its s tubbornness , p rec lude the possibility of impos ing a

l imit of du ra t ion u p o n it, especially since t i m e itself, w i t h its chronologica l

divisions and its quasi-spatial calendar , is doubtless n o t h i n g b u t an illusion

o f k n o w l e d g e . W h e r e o n e m o d e o f t h o u g h t predicts t h e end o f h is tory ,

the o the r proc la ims the infinity of life; w h e r e o n e recognizes t he real

p r o d u c t i o n o f th ings by labour , the o the r dissipates t he chimeras o f c o n ­

sciousness; w h e r e o n e affirms, w i t h the l imits o f t he individual , the

exigencies o f his life, the o the r masks t h e m benea th the m u r m u r i n g of

dea th . Is this oppos i t ion t he sign tha t f r o m the n ine teen th cen tu ry the

field of k n o w l e d g e can no longer p rov ide the g r o u n d for a reflection tha t

wil l be h o m o g e n e o u s and u n i f o r m a t all points? M u s t we a d m i t tha t f r o m

n o w on each f o r m of posi t ivi ty wil l have t he ' ph i losophy ' tha t suits it?

E c o n o m i c s , tha t o f a l abour s t amped w i t h t he sign of need , b u t w i t h the

eventual p romise of the grea t r e w a r d of t ime? B io logy , that of a life

m a r k e d by the con t inu i ty that forms beings o n l y in o rde r to dissolve t h e m

again, and so finds itself emanc ipa ted f rom all t he l imitat ions of His to ry?

A n d the sciences of l anguage a ph i losophy of cul tures , of their relat ivi ty

and their individual p o w e r o f expression?

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I V B O P P

T h e r e is, h o w e v e r , o n e single po in t , the invest igat ion o f w h i c h o u g h t

to decide every d o u b t , and elucidate every difficulty; t he s t ructure or

c o m p a r a t i v e g r a m m a r of languages furnishes as certain a key of their

genea logy as the s tudy of compara t i ve a n a t o m y has d o n e to the loftiest

b r anch of na tura l science[29].

Schlegel was wel l a w a r e of i t : the const i tut ion of historicity in the sphere

of g r a m m a r t o o k place in accordance wi th the same m o d e l as in the

science of l iving beings. A n d there is n o t h i n g surpris ing in this, in fact,

since, t h r o u g h o u t the Classical age , the w o r d s that languages w e r e

t h o u g h t to be c o m p o s e d of, and the characters tha t w e r e used in the

a t t e m p t to const i tu te a na tu ra l o rder , had had the same, the identical,

status: t hey existed on ly by v i r tue o f the representat ive va lue they

possessed, and the p o w e r o f analysis, o f dupl icat ion, o f compos i t ion and

a r r a n g e m e n t that t h e y w e r e accorded w i t h r ega rd to the th ings r ep re ­

sented. W i t h Jussieu and L a m a r c k in the first place, and then w i t h Cuv ie r ,

the character had lost its representat ive funct ion, or ra ther , t h o u g h i t

c o u l d still ' represent ' and m a k e possible the establ ishment of relations of

adjacency or kinship, i t d id so no t by the v i r tue p rope r to its visible

s t ruc ture or to the describablc elements of w h i c h i t was composed , b u t

because it had been related, at first, to a total o rgan ic s t ruc ture and to a

funct ion that i t cou ld p e r f o r m in a direct or indirect , major or collateral,

' p r i m a r y ' o r ' secondary ' w a y . In the d o m a i n o f language , the w o r d

undergoes , m o r e or less a t the same per iod , an analogous t rans format ion :

needless to say, i t does n o t cease to have a meaning%ind to be able to

' represent ' s o m e t h i n g in the m i n d that employs or unders tands it; bu t this

role is no longer const i tut ive of the w o r d in its v e r y be ing , in its essential

archi tecture , in w h a t enables i t to take its place w i th in a sentence and to

l ink itself there w i t h o the r m o r e or less different w o r d s . I f the w o r d is

able to f igure in a discourse in w h i c h i t means some th ing , i t wil l no

longer be by v i r tue of s o m e i m m e d i a t e discursivity tha t i t i s t h o u g h t to

possess in itself, and by r ight of bir th , b u t because, in its v e r y fo rm, in the

sounds tha t c o m p o s e it, in the changes i t undergoes in accordance w i t h the

g rammat i ca l funct ion i t is pe r fo rming , and finally in the modif icat ions to

w h i c h i t finds itself subject in the course of t ime , i t obeys a certain n u m b e r

of strict laws w h i c h regulate , in a similar w a y , all the o the r e lements of

the same language ; so tha t the w o r d is no longer a t tached to a r ep re ­

sentation except in so far as it is previously a par t of the g rammat ica l

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organiza t ion by means of wh ich the language defines and guarantees its

o w n coherence . For the w o r d to be able to say w h a t i t says, i t must

be long to a g r ammat i ca l total i ty w h i c h , in relat ion to the w o r d , is

p r imary , fundamenta l , and de te rmin ing .

This displacement of the w o r d , this b a c k w a r d j u m p , as i t w e r e , away

f r o m its representat ive functions, was cer tainly o n e of the impor tan t

events o f W e s t e r n cul ture t owards the end o f the e igh teen th cen tu ry . And

it is also o n e of those that have passed mos t unperce ived . A great deal of

a t ten t ion is wi l l ingly pa id to the beginnings of political e c o n o m y , to

Ricardo 's analysis o f g r o u n d ren t and the cost o f p r o d u c t i o n : that event

is recognized as hav ing reached vast d imensions , since, in the course of its

progress , i t has no t on ly m a d e possible the d e v e l o p m e n t of a science bu t

also b r o u g h t in its w a k e a certain n u m b e r of e c o n o m i c and political

muta t ions . T h e n e w forms taken by the sciences o f na tu re have n o t been

neglected ei ther; and t h o u g h i t is t rue that Lamarck , by the influence of a

re t rospect ive illusion, has been overes t imated at the expense of Cuvie r ,

t h o u g h it is t rue that there is little awareness of the fact that 'life' reached

the threshold of its posi t ivi ty for the first t i m e w i t h t he Lecons d'anatomie

comparee, there is nevertheless at least a diffused consciousness of the fact

tha t W e s t e r n cu l ture began , f rom that m o m e n t o n w a r d , to look a t the

w o r l d o f l iving beings w i t h n e w eyes. On the o the r hand , the isolation

of the I n d o - E u r o p e a n languages, the cons t i tu t ion of a compara t ive g r a m ­

m a r , the s tudy o f inflections, the fo rmula t ion o f the laws o f v o w e l

g rada t ion and consonanta l changes - in shor t , the w h o l e b o d y of ph i lo ­

logical w o r k accomplished by G r i m m , Schlegel, Rask, and B o p p , has

remained on the fringes of o u r historical awareness , as t h o u g h i t had

mere ly p r o v i d e d the basis for a s o m e w h a t lateral and esoteric discipline -

as t h o u g h , in fact, i t was n o t the w h o l e m o d e of be ing of l anguage (and

o f o u r o w n language) that had been modif ied t h r o u g h it. Cer ta in ly wc

o u g h t no t to a t t e m p t a justification of this neglect in spite of the i m p o r t ­

ance of the change , bu t , on the con t ra ry , on the basis of its impor t ance ,

and on that o f the bl ind p r o x i m i t y that the event still preserves for o u r

eyes, in their con t inu ing a t t achmen t to their cu s tomary l ights. T h e fact is

that , even a t the t ime w h e n i t occur red , this even t was a l ready enve loped ,

if n o t in secret, at least in a certain discretion. Perhaps changes in t he

m o d e of be ing of l anguage are like alterations that affect p ronunc ia t ion ,

g r a m m a r , or semantics : swift as they are, t hey are never clearly grasped by

those w h o are speaking and w h o s e language is nevertheless already sp read­

ing these mu ta t i ons ; they a re not iced on ly indirect ly, for b r ie f m o m e n t s ;

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and then the decision is finally indicated on ly in the negat ive m o d e - by

the radical and immed ia t e ly percept ible obsoleteness of the language o n e

has been using. It is p r o b a b l y impossible for a cu l ture to b e c o m e aware in

a themat ic and posi t ive m a n n e r that its l anguage is ceasing to be t rans­

parent to its representat ions, because it is th icken ing and tak ing on a

peculiar heaviness. As one is in the act of discoursing, h o w is o n e to k n o w

- unless by means of some obscure indices that can interpret on ly w i t h

difficulty and bad ly - tha t l anguage (the v e r y l anguage o n e is using) is

acquir ing a d imens ion i r reducible to p u r e discursivity? Perhaps for all of

these reasons the b i r t h o f ph i lo logy has remained m u c h m o r e h idden f r o m

W e s t e r n consciousness than that of b io logy and tha t of economics - even

t h o u g h i t was par t o f the same archaeological upheava l ; and even t h o u g h

its consequences have ex tended m u c h further in o u r cu l ture , at least in the

subterranean strata that run t h r o u g h i t and suppor t it.

H o w was this philological posi t ivi ty formed? T h e r e are four theoret ical

segments that p r o v i d e us wi th indications of its cons t i tu t ion early in the

n ine teen th cen tu ry - a t the t ime of Schlegel 's essay on the language and

ph i losophy of the Indians (1808), G r i m m ' s Deutsche Gramtnatik (1818),

and B o p p ' s b o o k on the conjugat ion system of Sanskri t (1816).

1. T h e first of these segments concerns the m a n n e r in w h i c h a l anguage

can be character ized f rom wi th in and dist inguished f rom o the r languages .

In the Classical per iod , i t was possible to define the individual i ty of a

l anguage on the basis of several criteria: the p ropo r t i ons of the different

sounds e m p l o y e d to f o r m the w o r d s ( there are languages w i t h a major i ty

of vowe l s and o thers w i t h a major i ty of consonants) , the precedence

accorded certain categories of w o r d s (languages favour ing concre te sub ­

stantives, languages favour ing abstract substantives, etc.) , the m a n n e r of

represent ing relations (by preposi t ions or by declensions), the preferred

o rde r of the w o r d s (whe the r the logical subject is placed first, as in

French, or p recedence is g iven to the mos t i m p o r t a n t w o r d s , as in La t in ) ;

in these ways distinctions w e r e m a d e be tween N o r t h e r n languages and

Medi te r ranean languages , languages of feeling and languages of need ,

languages of f r eedom and languages of slavery, barbarous languages and

civilized languages, languages of logical reasoning and languages of

rhetor ical a r g u m e n t a t i o n ; n o n e o f these dist inctions, h o w e v e r , was c o n ­

cerned w i t h a n y t h i n g b u t the w a y in w h i c h languages w e r e able to

analyse representat ion, and subsequent ly to c o m b i n e its e lements . B u t

beg inn ing w i t h Schlegel, languages arc defined, a t least in their mos t

general t ypo logy , accord ing to the w a y in w h i c h they l ink toge ther the

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prope r ly verba l e lements that c o m p o s e t h e m ; a m o n g these elements there

are some, needless to say, that are representa t ive: t hey d o , a t any rate ,

possess a visible representat ive va lue ; whereas there are others tha t c o n ­

tain no m e a n i n g , and that serve on ly by means of a certain compos i t ion

to de te rmine t he m e a n i n g o f some o the r e l ement in the un i ty o f the d is ­

course. I t is this mater ial - m a d e up of nouns , verbs , w o r d s in general , b u t

also of syllables and sounds - tha t languages j o i n toge the r to f o r m p r o ­

posi t ions and sentences. B u t the mater ia l un i ty const i tu ted by the a r r a n g e ­

m e n t o f sounds , syllables, and w o r d s i s n o t g o v e r n e d by the m e r e

c o m b i n a t i o n of the e lement of representa t ion. I t has its o w n principles,

w h i c h differ f r o m language to l anguage : g r ammat i ca l compos i t i on has

regularit ies w h i c h are n o t t ransparent to the signification of the discourse.

M o r e o v e r , since signification can be t ransformed, practically un impa i red ,

f r o m o n e l anguage to ano ther , i t is these regularit ies that will m a k e i t

possible to define the individual i ty of a l anguage . Each o n e has an a u t o ­

n o m o u s g rammat i ca l space; these spaces can be c o m p a r e d laterally, tha t

is, f r o m o n e l anguage to ano ther , w i t h o u t its be ing necessary to pass

t h r o u g h the c o m m o n ' m i d d l e g r o u n d ' o f the field o f representa t ion w i t h

all its possible subdivisions.

I t i s easy to distinguish r igh t a w a y t w o b r o a d m o d e s of c o m b i n a t i o n

be tween g rammat i ca l e lements . T h e first consists in j u x t a p o s i n g t h e m in

such a w a y tha t they de t e rmine o n e ano the r ; in this case, the l anguage

is m a d e up of f r agmented elements - general ly v e r y shor t - wh ich can

be c o m b i n e d in different ways , b u t w i t h each of the units preserv ing its

a u t o n o m y , and thus the possibility of b reak ing the t rans i tory l ink i t has

j u s t established w i t h ano the r un i t inside a sentence or p ropos i t ion . T h e

l anguage is then defined by the n u m b e r of its units, and by all the possible

combina t ions tha t can be established be tween t h e m in discourse; so tha t

i t is a ques t ion of an ' a g g l o m e r a t i o n of a t o m s . . . w i t h no internal

connec t ion b e y o n d the pure ly mechanica l adapta t ion o f particles and

affixes'[30]. T h e second m o d e of connec t ion be tween the e lements o f a

l anguage is the inflectional system, w h i c h modifies t he essential syllables

or w o r d s - t he r o o t forms - f r o m wi th in . Each of these r o o t forms carries

w i t h i t a certain n u m b e r of possible variat ions, de t e rmined in advance ;

and accord ing to the o the r w o r d s in the sentence, accord ing to t he rela­

t ions o f dependence o r corre la t ion be tween those w o r d s , accord ing to the

adjacencies and associations that occur , so o n e var ia t ion or ano the r wi l l

be used. On the surface, this m o d e o f connec t ion appears less r ich than

the f i r s t , since t he n u m b e r o f combina t i ve possibilities i s m u c h m o r e

T H B O R D E R O F T H I N G S

restr icted; bu t , in reali ty, the inflectional sys tem never exists in its p u r e

and m o s t skeletal f o r m ; the internal modif icat ion of the r o o t enables i t

to have o the r e lements a d d e d to it, themselves susceptible of internal

modif icat ion, so tha t 'each r o o t is like a l iving and p roduc t ive g e r m , every

modif icat ion o f c i rcumstance o r degree be ing p r o d u c e d by internal

changes ; freer scope is thus given to its deve lopmen t , and its rich p r o ­

ductiveness is in t r u t h a lmost illimitable'[31].

C o r r e s p o n d i n g t o these t w o b road types o f l inguistic organiza t ion , we

find, on the o n e hand , Chinese , in w h i c h 'all particles indicat ing m o d i ­

fication of t ime , person , etc. , are monosyl lables , perfect in themselves, and

independen t o f the roo t ' , and , on t he o ther , Sanskrit , w h o s e

s t ruc ture i s h igh ly organized , fo rmed by inflection, or the change a n d

t ransposi t ion of its p r i m a r y radical signs, carr ied t h r o u g h every r a m i ­

fication o f m e a n i n g and expression, and n o t by t he mere ly mechanica l

process o f annex ing w o r d s o r particles to t he same lifeless and u n p r o ­

duct ive roo t [3 2].

B e t w e e n these ma jo r and e x t r e m e mode ls , any l anguage w h a t e v e r can be

si tuated; every l anguage wil l necessarily possess an organiza t ion that wil l

a p p r o x i m a t e i t to o n e of the t w o , or wil l place i t a t an equal distance f r o m

b o t h , a t the cent re of the field thus defined. Neares t to Chinese , we find

Basque, Cop t i c , a n d the Amer i can languages ; these all use separable

e lements as a means of connec t ion ; b u t those e lements , instead of r e m a i n ­

ing a lways in a free state, like so m a n y i r reducible verbal a toms , ' a re

a l ready beg inn ing to me l t i n to the w o r d ' ; Arab ic i s defined by its m i x t u r e

of the sys tem of affixes and tha t of inflections; Cel t ic is a lmost exclusively

an inflectional l anguage , t h o u g h o n e still finds in i t Vestiges of affixive

languages ' . I t m a y perhaps be objected that this oppos i t ion was a l ready

k n o w n in the e igh teen th cen tury , and tha t the abil i ty to dist inguish b e ­

tween the combina t i ve s t ruc ture o f Chinese a n d the declensions and c o n ­

juga t ions o f languages like Lat in and Greek was by no means n e w . I t

m a y also be objected that the absolute dist inction established by Schlegel

was criticized v e r y shor t ly af terwards by B o p p : w h e r e Schlegel saw t w o

types o f l anguage tha t w e r e radically inassimilable to o n e ano the r , B o p p

searched for a c o m m o n o r ig in ; he a t t empts to establish[33] that inflections

are n o t a sort of internal and spontaneous d e v e l o p m e n t of t he p r imi t ive

e lement , b u t particles tha t h a v e been a g g l o m e r a t e d to t he r o o t syllable:

t he m of the first person in Sanskrit (bhavami) or t he t of t he th i rd person

(bhavati) are the effect of the adjunct ion to t he verba l r o o t of the

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L A B O U R , LIFE, L A N G U A G E

285

p r o n o u n mam (1) or the p r o n o u n tern (he). B u t w h a t is i m p o r t a n t for the

const i tu t ion o f ph i lo logy i s no t so m u c h k n o w i n g w h e t h e r the e lements o f

conjugat ion m a y , a t some m o r e or less distant pe r iod in the past, have

enjoyed the benefit of an isolated existence ca r ry ing w i t h i t an a u t o n o m o u s

va lue ; w h a t is essential, and w h a t distinguishes the analyses of Schlegel and

B o p p f rom those that m a y perhaps h a v e seemed to anticipate t h e m in t he

e ighteenth cen tu ry [34 ] , i s that t he original syllables do n o t g r o w (by

means of internal adjunctions or proliferations) w i t h o u t a certain n u m b e r

of modificat ions regulated wi th in the roo t . In a language like Chinese ,

there are s imply laws of j ux t apos i t i on ; bu t in languages in w h i c h the

roo ts are subjected to g r o w t h (whether they be monosyl lab ic , as in

Sanskrit, or polysyllabic, as in H e b r e w ) , o n e a lways finds internal var ia ­

t ions g o v e r n e d by regular forms. I t is therefore unders tandable that the

n e w phi lo logy , since i t n o w has these criteria of internal s t ructure w i t h

w h i c h to characterize languages, should have abandoned the hierarchic

classifications practised in the e igh teen th c e n t u r y : at tha t t ime , i t was

accepted that there w e r e s o m e languages that w e r e m o r e i m p o r t a n t than

o thers , because they w e r e able to analyse representat ions m o r e precisely

o r m o r e delicately. F r o m n o w on , all languages have an equal va lue :

they s imply have different internal s tructures. Hence that curiosi ty for

rare, little spoken, p o o r l y 'civil ized' languages, of w h i c h Rask gave an

example w i t h his grea t v o y a g e of inqui ry t h r o u g h Scandinavia, Russia,

the Caucasus, Persia, and India.

2. T h e s tudy of these internal variations consti tutes the second i m p o r t a n t

theoret ical segment . In its e tymolog ica l investigations, general g r a m m a r

did of course s tudy t ransformat ions of words and syllables ove r t i m e ; bu t

this s tudy was l imi ted for three reasons. I t b o r e m o r e u p o n the m e t a ­

morphos i s o f the letters o f the a lphabet than u p o n the m a n n e r in w h i c h

the sounds actually p r o n o u n c e d could be modif ied . M o r e o v e r , the t r ans ­

format ions w e r e considered as the effect - a lways possible, at any t ime

and under any condi t ions - of a certain affinity be tween the letters t h e m ­

selves; it was accepted that p and b, and m and «, w e r e sufficiently close to

o n e ano ther for the one to be subst i tuted for the o the r ; such changes w e r e

p r o v o k e d or de t e rmined exclusively by this doubtful p r o x i m i t y and the

confusion that could result in p r o n o u n c i n g or hear ing those letters.

Finally, vowels w e r e t reated as the m o s t f lu id and unstable e lement of

l anguage , whereas the consonants w e r e t h o u g h t of as f o r m i n g its solid

f r a m e w o r k (does n o t H e b r e w , for example , dispense wi th the w r i t i n g o f

its vowels?) .

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

restr icted; bu t , in reali ty, the inflectional sys tem never exists in its p u r e

and mos t skeletal f o r m ; t he internal modif icat ion of the r o o t enables i t

to have o the r e lements a d d e d to it, themselves susceptible of internal

modif icat ion, so tha t ' each r o o t is like a l iving and p roduc t i ve g e r m , every

modif icat ion o f c i rcumstance o r degree be ing p r o d u c e d by internal

changes ; freer scope is thus g iven to its deve lopmen t , and its r ich p r o ­

ductiveness is in t r u t h a lmost i l l imitable '[31].

C o r r e s p o n d i n g t o these t w o b r o a d types o f l inguistic organiza t ion , we

find, on the o n e h a n d , Chinese , in w h i c h 'all particles indicat ing m o d i ­

fication of t ime, person , etc . , are monosyl lables , perfect in themselves, and

independen t o f the roo t ' , and, on the o ther , Sanskrit , w h o s e

s t ruc ture i s h ig h ly organized , fo rmed by inflection, or the change a n d

t ransposi t ion of its p r i m a r y radical signs, carr ied t h r o u g h eve ry r a m i ­

fication o f m e a n i n g and expression, and n o t by the mere ly mechanical

process o f annex ing w o r d s or particles to t he same lifeless and u n p r o ­

duc t ive r o o t [3 2].

B e t w e e n these ma jo r and e x t r e m e models , any l anguage w h a t e v e r can be

si tuated; every l anguage wil l necessarily possess an organiza t ion that wil l

a p p r o x i m a t e i t to o n e of the t w o , or wil l place i t a t an equal distance f r o m

bo th , a t the cent re o f t he field thus d e n n e d . Neares t to Chinese , we find

Basque, Cop t i c , and the A m e r i c a n languages ; these all use separable

e lements as a means of connec t ion ; b u t those e lements , instead of r e m a i n ­

ing a lways in a free state, l ike so m a n y i r reducible verba l a toms , ' a re

a l ready beg inn ing to me l t i n to the w o r d ' ; Arab ic i s defined by its m i x t u r e

of the sys tem of affixes and tha t of inflections; Cel t ic is a lmost exclusively

an inflectional l anguage , t h o u g h o n e still f inds in i t 'vestiges of affixive

languages ' . I t m a y perhaps be objected tha t this oppos i t ion was a l ready

k n o w n in t he e igh teen th cen tury , and tha t t he abil i ty to dist inguish b e ­

tween the combina t i ve s t ruc ture o f Chinese a n d the declensions and c o n ­

juga t ions o f languages like Lat in and Greek was by no means n e w . I t

m a y also be objected that the absolute dist inct ion established by Schlegel

was criticized v e r y shor t ly af terwards b y B o p p : w h e r e Schlegel saw t w o

types o f l anguage tha t w e r e radically inassimilable to o n e another , B o p p

searched for a c o m m o n o r ig in ; he a t t empt s to establish[33] tha t inflections

a re n o t a sort o f in ternal a n d spontaneous d e v e l o p m e n t o f t he p r imi t i ve

e lement , b u t particles tha t h a v e been a g g l o m e r a t e d to t h e r o o t syllable:

t he m of the f irst person in Sanskrit (bhavami) or the t of the th i rd person

(bhavati) a re the effect of the adjunct ion to the verbal r o o t of the

284

L A B O U R , LIFE, L A N G U A G E

285

p r o n o u n mam (1) or the p r o n o u n tern (he). B u t w h a t is i m p o r t a n t for the

const i tu t ion o f ph i lo logy i s n o t so m u c h k n o w i n g w h e t h e r the e lements o f

conjugat ion m a y , a t s o m e m o r e or less distant pe r iod in the past, have

enjoyed the benefit of an isolated existence ca r ry ing w i t h i t an a u t o n o m o u s

va lue ; w h a t is essential, and w h a t distinguishes the analyses of Schlegel and

B o p p f rom those that m a y perhaps h a v e seemed to ant icipate t h e m in t he

e ighteenth cen tu ry [34 ] , i s that t he original syllables do n o t g r o w (by

means of internal adjunctions or proliferations) w i t h o u t a certain n u m b e r

of modificat ions regulated w i th in the roo t . In a language like Chinese ,

there are s imply laws of j ux t apos i t i on ; b u t in languages in w h i c h the

roo ts are subjected to g r o w t h (whether they be monosyl lab ic , as in

Sanskrit , or polysyllabic, as in H e b r e w ) , o n e always finds internal var ia ­

tions gove rned by regular forms. I t is therefore unders tandable tha t the

n e w phi lo logy , since i t n o w has these criteria of internal s t ructure w i t h

w h i c h to characterize languages, should have abandoned the hierarchic

classifications practised in the e ighteenth c e n t u r y : at tha t t ime , i t was

accepted that there w e r e s o m e languages that w e r e m o r e i m p o r t a n t than

others , because they w e r e able to analyse representat ions m o r e precisely

o r m o r e delicately. F r o m n o w on , all languages have an equal va lue :

they s imply h a v e different internal s tructures. H e n c e that curiosi ty for

rare , little spoken, p o o r l y 'civil ized' languages, of w h i c h Rask gave an

example w i t h his grea t v o y a g e of inqu i ry t h r o u g h Scandinavia, Russia,

the Caucasus, Persia, and India.

2. T h e s tudy of these internal variations consti tutes the second i m p o r t a n t

theoret ical segment . In its e tymolog ica l investigations, genera l g r a m m a r

did o f course s tudy t ransformat ions o f w o r d s and syllables over t ime ; b u t

this s tudy was l imited for three reasons. I t b o r e m o r e u p o n the m e t a ­

morphos i s o f the letters o f the a lphabet than u p o n the m a n n e r in w h i c h

the sounds actually p r o n o u n c e d could be modif ied . M o r e o v e r , the t r ans ­

format ions w e r e considered as the effect - a lways possible, at any t ime

and u n d e r any condi t ions - of a certain affinity be tween the letters t h e m ­

selves; it was accepted that p and b, and m and «, w e r e sufficiently close to

o n e ano the r for the o n e to be substi tuted for the o the r ; such changes w e r e

p r o v o k e d o r de t e rmined exclusively by this doubtful p r o x i m i t y and the

confusion that cou ld result in p r o n o u n c i n g or hear ing those letters.

Finally, vowel s w e r e t reated as the m o s t f lu id and unstable e lement of

language, whereas the consonants w e r e t h o u g h t of as f o rming its solid

f r a m e w o r k (does n o t H e b r e w , for example , dispense w i t h the w r i t i n g o f

its vowels?) .

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

W i t h Rask, G r i m m , a n d B o p p , l anguage i s t reated for the first t i m e

(even t h o u g h there i s no longer any a t t e m p t to refer i t back to the cries

f r o m w h i c h i t or ig ina ted) as a total i ty of phone t i c e lements . W h e r e a s ,

for general g r a m m a r , l anguage arose w h e n the noise p r o d u c e d by the

m o u t h or the lips had b e c o m e a letter, i t i s accepted f rom n o w on that

l anguage exists w h e n noises have been art iculated and d iv ided in to a

series of distinct sounds. T h e w h o l e be ing of l anguage i s n o w one of sound .

This explains the n e w interest, s h o w n by R a y n o u a r d a n d the b ro the rs

G r i m m , in n o n - w r i t t e n l i terature, in folk tales and spoken dialects. L a n ­

guage is sough t in its m o s t au thent ic state: in the spoken w o r d - the w o r d

tha t i s dr ied up and frozen in to i m m o b i l i t y by w r i t i n g . A w h o l e mys t ique

i s be ing b o r n : that o f the v e r b , o f the p u r e poe t ic f lash that disappears

w i t h o u t trace, leaving n o t h i n g beh ind i t b u t a v ib ra t ion suspended in the

air for o n e br ief m o m e n t . By means o f the ephemera l and p r o f o u n d sound

i t p roduces , the spoken w o r d accedes to sovere ignty . A n d its secret

p o w e r s , d r a w i n g n e w life f r o m the b rea th o f the p rophe t s , rise up in

fundamenta l oppos i t ion (even t h o u g h t h e y do tolerate s o m e over lapp ing)

to the esoteric na tu re o f wr i t i ng , w h i c h , on t he o the r hand , presupposes

some secret p e r m a n e n t l y lu rk ing a t the cent re of its visible labyr inths .

Language is no longer to the same ex ten t that s ign - m o r e or less distant,

similar, and a rb i t ra ry - for w h i c h the Logique de Port-Royal p roposed as an

immed ia t e and evident m o d e l the por t ra i t of a m a n , or a m a p . I t has

acquired a v i b r a t o r y na tu re w h i c h has separated i t f r o m the visible sign

and m a d e i t m o r e near ly p r o x i m a t e to t he n o t e in music . A n d i t was for

this v e r y reason tha t Saussure had to by-pass this m o m e n t in the h is tory of

the spoken w o r d , w h i c h was a major even t for t he w h o l e o f n ine t een th -

cen tu ry ph i lo logy , in o rde r to restore, b e y o n d its historical forms , the

d imens ion of l anguage in general , and to reopen , after such neglect , the

o ld p r o b l e m o f t h e sign, w h i c h had con t inued t o an imate the w h o l e o f

t h o u g h t f r o m P o r t - R o y a l to the last o f the ' Ideo logues ' .

T h u s , in the n ine teen th cen tu ry , there begins an analysis of l anguage

t reated as a total i ty of sounds emancipa ted f r o m t h e letters that m a y be

used to transcribe t h e m [ 3 5 ] . This analysis was m a d e in three direct ions.

First, t he t y p o l o g y of the var ious sounds e m p l o y e d in a l anguage : in the

case of vowels , for example , the oppos i t ion b e t w e e n s imple and doub le

vowel s ( lengthened as in a, o; or d iph thong ized as in ce, ai); a m o n g

s imple vowels , the oppos i t ion be tween those tha t are p u r e (a, i, o, u) and

those tha t are modif ied (e, 6, u); a m o n g those tha t are p u r e , there are

those that are susceptible of var ious p ronunc ia t ions (such as o), and those

286

L A B O U R , L I F E , L A N G U A G E

tha t have o n l y o n e (a, i , u); finally, a m o n g this last g r o u p , some are

subject to change and can receive an umlaut (a and u ) ; the i , on the o ther

hand , a lways remains the same [3 6 ] . T h e second f o r m of analysis bears

u p o n the condi t ions tha t m a y de t e rmine a sound change ; the place of the

sound wi th in t he w o r d is in itself an i m p o r t a n t factor: a syllable is less

easily able to p ro tec t its pe rmanence if it is an end ing than if it is a roo t ;

r o o t letters, G r i m m tells us, are l o n g l ived; the sounds in inflectional

endings are shor ter l ived. B u t there are posi t ive de terminat ions as wel l , for

' t he preservat ion or modification* of a g iven sound 'is never arbi t rary ' [3 7 ] .

This absence of arbitrariness was for G r i m m the de te rmina t ion of a m e a n ­

ing (in the r o o t of a grea t m a n y G e r m a n verbs a stands in the same

opposi t ion to i as the preter i te does to the present ) . For B o p p , i t is the

effect of a certain n u m b e r of laws. S o m e of these define the rules g o v e r n ­

ing the changes tha t occur w h e n t w o consonants are adjacent: ' T h u s w h e n

o n e says in Sanskrit at-ti (he eats) instead of ad-ti ( f rom the r o o t ad, to

ea t ) , the chang ing of the d in to t has a physical l a w as its cause. ' O t h e r s

define the m o d e in w h i c h a te rmina t ion acts u p o n the sounds of the r o o t :

' B y mechanical laws, I m e a n principal ly the laws of w e i g h t and in pa r t i ­

cular the influence exer ted by the w e i g h t of inflectional ve rb endings

u p o n the p reced ing syl lable ' [38] . Lastly, the th i rd f o r m of analysis bears

u p o n the invariabil i ty o f these t ransformat ions t h r o u g h o u t His to ry .

G r i m m , for example , d r e w up a table of correspondences for labials,

dentals, and gut tura ls be tween Greek , 'Go th i c ' , and H i g h G e r m a n : the

p, b, and / of t he Greeks b e c o m e respectively f, p, and b in Go th i c and

b or v,f and p in H i g h G e r m a n ; t,d,th in Greek b e c o m e th,t,d in Go th ic ,

and d,z,t in H i g h G e r m a n . T h e total i ty of these relationships de te rmines

the courses of h i s tory ; and instead of languages be ing subject to that

external yardst ick, to those things in h u m a n his tory that should , accord ing

to Classical t h o u g h t , explain the changes in t h e m , they themselves c o n ­

tain a pr inciple of evolu t ion . H e r e , as e lsewhere, it is ' a n a t o m y ' [ 3 9 ] tha t

de te rmines fate.

3. This definit ion of a l a w for consonanta l or vocal ic modif icat ions

makes it possible to establish a new theory of the root. In the Classical

per iod , roots w e r e dist inguished by a d o u b l e sys tem of constants : a lpha­

betical constants, w h i c h bore u p o n an arb i t rary n u m b e r of letters (in s o m e

cases on ly o n e ) , and significative constants , w h i c h g r o u p e d toge the r

unde r one genera l t h e m e an indefinitely extensible n u m b e r o f adjacent

mean ings ; a t the intersection of these t w o constants , a t t he po in t w h e r e an

identical m e a n i n g was expressed by an identical let ter or an identical

287

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

syllable, a roo t was taken to have been isolated. T h e r o o t was an expressive

nucleus t ransformable to infinity f r o m the s ta r t ing-poin t o f o n e or iginal

sound . B u t i f vowel s and consonants change o n l y in accordance w i t h

certain laws and u n d e r certain condi t ions , the radical m u s t be a stable

linguistic ent i ty (be tween certain l imits) , w h i c h can be isolated w i t h its

possible variat ions, and w h i c h consti tutes, w i t h its different possible forms,

an c lement o f l anguage . In o rde r to d e t e r m i n e the p r i m a r y and qui te

s imple e lements of a language , general g r a m m a r was obl iged to w o r k

backwards t owards that imag ina ry po in t o f contac t w h e r e the sound , as

yet no t verbal , was in s o m e sort o f contac t w i t h the vital ene rgy of

representat ion. F r o m n o w on , h o w e v e r , the e lements o f a language are

inter ior to i t (even if they also be long to o the r languages) : there exist

pure ly linguistic means of establishing the constants accord ing to w h i c h

they can be c o m b i n e d and the table of their possible modif icat ions.

E t y m o l o g y will therefore cease to be an endless regress t owards a p r i m i ­

tive language ent i rely s tocked w i t h pr imal , na tura l cries; i t becomes a

definite, l imited m e t h o d of analysis, the a im of w h i c h is to discover

wi th in a n y g iven w o r d the radical f rom w h i c h i t has been fo rmed : ' T h e

roo ts of w o r d s w e r e b r o u g h t to l ight on ly after the successful analysis of

inflections and derivations'[40].

It thus becomes possible to establish that in certain languages, such as

the Semitic ones , the roots are bisyllabic (and general ly of th ree let ters);

tha t in o thers (the I n d c - G e r m a n i c ones) they are regular ly monosy l lab ic ;

some are const i tu ted by a single v o w e l (1 is the r o o t of verbs m e a n i n g

' t o g o ' , H of those m e a n i n g ' t o reverbera te ' ) ; b u t in general , in these lan­

guages, the roo t comprises a t least o n e consonant add o n e v o w e l - the

consonant be ing ei ther te rmina l or initial; in the first case, the v o w e l is

necessarily initial; in the second, i t m a y be fo l lowed by a second c o n ­

sonant w h i c h serves it as a suppor t (as in the r o o t ma, mad, w h i c h gives

metiri in Latin and messcn in G e r m a n ) [41]. These monosyl lab ic roots m a y

also be dupl icated, as do is dupl icated in the Sanskrit dadami and the Greek

didomi, or sta in tishtami and istemi [42]. A b o v e all, the na tu re of the r o o t

and its const i tuent ro le in language are conceived in an absolutely n e w

m o d e : in the e igh teen th cen tu ry , the r o o t was a r u d i m e n t a r y n a m e w h i c h

designated, in its or ig in , a concre te th ing , an immedia te representat ion, an

object tha t was g iven to man ' s sight or to any o the r of his senses. L a n ­

guage was cons t ruc ted on the basis of the interact ion of its n o m i n a l

character izat ions: der iva t ion ex tended its scope; abstract ion gave rise to

adjectives; and then i t was sufficient to add to the latter that o the r i r rc -

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ducible e lement , the b road m o n o t o n o u s funct ion of the ve rb to be, to

b r i n g abo u t the format ion of the ca tegory of conjugablc w o r d s - a sort of

squeezing toge ther in verbal fo rm of being and epithet . B o p p too accepts

that verbs are mix tu res obta ined by the coagula t ion o f ve rb w i t h roo t .

B u t his analysis differs in several essential points f rom the Classical schema:

there is no quest ion of the potent ia l , under ly ing , invisible addi t ion of the

a t t r ibut ive function, and of the proposi t ional m e a n i n g a t t r ibu ted to the

ve rb to be; it is a ques t ion pr imar i ly of a mater ia l j u n c t i o n be tween a

radical and the forms of the ve rb to be: the Sanskrit as is to be found in

the s igma of the Greek aorist, in the er of the Latin pluperfect and future

perfect; the Sanskrit bhu is to be found in the b of the Latin future and

imperfect . M o r e o v e r , this adjunct ion of the ve rb to be makes possible,

essentially, the a t t r ibut ion of a tense and a person to the radical (the

inflectional end ing const i tu ted by the radical of the ve rb to be also c a r r y ­

ing w i t h it tha t deno t ing the personal p r o n o u n , as in scrip-s-i)^]. As a

result, it is n o t the adjunct ion of the to be tha t t ransforms an epi thet in to

a v e r b ; the radical itself contains a verbal signification, to w h i c h the

der ived inflectional endings of the conjugat ion of to be add mere ly m o d i ­

f ica t ions of person and tense. Or ig ina l ly , therefore, the roots of verbs

designate no t ' th ings ' , bu t actions, processes, desires, wil ls; and it is these

that , w h e n they receive certain inflectional endings p roceed ing f rom

the ve rb to be and f rom the personal p r o n o u n s , b e c o m e susceptible

of conjugat ion , whereas , w h e n they receive o the r suffixes - themselves

modif iable - t hey b e c o m e nouns susceptible of declension. H e n c e t he

' n o u n s / v e r b to be ' b ipolar i ty that characterized classical analysis m u s t be

replaced by a m o r e c o m p l e x a r r a n g e m e n t : roots w i t h a verbal significa­

t ion, able to receive inflectional endings of different types, and thus

capable of g iv ing rise to conjugablc verbs or to substantives. Verbs (and

personal p r o n o u n s ) thus b e c o m e the p r imord ia l c lement of l anguage - the

e l ement f rom w h i c h i t can deve lop . ' T h e ve rb and the personal p r o n o u n s

appear to be the t rue levers of l anguage ' [44 ] .

B o p p ' s analyses w e r e to be of major impor t ance , no t on ly in b reak ing

d o w n the internal compos i t ion of a language , bu t also in defining w h a t

l anguage m a y be in its essence. It is no longer a system of representat ions

w h i c h has the p o w e r to pa t te rn and r ecompose o the r representat ions; i t

designates in its roo ts the mos t constant of actions, states, and wishes;

w h a t i t is t r y ing to say, or iginal ly, is n o t so m u c h w h a t one sees as w h a t

o n e docs or w h a t o n e undergoes ; and t h o u g h i t does eventual ly indicate

th ings as t h o u g h by po in t ing at t h e m , it docs so on ly in so far as they are

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

the result , o r the object, o r the ins t rument o f that ac t ion; n o u n s do n o t

so m u c h pa t te rn the c o m p l e x table of a representat ion as pa t t e rn and arrest

and fix the process of an act ion. L a n g u a g e is ' r o o t e d ' n o t in the th ings

perceived, b u t in the active subject. A n d perhaps , in that case, i t is a

p r o d u c t o f wil l and energy , ra ther than o f the m e m o r y that duplicates

representat ion. We speak because we act, and n o t because recogni t ion i s

a means of cogni t ion . Like act ion, l anguage expresses a p r o f o u n d wil l to

someth ing . A n d this has t w o consequences. T h e first is paradoxica l a t

first s ight : i t is tha t at the m o m e n t w h e n ph i lo logy is const i tu ted by the

d iscovery of a d imens ion of p u r e g r a m m a r , the re arises once m o r e

the t endency to a t t r ibu te to language p r o f o u n d p o w e r s o f expression

( H u m b o l d t i s n o t mere ly B o p p ' s c o n t e m p o r a r y ; he k n e w his w o r k , and in

detai l) ; whereas in the Classical pe r iod the expressive function of l anguage

was requi red on ly a t its po in t of or igin , and in o rde r to explain h o w a

sound could represent a th ing , l anguage in the n ine teen th cen tury ,

t h r o u g h o u t its d e v e l o p m e n t a n d even in its m o s t c o m p l e x forms, was to

have an i r reducible expressive va lue ; no arbitrariness, no g rammat i ca l

conven t ion is able to obl i terate that value, for, if l anguage expresses, i t

does so n o t in so far as i t is an imi ta t ion and dupl ica t ion of th ings , b u t

in so far as i t manifests and translates the fundamenta l wil l of those w h o

speak it. T h e second consequence is that l anguage is no longer l inked to

civilizations by the level of learning to w h i c h they have at ta ined (the

delicacy of their representa t ive gr id, the mul t ip l ic i ty of the connect ions

i t i s possible to establish be tween its e lements) , b u t by the m i n d of the

peoples w h o have g iven rise to it, an ima te it, and are recognizable in it.

Jus t as the l iving o rgan i sm manifests, by its inner coherence , the functions

that keep i t alive, so language , in the w h o l e archi tec ture of its g r a m m a r ,

makes visible the fundamenta l wil l tha t keeps a w h o l e people alive and

gives i t the p o w e r to speak a language be long ing solely to itself. This

means that the condi t ions of historici ty of l anguage are changed a t o n c e :

its muta t ions no longer c o m e f r o m above ( f rom the learned elite, f rom

the small g r o u p of merchan t s and travellers, f rom vic tor ious armies , f rom

an invad ing ar is tocracy) , b u t take their be ing obscure ly f r o m b e l o w , for

language is nei ther an ins t rument n o r a p r o d u c t - an ergon, as H u m b o l d t

t e rmed it - b u t a ceaseless act ivi ty - an energeia. In any language , the

speaker, w h o neve r ceases to speak in a m u r m u r that is no t heard a l t h o u g h

i t p rov ides all the vividness of the language , i s the people . G r i m m t h o u g h t

that he ove rhea rd such a m u r m u r w h e n he listened to the altdeutsche

Meistergesang, and R a y n o u a r d w h e n he t ranscribed the Poesies originates

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L A B O U R , L I F E , L A N G U A G E

des troubadours. Language is no longer l inked to the k n o w i n g of things,

bu t to m e n s f reedom: 'Language is h u m a n : i t owes its or ig in and progress

to o u r full f r eedom; i t i s o u r his tory, ou r he r i t age ' [45] . By defining the

internal laws of g r a m m a r , one is s imultaneously l inking language and the

free dest iny of m e n in a p r o f o u n d kinship. T h r o u g h o u t the n ine teen th

cen tury , ph i lo logy was to have p ro found polit ical reverbera t ions .

4. T h e analysis of roots m a d e possible a n e w definit ion of the systems of

kinship b e t w e e n languages . A n d this is the four th b road theoret ical seg­

m e n t that characterizes the appearance of ph i lo logy . In the first place, this

definition presupposes tha t languages are d iv ided in to b r o a d g roups

w h i c h are d iscont inuous in relat ion to o n e another . Genera l g r a m m a r

excluded compar i son in so far as it accepted the presence in any l anguage

w h a t e v e r o f t w o orders o f con t inu i ty : one , a vertical con t inu i ty , p e r m i t t e d

the a r r a n g e m e n t o f the mos t p r imi t ive o f the a l lo tment o f roots , w h i c h , a t

the expense of a few t ransformat ions , b o u n d each language to its initial

ar t iculat ions; t he o ther , a hor izon ta l one , enabled languages to c o m m u n i ­

cate in the universal i ty of representa t ion: all languages had as their task

the analysis, decompos i t ion , and recompos i t ion of representat ions, w h i c h ,

w i th in fairly b r o a d l imits, w e r e the same for the ent i re h u m a n race. So

that i t was possible to c o m p a r e languages on ly in an indirect w a y , and

by a t r iangular rou te , as i t w e r e ; i t was possible to analyse the w a y in

w h i c h a par t icular l anguage had treated and modif ied the c o m m o n

allocation of p r imi t ive roo t s ; i t was also possible to c o m p a r e the w a y in

w h i c h t w o languages pa t te rned and l inked toge ther the same r e p r e ­

sentations. B u t w h a t becomes possible after G r i m m and B o p p is the direct

and lateral compar i son of t w o or m o r e languages . Di rec t , because i t i s

no longer necessary to pass t h r o u g h p u r e representat ions or the absolutely

pr imi t ive r o o t ; i t i s e n o u g h to s tudy the modif icat ions of the radical, t he

system of inflections, the series of var iable te rmina t ions . Lateral , because

the compar i son does n o t reach back to the e lements shared by all languages

or to the representat ive s tock u p o n w h i c h they d r a w ; i t i s therefore n o t

possible to relate a l anguage to the f o r m or the principles that render all

o the r languages possible; t hey m u s t be g r o u p e d accord ing to their formal

p r o x i m i t y : 'Th is resemblance or affinity does n o t exist on ly in the

n u m e r o u s roo ts , w h i c h i t has in c o m m o n w i t h b o t h those nat ions, b u t

ex tends also to the g r a m m a r and internal s t ruc tu re ' [46] .

N o w , these g rammat i ca l s t ructures that i t i s possible to c o m p a r e

direct ly w i t h o n e ano ther present t w o special characteristics. First, tha t o f

exist ing on ly as systems: w i t h monosyl lab ic radicals, a certain n u m b e r of

2 9 1

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

inflections are possible; the w e i g h t of the te rmina t ions m a y have effects

w h o s e n u m b e r and na tu re are de te rminab le ; the m o d e s o f affixation

cor respond to a few comple t e ly fixed mode l s ; whereas , in languages w i t h

polysyl labic radicals, all the modif icat ions and combina t ions will o b e y

o the r laws. B e t w e e n t w o systems like these (the o n e be ing characteristic of

the I n d o - E u r o p e a n languages , the o the r o f the Semit ic languages) , we find

no in te rmedia te t ype and no transit ional forms. T h e r e is a d iscont inui ty

f r o m o n e family to the o the r . Bu t , on the o the r hand , g r ammat i ca l

systems, since they lay d o w n a certain n u m b e r of laws of evo lu t ion

and m u t a t i o n , m a k e i t possible, up to a certain po in t , to fix the a g e -

scale of a l anguage ; for such and such a f o r m to be p r o d u c e d f rom a

certain radical, such and such a t ransformat ion mus t have occur red . In t he

Classical age, w h e n t w o languages resembled o n e another , i t was neces­

sary either to l ink t h e m b o t h to the absolutely pr imi t ive l anguage they

b o t h sprang f rom, o r to a d m i t that o n e deve loped f rom the od ic r (but

the cr i ter ion was external , the m o r e der ived o f the t w o languages be ing

that w h i c h had appeared historically a t the m o r e recent da te) or , again,

to a d m i t that there had been exchanges be tween t h e m (due to ex t r a -

linguistic events : invasion, t rade , m ig ra t i on ) . N o w , w h e n t w o languages

present ana logous systems, one mus t to be able to decide ci ther that o n e

of t h e m is der ived f r o m the o ther , or that they have b o t h issued f rom a

th i rd , f r o m w h i c h they have each deve loped systems w h i c h are par t ly

different and also par t ly ana logous . I t was in this w a y , in the case of

Sanskrit and Greek , that the hypothesis o f C o c u r d o u x , w h o believed in

traces of the p r imi t ive language , and that of Anquet i l , w h o posi ted a

m i x t u r e a t the t ime o f the Bact r ian k i n g d o m , w e r e a b a n d o n e d ; and B o p p

was also able to refute Schlegel, for w h o m die Indian language was the

mos t ancient , and the o thers (Latin, Greek , G e r m a n i c and Persian lan­

guages) w e r e m o r e m o d e r n and der ived f rom the first. He s h o w e d d ia t

there was a relation o f ' f r a t e rn i t y ' be tween Sanskrit , Latin, Greek , and the

G e r m a n i c languages, Sanskrit be ing, n o t the m o t h e r - l a n g u a g e o f t he

o thers , b u t ra ther their elder sister, the nearest of t h e m to a l anguage

w h i c h had apparen t ly been the source of this ent i re family.

I t i s apparen t , then , that historici ty was in t roduced in to the d o m a i n of

languages in the same w a y as i n to that of l iving beings. For an evo lu t ion

- o the r than o n e that is solely the traversal of ontological continuit ies - to

be conceived, the s m o o t h u n b r o k e n plan o f na tura l h is tory had to be

b roken , the d iscont inui ty o f t he s u b - k i n g d o m s h a d to reveal the plans o f

organic s t ructure in all their diversi ty and w i d i o u t any in te rmedia ry ,

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293

organisms had to be o rde red in accordance w i t h the functional a r r a n g e ­

men t s they w e r e to pe r fo rm, and thus establish the relations of the l iv ing

be ing wi th w h a t enables i t to exist. In the same way , for the h is tory of

languages to be conceived, they had to be de tached f rom the b r o a d

chronologica l con t inu i ty that had l inked t h e m w i t h o u t in te r rup t ion as far

back as their o r ig in ; t hey also had to be freed f rom the c o m m o n expanse

of representat ions in w h i c h they were caught ; by means of this d o u b l e

break, the he te rogene i ty o f the var ious g rammat ica l systems e m e r g e d

w i t h its peculiar pat ternings , the laws prescr ibing change wi th in each one ,

and the paths f ixing possible lines of deve lopmen t . O n c e the h is tory of

the species had been suspended as a chronologica l sequence of all possible

forms, then, and on ly then, the l iving be ing was able to assume its his­

tor ic i ty ; in the same w a y , in the sphere of l anguage , i f there had no t been

a suspension of the analysis of those endless der ivat ions and limitless

mix tures that general g r a m m a r perpe tua l ly presupposed, then language

w o u l d never have been affected by an internal historicity. Sanskrit ,

Greek , Latin, and G e r m a n had to be t reated in accordance w i t h a systematic

s imul tanei ty ; breaking w i t h all ch rono logy , they had to be inserted in to a

fraternal t ime-sys tem so that their s tructures cou ld b e c o m e t ransparent

and a h is tory of languages could b e c o m e legible in t h e m . H e r e , as else­

w h e r e , the a r r angement s in to chronologica l series had to be b r o k e n u p ,

and their e lements redistr ibuted, then a n e w his tory was const i tuted, o n e

that does n o t mere ly express the m o d e of succession of beings and their

connec t ion in t ime , bu t the moda l i t y of their fo rmat ion . Empi r i c i ty - and

this i s equal ly t rue of natural individuals and of the w o r d s by w h i c h they

can be n a m e d - is hencefor th traversed by His to ry , t h r o u g h the w h o l e

densi ty of its be ing . T h e o rde r of t ime is beg inn ing .

