formalization institutions: the law of impersonal transactions— meaning and difficulties building...
TRANSCRIPT
Formalization Institutions: The Law of Impersonal Transactions—Meaning and Difficulties
Building Market Institutions: Property Rights, Business Formalization and Economic Development University of Chicago Press, 2010
Benito ARRUÑADAPompeu Fabra University
ISNIE 13th Annual ConferenceUC Berkeley, June 19, 2009
Outline
▪ The problem of impersonal exchange♦ Sequential exchange
▪ The contract formalization solution: ♦ Efficiently diluting property rights
▪ Prevalence of ‘sequential’ exchange
▪ Consequences & difficulties: ♦ E.g., rules are not enough & luddite lawyers
1. The problem
Impersonal exchange of “lemons”
Contract b/w seller S & buyer B
Judicial decision
S & B
Originative contract b/w
P & A
Subsequent contract b/w
A & T
Judicial decision
P & T
Sequential exchange: property rights vs.transaction costs
The judge’s dilemma: The tradeoff of property versus liability rules
▪ Property rule: No one deprived without consent♦ Provides better enforcement: Consent of right holder
required for a right to be damaged, but♦ increases information asymmetry b/c title uncertainty
deters acquirers because rights survive
▪ Liability rule: Protects less informed party ♦ Reduces transaction costs, but♦ provides bad enforcement b/c consent not required
▪ Goal: Overcoming this tradeoff, achieving both good enforcement and low transactions costs
2. The solution
Organized (voluntary, verifiable) dilution of property rights
▪ Liability rule—as in, e.g., Merchant Law:♦ Ruling for third party makes information asymmetry irrelevant
▪ Property rule conditioned to publicity: e.g., real property♦ Publicity makes information asymmetry manageable♦ Registration makes it irrelevant
▪ Preserving a role for consent keeps the enforcement advantage of property rights ♦ Consent in choosing agent and activating liability rule♦ Consent in recording or registering
▪ Independent intervention ex ante:♦ Commitment Avoids opportunistic choice of rules ex post by
P♦ Publicity Obviates information asymmetry to T
3. Cases: The prevalence of “sequential” exchange
Business transactions
Originative contract b/w
Er & E
Interaction
b/w E & T
•Judicial decisionEr & T
Employee E harms T non-contractually
Originative contract b/w
LP & GP
Subsequent contract b/w
GP & CC
Judicial decision LP & CC
Borrowing by a hidden LLP
Originative contract b/w P1 … Pn & M
Subsequent contract b/w
M & Pn+j
Judicial decision
P1…Pn & Pn+j
Sale of new shares
IncorporationP1 … Pn & M
Manager contracts
M & T
Judicial decision
P1 … Pn & T
Company representation
Real property and ‘secured’ transactions
Sale b/w B1 & O
Second sale O & B2
Judicial decisionB1 & B2
Double sale of land
First mortgage
M1 & O
Second mortgage
O & M2
Judicial decision
M1 & M2
Second mortgage
Two types of solution
Originative contract b/w
P & A
Subsequent contract b/w
A & T
Judicial decision
P & T
+
Automatic publicity
OR
“Formalized” publicity
Market-enabling rules used when adjudicating the
subsequent contract
Informal publicity & formalizationLegal area
Consent granted when
Independence provided
Land Recording deed Dating by titling office
Requesting registration, granting consent
Registration judgment
n. a. Possession of lessee, visible easements, etc.
Movables Entrusting possession Verifiable possession and commercial character
Agency Employing agent Notoriety of employment
Corporate Filing for incorporation Registration
Registering appointment Registration
n. a. Notoriety of company, representation, etc.
4. Consequences & interpretation
Conclusions
▪ Legal title the key info asymmetry for institutions
▪ Property, in rem, rights key for impersonal trade
▪ Overcoming tradeoff b/w property and transaction costs requires more than rules: organization♦ Verifiable publicity of originative contracts♦ Independence from parties to the originative contract
Why is it so hard to develop these market-enabling institutions?
▪ Tortuous development♦ Liability is the default rule of impersonal trade
• Commerce since 11th century
• Corporate limitations not applied against third parties
• Property titling moves into registration
♦ But delayed +10 centuries, with awkward exceptions, failed in developing registers (US mess, Peru, etc).
▪ Path-dependency: law developed for personal exchange Luddite conflict:♦ Artisan jurists defending rents and using pre-market concepts
♦ But the competing industry is… a public bureaucracy
Thanks