foreign policy and national security

7/21/2019 Foreign Policy and National Security

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THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC

REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL

SECURITY

POLICY AND STRATEGY

Ministry of Information

Press A!"io#is!a$ De%artment

No#em&er '(('

A""is A&a&a

Ta&$e of Contents



b* )uilding capacity by focusing on manpo,er

development ……………………................................................ %3

c* +ost-effective use of financial resources .....................................%(

d* nsuring symibiotic lin/age bet,een defence e0penditure

and the economy……………………………… ......................... %

e* )uilding capacity in the conte0t of economic development

and current threats …………………………………................... %"

3. )uilding strong implementation capacity................................... %9

a* #orging national consensus......................................................... 5$

b* !trengthening the professional diplomatic

capability................................................................................... 52

c* +oordinating and involving those ,ith

a role in implementation............................................................. 53

Se*tion '-

Et.io%ia1s Re$ations 2it. Ot.er Co!ntries

,+ Co!ntries of t.e Horn of Afri*a.......................................................................... 5(

1.1 General ……………................................................................... 5(

a* !ignificance of neighboring countries to the

development of thiopia......................................................... 5

b* !ignificance of neighboring countries

to the democratiation of thiopia ………………................. 59

c* he impact of thiopias development and democratiation

on neighboring countries ...................................................... ($



1.2 thiopias policy to,ards ritrea............................................ (3

a* !ignificance of the lin/s.................................................. (%

b* he 'uling Group4 an obstacle to friendly relations……(5

c* olicy direction ............................................................... (9

1.3 thiopias policy to,ards !omalia.............................................

3

a* 6istorical bac/ground of relations .................................. 3

b* !ignificance of the relations............................................ 5

c* olicy direction................................................................

1.% thiopias policy to,ards he !udan .................................... "2

a* 6istorical bac/ground of thio-!udan 'elations……... "2

b* !ignificance of the 'elations......................................... "(

c* olicy direction.............................................................. "

1.5 thiopias policy to,ards D7ibouti ....................................... 91

a* 6istorical bac/ground of relations ……....................... 91

b* !ignificance of the relations ........................................ 92

c* roblems regarding the relationship.............................. 93

d* olicy direction............................................................. 9(

1.( thiopias policy to,ards 8enya........................................... 99

a* 6istorical bac/ground of the relations......................... 99

b* !ignificance of the relations ..................................... 1$$



c* roblems in the relations......................................... 1$2

d* olicy direction........................................................ 1$3

1. !trengthening the G:D ............................................. 1$5

'+ Re$ations 3it. Ot.er Afri*an Co!ntries ......................................................... 1$(

2.1 6istorical bac/ground of the relations ........................ 1$(

2.2 !ignificance of the relations ....................................... 1$

2.3 olicy direction............................................................ 11$

0+ Re$ations 2it. Co!ntries of t.e Mi""$e East.................................................... 111

3.1 General....................................................................... 111

3.2 'elations ,ith gypt.................................................. 11

a* 6istorical bac/ground and problems regarding

the relations ............................................................ 11

b* !ignificance of the relations....................................12%

c* olicy direction ....................................................... 125

3.3 'elations ,ith :rabian eninsula +ountries ....................... 129

a* 6istorical bac/ground and problems in

the relations ........................................................ 129

b* !ignificance of the relations .................................... 13$

c* olicy direction........................................................... 131

3.% 'elations ,ith North :frican +ountries ...................... 132



3.5 'elations ,ith srael ................................................... 133

3.( 'elations ,ith ur/ey and ran .................................. 13(

4+ E!ro%e................................................................................................................. 13

%.1 he uropean ;nion <;*............................................ 13

%.2 he 'ussian #ederation................................................ 1%3

5+ Re$ations 2it. t.e Unite" States 6U+S+A7 .......................................................... 1%%

8+ Asia ...................................................................................................................... 1%"

(.1 General ........................................................................ 1%"

(.2 =apan ............................................................................15$

(.3 +hina ........................................................................... 151

(.% ndia ............................................................................ 152

9+ Internationa$ an" non:)o#ernmenta$ or)ani;ations........................................ 15%

.1 nternational organiations .......................................... 15%

.2 nternational non-governmental organiations............. 155



ntroduction

here can be no doubt that the attainment of speedy economic development4

democratiation and peace is fundamental to the survival of our country ,hich finds

itself in a state of ab7ect poverty and bac/,ardness. hat is ,hy the Government

gives priority to matters that are /ey to our survival and ,ell-being. ;nless the overall

policy direction pursued by the Government ta/es this basic reality into account4 our

national e0istence and security ,ill face grave danger. n this respect it is clear to see

that our foreign relations and national security policy and strategy can only have

relevance if it contributes to the fight against poverty and promotes speedy economicdevelopment4 democracy and peace. f ,e do not realie our goals4 one can predict

that our country ,ill be e0posed to great instability and even collapse and our very

security4 and indeed survival4 ,ill be at sta/e.

#ormer governments pursued e0ternal relations and national security policies that

disregarded internal problems that ,ere fundamental to our national condition.

'ather4 the effort ,as to focus on the outside ,orld and to loo/ in from the outside4 as

it ,ere. !uch an approach could not ade>uately protect our national interest and

security. here is no point in trying to pursue a foreign relations and national security

policy to be implemented e0ternally ,ithout a ma7or and effective in-country effort to

realie our vision of development and democratiation.

t should also be noted that the foreign policies of past governments ,ere4 in part4

founded on a ?siege mentality ,hich considered the country to be surrounded by

enemies. ts effects on the psychology of the people and its adverse impact on our relations ,ith the outside ,orld cannot be underestimated. his is4 ho,ever4 not to say

that the country does not have e0ternal enemies or that all past policies directed

against those ,ho ,ere arrayed against the country ,ere ,rong. @hat is essential is

the necessity to carry out appropriate studies and assessments to distinguish bet,een

those ,hose interests ,ould be negatively affected by our development and

democratiation efforts4 and those ,ho mista/enly believe that their interests ,ould

be negatively affected in this ,ay. t ,ould subse>uently be proper to pursue a policy



and strategy that ,ould reduce the dangers and threats ,hile ensuring that speedy

economic development and democratiation process.

Generally spea/ing4 it could be said that the foreign relations and security policy

implemented by former thiopian governments did not ade>uately ta/e into account

the impact that our internal problems and vulnerabilities had on our national security

and our very survival.

:lthough4 over the past t,elve years4 since the do,nfall of the Derg regime4 it ,as

theoretically understood that our national <domestic* policies ,ere the basis of our

foreign policy4 and that ,e needed to concentrate on development4 it is difficult to

conclude that ,e had a common understanding regarding 7ust ho, internal problems,eighed on the prospects for our national survival. he demands of security and

survival have thus made it necessary to elaborate a foreign relations and national

security policy that too/ our internal situation into proper account.

Not only is this ne, foreign and national security policy and strategy drafted to

protect our national interests and to ensure thiopias survival as a country4 but its

basic thrust is designed to bring about a fundamental change of attitude regarding the

essence of foreign relations and national security. his is one step that opens a ne,

chapter in the history of our country. he policy and strategy in the main revolve

around ho, to create enabling conditions so that the people4 step by step4 benefit from

rapid economic gro,th and democratiation. n order to bring this about4 the policy

and strategy bases itself on the internal challenges and vulnerability to threats that

have an influence on our survival4 and its focus is on tas/s that should be carried out

,ithin the country. Aur direction is to move from the internal to ,hat is e0ternal4

doing our home,or/ first4 thereby enabling us to identify our shortcomings. Aur

foreign relations and national security policy and strategy are designed to address the

gaps that need to be filled. he e0ternal environment is vie,ed from the prism of our

national situation and condition4 and this ensures that the policy and strategy have

relevance to our national security and survival.



Et.io%ia<s Po$i*y an" Strate)y On Forei)n Affairs an" Nationa$ Se*!rity

Se*tion I

Basi* Prin*i%$es

,+ T.e Fo!n"ations of Forei)n Affairs an" Nationa$ Se*!rity Po$i*y

n a fundamental sense4 security policy is a matter of ensuring national survival. he

alpha and omega of security is the ensuring of national survival. Ather national

security issues may be raised only if national e0istence is ensured. #oreign affairs and

security policy must be formulated first and foremost to ensure national security.ssues of prosperity4 sustainable peace4 and stability and other related concerns then

follo,. n order to formulate a foreign affairs and security policy that addresses these

issues4 it is important to identify and e0amine the sources and basis from ,hich the

policy springs.

,+, De#e$o%ment an" t.e &!i$"in) of a "emo*rati* system as a &asis for %o$i*y

#or the thiopian people4 benefiting from rapid development4 means living a life free

from poverty4 ignorance and bac/,ardness. he primary interest of the people is to

live free from poverty4 disease and ignorance. 'apid development is not merely

important in raising the standard of living of the people4 but also a guarantee of

national survival. ;nless ,e can bring about rapid development that benefits the

people4 ,e ,ill not be able to avoid chaos and disintegration. herefore4 assuring

accelerated development and raising the living standard of our people is critical in

preventing our country from disaster and dismemberment. his is a fundamental issueon ,hich the interests and the survival of the people of thiopia depends.

stablishing a democratic order in thiopia is the ,ay to respect peoples and

individual rights4 affirm good governance4 and assure stable ,or/ing and living

conditions. Democracy is an important instrument to mobilie around common goals

and to involve the people in nation building. Democracy guarantees that the members

of the various nations4 nationalities and religions in thiopia live in an atmosphere of

tolerance. n the absence of a democratic order4 national and religious divisions ,ill



invariably intensify4 the abuse of human rights ,ould result in strife4 and poverty

,ould spread further - a recipe for disintegration and destruction. he realiation of

democracy ,ill therefore not only help to attain development and good governance4

but ensure national security. @ithout doubt4 democratiation is fundamental to

safeguard the individual interests of every thiopian as ,ell as to ensure the countrys

continued e0istence.

#oreign policy as ,ell as national security policy should have the mission of

protecting national interest and security. )y national interest ,e can only be referring

to the interest of the entire people - no more4 no less. @hat is crucial to the interests of

the entire people is rapid development that benefits the population. t is in the interest

of the people as a ,hole that democracy and good governance ta/e root. f ,e are to

formulate a foreign policy to protect our national interest4 ,e ,ill have to elaborate a

policy that facilitates rapid development and democratiation. Aur national interest is

all about democracy and development. Bi/e,ise our foreign and national security

policies need to be essentially based on4 and cause the promotion of4 development and

democracy.

Abviously4 the national security policy must first ensure national e0istence or

survival. nsuring national security means protecting the population from strife4 ,ar

and disintegration. f ,e do not develop and establish a democratic order4 there is no

doubt that ,e ,ill not survive as a nation. @e must therefore promote democracy and

development to ensure our survival. Aur security policy cannot have a goal that does

not proceed from this premise.

)ecause it is through rapid development and democratiation that the nation can avert

strife4 it is this same development and democratiation agenda that ensures peace. o

the degree that development and democracy bring about peace4 peace too4 is crucial in

the attainment and ensurance of democracy and development. !o ,hen ,e say that

development and democracy are the basis for national security and for peace4 ,e are

also affirming in turn4 that peace is a prere>uisite for economic development and the

establishment of democracy.

)ringing about people-centred rapid development and ensuring democracy and good

governance are ,hat our national interest is all about. :ll other issues are secondary



to4 and based on4 these fundamentals. he goal of our foreign and security policies4

formulated to ensure our national interest and ,ell being4 should also serve to

promote democracy and development. : foreign and security policy that is ,orthy of

the name is one that is capable of achieving such a goal. 6o,ever sophisticated and

relevant in other respects4 a policy incapable of bringing about development and

democracy is of no use. he fundamental goals of foreign and national security policy

must be democracy and development.

,+' Nationa$ %ri"e an" %resti)e as a &asis for %o$i*y

!ome vie, protecting national pride as a fundamental foreign and security policy

ob7ective. hey label countries as hostile or friendly depending on ho, others haveedified or ,ounded our national pride or prestige. Athers regard national pride as a

result of other endeavours and contend that it is such endeavors and not national pride

per se that should be vie,ed as an ob7ective. : fe, argue that countries obsessed ,ith

national pride are those living in past glories but desperate about the future. hese

countries are said to have lost hope in the future and could be loo/ing for a prete0t to

launch aggression. he place that national pride should be given in the thiopian

conte0t deserves to be properly studied.

@e are proud that ,e are a people that never succumbed to colonialism and the only

nation in :frica to have remained independent. 'ightly so4 ,e also deservedly ta/e

pride in our historical heritage ,hose creativity has been much appreciated. he

heritage belongs to past generations of thiopians4 their hard ,or/4 s,eat and blood.

he source of the pride of the present generation is the attainments of past

generations. @e are proud of real achievements4 most of ,hich are not produced by

the labors of the current generation4 but of preceding ones.

n so much as there are the aforementioned values and assets that the present

generation should ta/e pride in4 protect and preserve4 there are also aspects of the

country ,hich are embarrassing sources of painful national disgrace. :t this 7uncture4

our country is heavily dependent on foreign aid. @e cannot even feed ourselves and

have to beg annually for food aid. Nothing has as much humiliating effect on the pride

of a nation as having to beg. Aur development activities ,ould also get no,here

,ithout significant foreign aid and the provision of loans. o obtain the re>uisite aid



and loans re>uires the good ,ill and meeting the conditions of our donors and lenders.