T h e r e is one major difference, h o w e v e r , b e t w e e n languages and l iving

beings. T h e latter have no t rue h is tory except by means of a certain

relat ion be tween their functions and the condi t ions of their existence.

A n d t h o u g h their internal compos i t ion as s t ructured individuals makes

their historici ty possible, tha t historici ty becomes real h is tory on ly by

means of the external w o r l d in w h i c h they live. T h u s , to enable this

h i s tory to e m e r g e clearly, and to be described in discourse, there had to

be , in addi t ion to Cuv ie r ' s compara t ive a n a t o m y , an analysis of the

e n v i r o n m e n t and condi t ions that act on the l iving be ing . T h e ' a n a t o m y '

o f language , to use G r i m m ' s expression, functions on the o the r hand

w i th in the e l ement of H i s t o r y : for i t i s an a n a t o m y of possible changes ,

o n e tha t expresses n o t the real coex i s tence o f o r g a n s , o r the i r m u t u a l

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

exclusion, bu t the direct ion in w h i c h muta t ions wil l or wil l n o t be able

to occur . T h e n e w g r a m m a r i s immedia te ly d iachronic . H o w could i t have

been o therwise , since its posit ivi ty could be established o n l y by a b reak

be tween language and representat ion? T h e internal s t ructure o f languages

- w h a t they sanction and w h a t they exclude in o rde r to funct ion - cou ld

be re -apprehended on ly in the fo rm of w o r d s ; bu t , in itself, this f o r m

can express its o w n l aw o n l y if i t is related back to its p rev ious states, to

the changes of w h i c h i t is susceptible, to the modif icat ions that neve r

occur . By be ing cu t off f rom w h a t i t represents, l anguage was certainly

m a d e to e m e r g e for the first t i m e in its o w n part icular legality, a n d a t t he

same t i m e i t was d o o m e d to be re-apprehensible on ly wi th in his tory . I t

is wel l k n o w n that Saussure was able t6 escape f rom this d iachronic

voca t ion o f ph i lo logy on ly by res tor ing the relat ion o f l anguage to

representat ion, at t he expense of reconst i tut ing a ' s emio logy ' wh ich , like

general g r a m m a r , defined the sign as the connec t ion be tween t w o ideas.

T h e same archaeological even t was expressed therefore in a part ial ly dif­

ferent fashion in t he cases of natural h i s tory and language . By separat ing

the characters o f the l iving be ing o r the rules o f g r a m m a r f r o m the laws

of a self-analysing representat ion, the historici ty of life and l anguage was

m a d e possible. B u t , in the sphere of b io logy , this historici ty needed a

supp lementa ry h is tory to express the relations of the individual w i t h the

e n v i r o n m e n t ; in o n e sense the h is tory of life is ex te r io r to the historici ty of

the l iving be ing ; this is w h y evolu t ion ism is a biological theory , of w h i c h

the condi t ion of possibility was a b io logy w i t h o u t evo lu t ion - that of

Cuvie r . T h e historici ty o f language , on the con t ra ry , reveals its h is tory i m ­

media te ly , and w i t h o u t in t e rmed ia ry ; they c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h o n e ano the r

internal ly. W h e r e a s n ine teen th -cen tu ry b io logy was to advance m o r e and

m o r e t owards the exter ior o f the l iving be ing , t o w a r d s w h a t lay b e y o n d

it, r ender ing progressively m o r e pe rmeab le tha t surface of the b o d y a t

wh ich the naturalist 's gaze had once hal ted, ph i lo logy was to unt ie the r e ­

lations that the g r a m m a r i a n had established be tween language and external

his tory in o rde r to define an internal his tory. A n d the latter, once secure in

its objectivi ty, cou ld serve as a gu id ing- th read , m a k i n g it possible to r econ ­

stitute - for the benefit of His to ry p r o p e r - events l ong since forgot ten .

V L A N G U A G E B E C O M E O B J E C T

I t m a y be observed that the four theoretical segments that have jus t been

analysed, perhaps because they const i tute the archaeological g r o u n d of

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phi lo logy , co r re spond and contrast , t e r m by t e r m , w i t h those that m a d e

i t possible to define general g r a m m a r [47] . W o r k i n g backwards f r o m the

last of these four segments to the first, we find that the t h eo ry of the

kinship b e t w e e n languages (discontinuity be tween the b r o a d families, and

internal analogies in the system of changes) is opposed by the t h eo ry of

derivation, w h i c h presupposed cons tant factors of a t t r i t ion and a d m i x t u r e ,

ac t ing in the same w a y on all languages of w h a t e v e r k ind , as an external

pr inciple and w i t h un l imi ted effects. T h e t h e o r y of the radical contrasts

w i t h that of designation: for the radical is an isolable linguistic individual i ty ,

inside a g r o u p of languages , and serving a b o v e all as a nucleus of verbal

fo rms ; whereas the roo t , encroach ing u p o n language f rom the side o f

na tu re and the p r imi t ive c ry , exhaus ted itself till i t was no m o r e than an

endlessly t ransformable sound w h i c h had as its function a p r i m a r y n o m i n a l

pa t t e rn ing of th ings . T h e s tudy of the internal variations of l anguage is also

opposed by the t heo ry of representat ive articulation: the latter defined

w o r d s and gave t h e m an individual i ty that dis t inguished t h e m f rom each

o t h e r by rela t ing t h e m to the con t en t t h e y w e r e able to signify; the

ar t iculat ion o f l anguage was the visible analysis o f representa t ion; n o w

w o r d s are character ized in the first place by their m o r p h o l o g y and by the

total i ty of the muta t ions each of their sounds is capable of u n d e r g o i n g .

A b o v e all, the internal analysis of l anguage is opposed by the p r i m a c y

accorded in Classical t h o u g h t to the v e r b to be: the latter held sway on the

frontiers of l anguage , b o t h because i t was the p r i m a r y l ink b e t w e e n

w o r d s and because i t possessed the fundamenta l p o w e r of affirmation; i t

m a r k e d the threshold of l anguage , indicated its specificity, and connec ted

it, in an ineffaceable w a y , to the forms of t h o u g h t . On the o the r hand , the

independen t analysis of g r ammat i ca l structures, as practised f rom the

n ine teen th cen tury , isolates language , treats i t as an a u t o n o m o u s o rgan ic

s t ruc ture , and breaks its bonds w i t h j u d g e m e n t s , a t t r ibu t ion , and affirma­

t ion. T h e onto logica l t ransi t ion p rov ided by the v e r b to be be tween speak­

ing and th ink ing is r e m o v e d ; w h e r e u p o n language acquires a being p r o p e r

to itself. A n d it is this be ing that contains the laws that g o v e r n it.

T h e Classical o rde r of l anguage has n o w d r a w n to a close. I t has lost

its t ransparency and its ma jo r funct ion in the d o m a i n of k n o w l e d g e . In

the seventeenth and e ighteenth centuries, i t was the immed ia t e a n d

spontaneous unfo ld ing of representat ions; i t was in that o rde r in the first

place that representat ions received their p r i m a r y signs, pa t t e rned and r e ­

g r o u p e d their c o m m o n features, and established their relations o f

ident i ty or a t t r ibu t ion ; l anguage was a fo rm of k n o w i n g and k n o w i n g

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was automat ica l ly discourse. T h u s , language occupied a fundamenta l si tua­

t ion in relat ion to all k n o w l e d g e : i t was o n l y by the m e d i u m of language

that the things of the w o r l d cou ld be k n o w n . N o t because i t was a par t o f

the w o r l d , onto logica l ly i n t e r w o v e n w i t h i t (as in the Renaissance), bu t

because i t was the first sketch of an o rde r in representat ions of the w o r l d ;

because i t was the initial, inevitable w a y of represent ing representat ions. I t

was in language that all genera l i ty was fo rmed. Classical k n o w l e d g e was

p ro found ly nominal is t . F r o m the n ine teenth cen tu ry , l anguage began to

fold in u p o n itself, to acquire its o w n part icular densi ty, to dep loy a

his tory, an object ivi ty, and laws of its o w n . I t became o n e object of

k n o w l e d g e a m o n g others , on the same level as l iv ing beings, wea l th and

value, and the h is tory of events and m e n . I t m a y possess its o w n concepts ,

b u t the analyses that bear u p o n i t have their roots at the same level as

those that deal w i t h o the r empirical forms o f k n o w l e d g e . T h e p r e ­

eminence that enabled general grammar to be logic whi le at the same t i m e

intersecting w i t h i t has n o w been lost. To k n o w language i s no longer

to c o m e as close as possible to k n o w l e d g e itself; i t is mere ly to app ly

the m e t h o d s of unders tand ing in general to a par t icular d o m a i n of

object ivi ty.

This d e m o t i o n of language to the m e r e status of an object i s c o m p e n ­

sated for, h o w e v e r , in three ways . First, by the fact that it is a necessary

m e d i u m for any scientific k n o w l e d g e that wishes to be expressed in dis­

course. I t c anno t itself be a r ranged , dep loyed , and analysed benea th the

gaze of a science, because i t a lways re-emerges on the side of the k n o w i n g

subject - as soon as that subject expresses w h a t he k n o w s . H e n c e t w o c o n ­

stant concerns t h r o u g h o u t the n ine teenth cen tury . T h e first i s the wish to

neutral ize, and as i t w e r e polish, scientific l anguage to the po in t at w h i c h ,

s t r ipped of all its s ingulari ty, purified of all its accidents and alien elements

- as t h o u g h they did no t be long to its essence - it cou ld b e c o m e the exact

reflection, t he perfect doub le , the unmis ted m i r r o r of a non-ve rba l k n o w ­

ledge. This is the positivist d r e a m of a language keep ing strictly to the

level of w h a t i s k n o w n : a table- language, like the o n e C u v i e r was p r o b ­

ably d r e a m i n g of w h e n he a t t r ibuted to science the project o f fo rming a

' copy ' o f na tu re ; scientific discourse was to be the ' table ' o f th ings ; bu t

' table ' here has a fundamenta l ly different m e a n i n g f rom the o n e i t p o s ­

sessed in the e igh teen th cen tu ry ; then, i t was a ma t t e r of d iv id ing na tu re

up by means of a constant table of identities and differences for w h i c h

language p rov ided a p r imary , approx imat ive , and rectifiable grid; n o w ,

language is no t so m u c h a table as a pic ture , in the sense that , freed f rom

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the intricacy that gives it its immedia te ly classifying role, it stands a cer­

tain distance apar t f rom na tu re in o rde r to d r a w some of i t in to itself by

means of its o w n passivity, and finally to b e c o m e nature ' s faithful po r ­

trait [ 4 8 ] . T h e o the r concern - entirely different f rom the first, even

t h o u g h in corre la t ion w i t h i t - was the search for a logic independen t of

g r a m m a r s , vocabular ies , synthet ic forms, a n d w o r d s : a logic that could

clarify and utilize the universal implicat ions of t h o u g h t wh i l e p ro tec t ing

t h e m f rom the singularities of a const i tuted language in w h i c h they m i g h t

be obscured. I t was inevitable that a symbol ic logic should c o m e in to

be ing , w i t h Boo le , a t precisely that per iod w h e n languages w e r e b e c o m i n g

philological objects: for, despite some superficial resemblances and a few

technical analogies, it was no t a quest ion, as it had been in the Classical

age, of const i tu t ing a universal language , b u t of represent ing the forms

and connect ions of t h o u g h t outside all language. A n d since language was

b e c o m i n g an object of science, a l anguage h a d to be invented that w o u l d

be a symbol i sm ra ther than a language , and w o u l d for that reason be

t ransparent to t h o u g h t in the v e r y m o v e m e n t that permi t s i t to k n o w .

O n e m i g h t say in one sense that logical algebra and the Indo-European lan­

guages are t w o p roduc t s of the dissociation of general grammar: the I n d o -

E u r o p e a n languages expressing the shift of l anguage in the direct ion of

the k n o w n object, logical a lgebra the m o v e m e n t that makes i t s w i n g

towards the act of k n o w i n g , s t r ipping i t in the process of all its a l ready

const i tuted fo rm. B u t i t w o u l d be inadequate to express the fact in this

pu re ly negat ive fo rm: a t the archaeological level, the condi t ions of possi­

bil i ty of a non-ve rba l logic and a historical g r a m m a r arc the same. T h e

g r o u n d of their posit ivi ty is identical.

T h e second compensa t ion for this d e m o t i o n of l anguage is the critical

va lue bes towed u p o n its s tudy. H a v i n g b e c o m e a dense and consistent

historical reality, l anguage forms the locus of t radi t ion, of the unspoken

habits of t h o u g h t , of w h a t lies h idden in a people ' s m i n d ; i t accumulates

an ineluctable m e m o r y w h i c h does n o t even k n o w itself a s m e m o r y .

Express ing their t hough t s in w o r d s o f w h i c h they are n o t the masters ,

enclosing t h e m in verbal forms whose historical d imensions they are u n ­

aware of, m e n believe that their speech is their servant and do no t realize

that they are submi t t ing themselves to its demands . T h e g rammat ica l

a r rangements of a l anguage are the a priori of w h a t can be expressed in it.

T h e t r u t h of discourse i s caugh t in the t rap of ph i lo logy . H e n c e the need

to w o r k one 's w a y back f rom opinions , philosophies, and perhaps even

f rom sciences, to the w o r d s that m a d e t h e m possible, and, b e y o n d that ,

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to a t h o u g h t whose essential life has no t yet been caugh t in the n e t w o r k of

any g r a m m a r . This i s h o w we mus t unders tand the revival , so m a r k e d in

the n ine teen th cen tury , of all the techniques of exegesis. This reappearance

is due to the fact that l anguage has resumed the en igmat ic density i t

possessed at the t i m e of the Renaissance. B u t n o w i t is n o t a ma t t e r of

rediscover ing some p r i m a r y w o r d that has been bur ied in it, b u t of dis­

tu rb ing the w o r d s we speak, o f d e n o u n c i n g the g rammat i ca l habits o f o u r

th ink ing , o f dissipating the m y t h s that an imate o u r w o r d s , o f r ende r ing

once m o r e noisy and audible the e lement of silence that all discourse

carries w i t h it as it is spoken . T h e first b o o k of Das Kapital is an exegesis of

' va lue ' ; all Nie tzsche is an exegesis of a few Greek w o r d s ; Freud, the

exegesis of all those unspoken phrases that suppor t and at the same t i m e

u n d e r m i n e o u r apparen t discourse, o u r fantasies, o u r d reams , ou r bodies .

Ph i lo logy , as the analysis of w h a t is said in the depths of discourse, has

b e c o m e the m o d e r n f o r m o f crit icism. W h e r e , a t the end o f the e igh teen th

cen tury , i t was a m a t t e r of f ixing the frontiers of k n o w l e d g e , i t will n o w

be one of seeking to des t roy syntax , to shatter tyrannical m o d e s of speech,

to t u rn w o r d s a r o u n d in o rde r to perceive all that is be ing said t h r o u g h

t h e m and despite t h e m . G o d is perhaps n o t so m u c h a reg ion b e y o n d

k n o w l e d g e as s o m e t h i n g p r io r to the sentences we speak; and i f W e s t e r n

m a n is inseparable f rom h i m , i t is no t because of some invincible p r o ­

pensity to go b e y o n d the frontiers of exper ience , b u t because his l anguage

ceaselessly foments h i m in the s h a d o w of his laws: ' I fear indeed that we

shall neve r rid ourselves of G o d , since we still believe in grammar ' [49] .

In the s ixteenth cen tury , in terpre ta t ion p roceeded f r o m the w o r l d (things

and texts toge ther ) t owards the divine W o r d that could be deciphered in

it; o u r in terpre ta t ion , or a t all events that w h i c h was fo rmed in the n i n e ­

teenth cen tu ry , proceeds f rom men , f rom G o d , f r o m k n o w l e d g e o r fan­

tasies, t o w a r d s the w o r d s that m a k e t h e m possible; and w h a t i t reveals is

n o t the sovere ignty of a p r ima l discourse, bu t the fact that we are already,

before the v e r y least o f o u r w o r d s , gove rned and paralysed by language .

M o d e r n crit icism has devo ted itself to a s t range k ind of c o m m e n t a r y ,

since i t does n o t p roceed f r o m the observat ion that there is l anguage

t o w a r d s the d iscovery o f w h a t that l anguage means , bu t f rom the d e p l o y ­

m e n t of manifest discourse t owards a revelat ion of l anguage in its c rude

be ing .

T h u s the m e t h o d s o f in terpre ta t ion o f m o d e r n t h o u g h t are opposed by

the techniques of formal izat ion: t he first c la iming to m a k e language

speak as it w e r e b e l o w itself, and as near as possible to w h a t is be ing said

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in it, w i t h o u t it; the second c la iming to con t ro l any language that m a y

arise, and to impose u p o n i t f rom a b o v e the l aw of w h a t i t i s possible to

say. In terpre ta t ion and formalizat ion have b e c o m e the t w o great forms

o f analysis o f ou r t ime - i n fact, we k n o w no others . B u t do we k n o w

w h a t the relations of exegesis and formalizat ion are? A r e we capable of

cont ro l l ing and mas te r ing them? For i f exegesis leads us no t so m u c h

towards a p r ima l discourse as t owards the naked existence of s o m e t h i n g

like a language , will i t n o t be obl iged to express o n l y the p u r e forms of

language even before i t has taken on a mean ing? A n d in o rde r to formalize

w h a t we suppose to be a language , is i t no t necessary to have practised

s o m e m i n i m u m of exegesis, and a t least in terpre ted all those m u t e forms

as hav ing the in tent ion of m e a n i n g someth ing? I t is t rue that the division

be tween in terpre ta t ion and formalizat ion presses u p o n us and domina tes us

today . B u t i t is no t r igorous e n o u g h : the fork i t forms has no t been d r iven

far e n o u g h d o w n in to o u r cul ture , its t w o branches are t o o c o n t e m p o r a ­

neous for us to be able to say even that it is prescr ibing a s imple o p t i o n or

that i t is invi t ing us to choose be tween the past, w h i c h believed in m e a n ­

ing, and the present (the future) , wh ich has discovered the significant. In

fact, i t is a ma t t e r of t w o correlat ive techniques whose c o m m o n g r o u n d

of possibility is fo rmed by the being of language , as i t was const i tu ted on

the threshold o f the m o d e r n age. T h e critical elevation o f language , w h i c h

was a compensa t ion for its subsidence wi th in the object , impl ied that it

had been b r o u g h t nearer b o t h to an act o f k n o w i n g , p u r e of all w o r d s , and

to the unconscious c lement in o u r discourse. I t had to be ei ther m a d e

t ransparent to the forms o f k n o w l e d g e , o r thrus t d o w n in to the contents

of the unconscious. This certainly explains the n ine teenth century ' s doub le

advance , on the one hand towards formal ism in t h o u g h t and on the o t h e r

t owards the discovery of the unconscious - t owards Russell and Freud . I t

also explains the tendency of o n e to m o v e t o w a r d s the o ther , and of these

t w o directions to cross: the a t t empt , for example , to discover t he p u r e

forms that are imposed u p o n ou r unconscious before all con ten t ; or again,

the e n d e a v o u r to raise the g r o u n d of exper ience , the sense of be ing ,

the lived h o r i z o n of all o u r k n o w l e d g e to the level of o u r discourse. I t

i s here that s t ructural ism and p h e n o m e n o l o g y find, toge ther w i t h the

a r r angement s p r o p e r to t h e m , the general space that defines their common

ground.

Finally, the last of the compensa t ions for the d e m o t i o n of language , the

m o s t impor t an t , and also the m o s t unexpec ted , is the appearance of

l i terature, of l i terature as such - for there has of course existed in the

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W e s t e r n w o r l d , since D a n t e , since H o m e r , a f o r m o f l a n g u a g e that w e

n o w call ' l i terature ' . B u t the w o r d i s o f recent date , a s i s also, in o u r

cul ture , the isolat ion o f a part icular l a n g u a g e w h o s e pecul ia r m o d e o f

b e i n g i s ' l i t e ra ry ' . T h i s i s because a t the b e g i n n i n g of the n ine teen th

cen tu ry , a t a t i m e w h e n l a n g u a g e w a s b u r y i n g i tse l f w i t h i n its o w n

densi ty as an ob jec t and a l l o w i n g i tse l f to be t raversed, t h r o u g h a n d

t h r o u g h , by k n o w l e d g e , i t w a s also recons t i tu t ing i t se l f e l s ewhere , i n an

independen t f o r m , difficult o f access, fo lded b a c k u p o n the e n i g m a o f its

o w n o r i g i n and ex i s t ing w h o l l y i n reference t o the pu re act o f w r i t i n g .

Li tera ture i s the contes ta t ion of p h i l o l o g y ( o f w h i c h i t i s never theless the

t w i n f i g u r e ) : i t leads l a n g u a g e b a c k f r o m g r a m m a r t o the n a k e d p o w e r o f

speech, and there i t encounte rs the u n t a m e d , i m p e r i o u s b e i n g o f w o r d s .

F r o m the R o m a n t i c r e v o l t against a discourse f rozen in its o w n r i tual

p o m p , t o the M a l l a r m e a n d i s c o v e r y o f the w o r d i n its i m p o t e n t p o w e r , i t

b e c o m e s clear w h a t the func t ion o f l i terature w a s , i n the n ine teen th

cen tu ry , i n relat ion t o the m o d e r n m o d e o f b e i n g o f l a n g u a g e . A g a i n s t t he

b a c k g r o u n d of this essential in terac t ion , the rest i s m e r e l y effect: l i t e ra­

ture b e c o m e s p rog re s s ive ly m o r e differentiated f r o m the d iscourse o f

ideas, and encloses i tse l f w i t h i n a radical in t rans i t iv i ty ; i t b e c o m e s d e ­

tached f r o m all the va lues that w e r e ab le to k e e p i t in genera l c i r cu la t ion

d u r i n g the Classical a g e (taste, pleasure, naturalness, t ru th) , and creates

w i t h i n its o w n space e v e r y t h i n g that w i l l ensure a lud ic denial o f t h e m (the

scandalous , the u g l y , the imposs ib l e ) ; i t breaks w i t h the w h o l e de f in i t ion

o f genres a s fo rms adapted to an o rde r o f representat ions, and b e c o m e s

m e r e l y a manifes ta t ion o f a l a n g u a g e w h i c h has no o the r l a w than that o f

aff i rming - in oppos i t i on to all o the r f o r m s of d iscourse - its o w n p r e ­

c ipi tous ex i s tence ; and so there i s n o t h i n g for i t to do bu t to c u r v e b a c k

in a perpetua l re turn u p o n itself, as i f its d iscourse c o u l d h a v e no o t h e r

con ten t than the express ion o f its o w n f o r m ; i t addresses i tse l f to i t se l f a s

a w r i t i n g sub jec t iv i ty , or seeks to r e -apprehend the essence of all l i t e ra ­

ture in the m o v e m e n t that b r o u g h t i t i n to b e i n g ; and thus all its threads

c o n v e r g e u p o n the finest o f po in t s - s ingular , instantaneous, and y e t a b s o ­

lu te ly universa l - u p o n the s imple act o f w r i t i n g . A t the m o m e n t w h e n

l anguage , a s s p o k e n and scat tered w o r d s , b e c o m e s a n ob jec t o f k n o w ­

l edge , we see i t r eappea r ing in a s t r ic t ly oppos i t e m o d a l i t y : a s i lent ,

caut ious depos i t ion o f the w o r d u p o n the whi teness o f a p i ece o f p a p e r ,

w h e r e i t can possess nei ther s o u n d n o r in te r locu tor , w h e r e i t has n o t h i n g

to say b u t itself, n o t h i n g to do bu t shine in the br ightness o f its b e i n g .

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CHAPTER 9

Man and his Doubles

I THE RETURN OF LANGUAGE

W i t h the appearance o f l i terature, w i t h the re turn o f exeges is and the

c o n c e r n for fo rma l i za t ion , w i t h the d e v e l o p m e n t o f p h i l o l o g y — i n short ,

w i t h the reappearance o f l a n g u a g e a s a m u l t i p l e p rofus ion , the o r d e r o f

Class ica l t h o u g h t can n o w b e ecl ipsed. A t this t ime , f r o m a n y r e t ro ­

spec t ive v i e w p o i n t , i t enters a r e g i o n o f shade. E v e n so , w e shou ld speak

n o t o f darkness b u t o f a s o m e w h a t b lu r red l i gh t , d e c e p t i v e i n its apparent

c lar i ty , and h i d i n g m o r e than i t r evea l s : i t seems to us, in fact, that we

k n o w all there i s t o b e k n o w n a b o u t Class ica l k n o w l e d g e i f w e u n d e r ­

stand tha t i t is rat ionalist ic, that , s ince G a l i l e o a n d Descar tes , i t has

a c c o r d e d an abso lu te p r i v i l e g e to M e c h a n i s m , tha t i t presupposes a g e n e r a l

o r d e r i n g o f na ture , tha t i t accepts the poss ib i l i ty o f a n analysis sufficiently

radical to d i s c o v e r e lements or o r ig ins , b u t that i t a l r eady has a present i ­

m e n t , b e y o n d and despi te all these concep t s o f unders tand ing , o f the

m o v e m e n t o f l ife, o f the dens i ty o f h i s tory , and o f the d isorder , s o diffi­

cu l t t o master , i n nature . B u t t o r e c o g n i z e Class ica l t h o u g h t by such signs

a lone is to misunders tand its fundamenta l a r r a n g e m e n t ; i t is to n e g l e c t

en t i re ly the re la t ion b e t w e e n such manifes ta t ions and w h a t m a d e t h e m

poss ible . A n d h o w , after all ( i f n o t by a s l o w and l abor ious t e chn ique ) , are

w e t o d i s cove r the c o m p l e x re la t ion o f representat ions, identi t ies, o rders ,

w o r d s , natural be ings , desires, and interests, o n c e that vas t g r i d has been

d i smant led , o n c e needs h a v e o r g a n i z e d their p r o d u c t i o n for themse lves ,

o n c e l i v i n g b e i n g s h a v e tu rned i n t o w a r d s the essential funct ions o f l ife,

o n c e w o r d s h a v e b e c o m e w e i g h e d d o w n w i t h their o w n mater ia l h i s ­

t o r y - in shor t , o n c e the identit ies o f representa t ion h a v e ceased to express

the o rde r o f be ings c o m p l e t e l y and o p e n l y ? T h e ent ire s y s t e m o f

gr ids w h i c h ana lysed the sequence o f representat ions ( a th in t e m p o r a l

series u n f o l d i n g in men ' s m i n d s ) , arrest ing its m o v e m e n t , f r a g m e n t i n g it,

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304

spreading i t o u t and redis t r ibut ing i t in a p e r m a n e n t table , all these d i s ­

t inct ions c rea ted by w o r d s and discourse, characters and classif ication,

equ iva lences and e x c h a n g e , h a v e been so c o m p l e t e l y abol i shed that i t i s

difficult t o d a y t o r ed i scover h o w that s t ructure w a s ab le t o func t ion . T h e

last ' bas t ion ' to fall - and the o n e w h o s e d isappearance c u t us o f f f r o m

Classical t h o u g h t f o r e v e r - w a s prec ise ly the first o f all those g r i d s : d i s ­

course , w h i c h ensured the initial , spontaneous , uncons ide red d e p l o y m e n t

o f representat ion in a table. W h e n discourse ceased to exist and to func t ion

w i t h i n representat ion as the first means of o r d e r i n g it, Class ical t h o u g h t

ceased a t the same t i m e to be d i r ec t ly accessible to us.

T h e threshold b e t w e e n Class ic i sm and m o d e r n i t y ( t h o u g h the t e rms

themse lves h a v e no i m p o r t a n c e - let us say b e t w e e n o u r p reh i s to ry and

w h a t i s still c o n t e m p o r y ) had been de f in i t ive ly crossed w h e n w o r d s

ceased to intersect w i t h representat ions and to p r o v i d e a spon taneous g r i d

for the k n o w l e d g e o f th ings . A t the b e g i n n i n g o f the n ine teenth cen tu ry ,

t h e y r ed i scove red their ancient , e n i g m a t i c dens i ty ; t h o u g h n o t in o rde r

t o restore the c u r v e o f the w o r l d w h i c h had h a r b o u r e d t h e m d u r i n g the

Renaissance, n o r in o rde r to m i n g l e w i t h th ings in a c i rcular s y s t e m of

s igns. O n c e de tached f r o m representat ion, l a n g u a g e has exis ted , r i gh t up

t o o u r o w n d a y , o n l y i n a dispersed w a y : for ph i lo log is t s , w o r d s are l ike

s o m a n y objects f o r m e d a n d depos i ted b y h i s to ry ; for those w h o w i s h

to a c h i e v e a fo rma l i za t ion , l a n g u a g e mus t strip i tse l f o f its c o n c r e t e c o n ­

tent and l eave n o t h i n g v is ib le b u t those f o r m s o f d iscourse that are u n i v e r ­

sally v a l i d ; i f one ' s intent i s to interpret , then w o r d s b e c o m e a tex t to

be b r o k e n d o w n , so a s to a l l o w that o the r m e a n i n g h idden in t h e m to

e m e r g e and b e c o m e c lear ly v i s ib le ; lastly, l a n g u a g e m a y s o m e t i m e s arise

for its o w n sake in an act o f w r i t i n g that designates n o t h i n g o the r than

itself. T h i s dispersion imposes u p o n l a n g u a g e , i f n o t a p r i v i l e g e d pos i t ion ,

a t least a des t iny that seems s ingular w h e n c o m p a r e d w i t h that o f l abour

o r o f l ife. W h e n the table o f natural h i s to ry w a s dissociated, the l i v i n g

be ings w i t h i n i t w e r e n o t dispersed, bu t , on the con t r a ry , r e g r o u p e d

a r o u n d the central e n i g m a o f l ife; w h e n the analysis o f w e a l t h had d is ­

appeared , all e c o n o m i c processes w e r e r e g r o u p e d a r o u n d the central fact

o f p r o d u c t i o n and all that r endered i t poss ible ; on the o the r hand , w h e n

the u n i t y o f genera l g r a m m a r - d iscourse - w a s b r o k e n up , l a n g u a g e

appeared i n a mu l t i p l i c i t y o f m o d e s o f b e i n g , w h o s e un i ty w a s p r o b a b l y

i r r ecoverab le . I t is for this reason, perhaps , that ph i losoph ica l ref lect ion

for so l o n g he ld i tse l f a l o o f f r o m l a n g u a g e . W h e r e a s i t s o u g h t tirelessly in

the reg ions o f life o r l abour for s o m e t h i n g that m i g h t p r o v i d e i t w i t h an

M A N A N D HIS D O U D L E S

305

objec t , o r w i t h its concep tua l m o d e l s , o r its real and fundamenta l g r o u n d ,

i t pa id re la t ive ly little a t tent ion to l a n g u a g e ; its m a i n c o n c e r n w a s to clear

a w a y the obstacles that m i g h t o p p o s e i t in its task; for e x a m p l e , w o r d s

had to be freed f r o m the silent con t en t that r endered t h e m alien, o r l an ­

g u a g e had to be m a d e m o r e f l ex ib l e and m o r e f l u id , a s i t w e r e , f r o m

w i t h i n , s o that o n c e emanc ipa t ed f r o m the spatial izations o f the u n d e r ­

s tanding i t w o u l d b e able t o express the m o v e m e n t and t empora l i t y o f

life. L a n g u a g e d id n o t re turn in to the field o f t h o u g h t d i rec t ly and in its

o w n r igh t unt i l the end o f the n ine teenth c e n t u r y . W e m i g h t e v e n h a v e

said unt i l the twen t i e th , had n o t N i e t z s c h e the ph i lo log i s t - and e v e n in

that field he w a s so w i s e , he k n e w so m u c h , he w r o t e such g o o d b o o k s -

been the first to c o n n e c t the ph i losoph ica l task w i t h a radical ref lect ion

u p o n l a n g u a g e .

A n d n o w , i n this ph i l o soph ica l -ph i l o log i ca l space o p e n e d up for u s

by N i e t z s c h e , l a n g u a g e w e l l s up i n an e n i g m a t i c mu l t ip l i c i t y that m u s t

b e mas tered . T h e r e appear , l ike s o m a n y projects (or ch imeras , w h o can

tell as ye t ? ) , the themes of a universa l fo rmal i za t ion of all d iscourse , o r

the themes o f a n in tegra l exeges is o f the w o r l d w h i c h w o u l d a t the same

t i m e be its to ta l demys t i f i ca t ion , o r those o f a genera l t h e o r y o f s igns ; o r

aga in , the t h e m e (his tor ical ly p r o b a b l y the first) o f a t ransformat ion

w i t h o u t r e s iduum, o f a to ta l reabsorp t ion o f all fo rms o f d iscourse in to

a s ingle w o r d , o f all b o o k s in to a s ingle p a g e , o f the w h o l e w o r l d in to o n e

b o o k . T h e g rea t task t o w h i c h Ma l l a rme ' ded ica ted himself , r i gh t u p t o

his dea th , i s the o n e that domina t e s us n o w ; in its s t ammer ings , i t e m ­

braces all o u r cur ren t efforts t o conf ine the f r a g m e n t e d b e i n g o f l a n g u a g e

o n c e m o r e w i t h i n a perhaps imposs ib le un i ty . M a l l a r m e ' s p ro jec t - that

o f enc los ing all possible d iscourse w i t h i n the fragile dens i ty o f the w o r d ,

w i t h i n that s l im, mater ia l b l ack l ine t raced by ink u p o n paper - i s funda­

m e n t a l l y a r e p l y to the ques t ion i m p o s e d u p o n p h i l o s o p h y by N i e t z s c h e .

Fo r N i e t z s c h e , i t w a s n o t a ma t t e r o f k n o w i n g w h a t g o o d and ev i l w e r e

in themse lves , b u t of w h o w a s b e i n g des ignated , or ra ther who was speak­

ing w h e n o n e said Agathos to des ignate o n e s e l f and Deilos to des ignate

o thers [ i ] . Fo r i t i s there, in the holder o f the discourse and, m o r e p r o ­

f o u n d l y still, in the possessor of the w o r d , that l a n g u a g e is ga the red t o g e t h e r

i n its ent i re ty . T o the N i e t z s c h e a n ques t ion : ' W h o i s speak ing? ' , Ma l l a rme '

r e p l i e s - a n d cons tan t ly rever ts t o that r e p l y - b y s a y i n g that w h a t i s

s p e a k i n g is, in its so l i tude , in its f ragi le v i b r a t i o n , in its no th ingness , the

w o r d i t s e l f - n o t the m e a n i n g o f the w o r d , b u t its e n i g m a t i c and p r e ­

car ious b e i n g . W h e r e a s N i e t z s c h e main ta ined his ques t ion ing a s t o w h o

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

i s s p e a k i n g r i gh t up to the end , t h o u g h fo rced , in the last resort , to i r rupt

in to that ques t ion ing h i m s e l f and to base i t u p o n h i m s e l f as the speak ing

and ques t i on ing subjec t : Ecce homo, Mallarme^ w a s cons tan t ly effacing

h i m s e l f f r o m his o w n l a n g u a g e , t o the p o i n t o f no t w i s h i n g t o f igu re i n

i t e x c e p t a s an execu t an t i n a p u r e c e r e m o n y o f the B o o k in w h i c h the

discourse w o u l d c o m p o s e itself. I t is qu i te poss ible that all those quest ions

n o w c o n f r o n t i n g o u r cur ios i ty ( W h a t i s l a n g u a g e ? W h a t i s a s ign? W h a t

i s u n s p o k e n in the w o r l d , i n o u r gestures , i n the w h o l e e n i g m a t i c

he ra ld ry o f o u r b e h a v i o u r , o u r d reams , o u r sicknesses - does all that

speak, a n d i f s o i n w h a t l a n g u a g e and i n o b e d i e n c e t o w h a t g r a m m a r ?

I s e v e r y t h i n g s ignif icant , and , i f no t , w h a t is, and for w h o m , and in

a c c o r d a n c e w i t h w h a t rules? W h a t re la t ion i s there b e t w e e n l a n g u a g e and

b e i n g , a n d is i t r ea l ly to b e i n g that l a n g u a g e is a l w a y s addressed — at

least, l a n g u a g e that speaks t ru ly? W h a t , then , i s this l a n g u a g e that says

n o t h i n g , is n e v e r silent, and is ca l led ' l i terature '?) - i t is qui te possible that

all these ques t ions are presented t o d a y in the distance that w a s n e v e r

crossed b e t w e e n N i e t z s c h e ' s ques t ion and M a l l a r m 6 ' s r ep ly .

W e k n o w n o w w h e r e these quest ions c o m e f r o m . T h e y w e r e m a d e

possible by the fact that , a t the b e g i n n i n g o f the n ine teen th cen tu ry , t he

l a w o f d i scourse h a v i n g been de tached f r o m representa t ion, the b e i n g o f

l a n g u a g e i t se l f b e c a m e , a s i t w e r e , f r a g m e n t e d ; b u t t hey b e c a m e i n e v i t ­

able w h e n , w i t h N i e t z s c h e , and M a l l a r m e t h o u g h t w a s b r o u g h t b a c k ,

and v i o l e n t l y so , t o w a r d s l a n g u a g e itself, t o w a r d s its u n i q u e and difficult

b e i n g . T h e w h o l e cu r ios i ty o f o u r t h o u g h t n o w resides i n the ques t ion :

W h a t i s l a n g u a g e , h o w c a n w e find a w a y r o u n d i t i n o rde r t o m a k e i t

appear in itself, in a l l its p len i tude? In a sense, this ques t ion takes up f r o m

those o t h e r ques t ions that, i n the n ine teen th c e n t u r y , w e r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h

life o r l abou r . B u t t he status o f this i n q u i r y and o f all the ques t ions in to

w h i c h i t b reaks d o w n is n o t pe r fec t ly clear . I s i t a s ign of the a p p r o a c h i n g

bi r th , o r , e v e n less than that , o f the v e r y first g l o w , l o w i n the s k y , o f a

d a y sca rce ly e v e n he ra lded a s y e t , b u t i n w h i c h w e can a l r eady d iv ine that

t h o u g h t - the t h o u g h t that has been s p e a k i n g for thousands o f years w i t h ­

o u t k n o w i n g w h a t s p e a k i n g i s or e v e n that i t i s s p e a k i n g - i s a b o u t to

r e - a p p r e h e n d i t se l f in its en t i re ty , and to i l l umine i tse l f o n c e m o r e in the

l i g h t n i n g flash o f b e i n g ? I s that n o t w h a t N i e t z s c h e w a s p a v i n g the w a y

for w h e n , i n t he in te r ior space o f his l a n g u a g e , h e k i l l ed m a n and G o d

b o t h a t the s a m e t i m e , and t h e r e b y p r o m i s e d w i t h the R e t u r n the m u l t i p l e

and r e - i l l u m i n e d l i g h t o f the g o d s ? O r m u s t w e qu i te s i m p l y a d m i t that

such a p l e tho ra o f ques t ions on the subject o f l a n g u a g e i s no m o r e than a

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c o n t i n u a n c e , o r a t m o s t a cu lmina t ion , o f the e v e n t that, as a r c h a e o l o g y

has s h o w n , c a m e in to exis tence and b e g a n to t ake effect a t the e n d o f the

e igh teen th c e n t u r y ? T h e f r agmenta t ion o f l a n g u a g e , o c c u r r i n g a t the

s a m e t ime as its transit ion to ph i l o log i ca l ob j ec t i v i t y , w o u l d in that case

be no m o r e than the m o s t recen t ly v is ib le (because the m o s t secret and

m o s t fundamenta l ) consequence o f the b r eak ing u p o f Classical o rde r ; b y

m a k i n g the effort to master this sch ism and to m a k e l a n g u a g e v i s ib le in

its ent i re ty , w e w o u l d b r i n g t o c o m p l e t i o n w h a t had o c c u r r e d be fo re us,

and w i t h o u t us, t o w a r d s the end o f the e igh teen th cen tu ry . B u t w h a t , i n

that case, w o u l d that c u l m i n a t i o n be? In a t t e m p t i n g to reconst i tu te the

lost un i ty o f l a n g u a g e , i s o n e c a r r y i n g to its c o n c l u s i o n a t h o u g h t w h i c h

i s that o f the n ine teen th cen tu ry , o r i s o n e p u r s u i n g f o r m s that are

a l r eady i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h it? T h e dispersion o f l a n g u a g e i s l i nked , i n

fact , i n a fundamenta l w a y , w i t h the a rchaeo log ica l e v e n t w e m a y d e s i g ­

nate a s the disappearance o f D i scour se . T o d i s c o v e r the vas t p l a y o f l an ­

g u a g e con ta ined o n c e m o r e w i t h i n a s ingle space m i g h t be j u s t as dec i s ive

a leap t o w a r d s a w h o l l y n e w f o r m of t h o u g h t as to d r a w to a c lose a

m o d e o f k n o w i n g const i tu ted d u r i n g the p r e v i o u s c e n t u r y .

I t i s t rue that I do no t k n o w w h a t to r ep ly to such quest ions , o r , g i v e n

these al ternat ives , w h a t t e r m I shou ld choose . I c a n n o t e v e n guess w h e t h e r

I shall e v e r be ab le t o answer t h e m , o r w h e t h e r the d a y w i l l c o m e w h e n

I shall h a v e reasons e n o u g h to m a k e a n y such c h o i c e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , I n o w

k n o w w h y I am able , l ike e v e r y o n e else, to ask t h e m - and I am unab le

n o t t o ask t h e m t o d a y . O n l y those w h o canno t read w i l l b e surprised that

I h a v e learned such a t h i n g m o r e c lear ly f r o m C u v i e r , B o p p , and R i c a r d o

than f r o m K a n t o r H e g e l .

I I T H E P L A C E O F T H E K I N G

Faced w i t h s o m a n y instances o f i gno rance , s o m a n y quest ions r e m a i n i n g

i n suspense, n o d o u b t s o m e decis ion mus t b e m a d e . O n e m u s t s ay : there

i s w h e r e discourse ends, and perhaps l abour beg ins aga in . Y e t there are

still a f e w m o r e w o r d s to be s a i d - w o r d s w h o s e status i t i s p r o b a b l y

difficult to jus t i fy , since i t is a ma t t e r of i n t r o d u c i n g at the last m o m e n t ,

ra ther l ike s o m e deus ex machina, a character w h o has n o t y e t appeared in

the g rea t Class ical in te rp lay o f representat ions. A n d let us, i f w e m a y ,

l o o k for the p r e v i o u s l y ex i s t ing l a w o f that in te rp lay i n the pa in t ing o f

Las Meninas, in w h i c h representat ion is represented at e v e r y p o i n t : the

painter , the palet te , the b r o a d da rk surface o f the canvas w i t h its b a c k to

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THE O R D E R O F T H I N G S

us, the pa in t ings h a n g i n g o n the w a l l , the spectators w a t c h i n g , w h o are

f ramed, i n turn , by those w h o are w a t c h i n g t h e m ; and last ly, i n the

cent re , in the v e r y hear t o f the representat ion, nearest to w h a t i s essential,

the m i r r o r , s h o w i n g us w h a t is represented, bu t as a ref lect ion so distant,

so d e e p l y bu r i ed in an unreal space, so fo re ign to all the gazes b e i n g

di rected e l sewhere , that i t i s no m o r e than the frailest dup l i ca t ion o f

representat ion. A l l the inter ior lines o f the pa in t ing , and a b o v e all those

that c o m e f r o m the centra l ref lect ion, p o i n t t o w a r d s the v e r y t h i n g that

i s represented, b u t absent . At o n c e ob jec t - s ince i t i s w h a t the artist

represented i s c o p y i n g o n t o his c a n v a s - a n d subject - s ince w h a t the

painter h a d in f ront o f his eyes , as he represented h i m s e l f in the cour se

o f his w o r k , w a s himself , since the gazes p o r t r a y e d in the p ic tu re are all

d i rected t o w a r d s the f ict i t ious pos i t ion o c c u p i e d by the r o y a l pe r sonage ,

w h i c h i s also the painter ' s real p lace , since the o c c u p i e r o f that a m b i g u o u s

p lace in w h i c h the pa in ter and the s o v e r e i g n al ternate, in a n e v e r - e n d i n g

f l icker , as i t w e r e , i s the spectator , w h o s e g a z e t ransforms the pa in t ing

in to an ob jec t , the p u r e representa t ion o f that essential absence. E v e n so ,

that absence is n o t a lacuna, e x c e p t for the discourse l abo r ious ly d e c o m ­

p o s i n g the pa in t ing , for i t n e v e r ceases to be inhabi ted , and rea l ly t o o , as is

p r o v e d b y the concen t r a t ion o f the painter thus represented, b y the

respect o f the characters p o r t r a y e d i n the p ic tu re , b y the presence o f the

g rea t canvas w i t h its b a c k to us , and by our g a z e , for w h i c h the pa in t ing

exists and for w h i c h , i n the depths o f t ime , i t w a s a r ranged .

In Classical t h o u g h t , the pe r sonage for w h o m the representat ion exists ,

and w h o represents h i m s e l f w i t h i n it, r e c o g n i z i n g h i m s e l f therein a s an

i m a g e o r ref lect ion, h e w h o ties t o g e t h e r all the in te r lac ing threads o f

the ' representa t ion in the f o r m of a p ic tu re or tab le ' - he i s n e v e r to be

f o u n d in that table himself . B e f o r e the end o f the e igh teen th cen tu ry ,

man d id n o t exist - a n y m o r e than the p o t e n c y o f life, the f ecund i ty o f

l abour , o r the his tor ical dens i ty of l a n g u a g e . He i s a qui te recent creature ,

w h i c h the d e m i u r g e o f k n o w l e d g e fabricated w i t h its o w n hands less than

t w o h u n d r e d years a g o : b u t h e has g r o w n o ld s o q u i c k l y that i t has b e e n

o n l y t o o easy t o i m a g i n e that h e had been w a i t i n g fo r thousands o f years

i n the darkness fo r that m o m e n t o f i l l umina t ion i n w h i c h h e w o u l d

f inal ly b e k n o w n . O f course , i t i s possible t o ob jec t that genera l g r a m m a r ,

natural h i s to ry , and the analysis o f w e a l t h w e r e all , i n a sense, w a y s o f

r e c o g n i z i n g the ex i s tence of m a n - b u t there i s a d is t inct ion to be m a d e .

T h e r e i s no d o u b t that the natural sciences deal t w i t h m a n as w i t h a

species o r a g e n u s : the c o n t r o v e r s y a b o u t the p r o b l e m of races in the

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e igh teen th c e n t u r y testifies t o that . A g a i n , genera l g r a m m a r and e c o n ­

o m i c s m a d e use o f such no t ions a s need and desire, o r m e m o r y and

imag ina t i on . B u t there w a s n o ep i s t emo log i ca l consciousness o f m a n a s

such . T h e Class ical episteme i s ar t icula ted a l o n g lines tha t do n o t isolate ,

i n a n y w a y , a specific d o m a i n p r o p e r t o m a n . A n d i f that i s n o t sufficient,

i f i t i s still ob j ec t ed that , e v e n so , no p e r i o d has a c c o r d e d m o r e a t ten t ion

to h u m a n nature , has g i v e n i t a m o r e stable, m o r e def in i t ive status, o r

o n e m o r e d i r ec t ly presented to discourse - o n e can r e p l y by s a y i n g that

the v e r y c o n c e p t o f h u m a n nature , and the w a y i n w h i c h i t func t ioned ,

e x c l u d e d a n y possibi l i ty o f a Class ical sc ience o f m a n .

I t i s essential to o b s e r v e that the funct ions of 'na ture ' and ' h u m a n

na ture ' are in oppos i t i on to o n e another , t e r m by t e rm, in the Class ical

episteme: na ture , t h r o u g h the ac t ion of a real and d i sordered j u x t a p o s i t i o n ,

causes difference t o appear i n the o r d e r e d c o n t i n u i t y o f b e i n g s ; h u m a n

na ture causes the ident ical to appear in the d i sordered cha in of representa­

t ions, and does so by the ac t ion o f a d isplay o f i m a g e s . T h e o n e impl ies the

f r agmen ta t ion of a h i s to ry in o rde r to cons t i tu te actual landscapes; the

o t h e r impl ies the c o m p a r i s o n o f non-ac tua l e lements w h i c h des t roy the

fabric o f a c h r o n o l o g i c a l sequence . D e s p i t e this oppos i t i on , h o w e v e r , o r

ra ther t h r o u g h it, w e see the pos i t ive re la t ion o f na ture t o h u m a n na ture

b e g i n n i n g to t ake shape. T h e y act , i n fact, u p o n ident ical e lements

(the same, the con t inuous , the impercep t ib l e difference, the u n b r o k e n

s equence ) ; b o t h r evea l against the b a c k g r o u n d o f a n un in te r rup ted fabric

the poss ib i l i ty o f a genera l analysis w h i c h m a k e s possible the d is t r ibut ion

of isolable identit ies and v is ib le differences o v e r a tabula ted space and in

an o r d e r e d sequence . B u t t hey c a n n o t succeed in d o i n g this w i t h o u t each

o the r , and i t i s there that the c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m o c c u r s . T h e

cha in o f representat ions can , i n effect, b y means o f the p o w e r i t possesses

to dupl ica te i tse l f (in i m a g i n a t i o n a n d m e m o r y , and in the m u l t i p l e

a t tent ion e m p l o y e d i n c o m p a r i s o n ) , r ed i scover , b e l o w the d isorder o f

the earth, the u n b r o k e n expanse o f b e i n g s ; m e m o r y , r a n d o m a t first, and

a t the m e r c y o f representat ions a s t h e y capr i c ious ly present themse lves

to it, i s g r a d u a l l y i m m o b i l i z e d in the f o r m of a genera l table o f all that

exis ts ; m a n i s then able to inc lude the w o r l d in the s o v e r e i g n t y o f a d i s ­

course that has the p o w e r to represent its representa t ion. In the act o f

speak ing , or ra ther (keep ing as c lose as possible to w h a t is essential in the

Class ical expe r i ence o f l a n g u a g e ) , in the act o f naming, h u m a n na ture -

l ike the f o l d i n g o f representat ion b a c k u p o n i t s e l f - t ransforms the l inear

sequence o f t h o u g h t s in to a constant table o f par t ia l ly different b e i n g s : the

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310

discourse in w h i c h i t dupl ica tes its representat ions and expresses t h e m is

w h a t l inks i t t o na ture . Inverse ly , the cha in o f b e i n g i s l i nked to h u m a n

nature by the p l a y o f na tu re : for since the real w o r l d , a s i t presents i t se l f

t o the g a z e , i s n o t m e r e l y the u n w i n d i n g o f the fundamenta l cha in o f

b e i n g , b u t offers j u m b l e d f ragments o f it , repea ted and d i scon t inuous ,

the series o f representat ions in the m i n d i s n o t o b l i g e d to f o l l o w the

c o n t i n u o u s pa th o f impe rcep t ib l e differences; e x t r e m e s m e e t w i t h i n it,

the same th ings o c c u r m o r e than o n c e ; ident ical traits are supe r imposed

in the m e m o r y ; differences stand ou t . T h u s the g rea t , endless, c o n t i n u o u s

surface is p r in ted w i t h dist inct characters , in m o r e or less gene ra l features,

i n m a r k s o f ident i f icat ion - and , consequen t ly , i n w o r d s . T h e cha in o f

b e i n g b e c o m e s discourse , t he r eby l i n k i n g i t se l f t o h u m a n nature and t o

the sequence o f representat ions.

T h i s establ ishing o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n na ture and h u m a n nature ,

on the basis o f t w o oppos i t e b u t c o m p l e m e n t a r y funct ions - since ne i ther

can take p lace w i t h o u t the o the r - carries w i t h i t b r o a d theore t ica l c o n s e ­

quences . Fo r Class ica l t h o u g h t , m a n does n o t o c c u p y a p lace in na ture

t h r o u g h the i n t e r m e d i a r y o f the r eg iona l , l imi ted , specific 'na ture ' that

is g r an t ed to h i m , as to all o the r be ings , as a b i r th r igh t . I f h u m a n nature

i s i n t e r w o v e n w i t h nature , i t i s b y the mechan i sms o f k n o w l e d g e and b y

their f unc t ion ing ; o r rather, i n the gene ra l a r r a n g e m e n t o f the Class ical

episteme, nature , h u m a n na ture , and their relat ions, are defini te and p r e ­

d ic tab le funct ional m o m e n t s . A n d m a n , a s a p r i m a r y real i ty w i t h his o w n

densi ty , a s the difficult ob j ec t and s o v e r e i g n subject o f all poss ible k n o w ­

l edge , has n o p lace i n it. T h e m o d e r n themes o f a n ind iv idua l w h o l ives ,

speaks, and w o r k s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the l a w s o f an "economics , a p h i l ­

o l o g y , a n d a b i o l o g y , b u t w h o also, b y a sort o f internal to rs ion and o v e r ­

l app ing , has acqu i red the r igh t , t h r o u g h the in te rp lay o f those v e r y l a w s ,

to k n o w t h e m and to subject t h e m to tota l c lar i f icat ion - all these t hemes

so famil iar t o us t o d a y and l i nked to the exis tence o f the ' h u m a n sciences '

are e x c l u d e d by Class ica l t h o u g h t : i t w a s n o t poss ible a t that t ime that

there shou ld arise, o n the b o u n d a r y o f the w o r l d , the s t range stature o f

a b e i n g w h o s e na ture (that w h i c h de te rmines it, conta ins it, and has

t raversed i t f r o m the b e g i n n i n g o f t ime ) i s to k n o w nature , and itself, i n

consequence , as a natural b e i n g .

In re turn , h o w e v e r , a t the m e e t i n g - p o i n t b e t w e e n representat ion and

b e i n g , a t the p o i n t w h e r e nature and h u m a n na ture intersect - a t the

p lace i n w h i c h w e b e l i e v e n o w a d a y s that w e can r e c o g n i z e the p r i m a r y ,

irrefutable, and e n i g m a t i c ex is tence o f m a n - w h a t Class ica l t h o u g h t

M A N A N D HIS D O U B L E S

reveals is the p o w e r of discourse . In o the r w o r d s , l a n g u a g e in so far as i t

represents - l a n g u a g e that names , patterns, c o m b i n e s , and connec t s and

disconnects th ings as i t m a k e s t h e m vis ib le in the t ransparency o f w o r d s .

In this ro le , l a n g u a g e t ransforms the sequence of pe rcep t ions in to a table,

and cuts u p the c o n t i n u u m o f be ings in to a pat tern o f characters . W h e r e

there is d iscourse , representat ions are laid o u t and j u x t a p o s e d ; and th ings

are g r o u p e d t o g e t h e r and ar t iculated. T h e p r o f o u n d v o c a t i o n o f C l a s ­

sical l a n g u a g e has a l w a y s been to create a table - a ' p i c tu re ' : w h e t h e r i t

b e i n the f o r m o f natural d iscourse , the a c c u m u l a t i o n o f t ruth, desc r ip ­

t ions o f th ings , a b o d y o f e x a c t k n o w l e d g e , o r a n e n c y c l o p a e d i c d i c ­

t ionary . I t exists , therefore , o n l y in o rde r to be t ransparent ; i t has lost that

secret cons i s tency w h i c h , in the s ix teenth cen tu ry , inspissated i t in to a

w o r d t o b e dec iphe red , and i n t e r w o v e i t w i t h all the th ings o f the w o r l d ;

i t has n o t y e t acqu i red the mu l t i p l e ex is tence a b o u t w h i c h w e ques t ion

ourse lves t o d a y ; in the Classical a g e , d iscourse is that t ranslucent necessi ty

t h r o u g h w h i c h representat ion and be ings m u s t pass - as be ings are repre ­

sented to the m i n d ' s e y e , and as representat ion renders be ings v is ib le in

their t ruth. T h e poss ib i l i ty o f k n o w i n g th ings and their o rde r passes, i n

the Class ical expe r i ence , t h r o u g h the s o v e r e i g n t y o f w o r d s : w o r d s are,

in fact, nei ther ma rks to be dec iphered (as in the Renaissance pe r iod ) n o r

m o r e or less faithful and masterablc ins t ruments (as in the posi t iv is t

p e r i o d ) ; t hey f o r m rather a co lour less n e t w o r k on the basis o f w h i c h

be ings manifes t themse lves and representat ions are o rde red . T h i s w o u l d

a c c o u n t for the fact that Class ical reflection u p o n l a n g u a g e , e v e n t h o u g h

c o m p r i s e d w i t h i n a genera l a r r a n g e m e n t o f w h i c h i t f o r m s par t by the

same r igh t as do the analysis o f w e a l t h and natural h i s tory , exercises , in

re la t ion to t h e m , a r egu l a t i ng ro le .

B u t the essential consequence is that Class ica l l a n g u a g e , as the common

discourse o f representa t ion and th ings , as the p lace w i t h i n w h i c h nature

and h u m a n na ture intersect, abso lu te ly exc ludes a n y t h i n g that c o u l d be

a ' sc ience o f m a n ' . As l o n g as that l a n g u a g e w a s spoken in W e s t e r n cu l ture

i t w a s no t possible for h u m a n exis tence to be ca l led in ques t ion on its o w n

accoun t , s ince i t con ta ined the n e x u s o f representat ion and b e i n g . T h e

discourse that, in the seventeenth cen tu ry , p r o v i d e d the l ink b e t w e e n the

' I th ink ' and the ' I a m ' of the b e i n g u n d e r t a k i n g i t - that v e r y discourse

r ema ined , in a v is ib le f o r m , the v e r y essence of Classical l a n g u a g e , for

w h a t w a s b e i n g l inked t oge the r i n i t w a s representat ion and b e i n g . T h e

transit ion f r o m the ' I th ink ' to the ' I a m ' w a s accompl i shed in the l igh t

o f e v i d e n c e , w i t h i n a discourse w h o s e w h o l e d o m a i n and func t ion ing

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consisted in a r t icu la t ing o n e u p o n the o the r w h a t o n e represents t o o n e ­

self" and w h a t is. I t canno t , therefore , be ob j ec t ed to this transit ion e i ther

that b e i n g in gene ra l i s n o t con ta ined in t h o u g h t , or that the s ingular

b e i n g as des igna ted by the ' I a m ' has no t been in te r roga ted o r analysed on

his o w n a c c o u n t . O r rather , these ob jec t ions m a y w e l l arise and c o m m a n d

respect , b u t o n l y on the basis o f a d iscourse w h i c h i s p r o f o u n d l y o ther ,

and w h i c h does n o t h a v e for its raison d'etre the l ink b e t w e e n representa­

t ion and b e i n g ; o n l y a p r o b l e m a t i c s able to by-pass representa t ion w o u l d

fo rmu la t e such ob jec t ions . B u t a s l o n g as Class ica l d iscourse lasted, no

in t e r roga t ion a s t o the m o d e o f b e i n g i m p l i e d b y the cogito c o u l d b e

ar t icula ted.

I l l T H E A N A L Y T I C O F F I N I T U D E

W h e n natural h i s to ry b e c o m e s b i o l o g y , w h e n the analysis o f w e a l t h

b e c o m e s e c o n o m i c s , w h e n , a b o v e al l , ref lect ion u p o n l a n g u a g e b e c o m e s

p h i l o l o g y , and Class ica l discourse, in w h i c h b e i n g and representa t ion

f o u n d their c o m m o n locus , i s ecl ipsed, then, i n the p r o f o u n d upheava l o f

such an a r c h a e o l o g i c a l m u t a t i o n , m a n appears in his a m b i g u o u s pos i t ion as

an o b j e c t o f k n o w l e d g e and as a subject that k n o w s : ens laved s o v e r e i g n ,

o b s e r v e d specta tor , he appears in the p lace b e l o n g i n g to the k i n g , w h i c h

w a s assigned to h i m in a d v a n c e by Las Meninas, b u t f r o m w h i c h his

real presence has for so l o n g been e x c l u d e d . As if, in that v a c a n t space

t o w a r d s w h i c h V e l a z q u e z ' s w h o l e pa in t ing w a s d i rec ted , bu t w h i c h i t

w a s never the less ref lec t ing o n l y in the chance presence o f a mi r ro r , and

as t h o u g h by stealth, all the f igures w h o s e a l ternat ion, r ec ip roca l e x c l u ­

s ion, i n t e r w e a v i n g , and f lu t t e r ing o n e i m a g i n e d (the m o d e l , the painter ,

the k i n g , the specta tor) sudden ly s t o p p e d their i m p e r c e p t i b l e dance ,

i m m o b i l i z e d in to o n e substantial f igure , a n d d e m a n d e d that the ent ire

space o f the representa t ion s h o u l d a t last be re la ted to o n e c o r p o r e a l g a z e .

T h e m o t i v e o f this n e w presence , the m o d a l i t y p r o p e r t o it, the p a r ­

t icular a r r a n g e m e n t of the episteme that just if ies it, the n e w re la t ion that

i s established by m e a n s o f i t b e t w e e n w o r d s , t h ings , a n d their o r d e r -

all this c a n n o w be clar if ied. C u v i e r and his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s had requ i red

o f life that i t shou ld i tse l f def ine , in the depths o f its b e i n g , the cond i t i ons

o f poss ibi l i ty o f the l i v i n g b e i n g ; i n the s a m e w a y , R i c a r d o h a d requ i red

l abou r t o p r o v i d e the cond i t i ons o f poss ib i l i ty o f e x c h a n g e , prof i t , and

p r o d u c t i o n ; the first ph i lo log is t s , t o o , had searched in the his tor ical

depths o f l anguages for the poss ibi l i ty o f d iscourse and o f g r a m m a r . T h i s

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313

m e a n t that representa t ion ceased, ipso facto, to h a v e v a l i d i t y as the locus

o f o r ig in o f l i v i n g be ings , needs , and w o r d s , o r a s the p r i m i t i v e seat o f

their t ru th ; hence fo r th , i t i s n o t h i n g m o r e in re la t ion to t h e m than an

effect, their m o r e or less b lu r red coun te rpa r t in a consciousness w h i c h

apprehends and reconst i tutes t h e m . T h e representa t ion o n e m a k e s t o

o n e s e l f o f th ings no l o n g e r has to d e p l o y , in a s o v e r e i g n space, the table

i n to w h i c h t h e y h a v e been o r d e r e d ; i t is, for that empi r i ca l i nd iv idua l w h o

is m a n , the p h e n o m e n o n - perhaps e v e n less, the appearance - of an

o rde r that n o w b e l o n g s t o th ings t hemse lves and t o their in ter ior l a w .

I t i s no l o n g e r their iden t i ty that be ings manifes t in representat ion, bu t the

ex te rna l re la t ion t h e y establish w i t h the h u m a n b e i n g . T h e latter, w i t h

his o w n b e i n g , w i t h his p o w e r t o present h i m s e l f w i t h representat ions,

arises i n a space h o l l o w e d o u t by l i v i n g be ings , objects o f e x c h a n g e , a n d

w o r d s , w h e n , a b a n d o n i n g representa t ion, w h i c h had b e e n their natural

site h i ther to , t h e y w i t h d r a w in to the depths o f th ings and rol l u p u p o n

themse lves i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the l a w s o f l ife, p r o d u c t i o n , and l a n g u a g e .

I n the m i d d l e o f t h e m all , c o m p r e s s e d w i t h i n the c i rc le t hey f o r m , m a n

is des igna ted - m o r e , requ i red - by t h e m , s ince i t is he w h o speaks, since

he is seen to reside a m o n g the an imals (and in a pos i t ion that is n o t m e r e l y

p r i v i l e g e d , b u t a source o f o rde r for the to ta l i ty t hey f o r m : e v e n t h o u g h

he i s no t c o n c e i v e d as the e n d - p r o d u c t o f e v o l u t i o n , he i s r e c o g n i z e d to

be o n e e x t r e m i t y o f a l o n g series), and since, last ly, the relat ion b e t w e e n

his needs and the means he possesses to satisfy t h e m is such that he is

necessari ly the p r inc ip le and means o f all p r o d u c t i o n . B u t this i m p e r i o u s

des igna t ion i s a m b i g u o u s . In o n e sense, m a n i s g o v e r n e d by l abour , l ife,

a n d l a n g u a g e : his conc re t e ex is tence finds its de te rmina t ions in t h e m ; i t

i s poss ible to h a v e access to h i m o n l y t h r o u g h his w o r d s , his o r g a n i s m ,

the objects he m a k e s - as t h o u g h i t is t h e y w h o possess the t ruth in the

first p lace (and t hey a lone pe rhaps ) ; and he , as s o o n as he th inks , m e r e l y

unvei l s h i m s e l f t o his o w n eyes i n the f o r m o f a b e i n g w h o i s a l ready , i n

a necessar i ly subjacent densi ty , in an i r r educ ib le anter ior i ty , a l i v i n g

b e i n g , a n ins t rument o f p r o d u c t i o n , a v e h i c l e for w o r d s w h i c h exis t

be fo re h i m . A l l these contents that his k n o w l e d g e reveals t o h i m as

ex t e r i o r t o himself , and o l d e r than his o w n b i r th , ant ic ipate h i m , o v e r h a n g

h i m w i t h all their so l id i ty , and t raverse h i m a s t h o u g h h e w e r e m e r e l y

an ob jec t o f na ture , a face d o o m e d to be erased in the course o f h i s to ry .

M a n ' s f in i tude is he ra lded - a n d i m p e r i o u s l y so - in the pos i t i v i t y of

k n o w l e d g e ; w e k n o w that m a n i s finite, a s w e k n o w the a n a t o m y o f the

bra in , the mechan ic s o f p r o d u c t i o n costs , o r the sys t em o f I n d o - E u r o p e a n

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

3 H

c o n j u g a t i o n ; or rather, l ike a w a t e r m a r k r u n n i n g t h r o u g h all these sol id ,

pos i t ive , and full f o r m s , we p e r c e i v e the f ini tude and l imits t hey impose ,

we sense, a s t h o u g h on their b l a n k reverse sides, all that t hey m a k e

imposs ib le .

B u t this p r i m a r y d i s c o v e r y o f f in i tude i s rea l ly an unstable o n e ;

n o t h i n g a l l o w s i t to c o n t e m p l a t e itself; and w o u l d i t no t be possible to

suppose that i t also p romises that v e r y inf ini ty i t refuses, a c c o r d i n g to the

s y s t e m o f ac tua l i ty? T h e e v o l u t i o n o f the species has perhaps n o t r eached

its c u l m i n a t i o n ; f o r m s o f p r o d u c t i o n and l abour are still b e i n g m o d i f i e d ,

and perhaps o n e d a y m a n w i l l n o l o n g e r f ind the p r inc ip le o f his a l iena­

t ion in his l abour , o r the cons tan t r e m i n d e r of his l imi ta t ions in his needs ;

n o r i s there a n y p r o o f that he w i l l n o t d i s cove r s y m b o l i c sys t ems suffi­

c i en t ly pu re t o d isso lve the ancient o p a c i t y o f his tor ical l anguages .

H e r a l d e d in pos i t i v i t y , m a n ' s f in i tude i s ou t l ined in the p a r a d o x i c a l

f o r m of the endless; ra ther than the r i g o u r o f a l imi ta t ion , i t indicates the

m o n o t o n y o f a j o u r n e y w h i c h , t h o u g h i t p r o b a b l y has no end , i s n e v e r ­

theless perhaps n o t w i t h o u t h o p e . A n d y e t all these contents , w i t h w h a t

t hey concea l and w h a t t h e y also l eave p o i n t i n g t o w a r d s the frontiers o f

t ime , h a v e pos i t iv i ty w i t h i n the space o f k n o w l e d g e and a p p r o a c h the

task o f a possible acquis i t ion o f k n o w l e d g e o n l y because t hey are t h o r ­

o u g h l y i m b u e d w i t h f in i tude . Fo r t h e y w o u l d n o t b e there, i n the l igh t

that pa r t ly i l lumines t h e m , i f m a n , w h o d i scovers h i m s e l f t h r o u g h t h e m ,

w a s t rapped i n the m u t e , noc tu rna l , i m m e d i a t e and h a p p y o p e n i n g o f

an imal l i fe ; b u t n o r w o u l d t hey posi t themse lves in the acu te ang le that

hides t h e m f r o m their o w n d i rec t ion i f m a n c o u l d t raverse t h e m w i t h o u t

r e s i d u u m in the l i g h t n i n g f l a sh o f an infinite unders tand ing . B u t t o m a n ' s

expe r i ence a b o d y has been g i v e n , a b o d y w h i c h is his b o d y - a f r a g m e n t

o f a m b i g u o u s space , w h o s e pecul ia r and i r reduc ib le spat ial i ty i s n e v e r ­

theless ar t icula ted u p o n the space o f th ings ; t o this same exper i ence ,

desire i s g i v e n as a p r i m o r d i a l appet i te on the basis of w h i c h all th ings

assume v a l u e , and re la t ive v a l u e ; to this same expe r i ence , a l a n g u a g e is

g i v e n in the thread o f w h i c h all the discourses o f all t imes , all successions

and all s imultanei t ies m a y be g i v e n . T h i s i s t o say that each o f these

pos i t ive fo rms in w h i c h m a n can learn that he i s finite i s g i v e n to h i m

o n l y against the b a c k g r o u n d o f its o w n f ini tude. M o r e o v e r , the latter i s

n o t the m o s t c o m p l e t e l y pur i f ied essence o f pos i t iv i ty , bu t that u p o n the

basis o f w h i c h i t i s poss ible for pos i t iv i ty t o arise. T h e m o d e o f be ing o f

life, and e v e n that w h i c h de te rmines the fact that life canno t exist w i t h o u t

p resc r ib ing its f o r m s for m e , are g i v e n t o m e , fundamenta l ly , b y m y b o d y ;

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the m o d e o f b e i n g o f p r o d u c t i o n , the w e i g h t o f its de te rmina t ions u p o n

m y exis tence , are g i v e n t o m e b y m y desire; and the m o d e o f b e i n g o f l an ­

g u a g e , the w h o l e b a c k w a s h o f h i s to ry t o w h i c h w o r d s lend their g l o w

at the instant t hey are p r o n o u n c e d , and perhaps e v e n in a t ime m o r e

impe rcep t ib l e still, are g i v e n t o m e o n l y a l o n g the s lender cha in o f m y

speak ing t h o u g h t . A t the founda t ion o f all the empi r i ca l posi t iv i t ies , and

o f e v e r y t h i n g that can indicate i t se l f a s a conc re t e l imi ta t ion o f m a n ' s

ex is tence , we d i scove r a f in i tude - w h i c h is in a sense the s a m e : it is

m a r k e d b y the spatial i ty o f the b o d y , the y a w n i n g o f desire, and the t ime

of l a n g u a g e ; and y e t i t i s r ad ica l ly o the r : in this sense, the l imi ta t ion is

expressed n o t as a de t e rmina t ion i m p o s e d u p o n m a n f r o m outs ide

(because he has a na ture or a h i s to ry ) , b u t as a fundamenta l f in i tude w h i c h

rests on n o t h i n g bu t its o w n ex is tence as fact , and opens u p o n the p o s i ­

t i v i t y o f all conc re t e l imi ta t ion .

T h u s , i n the v e r y heart o f emp i r i c i t y , there i s ind ica ted the o b l i g a t i o n

to w o r k b a c k w a r d s - o r d o w n w a r d s - t o an ana ly t ic o f f in i tude, i n w h i c h

m a n ' s b e i n g w i l l be ab le t o p r o v i d e a founda t ion in their o w n pos i t iv i ty

for all those f o r m s that indicate to h i m that he i s n o t infinite. A n d the

first characteris t ic w i t h w h i c h this ana ly t ic w i l l m a r k m a n ' s m o d e o f

b e i n g , o r ra ther the space i n w h i c h that m o d e o f b e i n g w i l l b e d e p l o y e d

in its ent i re ty , w i l l be that o f repe t i t ion - o f the ident i ty and the differ­

ence b e t w e e n the pos i t ive and the fundamenta l : the dea th that a n o n y ­

m o u s l y g n a w s a t the da i ly exis tence of the l i v i n g b e i n g i s the same as

that fundamenta l dea th on the basis o f w h i c h my empi r i ca l life i s g i v e n

to m e ; the desire that l inks and separates m e n in the neut ra l i ty o f the

e c o n o m i c process i s the s a m e as that on the basis of w h i c h e v e r y t h i n g i s

desirable for m e ; the t ime that bears l anguages a l o n g u p o n it, that takes

up its p lace w i t h i n t h e m and f inal ly w e a r s t h e m ou t , i s the same t i m e that

d r a w s my discourse ou t , e v e n be fo re I h a v e p r o n o u n c e d it, in to a suc ­

cession that n o m a n can master . F r o m o n e end o f expe r i ence t o the o the r ,

f in i tude answers itself; i t i s the iden t i ty and the difference of the pos i t i v ­

ities, and of their founda t ion , w i t h i n the f igure of the Same. I t i s apparen t

h o w m o d e r n ref lect ion, a s s o o n as the first shoo t o f this ana ly t ic appears ,

by-passes the d isplay o f representa t ion, t oge the r w i t h its c u l m i n a t i o n in

the f o r m o f a table a s o r d e r e d by Class ical k n o w l e d g e , and m o v e s t o w a r d s

a cer tain t h o u g h t of the S a m e - in w h i c h Di f fe rence is the same th ing as

Iden t i ty . I t i s w i t h i n this vas t b u t n a r r o w space, o p e n e d up by the repe t i ­

t ion o f the pos i t ive w i t h i n the fundamenta l , that the w h o l e o f this ana ly t ic

o f f in i tude - so c lose ly l inked to the future o f m o d e r n t h o u g h t - w i l l be

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

d e p l o y e d ; i t is there that we shall see in succession the t ranscendental

repeat the empi r i ca l , the c o g i t o repeat the u n t h o u g h t , the re turn o f the

o r i g in repeat its re t reat ; it is there, f r o m i tself as s ta r t ing-poin t , that a

t h o u g h t o f the S a m e i r reduc ib le t o Class ical p h i l o s o p h y i s a b o u t t o affirm

itself.

I t m a y perhaps be r e m a r k e d that there w a s no need to w a i t unti l the

n ine teen th c e n t u r y for the idea of f in i tude to be r evea led . I t i s t rue that

the n ine teen th c e n t u r y perhaps o n l y d isplaced i t w i t h i n the space o f

t h o u g h t , m a k i n g i t p l a y a m o r e c o m p l e x , m o r e a m b i g u o u s , less easi ly

by-passed r o l e : for s even teen th - and e igh t een th -cen tu ry t h o u g h t , i t w a s

his f i n i t u d e that fo rced m a n t o l i ve a n an ima l ex is tence , t o w o r k b y the

swea t o f his b r o w , t o th ink w i t h o p a q u e w o r d s ; i t w a s this same f i n i t u d e

that p r e v e n t e d h i m f r o m a t ta in ing a n y abso lu te k n o w l e d g e o f the

mechan i sms o f his b o d y , the means o f sat isfying his needs , the m e t h o d o f

t h i n k i n g w i t h o u t the per i lous aid o f a l a n g u a g e w o v e n w h o l l y o f habits

and i m a g i n a t i o n . As an inadequa t ion e x t e n d i n g t o inf ini ty , m a n ' s l im i t a ­

t ion a c c o u n t e d b o t h for the ex is tence o f the empi r i ca l contents and for the

imposs ib i l i ty o f k n o w i n g t h e m i m m e d i a t e l y . A n d thus the n e g a t i v e

re la t ion to inf ini ty - w h e t h e r c o n c e i v e d o f a s c rea t ion , o r fall , o r c o n ­

j u n c t i o n o f b o d y and soul , o r de t e rmina t ion w i t h i n the infinite b e i n g , o r

i nd iv idua l p o i n t o f v i e w o f the to ta l i ty , o r l ink b e t w e e n representa t ion

and impress ion - w a s pos i ted as anter ior to m a n ' s e m p i r i c i t y and to the

k n o w l e d g e h e m a y ga in o f it. I n a s ingle m o v e m e n t , bu t w i t h o u t r e c i p r o ­

cal re turn o r c i rcu lar i ty , i t p r o v i d e d the founda t ion for the ex is tence o f

bod ies , needs , and w o r d s , and for the imposs ib i l i ty o f sub juga t ing t h e m

w i t h i n a n abso lu te k n o w l e d g e . T h e e x p e r i e n c e t a k i n g f o r m a t the b e g i n ­

n i n g o f the n ine teen th c e n t u r y situates the d i s c o v e r y o f f i n i t u d e n o t

w i t h i n the t h o u g h t o f the infinite, b u t a t the v e r y hear t o f those contents

that are g i v e n , by a finite ac t o f k n o w i n g , a s the conc re t e f o r m s o f finite

ex is tence . H e n c e the in te rminab le t o and f ro o f a d o u b l e s y s t e m o f refer ­

ence : i f m a n ' s k n o w l e d g e is finite, i t i s because he is t rapped , w i t h o u t

poss ibi l i ty o f l ibera t ion , w i t h i n the pos i t ive con ten ts o f l a n g u a g e , l abour ,

and l i fe ; and inverse ly , i f life, l abour , and l a n g u a g e m a y be pos i t ed i n

their pos i t iv i ty , i t i s because k n o w l e d g e has finite fo rms . F o r Class ical

t h o u g h t , in o the r w o r d s , f in i tude (as a de t e rmina t ion p o s i t i v e l y cons t i ­

tu ted o n the basis o f the infinite) p r o v i d e s a n a c c o u n t o f those n e g a t i v e

fo rms , w h i c h are b o d y , needs , l a n g u a g e , and the l imi ted k n o w l e d g e i t i s

possible t o h a v e o f t h e m ; for m o d e r n t h o u g h t , the pos i t i v i t y o f l ife, o f

p r o d u c t i o n and l a b o u r ( w h i c h h a v e their o w n exis tence , h is tor ic i ty , and

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3^7

l a w s ) p r o v i d e s a founda t ion for the l imi t ed character o f k n o w l e d g e as

their n e g a t i v e co r re l a t ion ; and , inve r se ly , the l imits o f k n o w l e d g e p r o v i d e

a pos i t ive f o u n d a t i o n for the poss ibi l i ty o f k n o w i n g , t h o u g h in an e x p e r i ­

ence that i s a l w a y s l imi t ed , w h a t life, l abour , and l a n g u a g e are. As l o n g

as these empi r i ca l contents w e r e si tuated w i t h i n the space o f representa­

t ion , a me taphys ic s o f the infinite w a s n o t o n l y possible b u t necessary:

i t w a s necessary, in fact, that t hey shou ld be the manifes t f o r m s o f h u m a n

f in i tude, a n d y e t that t h e y shou ld be ab le to h a v e their locus a n d their

t ruth w i t h i n representa t ion; the idea o f inf ini ty , and the idea o f its de te r ­

m i n a t i o n i n f in i tude, m a d e o n e ano the r poss ible . B u t w h e n these empi r i ca l

contents w e r e de tached f r o m representa t ion a n d con ta ined the p r i n ­

c ip le o f their ex is tence w i t h i n themse lves , then the me taphys ic s o f inf in i ty

b e c a m e useless; f r o m that p o i n t o n , f in i tude n e v e r ceased to refer b a c k to

i tse l f ( f rom the pos i t iv i ty o f the contents t o the l imi ta t ions o f k n o w l e d g e ,

and f r o m the l imi t ed pos i t iv i ty o f k n o w l e d g e t o the l imi ted k n o w l e d g e

o f the conten ts ) . W h e r e u p o n the entire field o f W e s t e r n t h o u g h t w a s

inver t ed . W h e r e there h a d f o r m e r l y been a cor re la t ion b e t w e e n a meta­

physics o f representa t ion a n d o f the infinite and an analysis o f l i v i n g

be ings , o f m a n ' s desires, and o f the w o r d s o f his l a n g u a g e , w e f ind b e i n g

const i tu ted an analytic o f f in i tude and h u m a n exis tence , a n d in oppos i t i on

to i t ( t h o u g h in co r re la t ive oppos i t i on ) a pe rpe tua l t e n d e n c y to const i tu te

a metaphysics o f life, l abour , and l a n g u a g e . B u t these are n e v e r a n y t h i n g

m o r e than tendencies , i m m e d i a t e l y o p p o s e d and as i t w e r e u n d e r m i n e d

f r o m w i t h i n , for there can b e n o ques t ion o f a n y t h i n g b u t me taphys i c s

r e d u c e d to the scale o f h u m a n f in i tudes: the m e t a p h y s i c o f a life that

c o n v e r g e s u p o n m a n e v e n i f i t does n o t s top w i t h h i m ; the m e t a p h y s i c

of a l abou r that frees m a n so that m a n , in turn , can free h i m s e l f f r o m it;

the me taphys i c o f a l a n g u a g e that m a n can reappropr ia te in the c o n s c i o u s ­

ness o f his o w n cul ture . M o d e r n t h o u g h t , then , w i l l contes t e v e n its o w n

me taphys i ca l impulses , and s h o w that reflections u p o n life, l abour , and

l a n g u a g e , in so far as t hey h a v e v a l u e as analyt ics of f in i tude, express the

end o f me taphys i c s : the p h i l o s o p h y o f life denounces me taphys ic s a s

a v e i l o f i l lus ion, that o f l abou r denounces i t a s an a l ienated f o r m o f

t h o u g h t and an i d e o l o g y , that o f l a n g u a g e as a cu l tura l ep isode .

B u t the end o f me taphys ics i s o n l y the n e g a t i v e side o f a m u c h m o r e

c o m p l e x e v e n t i n W e s t e r n t h o u g h t . T h i s e v e n t i s the appearance o f m a n .

H o w e v e r , i t m u s t no t be supposed that he s u d d e n l y appeared u p o n o u r

h o r i z o n , i m p o s i n g the bruta l fact o f his b o d y , his l abour , and his l a n g u a g e

in a m a n n e r so i r rup t ivc as to be abso lu te ly baffl ing to o u r reflect ion. I t

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

i s n o t m a n ' s l ack o f pos i t i v i t y that r e d u c e d the space o f me taphys ic s s o

v i o l e n t l y . N o d o u b t , o n the l e v e l o f appearances , m o d e r n i t y beg ins w h e n

the h u m a n b e i n g beg ins t o exis t w i t h i n his o r g a n i s m , inside the shell o f

his head , inside the a rmature o f his l imbs , and i n the w h o l e s t ructure o f

his p h y s i o l o g y ; w h e n he beg ins t o exis t a t the cent re o f a l abou r by w h o s e

pr inciples h e i s g o v e r n e d and w h o s e p r o d u c t e ludes h i m ; w h e n h e l o d g e s

his t h o u g h t in the folds o f a l a n g u a g e so m u c h o l d e r than h i m s e l f that

he c a n n o t master its s ignif icat ions, e v e n t h o u g h t h e y h a v e been ca l led

b a c k t o life b y the insistence o f his w o r d s . B u t , m o r e fundamenta l ly , o u r

cu l tu re crossed the threshold b e y o n d w h i c h w e r e c o g n i z e o u r m o d e r n i t y

w h e n f in i tude w a s c o n c e i v e d i n a n in te rminab le cross-reference w i t h

itself. T h o u g h i t i s t rue, a t the l eve l o f the v a r i o u s b ranches o f k n o w l e d g e ,

that f in i tude i s a l w a y s des igna ted on the basis of m a n as a conc re t e b e i n g

and on the basis o f the empi r i ca l fo rms that can be ass igned to his ex is tence ,

never theless , a t the a r chaeo log i ca l l eve l , w h i c h reveals the genera l , h i s ­

tor ical a priori o f e ach o f those branches o f k n o w l e d g e , m o d e r n m a n

- that m a n ass ignable in his c o r p o r e a l , l a b o u r i n g , and s p e a k i n g ex i s tence -

i s possible o n l y as a f igu ra t ion of f in i tude . M o d e r n cu l tu re can c o n c e i v e

o f m a n because i t c o n c e i v e s o f the f ini te o n the basis o f itself. G i v e n these

cond i t ions , i t i s unders tandable that Class ica l t h o u g h t , and all the f o r m s

o f t h o u g h t that p r e c e d e d it , w e r e ab le t o speak o f the m i n d and the

b o d y , o f the h u m a n b e i n g , o f h o w restr icted a p lace h e occup ies i n the

un iverse , o f all the l imi ta t ions b y w h i c h his k n o w l e d g e o r his f r e e d o m

m u s t b e measured , bu t that n o t o n e o f t h e m w a s e v e r able t o k n o w m a n

as he i s pos i ted in m o d e r n k n o w l e d g e . Renaissance ' h u m a n i s m ' and

Class ica l ' r a t iona l i sm' w e r e indeed able to a l lot h u m a n be ings a p r i v i l e g e d

pos i t ion i n the o rde r o f the w o r l d , b u t t hey w e r e n o t ab le t o c o n c e i v e

o f m a n .

I V T H E E M P I R I C A L A N D T H E T R A N S C E N D E N T A L

M a n , in the ana ly t ic of f ini tude, i s a s t range empi r ico- t ranscenden ta l

d o u b l e t , s ince he i s a b e i n g such that k n o w l e d g e w i l l be at ta ined in h i m

o f w h a t renders all k n o w l e d g e poss ible . B u t d i d n o t the h u m a n nature o f

the e igh teen th -cen tu ry empiricis ts p l a y the same ro le? In fact, w h a t w a s

b e i n g analysed then w a s the proper t ies and f o r m s o f representat ion w h i c h

m a d e k n o w l e d g e in genera l possible (it w a s thus that C o n d i l l a c def ined

the necessary and sufficient opera t ions for representat ion to d e p l o y i tse l f

a s k n o w l e d g e : r emin i scence , self-consciousness, imag ina t i on , m e m o r y ) ;

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M A N A N D HIS D O U B L E S

n o w that the site o f the analysis i s no l o n g e r representa t ion bu t m a n in his

f ini tude, i t i s a ques t ion o f r e v e a l i n g the cond i t i ons o f k n o w l e d g e on the

basis o f the empi r i ca l contents g i v e n in it. I t i s o f l i t t le i m p o r t a n c e , for

the genera l m o v e m e n t o f m o d e r n t h o u g h t , w h e r e these contents h a p ­

p e n e d t o b e l oca l i z ed : k n o w i n g w h e t h e r t h e y w e r e s o u g h t i n in t rospec­

t ion o r i n o the r fo rms o f analysis i s n o t the po in t . F o r the th reshold o f

o u r m o d e r n i t y i s s i tuated n o t by the a t t empt to a p p l y o b j e c t i v e m e t h o d s

t o the s tudy o f m a n , bu t ra ther b y the cons t i tu t ion o f a n e m p i r i c c - t r a n s -

cenden ta l d o u b l e t w h i c h w a s ca l led man. T w o k inds o f analysis then

c a m e in to b e i n g . T h e r e are those that ope ra te w i t h i n the space o f the

b o d y , and - by s t u d y i n g pe rcep t ion , sensorial m e c h a n i s m s , n e u r o - m o t o r

d i ag rams , and the ar t icula t ion c o m m o n to th ings and to the o r g a n i s m -

funct ion as a sort of t ranscendental aesthetic; these l ed to the d i s c o v e r y

that k n o w l e d g e has a n a t o m o - p h y s i o l o g i c a l cond i t ions , that i t i s f o r m e d

g r a d u a l l y w i t h i n the structures o f the b o d y , that i t m a y h a v e a p r i v i l e g e d

p lace w i t h i n it, b u t that its fo rms canno t be dissociated f r o m its pecu l i a r

f unc t ion ing ; in short , that there is a nature of h u m a n k n o w l e d g e that

de te rmines its f o r m s and that can a t the same t i m e be m a d e manifes t to

i t in its o w n empi r i ca l contents . T h e r e w e r e also analyses that - by s t u d y ­

i n g h u m a n i t y ' s m o r e o r less ancient , m o r e o r less easi ly v a n q u i s h e d

i l lusions - func t ioned as a sort of t ranscendental d ia lect ic ; by this means

i t w a s s h o w n that k n o w l e d g e had his torical , social , o r e c o n o m i c c o n ­

di t ions , that i t w a s f o r m e d w i t h i n the relat ions that are w o v e n b e t w e e n

m e n , and that i t w a s n o t i ndependen t o f the par t icular f o r m t h e y m i g h t

t ake here o r there ; in short , that there w a s a history o f h u m a n k n o w ­

l e d g e w h i c h c o u l d b o t h b e g i v e n t o empi r i ca l k n o w l e d g e and p resc r ibe

its f o r m s .

N o w , these analyses h a v e this i n par t icular a b o u t t h e m : t hey apparen t ly

d o n o t need o n e ano the r i n a n y w a y ; m o r e o v e r , t h e y can dispense w i t h

the need for an ana ly t ic (or a t h e o r y o f the sub jec t ) : t h e y c l a i m to be ab le

to rest en t i re ly on themse lves , since i t i s the contents themse lves that

func t ion as t ranscendental ref lect ion. B u t in fact the search for a na ture

o r a h i s to ry o f k n o w l e d g e , i n the m o v e m e n t b y w h i c h the d i m e n s i o n

p r o p e r to a c r i t ique i s f i t ted o v e r the contents o f empi r i ca l k n o w l e d g e ,

a l r eady presupposes the use of a certain c r i t ique - a c r i t ique that is n o t

the exerc ise o f pu re ref lect ion, b u t the result o f a series o f m o r e o r less

obscu re d iv is ions . A n d , in the f i r s t p lace , these d iv is ions are r e l a t ive ly

c lea r ly e luc ida ted , e v e n t h o u g h t h e y are a rb i t ra ry : the d iv i s ion that d i s ­

t inguishes r u d i m e n t a r y , imper fec t , unequa l , e m e r g e n t k n o w l e d g e f r o m

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k n o w l e d g e that m a y be ca l led , i f n o t c o m p l e t e , a t least cons t i tu ted in its

s table and def in i t ive f o r m s (this d iv i s ion m a k e s poss ible the s tudy o f the

natura l cond i t ions o f k n o w l e d g e ) ; the d iv i s ion that dist inguishes i l lusion

f r o m truth, the i d e o l o g i c a l fantasy f r o m the scientific t h e o r y (this d iv i s ion

m a k e s possible the s tudy o f the his tor ical cond i t ions o f k n o w l e d g e ) ; bu t

there i s a m o r e obscu re and m o r e fundamenta l d iv i s ion : that o f t ruth

itself; there mus t , in fact, exist a t ru th that is of the s a m e o rde r as the

ob jec t - the t ru th that is g r a d u a l l y ou t l ined , f o r m e d , s tabi l ized, and

expressed t h r o u g h the b o d y and the rud imen t s o f p e r c e p t i o n ; the t ruth

that appears as i l lusions are dissipated, and as h i s to ry establishes a d i s -

a l icnated status for itself; b u t there m u s t also exist a t ru th that is of the

o rde r of discourse - a t ru th that m a k e s i t possible to e m p l o y , w h e n dea l ing

w i t h the nature o r h i s to ry o f k n o w l e d g e , a l a n g u a g e that w i l l be t rue . I t

i s the status o f this t rue discourse that remains a m b i g u o u s . T h e s e t w o

th ings lead to o n e c o n c l u s i o n : ei ther this t rue discourse finds its f o u n d a ­

t ion and m o d e l in the empi r i ca l t ru th w h o s e genesis in na ture and in

h i s to ry i t retraces, so that o n e has an analysis of the posi t iv is t t y p e (the

t ru th o f the ob jec t de te rmines the t ru th o f the discourse that describes its

f o r m a t i o n ) ; o r the t rue discourse anticipates the t ru th w h o s e na ture and

h i s to ry i t def ines ; i t sketches i t o u t in a d v a n c e and fomen t s i t f r o m a d is ­

tance , so that o n e has a d iscourse o f the e scha to log ica l t y p e (the t ruth o f

the ph i losoph ica l d iscourse const i tutes the t ru th in f o r m a t i o n ) . In fact,

i t i s a ques t ion n o t so m u c h of an a l ternat ive as of a f luctuat ion inherent in

all analysis , w h i c h b r ings o u t the v a l u e o f the empi r i ca l a t the t ranscen­

denta l l eve l . C o m t e and M a r x b o t h bear o u t the fact that e s c h a t o l o g y

(as the ob j ec t i ve t ruth p r o c e e d i n g f r o m m a n ' s d iscourse) and pos i t i v i sm

(as the t ru th o f d iscourse def ined o n the basis o f the t ru th o f the ob jec t )

are a r c h a e o l o g i c a l l y indissociable : a d iscourse a t t e m p t i n g to be b o t h

empi r i ca l and cri t ical c anno t b u t be b o t h posi t iv is t and e scha to log ica l ;

m a n appears w i t h i n i t as a t ruth b o t h r e d u c e d and p r o m i s e d . Pre-cr i t ica l

naivete" ho lds u n d i v i d e d ru le .

T h i s i s w h y m o d e r n t h o u g h t has b e e n unab le to a v o i d - and prec ise ly

f r o m the s ta r t ing-poin t o f this n a i v e discourse - sea rch ing fo r the locus

o f a d iscourse that w o u l d b e nei ther o f the o r d e r o f r educ t ion n o r o f the

o rde r o f p r o m i s e : a d iscourse w h o s e tension w o u l d k e e p separate the

empi r i ca l and the t ranscendental , w h i l e b e i n g d i rec ted a t b o t h ; a d iscourse

that w o u l d m a k e it possible to analyse m a n as a subject , that is, as a locus

o f k n o w l e d g e w h i c h has been empi r i ca l l y acqu i red b u t referred b a c k a s

c lose ly as possible to w h a t m a k e s i t possible, and as a p u r e f o r m i m m e d i -

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321

a te ly present to those con ten t s ; a discourse, in short , w h i c h in re la t ion to

t o quasi-aesthetics and quasi-dialect ics w o u l d p l a y the ro l e o f a n ana ly t ic

w h i c h w o u l d a t the same t i m e g i v e t h e m a founda t ion in a t h e o r y o f the

subject and perhaps enable t h e m to ar t iculate themse lves in that th i rd and

in t e rmed ia ry t e r m i n w h i c h b o t h the e x p e r i e n c e o f the b o d y and that o f

cu l tu re w o u l d be r o o t e d . S u c h a c o m p l e x , o v e r - d e t e r m i n e d , and neces ­

sary role has b e e n p e r f o r m e d i n m o d e r n t h o u g h t b y the analysis o f actual

e x p e i i e n c e . A c t u a l expe r i ence is, in fact, b o t h the space in w h i c h all

empi r i ca l contents are g i v e n to expe r i ence and the o r ig ina l f o r m that

m a k e s t h e m possible in genera l and designates their p r i m a r y roo t s ; i t does

indeed p r o v i d e a means o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n the space o f the b o d y

a n d the t i m e o f cu l ture , b e t w e e n the de te rmina t ions o f na ture and the

w e i g h t o f h i s tory , b u t o n l y o n c o n d i t i o n that the b o d y , and, t h r o u g h it,

nature , shou ld first be posi ted in the expe r i ence of an i r reduc ib le spat ial-

i ty , and that cu l ture , the carr ier o f h i s tory , shou ld be expe r i enced first o f

all in the i m m e d i a c y of its s ed imen ted signif icat ions. I t i s easy e n o u g h to

unders tand h o w the analysis o f actual expe r i ence has established itself, i n

m o d e r n ref lect ion, as a radical contes ta t ion of pos i t i v i sm and e s c h a t o l o g y ;

h o w i t has t r ied to restore the f o r g o t t e n d i m e n s i o n o f the t ranscendental ;

h o w i t has a t t emp ted to exorc i se the n a i v e discourse o f a t ru th r e d u c e d

w h o l l y t o the empi r i ca l , and the p rophe t i c d iscourse w h i c h w i t h s imilar

na ivet£ p romises a t last the even tua l a t t a inment b y m a n o f expe r i ence .

N e v e r t h e l e s s , the analysis o f actual expe r i ence i s a d iscourse o f m i x e d

na ture : i t i s d i rec ted to a specific y e t a m b i g u o u s s t ra tum, conc re t e e n o u g h

for i t to be possible to a p p l y to i t a me t i cu lous and descr ip t ive l a n g u a g e ,

y e t sufficiently r e m o v e d f r o m the pos i t iv i ty o f th ings for i t t o be possible ,

f r o m that s ta r t ing-poin t , to escape f r o m that naivete \ to contes t i t and

seek founda t ions for it. T h i s analysis seeks to ar t iculate the poss ib le

o b j e c t i v i t y o f a k n o w l e d g e o f na ture u p o n the o r ig ina l expe r i ence o f

w h i c h the b o d y p r o v i d e s an ou t l ine ; and to ar t iculate the possible h i s to ry

o f a cu l ture u p o n the semant ic densi ty w h i c h i s b o t h h i d d e n and r evea l ed

in actual expe r i ence . I t i s d o i n g no m o r e , then , than fulf i l l ing w i t h g rea te r

care the has ty d e m a n d s laid d o w n w h e n the a t t emp t w a s m a d e t o m a k e

the empi r ica l , in m a n , stand for the t ranscendental . D e s p i t e appearances

to the con t r a ry , i t i s ev iden t h o w c lose ly kn i t i s the n e t w o r k that l inks

t hough t s o f the posi t ivis t o r e scha to log ica l t y p e ( M a r x i s m b e i n g i n the

first r ank o f these) and reflections inspired b y p h e n o m e n o l o g y . T h e i r

recent rapprochement i s n o t of the o rde r of a t a rdy reconc i l i a t ion : a t the

l eve l o f a r chaeo log ica l conf igura t ions t hey w e r e b o t h necessary - and

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

necessary to o n e ano the r - f r o m the m o m e n t the a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l p o s t u ­

late w a s cons t i tu ted , that is, f r o m the m o m e n t w h e n m a n appeared a s an

empi r i co - t r anscenden ta l d o u b l e t .

T h e t rue contes ta t ion o f pos i t i v i sm and e s c h a t o l o g y does n o t l ie ,

therefore , in a re turn to actual expe r i ence ( w h i c h rather, in fact, p r o v i d e s

t h e m w i t h con f i rma t ion b y g i v i n g t h e m r o o t s ) ; b u t i f such a contes ta t ion

c o u l d b e m a d e , i t w o u l d b e f r o m the s ta r t ing-po in t o f a ques t ion w h i c h

m a y w e l l s e e m aberrant , so o p p o s e d i s i t t o w h a t has rendered the w h o l e

o f o u r t h o u g h t h is tor ica l ly possible . T h i s ques t ion w o u l d b e : D o e s m a n

rea l ly exist? T o i m a g i n e , for a n instant, w h a t the w o r l d and t h o u g h t and

t ru th m i g h t b e i f m a n d id n o t exist , i s cons ide red t o b e m e r e l y i n d u l g i n g

in p a r a d o x . T h i s i s because we are so b l i nded by the recent manifes ta t ion

o f m a n that we can no l o n g e r r e m e m b e r a t ime - and i t i s n o t so l o n g a g o

- w h e n the w o r l d , its o rde r , and h u m a n be ings exis ted , b u t m a n d id no t .

I t i s easy to see w h y N i e t z s c h e ' s t h o u g h t shou ld h a v e had, and still has

for us, such a d i s tu rb ing p o w e r w h e n i t i n t r o d u c e d in the f o r m of an

i m m i n e n t even t , the P r o m i s e - T h r e a t , the n o t i o n that m a n w o u l d s o o n b e

n o m o r e - b u t w o u l d b e rep laced b y the s u p e r m a n ; i n a p h i l o s o p h y o f the

R e t u r n , this m e a n t that m a n had l o n g since d isappeared and w o u l d c o n ­

t inue t o disappear , and that o u r m o d e r n t h o u g h t a b o u t m a n , o u r c o n c e r n

fo r h i m , o u r h u m a n i s m , w e r e all s leep ing serenely o v e r the th rea ten ing

r u m b l e o f his non -ex i s t ence . O u g h t w e n o t t o r e m i n d ourse lves - w e

w h o b e l i e v e ourse lves b o u n d to a f in i tude w h i c h b e l o n g s o n l y t o us, and

w h i c h opens u p the t ruth o f the w o r l d t o u s b y means o f o u r c o g n i t i o n -

o u g h t w e n o t t o r e m i n d ourse lves that w e are b o u n d t o the b a c k o f

a t iger?