;nder such circumstances4 ,e cannot proclaim that ,e are free in real terms. his is a

ma7or source of national humiliation and shame.

n sum4 although thiopia is the only :frican country to have successfully resisted

colonialism and despite having an ancient and proud civiliation4 it no, trails far

behind in the long list of countries ,hen it comes to development. Anly very fe,

countries find themselves in a lo,er position. :s a result of the desperate

circumstances4 the dream of many of our youth has become living in e0ile by

immigrating to urope or :merica. &any ,ho have failed to ma/e it to these

continents have resorted4 even illegally4 to crossing to the &iddle ast to ,or/ as

maidservants - a situation ,hich they consider to be an CopportunityC. t is difficult to

understand ,hat patriotism means to persons ,ho see their compatriots gratefully toil

abroad as domestic ,or/ers4 and yet ,ho d,ell on the past glories of their country.

!o4 ,hile ,e are proud of our heritage4 ,e are also ashamed of the current state of our

country. o the degree that ,e cherish the achievements of previous generations4 ,e

observe ,ith bitter regret the state of national humiliation in ,hich the present

generation finds itself. @hile ,e certainly deserve to ta/e pride in our heritage and

,or/ for its conservation4 ,e nevertheless need to address4 as a matter of greatest

priority4 the source of our national embarrassment if ,e are to hold our heads high.

@e deserve no peace of mind until and unless ,e decisively deal ,ith the source of

our disgrace and shame.

he real source of our national humiliation in our time is poverty and bac/,ardness.

t is the lac/ of democracy and good governance. !till another source is our inability

to ,or/ together in a spirit of tolerance and cooperation forged by a common belief in

our national destiny. o put it in short4 our only solution is to effect a rapid socio-

economic transformation and democratiation ,hich has a direct benefit to the people.

f maintaining our national pride is to be ta/en as a policy ob7ective4 this can only be

envisaged if concerted efforts in the direction of democratiation and development are

underta/en. herefore4 the ob7ective of maintaining national pride cannot be ta/en as

a policy ob7ective by itself4 but must be ta/en together ,ith the foundations on ,hich

it rests - the realiation of democracy and development. f maintaining national

prestige is to have any value4 it ,ill be because of its contribution to underlining the



urgency of our ,or/ to build democracy and develop the country and that nothing

should deter us from ta/ing this path.

6istory has sho,n that countries faced ,ith national humiliation4 ,hich identified the

source of their despair and set goals to eradicate the shame4 have eventually

succeeded in attaining their ob7ective. he e0ample of a couple of countries that can

be ta/en as success stories in this regard can help to illustrate the matter.

he histories of thiopia and =apan have certain similarities. )oth countries have4 in

the course of history4 managed to avoid succumbing to foreign rule. n similar periods

of history and for similar reasons4 both countries had deliberately closed their doors to

the outside ,orld. )oth countries e0perienced periods of feudal rule and attempted tosetup a strong central government. #or different reasons4 both ,ere forced to reopen

their doors and reestablish contact ,ith the outside ,orld. :lthough the path =apan

follo,ed helped her to achieve e0traordinary transformation in development and

democratic rule4 ,hile shedding her national shame4 thiopias fate has remained

>uite different.

:fter =apan had successfully barred foreigners4 particularly @esterners from its

territory for centuries4 more advanced countries using po,erful iron ships </no,n by

the =apanese then as Cblac/ shipsC* forced themselves in to the country. hey further

forced =apan to sign an agreement that caused her dishonor and humiliation. his

shame brought about a fundamental political and economic change in =apan. he

=apanese realied that they ,ere humiliated as a result of their bac/,ardness in

development. hey understood that feudalism had ,ea/ened their position and unity.

#ar-sighted members of the ruling class became a,are that if the system ,as not

fundamentally changed4 =apans very e0istence ,ould be in 7eopardy. hey4 thus4

started ,or/ing day and night to Cdrain the s,ampC of their humiliation.

ndignant about the humiliation of their country4 and acting under their ne, banner

C'ich +ountry4 !trong &ilitaryC the =apanese set out to overcome the source of their

shame. heir first decisive move ,as forming a strong central government.

+onse>uently they formed4 in the conte0t of a 8ingdom4 a strong central government

/no,n as the &ei7i 'estoration in 1"(". hey then began traveling to urope to

ac>uire ne, /no,ledge and learn s/ills to form a prosperous and militarily strong



country. hey toiled night and day to improve their technical s/ills and to speed

economic development. !ingle-mindedly they put aside all elements that ,ould deter

them from their path. Gritting their teeth4 they did all that ,as needed to build their

dream of a rich country ,ith a strong defense.

n less than thirty years =apan caught up ,ith the great nations of the ,orld and

embar/ed on colonial e0pansion and rivalry. n 19$% =apan militarily defeated 'ussia4

then one of the great po,ers of urope. he =apanese then con>uered and colonied

the island of ai,an and later on4 8orea. heir success gave birth to greater

arrogance4 and they moved to occupy the ,hole of +hina as a first step to control

astern :sia. =apan also launched a massive attac/ against the ;nited !tates. n the

end4 this arrogance led the =apanese to a devastating defeat and destruction in the

!econd @orld @ar. he country ,as reduced to ashes4 and faced a debilitating

economic crisis falling for a time under foreign military rule. he =apanese4 ,ho are

/no,n for choosing to die rather than face personal and national disgrace4 committed

suicide in great numbers. 6o,ever4 the nation did not choose samurai style suicide to

avert the disgrace that ,as visited upon the country for the second time. nstead =apan

preferred to ma/e the necessary ad7ustments to overcome the shame of its second

humiliation.

'ealiing that the only option they had to gain freedom from foreign rule ,as to obey

orders4 the =apanese did as told. :,a/ened to the fact that the reason for their

humiliation ,as undemocratic government and militarism4 they heeded :merican

instructions to do a,ay ,ith both. Ance again4 they fought hard to deal decisively

,ith the source of their humiliation4 in the ,a/e of the ending of ;.!. military

occupation. hey drafted a ne, democratic and anti-militarist constitution4 and abided

by it. hey commenced a ne, phase of nation rebuilding. n less than t,enty years

they managed to become the ,orlds second largest economy. heir ne, system also

became free from undemocratic and militaristic tendencies.

he =apanese e0perience is specific to =apan and may not be repeated else,here.

6o,ever4 one can learn from it. t is hard to match the =apanese in their personal and

national pride. !urrender ,as to both soldier and civilian a disgraceful e0perience4

and so suicide ,as a common preference of the =apanese to captivity. o die in style

by the s,ord <seppu/u* ,as traditionally honourable. )ut ,hen they ,ere faced ,ith



national disgrace they did not choose to commit collective suicide. 'ather4 they

recognied the source of their shame and ,or/ed patiently and indefatigably. )y

doing so4 they incurred the respect of the rest of the ,orld. +ountries that are at

similar levels of development as ours have a lesson to learn4 namely that they need to

identify the sources of their humiliation and ,or/ single-mindedly to eliminate them.

!imilarly a glimpse at a part of the long and convoluted history of Germany ,ould

illustrate the issue further. 6istorical documents sho, that Napoleon had caused

Germany humiliation at a time ,hen it ,as fragmented into about 3$$ small states.

6e invaded the territory4 reducing the number of states by defeating the army of

russia - the state ,ith greatest prominence. he treaty russia signed after the defeat

is believed by historians to be a study in humiliation.

he russian leaders sho,ed the ,isdom to avoid further humiliation by Napoleon

,ho had soundly defeated them ,ith the strength of the liberated #rench peasantry.

hey identified the source of their humiliation and ,or/ed hard to overcome it. he

russians realied that their main problems ,ere economic and military4 and they

began to address these priorities.

'ealiing that the indentured russian serfs could not succeed against the liberated

#rench peasantry4 russia moved to abolish serfdom and universalie primary

education4 albeit in comple0 ,ays. hey analyed and meticulously learned from the

,ar tactics of Napoleons peasant army. n due course4 they managed to mobilie an

army unparallel in its combat capability. 'ecogniing that the fragmentation of the

single German people had been an obstacle to their economic gro,th4 they first

formed an economic union and then developed it in to a politicical merger. hey

celebrated their success follo,ing their victory over #rance in the #rench royal city of

ersailles in 1"1. heir humiliation no, gave ,ay to arrogance ,hich then led to

another day of yet further humiliation.

he lesson ,e dra, from the Germans is that national humiliation cannot be effaced

by posturing and self-destruction4 but rather by the identification of the source of the

humiliation and by ,or/ing hard to reverse the situation. he ,ay to overcome

national humiliation is to organie the people under one ob7ective and to address the



cause of that shame. n the process one cannot allo, oneself to be distracted4 but

rather must /eep an unblin/ing eye on the ob7ective.

Ees4 ,e thiopians too4 are proud of our legacy and need to preserve it. 6o,ever due

to poverty4 coupled ,ith bac/,ardness and the absence of good governance4 ,e are in

a shameful state. Aur condition should give us no respite everyday. @e need to /eep

an eye on our ob7ective4 shoulder ,hatever burden and ,or/ ceaselessly to get ahead.

hrough development and democracy ,e must eradicate our humiliation. f ,e ta/e

national pride as a source of foreign and security policy4 ,e are doing so to utilie it

as an instrument of development and democracy and as a guarantor for overcoming

national humiliation.

,+0 G$o&a$i;ation as a &asis for %o$i*y

he efforts in our country to bring about rapid development4 democracy and good

governance cannot be seen outside the regional and global conte0ts. n the process of

globaliation4 the ,orld economy has become interconnected and an international

division of labour has been introduced. t is impossible to operate outside of this

conte0t. +ountries are either producers or aid recipients in the globaliing economy.

here are no e0ceptions and no country is outside of this global economy. 'apid

development can be achieved by our country only through strong efforts to graduate

from the aid recipient category to the category of producer. o sustain that

development4 a steady effort to improve ones position in the global division of labour

is re>uired. his also applies to the building of a democratic order.

@e cannot attain development and democracy by closing our doors and ta/ing refuge

in our mountains. t is only ,hen ,e accept the fact that ,e have no choice but toenter the global economy4 and ,hen ,e aim to transform ourselves from the state of

dependency to that of being a producer4 and a better producer in time4 ,e can realie

democracy and development. t is through fully e0ploiting the opportunities

globaliation provides us4 lessening the constraints it creates4 and becoming active

participants in the process of globaliation4 that ,e can promote our interests and

security. t is for this reason that the ma7or basis of our foreign and security policy is

that of achieving economic development and democracy in the frame,or/ of

globaliation. herefore4 a foreign and security policy that fully e0ploits the



@hen ,e argue that ,e should adopt a foreign and security policy ,hich can promote

our interests and security in the frame,or/ of globaliation4 ,e are referring to a

policy that can effectively integrate us into the international system. t also means a

policy that is based on mutual benefit4 give and ta/e4 negotiation and mutual respect

rather than one that advances unilateral interests. An the one hand4 the policy should

enable us to negotiate as a country and ,ithin a group4 to modify the rules and the

system of globaliation so that it ta/es our interests into account better. An the other4

the policy should facilitate our gaining ma0imum benefit from globaliation ,hile

strictly obeying the rules of the game.

@or/ing to have our interests and security protected in the ,orld of globaliation does

not mean that ,e ,or/ alone. #or instance4 negotiations to improve conditions

demand common action by developing countries. @e need to coordinate ,ith others

to derive ma0imum benefits from globaliation. @e proceed from one and only one

premise as ,e cooperate ,ith others - the protection of our national interest4 and

security. @e ,ill not be led by any other ob7ective. here is no other goal to be

achieved. his is ,hy ,e say that ensuring the protection of our national interest and

security ,ithin the frame,or/ of globaliation is the third foundation on ,hich our

foreign and security policy is based.

'+ O&/e*ti#es of t.e Forei)n Affairs an" Nationa$ Se*!rity Po$i*y

he failure to realie development and democracy has resulted in our security being

threatened. t has meant that ,e have remained impoverished4 dependent and unable

to hold our heads high. he prospect of disintegration cannot be totally ruled out. hat

is ,hy it is imperative that ,e e0pedite development and consolidate democracy. n

doing so4 ,e can consolidate our e0istence as a nation4 and preserve our honour. he

goal of our foreign and security policy is to ensure international conditions that are

conducive to achieving our development and democratic ob7ectives. he basis and

goal of our foreign and national security policy is defined as realiing development

and democracy.

o bring about development and realie it in the frame,or/ of globaliation4 ,e need

e0tensive mar/et opportunities4 investment and technical support. #or some time yet4

,e ,ill also need grants and loans to finance our development endeavours. @e also



re>uire considerable technical and financial support to build and strengthen

institutions of democratic governance4 so crucial for the gro,th of democracy. Aur

foreign policy goal ,ill be e0actly this. Aur main ob7ective ,ill be to create an

enabling environment for development and democracy and4 in this conte0t4 to identify

mar/ets4 attract investment4 solicit grants4 loans and technical support and ma/e

ma0imum utiliation of all possibilities. Aur diplomacy should be4 in the main4 that of

economic diplomacy.

Aur diplomatic ,or/ must aim at eliminating or at least reducing e0ternal security

threats. Aur policy should strive to ,iden the number of foreign friends that can help

to create a regional and global atmosphere conducive for our peace and security. Aur

diplomatic activity also aims at forecasting potential threats and addressing them

through dialogue and negotiation. he policy should also secure allies that can help us

,ithstand intractable challenges and threats.

:s ,ell as creating a favourable situation for our development4 our foreign policy

aims at both individually and collectively lessening the negative effects that

globaliation could have on development. his is another reason ,hy our diplomacy

is centered on economic diplomatic activity.

)asing itself on national efforts to overcome the danger of strife and collapse

emanating from ,ithin4 our foreign and national security policy has the ob7ective of

resisting e0ternal threats to our security and building our capacity to reduce our

vulnerability.

0+ T.e Forei)n Affairs an" Nationa$ Se*!rity Strate)ies

@e need to devise correct and clear strategies to bring to fruition our stated ob7ectives

regarding foreign affairs and national security. )ased on that4 ,e have to define

policies in greater detail and identify tactics. he strategies ,e need to devise in this

regard are presented as follo,s.

0+, De#otin) t.e %rime fo*!s to a*ti#ities at .ome

he ob7ective of our foreign and national security policy is the realiation of our

vision of democracy and development and creating an enabling environment to this



end. Aur vision for development and the building of a democratic order can succeed

only if ,e e0amine seriously our countrys ob7ective reality and decide on ,ays of

achieving our goals and moving in this direction4 in the frame,or/ of globaliation.

@e ourselves need to decide ,hat to do4 ho, to do it and ,hen to promote

democratiation and development4 as foreign prescriptions cannot lead us to

successful outcomes. @e can succeed in our endeavours only so long as ,e design our

o,n path4 by forging a common national understanding and consensus and doing

,hat needs to be done as a united people.

Aur foreign and national security policy can create favorable conditions for our vision

of democracy and development if a correct path of democracy and development is

charted and is able to be implemented by the people. @ith an idealistic vision ,here

the people are 7ust bystanders4 a foreign and national security policy has no relevance.

#ocusing on serious ,or/ ,ithin the country to bring about development and

democracy is the priority of a successful foreign relations and national security

endeavour. @e also need to focus on the efforts at the domestic front. )eing

preoccupied ,ith e0ternal activities at the e0pense of ,hat needs to be done at home

ris/s turning into a futile e0ercise.

f ,e ourselves chart our course of democracy and development4 engaging the entire

people and resources and obtaining re>uisite help4 ,e ourselves can identify the

elements that can ,or/ for us. @e can accurately define ho, best and to ,hat effect

,e can utilie e0ternal assistance. 0ternal support is necessary only to fill in the

gaps4 and to identify ,hat is needed. @e have to see ,hat ,e can do by ourselves.

his ,ill enable us to ma/e effective use of the prevailing international situation. he

absence of such an approach ,ould hobble the foreign relations and national security

policy and limit it only to mobiliing e0ternal support4 ,hether needed or not. Aur

priority should therefore be to do our home,or/ properly. @e can succeed in ensuring

that e0ternal conditions ,ould be favourable and yield positive results if ,e ourselves

carry out successful efforts to build democracy and promote development.

n sum4 because the success of development and democracy - the goals of our foreign

and national security policy - rest mainly on our o,n effortsF because ,e can correctly

identify areas of need for foreign aid and accordingly utilie it only if ,e can do our

best in this directionF because the international community is encouraged to create



favourable circumstances only if they are convinced of our practical commitment4 our

foreign and national security policy ,ill succeed4 depending mainly on our o,n

domestic efforts. @e need therefore to focus our efforts on the domestic front.

f our priority is to rely on e0ternal assistance4 ,e ,ill be concerned mainly ,ith

attempting to meet e0ternal demands and re>uirements. Aur approach ,ill be limited

to obtaining foreign aid and our policy designed for 7ust that purpose. his approach

is unli/ely to result in our receiving satisfactory levels of aid. #urthermore4 ,hatever

aid has been obtained ,ill have been donor-driven and not consistent ,ith our

interests. f ho,ever4 our priority ,ere based on using our o,n means first4 ,e ,ould

be compelled to do our home,or/ <i.e.4 identify ,hat ,e need*4 and our foreign and

national security policy ,ould ta/e into account ,hat ,e can do for ourselves. he

rationale for that policy ,ould therefore rest on realiing our o,n ob7ectives and

vision thereby yielding positive results.

herefore the strategy ,e use to reach our foreign relations and national security

ob7ectives is based on the Cdomestic first4 e0ternal secondC approach. he idea is to

focus on ,hat can be done by ourselves4 and to meet the need of our domestic

re>uirements.

0+' Strate)y *entere" on t.e e*onomy

Aur foreign and security policy is centered around development that benefits the

people and creating conducive situations for such development. :s repeatedly

mentioned4 our national interests and security ,ill be guaranteed only if rapid

development is attained. Aur main security threat is of an internal nature. he danger

is that ,idening poverty may lead to our collapse4 and that the absence of democracyand good governance may result in bloodshed and destruction. his threat can be

removed through overcoming poverty4 through development and economic initiative.

t is only ,hen ,e build a strong economy that ,e can effectively defend ourselves

from e0ternal threats. t is obvious that ,e have a truly fragile economy. herefore4

rapid development is critical for the protection of our national interests and security.

hat is ,hy ,e agree that a policy designed to create a favourable atmosphere to

safeguard our national interests and security should be centered around the economy.



@hen ,e contend that ,e should pursue an economy-centered strategy4 ,e mean that

our relations of friendship or other,ise should be based first of all on economic

matters. @e mean that ,e should not enter into hostilities or friendship based on

matters irrelevant to our development. @e also mean that our e0ternal activity should

focus on promoting business and investment opportunities and identifying sources of

aid and credit. t means ensuring that foreign service officers realie that they are first

of all development officers and that they ac>uire the re>uisite competence to

accomplish this mission. t also means that ,e should not vie, our economic-related

tas/s as 7ust one of many in our e0ternal activities4 but rather to place economic ,or/

at the center of foreign relations.

@hen ,e maintain that the economy should be in the center of our security strategy4

,e are recogniing that it is rapid economic gro,th that ,ill build our capacity to

,ithstand internal and e0ternal security threats. mpediments to economic

development are a threat to our security4 and therefore4 to assure security4 ,e ,ill have

to remove obstacles in the ,ay of rapid development. &inor impediments can be

handled ,ith greater tolerance. )ut even those problems that hinder development4 and

constitute a serious threat to security4 need to be dealt ,ith in a manner that ,ould not

be economically damaging4 through the use of diplomatic instruments such as

negotiations and political pressure.

)eyond all this ,e may be forced to defend ourselves4 but our defense capability

should not be built in a ,ay that ,ould have a detrimental influence on our economy.

0+0 F!$$ !ti$i;ation of &enefits &ase" on %ro%er ana$ysis

@e have already referred to ,hat ,e need from our foreign relations ,or/ to protectour national interests and security. he most important of our interests is economic. n

our list of priorities are mar/et opportunities4 investment4 technical and financial

support for our economic development and democratiation. !econdly4 ,e need

political4 diplomatic4 military and technical support for the maintenance of our

security. @e should be able to ma0imie ,hat ,e can receive in this regard and utilie

any assistance in the appropriate manner.



ossible avenues of cooperation and access to them need to be thoroughly assessed

and studied. t is important to /no, in detail the development cooperation policy of

each country. :lthough ,e need to absorb all forms of assistance to the fullest e0tent4

,e must move step by step. @e have to differentiate bet,een assistance that

contributes significantly to our development and building of a democratic order and

aid that has a more modest impact. his re>uires detailed study. @ho provides ,hat

must be /no,n4 and the priorities ,or/ed out4 in order for our ,or/ to yield results

!pontaneous and haphaard activity can only negatively impact the effective and

efficient utiliation of foreign assistance. hat is ,hy the need to have proper studies

cannot be over emphasied.

he studies ,e are referring to are themselves based on other studies. dentifying the

/ind of cooperation ,e re>uire demands our ability to separate ,hat ,e can do4 from

,hat ,e get from others. @e should also be able to decide ho, best and to ,hat

ma0imum effect ,e can utilie assistance. :ll this re>uires e0haustive study. #oreign

service ,or/ should be based on studies and proper coordination.

0+4 Minimi;in) t.reats on t.e &asis of %ro%er ana$ysis

:n important component of the effort to create a fertile ground for democratiation

and development is see/ing cooperation opportunities and bringing them to fruition.

:lso important is the prevention and mitigation of haards. @e need to develop

strategies to forestall threats directed against our national interests and security.

)efore anything else4 ,e need to identify the sources of such threats. n so far as our

main goal is development and democracy4 ,hat is threatening is ,hat hampers our

efforts in promoting them. Aur study of the sources of danger involves identifyingthose forces ,hose interests could be negatively affected by the process of

development and democratiation in thiopia. here may also be some ,ho

erroneously believe to be threatened by progress in thiopia4 ,hich re>uires further

assessment. he strategy ,e employ to reduce threats is therefore one that calls for a

study identifying those ,ho rightly or ,rongly feel their interests are harmed by the

gro,th of democracy and economic progress in thiopia. he study ,e embar/ on

should be revie,ed and updated regularly.



he identification process is by itself not enough. Ane ,ould have to assess ,hy

some forces become threats for the ,rong reasons. t is also important to study ,hat

interests are at sta/e4 ,hat those forces ,ould do to protect their interests and ,ith

,hat capability. t is necessary to allay the fears of those ,ho see imagined threats

and to deal constructively ,ith those ,hose interests may really be affected. t is also

necessary to identify parties that can help in resolving the problem. Ane should also

consider4 should peaceful ,ays of dealing ,ith the problems fail4 the detrimental

conse>uences and subse>uent arrangements that need to be put in place to deal ,ith

the problems.

t is4 therefore4 necessary to carry out detailed and accurate studies as a first /ey step

of a strategy to reduce threats and dangers. @or/ carried out on the basis of studies

has a better chance of bringing good results. )ut even armed ,ith good studies4

problems of implementation could have undesirable conse>uences.

@e need to ta/e ade>uate care that our strategy should include a sober assessment and

utiliation of our studies. Aur eyes should never stray from our final ob7ective. Aur

aim is to realie development and democracy. @e must not tolerate anything that

stands in our ,ay. @e should ho,ever give priority to solving problems through

cooperation4 clarification and patience4 ,hile avoiding arrogance and inadvertently

harming our o,n interests. he ,ay ,e function should be informed by an

understanding of relations in the ,orld of globaliation4 the give and ta/e4 the

negotiating and balancing of interests. @e should also involve those ,ho can

contribute to the easing of problems. n the end4 ho,ever4 if ,e are faced ,ith a

danger that threatens our democracy and development4 ,e should act to demonstrate

to the adversary the need to reflect on the effects of the dispute4 and if this does not

,or/4 ,e must be prepared4 both internally and e0ternally4 to defend ourselves

,ithout doing damage to the pursuit of our goals.

0+5 Re"!*in) #!$nera&i$ity to t.reats

t has been repeatedly mentioned that the main threat to our national interests and

e0istence is our poverty4 bac/,ardness and the infancy of our system of good

governance. t is apparent4 that to protect these interests and maintain our national

e0istence4 ,e need to address and do a,ay ,ith these threats-first of all internally. t



is a given that4 e0ternal threats are e0tensions of the national or domestic challenges

that ,e face. 0ternal threats are either coupled ,ith domestic challenges or they

e0ploit our vulnerabilities caused by internal difficulties. : historical e0amination of

acts of aggression against thiopia proves this to be the case.

#oreign governments and other forces may be encouraged to act against our national

interest thin/ing that they can get thiopia to succumb to their economic and other

pressures because the country is no, in a poor and bac/,ard state.

hey may be tempted to ta/e measures that ,ould put our fundamental interests in

danger believing that the people can easily be at each others throat and are unli/ely to

collaborate for a common cause. hey may feel that our defense and securitycapabilities are ,ea/ for economic4 political and technical reasons. Ane cannot

discount these presumptions. Aur poverty and bac/,ardness e0poses us to danger.

he absence of national consensus on important issues ma/es us vulnerable. n short4

although enemies may e0aggerate it4 one cannot deny our vulnerability.

he fact that ,e have limitations presents a challenge to our national interests and

security at t,o levels. #irstly4 it creates hindrances in the prompt management of

threats4 ,hich leaves us more vulnerable to conflict and ,ar. !ome time ago the !iad

)arre regime in !omalia launched an attac/ on thiopia on the presumption that

thiopia ,as unable to offer a united resistance and that it ,ould brea/ up under

military pressure. he regime in ritrea <the shabia* similarly launched an aggression

against thiopia thin/ing along the same lines. )oth regimes ,ere soundly defeated

because of their misguided and misconceived perceptions. 6o,ever4 until their defeat4

they had dragged us into ,ar for the duration and inflicted massive damage. f ,e had

not been invulnerable4 they ,ould have realied that their intentions ,ould not bear

fruit. @e have seen that being vulnerable invites pressure and attac/ from all types4

from village tyrants to more po,erful adversaries.

!econdly4 besides e0posing us to conflict and ,ar4 our vulnerability has ,rought

additional damage. t has made us pay a heavy price4 even after the ,ar4 as ,e try to

address its impact. :lthough ,ar has at no time succeeded in crushing us as a nation4

it has managed to succeed in perpetuating and deepening our poverty. ;nless ,e

move promptly to curb our vulnerability4 ,e ,ill remain prone not only to internal



dangers4 but to e0ternal ones as ,ell4 and ,ould continue to face pressure and even

imposed ,ars. he main source of our vulnerability to threats is our poverty and

bac/,ardness. @e need to >uic/ly address these problems. @e need to deploy all

efforts to develop >uic/ly for the benefit of the people. :ll other issues should come

second to this campaign.

n addition to poverty and bac/,ardness4 the absence of good governance is a factor

that induces vulnerability. ;nless ,e recognie that our country is home to many

nations and faiths and move to form a strong unity based on the voluntary ,ill of our

peoplesF and until ,e build strong national consensus based on the principles

embodied in the constitution4 ,e ,ill not only be e0posed to internal strife and

implosion but also to e0ternal conflicts and haards4 as ,ell. ;nless ,e establish

strong democratic institutionsF reach a broad national concord based on democratic

principlesF assure the rule of la,F isolate and through popular involvement4 deal ,ith

those ,ho operate outside legality4 ,e ,ill remain hostage to internal and e0ternal

threats as ,ell as dangerous conflicts and ,ars.

n the past4 thiopian governments had resorted to mobiliing and agitating the people

,ith a message centering on national pride and based on the achievements of previous

generations. hat this has framed the minds of the present generation4 is not in doubt.