V T H E ' C O G I T O ' A N D T H E U N T H O U G H T

I f m a n i s indeed , i n the w o r l d , the locus o f an empi r i co - t r anscenden ta l

d o u b l e t , i f he i s that p a r a d o x i c a l f igu re in w h i c h the empi r i ca l contents

o f k n o w l e d g e necessar i ly release, o f themse lves , the cond i t ions that h a v e

m a d e t h e m possible , then m a n c a n n o t posi t h i m s e l f i n the i m m e d i a t e

and s o v e r e i g n t ransparency of a cogito; no r , on the o the r hand , can he

inhabi t the o b j e c t i v e inert ia o f s o m e t h i n g that , b y r ights , does n o t and

n e v e r can lead t o self-consciousness. M a n i s a m o d e o f b e i n g w h i c h

a c c o m m o d a t e s that d i m e n s i o n - a l w a y s o p e n , n e v e r f inal ly de l imi t ed , y e t

cons tan t ly t raversed - w h i c h ex tends f r o m a par t o f h i m s e l f no t re f l ec ted in

a cogito to the act o f t h o u g h t by w h i c h he apprehends that par t ; and w h i c h ,

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in the inverse d i rec t ion , ex tends f r o m that p u r e apprehens ion to the

empi r i ca l c lut ter , the chao t i c a c c u m u l a t i o n o f contents , the w e i g h t o f

exper iences cons tan t ly e l u d i n g themse lves , the w h o l e silent h o r i z o n o f

w h a t i s pos i t ed in the s andy stretches o f n o n - t h o u g h t . B e c a u s e he i s an

empi r i co - t r anscenden ta l d o u b l e t , m a n i s a lso the locus o f m i s u n d e r ­

s tanding - o f misunder s t and ing that cons tan t ly exposes his t h o u g h t to the

risk o f b e i n g s w a m p e d b y his o w n b e i n g , and also enables h i m t o r e c o v e r

his in t eg r i ty o n the basis o f w h a t e ludes h i m . T h i s i s w h y t ranscendental

ref lect ion in its m o d e r n f o r m does no t , as in K a n t , f ind its fundamen ta l

necessi ty i n the exis tence o f a science o f na ture (opposed by the pe rpe tua l

confl icts and uncertaint ies o f ph i losophers ) , bu t in the ex is tence - m u t e ,

y e t r e a d y to speak, and secre t ly i m p r e g n a t e d w i t h a po ten t i a l d iscourse -

o f that not-known f r o m w h i c h m a n i s pe rpe tua l ly s u m m o n e d t o w a r d s

s e l f - k n o w l e d g e . T h e ques t ion i s n o l o n g e r : H o w can expe r i ence o f na ture

g i v e rise t o necessary j u d g e m e n t s ? B u t ra ther : H o w can m a n th ink w h a t

he does n o t th ink , inhabi t a s t h o u g h by a m u t e o c c u p a t i o n s o m e t h i n g

that e ludes h i m , an imate w i t h a k ind o f f rozen m o v e m e n t that f i gu re o f

h i m s e l f that takes the f o r m o f a s tubborn ex t e r io r i t y? H o w can m a n be

that life w h o s e w e b , pulsat ions, and bu r i ed e n e r g y cons tan t ly e x c e e d the

expe r i ence that h e i s i m m e d i a t e l y g i v e n o f t h e m ? H o w can h e b e that

l a b o u r w h o s e l a w s and d e m a n d s are i m p o s e d u p o n h i m l ike s o m e alien

sys t em? H o w can h e b e the subject o f a l a n g u a g e that for thousands o f

yea r s has b e e n f o r m e d w i t h o u t h i m , a l a n g u a g e w h o s e o r g a n i z a t i o n

escapes h i m , w h o s e m e a n i n g sleeps an a lmos t i nv inc ib le sleep in the

w o r d s h e m o m e n t a r i l y act ivates b y means o f d iscourse , and w i t h i n w h i c h

he i s o b l i g e d , f r o m the v e r y outset , to l o d g e his speech and t h o u g h t , a s

t h o u g h t h e y w e r e d o i n g n o m o r e than an imate , for a b r i e f p e r i o d , o n e

s e g m e n t o f that w e b o f i n n u m e r a b l e possibili t ies? - T h e r e has been a

four fo ld d i sp lacemen t in re la t ion to the K a n t i a n pos i t ion , for i t i s n o w

a ques t ion n o t o f t ruth, b u t o f b e i n g ; n o t o f nature , b u t o f m a n ; n o t o f

the poss ibi l i ty o f unders tand ing , b u t o f the poss ibi l i ty o f a p r i m a r y m i s ­

unde r s t and ing ; n o t o f the unaccoun tab l e na ture o f ph i lo soph ica l theor ies

as o p p o s e d to science, b u t of the r e s u m p t i o n in a c lear ph i l o soph i ca l

awareness o f that w h o l e r ea lm o f u n a c c o u n t e d - f o r exper i ences i n w h i c h

m a n does n o t r e c o g n i z e himself .

G i v e n this d i sp l acemen t o f the ques t ion o f t ranscendence , c o n t e m p o r a r y

t h o u g h t c o u l d n o t a v o i d r e v i v i n g the t h e m e o f the cogito. W a s i t n o t

also on the basis o f error , i l lusion, d reams and madness , all the exper i ences

o f u n a c c o u n t e d - f o r t h o u g h t , that Descar tes d i s c o v e r e d the imposs ib i l i ty

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of there n o t b e i n g t h o u g h t s - t o such effect that the t h o u g h t o f the i l l -

t h o u g h t , o f the n o n - t r u e , o f the ch imer i ca l , o f the p u r e l y i m a g i n a r y ,

e m e r g e d a s the poss ible locus and the p r i m a r y , i r refutable p r o o f o f all

those exper iences? B u t the m o d e r n cogito is as d i f ferent f r o m Desca r t e s ' as

o u r n o t i o n o f t ranscendence i s r e m o t e f r o m K a n t i a n analysis . Fo r D e s ­

cartes w a s c o n c e r n e d t o revea l t h o u g h t a s the m o s t gene ra l f o r m o f all

those t h o u g h t s w e t e r m e r ro r o r i l lus ion, t h e r e b y r e n d e r i n g t h e m h a r m ­

less, so that he w o u l d be free, o n c e that step had been t aken , to re tu rn

t o t h e m , t o e x p l a i n t h e m , and then t o p r o v i d e a m e t h o d o f g u a r d i n g

against t h e m . In the m o d e r n cogito, on the o the r hand , we are c o n c e r n e d

to g r an t the h ighes t v a l u e , the greatest d i m e n s i o n , to the distance that

b o t h separates a n d l inks t h o u g h t - c o n s c i o u s - o f - i t s e l f and w h a t e v e r ,

w i t h i n t h o u g h t , i s r o o t e d in n o n - t h o u g h t . T h e m o d e r n cogito (and this

i s w h y i t i s n o t so m u c h the d i s c o v e r y of an e v i d e n t t ruth as a ceaseless

task cons tan t ly to be unde r t aken afresh) mus t t raverse , dupl ica te , and

reac t iva te i n a n exp l i c i t f o r m the ar t icula t ion o f t h o u g h t o n e v e r y t h i n g

w i t h i n it, a r o u n d it, and benea th i t w h i c h i s n o t t h o u g h t , y e t w h i c h i s

never theless n o t f o r e ign to t h o u g h t , i n the sense o f an i r reducib le , an

insuperable e x t e r i o r i t y . In this f o r m , the cogito w i l l n o t therefore be the

sudden and i l l u m i n a t i n g d i s c o v e r y that all t h o u g h t i s t h o u g h t , bu t the

cons tan t ly r e n e w e d in t e r roga t ion a s t o h o w t h o u g h t can reside e l s ewhe re

than here , and y e t so v e r y c lose to itself; h o w i t can be i n the f o r m s o f

n o n - t h i n k i n g . T h e m o d e r n cogito does n o t r e d u c e the w h o l e b e i n g o f

th ings t o t h o u g h t w i t h o u t r a m i f y i n g the b e i n g o f t h o u g h t r i gh t d o w n

t o the iner t n e t w o r k o f w h a t does n o t th ink .

T h i s d o u b l e m o v e m e n t p r o p e r t o the m o d e r n cogito exp la ins w h y the

T th ink ' docs n o t , in its case, lead to the e v i d e n t t ruth of the ' I a m ' .

Indeed , as s o o n as the T th ink ' has s h o w n i tse l f to be e m b e d d e d in a

densi ty t h r o u g h o u t w h i c h i t i s quasi-present , and w h i c h i t an imates ,

t h o u g h in an e q u i v o c a l s e m i - d o r m a n t , s e m i - w a k e f u l fashion, i t i s no

l o n g e r possible to m a k e i t lead on to the aff i rmat ion T a m ' . Fo r can I , in

fact, say that I am this l a n g u a g e I speak, in to w h i c h my t h o u g h t insinuates

i tse l f t o the p o i n t o f f i nd ing i n i t the sys t em o f all its o w n possibi l i t ies ,

y e t w h i c h exists o n l y i n the w e i g h t o f sed imenta t ions m y t h o u g h t w i l l

n e v e r be capab le o f ac tua l i z ing a l toge ther? C a n I say that I am this l a b o u r

I p e r f o r m w i t h m y hands , y e t w h i c h eludes m e n o t o n l y w h e n I h a v e

finished it , b u t e v e n before I h a v e b e g u n it? C a n I say that I am this l ife

I sense d e e p w i t h i n m e , b u t w h i c h e n v e l o p s me b o t h in t he irresist ible

t i m e that g r o w s side by side w i t h i t and poses me fo r a m o m e n t on its

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crest , and in the i m m i n e n t t ime that prescr ibes my death? I can say ,

equa l ly w e l l , that I am and that I am n o t all this; the cogito does n o t lead

to an affirmation o f b e i n g , bu t i t does lead to a w h o l e series o f ques t ions

c o n c e r n e d w i t h b e i n g : W h a t m u s t I be , I w h o th ink and w h o a m m y

t h o u g h t , i n o rde r to be w h a t I do n o t th ink , i n o rde r for my t h o u g h t to

be w h a t I am not? W h a t i s this b e i n g , then, that sh immers and , as i t

w e r e , gl i t ters in the o p e n i n g o f the cogito, y e t i s no t s o v e r e i g n l y g i v e n in

i t o r by it? W h a t , then, i s the c o n n e c t i o n , the difficult l ink, b e t w e e n

b e i n g and t h o u g h t ? W h a t i s m a n ' s b e i n g , and h o w can i t be that that

b e i n g , w h i c h c o u l d so easily be charac ter ized by the fact that ' i t has

t h o u g h t s ' and i s poss ib ly a lone in h a v i n g t h e m , has an ineradicable and

fundamenta l re la t ion to the u n t h o u g h t ? A f o r m of ref lect ion is established

far r e m o v e d f r o m b o t h Car t e s i an i sm and K a n t i a n analysis , a f o r m that

i n v o l v e s , for the first t ime , man ' s b e i n g in that d i m e n s i o n w h e r e t h o u g h t

addresses the u n t h o u g h t and art iculates i tse l f u p o n it.

T h i s has t w o consequences . T h e first i s n e g a t i v e , and o f a p u r e l y h i s ­

tor ical o rde r . I t m a y s e e m that p h e n o m e n o l o g y has effected a u n i o n

b e t w e e n the Car tes ian t h e m e o f the cogito and the t ranscendental m o t i f

that K a n t had d e r i v e d f r o m H u m e ' s c r i t ique ; a c c o r d i n g t o this v i e w ,

Husser l has r e v i v e d the deepest v o c a t i o n of the W e s t e r n ratio, b e n d i n g i t

b a c k u p o n i tse l f in a ref lect ion w h i c h i s a radica l iza t ion of p u r e p h i l o s o p h y

and a basis for the poss ib i l i ty of its o w n h is tory . In fact, Husser l w a s ab le

to effect this u n i o n o n l y in so far as t ranscendental analysis had c h a n g e d

its po in t o f app l ica t ion (the latter has shifted f r o m the poss ibi l i ty o f

a science o f na ture t o the poss ib i l i ty fo r m a n to c o n c e i v e o f h i m s e l f ) , and

in so far as the cogito had m o d i f i e d its func t ion ( w h i c h is no l o n g e r to lead

to an apod ic t i c ex is tence , s tar t ing f r o m a t h o u g h t that affirms i tse l f

w h e r e v e r i t th inks , b u t t o s h o w h o w t h o u g h t can e lude i tse l f a n d thus

lead to a m a n y - s i d e d and pro l i fe ra t ing in te r roga t ion c o n c e r n i n g b e i n g ) .

P h e n o m e n o l o g y i s therefore m u c h less the r e sumpt ion o f an o ld ra t ional

g o a l o f the W e s t than the sensi t ive and prec ise ly fo rmula ted a c k n o w l e d g ­

m e n t o f the g rea t hiatus that o c c u r r e d in the m o d e r n episteme a t the tu rn

o f the e igh teen th and n ine teen th centuries . I f p h e n o m e n o l o g y has a n y

a l leg iance , i t i s t o the d i s c o v e r y o f life, w o r k , and l a n g u a g e ; and also to

the n e w f igure w h i c h , unde r the o l d n a m e o f m a n , first appeared less

than t w o centur ies a g o ; i t i s t o i n t e r roga t ion c o n c e r n i n g man ' s m o d e o f

b e i n g and his re la t ion t o the u n t h o u g h t . T h i s i s w h y p h e n o m e n o l o g y -

e v e n t h o u g h i t w a s first sugges t ed b y w a y o f a n t i - p s y c h o l o g i s m , o r ,

rather , prec ise ly in so far as, in o p p o s i t i o n to a n t i - p s y c h o l o g i s m , i t

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

r e v i v e d the p r o b l e m of the a priori and the t ranscendental m o t i f - has

n e v e r been able to e x o r c i z e its insidious k insh ip , its s imul t aneous ly p r o m i s ­

i n g and th rea ten ing p r o x i m i t y , t o empi r i ca l analyses o f m a n ; i t i s a l so

w h y , t h o u g h i t w a s inaugura ted by a r educ t ion to the cogito, i t has a l w a y s

been l ed t o ques t ions , t o the ques t ion o f o n t o l o g y . T h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l

p ro jec t con t i nua l l y resolves itself, be fo re o u r eyes , in to a descr ip t ion -

empi r i ca l despite i t se l f - o f actual expe r i ence , a n d in to an o n t o l o g y o f the

u n t h o u g h t that au toma t i ca l l y shor t -c i rcui ts the p r i m a c y o f the T th ink ' .

T h e s econd consequence i s a pos i t ive o n e . I t conce rns the re la t ion of

m a n to the u n t h o u g h t , o r , m o r e prec ise ly , their t w i n appearance i n

W e s t e r n cu l ture . I t seems o b v i o u s e n o u g h that, f r o m the m o m e n t w h e n

m a n first cons t i tu ted h i m s e l f as a pos i t ive f igu re in the f ield of k n o w l e d g e ,

the o l d p r i v i l e g e o f re f lex ive k n o w l e d g e , o f t h o u g h t t h i n k i n g itself,

c o u l d n o t b u t d isappear ; bu t that i t b e c a m e poss ib le , by this v e r y fact ,

for an ob j ec t i ve f o r m of t h o u g h t to inves t iga te m a n in his ent i re ty - a t

the risk o f d i s c o v e r i n g w h a t c o u l d n e v e r b e reached b y his ref lect ion o r

e v e n by his consc iousness : d i m mechan i sms , faceless de te rmina t ions , a

whole? landscape o f s h a d o w that has been t e rmed , d i rec t ly o r ind i rec t ly ,

the unconsc ious . Fo r i s n o t the unconsc ious w h a t necessar i ly y i e lds i tse l f

up to the scientific t h o u g h t m a n appl ies to h i m s e l f w h e n he ceases to

c o n c e i v e o f h i m s e l f i n the f o r m o f ref lect ion? A s a ma t t e r o f fact, the

unconsc ious , and the fo rms o f the u n t h o u g h t i n genera l , h a v e no t been

the r e w a r d g r an t ed t o a pos i t ive k n o w l e d g e o f m a n . M a n and the u n ­

t h o u g h t are, a t the a rchaeo log ica l l eve l , con t empora r i e s . M a n has n o t

been able to descr ibe h i m s e l f as a con f igu ra t i on in the episteme w i t h o u t

t h o u g h t a t the s a m e t ime d i s c o v e r i n g , b o t h in i tse l f and outs ide itself, a t

its bo rde r s y e t also in its v e r y w a r p and w o o f , an e l e m e n t o f darkness , an

apparen t ly inert densi ty in w h i c h i t i s e m b e d d e d , an u n t h o u g h t w h i c h i t

conta ins ent i re ly , y e t in w h i c h i t i s also c a u g h t . T h e u n t h o u g h t ( w h a t e v e r

n a m e we g i v e it) i s no t l o d g e d in m a n l ike a sh r ive l l ed -up nature o r

a stratified h i s to ry ; i t is, in re la t ion to m a n , the O t h e r : the O t h e r that is

n o t o n l y a b ro the r bu t a t w i n , b o r n , n o t o f m a n , n o r in m a n , b u t beside

h i m and a t the s a m e t ime , in an ident ical n e w n e s s , in an u n a v o i d a b l e

dual i ty . T h i s obscu re space so readi ly in te rpre ted as an abyssal r e g i o n

in m a n ' s nature , or as a u n i q u e l y i m p r e g n a b l e fortress in his h i s to ry , is

l i n k e d to h i m in an ent i re ly different w a y ; i t i s b o t h ex t e r i o r t o h i m and

indispensable to h i m : in o n e sense, the s h a d o w cast by m a n as he e m e r g e d

in the field o f k n o w l e d g e ; in another , the b l i nd stain by w h i c h i t i s

possible to k n o w h i m . In a n y case, the u n t h o u g h t has a c c o m p a n i e d m a n ,

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327

m u t e l y and un in te r rup ted ly , since the n ine teen th cen tu ry . S ince i t w a s

rea l ly n e v e r m o r e than an insistent d o u b l e , i t has n e v e r been the ob jec t

o f ref lect ion i n an a u t o n o m o u s w a y ; i t has r ece ived the c o m p l e m e n t a r y

f o r m and the inve r t ed n a m e o f that for w h i c h i t w a s the O t h e r and the

s h a d o w : in H e g e l i a n p h e n o m e n o l o g y , i t w a s the An sich as o p p o s e d to the

Fiir sich; for S c h o p e n h a u e r i t w a s the Unbewusste; for M a r x i t w a s a l ien­

ated m a n ; in Husser l ' s analyses i t w a s the impl ic i t , the inactual , the sedi-

m e n t e d , the non-ef fec ted - in e v e r y case, the inexhaus t ib le d o u b l e that

presents i tself to ref lect ion as the b lu r red p ro jec t ion of w h a t m a n i s in his

t ruth, bu t that also p lays the ro l e o f a p r e l im ina ry g r o u n d u p o n w h i c h

m a n mus t co l l ec t h i m s e l f and recall h i m s e l f in o rde r to attain his t ruth.

For t h o u g h this d o u b l e m a y be close, i t i s al ien, and the ro le , the t rue

unde r t ak ing , o f t h o u g h t w i l l be to b r i n g i t as c lose to i tse l f as poss ib le ;

the w h o l e o f m o d e r n t h o u g h t i s i m b u e d w i t h the necessi ty o f t h i n k i n g

the u n t h o u g h t - o f ref lect ing the contents of the In-itself in the f o r m

o f the For-itself, o f e n d i n g m a n ' s a l ienat ion b y r econc i l i ng h i m w i t h

his o w n essence, o f m a k i n g exp l i c i t the h o r i z o n that p r o v i d e s expe r i ence

w i t h its b a c k g r o u n d o f i m m e d i a t e and d i sa rmed p roof , o f l i f t ing the

v e i l o f the U n c o n s c i o u s , o f b e c o m i n g absorbed i n its s i lence, o r o f s train­

i n g to ca tch its endless m u r m u r .

I n m o d e r n exper i ence , the possibi l i ty o f es tabl ishing m a n w i t h i n k n o w ­

l e d g e and the m e r e e m e r g e n c e o f this n e w f igure i n the field o f the

episteme i m p l y an i m p e r a t i v e that haunts t h o u g h t f r o m w i t h i n ; i t mat ters

little w h e t h e r i t be g i v e n c u r r e n c y in the f o r m o f ethics, pol i t ics , h u m a n ­

ism, a d u t y to assume responsibi l i ty for the fate o f the W e s t , o r the m e r e

consciousness o f p e r f o r m i n g , in h i s to ry , a bureaucra t ic func t ion . W h a t i s

essential i s that t h o u g h t , b o t h for i t se l f and in the dens i ty of its w o r k i n g s ,

shou ld b e b o t h k n o w l e d g e and a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f w h a t i t k n o w s , ref lec­

t ion and a t ransformat ion o f the m o d e o f b e i n g o f that o n w h i c h i t

reflects. W h a t e v e r i t t ouches i t i m m e d i a t e l y causes to m o v e : i t c a n n o t

d i s cove r the u n t h o u g h t , o r a t least m o v e t o w a r d s it, w i t h o u t i m m e d i a t e l y

b r i n g i n g the u n t h o u g h t nearer t o i t s e l f - o r e v e n , perhaps , w i t h o u t p u s h ­

i n g i t further a w a y , and i n a n y case w i t h o u t caus ing m a n ' s o w n b e i n g t o

u n d e r g o a c h a n g e by that v e r y fact, s ince i t is d e p l o y e d in the distance

b e t w e e n t h e m . T h e r e i s s o m e t h i n g here p r o f o u n d l y b o u n d u p w i t h o u r

m o d e r n i t y : apar t f r o m its re l ig ious moral i t ies , i t i s c lear that the W e s t has

k n o w n o n l y t w o ethical fo rms . T h e o l d o n e (in the f o r m o f S t o i c i s m o r

Ep icu rean i sm) w a s ar t icula ted u p o n the o rde r o f the w o r l d , and b y d is ­

c o v e r i n g the l a w o f that o rde r i t c o u l d d e d u c e f r o m i t the pr inc ip le o f

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

a c o d e o f w i s d o m o r a c o n c e p t i o n o f the c i t y ; e v e n the pol i t i ca l t h o u g h t

o f the e igh teen th c e n t u r y still b e l o n g s t o this genera l f o r m . T h e m o d e r n

o n e , on the o the r hand , fo rmula tes no m o r a l i t y , s ince a n y i m p e r a t i v e i s

l o d g e d w i t h i n t h o u g h t a n d its m o v e m e n t t o w a r d s the apprehens ion o f

the u n t h o u g h t [2]; i t i s ref lect ion, the act of consciousness , the e luc ida t ion

o f w h a t i s silent, l a n g u a g e res tored t o w h a t i s m u t e , the i l lumina t ion o f

the e l emen t o f darkness that cuts m a n o f f f r o m himself , the r ean ima t ion

of the inert - i t is all this and this a lone that cons t i tu ted the con ten t and

f o r m o f the ethical . M o d e m t h o u g h t has neve r , i n fact, been able t o p r o ­

pose a m o r a l i t y . B u t the reason for this is no t because i t is p u r e specu la ­

t ion ; on the con t r a ry , m o d e r n t h o u g h t , f r o m its incep t ion and in its v e r y

densi ty , i s a cer tain m o d e o f ac t ion . L e t those w h o u r g e t h o u g h t t o l eave

its retreat and to fo rmu la t e its cho ices talk o n ; and let those w h o seek,

w i t h o u t a n y p l e d g e and in the absence o f v i r tue , to establish a m o r a l i t y

do a s t h e y w i s h . F o r m o d e r n t h o u g h t , no m o r a l i t y i s possible . T h o u g h t

had a l ready ' lef t ' i t se l f in its o w n b e i n g as ear ly as the n ine teen th c e n t u r y ;

i t is no l o n g e r theore t ica l . As s o o n as i t funct ions i t offends or reconc i les ,

attracts or repels, breaks , dissociates, unites or reuni tes ; i t c a n n o t he lp b u t

l iberate and ens lave . E v e n before p resc r ib ing , sugges t i ng a future, s a y i n g

w h a t m u s t b e d o n e , e v e n be fo re e x h o r t i n g o r m e r e l y s o u n d i n g a n a la rm,

t h o u g h t , a t the l eve l of its ex is tence , in its v e r y d a w n i n g , i s in i tse l f an

ac t ion - a per i lous act . Sade , N i e t z s c h e , A r t a u d , and Ba ta i l l e h a v e u n d e r ­

s tood this on b e h a l f o f all those w h o tried to i g n o r e i t ; bu t i t i s also cer ta in

that H e g e l , M a r x , and Freud k n e w it. C a n w e say that i t i s n o t k n o w n

by those w h o , in their p r o f o u n d s tupid i ty , assert that there i s no p h i l ­

o s o p h y w i t h o u t po l i t i ca l c h o i c e , that all t h o u g h t i s ^either ' p r o g r e s s i v e '

or ' r eac t iona ry ' ? T h e i r foolishness i s to b e l i e v e that all t h o u g h t ' expresses '

the i d e o l o g y of a class; their i n v o l u n t a r y p r o f u n d i t y i s that t h e y p o i n t

d i rec t ly a t the m o d e r n m o d e o f b e i n g o f t h o u g h t . Superf ic ia l ly , o n e

m i g h t say that k n o w l e d g e o f m a n , un l i ke the sciences o f na ture , i s a l w a y s

l inked , e v e n in its v a g u e s t f o r m , to ethics o r pol i t ics ; m o r e fundamenta l ly ,

m o d e r n t h o u g h t i s a d v a n c i n g t o w a r d s that r e g i o n w h e r e m a n ' s O t h e r

mus t b e c o m e the S a m e as himself .

V I T H E R E T R E A T A N D R E T U R N O F T H E O R I G I N

T h e last feature that character izes b o t h m a n ' s m o d e o f b e i n g and the

ref lect ion addressed to h i m is the re la t ion to the o r i g i n - a re lat ion v e r y

different f r o m that w h i c h Class ical t h o u g h t t r ied to establish in its ideal

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gcneses . In the e igh teen th cen tu ry , to re turn to the o r i g i n w a s to p lace o n e ­

se l f o n c e m o r e as near a s poss ible to the m e r e dup l i ca t ion o f representa t ion .

E c o n o m i c s w a s c o n c e i v e d o n the basis o f barter , because i n bar ter the t w o

representat ions that e ach pa r ty m a d e to h i m s e l f o f his p r o p e r t y and the

o ther ' s p r o p e r t y w e r e equ iva l en t ; s ince t h e y w e r e of fer ing satisfaction

for a lmos t ident ical desires, t hey w e r e , i n s u m , ' a l i ke ' . T h e o rde r o f na tu re

w a s c o n c e i v e d , p r io r to a n y ca tas t rophe, as a table in w h i c h be ings f o l ­

l o w e d o n e ano the r in so t i gh t ly kn i t an o rde r , and u p o n so c o n t i n u o u s

a fabr ic , that in g o i n g f r o m o n e p o i n t o f this succession to ano the r o n e

w o u l d h a v e m o v e d w i t h i n a quas i - ident i ty , and i n g o i n g f r o m o n e

e x t r e m i t y o f i t t o the o the r o n e w o u l d h a v e b e e n led b y the s m o o t h

expanse o f ' l i k e n e s s ' . T h e o r i g i n o f l a n g u a g e w a s c o n c e i v e d a s the t rans­

p a r e n c y b e t w e e n the representat ion o f a t h i n g and the representat ion o f

the c r y , sound , o r ges ture (the l a n g u a g e o f ac t ion) that a c c o m p a n i e d it.

F ina l ly , the o r i g i n o f k n o w l e d g e w a s s o u g h t w i t h i n this p u r e sequence

of representat ions - a sequence so per fec t and so l inear that the s econd

had rep laced the first w i t h o u t one ' s b e c o m i n g consc ious o f the fact, s ince

t h e y w e r e n o t s imul taneous , since i t w a s n o t poss ible to establish a n y

difference b e t w e e n t h e m , and since o n e c o u l d n o t expe r i ence the s econd

as o t h e r than ' l i k e ' the f i rs t ; and i t w a s o n l y w h e n a sensation appeared

to be m o r e ' l i k e ' a p r e v i o u s o n e than all the o thers that r emin i scence

c o u l d c o m e in to p l ay , that i m a g i n a t i o n c o u l d represent a representa t ion

afresh, and that k n o w l e d g e c o u l d ga in a f o o t h o l d in this dup l i ca t ion . I t

w a s o f little i m p o r t a n c e w h e t h e r this o r i g i n w a s cons idered f ict i t ious o r

real, w h e t h e r i t possessed the v a l u e o f a n e x p l a n a t o r y hypo thes i s o r

a his tor ical e v e n t : in fact , these dist inct ions exis t o n l y fo r us ; in a s y s t e m

o f t h o u g h t for w h i c h c h r o n o l o g i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t resides w i t h i n a table ,

u p o n w h i c h i t const i tutes no m o r e than a l ine of a cer ta in l e n g t h , its

s ta r t ing-poin t is at the s a m e t ime outs ide real t i m e and inside it: i t is the

f i r s t fo ld that enables all h is tor ical even t s to t ake p l ace .

I n m o d e r n t h o u g h t , such a n o r i g i n i s n o l o n g e r c o n c e i v a b l e : w e h a v e

seen h o w l a b o u r , l ife, and l a n g u a g e acqu i red their o w n his tor ic i ty , i n

w h i c h t hey w e r e e m b e d d e d ; t h e y c o u l d n e v e r , therefore , t ru ly express

their o r ig in , e v e n t h o u g h , f r o m the inside, their w h o l e h i s to ry is, a s i t

w e r e , d i rec ted t o w a r d s it. I t i s no l o n g e r o r i g i n that g i v e s rise to h i s ­

t o r i c i t y ; i t i s h is tor ic i ty that, in its v e r y fabric, m a k e s poss ib le the n e c e s ­

si ty o f a n o r i g i n w h i c h m u s t b e b o t h internal and fo r e ign t o i t : l i ke the

v i r tua l t ip of a c o n e in w h i c h all differences, all dispersions, all d i s c o n ­

tinuities w o u l d be kni t ted t o g e t h e r so as to f o r m no m o r e than a s ingle

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p o i n t o f ident i ty , the impa lpab l e f igu re o f the S a m e , y e t possessing the

p o w e r , never the less , t o burs t o p e n u p o n i t se l f and b e c o m e O t h e r .

M a n w a s cons t i tu ted a t the b e g i n n i n g o f the n ine teen th c e n t u r y i n

co r re la t ion w i t h these historicit ies, w i t h all these th ings i n v o l u t e d u p o n

themse lves and ind ica t ing , t h r o u g h their d i sp lay b u t b y means o f their

o w n l a w s , the inaccessible iden t i ty o f their o r i g i n . Y e t m a n ' s o w n re la t ion

to his o r i g i n does n o t o c c u r in the same w a y . T h i s i s because m a n , in fact ,

can be r evea l ed o n l y w h e n b o u n d to a p r e v i o u s l y ex i s t ing h is tor ic i ty : he

i s n e v e r c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s w i t h that o r i g i n w h i c h i s ou t l ined t h r o u g h the

t i m e o f th ings e v e n a s i t e ludes the g a z e ; w h e n he tries t o define h i m s e l f

a s a l i v i n g b e i n g , he can u n c o v e r his o w n b e g i n n i n g o n l y against the

b a c k g r o u n d o f a life w h i c h i tse l f b e g a n l o n g be fo re h i m ; w h e n h e

a t tempts to r e - app rehend h i m s e l f as a l a b o u r i n g b e i n g , he canno t b r i n g

e v e n the m o s t r u d i m e n t a r y fo rms o f such a b e i n g t o l igh t e x c e p t w i t h i n

a h u m a n t i m e a n d space w h i c h h a v e been p r e v i o u s l y ins t i tu t ional ized,

and p r e v i o u s l y sub juga ted b y soc ie ty ; and w h e n h e a t tempts t o def ine

his essence as a s p e a k i n g subject , p r io r to a n y ef fec t ive ly cons t i tu ted l an ­

g u a g e , all he e v e r finds i s the p r e v i o u s l y un fo lded poss ib i l i ty o f l a n g u a g e ,

and n o t the s t u m b l i n g sound , the first w o r d u p o n the basis o f w h i c h all

l anguages and e v e n l a n g u a g e i tself b e c a m e poss ible . I t is a l w a y s against a

b a c k g r o u n d o f the a l ready b e g u n that m a n i s ab le t o reflect o n w h a t m a y

se rve for h i m as o r i g i n . Fo r m a n , then, o r i g i n i s by no m e a n s the b e g i n ­

n i n g - a sort o f d a w n o f h i s to ry f r o m w h i c h his u l ter ior acquisi t ions

w o u l d h a v e a c c u m u l a t e d . O r i g i n , for m a n , i s m u c h m o r e the w a y i n

w h i c h m a n i n genera l , a n y m a n , articulates h i m s e l f u p o n the a l r eady -

b e g u n o f l abour , life, a n d l a n g u a g e ; i t mus t be s o u g h t for i n that fo ld

w h e r e m a n in all s impl i c i ty applies his l abou r to a w o r l d that has b e e n

w o r k e d for thousands o f yea r s , l ives i n the freshness o f his un ique , recent ,

a n d precar ious ex is tence a life that has its roots in the first o r g a n i c f o r m a ­

t ions, and c o m p o s e s in to sentences w h i c h h a v e n e v e r be fo re b e e n s p o k e n

(even t h o u g h gene ra t i on after gene ra t ion has repea ted t h e m ) w o r d s that

are o l d e r than all m e m o r y . In this sense, the l e v e l o f the o r ig ina l i s

p r o b a b l y that w h i c h i s closest to m a n : the surface he t raverses so i n n o ­

cen t ly , a l w a y s for the first t i m e , and u p o n w h i c h his scarce ly o p e n e d eyes

discern f igures as y o u n g as his o w n g a z e - f igures that m u s t necessari ly

be j u s t as ageless as he himself , t h o u g h for an oppos i t e reason; i t is no t

because t h e y are a l w a y s equa l l y y o u n g , i t i s because t hey b e l o n g to a t ime

that has nei ther the same standards o f m e a s u r e m e n t no r the same f o u n d a ­

t ions a s h i m . B u t this thin surface o f the o r ig ina l , w h i c h a c c o m p a n i e s o u r

330

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entire exis tence and n e v e r deserts i t (not e v e n , indeed especia l ly no t , a t

the m o m e n t o f death , w h e n , on the con t r a ry , i t reveals itself, a s i t w e r e ,

naked ) i s no t the i m m e d i a c y of a b i r th ; i t i s p o p u l a t e d ent i re ly by those

c o m p l e x media t ions f o r m e d and laid d o w n as a sed imen t in their o w n

h is tory by l abour , life, and l a n g u a g e ; so that in this s imp le con tac t , f r o m

the m o m e n t the first ob jec t i s man ipu la t ed , the s imples t need expressed ,

the mos t neutra l w o r d emi t t ed , w h a t m a n i s r e v i v i n g , w i t h o u t k n o w i n g

it , i s all the in termediar ies of a t ime that g o v e r n s h i m a lmos t to inf ini ty .

W i t h o u t k n o w i n g it, and y e t i t mus t be k n o w n , in a cer ta in w a y , since

i t i s by this means that m e n enter in to c o m m u n i c a t i o n and f ind t h e m ­

selves i n the a l r eady cons t ruc ted n e t w o r k o f c o m p r e h e n s i o n . N e v e r t h e ­

less, this k n o w l e d g e is l imi ted , d i agona l , par t ia l , s ince i t is su r rounded on

all sides b y a n i m m e n s e r e g i o n o f s h a d o w i n w h i c h l abour , life, and l an ­

g u a g e concea l their t ruth (and their o w n o r ig in ) f r o m those v e r y be ings

w h o speak, w h o exist , and w h o are a t w o r k .

T h e o r ig ina l , as m o d e r n t h o u g h t has n e v e r ceased to descr ibe i t s ince

The phenomenology of mind, is thus v e r y different f r o m that ideal genesis

that the Classical a g e had a t t empted to reconst i tu te ; b u t i t is also different

( t h o u g h l inked to i t by a fundamenta l cor re la t ion) f r o m the o r i g i n that

i s ou t l ined , in a sort o f re t rospec t ive b e y o n d , t h r o u g h the h is tor ic i ty o f

be ings . Far f r o m lead ing back , o r e v e n m e r e l y p o i n t i n g , t o w a r d s a p e a k

- w h e t h e r real or v i r tua l - of ident i ty , far f r o m ind ica t ing the m o m e n t

o f the S a m e a t w h i c h the dispersion o f the O t h e r has n o t y e t c o m e in to

p l a y , the o r ig ina l in m a n i s that w h i c h art iculates h i m f r o m the v e r y o u t ­

set u p o n s o m e t h i n g o the r than himself ; i t i s that w h i c h in t roduces in to

his expe r i ence contents and fo rms o lde r than h i m , w h i c h he c a n n o t

master ; i t i s that w h i c h , by b i n d i n g h i m to mul t ip l e , in tersect ing, of ten

m u t u a l l y i r reduc ib le c h r o n o l o g i e s , scatters h i m t h r o u g h t i m e and p in ions

h i m a t the cent re o f the du ra t ion o f th ings . P a r a d o x i c a l l y , the o r ig ina l ,

i n m a n , does n o t hera ld the t i m e o f his b i r th , o r the m o s t ancient ke rne l

o f his expe r i ence : i t l inks h i m t o that w h i c h does n o t h a v e the same t i m e

as himself ; and i t sets free in h i m e v e r y t h i n g that is n o t c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s

w i t h h i m ; i t indicates ceaselessly, and in an e v e r - r e n e w e d prol i fe ra t ion ,

that th ings b e g a n l o n g before h i m , and that fo r this v e r y reason, and

since his exper i ence i s w h o l l y const i tu ted a n d l imi ted by th ings , no o n e

can eve r assign h i m a n o r i g i n . N o w , this imposs ib i l i ty i tse l f has t w o

aspects: on the o n e hand , i t signifies that the o r i g i n o f th ings i s a l w a y s

pushed further b a c k , since i t g o e s b a c k to a ca lendar u p o n w h i c h m a n does

n o t f igu re ; bu t , on the o the r hand , i t signifies that m a n , as o p p o s e d to the

3 3 i

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332

th ings w h o s e g l i t t e r ing b i r th t ime a l l o w s to s h o w in all its densi ty , i s the

b e i n g w i t h o u t o r i g i n , w h o has 'ne i ther c o u n t r y n o r da te ' , w h o s e b i r th

i s n e v e r accessible because i t n e v e r t o o k ' p l a c e ' . W h a t i s c o n v e y e d in the

i m m e d i a c y o f the o r ig ina l is, therefore , that m a n i s c u t o f f f r o m the

o r i g i n that w o u l d m a k e h i m c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s w i t h his o w n ex i s tence :

a m i d all the th ings that are b o r n in t i m e and no d o u b t d ie in t ime , he , c u t

o f f f r o m all o r i g i n , i s a l r eady there. So that i t i s in h i m that th ings (those

same th ings that h a n g o v e r h i m ) f ind their b e g i n n i n g : ra ther than a cu t ,

m a d e a t s o m e g i v e n m o m e n t i n dura t ion , h e i s the o p e n i n g f r o m w h i c h

t ime in genera l can be reconst i tu ted , du ra t ion can f low, and th ings , a t

the appropr ia te m o m e n t , can m a k e their appearance . T h o u g h , i n the

empi r i ca l o rder , th ings are a l w a y s set b a c k f r o m h i m , so that t h e y are

unapprehendab le a t their z e r o po in t , never theless m a n finds h i m s e l f

fundamen ta l ly set b a c k in relat ion to that set t ing b a c k of th ings , and i t i s

b y this means that t h e y are ab le t o w e i g h d o w n u p o n the i m m e d i a c y o f the

o r ig ina l e x p e r i e n c e w i t h their sol id an ter ior i ty .

A task i s t h e r e b y set fo r t h o u g h t : that o f con tes t ing the o r i g i n o f

th ings , bu t o f con tes t ing i t in o rde r to g i v e i t a founda t ion , by r e d i s c o v e r ­

i n g the m o d e u p o n w h i c h the poss ibi l i ty o f t i m e i s cons t i tu ted - that

o r i g i n w i t h o u t o r i g i n o r b e g i n n i n g , o n the basis o f w h i c h e v e r y t h i n g i s

ab le to c o m e in to b e i n g . S u c h a task impl ies the ca l l ing in to ques t ion o f

e v e r y t h i n g that pertains to t i m e , e v e r y t h i n g that has f o r m e d w i t h i n it,

e v e r y t h i n g that resides w i t h i n its m o b i l e e l emen t , in such a w a y as to

m a k e v is ib le that rent, d e v o i d o f c h r o n o l o g y and h is tory , f r o m w h i c h

t i m e issued. T i m e w o u l d then b e suspended w i t h i n that t h o u g h t , w h i c h

never theless c a n n o t escape f r o m i t s ince i t i s n e v e r c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s w i t h

the o r i g i n ; b u t this suspension w o u l d h a v e the p o w e r t o r e v o l v e the

rec iproca l re la t ion o f o r i g i n and t h o u g h t ; and a s i t p i v o t e d u p o n itself,

the o r i g i n , b e c o m i n g w h a t t h o u g h t has y e t t o th ink , and a l w a y s afresh,

w o u l d b e f o r e v e r p r o m i s e d i n a n i m m i n e n c e a l w a y s nearer y e t n e v e r

a c c o m p l i s h e d . In that case the o r i g i n is that w h i c h is r e tu rn ing , the

repet i t ion t o w a r d s w h i c h t h o u g h t i s m o v i n g , the re turn o f that w h i c h

has a l ready a l w a y s b e g u n , the p r o x i m i t y o f a l i gh t that has been sh in ing

since the b e g i n n i n g o f t i m e . T h u s , for the thi rd t ime , the o r i g i n i s v i s ib le

t h r o u g h t i m e ; bu t this t ime i t i s the recession in to the future, the in junc­

t ion that t h o u g h t rece ives and imposes u p o n i tse l f t o a d v a n c e w i t h d o v e ­

l ike steps t o w a r d s that w h i c h has n e v e r ceased to render i t poss ible , to

k e e p w a t c h i n f ront o f itself, o n the e v e r - r e c e d i n g l ine o f its h o r i z o n , for

the day f r o m w h i c h i t c a m e and f r o m w h i c h i t i s c o m i n g in such profus ion .

M A N A N D HIS D O U B L E S

333

A t the v e r y m o m e n t w h e n i t b e c a m e poss ible for i t t o d e n o u n c e a s

fantasies the ideal geneses descr ibed in the e igh teen th cen tu ry , m o d e r n

t h o u g h t w a s establ ishing a p rob l ema t i c s o f the o r ig in a t o n c e e x t r e m e l y

c o m p l e x and e x t r e m e l y t ang led ; this p rob lemat i c s has se rved as the

founda t ion for o u r expe r i ence o f t ime , and, since the n ine teen th c e n t u r y ,

a s the s ta r t ing-poin t o f all o u r a t tempts t o re -apprehend w h a t b e g i n n i n g

and r e - b e g i n n i n g , the recession and the presence o f the b e g i n n i n g , the

re turn and the end , c o u l d be in the h u m a n sphere . In fact, m o d e r n t h o u g h t

established a re la t ion to the o r i g i n that w a s inverse for m a n and for

th ings : in this w a y i t sanct ioned - bu t o u t w i t t e d in a d v a n c e and p re se rved

all its p o w e r o f contes ta t ion w i t h r ega rd to t h e m - the posi t ivis t a t t empts

to insert m a n ' s c h r o n o l o g y w i t h i n that o f th ings , in such a w a y that the

u n i t y o f t ime w o u l d b e res tored and that m a n ' s o r ig in w o u l d b e n o m o r e

than a date, a fo ld , in the sequential series of be ings (p lac ing that o r ig in ,

and w i t h i t the appearance o f cu l ture , the d a w n o f c iv i l iza t ions , w i t h i n

the s t ream o f b i o l o g i c a l e v o l u t i o n ) ; i t sanc t ioned also the inverse and

c o m p l e m e n t a r y e n d e a v o u r t o a l ign the expe r i ence m a n has o f th ings , the

k n o w l e d g e he has acqu i red o f t h e m , and the sciences he has thus been

able to const i tu te , in acco rdance w i t h c h r o n o l o g y (so that t h o u g h all

m a n ' s b e g i n n i n g s h a v e their locus w i t h i n the t ime o f th ings , his i nd iv idua l

or cul tura l t ime m a k e s i t poss ible , in a p s y c h o l o g i c a l or historical genesis ,

t o define the m o m e n t a t w h i c h th ings m e e t the face o f their t ruth for the

first t i m e ) ; i n each o f these t w o a l ignment s , the o r ig in o f th ings and the

o r i g i n o f m a n are subord ina ted to each o the r ; bu t the m e r e fact that there

are t w o possible and i r reconc i lab le a l ignment s indicates the fundamenta l

a s y m m e t r y that character izes m o d e r n t h o u g h t o n o r ig in . M o r e o v e r , this

t h o u g h t b r ings in to a final l i gh t and, as i t w e r e , in to an essentially re t icent

c lar i ty , a cer tain s t ra tum of the or ig ina l in w h i c h no o r i g i n w a s in fact

present , bu t i n w h i c h m a n ' s t i m e ( w h i c h has n o b e g i n n i n g ) m a d e m a n i ­

fest, for a poss ible m e m o r y , the t i m e o f th ings ( w h i c h has no m e m o r y ) .

T h i s leads t o a d o u b l e t emp ta t i on : t o p s y c h o l o g i z e all k n o w l e d g e , o f

w h a t e v e r k ind , and t o m a k e p s y c h o l o g y in to a sort o f genera l sc ience o f

all the sciences; o r , inverse ly , to descr ibe this o r ig ina l s t ra tum in a s ty le

that avo ids all pos i t i v i sm in such a w a y as to m a k e i t poss ible , on this

basis, to d is turb the pos i t iv i ty o f all science and to use the fundamenta l ,

insuperable character of this expe r i ence as a w e a p o n against it . B u t in

set t ing i tse l f the task o f res to r ing the d o m a i n o f the o r ig ina l , m o d e r n

t h o u g h t i m m e d i a t e l y encounte r s the recession o f the o r i g i n ; and , pa ra ­

d o x i c a l l y , i t p roposes the so lu t ion o f a d v a n c i n g i n the d i rec t ion o f this

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

334

e v e r - d e e p e n i n g recess ion; i t tries to m a k e i t appear on the far side of

expe r i ence , as that w h i c h sustains i t by its v e r y retreat, as that w h i c h is

nearest to its m o s t v i s ib le poss ibi l i ty , as that w h i c h is, w i t h i n t h o u g h t ,

i m m i n e n t ; and i f the recession of the o r i g i n i s thus pos i t ed in its greates t

c lar i ty , is i t n o t the o r i g i n i tse l f that is set free and travels b a c k w a r d s unt i l

i t reaches i tself aga in , i n the d y n a s t y o f its a rchaism? T h i s i s w h y m o d e r n

t h o u g h t i s d o o m e d , a t e v e r y l e v e l , t o its g rea t p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h r ecu r ­

rence , to its c o n c e r n w i t h r e c o m m e n c e m e n t , to that s t range, s ta t ionary

a n x i e t y w h i c h forces u p o n i t the d u t y o f r epea t ing repe t i t ion . T h u s f r o m

H e g e l t o M a r x and S p e n g l e r w e f ind the d e v e l o p i n g t h e m e o f a t h o u g h t

w h i c h , by the m o v e m e n t in w h i c h i t i s a c c o m p l i s h e d - to ta l i ty at ta ined,

v i o l e n t r e c o v e r y a t the e x t r e m e po in t o f p o v e r t y , solar dec l ine - c u r v e s

o v e r u p o n itself, i l luminates its o w n p len i tude , b r ings its c i rc le t o c o m ­

ple t ion , r e c o g n i z e s i t se l f in all the s t range f igures o f its o d y s s e y , a n d

accepts its d isappearance in to that same ocean f r o m w h i c h i t sp rang ; in

o p p o s i t i o n to this re turn , w h i c h , e v e n t h o u g h i t i s n o t h a p p y , i s perfec t ,

w e f ind the e x p e r i e n c e o f H o l d e r l i n , N i e t z s c h e , and H e i d e g g e r , i n w h i c h

the re turn i s pos i t ed o n l y in the e x t r e m e recession of the o r i g i n - in that

r e g i o n w h e r e the g o d s h a v e turned a w a y , w h e r e the desert i s increas ing ,

w h e r e the texvr) has established the d o m i n i o n o f its w i l l ; so that w h a t w e

are c o n c e r n e d w i t h he re is ne i ther a c o m p l e t i o n n o r a c u r v e , b u t ra ther

that ceaseless r e n d i n g o p e n w h i c h frees the o r i g i n in e x a c t l y that d e g r e e

to w h i c h i t recedes ; the e x t r e m e i s therefore w h a t i s nearest . B u t w h e t h e r

this s t r a tum o f the o r ig ina l , r evea l ed b y m o d e r n t h o u g h t i n the v e r y

m o v e m e n t in w h i c h i t i n v e n t e d m a n , i s a p r o m i s e o f fu l f i lment and perfec t

p l en i tude o r restores the v o i d o f the o r i g i n - the v o i d crea ted b o t h by its

recession and by its a p p r o a c h - in a n y case, w h a t i t prescr ibes as t h o u g h t

i s s o m e t h i n g l ike the ' S a m e ' : t h r o u g h the d o m a i n o f the o r ig ina l , w h i c h

art iculates h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e u p o n the t i m e o f na ture and life, u p o n

h is tory , u p o n the sed imen ted past o f cul tures , m o d e r n t h o u g h t m a k e s i t

its task to re turn to m a n in his ident i ty , in that p len i tude or in tha t

n o t h i n g w h i c h he i s himself , t o h i s to ry a n d t ime in the repet i t ion w h i c h

t h e y render imposs ib le b u t w h i c h t h e y fo rce u s t o c o n c e i v e , and t o b e i n g

in that w h i c h i t is.

A n d b y this means , i n this infinite task o f c o n c e i v i n g o f the o r i g i n i n

w h a t i s nearest to i t and w h a t i s furthest f r o m it, t h o u g h t reveals that

m a n i s n o t c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s w i t h w h a t m a k e s h i m b e - o r w i t h that

u p o n the basis o f w h i c h he is ; b u t that he i s w i t h i n a p o w e r that disperses

h i m , d r a w s h i m far a w a y f r o m his o w n o r ig in , b u t p romises i t t o h i m i n

M A N A N D HIS D O U B L E S

a n i m m i n e n c e that w i l l pe rhaps b e fo rever snatched f r o m h i m ; n o w , this

p o w e r i s n o t f o r e ign to h i m ; i t does n o t reside outs ide h i m in the sereni ty

o f e ternal and ceaselessly r e c o m m e n c e d or ig ins , for then the o r i g i n w o u l d

be ef fec t ive ly pos i t ed ; this p o w e r i s that o f his o w n b e i n g . T i m e - the

t i m e that he h i m s e l f i s - cuts h i m o f f no t o n l y f r o m the d a w n f r o m w h i c h

he sprang bu t also f r o m that o the r d a w n p r o m i s e d h i m as still t o c o m e .