!uch influence has had positive as ,ell as negative results. #ormer governments

consistently failed to understand that the systems they put in place ,ould cause

national humiliation to the present generation. hey did not mobilie people to fight

the real sources of our shame. nstead4 they indulged in bragging and arrogant

declarations of bravado. his situation has e0acerbated our vulnerability in t,o ,ays.

n the first place4 it has prevented us from recogniing that the source of our national

shame is the lac/ of development and democracyF and this in turn has bloc/ed efforts

to embar/ on a path of progress through the forging of a national consensus. ast

governments indulged in 7ingoism ,ith an empty stomach4 adversely e0posing us to

even greater vulnerability because it ,as not in their character to promote democracy4

good governance and rapid development.

&ilitarism and arrogance have also in another ,ay e0posed us to peril. hey have

produced conflicts that could have been prevented and ,orsened their conse>uences.



his mentality has stifled debate4 dialogue4 give and ta/e4 and prevented us from

focusing on the fundamental issues. ;nless ,e dra, lessons from the e0periences of

Germany and =apan4 and set our sights firmly on our main ob7ective and ,or/ to,ards

that4 ,e ris/ further e0posure to danger. @e have to free ourselves from empty

bravado and focus on our fundamental interests.

:nother factor causing us vulnerability is our inability to foresee threats4 and failure

to develop a strong defense and security capability ,hile helping to nurture an

enabling international environment. he vulnerability is principally a product of our

poverty and the political problems that beset us. f ,e ma/e progress in dealing ,ith

these t,o problems and ,e form a strong defense and security capability4 potential

aggressors ,ould be forced to thin/ t,ice. Aur ,ea/ capabilities in this regard are

proof that efforts deployed so far lac/ed >uality and ,ere not result-oriented. @e

cannot say that ,e managed to build the necessary capacity economically. his points

to the need to ta/e corrective steps to reduce our vulnerability. Neither can ,e say that

,e had been effective in creating a supportive regional and international climate4 and

to enlarge our circle of friends in order to strengthen our defenses. hese

shortcomings have highlighted our vulnerability and it certainly is important to ta/e

corrective measures.

t is important in general that the basic strategy that ,e employ to reach our foreign

policy and security ob7ectives should be the reduction of vulnerability by correctly

identifying and then dealing ,ith the problem at the source.

0+8 B!i$"in) a re$ia&$e "efense *a%a&i$ity

t has repeatedly been asserted that our national security can be protected in a realsense through development and democracy. roceeding from this premise4 and

supported by proper analysis and study4 our diplomacy has a ma7or role in reducing

tensionsF in avoiding conflicts4 by embar/ing on early negotiationF and4 ,hen all fails4

in securing regional understanding as ,e ,or/ to have our interests protected. n

ensuring reliable national security and peace4 a strong defense obviously plays an

indispensable role.



+reating an efficient and state-of-the-art information net,or/ significantly enhances

the efforts launched in developing our defense strategies. his

informationHintelligence net,or/ must be fully capable of predicting threats to our

security and providing information of value to our diplomatic and defense initiatives.

he creation of a capable national defense force is similarly central to the protection

of our security. he e0istence of military strength compels prospective aggressors to

stop and thin/ t,ice. his allo,s for diplomacy to see/ a peaceful solution. n other

,ords4 strength in military po,er is a necessary pre-condition for deterrence and

effective diplomatic action. ven if conflict ,ere to brea/ out4 a strong military ,ould

help to ac>uire victory ,ith minimal damage to our efforts directed at building

democracy and fostering development. t is therefore proper that the institution of an

intelligence capacity4 and the strengthening of our defense capabilities must be the

basic strategy to realie our foreign affairs and national security ob7ectives.

No doubt ,e ,ill face problems as ,e set forth to build a capable military force. An

the one hand4 ,e are committed to placing all our resources at the disposal of

economic development. An the other hand4 ,e have to build a strong defense. his

,ill reduce our e0penditure for development. @e need to do both. +learly the

challenge in the building of a strong defense is that of the availability of resources.

his leads us to e0amine some approaches that are presented belo,.

a7 Ca%a*ity &!i$"in) on t.e &asis of a t.oro!). t.reat ana$ysis

:ddressing the issue of building a dependable military re>uires us to unloc/ the

contradiction bet,een the imperatives of economic development on the one hand4 and

that of building a strong defense on the other. roudly declaring that ,e shall build a

defense force second to none is no solution. ven if ,e tried4 the result ,ould not be

different from the debacle that the Derg <former military regime* faced. he definition

of ,hat constitutes an appropriate defense force must proceed from the threats that ,e

face and our political and economic capacities to deal ,ith them.

he building of a defense force should therefore start from an analysis of present

threats to national security. @ho are they ,ho mista/enly or accurately believe that

our building of democracy and speeding up of development threaten their interests

@hat is their capacity to pic/ a fight ,ith us n ,hat ,ay @hat is their capacity to



launch ,ar on a short4 medium4 and long-term time frame 6o, do ,e defend

ourselves ,ithout negatively affecting our development efforts and the process of

democratiation @hat are our strengths and ,ea/nesses @e need to as/ these

>uestions and then ans,er them ade>uately. his must be follo,ed by regularly

revie,ing our threat analysis. )ased on this4 ,e need to build a defense force that can

either deter others or face them appropriately if the situation demands it. #or this ,e

need to e0haustively rely on our advantages and strong points.

he national defense force that ,e build should essentially be ,ithin the limits of our

economic capacity4 and should not be above or belo, the needs defined by our threat

analysis.

&7 B!i$"in) *a%a*ity &y fo*!sin) on man%o2er "e#e$o%ment

0periences have confirmed that in the end4 in a conflict bet,een t,o forces ,ith

comparable technology4 the decisive factor is >uite simply - &an. t is the trained

manpo,er that can successfully utilie logistics and ,eapons of ,ar to ,in in a

battlefield. ven the state-of-the art military technology and the strongest logistical

bac/ing ,ould ma/e little or no difference in a battlefield in the absence of able

manpo,er. :lthough this does not mean that military technology and logistics are not

at all important to our capabilities4 a strong defense force means primarily the

mobiliation of capable soldiers.

t is not only because the individual soldier is important that ,e focus on human

capacity. @e realie all too ,ell that establishing a force based on sophisticated and

over,helming military hard,are ,ould have a devastating effect on the economy4 and

result in a negative outcome for defense and for development.

f ,e stoc/pile ,eapons and boast of an invincible army of hundreds of thousand of

troops ,ithout the financial means4 our economy ,ould collapse. @e4 thus4 need to

focus on >ualitative aspects of military training if ,e are to establish a force4 the costs

for ,hich ,ould not drain the resources ,e need to put aside to speed up development

and establish a democratic system.



@e stress the importance of focusing on human military capacity because ,e feel ,e

have an advantage in this regard. he efficiency4 success or failure4 of a given defense

force rests on the firm commitment of its members. his commitment springs from

each members trust of the e0isting systems principles and doctrines and hisHher

readiness to ma/e ,hatever sacrifice is re>uired in their defense. Aur constitutional

system4 and our democratic and development policies have all been designed to

protect the basic rights of our citiens. @e believe that if a national consensus is

reached upon these fundamental issues4 thiopians as a ,hole ,ill stand in unison and

safeguard ,ith dedication to their country and its security. :n army that emerges from

such a population ,ould fight ,ith great determination and valour. Doing effective

political ,or/ among the troops ,ould undoubtedly strengthen the :rmed #orces

singelness of purpose.

n other ,ords4 the efforts to further development and foster democracy4 and the

endeavor to achieve national consensus and register achievements4 ,ould help to

create citiens ,ho recognie the benefits and ,ho ,ould go to any length to protect

them. mbue the emerging army ,ith political education4 and a committed spirit

emerges.

t is important to note that nation-,ide educational and capacity building programmes

are no, being implemented. rimary education is more and more reaching large

segments of the population4 ,hile secondary education is gro,ing substantially. :

national army dra,n from an enlightened population4 and provided ,ith training in

military theory4 military science and techni>ues4 ,ould definitely become successful

in carrying out its duties. he organiation and ,or/ing procedures of such an army

have to be modern and efficient. +ombining all the above4 it is possible to create an

army ,hich is determined4 committed4 militarily and theoretically s/illed4 modern4

efficient and organied. his should be done ,ithout undue burden on the population.

*7 Cost effe*ti#e !se of finan*ia$ reso!r*es

Needless to say4 almost all countries ,ish to build up a national defense force ,hich4

at the end of the day4 ,ould be ,orth by far more than the cost of resources invested

in it. n our conte0t4 given the very lo, level of our economy4 this is a matter of

survival. n practical terms4 ,e have to ma/e sure that any e0pense4 ho,ever big or



small <each Birr and cent spent* contributes and enhances our security. Ather,ise the

economy4 and the defense sector as ,ell4 ,ill suffer grievously. t is essential that ,e

balance our economic development ,ith our defense re>uirements4 and in this ,ay4

ensure that everything spent on defense is spent prudently.

@e need to train a sufficient number of >ualified soldiers bac/ed by a reserve force in

time of emergency4 using the very limited resources ,e have in the most effective

manner. ositive results ,ould also come from instituting modern and efficient

methods of ,or/. :nother cost I effective strategy to be carefully considered4 is to be

able to use the armys potential labour and creativity4 for instance4 in the construction

and running of military camps.

"7 Ens!rin) sym&ioti* $in=a)e &et2een "efense e>%en"it!re an" t.e e*onomy

6o,ever cost-effective our strategy in developing our defense capacity4 the budget ,e

allocate for the defense sector cannot be reduced to ero. :ny e0pense represents

money that ,e cannot use for development. 6o,ever4 to significantly reduce the

negative impact the defense budget puts on the national economy4 ,e could devise a

mechanism ,hereby the economic and the defense sector could benefit one another.

his scheme could ,ell materialie if4 for e0ample4 the armys material needs such as

uniforms4 food4 shoes4 etc.4 ,ould be locally manufactured. his in turn fosters free

local mar/et competition leading eventually to >ualitative economic development.

Bi/e,ise factories ,hich ,ere originally designed for solely military purposes could

also be geared4 ,holly or partially4 to produce commodities needed by the civilian

community4 contributing to technology transfer bet,een the military and civilian

sector. n this manner4 the economic and the defense sectors can cross-fertilie each

other4 helping to reduce the negative impact of military spending on the economy.

e7 B!i$"in) *a%a*ity in t.e *onte>t of e*onomi* "e#e$o%ment an" *!rrent t.reats

&ost economists agree that ,hen a country allocates more than 2J of its G.N.. to

defense4 the effects on gro,th are significant. his is not to say that a less than 2J

e0penditure does not put any pressure on the economy. @e can4 and of course4 ,e

must strive to limit our defense budget to no more than 2J of our gross national

product. f4 ho,ever4 our economic development increases4 the defense budget ,ill



automatically rise proportionally. Aur economic gro,th ,ill therefore mean that the

money going to defense ,ill rise as ,ell4 enabling us to build a reliable defense force

,ithout undue negative impact on the economy.

:lthough pegging defense e0penditure to economic gro,th is appropriate4 spending

could go up or do,n depending on the gro,th rate and the urgency of the defense

threat posed. : fast developing military crisis cannot be halted by a long-term

capacity-building program for the military. Ane has to be ready for a crisis4 of that

there is no doubt4 and going above the ceiling of 2J cannot be ruled out. )ut if the

threat is e0pected to give us some time to prepare4 emphasis could be given on

e0panding the economy4 thereby ma/ing it possible4 through time4 to even spend

belo, the 2J ceiling. he ,ay for,ard is to set the 2J ceiling4 but implement the

policy fle0ibly depending on the level of threat.

Aur tas/ of developing an intelligence net,or/ should dovetail ,ith the direction ,e

have laid for building of a defense capability. t must be clear that the primary

ob7ective of building up our defense capacity is that of deterrence. fforts must be

deployed to further the development of democracy4 and not ,ar. Aur ob7ective is to

prosper4 and not to achieve a state of military arrogance. @e should go beyond

conflict and engage in ,ar for one and only one reason - ,hen conditions are imposed

that bloc/ our path to democracy and development4 and negotiations yield no result. f

faced ,ith such a ,ar4 our ob7ective is to emerge victorious ,ith as limited an impact

as possible on the national economy.

0+9 B!i$"in) stron) im%$ementation *a%a*ity

@ell-designed foreign and national policies4 ob7ectives and goals4 programmes andstrategies ,ould lead us no,here if they are not properly implemented. hat is ,hy

the building of an effective implementation capacity is regarded as a basic strategy.

a7 For)in) nationa$ *onsens!s

#oreign relations and national security goals are all about development4 democracy

and survival. he tas/ cannot be left to a fe, professionals or politicians. eople as a

,hole can4 in a manner4 participate. Aur foreign and security policies and strategies4



including our relations ,ith various countries should be made transparent to the

public so that various sections of the community discuss these policies4 improve on

them and reach a common position.

!ome analysts are of the opinion that a public discussion on foreign and security

policies ,ould be to divulge state secrets and serve the interests of the enemy. )ut ,e

need to ,eigh the pros and cons of public discussion. Apen discussions on policies

empo,er the people to closely monitor the governments implementation of these

policies4 and ,ould ensure the introduction of a culture of transparency and

accountability and indeed4 democracy. f members of the public truly understand the

ob7ective4 goals4 strategies and policies4 they can play a positive role in ensuring that

policy implementation is on trac/. hose ,ho for mista/en reasons believed that our

policies threatened them4 ,ould see from the publicly available document the need to

correct their perception. ublic discussion ensures that the policy remains constant

and helps the building of consensus. hese are arguments that are given high regard.

ransparency in our foreign policies and implementation may4 ho,ever4 alert those

,ho believe that ,e threaten their interest and4 ,ith their concerned suspicions4 that

they could harm us. )ut then the >uestion can be raised4 ,ould they not guess our

intentions as they see the implementation of the policy n that case4 ,ho is being

/ept in the dar/ Aur enemies or our people :lthough some matters of detail could

be /ept in confidence4 one cannot /eep fundamental issues a secret from those

enemies that have good intelligence net,or/s. n the end our policies ,ould remain a

secret to our people4 and not to the enemy.

:ll said4 the benefits of public discussion on basic policies and directions in order to

reach a common national understanding far out,eigh the loss. +reating the possibility

for such debate enables the people to ma/e their o,n contributionF this should be a

priority above all others.

&7 Stren)t.enin) t.e %rofessiona$ "i%$omati* *a%a&i$ity

utting our foreign and national security policies into practice needs4 first of all4 the

full participation of the entire nation. )e that as it may4 ,ithout professional staff

functioning ,ithin an organiation4 policy implementation ,ould not be satisfactory.

t is essential that >ualified professionals be deployed in an organied manner.



Kualified personnel need to be capable of carrying out studies and assessments in the

areas of foreign and national security policies4 threat analysis4 and implementation

strategies for these policies. hey are e0pected to elaborate and implement a plan

designed to ma/e the policies effective. #or professionals of this caliber to come to

the fore4 it is necessary for the nation to reach a common understanding on the main

elements of the national interests and security issues. @ithout such a common

understanding4 the proliferation of diplomats and researchers ,ould not allo, us to

protect our national interests and unity in a coordinated ,ay.

Government ministries and institutions that are directly or indirectly concerned ,ith

foreign and national security affairs should coordinate their ,or/. hat is one thing. n

addition4 &inistries of #oreign :ffairs4 Defense4 and !ecurity should coordinate their

,or/ ,ith ministries and institutions in the economic and the social sector in vie, of

the fact that the economy is central for diplomatic ,or/. t is of utmost priority for

these ministries to develop their manpo,er4 their organiational structure and

procedures so that they are effective in carrying out their responsibilities4 including

the responsibilities dealing ,ith foreign affairs and security. solated efforts ,ill not

bring results. hese institutions need to coordinate their ,or/ and reorganie

themselves accordingly.

*7 Coor"inatin) an" in#o$#in) t.ose 2it. a ro$e in im%$ementation

he reaching of consensus by the public on foreign relations and security issuesF the

participation of the public in the implementation of national tas/sF the organiation of

the ,or/ and the deployment of professionals may be critical4 but by themselves4 they

do not bring the desired result. o assist our international endeavors ,e need the

participation of others such as those referred to belo,.

he role higher educational institutions and scholars play in enriching policies and

implementing them is crucial. :lthough state research institutions have a role in

carrying out the studies relevant to policies and strategies4 other scholars and

institutions can also play a vital role. hey could present alternative vie,s and

promote debate. hey could also help in the training of manpo,er. he government

should encourage and coordinate this activity.



thiopians in the diaspora could also play an important role in carrying out research

and investing at home. n addition they could ,in friends for thiopia and try to

influence their country of residence to cooperate ,ith our country. hey could act as a

bridge bet,een thiopian companies and firms in their land of residence4 thereby

promoting investment and trade ties ,hile see/ing mar/ets for thiopian products.

+ogniant of the /ey roles played by thiopians residing abroad4 especially in the

economic sector4 the government should ta/e the initiative in creating the most

conducive environment for them to play a constructive role.

he basis of our diplomacy is the economic sector4 and the role of the private

investment in our economic development is obviously decisive. &embers of the

private sector must play a /ey role in diplomacy. +reating enabling conditions for

development means paving the ,ay for the private sector and the business community

to confidently e0pand their enterprises and invest in agriculture4 industry4 and tourism

to cite a fe, from among many others. rade and investment are critical to our

economic development4 and these can yield results if local and foreign businessmen

build strong ties. n vie, of the central role of the private sector4 the government

should encourage and even help coordinate its input.

n this ,orld so closely interconnected through globaliation4 civil society has started

to play a more important role in relations bet,een countries. 'eligious organiations4

professional associations and NGAs have been building lin/s ,ith fraternal

organiations all over the ,orld and are striving to spread the benefits of globaliation

around. n this ,ay4 they contribute to development and the building of democracy.

hey are becoming ne, forms of inter-country interchange. he government should

ta/e note of this gro,ing phenomenon and encourage and even help coordinate

thiopian civil society so that ones interests and security are respected. t is ,hen ,e

strengthen our net,or/ing4 ,hen ,e see/ the ,idest participation4 and ,hen ,e play

a /ey coordinating role that ,e can build our capacity to deliver ,hat is needed to

protect our interests and security.

Se*tion II

Et.io%ia1s Re$ations 2it. Ot.er Co!ntries



,+ Co!ntries of t.e Horn of Afri*a

@hen ,e spea/ of relations ,ith other countries4 ,e should first spea/ of our

neighbors in the 6orn of :fricaF namelyL the !udan4 ritrea4 D7ibouti4 !omalia4 and

8enya.

hese countries have long standing lin/s ,ith thiopia in such areas as language4

culture4 history4 natural resources4 and so on. +hanges in thiopia affect them directly4

and ,hat happens to them has an impact on us. here are rivers that connect us and

have a direct bearing on our development. his is particularly true of !udan4 !omalia

and also 8enya. thiopia is landloc/ed4 ,hile all our neighbors have ports that can

provide services. @e need to consider our strong ties ,ith our neighbors and chart outthe appropriate policy to,ards them.

,+, Genera$ Po$i*y

he relations ,e have ,ith a given country or group of countries is based on the

protection of national interests and security4 and as such4 is lin/ed to our

democratiation and development goals. Aur relations ,ith countries in the 6orn4

therefore4 should be seen from the vantage point of ho, relations could help us

promote our agenda of democracy and development. @ith our eyes firmly on

fundamental national interests4 ,e need to draft a policy on the basis of a sober

analysis of the value and role of these countries vis a vis our o,n interests.

thiopia has had a history of both friendship and hostility ,ith these countries in the

6orn4 and there is a ris/ of being guided by emotion in assessing the value of our

neighbors. here could be the tendency to e0aggerate or minimie their influence of

our neighbors in our effort to develop and democratie. t is important to be free of

emotions in analying the situation.

a7 Si)nifi*an*e of nei).&orin) *o!ntries to t.e "e#e$o%ment of Et.io%ia

!een from the economic development angle4 our neighbors are short of capital and

finance and cannot be considered sources of investment and development finance. @e

produce similar products and our mar/ets are small ,ith little impact on development.

rue4 ,e have not e0ploited our trading possibilities fully and as the region develops4



opportunities ,ill gro,. )ut in the present day conte0t4 the role of investment4 trade

and development finance originating from our region4 on our development is >uite

limited.

:s regards natural resources4 disagreements of differing degrees might be e0pected to

arise ,ith the !udan4 !omalia and 8enya. 6o,ever4 the capacity of our neighbors to

utilie ,ater resources is lo,4 and our assessments indicate that the basis for conflicts

of interest is not sound. he 6orn countries can neither be obstacles for our utiliation

of ,ater resources nor can they assist us to do so.

Aur neighbors have ports and ,e do not4 and as ,e develop4 the need for efficient

service rendering ports ,ill be important. ort service provision is to the mutual benefit of both the provider and the recipient of the service. n fact4 if some of our

neighbors ,ere not to provide port services to thiopia4 the damage to their

economies ,ould be substantial. herefore4 if seen from the economic and mutual

benefit point of vie,sF port services ,ould be provided steadily and predictably4 and

that is the ,ay it should be.

n general terms4 it can be said that at this time4 our neighbors do not have much of a

positive or negative influence on our economic development. @hat they have of value

is port service and the sole danger that ,ould arise is if they ,ere to collaborate to

deny thiopia the use of their ports or if they ,ere to reduce the efficiency of the

ports. !uch a situation ,ould not arise from economic interest4 but rather as a result of

political differences and conflict. Ane can4 ho,ever4 consider that in the longer term4

as our neighbors register greater economic development they could serve as an

important mar/et for our products.

&7 Si)nifi*an*e of nei).&orin) *o!ntries in t.e "emo*rati;ation of Et.io%ia

@hat is decisive for the realiation of a democratic order in thiopia is our o,n

internal ob7ective reality and our o,n effort4 although the ,orld outside could have a

positive or negative influence on this. here is little or no technicalHfinancial support

,e e0pect from our neighbors to speed up our democratiation process4 as some are

beginners li/e us and others are still alien to the process.



Aur neighbors could4 on the other hand4 play a negative role in undermining

democracy in thiopia. his should not be underestimated. )y promoting religious

e0tremism or providing the territory for religious e0tremists4 they could sorely test our

young democracy ,hich is based on the separation of state and religion and religious

tolerance. )elieving that ,e are vulnerable4 they could see/ to gain undue benefit

from our country4 or to disturb our peace directly or indirectly by falling under the

influence of other forces.

n sum4 the value of our neighbors - in the medium and short term - is limited to port

service. ;ntil such time that the region reaches a certain level of prosperity4 the role of

our neighbors4 both positive and negative4 on our development is limited. !imilarly

their positive impact on our democracy building process is limited. )ut in the negative

sense4 they could believe in our vulnerability4 and by promoting religious e0tremism

and narro, ethnic sentiments4 they could disturb the peace and our development and

democratiation efforts.

*7 T.e im%a*t of Et.io%ia1s "e#e$o%ment an" "emo*rati;ation on nei).&orin)

*o!ntries

@e have risen ,ith determination to improve our lives by deploying everything for

economic development and democratiation free from arrogance and adventurism. t

is e0pected of our people that they fully engage in this campaign imbued ,ith

common purpose. @e believe ,e are on the right trac/. :s our country holds half of

the inhabitants of the 6orn of :frica and is located at the center of the 6orn4 the

direction ,e are follo,ing ,ould have an impact on our neighbors.

#or a start4 our neighbors can be confident that thiopia ,ould not be the source of any threat to their peace4 in light of our devotion to development and democracy.

hey ,ill find thiopia ready4 more than ever before4 to address differences on the

basis of tolerance4 negotiation and the principle of give and ta/e. :s our political and

economic vision becomes a reality4 our neighbors ,ill see that our vulnerability to

e0ternal pressure4 <far and near* ,ill be reduced4 and that4 ,ith greater resolution4 ,e

,ould be more capable in preventing conflict. n other ,ords4 our neighbors ,ill feel

assured that thiopia ,ould be both internally and regionally a bastion for peace for



her o,n interest. :n thiopia that bases itself on the promotion of peace is not only

beneficial to herself but to all her neighbors as ,ell.

@hether by design or not4 the success of thiopias development ,ould benefit

neighboring countries4 and not 7ust in relation to ports. +ertainly4 as our economy

gro,s4 ,e ,ould need greater port services4 and this ,ould be beneficial to our

neighbors. Aur gro,th ,ould provide our neighbors ,ith a mar/et beneficial for all.

n other ,ords4 the efforts ,e deploy to build our economy and democracy in the

interest of our people4 ,ill have a positive impact on our neighbors and ,ould bring

about the transformation of the region as a ,hole. @ith this realiation ,e should

draft a policy that ,ould allo, us to contribute positively to the development of the

region.

)ased on the above4 and proceeding from our overall strategy4 ,e can say the

follo,ing about our policy as regards the 6orn of :frica.

Aur policy in the 6orn of :frica should4 li/e all our other policies4 be free of different

sentiments and proceed from a sober analysis of the situation4 /eeping in constant

vie, our development and democracy agenda. t should understand that the success of

our development and democratiation has a positive contribution not only to thiopia

but to all neighbours as ,ellF and that a policy that is free of arrogance and greed

,ould contribute to changing the entire region. hese are the premises on ,hich our

policy is based. An the other hand4 although our neighbors have little direct influence

on our economic development4 their role could gro, in time4 and as they ,ould then

have a bigger capacity to adversly affect our peace4 our policy should focus on

developing the culture of dealing ,ith contradictions through discussion and

negotiation ,hile reducing our vulnerability to danger and to address security threats

appropriately.