I t i s c lear h o w this fundamen ta l t i m e - this t i m e on the basis o f w h i c h

t i m e can be g i v e n to e x p e r i e n c e - i s different f r o m that w h i c h w a s ac t ive

i n the p h i l o s o p h y o f representa t ion: then, t i m e dispersed representa t ion,

since i t i m p o s e d the f o r m of a l inear sequence u p o n it ; b u t representa t ion

w a s able to reconst i tu te i tse l f fo r i t se l f in imag ina t i on , and thus to d u p l i ­

cate i tse l f pe r fec t ly and to subjuga te t ime ; the i m a g e m a d e i t poss ible to

r e - app rehend t i m e in its ent i re ty , to r e c o v e r w h a t had been c o n c e d e d to

succession, and to cons t ruc t a k n o w l e d g e as t rue as that of an e ternal

under s t and ing . In the m o d e r n exper i ence , on the con t r a ry , the retreat

of the o r i g i n i s m o r e fundamen ta l than all expe r i ence , s ince i t i s in i t that

e x p e r i e n c e shines and manifests its pos i t i v i ty ; i t i s because m a n is n o t c o n ­

t e m p o r a n e o u s w i t h his b e i n g that th ings are presented to h i m w i t h a

t i m e that i s p r o p e r t o t h e m . A n d here w e m e e t o n c e aga in the initial

t h e m e o f f in i tude . B u t this f in i tude, w h i c h w a s expressed first o f all b y

the w e i g h t o f th ings u p o n m a n - b y the fact that h e w a s d o m i n a t e d b y

life, h i s tory , and l a n g u a g e - n o w appears a t a m o r e fundamen ta l l e v e l :

i t i s the i n su rmoun tab l e re la t ion o f m a n ' s b e i n g w i t h t i m e .

T h u s , b y r e d i s c o v e r i n g f ini tude i n its i n t e r roga t ion o f the o r i g i n ,

m o d e r n t h o u g h t closes the g rea t quadri la teral i t b e g a n to ou t l ine w h e n

the W e s t e r n episteme b r o k e up a t the end o f the e igh teen th c e n t u r y : the

c o n n e c t i o n o f the posi t ivi t ies w i t h f ini tude, the redup l ica t ion o f the

empi r i ca l and the t ranscendental , the perpe tua l re la t ion of the cogito to

the u n t h o u g h t , the retreat and re turn o f the o r i g i n , def ine fo r us m a n ' s

m o d e o f b e i n g . I t i s i n the analysis o f that m o d e o f b e i n g , and n o l o n g e r

in the analysis o f representa t ion, that ref lect ion since the n ine teen th

c e n t u r y has s o u g h t a ph i losoph ica l founda t ion for the poss ib i l i ty o f

k n o w l e d g e .

V I I D I S C O U R S E A N D M A N ' S B E I N G

I t m a y be o b s e r v e d that these four theore t ica l s egment s (analysis o f f in i ­

tude , o f empi r ico- t ranscenden ta l repet i t ion , o f the u n t h o u g h t , a n d o f

o r i g i n ) stand in a cer tain re la t ion to the four subord ina te d o m a i n s w h i c h

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

336

t oge the r cons t i tu ted the genera l t h e o r y o f l a n g u a g e i n the Classical

a g e [3]. A re la t ion w h i c h i s a t first g l a n c e o n e o f r e semblance and s y m ­

m e t r y . I t w i l l be r e m e m b e r e d that the t h e o r y o f the verb exp la ined h o w

l a n g u a g e c o u l d o v e r f l o w its o w n boundar ies and affirm b e i n g - in a

m o v e m e n t w h i c h , i n re turn , assured the v e r y b e i n g o f l a n g u a g e , since

the latter c o u l d establish i tse l f and o p e n up its space o n l y w h e r e there

a l r eady exis ted , a t least in a h idden f o r m , a founda t ion p r o v i d e d by the

v e r b to be; the analysis offinitude exp la ins in the same w a y h o w m a n ' s

b e i n g finds i tse l f d e t e r m i n e d by posi t ivi t ies w h i c h are ex t e r i o r to i t and

w h i c h l ink i t to the dens i ty o f th ings , bu t h o w , in return, i t i s finite b e i n g

that g i v e s a n y de t e rmina t ion the poss ibi l i ty o f a p p e a r i n g in its pos i t i ve

t ru th . W h e r e a s the t h e o r y o f articulation s h o w e d h o w the pa t t e rn ing o f

w o r d s and o f the th ings t h e y represent c o u l d o c c u r w i t h o u t a hiatus

b e t w e e n t h e m , the analysis of the empirico-transcendental reduplication s h o w s

h o w w h a t i s g i v e n i n expe r i ence and w h a t renders e x p e r i e n c e possible

co r r e spond to o n e ano the r in an endless osci l la t ion. T h e quest fo r the

p r i m a r y designations o f l a n g u a g e d r e w o u t f r o m the silent and inne rmos t

hear,t o f w o r d s , syl lables , and sounds themse lves , a d o r m a n t representat ion

that f o r m e d , as i t w e r e , their f o rgo t t en soul ( w h i c h i t w a s necessary to

b r i n g b a c k to l igh t , t o m a k e speak and s ing o n c e m o r e , i n o rde r to attain

a g rea te r exac t i t ude o f t h o u g h t , a m o r e mi racu lous p o w e r o f p o e t r y ) ;

in a s imilar w a y , fo r m o d e r n t h o u g h t , the inert dens i ty of the unthought

is a l w a y s inhabi ted in a cer ta in m a n n e r by a cogito, and this t h o u g h t , d o r ­

m a n t w i t h i n w h a t i s n o t t h o u g h t , m u s t be b r o u g h t t o life aga in and

s t re tched o u t in the s o v e r e i g n t y o f the ' I t h ink ' . Las t ly , there w a s a t h e o r y

o f derivation i n Class ica l ref lect ion o n l a n g u a g e : this s h o w e d h o w l an ­

g u a g e , f r o m the b e g i n n i n g o f its h i s to ry and pe rhaps in the instant o f its

o r i g i n , a t the v e r y po in t w h e n i t b e g a n to speak, shifted inside its o w n

space, p i v o t e d a r o u n d on i tse l f a w a y f r o m its p r i m a r y representat ion, and

depos i ted its w o r d s , e v e n the v e r y o ldes t o f t h e m , o n l y w h e n they had

a l ready been d e p l o y e d i n the f igures o f rhe to r i c ; c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o that

analysis , w e n o w f ind the effort t o c o n c e i v e o f a n eve r - e lu s ive origin, t o

a d v a n c e t o w a r d s that p lace w h e r e m a n ' s b e i n g i s a l w a y s main ta ined , in

re la t ion to m a n himself , in a remoteness and a distance that const i tu te

h i m .

B u t this p l a y o f co r re spondences m u s t n o t b e a l l o w e d t o de lude us.

W e m u s t n o t i m a g i n e that the Class ica l analysis o f d iscourse has c o n ­

t inued w i t h o u t m o d i f i c a t i o n t h r o u g h the ages m e r e l y b y a p p l y i n g i tse l f

t o a n e w ob jec t ; that the fo rce o f s o m e historical w e i g h t has main ta ined

M A N A N D HIS D O U B L E S

337

i t in its ident i ty , despi te so m a n y adjacent muta t ions . In fact, the four

theore t ica l s egmen t s that ou t l ined the space o f genera l g r a m m a r h a v e n o t

been p r e se rved : bu t t h e y w e r e dissociated, t h e y c h a n g e d b o t h their f unc ­

t ion and their l eve l , t h e y m o d i f i e d the ent ire d o m a i n o f their v a l i d i t y

w h e n , a t the end o f the e igh teen th cen tu ry , the t h e o r y o f representat ion

w a s ecl ipsed. I n the Classical a g e , the func t ion o f gene ra l g r a m m a r w a s

t o s h o w h o w a l a n g u a g e c o u l d be i n t r o d u c e d in to the sequential cha in

o f representat ions, a l a n g u a g e that, w h i l e mani fes t ing i t se l f in the s imple

and abso lu te ly tenuous l ine o f discourse, p resupposed fo rms o f s i m u l ­

tanei ty (affirmation o f exis tences and coex i s tences ; pa t t e rn ing o f th ings

represented and f o r m a t i o n o f general i t ies ; o r ig ina l a n d inerasable re la t ion

b e t w e e n w o r d s and th ings ; d i sp lacement o f w o r d s w i t h i n their rhe tor ica l

space) . In contras t , the analysis o f man ' s m o d e o f b e i n g a s i t has d e v e l o p e d

since the n ine teenth c e n t u r y does n o t reside w i t h i n a t h e o r y of representa­

t i on ; its task, on the con t r a ry , i s to s h o w h o w th ings in genera l can be

g i v e n t o representat ion, i n w h a t cond i t ions , u p o n w h a t g r o u n d , w i t h i n

w h a t l imits t h e y can appear in a pos i t iv i ty m o r e p r o f o u n d than the

v a r i o u s m o d e s o f p e r c e p t i o n ; and w h a t i s then r evea led , i n this c o e x i s t ­

ence o f m a n and th ings , t h r o u g h the g rea t spatial expanse o p e n e d u p b y

representat ion, is m a n ' s radical f ini tude, the dispers ion that at the same

t i m e separates h i m f r o m his o r i g i n and p romises i t t o h i m , a n d the

insuperable distance o f t ime . T h e analy t ic o f m a n i s n o t a r e s u m p t i o n o f

the analysis o f d iscourse a s cons t i tu ted e l s e w h e r e and handed d o w n b y

t radi t ion. T h e presence o r absence o f a t h e o r y o f representat ion, o r , m o r e

e x a c t l y , the p r i m a r y character o r de r ived pos i t ion o f that t h e o r y , mod i f i e s

the e q u i l i b r i u m o f the s y s t e m f r o m t o p t o b o t t o m . A s l o n g a s representa­

t ion g o e s w i t h o u t ques t ion a s the genera l e l e m e n t o f t h o u g h t , the t h e o r y

o f discourse serves a t the same t ime , and in o n e and the same m o v e m e n t ,

a s the founda t ion o f all possible g r a m m a r and a s a t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e .

B u t a s s o o n as the p r i m a c y o f representa t ion disappears, then the t h e o r y

of discourse i s dissociated, and o n e can encoun te r its dis incarnated a n d

m e t a m o r p h o s e d f o r m o n t w o separate levels . O n the empi r i ca l l e v e l , the

four cons t i tuent segment s are still to be found , b u t the funct ion t h e y p e r ­

f o r m has been w h o l l y inver ted [4]: r ep l ac ing the analysis o f the v e r b ' s

p r i v i l e g e d pos i t ion , o f its p o w e r t o m a k e discourse e m e r g e f r o m i t se l f

and b e c o m e r o o t e d i n the b e i n g o f representat ion, w e f ind the analysis o f

an internal g r a m m a t i c a l s t ructure w h i c h i s i m m a n e n t in each l a n g u a g e

and const i tutes i t as an a u t o n o m o u s b e i n g , in o the r w o r d s u p o n itself;

s imi lar ly , the analysis o f the ar t icula t ion c o m m o n t o w o r d s and th ings has

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

33»

been rep laced b y the t h e o r y o f inflections and the a t t emp t t o establish

l a w s o f m u t a t i o n p r o p e r t o w o r d s a l o n e ; the t h e o r y o f the radical has

b e e n subst i tuted for the analysis o f the representa t ive r o o t ; f inal ly , w h e r e

be fo re there w a s the search for the boundless con t i nu i t y o f de r iva t ion ,

the lateral k insh ip o f l anguages has b e e n r evea led . I n o the r w o r d s , e v e r y ­

t h i n g that h a d func t ioned w i t h i n the d i m e n s i o n o f the re la t ion b e t w e e n

th ings (as t h e y are represented) a n d w o r d s ( w i t h their representa t ive

v a l u e ) has n o w b e e n d r a w n b a c k in to l a n g u a g e and g i v e n the task o f

p r o v i d i n g i t w i t h a n internal l ega l i ty . A t f o u n d a t i o n l eve l , the four s e g ­

ments o f the t h e o r y o f d iscourse are still t o be f o u n d : a s in the Class ical

a g e , t h e y still se rve i n this n e w analy t ic o f the h u m a n b e i n g t o express the

re la t ion to t h ings ; b u t this t i m e the m o d i f i c a t i o n i s the inverse o f w h a t i t

w a s p r e v i o u s l y ; i t i s no l o n g e r a ma t t e r of r ep l ac ing t h e m in a space

inter ior t o l a n g u a g e , b u t o f f ree ing t h e m f r o m the d o m a i n o f representa­

t ion w i t h i n w h i c h t h e y w e r e t rapped , a n d o f b r i n g i n g t h e m in to p l a y i n

that d i m e n s i o n of ex t e r io r i t y in w h i c h m a n appears as a f ini te, de te r ­

m i n e d b e i n g , t r apped i n the dens i ty o f w h a t h e does n o t th ink , and

subject , i n his v e r y b e i n g , t o the dispers ion o f t i m e .

F r o m the m o m e n t w h e n i t w a s n o l o n g e r i n c o n t i n u i t y w i t h a t h e o r y

o f representat ion, the Class ica l analysis o f d iscourse f o u n d itself, a s i t

w e r e , split i n t w o : on the o n e hand , i t inves ted i tse l f i n an empi r i ca l

k n o w l e d g e o f g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m s ; and , o n the o ther , i t b e c a m e a n

ana ly t ic o f f in i tude ; b u t nei ther o f these t w o transferences c o u l d take

p lace w i t h o u t a total i nve r s ion o f func t ion . W e are n o w i n a pos i t i on t o

unders tand, in all its impl ica t ions , the i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y that re igns b e t w e e n

the exis tence o f Class ica l d iscourse (based u p o n the unques t ioned e v i d e n c e

o f representa t ion) and the ex is tence o f m a n as i t i s presented in m o d e r n

t h o u g h t (and w i t h the a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l ref lect ion that i t sanct ions) : s o m e ­

t h i n g l ike a n ana ly t i c o f m a n ' s m o d e o f b e i n g b e c a m e poss ible o n l y after

the analysis o f representa t ive discourse had b e e n dissociated, transferred,

and inver t ed . A n d w e can also sense h o w m a n ' s b e i n g , thus def ined and

pos i ted , i s w e i g h e d d o w n b y the c o n t e m p o r a r y reappearance o f l a n g u a g e

in the e n i g m a of its u n i t y and its b e i n g as by a threat . I s the task ahead of

u s t o a d v a n c e t o w a r d s a m o d e o f t h o u g h t , u n k n o w n h i the r to i n o u r c u l ­

ture , that w i l l m a k e i t poss ible to reflect a t the s a m e t i m e , w i t h o u t d i s ­

c o n t i n u i t y o r con t rad ic t ion , u p o n m a n ' s b e i n g and the b e i n g o f l a n g u a g e ?

- I f that i s so , we mus t take the v e r y greates t p recau t ions to a v o i d a n y ­

t h i n g that m i g h t be a n a i v e re turn to the Class ica l t h e o r y o f d iscourse

(a re turn all the m o r e t e m p t i n g , i t m u s t be said, because we are so ill—

M A N A N D HIS D O U B L E S

e q u i p p e d t o c o n c e i v e o f the sh in ing b u t c r u d e b e i n g o f l a n g u a g e , w h e r e a s

the o l d t h e o r y of representa t ion i s there, a l r eady cons t i tu ted , of fer ing us

9 p lace in w h i c h that b e i n g c a n be l o d g e d and a l l o w e d to d issolve in to

p u r e func t ion) . B u t the r i gh t t o c o n c e i v e b o t h o f the b e i n g o f l a n g u a g e

and o f the b e i n g o f m a n m a y b e f o r e v e r e x c l u d e d ; there m a y be , a s i t

w e r e , an inerasable hiatus a t that p o i n t (precisely that hiatus in w h i c h we

ex is t and ta lk ) , so that i t w o u l d be necessary to dismiss as fantasy a n y

a n t h r o p o l o g y i n w h i c h there w a s a n y ques t ion o f the b e i n g o f l a n g u a g e ,

o r a n y c o n c e p t i o n o f l a n g u a g e o r s ignif ica t ion w h i c h a t t emp ted t o c o n ­

nec t w i t h , manifest , and free the b e i n g p r o p e r to m a n . I t i s pe rhaps he re

that the m o s t i m p o r t a n t ph i losoph ica l c h o i c e o f o u r p e r i o d has its roots

- a c h o i c e that can be m a d e o n l y in the test of a future ref lect ion. Fo r

n o t h i n g can tell us in a d v a n c e u p o n w h i c h side the t h r o u g h r o a d lies.

T h e o n l y t h i n g w e k n o w a t the m o m e n t , i n all cer ta in ty , i s that i n

W e s t e r n cu l tu re the b e i n g o f m a n and the b e i n g o f l a n g u a g e h a v e n e v e r ,

a t a n y t ime , b e e n able to coex i s t and to ar t iculate themse lves o n e u p o n

the o ther . T h e i r i ncompa t ib i l i t y has b e e n o n e o f the fundamenta l features

o f o u r t h o u g h t .

H o w e v e r , the m u t a t i o n o f the analysis o f D i s c o u r s e in to a n ana ly t i c

o f f in i tude has o n e o the r consequence . T h e Class ical t h e o r y o f the s ign

and the w o r d had t o s h o w h o w representat ions, w h i c h succeeded o n e

ano the r in a cha in so n a r r o w and so t i g h t l y kn i t that dis t inct ions d id n o t

appear , w i t h the result that t h e y w e r e all, in short , a l ike , c o u l d be spread

o u t to f o r m a p e r m a n e n t table of stable differences and l imi ted ident i t ies ;

i t w a s a ma t t e r of a genesis of Di f fe rence star t ing f r o m the secre t ly va r i ed

m o n o t o n y o f the L i k e . T h e analy t ic o f f in i tude has a n e x a c t l y inverse

r o l e : in s h o w i n g that m a n is de t e rmined , i t i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h s h o w i n g

that the founda t ion of those de te rmina t ions i s man ' s v e r y b e i n g in its

radical l imi ta t ions ; i t mus t also s h o w that the contents o f expe r i ence are

a l r eady their o w n cond i t ions , that t h o u g h t , f r o m the v e r y b e g i n n i n g ,

haunts the u n t h o u g h t that e ludes t h e m , and that i t i s a l w a y s s t r iv ing to

r e c o v e r ; i t s h o w s h o w that o r i g i n o f w h i c h m a n i s n e v e r the c o n t e m ­

p o r a r y i s a t the same t i m e w i t h d r a w n and g i v e n as an i m m i n e n c e : in

short , i t i s a l w a y s c o n c e r n e d w i t h s h o w i n g h o w the O t h e r , the Dis t an t ,

i s also the N e a r and the S a m e . T h u s we h a v e m o v e d f r o m a ref lect ion

u p o n the o rde r o f Dif ferences ( w i t h the analysis i t p resupposes a n d that

o n t o l o g y o f c o n t i n u i t y and that insistence u p o n a ful l , u n b r o k e n b e i n g

d e p l o y e d in its pe r fec t ion that p resuppose a me taphys ic s ) to a t h o u g h t

o f the S a m e , still t o be c o n q u e r e d in its c o n t r a d i c t i o n : w h i c h impl ies

339

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

(apart f r o m the ethics a l ready m e n t i o n e d ) a dialect ic and that f o r m of

o n t o l o g y w h i c h , s ince i t has no need o f c o n t i n u i t y and has t o reflect u p o n

b e i n g o n l y in its l imi t ed f o r m s or in its dis tance, can and m u s t do w i t h o u t

me taphys ic s . C a l l i n g t o o n e ano the r and a n s w e r i n g o n e ano the r t h r o u g h ­

o u t m o d e r n t h o u g h t and t h r o u g h o u t its h i s tory , we f ind a dialect ical

in te rp lay and an o n t o l o g y w i t h o u t m e t a p h y s i c s : for m o d e r n t h o u g h t i s

o n e that m o v e s n o l o n g e r t o w a r d s the n e v e r - c o m p l e t e d fo rma t ion o f

Di f fe rence , b u t t o w a r d s the e v e r - t o - b e - a c c o m p l i s h e d u n v e i l i n g o f the

S a m e . N o w , such a n u n v e i l i n g i s n o t a c c o m p l i s h e d w i t h o u t the s i m u l ­

taneous appearance o f the D o u b l e , and that hiatus, minuscu le and y e t

i nv inc ib l e , w h i c h resides in the ' and ' o f retreat and re turn, o f t h o u g h t and

the u n t h o u g h t , o f the empi r i ca l and the t ranscendental , o f w h a t b e l o n g s

t o the o rde r o f pos i t iv i ty and w h a t b e l o n g s t o the o rde r o f foundat ions .

Ident i ty separated f r o m i tse l f by a distance w h i c h , in o n e sense, is inter ior

to it, bu t , in ano ther , const i tutes it, and repet i t ion w h i c h posits ident i ty

a s a d a t u m , b u t in the f o r m of distance, are w i t h o u t d o u b t a t the heart o f

that m o d e r n t h o u g h t t o w h i c h the d i s c o v e r y o f t ime has s o hast i ly been

a t t r ibuted . I n fact, i f w e l o o k a little m o r e c lose ly , w e p e r c e i v e that C l a s ­

sical t h o u g h t re la ted the poss ibi l i ty of spat ia l iz ing th ings in a table to that

p r o p e r t y possessed by p u r e representa t ive succession to recall i t se l f on the

basis of itself, to fo ld b a c k u p o n itself, and to const i tu te a s imul tane i ty on

the basis o f a c o n t i n u o u s t i m e : t ime b e c a m e the founda t ion o f space. In

m o d e r n t h o u g h t , w h a t i s r evea l ed a t the founda t ion o f the h i s to ry o f

th ings and of the h is tor ic i ty p r o p e r to m a n i s the distance c rea t ing a

v a c u u m w i t h i n the S a m e , i t i s the hiatus that disperses and r eg roups i t a t

the t w o ends o f itself. I t i s this p r o f o u n d spatial i ty that m a k e s i t possible

for m o d e r n t h o u g h t still t o c o n c e i v e o f t ime - to k n o w i t a s succession, to

p r o m i s e i t to i t se l f as fu l f i lment , o r i g i n , or re turn .

V I I I T H E A N T H R O P O L O G I C A L SLEEP

A n t h r o p o l o g y as an analy t ic o f m a n has cer ta in ly p l a y e d a cons t i tuent

ro le in m o d e r n t h o u g h t , s ince to a l a rge ex t en t we are still no t free f r o m

it. I t b e c a m e necessary a t the m o m e n t w h e n representa t ion lost the p o w e r

to de t e rmine , on its o w n and in a s ingle m o v e m e n t , the in te rp lay o f its

syntheses and analyses. I t w a s necessary for empi r i ca l syntheses to be p e r ­

f o r m e d e l s ewhe re than w i t h i n the s o v e r e i g n t y o f the ' I t h ink ' . T h e y had

to be requ i red a t p rec i se ly the po in t a t w h i c h that s o v e r e i g n t y reached its

l imi t , that is, in m a n ' s f in i tude - a f in i tude that is as m u c h that of c o n -

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341

sciousness a s that o f the l i v i n g , speak ing , l a b o u r i n g ind iv idua l . T h i s had

a l ready been fo rmu la t ed by K a n t in his Logic, w h e n to his t radi t ional

t r i l o g y o f quest ions he added an u l t imate o n e : the three cri t ical quest ions

( W h a t can I k n o w ? W h a t m u s t I do? W h a t am I p e r m i t t e d to h o p e ? )

then f o u n d themse lves referred to a four th , a n d inscr ibed, as i t w e r e ,

' t o its a c c o u n t ' : Was ist der Mensch?[$]

T h i s ques t ion , a s w e h a v e seen, runs t h r o u g h t h o u g h t f r o m the ea r ly

n ine teen th c e n t u r y : this is because i t p roduces , surrept i t ious ly and in

a d v a n c e , the confus ion o f the empi r i ca l and the t ranscendental , e v e n

t h o u g h K a n t had demons t r a t ed the d iv i s ion b e t w e e n t h e m . B y m e a n s o f

this ques t ion , a f o r m of ref lect ion w a s cons t i tu ted w h i c h i s m i x e d in its

levels and characterist ic o f m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y . T h e c o n c e r n i t has for

m a n , w h i c h i t lays c l a i m to n o t o n l y in its discourse b u t in its pa thos , the

care w i t h w h i c h i t a t tempts to def ine h i m as a l i v i n g b e i n g , an ind iv idua l

a t w o r k , o r a speak ing subject , hera ld the l o n g - a w a i t e d re turn of a h u m a n

r e i g n o n l y t o the h i g h - m i n d e d f e w ; i n fact , i t conce rns , ra ther m o r e

prosa ica l ly and less m o r a l l y , an empi r i co -c r i t i ca l redupl ica t ion by means

o f w h i c h a n a t t empt i s m a d e t o m a k e the m a n o f na ture , o f e x c h a n g e , o r

o f discourse, serve a s the founda t ion o f his o w n f ini tude. I n this F o l d , the

t ranscendental funct ion i s d o u b l e d o v e r so that i t c o v e r s w i t h its d o m i n a ­

t i ng n e t w o r k the inert , g r e y space o f e m p i r i c i t y ; inverse ly , emp i r i ca l

contents are g i v e n life, g r a d u a l l y pu l l themse lves up r igh t , and are i m m e d i ­

a te ly subsumed in a discourse w h i c h carries their t ranscendental p r e ­

s u m p t i o n in to the distance. A n d s o w e f ind p h i l o s o p h y fal l ing asleep o n c e

m o r e i n the h o l l o w o f this F o l d ; this t ime n o t the sleep o f D o g m a t i s m ,

b u t that o f A n t h r o p o l o g y . A l l empi r i ca l k n o w l e d g e , p r o v i d e d i t conce rns

m a n , can se rve as a possible ph i losophica l f ield in w h i c h the founda t ion

o f k n o w l e d g e , the def in i t ion o f its l imi ts , and, i n the end , the t ruth o f all

t ru th mus t b e d i scoverab le . T h e a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l conf igura t ion o f m o d e r n

p h i l o s o p h y consists i n d o u b l i n g o v e r d o g m a t i s m , i n d i v i d i n g i t in to t w o

different levels each l e n d i n g suppor t to and l im i t i ng the o the r : the p r e -

cri t ical analysis o f w h a t m a n i s i n his essence b e c o m e s the ana ly t ic o f

e v e r y t h i n g that can , in genera l , be presented to man ' s expe r i ence .

In o rde r to a w a k e n t h o u g h t f r o m such a s leep - so d e e p that t h o u g h t

exper iences i t p a r a d o x i c a l l y as v i g i l a n c e , so w h o l l y does i t confuse the

c i rcular i ty of a d o g m a t i s m fo lded o v e r u p o n i tse l f in o rde r to f ind a basis

for i tself w i t h i n i tse l f w i t h the ag i l i t y and a n x i e t y o f a rad ica l ly p h i l o ­

sophica l t h o u g h t - in o r d e r to recall i t to the possibili t ies of its earliest

d a w n i n g , there i s no o the r w a y than to des t roy the a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

'quadrilateral* i n its v e r y founda t ions . W e k n o w , i n a n y case, that all

efforts to t h ink afresh are in fact d i rec ted at that obs tac le : w h e t h e r i t is

a ma t t e r o f c ross ing the a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l f i e ld , t ea r ing ourse lves free f r o m

i t w i t h the he lp o f w h a t i t expresses, and r e d i s c o v e r i n g a pur i f ied o n t o l o g y

o r a radical t h o u g h t o f b e i n g ; o r w h e t h e r , re jec t ing n o t o n l y p s y c h o -

l o g i s m and h is tor ic i sm, b u t all c o n c r e t e f o r m s o f the a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l

p re jud ice , w e a t t emp t t o ques t ion afresh the l imi ts o f t h o u g h t , and t o

r e n e w con tac t i n this w a y w i t h the p ro jec t for a gene ra l c r i t ique o f

reason. Perhaps w e shou ld see the f i r s t a t t emp t a t this u p r o o t i n g o f

A n t h r o p o l o g y - t o w h i c h , no d o u b t , c o n t e m p o r a r y t h o u g h t i s ded ica ted

- i n the N i e t z s c h e a n e x p e r i e n c e : b y means o f a p h i l o l o g i c a l c r i t ique , b y

means o f a cer ta in f o r m o f b i o l o g i s m , N i e t z s c h e r ed i scove red the p o i n t

a t w h i c h m a n and G o d b e l o n g t o o n e ano ther , a t w h i c h the dea th o f the

s econd i s s y n o n y m o u s w i t h the disappearance o f the f i r s t , and a t w h i c h

the p r o m i s e o f the s u p e r m a n signifies f i r s t and fo r emos t the i m m i n e n c e

o f the dea th o f m a n . In this, N i e t z s c h e , of fer ing this future to us a s b o t h

p r o m i s e a n d task, m a r k s the th reshold b e y o n d w h i c h c o n t e m p o r a r y

p h i l p s o p h y can b e g i n t h i n k i n g aga in ; and h e w i l l n o d o u b t con t i nue for

a l o n g w h i l e to d o m i n a t e its advance . I f the d i s c o v e r y o f the R e t u r n i s

i ndeed the e n d o f p h i l o s o p h y , then the end o f m a n , for its par t , i s the

re tu rn o f the b e g i n n i n g o f p h i l o s o p h y . I t i s n o l o n g e r poss ible t o th ink

in o u r d a y o the r than in the v o i d left by m a n ' s d isappearance. F o r this v o i d

does n o t create a de f i c i ency ; i t does n o t const i tu te a lacuna that m u s t be

f i l led . I t i s n o t h i n g m o r e , and n o t h i n g less, than the u n f o l d i n g of a space

in w h i c h i t i s o n c e m o r e poss ible to th ink .

A n t h r o p o l o g y const i tutes perhaps the fundamenta l a r r a n g e m e n t that

has g o v e r n e d and con t ro l l ed the pa th o f ph i losoph ica l t h o u g h t f r o m K a n t

unt i l o u r o w n d a y . T h i s a r r a n g e m e n t i s essential, s ince i t fo rms par t o f

o u r h i s to ry ; b u t i t i s d i s in tegra t ing be fo re o u r eyes , since we are b e g i n ­

n i n g to r e c o g n i z e and d e n o u n c e in it, in a cri t ical m o d e , b o t h a fo rge t fu l -

ness of the o p e n i n g that m a d e i t poss ible and a s tubborn obs tac le s tanding

obs t ina te ly i n the w a y o f a n i m m i n e n t n e w f o r m o f t h o u g h t . T o all those

w h o still w i s h to ta lk a b o u t m a n , a b o u t his r e ign o r his l ibera t ion , to all

those w h o still ask themse lves quest ions a b o u t w h a t m a n i s in his essence,

t o all those w h o w i s h to t ake h i m as their s ta r t ing-poin t i n their

a t t empts to r each the t ruth, to all those w h o , on the o the r hand , refer all

k n o w l e d g e b a c k t o the truths o f m a n himself , t o all those w h o refuse t o

fo rma l i ze w i t h o u t a n t h r o p o l o g i z i n g , w h o refuse t o m y t h o l o g i z e w i t h o u t

d e m y s t i f y i n g , w h o refuse t o th ink w i t h o u t i m m e d i a t e l y t h i n k i n g that i t

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C H A P T E R 1 0

The Human Sciences

I T H E T H R E E F A C E S O F K N O W L E D G E

M a n ' s m o d e o f b e i n g a s cons t i tu ted i n m o d e r n t h o u g h t enables h i m t o

p l a y t w o ro les : he i s a t the same t ime a t the founda t ion o f all posi t ivi t ies

and present , in a w a y that c a n n o t e v e n be t e r m e d p r i v i l e g e d , in the e l e ­

m e n t of empi r i ca l th ings . T h i s fact - i t i s n o t a ma t t e r he re of m a n ' s

essence in genera l , bu t s i m p l y of that historical a priori w h i c h , since the

n ine teen th c e n t u r y , has s e rved as an a lmos t se l f -evident g r o u n d for o u r

t h o u g h t - this fact i s no d o u b t dec is ive in the mat te r of the status to be

a c c o r d e d t o the ' h u m a n sciences ' , t o the b o d y o f k n o w l e d g e ( t h o u g h e v e n

that w o r d is perhaps a little t o o s t rong : let us say, to be m o r e neutral still,

to the b o d y of d iscourse) that takes as its ob j ec t m a n as an empi r ica l

en t i ty .

T h e first t h ing to be o b s e r v e d i s that the h u m a n sciences d id no t inher i t

a cer ta in d o m a i n , a l r eady ou t l ined , perhaps s u r v e y e d as a w h o l e , bu t

a l l o w e d to lie f a l l o w , w h i c h i t w a s then their task to e labora te w i t h

pos i t ive m e t h o d s and w i t h concep t s that had a t last b e c o m e scientific; the

e igh teen th c e n t u r y d id n o t hand d o w n t o t h e m , i n the n a m e o f m a n o r

h u m a n nature , a space, c i r cumscr ibed on the outs ide b u t still e m p t y ,

w h i c h i t w a s then their ro l e t o c o v e r and ana lyse . T h e ep i s t emo log i ca l

f i e l d t raversed b y the h u m a n sciences w a s no t laid d o w n i n a d v a n c e : n o

p h i l o s o p h y , n o pol i t i ca l o r m o r a l o p t i o n , n o empi r i ca l sc ience o f a n y

k ind , n o obse rva t i on o f the h u m a n b o d y , n o analysis o f sensat ion,

imag ina t i on , o r the passions, had e v e r encoun te r ed , in the seven teen th o r

e igh teen th cen tu ry , a n y t h i n g l ike m a n ; for m a n d id n o t exis t (any m o r e

than life, o r l a n g u a g e , o r l a b o u r ) ; and the h u m a n sciences d id n o t appear

w h e n , as a result o f s o m e press ing ra t ional i sm, s o m e un re so lved scientific

p r o b l e m , s o m e pract ica l c o n c e r n , i t w a s dec ided t o inc lude m a n ( w i l l y -

n i l ly , and w i t h a grea te r o r lesser d e g r e e o f success) a m o n g the objects o f

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T H E H U M A N S C I E N C E S

science - a m o n g w h i c h i t has perhaps no t been p r o v e d e v e n y e t that i t i s

abso lu te ly poss ible t o class h i m ; t hey appeared w h e n m a n const i tu ted h i m ­

se l f i n W e s t e r n cu l ture a s b o t h that w h i c h m u s t be c o n c e i v e d o f and that

w h i c h i s t o be k n o w n . T h e r e can be no d o u b t , cer ta in ly , that the his tor ical

e m e r g e n c e o f each o n e o f the h u m a n sciences w a s occas ioned b y a

p r o b l e m , a r equ i r emen t , an obs tac le of a theore t ica l or pract ica l o r d e r :

the n e w n o r m s i m p o s e d b y industrial soc ie ty u p o n indiv iduals w e r e c e r ­

ta in ly necessary before p s y c h o l o g y , s l o w l y , i n the course o f the n i n e ­

teenth cen tu ry , c o u l d const i tu te i tself as a sc ience ; and the threats that ,

s ince the French R e v o l u t i o n , h a v e w e i g h e d so h e a v i l y on the social

balances, and e v e n on the e q u i l i b r i u m established by the bou rgeo i s i e ,

w e r e no d o u b t also necessary before a ref lect ion o f the soc io log ica l t y p e

c o u l d appear . B u t t h o u g h these references m a y w e l l exp la in w h y i t w a s

in fact in such and such a de t e rmined set of c i rcumstances and in a n s w e r

to such and such a precise ques t ion that these sciences w e r e ar t iculated,

never theless , their intrinsic possibi l i ty , the s imple fact that m a n , w h e t h e r

in isolat ion or as a g r o u p , and for the first t ime since h u m a n be ings h a v e

exis ted and h a v e l i ved t oge the r in societies, shou ld h a v e b e c o m e the o b j e c t

o f sc ience - that c anno t be cons idered or t reated as a p h e n o m e n o n of

o p i n i o n : i t i s an e v e n t in the o rde r o f k n o w l e d g e .

A n d this e v e n t w a s i tself p r o d u c e d in a genera l redis t r ibut ion o f the

cpisteme: w h e n , a b a n d o n i n g the space o f representat ion, l i v i n g be ings t o o k

up their places in the specific depths o f life, w e a l t h in the o n w a r d thrust

o f n e w fo rms o f p r o d u c t i o n , and w o r d s i n the d e v e l o p m e n t o f l anguages .

I t w a s indeed necessary, g i v e n these cond i t ions , that the k n o w l e d g e o f

m a n shou ld appear , in its scientific a ims, as c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s and of the

s a m e o r ig in as b i o l o g y , e c o n o m i c s , and p h i l o l o g y , so that i t has been

v i e w e d , qu i te na tura l ly , a s o n e o f the m o s t dec is ive f o r w a r d steps m a d e

i n the h i s tory o f E u r o p e a n cu l tu re b y empi r i ca l ra t ional i ty . B u t s ince the

genera l t h e o r y o f representat ion w a s d isappear ing a t the same t ime , and

the necessi ty o f i n t e r roga t ing m a n ' s b e i n g a s the founda t ion o f all pos i t i v i -

ties w a s i m p o s i n g i tself in its p lace , an i m b a l a n c e c o u l d n o t fail to o c c u r :

m a n b e c a m e that u p o n the basis o f w h i c h all k n o w l e d g e c o u l d b e c o n ­

stituted as i m m e d i a t e and n o n - p r o b l e m a t i z e d e v i d e n c e ; he b e c a m e , a

fortiori, that w h i c h jus t i f ied the ca l l ing in to ques t ion o f all k n o w l e d g e o f

m a n . H e n c e that d o u b l e and inev i tab le con tes ta t ion : that w h i c h lies a t the

r o o t o f the perpe tua l c o n t r o v e r s y b e t w e e n the sciences o f m a n and the

sciences p r o p e r - the first l a y i n g an inv inc ib le c l a i m to be the founda t ion

o f the second , w h i c h are ceaselessly o b l i g e d i n turn t o seek their o w n

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T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

346

founda t ion , the jus t i f ica t ion o f their m e t h o d , and the pur i f ica t ion o f their

h is tory , in the tee th o f ' p s y c h o l o g i s m ' , ' s o c i o l o g i s m ' , and ' h i s to r i c i sm ' ;

and that w h i c h lies a t the r o o t o f the endless c o n t r o v e r s y b e t w e e n p h i l o ­

s o p h y , w h i c h objec ts t o the naivet£ w i t h w h i c h the h u m a n sciences t ry t o

p r o v i d e their o w n founda t i on , and those same h u m a n sciences w h i c h

c l a i m a s their r igh t fu l ob j ec t w h a t w o u l d f o r m e r l y h a v e cons t i tu ted the

d o m a i n o f p h i l o s o p h y .

B u t the fact that all these obse rva t ions mus t be m a d e does n o t neces ­

sari ly m e a n that their d e v e l o p m e n t occu r s w i t h i n the e l e m e n t o f p u r e

con t r ad i c t i on ; their ex i s tence , and their un t i r ing repet i t ion fo r m o r e than

a cen tu ry , do n o t indicate the p e r m a n e n c e o f an e v e r - o p e n ques t ion ; t h e y

refer b a c k to . a precise and e x t r e m e l y w e l l - d e t e r m i n e d ep i s t emo log i ca l

a r r a n g e m e n t i n h i s to ry . I n the Classical pe r iod , the f i e l d o f k n o w l e d g e ,

f r o m the p ro jec t o f a n analysis o f representat ion t o the t h e m e o f the

mathesis universalis, w a s pe r fec t ly h o m o g e n e o u s : all k n o w l e d g e , o f w h a t ­

e v e r k i n d , p r o c e e d e d t o the o r d e r i n g o f its mate r ia l b y the es tabl ishment

o f differences and def ined those differences b y the es tabl ishment o f a n

o rde r ; this w a s t rue fo r ma themat i c s , t rue also for taxonomies (in the b r o a d

sense) a n d for the sciences o f na ture ; b u t i t w a s e q u a l l y t rue for all those

a p p r o x i m a t i v e , imper fec t , and l a r g e l y spon taneous k inds o f k n o w l e d g e

w h i c h are b r o u g h t in to p l a y i n the cons t ruc t ion o f the least f r a g m e n t o f

d iscourse o r i n the d a i l y processes o f e x c h a n g e ; a n d i t w a s t rue, f i na l l y ,

for ph i losoph ica l t h o u g h t and for those l o n g chains o f o r d e r that the

' I d e o l o g u e s ' , no less than Descar tes o r S p i n o z a , t h o u g h in a different w a y ,

a t t emp ted to establish in o r d e r to create a pa th l ead ing necessar i ly f r o m the

v e r y s implest and m o s t e v i d e n t o f ideas t o the m o s t c o m p o s i t e truths.

B u t , f r o m the n ine teen th c e n t u r y , the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l f i e l d b e c a m e f r ag ­

m e n t e d , or rather e x p l o d e d in different d i rec t ions . I t i s difficult to escape

the p r e - e m i n e n c e o f l inear classifications and hierarchies i n the m a n n e r o f

C o m t e ; b u t t o seek t o a l ign all the branches o f m o d e r n k n o w l e d g e o n the

basis o f ma thema t i c s i s t o subject t o the s ingle p o i n t o f v i e w o f o b j e c t i v i t y

i n k n o w l e d g e the ques t ion o f the pos i t i v i t y o f each b r a n c h o f k n o w l e d g e ,

o f its m o d e o f b e i n g , and its roo t s i n those cond i t i ons o f poss ib i l i ty that

g i v e it, in h i s tory , b o t h its o b j e c t and its f o r m .

Q u e s t i o n e d a t this a r c h a e o l o g i c a l l eve l , the f i e ld o f the m o d e r n episteme

i s n o t o r d e r e d in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the ideal of a per fec t ma thema t i c i za t i on ,

n o r does i t un fo ld , on the basis of a f o r m a l pu r i t y , a l o n g , de scend ing

sequence o f k n o w l e d g e p r o g r e s s i v e l y m o r e b u r d e n e d w i t h emp i r i c i t y .

T h e d o m a i n of the m o d e r n episteme shou ld be represented ra ther as a

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v o l u m e o f space o p e n i n three d imens ions . I n o n e o f these w e w o u l d

situate the ma thema t i ca l and phys ica l sciences, for w h i c h o rde r i s a l w a y s

a d e d u c t i v e and linear l i n k i n g t oge the r o f e v i d e n t o r ve r i f i ed p ropos i t ions ;

in a second d i m e n s i o n there w o u l d be the sciences (such as those of l an ­

g u a g e , life, and the p r o d u c t i o n and d is t r ibu t ion o f w e a l t h ) that p r o c e e d

by re la t ing d i scon t inuous bu t a n a l o g o u s e lements in such a w a y that t h e y

are then able to establish causal relat ions and structural constants b e t w e e n

t h e m . T h e s e first t w o d imens ions t oge the r def ine a c o m m o n p lane : that

w h i c h can appear , a c c o r d i n g to the d i r ec t ion in w h i c h o n e traverses it,

a s a f i e ld o f app l ica t ion of ma thema t i c s to these empi r i ca l sciences, o r as

the d o m a i n o f the m a t h e m a t i c i z a b l e i n l inguist ics , b i o l o g y , and e c o ­

n o m i c s . T h e th i rd d i m e n s i o n w o u l d b e that o f ph i losoph ica l ref lect ion,

w h i c h d e v e l o p s as a t h o u g h t o f the S a m e ; i t f o r m s a c o m m o n p lane w i t h

the d imens ion o f l inguist ics , b i o l o g y , and e c o n o m i c s : i t i s here that w e

m a y mee t , and indeed h a v e me t , the va r ious ph i losoph ies o f life, o f a l i en ­

a ted m a n , o f s y m b o l i c a l fo rms ( w h e n concep t s and p r o b l e m s that f i r s t

arose in different empi r i ca l d o m a i n s are t ransposed in to the ph i losoph ica l

d i m e n s i o n ) ; b u t w e h a v e also e n c o u n t e r e d here , i f w e ques t ion the

founda t ion o f these empir ic i t ies f r o m a rad ica l ly ph i losoph ica l p o i n t o f

v i e w , those r e g i o n a l o n t o l o g i e s w h i c h a t t e m p t t o define w h a t life, l abour ,

and l a n g u a g e are i n their o w n b e i n g ; lastly, the ph i losoph ica l d i m e n s i o n

and that o f the ma thema t i ca l disciplines c o m b i n e t o define ano the r

c o m m o n p lane : that o f the fo rma l i za t ion o f t h o u g h t .

F r o m this e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l t r ihedron the h u m a n sciences are e x c l u d e d ,

a t least in the sense that t h e y c a n n o t be f o u n d a l o n g a n y of its d imens ions

o r o n the surface o f a n y o f the planes thus def ined . B u t o n e can e q u a l l y

w e l l say that t h e y are inc luded in it, s ince i t i s in the interstices of these

branches o f k n o w l e d g e , or , m o r e e x a c t l y , i n the v o l u m e def ined b y their

three d imens ions , that the h u m a n sciences h a v e their p lace . T h i s s i tuat ion

(in o n e sense m i n o r , in ano the r sense p r i v i l e g e d ) places t h e m in re la t ion to

all the o the r f o r m s o f k n o w l e d g e : t h e y h a v e the m o r e o r less deferred,

b u t constant , a i m o f g i v i n g themse lves , o r i n a n y case o f u t i l i z ing , a t o n e

l eve l o r another , a ma thema t i ca l f o rma l i za t i on ; t h e y p r o c e e d in a c c o r d ­

ance w i t h m o d e l s o r concep t s b o r r o w e d f r o m b i o l o g y , e c o n o m i c s , and

the sciences o f l a n g u a g e ; a n d t h e y address themse lves t o that m o d e o f

b e i n g o f m a n w h i c h p h i l o s o p h y i s a t t e m p t i n g t o c o n c e i v e a t the l e v e l o f

radical f in i tude, w h e r e a s their a i m is to t raverse all its empi r i ca l m a n i ­

festations. I t is perhaps this c l o u d y d is t r ibut ion w i t h i n a th ree -d imens iona l

space that renders the h u m a n sciences so difficult to situate, that g i v e s their

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

loca l iza t ion in the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l d o m a i n its i r reduc ib le precar iousness ,

that m a k e s t h e m appear a t o n c e per i lous and in per i l . Pe r i l ous , because

t h e y represent , as i t w e r e , a p e r m a n e n t d a n g e r to all the o the r branches

o f k n o w l e d g e : t rue, ne i ther the d e d u c t i v e sciences, n o r the empi r i ca l

sciences, n o r ph i losoph ica l ref lect ion run a n y risk, i f they r ema in w i t h i n

their o w n d imens ions , o f ' d e f e c t i n g ' t o the h u m a n sciences, o r o f b e i n g

con t amina t ed b y their i m p u r i t y ; b u t w e k n o w w h a t difficulties m a y b e

encoun te r ed , a t t imes , in the es tabl ishing of those i n t e rmed ia ry planes that

l ink t o g e t h e r the three d imens ions o f the ep i s t emo log i ca l space; for the

sl ightest dev i a t i on f r o m these r i g o r o u s l y def ined planes sends t h o u g h t

t u m b l i n g o v e r in to the d o m a i n o c c u p i e d b y the h u m a n sciences: h e n c e

the d a n g e r o f ' p s y c h o l o g i s m ' , o f ' s o c i o l o g i s m ' , - o f w h a t w e m i g h t t e r m ,

in a w o r d , ' a n t h r o p o l o g i s m ' - w h i c h b e c o m e s a threat as s o o n as the re la ­

t ions o f t h o u g h t t o fo rmal iza t ion are n o t reflected u p o n co r rec t ly , for

e x a m p l e , o r a s s o o n a s the m o d e s o f b e i n g o f l ife, l abour , and l a n g u a g e

are incor rec t ly ana lysed . ' A n t h r o p o l o g i z a t i o n ' i s the g rea t internal threat

t o k n o w l e d g e i n o u r d a y . W e are inc l ined t o b e l i e v e tha t m a n has

emanc ipa t ed h i m s e l f f r o m h i m s e l f since his d i s c o v e r y tha t he i s n o t a t

the cent re o f c rea t ion , n o r i n the m i d d l e o f space, n o r e v e n , perhaps , the

s u m m i t and c u l m i n a t i o n o f l i fe ; b u t t h o u g h m a n i s n o l o n g e r s o v e r e i g n

i n the k i n g d o m o f the w o r l d , t h o u g h h e n o l o n g e r re igns a t the cent re o f

be ing , the ' h u m a n sciences ' are dange rous in termediar ies i n the space o f

k n o w l e d g e . T h e t ru th o f the mat t e r is, h o w e v e r , that this v e r y pos tu re

d o o m s t h e m t o a n essential instabi l i ty. W h a t exp la ins the difficulty o f the

' h u m a n sciences ' , their precar iousness , their uncer ta in ty as sciences, their

dange rous fami l ia r i ty w i t h p h i l o s o p h y , their i l l -def ined re l iance u p o n

o the r d o m a i n s o f k n o w l e d g e , their pe rpe tua l ly s econda ry and d e r i v e d

character , and also their c l a i m to universa l i ty , is n o t , as is of ten stated, the

e x t r e m e densi ty o f their ob j ec t ; i t i s n o t the me taphys i ca l status o r the

inerasable t ranscendence o f this m a n t h e y speak of, bu t ra ther the c o m ­

p l e x i t y o f the ep i s t emo log i ca l con f igu ra t i on i n w h i c h t h e y f ind t h e m ­

selves p laced , their cons tant re la t ion to the three d imens ions that g i v e

t h e m their space.

I I T H E F O R M O F T H E H U M A N S C I E N C E S

W e mus t n o w ske tch o u t the f o r m o f this pos i t i v i ty . U s u a l l y , the a t t emp t

i s m a d e to define i t in t e rms o f m a t h e m a t i c s : e i ther by t r y i n g to b r i n g i t

a s near t o ma themat i c s a s possible , by d r a w i n g up an i n v e n t o r y o f e v e r y -

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th ing in the sciences of m a n that i s m a t h c m a t i c i z a b l e , and suppos ing that

e v e r y t h i n g that i s n o t suscept ible of such a fo rma l i za t ion has n o t y e t

a t ta ined to scientific pos i t i v i ty ; o r , on the con t r a ry , by t r y i n g to dis t in­

gu i sh v e r y careful ly b e t w e e n the d o m a i n o f the ma thema t i c i zab l e and

that o the r d o m a i n w h i c h i s r ega rded as i r reduc ib le to the fo rmer because

i t i s the locus of interpreta t ion, because the m e t h o d s appl ied to i t are

a b o v e all those o f c o m p r e h e n s i o n , because i t f inds i tself w o u n d a r o u n d

the cl inical p o l e o f k n o w l e d g e . S u c h analyses are w e a r i s o m e n o t o n l y

because t h e y are h a c k n e y e d but , a b o v e all, because t h e y lack r e l evance .