,+' Et.io%ia1s %o$i*y to2ar"s Eritrea

#rom among our neighbors4 the closest historical and cultural ties ,e have are ,ith

ritrea. !imilarly4 it is ,ith ritrea that ,e have had t,o vicious ,ars in the recent

historical period. f there is a policy that is heavily affected by different emotions4 it is

our policy to,ards ritrea. An the one hand4 there are those ,ho have not accepted



the independence of ritrea4 and they see this from the Cport accessC point of vie,.

here are those ,ho have difficulty to control their feelings4 insisting that ,e ,ere

one people and remain one people. &any cannot differentiate bet,een the ritrean

people and the regime and4 starting from the ,ounds of ,ar4 they call for a permanent

estrangement bet,een the t,o countries. :ll of them e0aggerate ritreas value to our

economic and political development. @hen vie,ed dispassionately4 and in the conte0t

of our development and democracy priority4 the reality begins to change.

a7 Si)nifi*an*e of t.e $in=s

he contribution the ritrean mar/et ma/es to our economy is negligible4 at least in

the immediate and foreseeable future. he same is true as regards investment andfinance. ritrean ports are4 ho,ever4 more convenient ports for us4 especially to the

northern and central parts of the country4 than other ports. @e also believe that the

significant electric po,er potential ,e have can be a better and cheaper alternative for

ritrea ,hich has scarce po,er resources. Aur ,ider mar/et opportunity is more to

the economic advantage of ritrea than their limited mar/et is to thiopia. Given all

these considerations4 a healthy relationship bet,een thiopia and ritrea ,ould bring

about mutual benefits for the peoples of both countries. 6o,ever ,e feel that our

lin/s do not 7ustify being given a high regard as far as our priorities are concerned.

#rom the point of vie, of democracy4 one cannot imagine a positive contribution

coming from ritrea. An the contrary4 our peace could be disturbed by ritrea ,hich

poses a significant threat. he source of the danger are not the ritrean people4 or an

intractable conflict of interest bet,een the t,o countries. he cause of the problem is

the group in po,er in ritrea. he second cause of the problem is our vulnerability to

attac/. :s our vulnerability is reduced so ,ill the threat4 and it ,ill not ta/e us long to

reach that point. !imilarly4 should the ruling group in ritrea and its policy be

replaced4 the danger could dissipate. he negative influence from ritrea ,ould only

re>uire serious attention in the short term4 and is e0pected to be reduced significantly

in the medium and long terms.

t is undeniable that there are conducive geographical and historical rationales for the

t,o countries to forge a relationship of ,hich the peoples of the t,o countries can be

primary beneficiaries in terms of economic development. thiopias focus ,ill be the



use of portsF ritrea ,ould emphasie the thiopian mar/et and electric po,er.

6o,ever4 even if a long and relatively peaceful period ,ere to be ahead of us ,ithout

benefiting from the advantages one gives to the other4 the effect on our fundamental

ob7ectives ,ould be negligible.

&7 T.e R!$in) Gro!%? an o&sta*$e to frien"$y re$ations

t ,as our conviction that the t,o countries ,ould commence a strong relationship

based on peace and mutual respect after the thirty-year protracted ,ar ,as over

<,hich claimed tens of thousands of lives and an immense amount of resources*

follo,ing ,hich thiopia gave recognition to ritrean independence. he recent

invasion the ritrean regime ,aged against thiopia and the ensuing destruction andloss of life4 ho,ever4 has dimmed our hopes. ;nderstanding ,hy ritrea invaded

thiopia ,ould significantly help our approach and policy to,ards that country in the

future.

he ruling party in ritrea has had a long history characteried by rent-see/ing

activities and preying upon others. ts economic agenda hangs on illegal economic

activity. o this effect4 the partys net,or/ is located not only in neighboring countries

but stretches as far a,ay as the D.'. +ongo and astern urope. he very cause of the

invasion ,as4 on the side of the ritrean ruling party4 the realiation that it could no

longer pursue its habitual illegal and unla,ful methods to get un7ustifiable economic

benefits from thiopia. t ,as not ready to choose to carry out relations based on

mutual benefit and sound legal economic principles.

he fact that the ruling elite is blinded by chauvinism and is prone to adventurism and

essentially undemocratic could be said to be one cause for ritreas aggression. :s aregime lac/ing in transparency and accountability4 it has managed to organie itself as

government cum-criminal gang and to e0pand its parasitic and rent-see/ing activities

and related net,or/s. ts anti-democratic character and adventuristic tendencies have

given it the feeling that it is the police of the region and has led to the militariation of

the entire ritrean society. !uch a position has led the regime to believe that it could

subdue its neighbors by force. ts arrogance led it to regard the peoples of neighboring

countries as inferior beings.



:lthough the ritrean regime launched an invasion against thiopia and other states

driven by its arrogant and 7ingoist character4 the fact that thiopia ,as vulnerable to

danger encouraged the regime to act4 thin/ing that it could succeed to force its ,ill

militarily. thiopias defense capabilities at that time ,ere very poor4 leading the

ritrean regime to believe that the thiopian people ,ere not truly united and could

therefore be dealt ,ith easily.

t is no, clear from ,hat transpired later that the ritrean regime indulged in grave

miscalculations. :nd yet the sacrifice paid to undo the aggression ,as not light. #or

some time our development and democratiation agenda ,as severely set bac/ and

the loss of human life ,as high. 6ad ,e had the foresight to have reduced our

vulnerabilities4 maybe the regime ,ould have thought t,ice before embar/ing on its

aggression. ven if the invasion had been launched4 ,e could have ,ithstood its

effects better.

:lthough the regime caused considerable destruction upon neighboring countries4 the

real victims are the ritrean people. he ritrean governments distorted ob7ectives

have prevented the people from mobiliing their mind and body to develop their

country. nstead4 the regime preferred to ta/e the road of dependency4 parasitism and

illegal economic activity as a means to fill its coffers. n ritrea the regime is

controlling all avenues ,here money can be made4 driving its citiens into destitution.

he aggressiveness of the regime has e0posed the people to unending ,ar and

destruction. )y calling to active military service all citiens of military age4 it has

created a ma7or social crisis. he regimes irresponsible behaviour has cynically pitted

the highlanders against the lo,landers4 those ,ho fought in the liberation ,ar against

those ,ho did not. he seeds of deep suspicion have indeed been so,n.

*7 Po$i*y Dire*tion

Aur foreign policy ,ith ritrea should ta/e into consideration our medium and long

term development strategies and basic national interests. :t a minimum4 our policy

should aim at avoiding conflict.



he ma0imal policy ,e ,ill pursue regarding ritrea ,ill come into play ,here the

regime or its policies have been changed. f ritrea pursues policies based on mutual

interest4 accountability and transparency4 i.e.4 democratic policies4 it ,ill be possible

to forge a ne, relationship. n the first place4 thiopia ,ould benefit from such a state

of affairs. !econdly4 ,e should realie that the establishment of such relations ,ith

ritrea ,ill have a positive effect on peace and security in the region. hirdly4 to the

e0tent that the ne, situation contributes to the safeguarding of our interests4 aids the

ritrean people and contributes to building friendship throughout the region4 ,e

should follo, this line.

:t such a 7uncture ,e ,ould need to revisit the issue of ports. )ased on past

e0perience4 ,e should not utilie these ports on the basis of a bilateral agreement. @e

,ould need to enter into a ne, type of port utiliation agreement that serves the

interests of both countries and is internationally guaranteed. ntering into economic

relations that do not guarantee the above ,ould not serve our interests4 and so ,e

shall not enter into such agreements. )ut if the desirable agreement is reached4 steps

should be ta/en to lin/ the t,o countries again <road4 phone4 electric po,er4 etc.* and

to provide for the legally acceptable movement of peoples bet,een the t,o countries.

his situation certainly is preferable to that ,hich is limited to conflict prevention.

)ut this scenario can only see the light of day if fundamental change comes to ritrea.

hat is a change ,e cannot bring about. n the first place4 ,e do not have the right to

overthro, the governments of neighboring countries. !econdly4 ,e couldnt do it if

,e tried. herefore the matter is in the hands of the ritrean people.

@e ,ish the ritrean people the best in getting rid of the yo/e of the regime. @e

cannot do their ,or/ for them. )ut ,ishing the ritrean people the best in their

struggle4 ,e ,ill do a,ay ,ith problems that create ill ,ill amongst the peoplesF and

stic/ing to our policy of conflict prevention4 ,e shall a,ait better opportunities for

going beyond this limited goals in the relations bet,een the t,o countries. @e trust

that it is only a matter of time until things ,ill change for the better in ritrea.

,+0 Et.io%ia1s %o$i*y to2ar"s Soma$ia

a7 Histori*a$ &a*=)ro!n" of re$ations



he relation bet,een thiopia and !omalia has not been a healthy one. n the recent

historical period4 one ma7or and one lesser ,ar ,ere fought bet,een the t,o

countries. he empty dream of the so-called CGreater !omaliaC4 an e0pansionist

policy4 had brought to !omalia nothing but hostility and conflicts ,ith all its

neighbors4 especially thiopia. &oreover4 !omalia had al,ays allied ,ith all groups

and countries it believed ,ere anti-thiopian and had disturbed thiopias peace. An

the other hand4 thiopian !omalis had resisted the oppressive system in thiopia.

'elated to this4 !omalia had succeeded in mobiliing a large number of thiopian

!omalis as allays in its attempt to e0ecute its e0pansionist policy. n this regard

thiopia has been e0posed to threats emanating from !omalia and other >uarters.

thiopia4 for its part4 rather than responding to the threat by respecting the right of

thiopian !omalis and by fostering brotherhood bet,een the peoples of thiopia4 so

thiopian !omalis could live in voluntary unity ,ith their other fello, thiopians4

resorted to dismantling !omalia to the e0tent possible. he policy ,as to respond to

!omali aggression by ta/ing the ,ar to !omalia and4 along the ,ay4 aggravating the

contradiction bet,een the !omali clans.

he situation has no, fundamentally changed. he CGreater !omaliaC ideology has

been discredited. t is no, over ten years since !omalia has become stateless. An the

other hand4 in thiopia4 a constitution in ,hich peoples rights are guaranteed is being

implemented. thiopian !omalis are living in brotherhood and voluntary unity ,ith

other thiopians in a ne,ly defined4 inclusive thiopian identity. ogether ,ith other

thiopians4 thio-!omalis are4 in the spirit of e>uality4 democracy4 development and

an thiopian identity4 resting on strong foundations and contributing to the building of

the country. thiopias vulnerability to the CGreater !omaliaC ideology has been

greatly diminished.

An the other hand4 the disintegration of !omalia has in itself brought ever-gro,ing

danger. he crisis in !omalia has allo,ed religious e0tremism to ta/e hold. !omalia

has become a haven and conduit for terrorists and e0tremists. :nti-peace elements are

using the country as a base and place of transit in order to threaten thiopias peace.

!omalias disintegration has brought danger to the peace in our country.

&7 Si)nifi*an*e of t.e re$ations



here is no condition ,hereby !omalia could contribute as a source of investment and

financial development or as a significant mar/et for thiopia. :fter a process of some

length4 follo,ed by peace and stability in !omalia4 there is the chance that it could

become a significant mar/et4 but this is difficult to imagine in the short and medium

term. 'egarding natural resources4 all the big rivers in !omalia flo, from thiopia.

he irrigation schemes in !omalia ,hich effectively served the people are in a poor

state. An the other hand4 as our country steps up its development4 ,e ,ill have to dam

the rivers for irrigation purposes. he harnessing of rivers in thiopia can help

!omalia resist floods4 and so the benefit ,ould be mutual. )ut on the other hand4

these rivers could be used in thiopia - mainly in the !omali region - for development

purposes. his could create a minor conflict but the problem can be tac/led by the

principle of give and ta/e in a ,ay that ta/es into account the national interests of the

t,o countries.

:s can be understood from the above4 in the short and medium terms4 !omalia does

not have a positive or negative influence of note in the development of our country.

:nd yet4 in !omalia there are numerous ports that can provide services to thiopia.

!tarting from the port of Meila ,hich gave services to thiopia during its long history4

all the ,ay to 8ismayo4 there are no less than seven ports in !omalia that can be used

by different parts of our country. hese possibilities could significantly contribute to

our development4 but due to the CGreater !omaliaC-driven conflict and national

oppression in thiopia4 they ,ere never seriously considered <not to forget that

thiopia had ports of its o,n*. he current collapse of the state in !omalia ma/es it

unrealistic to thin/ of using the ports at the present time.

ven if the chances to use the ports ,ere to arise4 and though that ,ould increase

!omalias relevance to our development4 one cannot see a positive role that !omalia

can play at this time. An the negative side4 it is ,orth noting that the disintegration of

!omalia has posed dangers for peace and stability in thiopia. his situation has spoilt

the image of our sub-region4 and the 6orn is no, perceived as an area of conflict. Aur

chances to attract investment have been reduced and the C!omalia effectC has

contributed to the uncertainty about regional peace and the lac/ of economic lin/ages

bet,een the t,o countries.

*7 Po$i*y Dire*tion



Aur pro0imity to !omalia ,ould be beneficial to our development if there ,ere peace

and stability in !omalia. eace can come to our region if a government committed to

fighting disorder4 terrorism and e0tremism in cooperation ,ith its neighbours is

established in !omalia. !ome circles say that the establishment of such a government

in !omalia ,ould once again resuscitate the ideology of CGreater !omaliaC and that

peace4 democracy and development in !omalia ,ould4 in that case4 not benefit

thiopia. his vie, is fundamentally ,rong and dangerous. #irst4 of all4 from no,

on,ards4 our country safeguards the unity of its peoples not by denying them options

but by helping them recognise and confirm in practice4 the option based on e>uality4

mutual development and democracy.

:s a result of this4 ,e have created the condition ,hereby thiopian !omalis4 no

matter ,hether the ideology of CGreater !omaliaC is revived or not4 ,ould choose to

live in e>uality and unity ,ith their other thiopian brothers and sisters. :s our

development and democratisation process gains momentum4 our vulnerability to the

effects of this and other similar slogans ,ill be much reduced. #urthermore4 it should

be underscored that4 since it has been the cause of much suffering first and foremost

to the people of !omalia4 this slogan of CGreater !omaliaC has been discredited and its

chances of revival are indeed very slim. n light of the encouraging political and

economic situation in thiopia4 the fact that !omalis live in both countries ,ould

actually ensure that they serve as a bridge that creates strong connections bet,een the

t,o countries4 rather than as a factor of suspicion.