C e r t a i n l y there can b e n o d o u b t that this f o r m o f empi r i ca l k n o w l e d g e

w h i c h i s appl icable t o m a n (and w h i c h , i n o r d e r t o c o n f o r m to c o n ­

v e n t i o n , w e m a y still t e r m ' h u m a n sciences ' e v e n before w e k n o w i n

w h a t sense and w i t h i n w h a t l imi ts t h e y can be ca l led ' sciences ' ) has a

re la t ion t o ma thema t i c s : l ike a n y o the r d o m a i n o f k n o w l e d g e , these

sciences m a y , in cer ta in cond i t ions , m a k e use of ma themat i c s as a t o o l ;

s o m e o f their p rocedures and a cer tain n u m b e r o f their results can be

fo rma l i zed . I t i s u n d o u b t e d l y o f the greatest i m p o r t a n c e to k n o w those

tools , to be ab le to practise those fo rmal iza t ions and to define the levels

u p o n w h i c h t h e y can b e p e r f o r m e d ; i t i s n o d o u b t o f interest h is tor ica l ly

t o k n o w h o w C o n d o r c e t w a s able t o a p p l y the ca lcu la t ion o f probabi l i t ies

t o pol i t ics , h o w Fechner def ined the l o g a r i t h m i c re la t ion b e t w e e n the

g r o w t h o f sensation and that o f exc i t a t ion , h o w c o n t e m p o r a r y p s y c h o ­

logis ts m a k e use o f i n fo rma t ion t h e o r y i n o rde r t o unders tand the p h e n o ­

m e n a o f l ea rn ing . B u t despite the specif ic i ty o f the p r o b l e m s posed , i t i s

u n l i k e l y that the relat ion t o ma themat i c s (the possibili t ies o f m a t h e -

ma t i c i za t ion , or the resistance to all efforts at f o rma l i za t ion ) is cons t i tu t ive

o f the h u m a n sciences i n their par t icular pos i t iv i ty . A n d fo r t w o reasons:

because , essential ly, t h e y share these p r o b l e m s w i t h m a n y o the r d i sc ip ­

lines (such as b i o l o g y and gene t ics ) e v e n i f these p r o b l e m s are no t a l w a y s

ident ica l ; and, a b o v e all , because a r chaeo log i ca l analysis has no t r evea led ,

i n the historical a priori o f the h u m a n sciences, a n y n e w f o r m o f m a t h e ­

mat ics , o r a n y sudden a d v a n c e b y ma thema t i c s in to the d o m a i n o f the

h u m a n , bu t ra ther a sort o f retreat o f the mathesis , a dissociat ion of its

un i ta ry f ield, and the emanc ipa t i on , in re la t ion to the l inear o rde r o f the

smallest possible differences, of empi r i ca l o rgan iza t ions such as life, l an ­

g u a g e , and l abou r . I n this sense, the appearance o f m a n and the c o n ­

st i tut ion o f the h u m a n sciences (even i f i t w e r e o n l y i n the f o r m o f a

p ro jec t ) w o u l d be cor re la ted to a sort o f ' d e - m a t h e m a t i c i z a t i o n ' . I t m a y

w e l l b e ob jec ted that this dissociat ion o f a b o d y o f k n o w l e d g e c o n c e i v e d

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in its ent i re ty as mathesis w a s n o t in fact a recession on the par t of m a t h e ­

mat ics , for the v e r y g o o d reason that the k n o w l e d g e i n ques t ion h a d

n e v e r l ed (excep t i n the case o f a s t r o n o m y and cer tain areas o f phys ics ) t o

an effective m a t h e m a t i c i z a t i o n ; rather, by d isappear ing , i t left na ture a n d

the ent ire f ield o f empir ic i t ies free for an appl ica t ion , l imi t ed and c o n ­

t ro l led m o m e n t b y m o m e n t , o f m a t h e m a t i c s ; for d o n o t the first g rea t

advances o f m a t h e m a t i c a l phys ics , the first mass ive ut i l izat ions o f the

ca lcu la t ion o f probabi l i t ies , date f r o m the t i m e w h e n the a t t emp t a t a n

i m m e d i a t e cons t i tu t ion o f a genera l sc ience o f non-quan t i f i ab le orders w a s

a b a n d o n e d ? I t c a n n o t rea l ly be den ied that the r enunc ia t ion of a mathesis

(p rov i s iona l ly a t least) m a d e i t possible , i n cer tain d o m a i n s o f k n o w l e d g e ,

t o r e m o v e the obs tac le o f qua l i ty , and t o a p p l y m a t h e m a t i c a l tools w h e r e

t hey h a d been unab le t o penetra te h i the r to . B u t if, o n the l e v e l o f phys ics ,

the dissocia t ion of the p ro j ec t to create a mathesis c a m e to e x a c t l y the

same t h i n g a s the d i s c o v e r y o f n e w appl icat ions for ma themat i c s , this w a s

n o t s o i n all the d o m a i n s o f k n o w l e d g e : b i o l o g y , for e x a m p l e , w a s c o n ­

sti tuted, outs ide a science of qual i ta t ive orders , as an analysis of the re la ­

t ions b e t w e e n o r g a n s and funct ions , as a s tudy of s tructures and balances,

a s research in to their f o r m a t i o n and d e v e l o p m e n t in the h i s to ry o f i n ­

d iv iduals o r species; all o f this d id n o t p r e v e n t b i o l o g y f r o m m a k i n g use

o f ma themat i c s , o r the latter f r o m b e i n g m u c h m o r e b r o a d l y appl icable t o

b i o l o g y than i t h a d been in the past. B u t i t i s n o t in its re la t ion to m a t h e ­

mat ics that b i o l o g y acqu i red its a u t o n o m y and def ined its par t icular

pos i t iv i ty . A n d the same w a s true for the h u m a n sciences: i t w a s the

retreat o f the mathesis , and n o t the a d v a n c e o f ma thema t i c s , that m a d e i t

possible for m a n t o const i tu te h i m s e l f a s an ob jec t o f k n o w l e d g e ; i t w a s

the i n v o l u t i o n o f l abour , l ife, and l a n g u a g e u p o n themse lves that de te r ­

m i n e d the appearance o f this n e w d o m a i n o f k n o w l e d g e f r o m outs ide ;

and i t w a s the appearance o f that empi r ico- t ranscenden ta l b e i n g , o f that

b e i n g w h o s e t h o u g h t i s cons tan t ly i n t e r w o v e n w i t h the u n t h o u g h t , o f

that b e i n g a l w a y s cu t o f f f r o m an o r i g i n w h i c h i s p r o m i s e d t o h i m in the

i m m e d i a c y o f the re turn - i t w a s this appearance that g a v e the h u m a n

sciences their par t icular f o r m . H e r e aga in , as w i t h o the r discipl ines, i t i s

v e r y poss ible that the app l ica t ion o f ma thema t i c s w a s facil i tated (and i s

inc reas ing ly so) by all the modi f ica t ions that o c c u r r e d i n W e s t e r n k n o w ­

l e d g e a t the b e g i n n i n g o f the n ine teen th c e n t u r y . B u t t o i m a g i n e that the

h u m a n sciences def ined their m o s t radical p ro jec t and inaugura t ed their

pos i t ive h i s to ry w h e n i t w a s dec ided t o a p p l y the ca lcu la t ion o f p r o b ­

abilities t o the p h e n o m e n a o f pol i t ica l o p i n i o n , and t o e m p l o y l oga r i t hms

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as a means o f m e a s u r i n g the increase o f intensi ty in sensations, that w o u l d

be to take a superficial counter -ef fec t for the fundamenta l even t .

I n o the r w o r d s , o f the three d imens ions that p r o v i d e the h u m a n sciences

w i t h their par t icular space and p r o d u c e the v o l u m e i n w h i c h those

sciences exist as a mass, that of ma thema t i c s is perhaps the least p r o b ­

lemat ica l ; i t i s w i t h ma thema t i c s , in a n y case, that the h u m a n sciences

main ta in the clearest , the m o s t un t roub led , and, as i t w e r e , the m o s t

transparent, re la t ions: indeed , the recourse to mathemat ics , in o n e f o r m

o r another , has a l w a y s been the s imples t w a y o f p r o v i d i n g pos i t ive k n o w ­

l e d g e a b o u t m a n w i t h a scientific s ty le , f o r m , and jus t i f ica t ion. O n the

o t h e r hand , the m o s t fundamenta l difficulties, those that m a k e i t poss ible

to define m o s t c l ea r ly w h a t the h u m a n sciences are in their essence, are

si tuated i n the d i rec t ion o f the t w o o the r d imens ions o f k n o w l e d g e : that

i n w h i c h the ana ly t i c o f f in i tude i s d e p l o y e d , and that a l o n g w h i c h are

d is t r ibuted the empi r i ca l sciences w h i c h h a v e as their objects l a n g u a g e ,

life, and l abou r .

In fact, the h u m a n sciences are addressed to m a n in so far as he l ives ,

speaks, and p r o d u c e s . I t is as a l i v i n g b e i n g that he g r o w s , that he has

funct ions and needs , that he sees o p e n i n g up a space w h o s e m o v a b l e

coord ina tes m e e t in h i m ; in a gene ra l fashion, his co rporea l ex is tence

interlaces h i m t h r o u g h and t h r o u g h w i t h the rest o f the l i v i n g w o r l d ;

since he p r o d u c e s objects and too ls , e x c h a n g e s the th ings he needs ,

o rgan i ze s a w h o l e n e t w o r k o f c i rcu la t ion a l o n g w h i c h w h a t h e i s ab le t o

c o n s u m e f lows , and in w h i c h he h i m s e l f i s def ined as an in t e rmed ia ry

s tage, he appears in his exis tence i m m e d i a t e l y i n t e r w o v e n w i t h o thers ;

last ly, because he has a l a n g u a g e , he can const i tu te a w h o l e s y m b o l i c

un iverse for himself , w i t h i n w h i c h he has a re la t ion to his past, to th ings ,

t o o the r m e n , and on the basis o f w h i c h he i s ab le equa l ly t o bu i ld s o m e ­

t h i n g l ike a b o d y o f k n o w l e d g e (in par t icular , that k n o w l e d g e o f himself ,

o f w h i c h the h u m a n sciences ou t l ine o n e o f the possible fo rms ) . T h e site

o f the sciences o f m a n m a y therefore b e f i x e d i n the v i c i n i t y , o n the

i m m e d i a t e frontiers , and a l o n g the w h o l e l e n g t h o f those sciences that

deal w i t h life, l abour , and l a n g u a g e . W e r e t h e y n o t f o r m e d , after al l , a t

prec ise ly that p e r i o d w h e n , for the f i r s t t ime , m a n offered h i m s e l f t o the

poss ibi l i ty o f a pos i t ive k n o w l e d g e ? Neve r the l e s s , b i o l o g y , e c o n o m i c s ,

and p h i l o l o g y mus t n o t be r e g a r d e d a s the f i r s t h u m a n sciences, o r the

m o s t fundamenta l . T h i s i s easily r e c o g n i z e d in the case o f b i o l o g y , since

i t i s addressed to m a n y o the r l i v i n g be ings besides m a n ; b u t i t i s m o r e

difficult t o accep t in the cases o f e c o n o m i c s and p h i l o l o g y , w h i c h h a v e a s

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their par t icular and exc lu s ive d o m a i n act ivi t ies that are specific to m a n .

B u t w e d o no t ask ourse lves w h y h u m a n b i o l o g y o r p h y s i o l o g y , w h y the

a n a t o m y o f the cor t ica l centres o f l a n g u a g e , c a n n o t i n a n y w a y b e c o n ­

sidered as sciences of m a n . T h i s i s because the ob jec t of those sciences i s

n e v e r pos i ted i n the m o d e o f b e i n g o f a b i o l o g i c a l funct ion (or e v e n i n

that of its par t icular f o r m , and , as i t w e r e , its ex tens ion in to m a n ) ; i t i s

ra ther its reverse , o r the h o l l o w i t w o u l d l eave ; i t beg ins a t the po in t , n o t

w h e r e the ac t ion o r the effects s top , b u t w h e r e that funct ion 's o w n b e i n g

stops - at that p o i n t w h e r e representat ions are set free, t rue or false, c lear

o r obscure , pe r fec t ly consc ious o r r o o t e d in s o m e d e e p sleep, obse rvab l e

d i rec t ly o r ind i rec t ly , p resented w i t h i n w h a t m a n h i m s e l f expresses, o r

d i scove rab le o n l y f r o m the ou ts ide ; research in to the int racor t ical c o n ­

nec t ions b e t w e e n the different centres o f l inguist ic in tegra t ion (audi t ive ,

v isual , m o t o r ) i s n o t the p r o v i n c e o f the h u m a n sciences; bu t those

sciences w i l l f ind their f ield o f ac t ion a s soon a s we ques t ion that space o f

w o r d s , that presence o r that forgetfulncss o f their m e a n i n g , that hiatus

b e t w e e n w h a t o n e wishes to say and the ar t icula t ion in w h i c h that a i m i s

inves ted , w h o s e subject m a y no t b e consc ious , bu t w h i c h w o u l d h a v e n o

assignable m o d e o f b e i n g i f that subject d id n o t h a v e representat ions.

In a m o r e genera l fashion, m a n for the h u m a n sciences is no t that l i v i n g

b e i n g w i t h a v e r y par t icular f o r m (a s o m e w h a t special p h y s i o l o g y and an

a lmos t un ique a u t o n o m y ) ; he i s that l i v i n g b e i n g w h o , f r o m w i t h i n the

life to w h i c h he ent i re ly b e l o n g s and by w h i c h he i s t raversed in his

w h o l e b e i n g , const i tutes representat ions b y means o f w h i c h h e l ives , and

o n the basis o f w h i c h h e possesses that s t range capac i ty o f b e i n g able t o

represent t o h i m s e l f prec ise ly that l ife. S imi l a r ly , e v e n t h o u g h m a n is, i f

no t the o n l y species in the w o r l d that w o r k s , a t least the o n e in w h o m the

p r o d u c t i o n , d is t r ibut ion, and c o n s u m p t i o n o f g o o d s h a v e taken o n s o

g rea t an i m p o r t a n c e and acqu i red so m a n y and such differentiated fo rms ,

e c o n o m i c s is still n o t a h u m a n science. I t m a y perhaps be ob jec ted that in

o rde r to define certain l a w s , e v e n t h o u g h they are inter ior to the mechan ics

o f p r o d u c t i o n (such a s the a c c u m u l a t i o n o f capi ta l o r the relat ions b e ­

t w e e n w a g e rates and pr ices) , e c o n o m i c s has recourse t o h u m a n b e h a v i o u r

pat terns and a representa t ion that p r o v i d e its f ounda t ion (interest, the

search for m a x i m u m prof i t , the t endency to a c c u m u l a t e s a v i n g s ) ; bu t , i n

d o i n g so , i t i s u t i l i z ing representat ions as the requisi te of a func t ion ( w h i c h

occu r s , i n effect, w i t h i n an exp l i c i t l y h u m a n a c t i v i t y ) ; on the o the r hand ,

there w i l l b e n o science o f m a n unless w e e x a m i n e the w a y i n w h i c h

ind iv idua ls o r g r o u p s represent t o themse lves the par tners w i t h w h o m

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they p r o d u c e o r e x c h a n g e , the m o d e i n w h i c h t hey clar i fy o r i g n o r e o r

m a s k this func t ion and the pos i t ion t h e y o c c u p y in it, the m a n n e r in

w h i c h t h e y represent to themse lves the soc ie ty in w h i c h i t takes p lace , the

w a y in w h i c h t h e y feel themse lves in tegra ted w i t h i t o r isolated f r o m it,

dependen t , subject , o r free; the ob jec t o f the h u m a n sciences i s n o t that

m a n w h o , s ince the d a w n o f the w o r l d , o r the first c r y o f his g o l d e n age ,

i s d o o m e d t o w o r k ; i t i s that b e i n g w h o , f r o m w i t h i n the fo rms o f p r o ­

duc t i on by w h i c h his w h o l e ex is tence i s g o v e r n e d , f o r m s the representa­

t ion o f those needs , o f the soc ie ty b y w h i c h , w i t h w h i c h , o r against w h i c h

he satisfies t h e m , so that u p o n that basis he can f ina l ly p r o v i d e h i m s e l f

w i t h a representa t ion o f e c o n o m i c s itself. T h e same i s t rue o f l a n g u a g e :

a l t h o u g h m a n i s the o n l y b e i n g i n the w o r l d w h o speaks, i n q u i r y in to

phone t i c muta t ions , relat ionships b e t w e e n l anguages , and semant ic shifts,

does no t cons t i tu te a h u m a n sc ience; on the o the r hand , i t w i l l be poss ible

t o speak o f h u m a n science w h e n an a t t emp t i s m a d e t o def ine the w a y i n

w h i c h ind iv idua ls o r g r o u p s represent w o r d s t o themse lves , u t i l ize their

fo rms and their m e a n i n g s , c o m p o s e real d iscourse , r evea l and c o n c e a l in i t

w h a t t hey are t h i n k i n g o r s ay ing , perhaps u n k n o w n t o themse lves , m o r e

o r less than t h e y w i s h , b u t in a n y case l e a v e a mass o f ve rba l traces o f

those though t s , w h i c h m u s t be dec iphe red a n d res tored as far as poss ible

t o their representa t ive v i v a c i t y . T h e ob jec t o f the h u m a n sciences i s n o t

l a n g u a g e ( t h o u g h i t i s s p o k e n by m e n a l o n e ) ; i t i s that b e i n g w h i c h , f r o m

the inter ior o f the l a n g u a g e b y w h i c h h e i s su r rounded , represents t o

himself , by speak ing , the sense o f the w o r d s o r p ropos i t ions he utters, and

f ina l ly p r o v i d e s h i m s e l f w i t h a representat ion o f l a n g u a g e itself.

T h e h u m a n sciences are no t , then , a n analysis o f w h a t m a n i s b y na ture ;

b u t ra ther an analysis that ex tends f r o m w h a t m a n i s in his p o s i t i v i t y

( l iv ing , speak ing , l a b o u r i n g b e i n g ) t o w h a t enables this same b e i n g t o

k n o w (or seek t o k n o w ) w h a t life is, i n w h a t the essence o f l a b o u r and

its l a w s consist , and in w h a t w a y he i s ab le t o speak. T h e h u m a n sciences

thus o c c u p y the distance that separates ( t h o u g h n o t w i t h o u t c o n n e c t i n g

t h e m ) b i o l o g y , e c o n o m i c s , and p h i l o l o g y f r o m that w h i c h g i v e s t h e m

poss ib i l i ty i n the v e r y b e i n g o f m a n . I t w o u l d therefore b e w r o n g t o see

the h u m a n sciences as an ex tens ion , in te r io r ized w i t h i n the h u m a n species,

w i t h i n its c o m p l e x o r g a n i s m , w i t h i n its b e h a v i o u r and consciousness , o f

b i o l o g i c a l m e c h a n i s m s ; and i t w o u l d b e n o less w r o n g t o p lace w i t h i n the

h u m a n sciences the science o f e c o n o m i c s o r the science o f l a n g u a g e

( w h o s e i r reduc ib i l i ty to the h u m a n sciences is expressed in the effort to

const i tu te a p u r e e c o n o m i c s a n d a p u r e l inguis t ics) . In fact, the h u m a n

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sciences are no m o r e w i t h i n these sciences than t h e y g i v e t h e m infer ior i ty

b y def lect ing t h e m t o w a r d s m a n ' s sub jec t iv i ty ; i f t h e y take t h e m u p aga in

i n the d i m e n s i o n o f representa t ion, i t i s ra ther by r e - app rehend ing t h e m

u p o n their ou t e r s lope , b y l e a v i n g t h e m their o p a c i t y , b y accep t i ng a s

th ings the m e c h a n i s m s and funct ions t h e y isolate, by ques t ion ing those

funct ions and mechan i sms n o t i n te rms o f w h a t t h e y are b u t i n te rms o f

w h a t t h e y cease t o b e w h e n the space o f representat ion i s o p e n e d u p ; and

u p o n that basis t h e y s h o w h o w a representa t ion o f w h a t t h e y are can c o m e

in to b e i n g and b e d e p l o y e d . Sur rep t i t ious ly , t h e y lead the sciences o f l ife,

l abour , and l a n g u a g e b a c k t o that ana ly t ic o f f in i tude w h i c h s h o w s h o w

m a n , i n his b e i n g , can b e c o n c e r n e d w i t h the th ings h e k n o w s , and k n o w

the th ings that, i n pos i t iv i ty , de t e rmine his m o d e o f b e i n g . B u t w h a t the

ana ly t ic requires in the in ter ior i ty , o r a t least in the p r o f o u n d k insh ip , o f a

b e i n g w h o o w e s his f in i tude o n l y t o himself , the h u m a n sciences d e v e l o p

i n the ex te r io r i ty o f k n o w l e d g e . T h i s i s w h y w h a t character izes the h u m a n

sciences is n o t that t h e y are d i rec ted at a cer ta in con t en t (that s ingular

ob jec t , the h u m a n b e i n g ) ; i t i s m u c h m o r e a p u r e l y f o r m a l character is t ic :

the s imp le fact that , in re la t ion to the sciences in w h i c h the h u m a n b e i n g

i s g i v e n a s ob jec t ( exc lus ive in the case o f e c o n o m i c s a n d p h i l o l o g y , o r

part ia l i n that o f b i o l o g y ) , t h e y are in a pos i t ion o f dup l i ca t ion , and that

this dup l i ca t ion can se rve a fortiori fo r themse lves .

T h i s pos i t ion i s m a d e pe rcep t ib le o n t w o l eve l s : the h u m a n sciences d o

n o t treat m a n ' s l ife, l abour , and l a n g u a g e in the m o s t t ransparent state in

w h i c h t h e y c o u l d b e pos i ted , b u t i n that s t ra tum o f c o n d u c t , b e h a v i o u r ,

at t i tudes, gestures a l r eady m a d e , sentences a l r eady p r o n o u n c e d o r w r i t t e n ,

w i t h i n w h i c h t h e y h a v e a l r eady been g i v e n o n c e t o those w h o act ,

b e h a v e , e x c h a n g e , w o r k , and speak; a t ano the r l e v e l (it i s still the s a m e

f o r m a l p r o p e r t y , b u t carr ied to its furthest, rarest p o i n t ) , i t i s a l w a y s

possible t o treat i n the s ty le o f the h u m a n sciences ( o f p s y c h o l o g y , s o c i o ­

l o g y , and the h i s to ry o f cu l tu re , ideas, o r sc ience) the fact that for cer ta in

indiv iduals or cer ta in societies there i s s o m e t h i n g l ike a specu la t ive k n o w ­

l e d g e of life, p r o d u c t i o n , and l a n g u a g e - a t m o s t , a b i o l o g y , an e c o n o m i c s ,

a n d a p h i l o l o g y . T h i s i s p r o b a b l y no m o r e than the ind ica t ion o f a poss i ­

b i l i ty w h i c h i s ra re ly rea l ized and i s perhaps n o t capab le , a t the l e v e l o f

the empir ic i t ies , o f y i e l d i n g m u c h o f v a l u e ; b u t the fact that i t exists a s a

poss ible distance, as a space g i v e n to the h u m a n sciences to w i t h d r a w

in to , a w a y f r o m w h a t t h e y sp r ing f r o m , and the fact, t o o , that this ac t ion

can be app l ied to themse lves (it i s a l w a y s possible to m a k e h u m a n sciences

o f h u m a n sciences - the p s y c h o l o g y o f p s y c h o l o g y , the s o c i o l o g y o f

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s o c i o l o g y , e tc . ) suffice to demons t ra t e their pecu l ia r conf igura t ion . In re la­

t ion t o b i o l o g y , t o e c o n o m i c s , t o the sciences o f l anguage , they are no t ,

therefore , l a c k i n g in exac t i tude and r i g o u r ; t h e y are ra ther l ike sciences o f

dup l i ca t ion , in a ' m e t a - e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l ' pos i t ion . T h o u g h e v e n that p re f ix

i s perhaps n o t v e r y w e l l chosen : for o n e can speak o f m e t a - l a n g u a g e o n l y

w h e n def in ing the rules o f in terpreta t ion o f a p r i m a r y l anguage . H e r e , the

h u m a n sciences, w h e n t h e y dupl ica te the sciences o f l anguage , l abour , and

life, w h e n a t their finest p o i n t t h e y dupl ica te themse lves , are d i rec ted no t

a t the es tabl ishment o f a f o r m a l i z e d d iscourse : on the con t ra ry , t hey

thrust m a n , w h o m they take a s their ob j ec t i n the area o f f ini tude, re la­

t i v i t y , and pe r spec t ive , d o w n in to the area o f the endless eros ion o f t ime .

I t w o u l d perhaps be be t te r t o speak i n their case o f an 'ana- ' o r ' h y p o -

e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l ' pos i t i on ; i f the pe jo ra t ive conno ta t ions o f this last p re f ix

w e r e r e m o v e d , i t w o u l d n o d o u b t p r o v i d e a g o o d a c c o u n t o f the facts:

i t w o u l d sugges t h o w the inv inc ib le impress ion o f haziness, inexac t i tude ,

a n d imprec i s ion left by a lmos t all the h u m a n sciences is m e r e l y a surface

effect o f w h a t m a k e s i t possible t o define t h e m in their pos i t iv i ty .

I l l T H E T H R E E M O D E L S

A t f i r s t g l a n c e , o n e c o u l d say that the d o m a i n o f the h u m a n sciences i s

c o v e r e d by three ' sc iences ' - o r ra ther by three ep i s t emo log ica l r eg ions , all

s u b d i v i d e d w i t h i n themse lves , and all i n t e r l ock ing w i t h o n e another ; these

r eg ions are def ined by the tr iple re la t ion o f the h u m a n sciences i n genera l

t o b i o l o g y , e c o n o m i c s , and p h i l o l o g y . T h u s o n e c o u l d admi t that the

' p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e g i o n ' has f o u n d its locus in that p lace w h e r e the l i v i n g

b e i n g , in the ex tens ion of its funct ions , in its n e u r o - m o t o r bluepr ints , its

p h y s i o l o g i c a l regu la t ions , b u t also in the suspense that interrupts and

l imi ts t h e m , opens i tse l f t o the poss ib i l i ty o f representa t ion; i n the same

w a y , the ' s o c i o l o g i c a l r e g i o n ' w o u l d b e si tuated w h e r e the l a b o u r i n g ,

p r o d u c i n g , a n d c o n s u m i n g ind iv idua l offers h i m s e l f a representat ion o f

the soc ie ty i n w h i c h this a c t i v i t y occur s , o f the g r o u p s and indiv iduals

a m o n g w h i c h i t i s d i v i d e d , o f the impera t ives , sanct ions, rites, festivities,

and beliefs by w h i c h i t i s u p h e l d or r egu la t ed ; lastly, in that r e g i o n w h e r e

the l a w s and f o r m s o f a l a n g u a g e h o l d s w a y , b u t w h e r e , never theless , t hey

r ema in o n the e d g e o f themse lves , enab l ing m a n t o i n t roduce in to t h e m

the p l a y o f his representat ions, i n that r e g i o n arise the s tudy o f l i terature

and m y t h s , the analysis o f all ora l express ions and w r i t t e n d o c u m e n t s , i n

shor t , the analysis of the ve rba l traces that a cu l tu re or an ind iv idua l m a y

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l eave beh ind t h e m . T h i s d iv i s ion , t h o u g h v e r y s u m m a r y , i s p r o b a b l y n o t

t o o inexac t . I t does , h o w e v e r , l eave t w o fundamenta l p r o b l e m s u n s o l v e d :

o n e concerns the f o r m o f pos i t i v i t y p r o p e r t o the h u m a n sciences (the

concep t s a r o u n d w h i c h t h e y are o r g a n i z e d , the t y p e o f ra t iona l i ty t o

w h i c h t h e y refer and b y means o f w h i c h t h e y seek t o const i tu te themse lves

as k n o w l e d g e ) ; the o the r is their re la t ion to representat ion (and the pa ra ­

d o x i c a l fact that e v e n w h i l e t h e y take p lace o n l y w h e r e there i s r ep re ­

sentat ion, i t i s to unconsc ious mechan i sms , fo rms , and processes , or a t

least to the ex t e r i o r boundar i e s o f consciousness , that t h e y address

themse lves ) .

T h e con t rovers ies to w h i c h the search for a specific pos i t iv i ty in the

field o f the h u m a n sciences has g i v e n rise are o n l y t o o w e l l k n o w n :

Gene t i c o r s tructural analysis? E x p l a n a t i o n o r c o m p r e h e n s i o n ? R e c o u r s e

t o w h a t i s ' unde rnea th ' o r d e c i p h e r m e n t k e p t s t r ic t ly t o the l eve l o f r ead­

ing? In fact , all these theore t ica l discussions d id n o t arise and w e r e n o t

pursued t h r o u g h o u t the h i s to ry o f the h u m a n sciences because the latter

had to deal , i n m a n , w i t h an ob jec t so c o m p l e x that i t w a s n o t y e t poss ible

to f ind a u n i q u e m o d e o f access t o w a r d s it, o r because i t w a s necessary to

use severa l in turn . T h e s e discussions w e r e ab le to exis t o n l y in so far as

the pos i t iv i ty o f the h u m a n sciences rests s imul taneous ly u p o n the t rans­

ference of three dist inct m o d e l s . T h i s t ransference i s n o t a m a r g i n a l

p h e n o m e n o n for the h u m a n sciences (a sort o f s u p p o r t i n g f r a m e w o r k , a

de tou r to inc lude s o m e ex t e r io r in te l l ig ibi l i ty , a con f i rma t ion d e r i v e d

f r o m sciences a l r eady cons t i tu ted) ; n o r is i t a l imi t ed ep isode in their

h i s tory (a crisis o f f o r m a t i o n , a t a t ime w h e n they w e r e still so y o u n g that

t h e y c o u l d no t f i x their concep t s and their l a w s themse lves ) . O n the

con t r a ry , i t i s a ma t t e r of an ineffaceable fact, w h i c h is b o u n d u p , f o r ­

eve r , w i t h their par t icular a r r a n g e m e n t i n the ep i s t emo log i ca l space. W e

should , indeed , d is t inguish b e t w e e n t w o different sorts o f m o d e l u d l i z c d

b y the h u m a n sciences ( l eav ing aside m o d e l s o f fo rma l i za t ion ) . O n the

o n e hand , there w e r e - and of ten still are - concep t s i n t roduced f r o m

another d o m a i n o f k n o w l e d g e , w h i c h , los ing all opera t iona l efficacity i n

the process , n o w p l a y o n l y the ro le o f a n i m a g e (organic me taphor s i n

n ine teen th -cen tu ry s o c i o l o g y ; e n e r g y me taphor s i n Janet ; g e o m e t r i c a l and

d y n a m i c m e t a p h o r s i n L e w i n ) . B u t there are also cons t i tuent m o d e l s ,

w h i c h are no t j u s t t echn iques o f fo rma l i za t ion for the h u m a n sciences, o r

s imple means o f dev i s i ng m e t h o d s o f ope ra t ion w i t h less effort ; t hey m a k e

i t possible to create g r o u p s of p h e n o m e n a as so m a n y ' ob jec t s ' for a

possible b ranch o f k n o w l e d g e ; t hey ensure their c o n n e c t i o n i n the

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empi r ica l sphere , bu t t h e y offer t h e m to expe r i ence a l ready l inked

toge the r . T h e y p l a y the ro l e o f ' c a t egor i e s ' i n the area o f k n o w l e d g e

par t icular to the h u m a n sciences.

T h e s e const i tuent m o d e l s are b o r r o w e d f r o m the three d o m a i n s o f

b i o l o g y , e c o n o m i c s , and the s tudy o f l a n g u a g e . I t i s u p o n the p ro jec ted

surface of b i o l o g y that m a n appears as a b e i n g possessing functions -

r e c e i v i n g s t imul i (phys io log ica l ones , bu t also social , i n t e rhuman , and

cul tura l ones ) , r eac t ing to t h e m , adap t ing himself , e v o l v i n g , s u b m i t t i n g

t o the d e m a n d s o f a n e n v i r o n m e n t , c o m i n g t o te rms w i t h the m o d i f i c a ­

t ions i t imposes , s eek ing to erase imbalances , ac t ing in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h

regular i t ies , h a v i n g , i n short , cond i t ions o f ex is tence and the poss ibi l i ty o f

f i nd ing a v e r a g e norms o f adjus tment w h i c h p e r m i t h i m t o p e r f o r m his

funct ions . O n the p ro jec ted surface o f e c o n o m i c s , m a n appears a s h a v i n g

needs and desires, as s eek ing to satisfy t h e m , and therefore as h a v i n g

interests, des i r ing profi ts , en te r ing in to oppos i t i on w i t h o the r m e n ; in

short , he appears in an i r reduc ib le s i tuat ion of conflict; he evades these

confl icts , he escapes f r o m t h e m or succeeds in d o m i n a t i n g t h e m , in f ind ing

a so lu t ion that w i l l - on o n e l eve l at least, and for a t ime - appease their

con t rad ic t ions ; he establishes a b o d y of rules w h i c h are b o t h a l imi ta t ion of

the conf l ic t and a result o f it. Las t ly , on the p ro jec t ed surface o f l a n g u a g e ,

m a n ' s b e h a v i o u r appears as an a t t empt to say s o m e t h i n g ; his sl ightest

gestures , e v e n their i n v o l u n t a r y mechan i sms and their failures, h a v e a

meaning; and e v e r y t h i n g h e ar ranges a r o u n d h i m b y w a y o f objects , rites,

c u s t o m s , discourse , all the traces he leaves beh ind h i m , const i tu te a

c o h e r e n t w h o l e and a system of signs. T h u s , these three pairs of function

and norm, conflict and rule, signification and system c o m p l e t e l y c o v e r the

entire d o m a i n o f w h a t can b e k n o w n a b o u t m a n .

I t m u s t n o t b e supposed , h o w e v e r , that a n y o f these pairs o f concep t s

remains loca l ized o n the p ro jec ted surface o n w h i c h i t m a y h a v e appeared :

func t ion and n o r m are no t p s y c h o l o g i c a l concep t s e x c l u s i v e l y ; conf l ic t

and ru le do n o t h a v e an app l ica t ion l imi ted w h o l l y t o the soc io log i ca l

d o m a i n ; s ignif icat ion and s y s t e m are no t va l id so le ly for p h e n o m e n a m o r e

o r less ak in to l a n g u a g e . A l l these concep t s o c c u r t h r o u g h o u t the ent ire

v o l u m e c o m m o n t o the h u m a n sciences and are va l id i n each o f the

reg ions inc luded w i t h i n i t : hence the f requent diff iculty in f i x i n g l imits ,

n o t m e r e l y b e t w e e n the objec ts , b u t also b e t w e e n the m e t h o d s p r o p e r t o

p s y c h o l o g y , s o c i o l o g y , and the analysis o f l i terature and m y t h . N e v e r t h e ­

less, we can say in a genera l w a y that p s y c h o l o g y is fundamen ta l ly a s tudy

o f m a n i n terms o f functions and n o r m s (functions and n o r m s w h i c h can ,

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in a s econdary fashion, be interpreted on the basis of confl icts and s i g ­

nif icat ions, rules and sys tems) ; s o c i o l o g y i s fundamen ta l ly a s tudy of m a n

in te rms of rules and confl icts (but these m a y be in terpre ted, and o n e i s

cons tan t ly led to interpret t h e m , in a s econda ry w a y , ei ther on the basis o f

funct ions , a s t h o u g h they w e r e indiv iduals o rgan ica l ly c o n n e c t e d to t h e m ­

selves, o r o n the basis o f sys tems o f s ignif icat ions, a s t h o u g h t h e y w e r e

wr i t t en o r s p o k e n tex t s ) ; last ly, the s tudy o f l i terature and m y t h i s essen­

t ial ly the p r o v i n c e o f a n analysis o f s ignif icat ions and s ign i fy ing sys tems,

b u t w e all k n o w that this analysis m a y b e carr ied o u t i n te rms o f func ­

t ional c o h e r e n c e o r o f confl ic ts and rules. I n this w a y all the h u m a n

sciences in te r lock and can a l w a y s be used to interpret o n e ano the r : their

frontiers b e c o m e b lur red , i n t e rmed ia ry and c o m p o s i t e disciplines m u l t i ­

p l y endlessly, and in the end their p r o p e r o b j e c t m a y e v e n disappear

a l toge ther . B u t w h a t e v e r the nature o f the analysis and the d o m a i n t o

w h i c h i t i s appl ied , we h a v e a fo rma l c r i te r ion for k n o w i n g w h a t i s on

the l e v e l o f p s y c h o l o g y , w h a t o n that o f s o c i o l o g y , and w h a t o n tha t

o f l a n g u a g e analysis : this i s the c h o i c e o f the fundamenta l m o d e l and

the pos i t ion o f the secondary m o d e l s , w h i c h m a k e i t possible t o k n o w

a t w h a t p o i n t o n e beg ins t o ' p s y c h o l o g i z e ' o r ' s o c i o l o g i z e ' i n the s tudy o f

l i terature and m y t h , o r a t w h a t po in t i n p s y c h o l o g y o n e has m o v e d o v e r

in to the d e c i p h e r m e n t o f texts o r in to soc io log i ca l analysis . B u t this

super impos i t ion o f several m o d e l s i s n o t a defect o f m e t h o d . I t b e c o m e s

a defect o n l y i f the m o d e l s h a v e no t been prec ise ly o r d e r e d and exp l i c i t l y

ar t iculated i n re la t ion t o o n e another . A s w e k n o w , i t p r o v e d poss ible t o

c o n d u c t a n a d m i r a b l y precise s tudy o f the I n d o - E u r o p e a n m y t h o l o g i e s b y

us ing the soc io log ica l m o d e l super imposed u p o n the basic analysis o f

significants and signif icat ions. W e k n o w also, o n the o the r hand , t o w h a t

syncre t ic plat i tudes the sdl l m e d i o c r e unde r t ak ing of f o u n d i n g a so-ca l led

' c l in ica l ' p s y c h o l o g y has led .

W h e t h e r p r o p e r l y f o u n d e d and con t ro l l ed , o r carr ied o u t i n confus ion ,

this i n t e r lock ing o f cons t i tuent m o d e l s expla ins the discussions o f m e t h o d

referred to a b o v e . T h e y do n o t h a v e their o r i g i n and jus t i f ica t ion in a

s o m e t i m e s c o n t r a d i c t o r y c o m p l e x i t y w h i c h w e k n o w a s the character

p r o p e r t o m a n ; b u t i n the p l a y o f oppos i t ions , w h i c h m a k e s i t possible t o

define each o f the three m o d e l s i n re la t ion t o the t w o o thers . T o o p p o s e

genesis to s t ructure is to o p p o s e funct ion (in its d e v e l o p m e n t , in its p r o ­

gress ive ly divers i f ied opera t ions , in the p o w e r s o f adapta t ion i t has

acqu i red and ba lanced i n t i m e ) t o the s y n c h r o n i s m o f conf l ic t and rule , o f

s ignif icat ion and s y s t e m ; t o o p p o s e analysis by means o f that w h i c h i s

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' unde rnea th ' to analysis on the same l eve l as its ob j ec t i s to o p p o s e c o n ­

f l ic t (a p r i m a r y , archaic d a t u m inscr ibed a t the s a m e t ime as m a n ' s f unda ­

m e n t a l needs) to func t ion and s ignif ica t ion as t h e y are d e p l o y e d in their

par t icular rea l iza t ion ; to o p p o s e c o m p r e h e n s i o n to exp lana t ion i s to

o p p o s e the t echn ique that m a k e s i t possible to dec iphe r a m e a n i n g on the

basis o f a s i gn i fy ing s y s t e m to those that m a k e i t possible to g i v e an

a c c o u n t o f a conf l ic t t o g e t h e r w i t h its consequences , o r o f the f o r m s and

de fo rma t ions that a func t ion and its o rgans m a y assume or u n d e r g o . B u t

w e m u s t g o further . W e k n o w that i n the h u m a n sciences the p o i n t o f

v i e w o f d i scon t inu i ty ( the threshold b e t w e e n na ture and cu l tu re , the

i r reduc ib i l i ty o n e t o ano the r o f the balances o r solut ions f o u n d b y each

soc ie ty o r e a c h ind iv idua l , the absence o f i n t e r m e d i a r y f o r m s , the n o n ­

exis tence of a c o n t i n u u m ex is t ing in space or t i m e ) i s in oppos i t i on to the

p o i n t o f v i e w o f con t inu i ty . T h e ex is tence o f this o p p o s i t i o n i s t o b e

e x p l a i n e d by the b ipo la r charac ter o f the m o d e l s : analysis i n a c o n t i n u o u s

m o d e relies u p o n the p e r m a n e n c e o f func t ion ( w h i c h i s t o b e f o u n d i n

the v e r y depths o f life i n an iden t i ty that au thor izes and p r o v i d e s roo t s for

s u c c e e d i n g adapta t ions) , u p o n the in t e r connec t ion o f confl icts ( they m a y

take va r ious fo rms , b u t t h e y are a l w a y s present i n the b a c k g r o u n d ) , u p o n

the fabric o f s ignif icat ions ( w h i c h l ink u p w i t h o n e ano the r and c o n ­

stitute, as i t w e r e , the c o n t i n u o u s expanse of a d i scourse ) ; on the c o n t r a r y ,

the analysis o f discont inui t ies seeks rather t o d r a w o u t the internal

c o h e r e n c e o f s i gn i fy ing sys tems, the speci f ic i ty o f bod ies o f rules a n d the

dec i s ive charac ter t h e y assume in re la t ion to w h a t m u s t be r egu la ted , and

the e m e r g e n c e o f the n o r m a b o v e the l e v e l o f funct ional f l u c t u a t i o n s .

I t m i g h t be poss ible t o re t race the ent ire h i s to ry o f the h u m a n sciences,

f r o m the n ine teen th c e n t u r y o n w a r d , o n the basis o f these three m o d e l s .

T h e y h a v e , i n fact , c o v e r e d the w h o l e o f that h i s to ry , since w e can

f o l l o w the d y n a s t y o f their p r iv i l eges f o r m o r e than a c e n t u r y : f i r s t , the

r e ign o f the b i o l o g i c a l m o d e l (man, his p s y c h e , his g r o u p , his soc ie ty , the

l a n g u a g e he speaks - all these exist in the R o m a n t i c p e r i o d as l i v i n g be ings

and in so far as t hey w e r e , in fact, a l ive ; their m o d e of b e i n g i s o r g a n i c and

i s ana lysed i n te rms o f func t ion ) ; then c o m e s the r e ign o f the e c o n o m i c

m o d e l (man a n d his ent ire a c t i v i t y are the locus o f confl icts o f w h i c h t h e y

are b o t h the m o r e or less manifes t express ion and the m o r e or less success­

ful so lu t i on ) ; las t ly - j u s t as F reud c o m e s after C o m t e and M a r x - there

beg ins the r e i g n o f the p h i l o l o g i c a l ( w h e n i t i s a ma t t e r o f in terpre ta t ion

and the d i s c o v e r y o f h i d d e n m e a n i n g s ) and l inguis t ic m o d e l ( w h e n i t i s a

ma t t e r o f g i v i n g a s t ructure t o and c la r i fy ing the s ign i fy ing sy s t em) . T h u s

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a vas t shift has led the h u m a n sciences f r o m a f o r m m o r e dense in l i v i n g

m o d e l s t o ano the r m o r e saturated w i t h m o d e l s b o r r o w e d f r o m l a n g u a g e .

B u t this shift w a s paral le led by ano ther : that w h i c h caused the first t e r m

in each o f the cons t i tuent pairs ( funct ion, conf l ic t , s ignif icat ion) to recede ,

a n d the second t e r m ( n o r m , rule , s y s t e m ) to e m e r g e w i t h a c o r r e s p o n d ­

i n g l y g rea te r intensi ty and i m p o r t a n c e : Go lds t e in , M a u s s , D u m e z i l m a y

be t aken to represent , as near as m a k e s no difference, the m o m e n t a t

w h i c h the reversa l t o o k p lace w i t h i n each o f the m o d e l s . S u c h a reversal

has t w o series o f n o t e w o r t h y consequences : a s l o n g a s the funct ional p o i n t

o f v i e w c o n t i n u e d t o c a r ry m o r e w e i g h t than the n o r m a t i v e p o i n t o f

v i e w (as l o n g a s i t w a s n o t o n the basis o f the n o r m a n d the in ter ior o f the

ac t iv i ty d e t e r m i n i n g that n o r m that the a t t emp t w a s m a d e t o unders tand

h o w a funct ion w a s p e r f o r m e d ) , i t w a s of cour se necessary, de facto, to

share the n o r m a l funct ions w i t h the n o n - n o r m a l ; thus a p a t h o l o g i c a l

p s y c h o l o g y w a s accep ted side b y side w i t h n o r m a l p s y c h o l o g y , b u t f o r m ­

i n g a s i t w e r e a n i nve r t ed i m a g e o f i t (hence the i m p o r t a n c e o f the

Jacksonian n o t i o n o f d is in tegra t ion i n R i b o t o r Jane t ) ; i n the same w a y ,

a p a t h o l o g y o f societ ies ( D u r k h e i m ) , o f i r rat ional and q u a s i - m o r b i d fo rms

o f b e l i e f ( L e v y - B r u h l , B l o n d e l ) w a s also accep t ed ; s imi la r ly , a s l o n g a s

the po in t o f v i e w o f confl ic t car r ied m o r e w e i g h t than that o f the rule ,

i t w a s supposed that cer ta in confl icts c o u l d n o t be o v e r c o m e , that i n ­

d iv idua ls and societ ies ran the risk o f d e s t r o y i n g themse lves b y t h e m ;

f inal ly , a s l o n g a s the po in t o f v i e w o f s ignif ica t ion car r ied m o r e w e i g h t

than that o f sy s t em, a d iv i s ion w a s m a d e b e t w e e n signif icant and n o n ­

signif icant : i t w a s accep ted that there w a s m e a n i n g i n cer ta in d o m a i n s o f

h u m a n b e h a v i o u r o r cer tain reg ions o f the social area, bu t n o t i n o thers .

So that the h u m a n sciences laid d o w n an essential d iv i s ion w i t h i n their

o w n f ie ld : t hey a l w a y s e x t e n d e d b e t w e e n a pos i t ive p o l e and a n e g a t i v e

p o l e ; t h e y a l w a y s des igna ted an al ter i ty (based, fu r the rmore , on the c o n ­

t inui ty t h e y w e r e ana lys ing ) . W h e n , o n the o the r hand , the analysis w a s

c o n d u c t e d f r o m the po in t o f v i e w o f the n o r m , the rule , and the sys t em,

each area p r o v i d e d its o w n c o h e r e n c e and its o w n v a l i d i t y ; i t w a s n o

l o n g e r possible t o speak o f ' m o r b i d consciousness ' ( even refer r ing t o the

s i ck ) , o f ' p r i m i t i v e mental i t ies ' (even w i t h reference to societies left beh ind

b y h i s to ry ) , o r o f ' i n s i g n i f i c a n t d iscourse ' (even w h e n refer r ing t o absurd

stories, o r t o apparen t ly incoheren t l egends ) . E v e r y t h i n g m a y b e t h o u g h t

w i t h i n the o r d e r o f the sys t em, the rule , and the n o r m . B y p lu ra l i z ing

i t s e l f - s ince sys tems are isolated, since rules f o r m c losed w h o l e s , since

n o r m s are pos i ted in their a u t o n o m y - the field of the h u m a n sciences

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f o u n d i tse l f un i f ied : sudden ly , i t w a s no l o n g e r fissured a l o n g its f o r m e r

d i c h o t o m y o f va lues . A n d bea r ing i n m i n d that F reud m o r e than a n y o n e

else b r o u g h t the k n o w l e d g e o f m a n closer t o its p h i l o l o g i c a l and l inguis t ic

m o d e l , and that he w a s also the first to under t ake the radical erasure o f the

d iv i s ion b e t w e e n pos i t i ve and n e g a t i v e ( b e t w e e n the n o r m a l a n d the

p a t h o l o g i c a l , the c o m p r e h e n s i b l e and the i n c o m m u n i c a b l e , the s ignif icant

and the non-s ign i f i can t ) , i t i s easy to see h o w he pref igures the transi t ion

f r o m an analysis in te rms of funct ions , confl icts , and s ignif icat ions to an

analysis in te rms o f n o r m s , rules, and sys tems : thus all this k n o w l e d g e ,

w i t h i n w h i c h W e s t e r n cu l tu re h a d g i v e n i t se l f i n o n e c e n t u r y a cer tain

i m a g e o f m a n , p i v o t s o n the w o r k o f F reud , t h o u g h w i t h o u t , for all that,

l e a v i n g its fundamen ta l a r r angemen t . B u t e v e n so , i t i s n o t here - as we

shall see later on - that the m o s t dec i s ive i m p o r t a n c e of psychoana lys i s

l ies.

I n a n y case, this transit ion t o the po in t o f v i e w o f the n o r m , the rule ,

and the s y s t e m br ings us to a p r o b l e m that has been left in suspense: that

o f the ro l e o f representa t ion i n the h u m a n sciences. I t m i g h t a l r eady

appear e x t r e m e l y contes tab le to inc lude the h u m a n sciences (as o p p o s e d to

b i o l o g y , e c o n o m i c s , and p h i l o l o g y ) w i t h i n the space o f representa t ion:

w a s i t no t a l ready necessary to po in t o u t that a funct ion can be p e r f o r m e d ,

a conf l ic t can d e v e l o p its consequences , a s ignif ica t ion can i m p o s e its

in te l l ig ib i l i ty , w i t h o u t passing t h r o u g h the s tage o f exp l i c i t consciousness?

A n d n o w , i s i t n o t necessary t o r e c o g n i z e that the pecul ia r p r o p e r t y o f

the n o r m in re la t ion to the funct ion i t de te rmines , o f the rule in re la t ion

to the confl ic t i t regula tes , o f the s y s t e m in re la t ion to the s ignif ica t ion i t

m a k e s possible , i s prec ise ly that o f n o t b e i n g g i v e n t o consciousness? A r e

we n o t fo rced to add a thi rd historical g rad ien t to the t w o a l ready isolated,

and to say that since the n ine teen th c e n t u r y the h u m a n sciences h a v e n e v e r

ceased t o a p p r o a c h that r e g i o n o f the unconsc ious w h e r e the ac t ion o f

representa t ion is he ld in suspense? In fact , representa t ion is n o t consc ious ­

ness, and there i s n o t h i n g to p r o v e that this b r i n g i n g to l i gh t o f e lements

or s tructures that are n e v e r presented to consciousness as such enables the

h u m a n sciences t o escape the l a w o f representa t ion. T h e ro l e o f the c o n ­

cep t o f s ignif ica t ion is, i n fact , t o s h o w h o w s o m e t h i n g l ike a l a n g u a g e ,

e v e n i f i t i s n o t i n the f o r m o f exp l i c i t d iscourse , and e v e n i f i t has n o t

been d e p l o y e d fo r a consciousness , can in gene ra l be g i v e n to r e p r e ­

senta t ion; the r o l e o f the c o m p l e m e n t a r y c o n c e p t o f s y s t e m i s t o s h o w

h o w s igni f ica t ion i s n e v e r p r i m a r y and c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s w i t h itself, b u t

a l w a y s s e c o n d a r y and as i t w e r e d e r i v e d in re la t ion to a s y s t e m that

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precedes it, const i tu tes its pos i t i ve o r i g i n , and posits itself, l i t t le by little, in

f ragments and out l ines t h r o u g h s igni f ica t ion; in relat ion to the c o n s c i o u s ­

ness of a s ignif icat ion, the s y s t e m is i ndeed a l w a y s unconsc ious since i t

w a s there before the s igni f ica t ion, since i t i s w i t h i n i t that the s igni f ica t ion

resides a n d on the basis o f i t that i t b e c o m e s ef fec t ive ; b u t because the

sys t em is a l w a y s p r o m i s e d to a future consciousness w h i c h w i l l perhaps

n e v e r add i t u p . In o the r w o r d s , the s i gn i f i ca t i on / sys t em pai r i s w h a t

ensures b o t h the representabi l i ty o f l a n g u a g e (as t ex t o r s t ructure ana lysed

b y p h i l o l o g y a n d l inguis t ics) a n d the near b u t w i t h d r a w n presence o f the

o r i g in (as i t i s manifes ted a s m a n ' s m o d e o f b e i n g by means o f the ana ly t i c

o f f in i tude) . I n the same w a y , the n o t i o n o f conf l ic t s h o w s h o w need ,

desire, and interest, e v e n i f t h e y are n o t presented to the consciousness

e x p e r i e n c i n g t h e m , can t ake f o r m in representa t ion; and the ro l e o f the

inverse c o n c e p t o f ru le i s t o s h o w h o w the v i o l e n c e o f conf l ic t , the

apparen t ly u n t a m e d insistence o f need , the lawless inf ini ty o f desire are

i n fact a l r eady o r g a n i z e d b y a n u n t h o u g h t w h i c h n o t o n l y prescr ibes their

rules, b u t renders t h e m possible u p o n the basis o f a ru le . T h e c o n f l i c t / r u l e

pair ensures the representabi l i ty o f need ( o f the n e e d that e c o n o m i c s

studies' as an o b j e c t i v e process in l abour and p r o d u c t i o n ) a n d the r ep re ­

sentabi l i ty o f the u n t h o u g h t that i s u n v e i l e d b y the ana ly t ic o f f in i tude .

Las t ly , the c o n c e p t o f func t ion has the ro l e o f s h o w i n g h o w the structures

o f life m a y g i v e rise t o representa t ion (even t h o u g h t h e y are n o t c o n ­

sc ious) , and the c o n c e p t o f n o r m h o w func t ion p r o v i d e s its o w n c o n ­

di t ions o f poss ibi l i ty and the frontiers w i t h i n w h i c h i t i s ef fect ive .

T h u s i t c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d w h y these b r o a d ca tegor ies can s t ructure

the ent ire f ield of the h u m a n sciences: i t i s because t h e y span i t f r o m e n d

t o end , because t h e y b o t h h o l d apar t a n d l ink t o g e t h e r the emp i r i ca l

posi t ivi t ies o f l ife, l abour , and l a n g u a g e (on the basis o f w h i c h m a n first

de tached h i m s e l f h is tor ica l ly a s a f o r m o f poss ib le k n o w l e d g e ) and

the f o r m s o f f in i tude that charac te r ize m a n ' s m o d e o f b e i n g (as h e c o n ­

sti tuted h i m s e l f w h e n representa t ion ceased to def ine the g e n e r a l space

o f k n o w l e d g e ) . T h e s e ca tegor ies arc no t , therefore , m e r e empi r i ca l c o n ­

cepts o f ra ther b r o a d gene ra l i t y ; t hey are indeed the basis o n w h i c h m a n

is ab le to present h i m s e l f to a possible k n o w l e d g e ; t h e y t raverse the ent i re

f ield o f his poss ibi l i ty and ar t iculate i t b o l d l y i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the t w o

d imens ions that f o r m its f rame.

B u t that i s n o t a l l : t hey also p e r m i t the dissociat ion, w h i c h i s c h a r ­

acteristic o f all c o n t e m p o r a r y k n o w l e d g e a b o u t m a n , o f consciousness and

representat ion. T h e y def ine the m a n n e r i n w h i c h the empir ic i t ies can be

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g i v e n to representat ion bu t in a f o r m that i s n o t present to the c o n s c i o u s ­

ness ( funct ion, conf l ic t , and s ignif icat ion are indeed the m a n n e r in w h i c h

life, need , and l a n g u a g e are d o u b l e d o v e r in representa t ion, b u t in a f o r m

that m a y b e c o m p l e t e l y u n c o n s c i o u s ) ; o n the o the r hand , t hey define

the m a n n e r i n w h i c h the fundamen ta l f in i tude can be g i v e n t o r ep re ­

sentat ion in a f o r m b o t h pos i t ive and empi r i ca l , y e t n o t t ransparent to

the n a i v e consciousness (nei ther n o r m , n o t rule , n o t s y s t e m i s g i v e n in

da i ly e x p e r i e n c e : t hey run t h r o u g h it, g i v e rise to part ial consciousnesses

o f themse lves , b u t can n e v e r b e w h o l l y i l l umined e x c e p t b y a re f lex ive

f o r m o f k n o w l e d g e ) . S o the h u m a n sciences speak o n l y w i t h i n the e l e m e n t

o f the representable , bu t i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a c o n s c i o u s / u n c o n s c i o u s

d imens ion , a d imens ion that b e c o m e s m o r e and m o r e m a r k e d as o n e

a t tempts to b r i n g the o rde r of sys tems, rules, and n o r m s to l igh t . I t i s as

t h o u g h the d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n n o r m a l and p a t h o l o g i c a l w e r e t end ing t o

b e ecl ipsed i n f a v o u r o f the b ipo la r i t y o f consciousness and the unconsc ious .

I t m u s t n o t be fo rgo t t en , therefore , that the increas ing ly m a r k e d

i m p o r t a n c e o f the unconsc ious i n n o w a y c o m p r o m i s e s the p r i m a c y o f

representat ion. T h i s p r i m a c y does , h o w e v e r , raise an i m p o r t a n t p r o b l e m .

N o w that the empi r i ca l f o r m s o f k n o w l e d g e , such a s those o f l ife, l abour ,

and l a n g u a g e , h a v e escaped f r o m its l a w , n o w that the a t t emp t t o def ine

m a n ' s m o d e o f b e i n g i s b e i n g m a d e outs ide the f ield o f representat ion,

w h a t i s representat ion, i f n o t a p h e n o m e n o n o f a n empi r i ca l o rde r w h i c h

occu r s w i t h i n m a n , and c o u l d be ana lysed a s such? A n d i f representat ion

occu r s w i t h i n m a n , w h a t difference i s there b e t w e e n i t and consciousness?

B u t representa t ion i s n o t s i m p l y an ob jec t for the h u m a n sciences; i t is,

a s w e h a v e j u s t seen, the v e r y field u p o n w h i c h the h u m a n sciences o c c u r ,

and to their fullest ex t en t ; i t i s the genera l pedestal o f that f o r m o f k n o w ­

l e d g e , the basis that m a k e s i t possible . T w o consequences e m e r g e f r o m

this. O n e is of a historical o r d e r : i t i s the fact that the h u m a n sciences,

un l ike the empi r i ca l sciences since the n ine teen th cen tu ry , and un l ike

m o d e r n t h o u g h t , h a v e been unable t o f ind a w a y a r o u n d the p r i m a c y o f

representa t ion; l i ke the w h o l e o f Class ical k n o w l e d g e , t h e y reside w i t h i n

i t ; bu t t hey are in no w a y its heirs o r its con t inua t ion , for the w h o l e

con f igu ra t i on o f k n o w l e d g e has been m o d i f i e d and t hey c a m e in to b e i n g

o n l y t o the d e g r e e t o w h i c h there appeared , w i t h m a n , a b e i n g w h o d id

no t exis t be fo re in the f ield of the episteme. H o w e v e r , i t i s easy to u n d e r ­

stand w h y e v e r y t i m e o n e tries t o use the h u m a n sciences t o ph i lo soph ize ,

t o p o u r back in to the space o f t h o u g h t w h a t o n e has been able t o learn o f

m a n , o n e finds o n e s e l f imi ta t ing the ph i losoph ica l pos ture o f the e igh teen th

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cen tu ry , i n w h i c h , never the less , m a n h a d n o p l a c e ; fo r b y e x t e n d i n g the

d o m a i n o f k n o w l e d g e a b o u t m a n b e y o n d its l imi ts o n e i s s imi la r ly e x ­

t e n d i n g the r e ign o f representa t ion b e y o n d itself, and thus t a k i n g up o n e ' s

pos i t ion o n c e m o r e i n a p h i l o s o p h y o f the Class ical t y p e . T h e o t h e r c o n ­

sequence i s that the h u m a n sciences, w h e n dea l ing w i t h w h a t i s r e p r e ­

sentat ion (in e i ther consc ious or unconsc ious f o r m ) , f ind themse lves

t rea t ing as their ob j ec t w h a t i s in fact their c o n d i t i o n o f poss ib i l i ty . T h e y

are a l w a y s an imated , therefore , b y a sort o f t ranscendental m o b i l i t y . T h e y

n e v e r cease t o exerc i se a cr i t ical e x a m i n a t i o n o f themse lves . T h e y p r o c e e d

f r o m that w h i c h i s g i v e n t o representa t ion t o that w h i c h renders r e p r e ­

sentat ion possible , b u t w h i c h i s still representa t ion. So that, un l i ke o t h e r

sciences, t h e y seek n o t s o m u c h t o gene ra l i ze themse lves o r m a k e t h e m ­

selves m o r e precise a s t o be cons tan t ly d e m y s t i f y i n g t hemse lve s : t o m a k e

the transi t ion f r o m an i m m e d i a t e and n o n - c o n t r o l l e d e v i d e n c e to less

transparent b u t m o r e fundamenta l fo rms . T h i s quasi - t ranscendental p r o ­

cess i s a l w a y s g i v e n in the f o r m of an u n v e i l i n g . I t i s a l w a y s by an u n ­

v e i l i n g that t h e y are able , as a consequence , to b e c o m e sufficiently

gene ra l i zed o r ref ined t o c o n c e i v e o f i nd iv idua l p h e n o m e n a . O n the

h o r i z d n o f a n y h u m a n sc ience , there i s the p ro j ec t o f b r i n g i n g m a n ' s

consciousness b a c k to its real cond i t ions , o f r e s to r ing i t t o the con ten ts

and fo rms that b r o u g h t i t i n to b e i n g , and e lude us w i t h i n i t ; this i s w h y

the p r o b l e m o f the unconsc ious - its poss ibi l i ty , status, m o d e o f ex is tence ,

the means of k n o w i n g i t and of b r i n g i n g i t to l i gh t - i s n o t s i m p l y a

p r o b l e m w i t h i n the h u m a n sciences w h i c h t h e y can b e t h o u g h t o f a s

e n c o u n t e r i n g by chance in their steps; i t is a p r o b l e m that is u l t ima te ly

c o e x t e n s i v e w i t h their v e r y exis tence . A t ranscendental ra is ing o f l e v e l

that is, on the o the r side, an u n v e i l i n g of the n o n - c o n s c i o u s i s cons t i tu t ive

o f all the sciences o f m a n .

W e m a y f i n d i n this the means o f i sola t ing t h e m i n their essential

p r o p e r t y . I n a n y case, we can see tha t w h a t manifests this pecu l ia r p r o ­

p e r t y o f the h u m a n sciences i s n o t that p r i v i l e g e d a n d s ingu la r ly b lu r red

ob jec t w h i c h i s m a n . F o r the g o o d reason that i t i s n o t m a n w h o c o n ­

stitutes t h e m and p r o v i d e s t h e m w i t h a specific d o m a i n ; i t i s the gene ra l

a r r a n g e m e n t o f the episteme that p r o v i d e s t h e m w i t h a site, s u m m o n s

t h e m , and establishes t h e m - thus enab l i ng t h e m to const i tu te m a n as their

ob jec t . We shall say, therefore , that a ' h u m a n sc ience ' exists, n o t w h e r e v e r

m a n is in ques t ion , b u t w h e r e v e r there is analysis - w i t h i n the d imens ion

p r o p e r to the unconsc ious - o f n o r m s , rules, and s ign i fy ing totalit ies w h i c h

unve i l t o consciousness the cond i t ions o f its fo rms and contents . T o speak

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o f ' s c i e n c e s o f m a n ' i n a n y o the r case i s s i m p l y a n abuse o f l a n g u a g e . W e

can see, then, h o w v a i n and idle are all those w e a r i s o m e discussions a s to

w h e t h e r such and such fo rms o f k n o w l e d g e m a y b e t e r m e d t ru ly sc ien­

t i f i c , and t o w h a t cond i t i ons t h e y o u g h t t o b e subjec ted i n o r d e r t o

b e c o m e so . T h e 'sciences o f m a n ' are par t o f t he m o d e r n episteme i n the

s a m e w a y a s c h e m i s t r y o r m e d i c i n e o r a n y o t h e r such sc ience ; o r aga in ,

i n the same w a y a s g r a m m a r and natura l h i s tory w e r e pa r t o f the Class ica l

episteme. B u t t o say that t h e y are par t o f the ep i s t emo log i ca l f i e ld m e a n s

s i m p l y that their pos i t i v i t y is r o o t e d in it, that that i s w h e r e t h e y f ind their

c o n d i t i o n o f ex is tence , that t h e y are therefore n o t m e r e l y i l lusions,

pseudo-sc ient i f ic fantasies m o t i v a t e d a t the l e v e l o f op in ions , interests, o r

beliefs, that t h e y are n o t w h a t o thers call by the b iza r re n a m e o f ' i d e o l o g y ' .

B u t that does n o t necessari ly m e a n that t hey are sciences.

A l t h o u g h i t i s t rue that a n y science, a n y sc ience w h a t e v e r , w h e n i t i s

ques t ioned on the a r chaeo log i ca l l e v e l and w h e n an a t t e m p t i s m a d e t o

c lear the g r o u n d o f its pos i t i v i t y , a l w a y s reveals the ep i s t emo log i ca l c o n ­

f igu ra t ion that m a d e i t poss ible , a n y e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l con f igu ra t i on , on the

o t h e r hand , e v e n i f i t i s c o m p l e t e l y assignable in its pos i t iv i ty , m a y v e r y

w e l l n o t be a sc ience : i t does n o t t h e r e b y r e d u c e itself, ipso facto, to the

status o f a n i m p o s t u r e . W e m u s t d is t inguish carefu l ly b e t w e e n three

th ings . T h e r e are t hemes w i t h scientific pretensions that o n e m a y e n ­

c o u n t e r a t the l e v e l o f o p i n i o n and that are n o t (or are n o l o n g e r ) par t o f

a cu l ture ' s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l n e t w o r k : f r o m the seven teen th cen tu ry , fo r

e x a m p l e , na tura l m a g i c ceased to b e l o n g to the W e s t e r n episteme, b u t i t

persisted for a l o n g t i m e in the in terac t ion of beliefs and affect ive v a l o r i z a ­

t ions. T h e n there are e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l f i gu re s w h o s e ou t l ine , pos i t ion , a n d

func t ion can b e recons t i tu ted i n their pos i t i v i t y b y means o f a n analysis o f

the a r c h a e o l o g i c a l t y p e ; and these, i n turn , m a y o b e y t w o different

o rgan i za t i ons : s o m e present characterist ics o f o b j e c t i v i t y a n d sys temat ic i ty

w h i c h m a k e i t poss ible t o def ine t h e m as sciences; o thers do n o t a n s w e r t o

those cri teria, that is, their f o r m of c o h e r e n c e and their re la t ion to their

o b j e c t are d e t e r m i n e d by their pos i t i v i t y a lone . T h e fact that these lat ter

d o n o t possess t he f o r m a l cri teria o f a scientific f o r m o f k n o w l e d g e does

n o t p r e v e n t t h e m f r o m b e l o n g i n g , never theless , t o the pos i t i ve d o m a i n o f

k n o w l e d g e . I t w o u l d thus be as futile and unjust to analyse t h e m as

p h e n o m e n a o f o p i n i o n a s t o contras t t h e m his tor ica l ly o r cr i t ical ly w i t h

scientific fo rma t ions p r o p e r ; i t w o u l d be m o r e absurd still t o treat t h e m

as a c o m b i n a t i o n w h i c h m i x e s t o g e t h e r in va r i ab l e p ropo r t i ons ' ra t ional

e l emen t s ' and o t h e r e lements that are n o t ra t ional . T h e y m u s t be rep laced

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

on the l eve l o f pos i t iv i ty that renders t h e m possible and necessari ly de te r ­

mines their f o r m . A r c h a e o l o g y , then, has t w o tasks w i t h r e g a r d t o these

f igures : t o de t e rmine the m a n n e r in w h i c h t h e y are a r r a n g e d in the

episteme in w h i c h t h e y h a v e their roo t s ; and to s h o w , also, in w h a t respect

their con f igu ra t i on i s rad ica l ly different f r o m that of the sciences in the

strict sense. T h e r e i s no reason to treat this pecu l ia r con f igu ra t i on of theirs

as a n e g a t i v e p h e n o m e n o n : i t i s no t the presence of an obs tac le n o r s o m e

internal de f i c i ency w h i c h has left t h e m st randed across the threshold o f

scientific f o rms . T h e y const i tu te , i n their o w n f o r m , side b y side w i t h the

sciences and on the same a r chaeo log i ca l g r o u n d , other conf igura t ions o f

k n o w l e d g e .

W e h a v e a l ready encoun t e r ed e x a m p l e s o f such conf igura t ions i n

genera l g r a m m a r o r i n the Class ical t h e o r y o f v a l u e ; t hey possessed the

same g r o u n d o f pos i t iv i ty a s Car tes ian ma thema t i c s , bu t t h e y w e r e n o t

sciences, a t least for the m a j o r i t y o f those w h o w e r e their con t empora r i e s .

S u c h i s also the case w i t h w h a t w e t o d a y cal l the h u m a n sciences; w h e n

analysed a rchaeo log ica l ! y , t h e y p r o v i d e the out l ines o f c o m p l e t e l y pos i t ive

conf igura t ions ; bu t as s o o n as these conf igura t ions and the w a y in w h i c h

t h e y are a r ranged w i t h i n the m o d e r n episteme are de t e rmined , we u n d e r ­

stand w h y t h e y c a n n o t b e sciences: w h a t renders t h e m possible , i n fact ,

i s a certain s i tuat ion of ' v i c i n i t y ' w i t h r ega rd to b i o l o g y , e c o n o m i c s , and

p h i l o l o g y (or l inguis t ics) ; t h e y exis t o n l y in so far as t hey d w e l l side by

side w i t h those sciences - o r rather benea th t h e m , in the space of their

p ro jec t ions . H o w e v e r , t h e y main ta in a re la t ionship w i t h those sciences

that i s r ad ica l ly different f r o m that w h i c h can be established b e t w e e n t w o

' re la ted ' or ' g e r m a n e ' sciences: this re la t ionship presupposes , in fact, the

t ransposi t ion o f ex te rna l m o d e l s w i t h i n the d imens ion o f the unconsc ious

and consciousness , and the f l owing b a c k o f cri t ical ref lect ion t o w a r d s the

v e r y p lace f r o m w h i c h those m o d e l s c o m e . I t i s useless, then, to say that

the ' h u m a n sciences ' are false sciences; t h e y are n o t sciences a t a l l ; the

con f igu ra t i on that defines their pos i t i v i ty and g i v e s t h e m their roo t s in

the m o d e r n episteme a t the same t ime m a k e s i t imposs ib le for t h e m to be

sciences; and i f i t i s then asked w h y they assumed that title, i t i s sufficient

to recall that i t pertains to the a r chaeo log i ca l def in i t ion of their roo t s that

t h e y s u m m o n and r ece ive the transference o f m o d e l s b o r r o w e d f r o m the

sciences. I t is therefore n o t m a n ' s i r reduc ib i l i ty , w h a t is des igna ted as his

i nv inc ib le t ranscendence , n o r e v e n his excess ive ly g rea t c o m p l e x i t y , that

p reven ts h i m f r o m b e c o m i n g a n ob jec t o f science. W e s t e r n cu l tu re has

cons t i tu ted , unde r the n a m e o f m a n , a b e i n g w h o , b y o n e and the same

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in te rp lay o f reasons, m u s t be a pos i t i ve d o m a i n o f knowledge and c a n n o t

be an ob jec t o f science.

I V H I S T O R Y

W e h a v e s p o k e n o f the h u m a n sciences; w e h a v e s p o k e n o f those b r o a d

r eg ions de l imi t ed m o r e o r less by p s y c h o l o g y , s o c i o l o g y , and the analysis

o f l i terature and m y t h o l o g y . W e h a v e n o t y e t m e n t i o n e d h i s to ry , t h o u g h

i t i s the f i r s t and as i t w e r e the m o t h e r of all the sciences of m a n , and i s

perhaps as o l d as h u m a n m e m o r y . Or rather , i t i s for that v e r y reason

that w e h a v e unt i l n o w passed i t o v e r i n s i lence. Perhaps h i s to ry has n o

p lace , i n fact, a m o n g the h u m a n sciences, o r bes ide t h e m : i t m a y w e l l b e

that i t mainta ins w i t h t h e m all a re la t ion that is s t range , undef ined ,

ineffaceable, and m o r e fundamenta l than a n y relat ion o f ad jacency in a

c o m m o n space w o u l d be .

I t i s t rue that H i s t o r y ex is ted l o n g before the cons t i tu t ion o f the h u m a n

sciences; f r o m the b e g i n n i n g s o f the A n c i e n t G r e e k c iv i l i za t ion , i t has per ­

f o r m e d a cer ta in n u m b e r o f ma jo r funct ions i n W e s t e r n cu l tu r e : m e m o r y ,

m y t h , transmission, o f the W o r d and o f E x a m p l e , v e h i c l e o f t radi t ion ,

cr i t ical awareness o f the present , d e c i p h e r m e n t o f h u m a n i t y ' s des t iny ,

an t ic ipa t ion o f the future, o r p r o m i s e o f a re turn. W h a t charac te r ized this

H i s t o r y - or a t least w h a t m a y be used to def ine i t in its gene ra l features,

a s o p p o s e d t o o u r o w n - w a s that b y o r d e r i n g the t ime o f h u m a n be ings

u p o n the w o r l d ' s d e v e l o p m e n t (in a sort o f g rea t c o s m i c c h r o n o l o g y such

a s w e f i n d i n the w o r k s o f the S to ics ) , o r inve r se ly b y e x t e n d i n g the

p r inc ip le and m o v e m e n t o f a h u m a n des t iny to e v e n the smallest part icles

o f na ture (rather i n the same w a y a s Chr i s t i an P r o v i d e n c e ) , i t w a s c o n ­

c e i v e d o f a s a vas t historical s t ream, u n i f o r m in each o f its poin ts , d r a w i n g

w i t h i t in o n e and the same cur rent , in o n e and the same fall o r ascension,

o r c y c l e , all m e n , and w i t h t h e m th ings and animals , e v e r y l i v i n g o r iner t

b e i n g , e v e n the m o s t u n m o v e d aspects o f the ear th. A n d i t w a s this u n i t y

that w a s shat tered a t the b e g i n n i n g o f the n ine teen th cen tu ry , in the g rea t

u p h e a v a l that o c c u r r e d in the W e s t e r n episteme: i t w a s d i s cove red that

there exis ted a h is tor ic i ty p r o p e r to na ture ; f o r m s o f adap ta t ion to the

e n v i r o n m e n t w e r e def ined fo r each b r o a d t y p e o f l i v i n g b e i n g , w h i c h

w o u l d m a k e poss ible a subsequent def in i t ion o f its e v o l u t i o n a r y o u t l i n e ;

m o r e o v e r , i t b e c a m e possible to s h o w that act ivi t ies a s pecu l i a r ly h u m a n

as l abou r or l a n g u a g e con t a ined w i t h i n themse lves a h is tor ic i ty that c o u l d

n o t b e p laced w i t h i n the g rea t nar ra t ive c o m m o n t o th ings and t o m e n :

THE O R D E R O F T H I N G S

p r o d u c t i o n has its m o d e s o f d e v e l o p m e n t , capi tal its m o d e s o f a c c u m u l a ­

t ion , pr ices their l a w s o f f luctuat ion and c h a n g e w h i c h c a n n o t b e f i t ted

o v e r natura l l a w s o r r e d u c e d t o the gene ra l p rogress o f h u m a n i t y ; i n the

same w a y , l a n g u a g e i s n o t m o d i f i e d a s m u c h b y m i g r a t i o n s , t rade, and

w a r s , b y w h a t happens t o m a n o r w h a t his i m a g i n a t i o n i s ab le t o i nven t ,

a s by cond i t i ons tha t p r o p e r l y b e l o n g t o the p h o n e t i c and g r a m m a t i c a l

f o r m s o f w h i c h i t i s cons t i tu ted ; and i f i t has been poss ible t o say tha t

the v a r i o u s l anguages are b o r n , l i ve , lose their e n e r g y as t h e y age , a n d

f ina l ly d ie , this b i o l o g i c a l m e t a p h o r i s n o t in tended to d isso lve their h i s ­

t o r y in a t i m e w h i c h w o u l d be that o f life, b u t ra ther t o under l ine the fact

that t h e y t o o h a v e internal l a w s o f func t ion ing , and that their c h r o n o l o g y

unfolds in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a t i m e that refers in the first p l ace to thei r

o w n par t icular c o h e r e n c e .

W e are usual ly inc l ined t o b e l i e v e that the n ine teen th c e n t u r y , l a r g e l y

for po l i t i ca l and socia l reasons, pa id c loser a t tent ion to h u m a n h is tory , that

the idea o f a n o r d e r o r a c o n t i n u o u s l e v e l o f t i m e w a s a b a n d o n e d , a s w e l l

a s that o f an un in te r rup ted progress , and that the b o u r g e o i s i e , in a t t e m p t ­

i n g t o r e c o u n t its o w n ascension, encoun te r ed , i n the ca lendar o f its

v i c t o r y , the his tor ical densi ty o f insti tutions, the specific g r a v i t y o f habi ts

and beliefs, the v i o l e n c e o f s t ruggles , the a l te rnat ion o f success and fai lure.

A n d w e suppose that , o n this basis, the h is tor ic i ty d i s c o v e r e d w i t h i n m a n

w a s e x t e n d e d to t he objects he had m a d e , the l a n g u a g e he s p o k e , and -

e v e n further still - t o life. A c c o r d i n g t o this p o i n t o f v i e w , the s tudy o f

e c o n o m i e s , the h i s to ry o f l i teratures and g r a m m a r s , and e v e n the e v o l u ­

t ion o f l i v i n g b e i n g s are m e r e l y effects o f the diffusion, o v e r inc reas ing ly

m o r e distant areas o f k n o w l e d g e , o f a h is tor ic i ty first r evea l ed in m a n . In

real i ty , i t w a s the oppos i t e that happened . T h i n g s first o f all r e c e i v e d a

h is tor ic i ty p r o p e r t o t h e m , w h i c h freed t h e m f r o m the c o n t i n u o u s space

that i m p o s e d the s a m e c h r o n o l o g y u p o n t h e m a s u p o n m e n . S o that m a n

f o u n d h i m s e l f dispossessed o f w h a t cons t i tu ted the m o s t manifes t contents

o f his h i s to ry : na tu re n o l o n g e r speaks t o h i m o f the c rea t ion o r the end

o f the w o r l d , o f his d e p e n d e n c y o r his a p p r o a c h i n g j u d g e m e n t ; i t n o

l o n g e r speaks o f a n y t h i n g b u t a natura l t i m e ; its w e a l t h n o l o n g e r i n ­

dicates t o h i m the an t iqu i ty o r the i m m i n e n t re turn o f a G o l d e n A g e ; i t

speaks o n l y o f cond i t i ons o f p r o d u c t i o n b e i n g m o d i f i e d i n the cour se o f

h i s to ry ; l a n g u a g e n o l o n g e r bears the m a r k s o f a t i m e be fo re B a b e l o r o f

the first cries that r a n g t h r o u g h the j u n g l e ; i t carr ies the w e a p o n s of its

o w n affiliation. T h e h u m a n b e i n g n o l o n g e r has a n y h i s to ry : o r rather,

since he speaks, w o r k s , and l ives , he finds h i m s e l f i n t e r w o v e n in his o w n

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b e i n g w i t h histories that are nei ther subord ina te t o h i m n o r h o m o g e n e o u s

w i t h h i m . B y the f r agmen ta t i on o f the space o v e r w h i c h Class ical k n o w ­

l e d g e e x t e n d e d i n its con t inu i ty , b y the f o l d i n g o v e r o f each separated

d o m a i n u p o n its o w n d e v e l o p m e n t , the m a n w h o appears a t the b e g i n n i n g

o f the n ine teen th c e n t u r y i s ' deh i s to r i c i zed ' .

A n d the i m a g i n a t i v e va lues then assumed b y the past, the w h o l e

ly r i ca l h a l o that su r rounded the consciousness o f h i s to ry a t that p e r i o d ,

the l i v e l y cur ios i ty s h o w n for d o c u m e n t s o r for traces left beh ind by t i m e

- all this is a surface express ion of the s imple fact that m a n f o u n d h i m s e l f

e m p t i e d o f h i s to ry , b u t that h e w a s a l ready b e g i n n i n g t o r e c o v e r i n the

depths o f his o w n b e i n g , and a m o n g all the th ings that w e r e still c apab le

o f ref lect ing his i m a g e (the others h a v e fallen silent and fo lded b a c k u p o n

themse lves ) , a h i s to r i c i ty l inked essentially to m a n himself . B u t this h i s ­

to r i c i ty i s i m m e d i a t e l y a m b i g u o u s . S ince m a n posits h i m s e l f i n the f i e ld o f

pos i t i ve k n o w l e d g e o n l y in so far as he speaks, w o r k s , and l ives , can his

h i s to ry e v e r b e a n y t h i n g b u t the inex t r i cab le n e x u s o f different t imes ,

w h i c h are f o r e ign t o h i m and h e t e r o g e n e o u s i n respect o f o n e ano ther?

W i l l the h i s to ry o f m a n e v e r b e m o r e than a sor t o f m o d u l a t i o n c o m m o n

t o changes i n the cond i t ions o f life (c l imate , soi l fer t i l i ty, m e t h o d s o f

agr icu l tu re , exp lo i t a t i on o f w e a l t h ) , t o t ransformat ions i n the e c o n o m y

(and consequen t l y in soc ie ty and its inst i tut ions) , and to the succession of

f o r m s and usages in l a n g u a g e ? B u t , in that case, m a n i s n o t h i m s e l f h i s ­

to r i ca l : since t i m e c o m e s t o h i m f r o m s o m e w h e r e o the r than himself , h e

const i tutes h i m s e l f a s a subject o f h i s to ry o n l y b y the supe r impos i t ion o f

the h i s to ry o f l i v i n g be ings , the h i s to ry o f th ings , and the h i s to ry o f w o r d s .

He i s subjected to the p u r e events those histories con ta in . B u t this re la t ion

o f s imple pass iv i ty i s i m m e d i a t e l y r eve r sed ; fo r w h a t speaks i n l a n g u a g e ,

w h a t w o r k s and c o n s u m e s i n e c o n o m i c s , w h a t l ives i n h u m a n life, i s m a n

h imsel f ; and, this b e i n g so , he t o o has a r i g h t to a d e v e l o p m e n t qui te as

pos i t i ve as that o f be ings and th ings , o n e no less a u t o n o m o u s - and p e r ­

haps e v e n m o r e fundamenta l : i s i t n o t a h is tor ic i ty p r o p e r to m a n , o n e

inscr ibed i n the v e r y depths o f his b e i n g , that enables h i m to adapt h i m s e l f

l ike a n y l i v i n g b e i n g , and t o e v o l v e l ike a n y l i v i n g b e i n g ( t h o u g h w i t h

the h e l p o f too l s , t echniques , and o rgan iza t ions b e l o n g i n g t o n o o the r

l i v i n g b e i n g ) , that enables h i m t o i n v e n t f o r m s o f p r o d u c t i o n , t o stabil ize,

p r o l o n g , o r a b r i d g e the v a l i d i t y o f e c o n o m i c l a w s b y means o f the c o n ­

sciousness h e attains o f t h e m and b y means o f the insti tutions h e const ructs

u p o n o r a r o u n d t h e m , and that enables h i m t o exerc ise u p o n l a n g u a g e ,

w i t h e v e r y w o r d h e speaks, a sort o f cons tant in ter ior pressure w h i c h

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m a k e s i t shift i m p e r c e p t i b l y u p o n i tse l f a t a n y g i v e n m o m e n t in t i m e .

T h u s , b e h i n d the h i s to ry o f the posi t iv i t ies , there appears ano ther , m o r e

radical , h i s to ry , that o f m a n h i m s e l f - a h i s tory that n o w conce rns m a n ' s

v e r y b e i n g , since he n o w realizes that he n o t o n l y 'has h i s to ry ' all a r o u n d

h i m , b u t i s himself , i n his o w n his tor ic i ty , that by means o f w h i c h a

h i s to ry o f h u m a n life, a h i s to ry o f e c o n o m i c s , and a h i s to ry o f l anguages

are g i v e n their f o r m . In w h i c h case, a t a v e r y d e e p l eve l , there exists a

h is tor ic i ty o f m a n w h i c h i s i t se l f its o w n h i s to ry b u t also the radical d i s ­

pers ion that p r o v i d e s a founda t ion fo r all o the r histories. I t w a s j u s t this

p r i m a r y e ros ion that the n ine teen th c e n t u r y s o u g h t in its c o n c e r n to

h is tor ic ize e v e r y t h i n g , t o w r i t e a genera l h i s to ry o f e v e r y t h i n g , t o g o b a c k

ceaselessly t h r o u g h t ime , and to p lace the m o s t stable o f th ings in the

l ibera t ing s t ream o f t ime . H e r e aga in , w e shou ld n o d o u b t rev ise the w a y

i n w h i c h w e t rad i t iona l ly w r i t e the h i s to ry o f H i s t o r y ; w e are a c c u s t o m e d

to s a y i n g that the n ine teen th c e n t u r y b r o u g h t an end to the p u r e c h r o n i c l e

o f even ts , the s imp le m e m o r y o f a past p e o p l e d o n l y b y ind iv idua l s a n d

accidents , and that i t b e g a n the search for the genera l l a w s o f d e v e l o p m e n t .

I n fact, n o h i s to ry w a s e v e r m o r e ' e x p l a n a t o r y ' , m o r e p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h

genera l l a w s a n d constants , than w e r e the histories o f the Class ical a g e -

w h e n the w o r l d a n d m a n w e r e inex t r i cab ly l i n k e d i n a s ingle h i s to ry .

W h a t first c o m e s to l igh t i n the n ine teen th c e n t u r y i s a s imp le f o r m o f

h u m a n h is tor ic i ty - the fact that m a n as such is e x p o s e d to the e v e n t .

H e n c e the c o n c e r n e i ther to f ind l a w s for this p u r e f o r m ( w h i c h g i v e s us

ph i losoph ies such a s that o f S p e n g l e r ) o r t o de f ine i t on the basis o f the

fact that m a n l ives , w o r k s , speaks, and th inks : and this g i v e s us in te r ­

pretat ions o f h i s t o ry f r o m the s tandpoin t o f m a n e n v i s a g e d a s a l i v i n g

species, o r f r o m the s tandpoin t o f e c o n o m i c l a w s , o r f r o m that o f cu l tura l

totali t ies.

I n a n y case, this a r r a n g e m e n t o f h i s to ry w i t h i n the ep i s t emo log i ca l

space i s o f g rea t i m p o r t a n c e for its re la t ion w i t h the h u m a n sciences. S ince

his tor ical m a n i s l i v i n g , w o r k i n g , and s p e a k i n g m a n , a n y con t en t o f

H i s t o r y i s the p r o v i n c e o f p s y c h o l o g y , s o c i o l o g y , o r the sciences o f l an­

g u a g e . B u t , i nve r se ly , s ince the h u m a n b e i n g has b e c o m e historical ,

t h r o u g h and t h r o u g h , n o n e o f the con ten ts ana lysed b y the h u m a n

sciences can r ema in stable i n i tse l f o r escape the m o v e m e n t o f H i s t o r y .

A n d this for t w o reasons : because p s y c h o l o g y , s o c i o l o g y , a n d p h i l o s o p h y ,

e v e n w h e n appl ied to objects - that is, m e n - w h i c h are c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s

w i t h t h e m , are n e v e r d i rec ted a t a n y t h i n g o the r than s y n c h r o n o l o g i c a l

pa t tc rn ings w i t h i n a h is tor ic i ty that const i tutes and traverses t h e m ; and

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because the fo rms success ively t aken by the h u m a n sciences, the c h o i c e o f

objects t h e y m a k e , and the m e t h o d s t h e y a p p l y to t h e m , are all p r o v i d e d

by H i s t o r y , ceaselessly b o r n e a l o n g by it, and m o d i f i e d a t its p leasure .

T h e m o r e H i s t o r y a t tempts t o t ranscend its o w n roo tcdness i n h is tor ic i ty ,

and the g rea te r the efforts i t m a k e s to attain, b e y o n d the historical re la ­

t i v i t y o f its o r i g i n a n d its cho ices , the sphere o f un iversa l i ty , the m o r e

c lea r ly i t bears the m a r k s o f its his tor ical b i r th , and the m o r e e v i d e n t l y

there appears t h r o u g h i t the h i s to ry of w h i c h i t i s i t se l f a par t (and this,

aga in , i s to be f o u n d in S p e n g l e r a n d all the ph i losophers o f h i s t o r y ) ;

inverse ly , the m o r e i t accepts its re la t iv i ty , a n d the m o r e d e e p l y i t sinks

in to the m o v e m e n t i t shares w i t h w h a t i t i s r e c o u n t i n g , then the m o r e i t

tends to the slenderness of the nar ra t ive , and all the pos i t i ve c o n t e n t i t

ob t a ined for i t se l f t h r o u g h the h u m a n sciences i s dissipated.

H i s t o r y const i tutes , therefore , for the h u m a n sciences, a f avou rab l e

e n v i r o n m e n t w h i c h i s b o t h p r i v i l e g e d and d a n g e r o u s . T o each o f the

sciences o f m a n i t offers a b a c k g r o u n d , w h i c h establishes i t and p r o v i d e s

i t w i t h a f i x e d g r o u n d and , as i t w e r e , a h o m e l a n d ; i t de te rmines the

cu l tura l area - the c h r o n o l o g i c a l and g e o g r a p h i c a l boundar i e s - in w h i c h

that b r anch o f k n o w l e d g e can b e r e c o g n i z e d a s h a v i n g v a l i d i t y ; b u t i t

also sur rounds the sciences o f m a n w i t h a f ront ier that l imits t h e m and

des t roys , f r o m the outset , their c l a i m t o v a l i d i t y w i t h i n the e l e m e n t o f

universa l i ty . I t reveals in this w a y that t h o u g h m a n - e v e n before k n o w ­

i n g i t - has a l w a y s been subjected to the de te rmina t ions that can be e x ­

pressed by p s y c h o l o g y , s o c i o l o g y , and the analysis o f l a n g u a g e , he i s n o t

therefore the i n t e m p o r a l ob j ec t o f a k n o w l e d g e w h i c h , a t least a t the l eve l

o f its r ights , m u s t i t se l f b e t h o u g h t o f a s ageless. E v e n w h e n t h e y a v o i d all

reference to h i s tory , the h u m a n sciences (and h i s to ry m a y be i n c l u d e d

a m o n g t h e m ) n e v e r d o a n y t h i n g bu t relate o n e cul tura l ep i sode t o ano the r

(that to w h i c h t h e y a p p l y themse lves a s their ob jec t , and that in w h i c h

their exis tence , their m o d e o f b e i n g , their m e t h o d s , and their concep t s

h a v e their r o o t s ) ; and t h o u g h they a p p l y themse lves t o their o w n s y n -

c h r o n o l o g y , t h e y relate the cu l tura l ep isode f r o m w h i c h t h e y e m e r g e d t o

itself. M a n , therefore , n e v e r appears in his pos i t iv i ty and that pos i t i v i t y i s

n o t i m m e d i a t e l y l imi t ed b y the limitlessness o f H i s t o r y .

H e r e we see b e i n g recons t i tu ted a m o v e m e n t a n a l o g o u s t o that w h i c h

an ima ted f r o m w i t h i n the ent ire d o m a i n o f the h u m a n sciences: a s

ana lysed a b o v e , this m o v e m e n t pe rpe tua l ly referred cer ta in posi t ivi t ies

d e t e r m i n i n g m a n ' s b e i n g to the f in i tude that caused those same posi t ivi t ies

to appear ; so that the sciences w e r e themse lves taken up in that g rea t

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372

osci l la t ion, b u t in such a w a y that t h e y in turn t o o k i t up in the f o r m of

their o w n pos i t i v i t y b y seek ing t o m o v e ceaselessly b a c k w a r d s and f o r ­

w a r d s b e t w e e n the consc ious and the unconsc ious . A n d n o w w e f ind the

b e g i n n i n g of a s imilar osci l la t ion in the case o f H i s t o r y ; b u t this t i m e i t

does n o t m o v e b e t w e e n the pos i t i v i t y o f m a n taken a s ob jec t (and

e m p i r i c a l l y manifes ted by l a b o u r , life, and l a n g u a g e ) and the radical l imits

o f his b e i n g ; i t m o v e s instead b e t w e e n the t e m p o r a l l imits that def ine the

par t icular f o r m s o f l abour , l ife, and l a n g u a g e , a n d the his tor ical pos i t i v i t y

o f the subject w h i c h , b y m e a n s o f k n o w l e d g e , ga ins access t o t h e m . H e r e

aga in , the subject and the ob jec t are b o u n d t o g e t h e r in a r ec ip roca l q u e s ­

t i on ing o f o n e ano the r ; b u t w h e r e a s , be fore , this ques t ion ing t o o k p lace

w i t h i n pos i t i ve k n o w l e d g e itself, and b y the p rog re s s ive u n v e i l i n g o f the

unconsc ious by consciousness , here i t takes p lace on the ou t e r l imits o f the

ob jec t a n d subject ; i t designates the e ros ion to w h i c h b o t h are subjected,

the dispersion that creates a hiatus b e t w e e n t h e m , w r e n c h i n g t h e m loose

f r o m a c a l m , r o o t e d , and def in i t ive pos i t iv i ty . B y u n v e i l i n g the u n c o n ­

scious as their m o s t fundamen ta l objec t , the h u m a n sciences s h o w e d that

there w a s a l w a y s s o m e t h i n g still t o be t h o u g h t i n w h a t had a l r eady b e e n

t h o u g h t on a manifes t l e v e l ; by r evea l i ng the l a w o f t ime a s the ex te rna l

b o u n d a r y o f the h u m a n sciences, H i s t o r y s h o w s that e v e r y t h i n g that has

been t h o u g h t w i l l be t h o u g h t aga in by a t h o u g h t that does n o t y e t exis t .

B u t perhaps all w e h a v e here , i n the conc re t e f o r m s o f the unconsc ious and

H i s t o r y , i s the t w o faces o f that f in i tude w h i c h , by d i s c o v e r i n g that i t

w a s its o w n founda t ion , caused the f i gu re o f m a n t o appear i n the n i n e ­

teenth c e n t u r y : a f in i tude w i t h o u t inf ini ty is no d o u b t a f in i tude that has

n e v e r f inished, that i s a l w a y s in recession w i t h re la t ion to itself, that

a l w a y s has s o m e t h i n g still t o th ink a t the v e r y m o m e n t w h e n i t th inks ,

that a l w a y s has t i m e to t h ink aga in w h a t i t has t h o u g h t .

I n m o d e r n t h o u g h t , h i s to r ic i sm and the ana ly t ic o f f in i tude con f ron t

o n e ano ther . H i s to r i c i sm i s a m e a n s of v a l i d a t i n g fo r i t se l f the pe rpe tua l

cri t ical re la t ion a t p l a y b e t w e e n H i s t o r y and the h u m a n sciences. B u t i t

establishes i t so le ly a t the l e v e l o f the pos i t iv i t ies : the pos i t i ve k n o w l e d g e

o f m a n i s l i m i t e d b y the his tor ical pos i t i v i t y o f the k n o w i n g subject , s o

that the m o m e n t o f f in i tude i s d i sso lved in the p l a y o f a re la t iv i ty f r o m

w h i c h i t c a n n o t escape, a n d w h i c h i tse l f has v a l u e a s an absolu te . To be

finite, then, w o u l d s i m p l y be t o be t r apped in the l a w s o f a pe r spec t ive

w h i c h , w h i l e a l l o w i n g a cer ta in apprehens ion - o f the t y p e o f pe rcep t ion

or unders tand ing - p reven t s i t f r o m e v e r b e i n g universa l and def in i t ive

in te l lec t ion . A l l k n o w l e d g e is r o o t e d in a life, a soc ie ty , and a l a n g u a g e

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373

that h a v e a h i s to ry ; a n d i t i s in that v e r y h i s to ry that k n o w l e d g e f inds the

e l e m e n t e n a b l i n g i t t o c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h o t h e r f o r m s o f l i fe , o the r types

o f soc ie ty , o the r s ignif icat ions: that i s w h y h is tor ic i sm a l w a y s impl ies a

cer ta in p h i l o s o p h y , o r a t least a cer ta in m e t h o d o l o g y , o f l i v i n g c o m p r e ­

hens ion (in the e l e m e n t o f the Lebenswelt), o f i n t e r h u m a n c o m m u n i c a t i o n

(against a b a c k g r o u n d o f social s t ructures) , a n d o f he rmeneu t i c s (as the

re -apprehens ion t h r o u g h the manifest m e a n i n g o f the discourse o f ano the r

m e a n i n g a t o n c e s e c o n d a r y and p r i m a r y , that is, m o r e h idden b u t also

m o r e fundamenta l ) . B y this means , the different posi t iv i t ies f o r m e d b y

H i s t o r y and la id d o w n in i t are ab le t o enter i n to c o n t a c t w i t h o n e ano ther ,

su r round o n e ano the r i n the f o r m o f k n o w l e d g e , a n d free the c o n t e n t

d o r m a n t w i t h i n t h e m ; i t i s no t , then, the l imi ts themse lves that appear , in

their absolu te r i g o u r , b u t part ia l totalit ies, totali t ies that tu rn o u t to be

l imi ted b y fact , totalit ies w h o s e frontiers c a n b e m a d e t o m o v e , u p t o a

cer ta in po in t , b u t w h i c h w i l l n e v e r e x t e n d in to the space o f a de f in i t ive

analysis , and w i l l n e v e r raise themse lves t o the status o f abso lu te to ta l i ty .

T h i s i s w h y the analysis o f f in i tude n e v e r ceases to use, a s a w e a p o n

against h is tor ic ism, the pa r t o f i t se l f that h is tor ic ism has n e g l e c t e d : its a i m

i s to r evea l , a t the founda t ion o f all the posi t ivi t ies a n d be fo re t h e m , the

f in i tude that m a k e s t h e m poss ib le ; w h e r e h i s to r ic i sm s o u g h t fo r the poss i ­

b i l i ty and jus t i f ica t ion o f conc re t e relat ions b e t w e e n l imi t ed total i t ies,

w h o s e m o d e o f b e i n g w a s p r ede t e rmined b y life, o r b y social f o r m s , o r

b y the signif icat ions o f l a n g u a g e , the ana ly t i c o f f in i tude tries t o ques t ion

this re la t ion o f the h u m a n b e i n g t o the b e i n g w h i c h , b y des igna t ing

f in i tude, renders the posi t iv i t ies poss ible i n their c o n c r e t e m o d e o f

b e i n g .

V P S Y C H O A N A L Y S I S A N D E T H N O L O G Y

Psychoana lys i s a n d e t h n o l o g y o c c u p y a p r i v i l e g e d pos i t ion i n o u r k n o w ­

l e d g e - no t because t h e y h a v e established the founda t ions o f their p o s i ­

t i v i t y bet ter than a n y o the r h u m a n science, and a t last a c c o m p l i s h e d the

o l d a t t emp t t o b e t ru ly scientific; b u t ra ther because, o n the conf ines o f

all the branches o f k n o w l e d g e inves t iga t ing m a n , t h e y f o r m a n u n d o u b t e d

and inexhaus t ib le t reasure-hoard o f exper iences and concep t s , and a b o v e

all a perpe tua l p r inc ip le o f dissatisfaction, o f ca l l ing in to ques t ion , o f

c r i t ic i sm and contes ta t ion o f w h a t m a y seem, i n o t h e r respects, t o b e

established. N o w , there is a reason fo r this that conce rns the ob jec t t h e y

r e spec t ive ly g i v e t o o n e ano ther , b u t conce rns e v e n m o r e the pos i t ion t h e y

T H E O R D E R O P T H I N G S

o c c u p y and the func t ion t h e y p e r f o r m w i t h i n the genera l space o f the

episteme.

Psychoana lys i s stands as c lose as possible , in fact , to that cr i t ical func t ion

w h i c h , a s we h a v e seen, exists w i t h i n all the h u m a n sciences. In se t t ing

i tse l f the task o f m a k i n g the discourse o f the unconsc ious speak t h r o u g h

consciousness , p sychoana lys i s i s a d v a n c i n g in the d i rec t ion of that funda ­

m e n t a l r e g i o n i n w h i c h the relat ions o f representa t ion and f in i tude c o m e

in to p l a y . W h e r e a s all the h u m a n sciences a d v a n c e t o w a r d s the u n c o n ­

scious o n l y w i t h their b a c k to it, w a i t i n g fo r i t to u n v e i l i t se l f as fast as

consciousness i s ana lysed , as i t w e r e b a c k w a r d s , p sychoana lys i s , on the

o the r hand , po in t s d i r ec t ly t o w a r d s it, w i t h a del ibera te p u r p o s e - n o t

t o w a r d s that w h i c h m u s t b e r endered g r a d u a l l y m o r e exp l i c i t b y the p r o ­

gress ive i l l umina t ion o f the impl ic i t , b u t t o w a r d s w h a t i s there and y e t i s

h idden , t o w a r d s w h a t exists w i t h the m u t e so l id i ty o f a t h ing , o f a t ex t

c losed in u p o n itself, or of a b l ank space in a v i s ib le tex t , a n d uses that

qua l i ty to de fend itself. I t m u s t n o t be supposed that the Freudian a p p r o a c h

i s the c o m b i n a t i o n o f a n in terpreta t ion o f m e a n i n g a n d a d y n a m i c s o f

resistance o r de fence ; by f o l l o w i n g the same p a t h a s the h u m a n sciences,

bu t w i t h its g a z e tu rned the o t h e r w a y , psychoana lys i s m o v e s t o w a r d s the

m o m e n t - b y def in i t ion inaccessible t o a n y theore t ica l k n o w l e d g e o f m a n ,

t o a n y c o n t i n u o u s apprehens ion i n te rms o f s igni f ica t ion, confl ic t , o r

func t ion - a t w h i c h the con ten ts o f consciousness art iculate themse lves , o r

ra ther s tand g a p i n g , u p o n m a n ' s f in i tude . T h i s m e a n s that, un l ike the

h u m a n sciences, w h i c h , e v e n w h i l e t u rn ing b a c k t o w a r d s the u n c o n ­

scious, a l w a y s r e m a i n w i t h i n the space o f the representable , p s y c h o ­

analysis advances a n d leaps o v e r representat ion, o v e r f l o w s i t o n the side o f

f in i tude, and thus revea ls , w h e r e o n e h a d e x p e c t e d funct ions bea r ing their

n o r m s , confl icts b u r d e n e d w i t h rules, and s ignif icat ions f o r m i n g a sys tem,

the s imp le fact tha t i t i s poss ible fo r there to be s y s t e m (therefore s i g ­

n i f ica t ion) , ru le ( therefore conf l ic t ) , n o r m (therefore func t ion) . A n d i n

this r e g i o n w h e r e representa t ion remains i n suspense, o n the e d g e o f

itself, o p e n , i n a sense, t o the c losed b o u n d a r y o f f in i tude, we f i nd o u t ­

l ined the three f i g u r e s b y m e a n s o f w h i c h life, w i t h its func t ion and n o r m s ,

attains its f o u n d a t i o n in the m u t e repet i t ion o f D e a t h , confl icts a n d rules

their f ounda t ion i n the n a k e d o p e n i n g o f Des i r e , s ignif icat ions and

systems their f o u n d a t i o n in a l a n g u a g e w h i c h i s a t the s a m e t ime L a w .