An the contrary4 if !omalia en7oys peace and democracy4 ,e ,ill have the opportunity

to use the !omali ports e0tensively and continuously and this ,ould contribute to our

development significantly. !uch a situation ,ould ma/e it possible4 in alliance ,ith

the ne, government4 to stamp out anti-peace activities originating from !omalia.

)oth countries can ,or/ together to 7ointly develop river utiliation plans. he ,ay

,ould also be clear to promote strong educational and cultural ties and

interdependence in light of the educational and other related activities that are carried

out in the !omali language ,ithin the !omali 'egion of our country. )y creating

strong relations bet,een the t,o countries regarding the use of ports and rivers4

commerce4 culture and so on4 and seeing to it that the t,o peoples are benefiting from

this4 one could be sure that the peoples ,ould resist activities designed to harm the



relations that are proving to be so beneficial to them. thiopia ,ould also gain direct

economic advantages from this situationF in addition4 ,hen thiopias eastern border

ceases to be a source of threat4 overall economic development ,ould be enhanced.

hat is ,hy4 at this time4 our ma7or ob7ective in !omalia is to see the establishment of

peace and democracy4 and based on that4 the development of strong economic4

cultural and political ties bet,een the t,o countries.

his may be our ,ish and policy4 but peace and democracy cannot be realised through

our efforts only. :lthough ,e ,ill do all in our po,er to contribute to the peace and

stability of !omalia4 as it is in our interest to do so4 the responsibility to establish

peace in that country principally rests on the !omali people and the political forces

there. n addition to this4 those e0ternal forces ,hich can influence events should see

to it that they use their authority to contribute to bringing about peace and democracy

in !omalia.

he events of the last ten years in !omalia have not been encouraging4 but ,e should

not give up hope that peace and democracy ,ill eventually come to !omalia. he

country has disintegrated into different areas4 and ,hile some are comparatively4 calm

others are in continuous turmoil. hose ,ho reap benefits from the absence of

authority - a number of !omali groups4 some traders4 religious e0tremists4 and their

foreign friends - are bent on sabotaging in one ,ay or another any effort aimed at

bringing about peace in !omalia. :lthough the !omali people long for peace4 they

have not been able to brea/ out of the ,eb of obstruction put in place by those ,ho

oppose peace and change. :lthough the international community ,ishes to bring

about peace in !omalia4 it is evidently not ready to e0ert all its efforts to realise this.

hus4 it appears to us that the condition of instability in !omalia is li/ely to persist for

some time. herefore our policy should not be limited to contributing to the

emergence of peace and democracy only and4 based on that4 to forging strong tiesF

rather4 it should also address ,hat ,e should do if instability and turmoil persist.

Aur fundamental policy remains to persistently ,or/ to,ards the birth of a peaceful

and democratic !omalia. )ut in light of the continuing instability4 the policy ,e

pursue should essentially be a damage-limitation policy to ensure that the instability

does not further harm our country4 the region and the people of !omalia. f the



a7 Histori*a$ &a*=)ro!n" of Et.io:S!"an Re$ations+

t is /no,n that there is a long historical relationship ,ith the !udan starting from the

time of the states of :0um and &ero,e4 there are also long-standing ties bet,een the

t,o peoples ,ho have lived in one anothers country over the years. t is evident that

this relationship has had its o,n positive and negative features. n particular4 since the

end of @orld @ar 4 ,hen he !udan became independent4 the relationship has not

developed in a positive manner as much as it should have.

Ane reason for this is religious e0tremism. :lthough it is the people of !udan ,ho

bear the main brunt of intermittent manifestations of religious e0tremism4 such

phenomena have also harmed the relationships bet,een the t,o countries. )esidesattempting to spread religious e0tremism in our country4 there ,ere various efforts

aided by he !udan that ,ere designed to ma/e our country a victim of terrorist

attac/s.

here has al,ays been religious tolerance in our country for a long period of time4

and no political ground e0isted for e0tremism. he religiously motivated attempts

from he !udan should also have had little impact. )ut it is clear that the previous4

undemocratic systems in thiopia had e0posed us to this danger. t cannot be denied

that ,idespread poverty4 and the fact that religious e>uality had not been satisfactorily

realised had e0posed our country to imminent danger. :lthough our endeavours to

fully implement all aspects of religious e>uality4 to spread education and modern

thin/ing4 and to succeed in the ,ar against poverty ,ill certainly free our country

from such dangers4 ,e cannot say ,e have reached that level yet. t should be

underscored therefore that there is a vulnerability that has substantially been reduced4

but has not been completely done a,ay ,ith.

Ane of the causes for the deterioration of relations ,ith he !udan concerns the use of

the ,aters of the Nile. n this regard4 the agreement he !udan signed ,ith gypt in

1959 that e0cluded thiopia from the use of the river is an e0ample ,orth mentioning.

thiopia is the main source of the Nile4 and he !udan is the second biggest source.

gypt4 on the contrary4 is not a source at all. thiopias opportunities to use the Nile

for irrigation are limited. ven if ,e ,ere to irrigate all the lands on the thiopian



side of the Nile )asin4 due to the topography and limitations of the territory4 the

amount of ,ater ,e use ,ould not be that high. An the contrary4 since he !udan has

e0pansive and fertile lands that can be irrigated4 it is in a better position than gypt

and thiopia to gain ma0imum advantage.

ven if in accord ,ith sound principle regarding the use of rivers for irrigation

purposes4 gypt - ,hich adds no volume to the Niles ,aters - does not have enough

land for irrigation. 6o,ever4 according to the 1959 agreement4 it has appropriated the

right to use the most substantial portion of the Niles ,aters. thiopia may be the main

source of the Nile4 but it does not possess e0tensive lands li/e he !udan to be

developed through irrigation. he country that has a ,ide territory that can be

developed using irrigation is he !udan4 although its share of the Nile is limited

according to the agreement it entered ,ith gypt. :s a result4 he !udans national

interest cannot be said to have been respected in the 1959 agreement. n fact4 !udans

national interest can best be protected ,hen there is an agreement on e>uitable

utiliation of the Nile ,aters bet,een !udan4 gypt and thiopia. f such a stage is

reached4 ,hat becomes difficult is not reconciling the interests of thiopia and he

!udan but the interests of gypt and he !udan. rue as that may be4 in practice4 he

!udan has been supporting gypts stand on the issue. he !udan has ,rongly

considered that its interest in this regard is threatened by thiopia. :lthough this

attitude is gradually changing4 it has been one reason ,hich prevented the

strengthening of the thio-!udanese relationship for a long period of time.

:nother reason for the poor relations has been4 on the one hand4 the support he

!udan provided - also because of the influence of others - to various opposing forces

that aimed at disrupting the peace of thiopia4 and on the other hand4 thiopias

retaliation through the support it gave to !udanese opposition forces4 especially those

in !outhern !udan. ;nable to address the root causes of their problem4 the t,o nations

have been suspicious and ,ary of each other over the years.


n the 6orn of :frica4 !udan is ne0t to thiopia in population sie. he !udan has rich

natural resources and the potential to go far in development. resently its GD is

higher than that of thiopia4 and ,hen compared ,ith others in the 6orn of :frica4



the !udanese mar/et is >uite substantial. !een from the mar/et perspective4 he

!udan offers substantial advantages for thiopias development. !ervicing the

!udanese mar/et ,ill have a significant contribution to enhancing our development.

Ane could also e0pect investment from he !udan4 although in a limited scale.

he port of he !udan can be used as a trading option by some regions of our country.

!imilarly4 he !udan can play a constructive role regarding the utiliation of the

,aters of the Nile. n the process4 thiopia4 by developing its electric po,er potential4

can provide this service to he !udan and reap considerable benefits. n sum4 from the

vantage point of our economic development4 out of all the countries in the 6orn of

:frica4 he !udan can play a more significant role in the short4 medium and long

terms. n light of promoting our national interests4 ,e have to give proper focus to the

development of this relationship.

Af optimum value ,ill be the development of strong political4 economic and

diplomatic ties ,ith he !udan4 a ,orld a,ay from the suspicion ,hich has mar/ed

our relations in the past. he !udan needs to attain durable peace and a development

that ,ould contribute importantly to the prevalence of peace and security in the 6orn

of :frica. f strong ties are built bet,een thiopia and he !udan4 they ,ill ma/e a

significant contribution to the stabiliation and peaceful interdependence in the 6orn

of :frica.

*7 Po$i*y Dire*tion

#rom the perspective of our o,n economic development agenda4 for regional stability

and peace-in short4 in light of our fundamental national interest framed by

development and security-utmost priority should be given to the relations bet,eenthiopia and he !udan. 6o,ever4 it should be recognied that those factors that have

been obstacles for the creation of a strong relationship bet,een the t,o countries4

although substantially reduced4 ,ill remain and could continue to aggravate our ties to

some degree or another.

Ane problem has been thiopias vulnerability to threats emanating from he !udan

or other neighbours4 and thiopias subse>uent attitude to,ards its neighbours4 li/e

he !udan4 ,as also suspicion. &oreover4 the perception of the relationship by many



thiopians is distorted and mi0ed ,ith suspicion. @hat is important is that ,e are

striving internally to realie our development and democratisation agenda4 ,ith

encouraging results. :s ,e become stronger4 threats to our security - be they in the

guise of religion or other,ise - ,ill have no ground to flourish. )y focusing on

eliminating the conditions that ma/e us vulnerable4 ,e can ,ith self-confidence build

strong relations ,ith neighbouring countries4 and4 in particular4 ,ith he !udan.

he other problem is the internal situation in he !udan. t has been practically

demonstrated that the absence of democracy and e0tremism has led he !udan into

deep crisis4 and its people are reaching the point of realiing this. :s they understand

that e0tremism and resistance to democracy provide no ans,er but further destruction

and crisis4 he !udanese people are4 in the frame,or/ of establishing democracy and

moving to,ards unity based on free ,ill and e>uality. he effort under,ay to resolve

the crisis in !outhern !udan on the basis of the abovementioned principles is a result

of these ne, trends.

:chieving unity in he !udan ,ithin the frame,or/ of peace and democracy ,ill

offer a significant advantage for both thiopia and our region. ;nity founded on

democracy and e>uality ,ould mean that he !udan has ceased to become a venue

for e0tremism and anti-peace activities4 and this ,ould end the threat that thiopia

faces from that country. rue4 the establishment of unity based on peace4 democracy

and e>uality in he !udan is the duty its o,n people. )ut since ,e also benefit from

this4 ,e should pursue a policy of supporting this ob7ective ,ith all our means ,hile

adhering to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of he !udan.

'egarding the use of the Niles ,aters even at present4 he !udan has not totally

divorced itself from its past stance4 and it cannot be said today that it is actively

promoting the e>uitable use of Nile ,aters. hat this stance ,ill have its impact on

the relations of the t,o countries cannot be denied. 6o,ever4 he !udan has not been

a ma7or obstacle for thiopia on ,ater issues. here has been limited improvement in

the !udanese position4 but not real change. herefore4 it cannot be said that the sub7ect

of the Niles ,aters poses an unsurpassable obstacle for establishing strong ties

bet,een the t,o countries. !o4 ,hile ,e e0ert our efforts to secure !udanese support

for the fair and e>uitable utiliation of Nile ,aters4 ,e should follo, a policy that



supports the establishment of strong ties bet,een the t,o countries ,ithout ,aiting

for a change in he !udans position on the matter.

!tarting from this4 ,e can reinforce basic infrastructural ties such as roads4 rail,ays

<in due course*4 telephone lines4 electric po,er4 and the li/e4 enabling the creation of

economic ties bet,een the t,o countries. )ased on this ,e can focus on creating

strong trade lin/s. here is a need to create a mutual vision in order for us to build

momentum in promoting the mutual interests of both peoples and governments.

:lthough ,e should give priority to strengthening our relations and enforcing the

positive aspects of our ties4 ,e cannot be certain that all ,ill be accomplished in the

,ay ,e ,ould ,ish. @e should understand that there are circles both in he !udanand else,here that do not ,ish our relations to e0pand in the manner 7ust described.

roceeding from this4 and reducing our susceptibility to dangers4 ,e should calibrate

our policies based on the situation in he !udan and the response of the !udanese

Government.

,+5 Et.io%ia1s %o$i*y to2ar"s D/i&o!ti

a7 Histori*a$ &a*=)ro!n" of t.e re$ations

:n effort has been made to create strong economic ties bet,een thiopia and D7ibouti

since the time of its coloniation by #rance the establishment of a modern port there.

n our country the only rail,ay line is the one that lin/s :ddis :baba and D7ibouti. :t

the time the line ,as established4 it ,as ,ith the consideration that D7ibouti ,ould be

the outlet for thiopia <since thiopia ,as land loc/ed*. n fact4 the very

establishment of the port of D7ibouti ,as based on the understanding that it ,ould

provide port services to thiopia. #urther4 there are people ,ho have the same culture

and language living in both countries. !ince early on4 it appears that history has

dictated that the t,o countries be bound together.

0cept for the fe, occasional instances of differences that have emerged bet,een the

t,o countries4 thiopia and D7ibouti have never entered a conflict ,ith lasting

conse>uences. @hilst this is the case4 the relationship bet,een the t,o countries4 for a

number of reasons4 is not as strong and healthy as it could be.