W e k n o w that p sycho log i s t s a n d ph i losophers h a v e dismissed all this a s

Freudian m y t h o l o g y . I t w a s indeed inev i tab le that this a p p r o a c h o f

Freud 's s h o u l d h a v e appeared t o t h e m in this w a y ; t o a k n o w l e d g e

374

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situated w i t h i n the representablc , all that f rames and defines, on the o u t ­

side, the v e r y poss ibi l i ty o f representat ion can b e n o t h i n g o the r than

m y t h o l o g y . B u t w h e n o n e f o l l o w s the m o v e m e n t o f psychoana lys i s a s i t

progresses , o r w h e n o n e traverses the ep i s t emo log i ca l space as a w h o l e ,

o n e sees that these f igures are in fact - t h o u g h i m a g i n a r y no d o u b t to the

m y o p i c g a z e - the v e r y f o r m s o f f in i tude , a s i t i s ana lysed in m o d e r n

t h o u g h t . I s dea th n o t that u p o n the basis o f w h i c h k n o w l e d g e in genera l i s

possible - so m u c h so that we can t h i n k o f i t a s b e i n g , i n the area o f

psychoana lys i s , the f igure of that empi r i co - t ranscenden ta l duplication that

character izes m a n ' s m o d e o f b e i n g w i t h i n f in i tude? I s desire n o t that

w h i c h remains a l w a y s unthought a t the hear t o f t h o u g h t ? A n d the l a w -

l a n g u a g e (at o n c e w o r d and w o r d - s y s t e m ) that psychoana lys i s takes such

pains to m a k e speak, i s i t n o t that in w h i c h all s ignif icat ion assumes an

origin m o r e distant than itself, b u t also that w h o s e re turn is p r o m i s e d in

the v e r y ac t o f analysis? I t i s i n d e e d t rue that this D e a t h , and this Des i r e ,

and this L a w c a n n e v e r m e e t w i t h i n the k n o w l e d g e that t raverses i n

its pos i r iv i ty the empi r i ca l d o m a i n o f m a n ; b u t the reason for this i s that

t hey des ignate the cond i t ions o f poss ib i l i ty o f all k n o w l e d g e a b o u t m a n .

A n d prec ise ly w h e n this l a n g u a g e e m e r g e s in all its n u d i t y , y e t a t the

same t ime e ludes all s ignif ica t ion as i f i t w e r e a vas t and e m p t y despot ic

sy s t em, w h e n D e s i r e re igns in the w i l d state, a s i f the r i g o u r o f its ru le

h a d l eve l l ed all oppos i t i on , w h e n D e a t h domina t e s e v e r y p s y c h o l o g i c a l

func t ion and stands a b o v e i t as its u n i q u e and devas ta t ing n o r m - then we

r e c o g n i z e madness in its present f o r m , madness as i t is pos i ted in the

m o d e r n expe r i ence , as its t ru th and its a l ter i ty . In this f i gu re , w h i c h is at

o n c e empi r i ca l a n d y e t f o r e i g n t o (and in) all that w e can expe r i ence , o u r

consciousness n o l o n g e r f i n d s - a s i t d id i n the s ix teen th c e n t u r y - t h e

trace o f ano the r w o r l d ; i t n o l o n g e r observes the w a n d e r i n g o f a s t r ay ing

reason; i t sees w e l l i n g up that w h i c h is, pe r i lous ly , nearest to us - as if,

sudden ly , the v e r y h o l l o w n e s s o f o u r exis tence i s ou t l ined i n relief; t h e

f in i tude u p o n the basis o f w h i c h w e are, and th ink , and k n o w , i s s u d d e n l y

there before us : an ex is tence a t o n c e real and imposs ib le , t h o u g h t that we

c a n n o t th ink , an ob jec t for o u r k n o w l e d g e that a l w a y s e ludes it. T h i s i s

w h y psychoana lys i s f inds in that madness par excellence - w h i c h p s y c h i a ­

trists t e r m sch izophren ia - its in t imate , its m o s t i nv inc ib l e to r tu re : for ,

g i v e n i n this f o r m o f madness , i n an abso lu te ly manifes t a n d abso lu te ly

w i t h d r a w n f o r m , are the f o r m s o f f in i tude t o w a r d s w h i c h i t usua l ly

advances unceas ing ly (and i n t e r m i n a b l y ) f r o m the s ta r t ing-poin t o f that

w h i c h i s v o l u n t a r i l y - i n v o l u n t a r i l y offered to i t in the pat ient ' s l a n g u a g e .

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S o psychoana lys i s ' r e c o g n i z e s i t s e l f w h e n i t i s c o n f r o n t e d w i t h those v e r y

psychoses w h i c h never theless (or rather, fo r that v e r y reason) i t has

scarce ly a n y m e a n s o f r e a c h i n g : a s i f the psychos i s w e r e d i sp l ay ing in a

s a v a g e i l lumina t ion , a n d of fer ing in a m o d e n o t t o o distant b u t j u s t t o o

c lose , that t o w a r d s w h i c h analysis m u s t m a k e its l abor ious w a y .

B u t this re la t ion o f psychoana lys i s w i t h w h a t m a k e s all k n o w l e d g e i n

g e n e r a l poss ible i n the sphere o f the h u m a n sciences has y e t ano the r c o n ­

sequence - n a m e l y , that psychoana lys i s c a n n o t be d e p l o y e d as p u r e s p e c u ­

la t ive k n o w l e d g e or as a genera l t h e o r y of m a n . I t c a n n o t span the entire

f i e l d o f representat ion, a t t emp t t o e v a d e its f ront iers , o r p o i n t t o w a r d s

w h a t i s m o r e fundamenta l , i n the f o r m o f an empi r i ca l sc ience cons t ruc ted

o n the basis o f careful o b s e r v a t i o n ; that b r e a k t h r o u g h c a n b e m a d e o n l y

w i t h i n the l imits o f a p rax i s i n w h i c h i t i s n o t o n l y the k n o w l e d g e w e

h a v e o f m a n that i s i n v o l v e d , bu t m a n h i m s e l f - m a n t o g e t h e r w i t h the

D e a t h that i s a t w o r k in his suffering, the D e s i r e that has lost its ob jec t ,

and the l a n g u a g e b y m e a n s o f w h i c h , t h r o u g h w h i c h , his L a w i s s i lent ly

ar t icula ted. A l l ana ly t ic k n o w l e d g e i s thus i n v i n c i b l y l i nked w i t h a praxis ,

w i t h that s t rangula t ion p r o d u c e d b y the re la t ion b e t w e e n t w o indiv iduals ,

o n c o f w h o m i s l i s tening t o the o ther ' s l a n g u a g e , thus f ree ing his desire

f r o m the ob jec t i t has lost ( m a k i n g h i m unders tand he has lost i t ) , l iber ­

a t ing h i m f r o m the eve r - repea ted p r o x i m i t y o f dea th ( m a k i n g h i m

unders tand that o n e d a y h e w i l l d i e ) . T h i s i s w h y n o t h i n g i s m o r e alien

t o psychoana lys i s than a n y t h i n g r e s e m b l i n g a gene ra l t h e o r y o f m a n o r an

a n t h r o p o l o g y .

Just as psychoana lys i s situates i tself in the d i m e n s i o n of the unconsc ious

( o f that cri t ical a n i m a t i o n w h i c h disturbs f r o m w i t h i n the ent ire d o m a i n

o f the sciences o f m a n ) , s o e t h n o l o g y situates i t se l f i n the d i m e n s i o n o f

h is tor ic i ty ( o f that pe rpe tua l osci l la t ion w h i c h i s the reason w h y the

h u m a n sciences are a l w a y s b e i n g contes ted , f r o m w i t h o u t , b y their o w n

h i s t o ry ) . I t is no d o u b t difficult to ma in ta in that e t h n o l o g y has a funda­

m e n t a l re la t ion w i t h h i s to r ic i ty since i t i s t rad i t iona l ly the k n o w l e d g e

w e h a v e o f peop l e s w i t h o u t his tor ies; i n a n y case, f t studies (both b y

sys temat ic c h o i c e and because o f the l ack o f d o c u m e n t s ) the structural

invar iab les o f cul tures rather than the succession o f even t s . I t suspends the

l o n g ' c h r o n o l o g i c a l ' d iscourse b y m e a n s o f w h i c h w e t ry t o reflect o u r

o w n cu l tu re w i t h i n itself, and instead i t reveals s y n c h r o n o l o g i c a l c o r r e ­

la t ions i n o the r cu l tura l fo rms . A n d y e t e t h n o l o g y i tse l f i s possible o n l y on

the basis o f a cer ta in s i tuat ion, o f an abso lu te ly s ingular e v e n t w h i c h

i n v o l v e s n o t o n l y o u r h is tor ic i ty bu t also that o f all m e n w h o can c o n -

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stitute the ob jec t o f an e t h n o l o g y (it b e i n g u n d e r s t o o d that we can p e r ­

fect ly w e l l app rehend o u r o w n soc ie ty ' s e t h n o l o g y ) : e t h n o l o g y has its

roo ts , in fact, in a poss ibi l i ty that p r o p e r l y b e l o n g s to the h i s to ry of o u r

cul ture , e v e n m o r e t o its fundamenta l re la t ion w i t h the w h o l e o f h i s to ry ,

and enables i t to l ink i tse l f to o the r cul tures in a m o d e of pu re t h e o r y .

T h e r e is a cer ta in pos i t ion of the W e s t e r n ratio tha t w a s cons t i tu ted in its

h i s to ry and p r o v i d e s a founda t ion for the re la t ion i t can h a v e w i t h all

o the r societies, e v e n w i t h the soc ie ty in w h i c h i t h is tor ica l ly appeared .

O b v i o u s l y , this does n o t m e a n that the c o l o n i z i n g s i tuat ion i s indispensable

to e t h n o l o g y : ne i ther hypnos i s , n o r the pat ient ' s a l ienat ion w i t h i n the

fantasmatic character o f the d o c t o r , i s cons t i tu t ive o f p sychoana lys i s ; b u t

jus t a s the latter can be d e p l o y e d o n l y in the c a l m v i o l e n c e o f a par t icular

re la t ionship and the transference i t p roduces , so e t h n o l o g y can assume its

p r o p e r d imens ions o n l y w i t h i n the his tor ical s o v e r e i g n t y - a l w a y s r e ­

strained, bu t a l w a y s present - o f E u r o p e a n t h o u g h t and the re la t ion that

can b r i n g i t face to face w i t h all o the r cul tures as w e l l as w i t h itself.

B u t this re la t ion (in so far as e t h n o l o g y does n o t seek to efface it , bu t

on the con t r a ry deepens i t by establ ishing i t se l f de f in i t ive ly w i t h i n it) does

n o t impr i son i t w i t h i n the c i rcular s y s t e m o f act ions and react ions p r o p e r

to h i s tor ic i sm; rather, i t places i t in a pos i t ion to f ind a w a y r o u n d that

d a n g e r b y i n v e r t i n g the m o v e m e n t that g a v e rise t o i t ; i n fact, instead o f

re la t ing empi r i ca l contents - as r evea l ed in p s y c h o l o g y , s o c i o l o g y , or the

analysis o f l i terature and m y t h - t o the historical pos i t i v i ty o f the subject

p e r c e i v i n g t h e m , e t h n o l o g y places the par t icular fo rms o f each cu l tu re ,

the differences that contras t i t w i t h o thers , the l imits by w h i c h i t defines

i tse l f and encloses i tself u p o n its o w n c o h e r e n c e , w i t h i n the d imens ion in

w h i c h its relat ions o c c u r w i t h each o f the three g rea t posi t ivi t ies (life, need

and l abour , a n d l a n g u a g e ) : thus, e t h n o l o g y s h o w s h o w , w i t h i n a g i v e n

cu l tu re , there o c c u r the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f the b r o a d b i o l o g i c a l funct ions ,

the rules that render poss ible o r o b l i g a t o r y all the fo rms o f e x c h a n g e ,

p r o d u c t i o n , and c o n s u m p t i o n , and the sys tems that are o r g a n i z e d a r o u n d

o r o n the m o d e l o f l inguist ic structures. E t h n o l o g y , then, advances

t o w a r d s that r e g i o n w h e r e the h u m a n sciences are ar t iculated u p o n that

b i o l o g y , that e c o n o m i c s , and that p h i l o l o g y and l inguist ics w h i c h , a s w e

h a v e seen, d o m i n a t e the h u m a n sciences f r o m such a v e r y g rea t h e i g h t :

this i s w h y the genera l p r o b l e m o f all e t h n o l o g y i s i n fact that o f the

relat ions ( o f con t i nu i t y o r d i scon t inu i ty ) b e t w e e n nature and cu l tu re .

B u t i n this m o d e o f ques t ion ing , the p r o b l e m o f h i s to ry i s f o u n d t o h a v e

been reversed : for i t then b e c o m e s a ma t t e r o f de t e rmin ing , a c c o r d i n g to

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378

the s y m b o l i c sys tems e m p l o y e d , a c c o r d i n g t o the p resc r ibed rules, a c c o r d ­

i n g t o the funct ional n o r m s chosen a n d l a id d o w n , w h a t sor t o f historical

d e v e l o p m e n t each cu l tu re i s suscept ib le o f ; i t i s s eek ing to r e - apprehend ,

i n its v e r y r o o t s , the m o d e o f h i s t o r i c i t y tha t m a y o c c u r w i t h i n that

cu l tu re , and the reasons w h y its h i s t o r y m u s t i n e v i t a b l y b e c u m u l a t i v e o r

c i rcular , p rog re s s ive o r subjected t o r e g u l a t i n g f l u c t u a t i o n s , capable o f

spon taneous adjustments o r subject to cr ises . A n d thus i s r evea l ed the

f o u n d a t i o n o f that h is tor ical f l o w w i t h i n w h i c h the different h u m a n

sciences assume their v a l i d i t y and c a n be a p p l i e d to a g i v e n cu l tu re and

u p o n a g i v e n s y n c h r o n o l o g i c a l area .

E t h n o l o g y , l i ke psychoana lys i s , ques t ions n o t m a n himself , a s he

appears i n the h u m a n sciences, b u t the r e g i o n tha t m a k e s poss ible k n o w ­

l e d g e a b o u t m a n in g e n e r a l ; l ike p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , i t spans the w h o l e f ield

o f that k n o w l e d g e in a m o v e m e n t tha t tends t o r each its bounda r i e s . B u t

psychoana lys i s m a k e s use o f the pa r t i cu la r r e l a t ion o f the transference i n

o r d e r t o r evea l , o n the ou t e r conf ines o f representa t ion , D e s i r e , L a w , and

D e a t h , w h i c h ou t l ine , a t the e x t r e m i t y o f ana ly t i c l a n g u a g e and prac t ice ,

the conc re t e f igures o f f in i tude ; e t h n o l o g y , on the o the r hand , i s s i tuated

w i t h i n the par t icular re la t ion that t he W e s t e r n ratio establishes w i t h all

o the r cu l tures ; and f r o m that s t a r t ing-po in t i t a v o i d s the representat ions

that m e n i n a n y c iv i l i za t ion m a y g i v e t h e m s e l v e s o f themse lves , o f their

life, o f their needs , o f the s ignif icat ions la id d o w n i n their l a n g u a g e ; and

i t sees e m e r g i n g beh ind those representa t ions the n o r m s b y w h i c h m e n

p e r f o r m the funct ions o f l ife, a l t h o u g h t h e y re jec t their i m m e d i a t e p res ­

sure, the rules t h r o u g h w h i c h they e x p e r i e n c e a n d main ta in their needs ,

the sys tems against the b a c k g r o u n d o f w h i c h all s ignif ica t ion i s g i v e n to

t h e m . T h e p r i v i l e g e o f e t h n o l o g y a n d p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , the reason for their

p r o f o u n d k inship and s y m m e t r y , m u s t n o t b e s o u g h t , therefore , i n s o m e

c o m m o n c o n c e r n t o p ie rce the p r o f o u n d e n i g m a , the m o s t secret par t

o f h u m a n na ture ; i n fact, w h a t i l lumina tes the space o f their d iscourse i s

m u c h m o r e the his tor ical a priori o f all the sciences o f m a n - those g rea t

caesuras, f u r r o w s , and d iv id ing - l ines w h i c h t raced m a n ' s ou t l ine in the

W e s t e r n episteme and m a d e h i m a poss ible area o f k n o w l e d g e . I t w a s

qui te inevi tab le , then, that t h e y s h o u l d b o t h b e sciences o f the u n c o n ­

sc ious : n o t because t hey reach d o w n t o w h a t i s b e l o w consciousness i n

m a n , b u t because t hey are d i rec ted t o w a r d s tha t w h i c h , outs ide m a n ,

m a k e s i t possible to k n o w , w i t h a pos i t i ve k n o w l e d g e , that w h i c h i s g i v e n

to or e ludes his consciousness .

On this basis, a cer ta in n u m b e r o f dec i s ive facts b e c o m e comprehens ib l e .

T H E H U M A N S C I E N C E S

A n d the f i r s t i s this: that p sychoana lys i s and e t h n o l o g y are n o t so m u c h

t w o h u m a n sciences a m o n g others , bu t that t h e y span the ent ire d o m a i n o f

those sciences, that t h e y an ima te its w h o l e surface, spread their concep t s

t h r o u g h o u t it, and are ab le t o p r o p o u n d their m e t h o d s o f d e c i p h e r m e n t

and their interpretat ions e v e r y w h e r e . N o h u m a n science can b e sure that

i t i s o u t o f their deb t , o r en t i re ly independen t o f w h a t t hey m a y h a v e

d i scove red , o r cer ta in o f n o t b e i n g b e h o l d e n t o t h e m i n o n e w a y o r

another . B u t their d e v e l o p m e n t has o n e par t icular feature, w h i c h i s that ,

despite their quas i -universa l ' b e a r i n g ' , t hey n e v e r , for all that, c o m e near

t o a genera l c o n c e p t o f m a n : a t n o m o m e n t d o t h e y c o m e near t o i so la t ing

a qua l i ty in h i m that i s specific, i r reducib le , a n d u n i f o r m l y v a l i d w h e r e v e r

he i s g i v e n to expe r i ence . T h e idea o f a ' p s y c h o a n a l y t i c a n t h r o p o l o g y ' , and

the idea o f a ' h u m a n na tu re ' recons t i tu ted by e t h n o l o g y , are no m o r e than

p ious wishes . N o t o n l y are t hey able t o d o w i t h o u t the c o n c e p t o f m a n ,

they are also unab le to pass t h r o u g h it, for t h e y a l w a y s address themse lves

t o that w h i c h const i tu tes his ou t e r l imits . O n e m a y say o f b o t h o f t h e m

w h a t Lev i -S t rauss said o f e t h n o l o g y : that t h e y d isso lve m a n . N o t that

there i s a n y ques t ion of r e v e a l i n g h i m in a bet ter , pure r , and as i t w e r e

m o r e l iberated state; b u t because t h e y g o b a c k t o w a r d s that w h i c h fomen t s

his pos i t iv i ty . In re la t ion to the ' h u m a n sciences ' , p sychoana lys i s and

e t h n o l o g y are ra ther ' coun te r - sc i ences ' ; w h i c h does n o t m e a n that t h e y

are less ' ra t iona l ' o r ' o b j e c t i v e ' than the o thers , b u t that t h e y f l o w in the

oppos i t e d i rec t ion , that t h e y lead t h e m b a c k to their ep i s t emo log i ca l

basis, and that t hey ceaselessly ' u n m a k e ' that v e r y m a n w h o i s c rea t ing

and re -c rea t ing his pos i t i v i t y i n the h u m a n sciences. Las t ly , we can u n d e r ­

stand w h y psychoana lys i s and e t h n o l o g y shou ld h a v e been cons t i tu ted i n

conf ron ta t ion , in a fundamen ta l co r re l a t ion : s ince Totem and taboo, the

es tabl ishment o f a c o m m o n f i e ld fo r these t w o , the poss ibi l i ty o f a d i s ­

cour se that c o u l d m o v e f r o m o n e t o the o the r w i t h o u t d i scon t inu i ty , the

d o u b l e ar t icula t ion o f the h i s to ry o f ind iv idua ls u p o n the unconsc ious o f

cu l ture , and o f the h is tor ic i ty o f those cul tures u p o n the unconsc ious o f

ind iv idua ls , has o p e n e d up , w i t h o u t d o u b t , the m o s t gene ra l p r o b l e m s

that can b e posed w i t h r e g a r d t o m a n .

O n e can i m a g i n e w h a t pres t ige and i m p o r t a n c e e t h n o l o g y c o u l d

possess if, instead of de f in ing i tse l f in the f irst p lace - as i t has d o n e unt i l

n o w - a s the s t u d y o f societies w i t h o u t h i s to ry , i t w e r e de l ibera te ly to

seek its ob jec t in the area of the unconsc ious processes that charac te r ize the

s y s t e m o f a g i v e n cu l tu re ; i n this w a y i t w o u l d b r i n g the re la t ion o f

h is tor ic i ty , w h i c h i s cons t i tu t ive o f all e t h n o l o g y in genera l , in to p l ay

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380

w i t h i n the d i m e n s i o n i n w h i c h psychoana lys i s has a l w a y s been d e p l o y e d .

In so d o i n g i t w o u l d n o t assimilate the m e c h a n i s m s and f o r m s o f a soc ie ty

t o the pressure and repression o f co l l e c t i ve hal lucinat ions , thus d i s c o v e r i n g

- t h o u g h on a l a rge r scale - w h a t analysis can d i s c o v e r a t the l eve l of the

i n d i v i d u a l ; i t w o u l d def ine as a s y s t e m of cu l tu ra l unconsc iouses the

to ta l i ty o f f o r m a l structures w h i c h render m y t h i c a l d iscourse signif icant ,

g i v e their c o h e r e n c e a n d necessi ty to the rules that regu la te needs , and

p r o v i d e the n o r m s o f life w i t h a founda t ion o the r than that t o be f o u n d

in nature , o r i n p u r e b i o l o g i c a l funct ions . O n e can i m a g i n e the s imilar

i m p o r t a n c e that a psychoana lys i s w o u l d h a v e i f i t w e r e to share the d i m e n ­

s ion o f a n e t h n o l o g y , n o t b y the es tabl ishment o f a ' cu l tu ra l p s y c h o l o g y ' ,

n o t b y the s o c i o l o g i c a l exp lana t ion o f p h e n o m e n a manifes ted a t the l eve l

o f ind iv idua ls , b u t b y the d i s c o v e r y that the unconsc ious also possesses,

or ra ther that i t is in itself, a cer tain f o r m a l s t ructure . By this means ,

e t h n o l o g y and psychoana lys i s w o u l d succeed, n o t i n s u p e r i m p o s i n g t h e m ­

selves o n o n e another , n o r e v e n perhaps i n c o m i n g t oge the r , b u t i n

in tersect ing l ike t w o lines different ly o r i en ted : o n e p r o c e e d i n g f r o m the

apparen t el ision of the s ignif ied in a neurosis to the lacuna in the s ign i fy ing

s y s t e m t h r o u g h w h i c h the neurosis f o u n d express ion ; the o the r p r o c e e d i n g

f r o m the a n a l o g y b e t w e e n the mu l t i p l e th ings s ignif ied (in m y t h o l o g i e s ,

for e x a m p l e ) t o the u n i t y o f a s t ructure w h o s e f o r m a l t ransformat ions

w o u l d y i e l d up the d ive r s i ty ex i s t ing in the actual stories. I t w o u l d thus

n o t be a t the l eve l o f the relat ions b e t w e e n the i nd iv idua l and soc ie ty , a s

has of ten been b e l i e v e d , that p sychoana lys i s and e t h n o l o g y c o u l d be a r t i cu ­

la ted o n e u p o n the o the r ; i t i s no t because the i nd iv idua l i s a par t of his

g r o u p , i t is n o t because a cu l tu re is reflected and expressed in a m o r e or

less dev ian t m a n n e r i n the i nd iv idua l , that these t w o f o r m s o f k n o w l e d g e

are n e i g h b o u r s . In fact, t h e y h a v e o n l y o n e p o i n t in c o m m o n , b u t i t i s

an essential a n d inev i t ab le o n e : the o n e a t w h i c h t h e y intersect a t r i g h t

angles ; fo r the s i gn i fy ing cha in b y w h i c h the u n i q u e expe r i ence o f the

i nd iv idua l is const i tu ted is pe rpend icu la r to the f o r m a l s y s t e m on the basis

o f w h i c h the s ignif icat ions o f a cu l tu re are cons t i tu ted : a t a n y g i v e n

instant, the s t ructure p r o p e r to i nd iv idua l expe r i ence f inds a cer ta in

n u m b e r o f possible cho ices (and o f e x c l u d e d possibil i t ies) i n the sys tems o f

the soc ie ty ; i nve r se ly , a t each o f their po in t s o f c h o i c e the social structures

e n c o u n t e r a cer ta in n u m b e r o f possible ind iv idua ls (and o thers w h o are

n o t ) - j u s t as the l inear s t ruc ture of l a n g u a g e a l w a y s p r o d u c e s a possible

c h o i c e b e t w e e n severa l w o r d s o r several p h o n e m e s a t a n y g i v e n m o m e n t

(but exc ludes all o thers ) .

T H E H U M A N S C I E N C E S

38i

W h e r e u p o n there i s f o r m e d the t h e m e o f a p u r e t h e o r y o f l a n g u a g e

w h i c h w o u l d p r o v i d e the e t h n o l o g y and the psychoana lys i s thus c o n ­

c e i v e d w i t h their f o r m a l m o d e l . T h e r e w o u l d thus be a discipl ine that

c o u l d c o v e r i n a s ingle m o v e m e n t b o t h the d i m e n s i o n o f e t h n o l o g y that

relates the h u m a n sciences to the posi t ivi t ies in w h i c h t h e y are f r a m e d a n d

the d i m e n s i o n o f psychoana lys i s that relates the k n o w l e d g e o f m a n t o the

f in i tude tha t g i v e s i t its founda t ion . In l inguist ics , o n e w o u l d h a v e a

science pe r fec t ly f o u n d e d i n the o r d e r o f posi t iv i t ies ex te r io r t o m a n

(since i t i s a ques t ion of p u r e l a n g u a g e ) , w h i c h , after t ravers ing the w h o l e

space o f the h u m a n sciences, w o u l d encoun te r the ques t ion o f f in i tude

(since i t i s t h r o u g h l a n g u a g e , and w i t h i n it, that t h o u g h t is ab le to t h ink :

so that i t i s in i t se l f a pos i t i v i t y w i t h the v a l u e of a fundamen ta l ) . A b o v e

e t h n o l o g y and psychoana lys i s , o r , m o r e e x a c t l y , i n t e r w o v e n w i t h t h e m ,

a th i rd ' coun te r - sc i ence ' w o u l d appear to t raverse , an imate , and dis turb

the w h o l e cons t i tu ted f i e l d o f the h u m a n sciences; and b y o v e r f l o w i n g i t

b o t h o n the side o f posi t iv i t ies a n d o n that o f f i n i t u d e , i t w o u l d f o r m the

m o s t genera l con tes ta t ion o f that f i e l d . L i k e the t w o o the r c o u n t e r -

sciences, i t w o u l d m a k e v is ib le , i n a d iscurs ive m o d e , the f ron t ie r - forms o f

the h u m a n sciences; l i ke t h e m , i t w o u l d situate its e x p e r i e n c e in those

en l i gh t ened and d a n g e r o u s r eg ions w h e r e the k n o w l e d g e o f m a n acts

o u t , i n the f o r m o f the unconsc ious a n d o f h is tor ic i ty , its re la t ion w i t h

w h a t renders t h e m possible . In ' e x p o s i n g ' it , these three counter - sc iences

threaten the v e r y t h i n g that m a d e i t poss ible fo r m a n t o b e k n o w n . T h u s

w e see the des t iny o f m a n b e i n g spun be fo re o u r v e r y eyes , b u t b e i n g

spun b a c k w a r d s ; i t i s b e i n g led b a c k , by those s t range b o b b i n s , t o the

f o r m s o f its b i r th , t o the h o m e l a n d that m a d e i t possible . A n d i s that n o t

o n e w a y o f b r i n g i n g a b o u t its end? Fo r l inguist ics n o m o r e speak o f m a n

h i m s e l f than d o psychoana lys i s and e t h n o l o g y .

I t m a y be said that, i n p l a y i n g this ro le , l inguist ics i s d o i n g no m o r e

than r e s u m i n g the funct ions that h a d o n c e b e e n those o f b i o l o g y o r o f

e c o n o m i c s , w h e n , i n the n ine teen th and ea r ly t w e n t i e t h centur ies , an

a t t e m p t w a s m a d e t o un i fy the h u m a n sciences unde r concep t s b o r r o w e d

f r o m b i o l o g y o r e c o n o m i c s . B u t l inguist ics m a y h a v e a m u c h m o r e

fundamenta l ro le . A n d for severa l reasons. First, because i t pe rmi t s - or

in a n y case str ives to render poss ible - the s t ruc tura t ion of contents t h e m ­

se lves ; i t i s therefore n o t a theore t ica l r e w o r k i n g o f k n o w l e d g e acqu i red

e l sewhere , the in terpre ta t ion o f a n a l r eady a c c o m p l i s h e d r ead ing o f

p h e n o m e n a ; i t does n o t offer a ' l inguis t ic v e r s i o n ' o f the facts o b s e r v e d in

the h u m a n sciences, i t i s ra ther the pr inc ip le of a p r i m a r y d e c i p h e r m e n t :

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

to a g a z e forearmed by l inguist ics , th ings attain to ex is tence o n l y in so far

a s t h e y are ab le to f o r m the e lements o f a s i g n i f y i n g sys t em. L ingu i s t i c

analysis is m o r e a p e r c e p t i o n than an e x p l a n a t i o n : that is, i t is cons t i tu t ive

o f its v e r y ob jec t . M o r e o v e r , w e f ind that b y m e a n s o f this e m e r g e n c e o f

s t ructure (as an invar iab le re la t ion w i t h i n a to ta l i ty of e l ement s ) the r e ­

la t ion o f the h u m a n sciences t o ma thema t i c s has been o p e n e d u p o n c e

m o r e , and in a w h o l l y n e w d i m e n s i o n ; i t i s no l o n g e r a ma t t e r o f k n o w i n g

w h e t h e r o n e c a n quan t i fy results, o r w h e t h e r h u m a n b e h a v i o u r i s sus­

cep t ib le o f b e i n g i n t r o d u c e d in to the field o f a measurab le p r o b a b i l i t y ;

the ques t ion that arises i s that of k n o w i n g w h e t h e r i t i s poss ible w i t h o u t

a p l a y on w o r d s t o e m p l o y the n o t i o n o f s t ructure , o r a t least w h e t h e r i t

is the same s t ructure that is referred to in ma thema t i c s a n d in the h u m a n

sciences: a ques t ion that i s central i f o n e wi shes to k n o w the possibili t ies

and r igh ts , the cond i t i ons a n d l imita t ions , o f a jus t i f ied fo rma l i za t i on ; i t

w i l l b e seen that the re la t ion o f the sciences o f m a n t o the axis o f the

f o r m a l and a priori discipl ines - a re la t ion that had n o t been essential till

then, a n d as l o n g as the a t t e m p t w a s m a d e to ident i fy i t w i t h the r i g h t to

measure - re turns to life and perhaps b e c o m e s fundamen ta l n o w that

with ' in the space o f the h u m a n sciences there e m e r g e s their re la t ion b o t h

t o the emp i r i ca l p o s i t i v i t y o f l a n g u a g e a n d t o the ana ly t i c o f f in i tude ; the

three axes w h i c h def ine the v o l u m e p r o p e r t o the sciences o f m a n thus

b e c o m e v is ib le , a n d a lmos t s imul t aneous ly so , i n the quest ions t h e y pose .

Las t ly , a s a result o f the i m p o r t a n c e o f l inguist ics a n d o f its app l ica t ion to

the k n o w l e d g e o f m a n , the ques t ion o f the b e i n g o f l a n g u a g e , w h i c h , a s

w e h a v e seen, i s s o in t ima te ly l i nked w i t h the fundamen ta l p r o b l e m s o f

o u r cu l ture , reappears in all its e n i g m a t i c insistence. W i t h the con t i nua l l y

e x t e n d e d use o f l inguis t ic ca tegor ies , i t i s a ques t ion o f g r o w i n g i m p o r t ­

ance , s ince w e m u s t hence fo r th ask ourse lves w h a t l a n g u a g e m u s t b e i n

o rde r to s t ructure in this w a y w h a t i s never theless n o t in i tse l f e i ther w o r d

o r discourse , and i n o rde r t o ar t iculate i t se l f o n the p u r e f o r m s o f k n o w ­

l e d g e . B y a m u c h l o n g e r a n d m u c h m o r e u n e x p e c t e d pa th , w e are led

b a c k to the p lace that N i e t z s c h e and Mallarme^ s ignpos ted w h e n the first

a sked : W h o speaks?, and the second s a w his g l i t t e r ing a n s w e r i n the W o r d

itself. T h e ques t ion as to w h a t l a n g u a g e i s in its b e i n g i s o n c e m o r e o f the

greatest u r g e n c y .

A t this po in t , w h e r e the ques t ion o f l a n g u a g e arises aga in w i t h such

h e a v y o v e r - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , and w h e r e i t seems to l a y s iege on e v e r y side

t o the f i gu re o f m a n (that f igu re w h i c h had o n c e taken the p lace o f

Class ical D i s c o u r s e ) , c o n t e m p o r a r y cu l tu re i s s t r u g g l i n g to create an

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383

important part of its present, and perhaps of its future. On the one hand,

suddenly very near to all these empirical domains, questions arise wh ich

before had seemed very distant from them: these questions concern a

general formalization of thought and knowledge; and at a t ime w h e n they

were still thought to be dedicated solely to the relation between logic and

mathematics, they suddenly open up the possibility, and the task, of

purifying the old empirical reason by constituting formal languages, and

of applying a second critique of pure reason on the basis of n e w forms of

the mathematical a priori. However , at the other extremity of our culture,

the question of language is entrusted to that form of speech which has no

doubt never ceased to pose it, but which is n o w , for the first time, posing

it to itself. That literature in our day is fascinated by the being of language

is neither the sign of an imminent end nor proo f of a radicalization: it is a

phenomenon whose necessity has its roots in a vast configuration in

which the w h o l e structure of our thought and our knowledge is traced.

But if the question of formal languages gives prominence to the possi­

bility or impossibility of structuring positive contents, a literature dedi­

cated to language gives prominence, in all their empirical vivacity, to the

fundamental forms of finitude. From within language experienced and

traversed as language, in the play of its possibilities extended to their

furthest point, what emerges is that man has 'come to an end', and that,

by reaching the summit of all possible speech, he arrives not at the very

heart of himself but at the brink of that which limits h im; in that region

where death prowls, where thought is extinguished, where the promise

of the origin interminably recedes. It was inevitable that this n e w m o d e

of being of literature should have been revealed in works like those of

Artaud or Roussel - and by men like them; in Artaud's work, language,

having been rejected as discourse and re-apprehended in the plastic

violence of the shock, is referred back to the cry, to the tortured body, to

the materiality of thought, to the flesh; in Roussel's work, language,

having been reduced to powder by a systematically fabricated chance,

recounts interminably the repetition of death and the enigma of divided

origins. A n d as if this experiencing of the forms of finitude in language

were insupportable, or inadequate (perhaps its very inadequacy was in­

supportable), it is within madness that it manifested itself - the figure of

finitude thus positing itself in language (as that which unveils itself within

it), but also before it, preceding it, as that formless, mute , unsignifying

region where language can find its freedom. A n d it is indeed in this space

thus revealed that literature, first wi th surrealism (though still in a very

T H E O R D E R O F T H I N G S

m u c h disguised f o r m ) , then , m o r e a n d m o r e p u r e l y , w i t h K a f k a , Ba ta i l l e ,

a n d B l a n c h o t , pos i ted i t se l f a s e x p e r i e n c e : a s e x p e r i e n c e o f dea th (and in

the e l e m e n t o f dea th ) , o f un th inkab le t h o u g h t (and i n its inaccessible

p resence) , o f repe t i t ion ( o f o r ig ina l i n n o c e n c e , a l w a y s there a t the nearest

a n d y e t a l w a y s the m o s t distant l imi t o f l a n g u a g e ) ; a s e x p e r i e n c e o f

f in i tude ( t rapped i n the o p e n i n g and the t y r a n n y o f that f in i tude) .

I t i s c lear that this ' r e tu rn ' of l a n g u a g e is n o t a sudden in te r rup t ion in

o u r cu l t u r e ; i t i s n o t the i r rup t ive d i s c o v e r y o f s o m e l o n g - b u r i e d

e v i d e n c e ; i t does n o t indicate a f o l d i n g b a c k o f t h o u g h t u p o n itself, i n the

m o v e m e n t by w h i c h i t emanc ipa tes i t se l f f r o m all con ten t , o r a narcissism

o c c u r r i n g w i t h i n a l i terature f ree ing i tse l f a t last f rom w h a t i t has to say

in o r d e r to speak hence fo r th o n l y a b o u t the fact that i t i s l a n g u a g e

s t r ipped n a k e d . I t is, i n fact, the strict u n f o l d i n g o f W e s t e r n cu l tu re in

a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the necessi ty i t i m p o s e d u p o n i t se l f a t the b e g i n n i n g o f

the n ine teen th c e n t u r y . I t w o u l d be false to see in this gene ra l ind ica t ion

o f o u r expe r i ence , w h i c h m a y b e t e r m e d ' f o r m a l i s m ' , the s ign o f a d r y i n g

u p , o f a rarefact ion o f t h o u g h t l o s ing its capac i ty fo r r e - app rehend ing the

p len i tude o f con ten t s ; i t w o u l d be no less false t o p lace i t f rom the ou tse t

u p o n the h o r i z o n o f s o m e n e w t h o u g h t o r n e w k n o w l e d g e . I t i s w i t h i n

the v e r y t igh t -kn i t , v e r y cohe ren t out l ines o f the m o d e r n episteme that

this c o n t e m p o r a r y e x p e r i e n c e f o u n d its poss ib i l i ty ; i t is e v e n that episteme

w h i c h , by its l o g i c , g a v e rise t o such an expe r i ence , cons t i tu ted i t t h r o u g h

and t h r o u g h , and m a d e i t imposs ib le for i t n o t t o exis t . W h a t o c c u r r e d a t

the t i m e o f R i c a r d o , C u v i e r , a n d B o p p , the f o r m o f k n o w l e d g e that w a s

established w i t h the appearance o f e c o n o m i c s , b i o l o g y , a n d p h i l o l o g y ,

the t h o u g h t o f f in i tude laid d o w n b y the K a n t i a n c r i t ique a s p h i l o s o p h y ' s

task - all that still f o r m s the i m m e d i a t e space o f o u r ref lect ion. We th ink

in that area.

A n d y e t the impress ion o f ful f i lment and o f end , the muff led fee l ing

that carries a n d an imates o u r t h o u g h t , a n d perhaps lulls i t t o s leep w i t h

the faci l i ty o f its p romises , a n d m a k e s us b e l i e v e that s o m e t h i n g n e w i s

a b o u t t o b e g i n , s o m e t h i n g w e g l i m p s e o n l y a s a th in l ine o f l i gh t l o w o n

the h o r i z o n - that f ee l ing and that impress ion are perhaps n o t ill f o u n d e d .

I t w i l l be said that t h e y exis t , that t h e y h a v e n e v e r ceased to be f o r m u l a t e d

o v e r and o v e r aga in s ince the ea r ly n ine teen th c e n t u r y ; i t w i l l be said that

H o l d e r l i n , H e g e l , Feue rbach , a n d M a r x all felt this ce r ta in ty that in t h e m

a t h o u g h t and perhaps a cu l tu re w e r e c o m i n g to a c lose , a n d that f r o m

the depths o f a dis tance, w h i c h w a s perhaps n o t i nv inc ib l e , ano the r w a s

a p p r o a c h i n g - i n the d i m l i gh t o f d a w n , i n the br i l l iance o f n o o n , o r i n

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the dissension o f the fa l l ing d a y . B u t this c lose , this per i lous i m m i n e n c e

w h o s e p r o m i s e w e fear t o d a y , w h o s e d a n g e r w e w e l c o m e , i s p r o b a b l y n o t

o f the same o rde r . T h e n , the task en jo ined u p o n t h o u g h t b y that a n n u n ­

c ia t ion w a s to establish for m a n a stable so jou rn u p o n this ear th f r o m

w h i c h the g o d s had tu rned a w a y o r van i shed . I n o u r d a y , and o n c e aga in

N i e t z s c h e ind ica ted the t u r n i n g - p o i n t f r o m a l o n g w a y off, i t i s n o t so

m u c h the absence o r the dea th o f G o d that i s affirmed a s the end o f m a n

(that n a r r o w , i m p e r c e p t i b l e d i sp lacement , that recession i n the f o r m o f

ident i ty , w h i c h are the reason w h y m a n ' s f i n i t u d e has b e c o m e his e n d ) ;

i t b e c o m e s apparent , then, that the dea th o f G o d a n d the last m a n are

e n g a g e d in a contes t w i t h m o r e than o n e r o u n d : i s i t n o t the last m a n w h o

announces that he has k i l l ed G o d , thus s i tuat ing his l a n g u a g e , his t h o u g h t ,

his l augh te r i n the space o f that a l r eady dead G o d , y e t pos i t i ng h i m s e l f also

a s h e w h o has k i l l ed G o d and w h o s e ex i s t ence inc ludes the f r e e d o m and

the dec is ion o f that m u r d e r ? T h u s , the last m a n i s a t the same t i m e o lde r

a n d y e t y o u n g e r than the dea th o f G o d ; s ince h e has k i l l ed G o d , i t i s h e

h i m s e l f w h o m u s t a n s w e r for his o w n f in i tude ; b u t since i t i s i n the dea th

o f G o d that he speaks, th inks , and exists, his m u r d e r i tse l f i s d o o m e d to

d ie ; n e w g o d s , the same g o d s , are a l r eady s w e l l i n g the future O c e a n ; m a n

w i l l disappear . R a t h e r than the dea th o f G o d - o r , ra ther , i n the w a k e o f

that dea th and in a p r o f o u n d cor re la t ion w i t h i t — w h a t N i e t z s c h e ' s

t h o u g h t heralds i s the end o f his m u r d e r e r ; i t i s the e x p l o s i o n o f m a n ' s

face in l augh te r , and the re turn o f masks ; i t i s the scat ter ing o f the p r o ­

f o u n d s t ream o f t ime b y w h i c h h e felt h i m s e l f carr ied a l o n g and w h o s e

pressure he suspected in the v e r y b e i n g o f th ings ; i t i s the ident i ty o f the

R e t u r n o f the S a m e w i t h the absolute dispersion o f m a n . T h r o u g h o u t the

n ine teen th cen tu ry , the end o f p h i l o s o p h y and the p r o m i s e o f a n a p p r o a c h ­

i n g cu l tu re w e r e n o d o u b t o n e a n d the same t h i n g a s the t h o u g h t o f f i n i ­

tude and the appearance o f m a n i n the f i e l d o f k n o w l e d g e ; i n o u r d a y , the

fact that p h i l o s o p h y is still - and aga in - in the process of c o m i n g to an

end , and the fact that in i t pe rhaps , t h o u g h e v e n m o r e outs ide and against

it, in l i terature as w e l l as in f o r m a l ref lect ion, the ques t ion of l a n g u a g e is

b e i n g posed , p r o v e n o d o u b t that m a n i s i n the process o f d i sappear ing .

F o r the ent ire m o d e r n episteme - that w h i c h w a s f o r m e d t o w a r d s the

end o f the e igh teen th c e n t u r y and still serves a s the pos i t i ve g r o u n d o f o u r

k n o w l e d g e , that w h i c h cons t i tu ted m a n ' s par t icular m o d e o f b e i n g and

the poss ibi l i ty o f k n o w i n g h i m empi r i ca l l y - that ent ire episteme w a s

b o u n d u p w i t h the disappearance o f D i s c o u r s e and its featureless r e ign ,

w i t h the shift o f l a n g u a g e t o w a r d s o b j e c t i v i t y , and w i t h its reappearance

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i n m u l t i p l e f o r m . I f this s a m e l a n g u a g e i s n o w e m e r g i n g w i t h grea ter

and grea te r insistence in a u n i t y that we o u g h t to th ink b u t c a n n o t a s y e t

do so , i s this n o t the s ign that the w h o l e o f this con f igu ra t i on i s n o w

a b o u t to t opp le , a n d that m a n i s in the process o f pe r i sh ing as the b e i n g

o f l a n g u a g e con t inues t o shine eve r b r igh te r u p o n o u r h o r i z o n ? Since m a n

w a s cons t i tu ted a t a t ime w h e n l a n g u a g e w a s d o o m e d to dispersion, w i l l

h e n o t b e dispersed w h e n l a n g u a g e regains its u n i t y ? A n d i f that w e r e

t rue, w o u l d i t n o t be an e r r o r - a p r o f o u n d e r ror , since i t c o u l d h ide

f r o m us w h a t shou ld n o w be t h o u g h t - t o interpret o u r actual expe r i ence

a s a n appl ica t ion o f the f o r m s o f l a n g u a g e t o the h u m a n order? O u g h t w e

n o t rather t o g i v e u p t h i n k i n g o f m a n , o r , t o b e m o r e strict, t o th ink o f

this d isappearance o f m a n - and the g r o u n d o f poss ibi l i ty o f all the

sciences o f m a n - as c lose ly as possible in co r re la t ion w i t h o u r c o n c e r n

w i t h l a n g u a g e ? O u g h t w e n o t t o a d m i t that , s ince l a n g u a g e i s here o n c e

m o r e , m a n w i l l re turn t o that serene non -ex i s t ence i n w h i c h h e w a s

f o r m e r l y ma in ta ined b y the impe r ious un i ty o f Discourse? M a n had been

a f i gu re o c c u r r i n g b e t w e e n t w o m o d e s o f l a n g u a g e ; o r , rather , h e w a s

cons t i tu ted o n l y w h e n l a n g u a g e , h a v i n g b e e n situated w i t h i n r e p r e ­

sentat ion and , as i t w e r e , d i sso lved in it, f reed i tse l f f r o m that s i tuat ion

a t the cos t o f its o w n f r agmen ta t i on : m a n c o m p o s e d his o w n f igu re i n the

interstices o f that f r a g m e n t e d l a n g u a g e . O f course , these are n o t aff irma­

t ions; t h e y are a t m o s t quest ions to w h i c h i t i s n o t possible to r e p l y ; t h e y

mus t b e left i n suspense, w h e r e t hey pose themse lves , o n l y w i t h the k n o w ­

l e d g e that the poss ibi l i ty o f p o s i n g t h e m m a y w e l l o p e n the w a y t o a

future t h o u g h t .

VI IN CONCLUSION

O n e t h i n g in a n y case i s cer ta in : m a n i s nei ther the o ldes t n o r the m o s t

cons tant p r o b l e m that has been posed f o r h u m a n k n o w l e d g e . T a k i n g a

re la t ive ly shor t c h r o n o l o g i c a l sample w i t h i n a restr icted g e o g r a p h i c a l area

- E u r o p e a n cu l tu re since the s ixteenth c e n t u r y - o n e can be cer tain that

m a n is a recent i n v e n t i o n w i t h i n it. I t is no t a r o u n d h i m and his secrets

that k n o w l e d g e p r o w l e d for so l o n g in the darkness . In fact, a m o n g all the

muta t ions that h a v e affected the k n o w l e d g e o f th ings and their o rder , the

k n o w l e d g e of identi t ies, differences, characters , equ iva lences , w o r d s - in

short , i n the mids t o f all the episodes o f that p r o f o u n d h is tory o f the Same

- o n l y o n e , that w h i c h b e g a n a c e n t u r y and a h a l f a g o and is n o w perhaps

d r a w i n g to a c lose , has m a d e i t possible for the f igu re of m a n to appear .

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A n d that appearance w a s no t the l ibera t ion o f a n o l d a n x i e t y , the t ran­

si t ion in to l u m i n o u s consciousness o f a n a g e - o l d c o n c e r n , the e n t r y in to

o b j e c t i v i t y o f s o m e t h i n g that had l o n g r e m a i n e d t rapped w i t h i n beliefs

and ph i lo soph ie s : i t w a s the effect of a c h a n g e in the fundamenta l a r r a n g e ­

ments o f k n o w l e d g e . A s the a r c h a e o l o g y o f o u r t h o u g h t easily s h o w s ,

m a n i s a n i n v e n t i o n o f recent date . A n d o n e perhaps nea r ing its end .

I f those a r r angemen t s w e r e t o disappear a s t h e y appeared , i f s o m e e v e n t

o f w h i c h w e can a t the m o m e n t d o n o m o r e than sense the poss ib i l i ty -

w i t h o u t k n o w i n g ei ther w h a t its f o r m w i l l be o r w h a t i t p romises - w e r e

to cause t h e m to c r u m b l e , a s the g r o u n d o f Class ical t h o u g h t d id , a t the

end o f the e igh t een th cen tu ry , then o n e can cer ta in ly w a g e r that m a n

w o u l d be erased, l ike a face d r a w n in sand a t the e d g e of the sea.

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