#rom thiopias side4 the anchor of the relationship is that of port use. he port4 from

its very establishment4 ,as meant to provide services to thiopia4 and naturally so4

due to its pro0imity to most regions ,ithin our country. D7ibouti ,ould benefit the

most from providing port services compared to thiopias other neighbours. t also is

a country that does not have any negative legacy lin/ed to thiopia. #or all these

reasons4 D7ibouti is ,ell placed to be the principal port of use. :lthough our use of

other ports is to be e0pected4 the relationship ,ith D7ibouti is highly valued as it

relates to the development of thiopia.

!een from D7iboutis perspective4 providing port services by itself has economicsignificance as the port is the main source of income for D7ibouti. :s thiopia

develops4 inevitably more and more goods ,ill be going through the port4 and

D7ibouti ,ill increasingly benefit from the income of the port services. )esides4

thiopia can become a ma7or mar/et for D7ibouti and can provide electric po,er and

other basic services to that country. t is therefore clear that thiopia can play a vital

role in the conte0t of D7iboutis economic interest and development.

*7 Pro&$ems re)ar"in) t.e re$ations.i%

:lthough they may not create fundamental lasting resentment bet,een the countries4

it is undeniable that there are obstacles that hinder the relationships from developing

to the desired level. he gravity of issues differs from one problem to the other and no

one country is free of them.

#rom the side of D7ibouti4 the main problem concerns the handling of mutual

advantages4 in particular the balancing of short and long term benefits. Ees4 the people

and their leaders recognie that D7ibouti has to provide long term and reliable port

services to thiopia. hey also /no, that if D7ibouti cannot do this4 its main source of

income ,ill dry up4 and in general4 they are ,ell disposed to,ards thiopia. )ut there

are occasions ,hen some officials focus only on the short term. @ere it to provide

services at reasonable rates4 D7ibouti ,ould benefit increasingly as thiopia develops

and increases its use. )ut ,e sometimes observe the tendency ,here D7ibouti

scrambles to ma0imie benefits ,ithin a very short period of time. #urthermore4



instead of recogniing that thiopia needs a durable and guaranteed port use

arrangement4 there is a preference to loo/ for other options. his problem so,s seeds

of suspicion4 and reduces the chances of the port serving the long-term mutual interest

of the t,o countries.

An the other hand4 there is the problem that arises due to the fact that the people in

D7ibouti do not derive direct benefits from the use of the port. ;ndoubtedly4 the

revenue can be said to be benefiting the public in an indirect ,ayF and this applies

also to those employed to ,or/ at the port. 6o,ever the people ,ould gain more from

the development underta/ings in thiopia and defend the relationship staunchly if

they ,ere to substantially benefit from trade and investment. #or e0ample4

D7iboutians could get electric po,er supply from thiopia at cheap rates4 but this has

yet to see the light of day. here is a need to tac/le the problem of drin/ing ,ater4 and

thiopia4 could e0amine ,hat it could do4 but this again4 has not materialied. he

citiens of D7ibouti could participate in the various medium trade and investment

opportunities in thiopia but nothing is in the ,or/s4 and so on. D7iboutians have not

benefited to the e0tent that they should. :s a result4 the people have not become as

strong a foundation for the relationship as they should. 'egarding this matter4

although there are4 on the side of D7ibouti4 shortcomings in helping the people

become beneficiaries4 it can generally be said that this problem mainly emanates from

thiopia.

f in D7ibouti the economic and political problems ,ere to ,orsen4 the use of the port

may be hampered by instability. t may open the door for other forces to prevent

thiopias use of the port by imposing their ,ill on D7ibouti. @hen vie,ed from this

angle4 although it is the responsibility of the government and people of D7ibouti to

maintain peace and stability in their country4 the issue affects our interest directly and

the threats in this regard4 need to be considered al,ays.

An the side of thiopia4 the main concern has to do ,ith seeing to it that4 on the

principle of give and ta/e4 the people of D7ibouti reasonably benefit from the

relationship. @hile it is proper to ob7ect to attempts by D7ibouti to reap undue benefits

and to ma0imie short-term advantages4 ,e do need to recognie4 on our part4 that not

only thiopia4 but D7ibouti has to ade>uately benefit from the use of the port4 and that

,e are living in a ,orld of give and ta/e. :lso4 at times ,e see there is a chauvinistic



and condescending attitude that is e0hibited. !trong relations bet,een D7ibouti and

thiopia4 beneficial to both and the region at large4 can come into being only ,hen

these problems are solved and ,hen an appropriate policy is designed and

implemented.

"7 Po$i*y Dire*tion

he policy ,e should follo, to,ards D7ibouti should be to assure long lasting and

reliable port services ,ith reasonable fees. @hile ,e should maintain the option of

using other ports4 ,e need a policy that underlines the continued utiliation of

D7ibouti as the reliable port of prime use. his ,ill re>uire reaching a long-term

agreement ,ith guarantees4 and then4 its implementation. he D7iboutian peopleshould be made a,are of its provisions in order that they bac/ it. he agreement

should4 on the one hand4 help the speeding up of the development of our country4 and

it should not impose negative pressures on us. An the other hand4 it should enable

D7ibouti to receive fair benefits and it should aim at securing the long-lasting interests

of both countries. he agreement should help avoid some negative tendencies that are

manifested on both sides.

thiopias e0tensive use of the port and the gro,th of strong trade lin/s bet,een the

t,o countries depend on the strengthening and e0pansion of the already e0isting basic

infrastructure net,or/. n this respect4 the improvement and reinforcement of the

rail,ay line and the high,ay should be given special attention. rompt action should

also be ta/en to create and e0pand telecommunication and electric po,er services

bet,een the t,o countries. !o4 our policy should ta/e into consideration the

substantial upgrading and strengthening of the basic infrastructure services bet,een

the t,o countries as soon as possible.

f the people of D7ibouti are to get significant benefit from the relationship and if they

are to stand in unison in support of ties ,ith thiopia4 it is essential that trade and

investment be strengthened and sound legal practices adhered to. n this regard4

restrictions in place in thiopia should be eased for D7iboutians in a ,ay that does not

harm4 but rather enhances trade and investment. f the nationals of D7ibouti participate

in limited-scale investments reserved only for thiopians4 there is no harm envisaged.

:s long as precautions are ta/en in order to see to it that others do not use this outlet



to frustrate the development of our countrys entrepreneurs4 such a policy ,ould

enable the people of D7ibouti to see that their interests lie in the development of

thiopia. hey could thus become strong allies and supporters of thiopia4 a situation

,hich ,ould provide us strategic advantages. Aur policy should4 therefore4 give

proper focus to this tas/ and to create an enabling environment.

t is the duty of the people and government of D7ibouti to safeguard peace and

stability in their country4 for their o,n benefit. @e also have a direct interest in

D7ibouti remaining peaceful. t therefore goes ,ithout saying that the promotion of

peace in D7ibouti and the region4 in league ,ith the government and people of

D7ibouti ,ould have to constitute a ma7or feature of our policy.

n general4 by establishing e0tensive and allencompassing economic relations bet,een

countries4 and by helping the peoples to benefit from these ties in order that they

protect the relationship4 the 6orn of :frica can be transformed from an arena of

turmoil into one of cooperative development and peace. Aur country can play a

special and prominent role in this regard. t is easier to put in place such a relationship

bet,een thiopia and D7ibouti4 follo,ed later by one bet,een thiopia and he

!udan. f4 together ,ith D7ibouti4 ,e in a short time establish multi-sectoral economic

ties4 ,e could step by step4 conditions permitting4 e0pand this process ,ith the other

countries. G:D could be instrumental in facilitating this initiative ,hich promotes

the transformation of the region into one of development and peace. hat is ,hat our

policy should ,or/ for - the realiation of our vision of development and democracy

in a comprehensive ,ayF one that shapes the 6orn of :frica to be a region of peace

and development based on e>uality and mutual benefit. he policy ,e pursue should

enable thiopia to play the role that it can4 namely a pivotal role4 starting ,ith those

countries ,hich are ready to move for,ard. he firm and healthy relations ,e

establish ,ith D7ibouti should serve as an e0ample to the region as a ,hole.

,+8 Et.io%ia1s %o$i*y to2ar"s @enya

a7 Histori*a$ &a*=)ro!n" of t.e re$ations

!ince 8enyas independence4 our t,o countries have en7oyed good neighbourly

relations. thiopia and 8enya have lived in mutual respect ,ithout interfering in the



internal affairs of each other4 and ,ithout threatening each other. n fact4 the ideology

CGreater !omaliaC ,as a threat directed at both countries4 leading them to render each

other support and to sign a mutual defence agreement. hat having been said4 cattle

rustling has been a feature in the border area bet,een the t,o countries and this

problem has gro,n in the past decade. &oreover4 as economic and political problems

emerged in 8enya4 the Aromo Biberation #ront <AB#* and li/e-minded elements ,ere

able to ta/e refuge in the northern part of that country. @hile it is important that these

problems be addressed4 they do not define or alter4 the fundamental nature of the

relationship.

@hile the political relationship has been basically healthy4 the economic relationship4

,hich could have gone far4 has lagged behind. 8enya has faced a series of economic

difficulties in the last ten years4 that ,ea/ened its economy. )ut it certainly en7oyed

better development than others in our region and it still does. ven though it faced

various political problems aggravated by its troubled economy4 8enya is basically a

peaceful country. 8enya follo,s thiopia and he !udan in terms of population but

has a comparatively larger mar/et. 6o,ever4 the economic ties bet,een thiopia and

8enya are ,ea/ and hobbled by contraband.


ven though some economic problems constrain its development4 8enya has a

comparatively large mar/et in our region. :s it addresses its problems and ma/es

strides in development4 8enya could constitute a truly significant mar/et. )esides4

8enya is our bridge to ast and !outhern :frica. n commercial terms4 the 8enyan

mar/et could be comparable to that of the !udan.

n terms of facilities it can offer4 8enyas ports could be better options for some parts

of our country. !ince 8enya suffers from a large electric po,er shortage4 it could be

envisaged in the future that it could purchase po,er from thiopia4 enabling both

countries to benefit substantially. he utilisation of the Amo 'iver4 ,hich flo,s from

thiopia and enters Ba/e ur/ana4 on the border ,ith 8enya4 has been a point of

difference. )ut if handled correctly4 the difference could be resolved ,ithout much

difficulty. n general4 despite the fact that lac/ of attention has resulted in ,ea/



economic relations4 it is obvious that 8enya can play a considerable and positive role

in the development in thiopia.

!o far4 8enya has been a land of peace and stability4 and is ,ell placed to play a

significant role in the promotion of stability in the region. f the economic and

political challenges that tested 8enya in the past decade are resolved4 the country can

most certainly play a significant and constructive role in the 6orn of :frica.

*7 Pro&$ems in t.e re$ations

he basic problem manifested in the relationship ,ith 8enya ,as the fact that no

attention ,as given to the creation of a strong4 legally based economic relationship.

:s a result4 although it is possible to lin/ the t,o countries by roads and rail,ays4

there is4 at present4 no road lin/ ,orthy of mention. t had also been possible to create

telecommunication and electric po,er service lin/s4 but again4 there are no

achievements in this field. n general4 no significant effort ,as made to lin/ the t,o

countries economically. !o the good neighbourly relations the t,o states en7oyed did

not e0tent to development. )oth countries are responsible for this state of affairs.

;nless the political and economic problems that have manifested themselves in the

past ten years in 8enya are solved4 the countrys peace and stability ,ill be sorely

tested. he negative influence that can come from this ,as evidenced in the last ten

years ,hen northern 8enya became an active center for anti-peace forces. !ome

8enyans4 ,ho are still stuc/ on dependency4 ,orry ,hen neighbouring countries

ma/e economic progress and e0perience peace and democracy4 thin/ing that 8enya

may lose both the prominence in the eyes of aid donors4 and the advantages she has

en7oyed for many years. his leads them to vie, stability in neighbouring countries ascontrary to their interest4 and hence4 to vie, the emerging situation ,ith suspicion and

some degree of envy. f this attitude gains prominence in 8enya4 it could become an

obstacle for the strengthening of its relationships ,ith its neighbours4 including

thiopia.

"7 Po$i*y Dire*tion



hat G:D has various problems is a fact. Ane ,ea/ness is that it does not have

enough human and financial resources. &ember countries do not sho, the same level

of concern for the development of the organiation and that is another reason for

G:Ds ,ea/ness. he disintegration of !omalia and the civil ,ar in he !udan have

also contributed their share in this regard. : further reason4 and one that could

probably be cited as a main cause for the ,ea/ening of G:D4 is the relations

bet,een member states4 and particularly4 bet,een ritrea and other G:D countries.

: basic tenet in our foreign policy should be to strengthen G:D by striving to ease

these problems.

'+ Re$ations 3it. Ot.er Afri*an Co!ntries

'+, Histori*a$ &a*=)ro!n" of t.e re$ations

ver since their achievement of independence4 the relations that other :frican

countries have had ,ith thiopia could be described as very healthy. :s a founding

member of the Arganisation of :frican ;nity4 thiopia has struggled faithfully and

prominently for the realiation of the ob7ectives of the A:;. t has done its level best

overtly and covertly to assist those countries under colonialism to gain their

independence. t is ,orth mentioning that the policy and practice pursued by past

thiopian governments in this regard must be seen in a positive light because their

polices enabled our country to discharge its :frican responsibilities and to gain the

respect of our :frican brothers and sisters. Aver the past ten years ,e have continued

along similar lines4 and the healthy relationships established earlier have been

maintained.

n connection ,ith this4 thiopia has been receiving ,ide political and diplomaticsupport from the Arganisation of :frican ;nity and its member states. 'ecently4 as

evidenced ,hen our country ,as invaded by the ritrean government4 :frica firmly

stood in support of the peace and security of thiopia4 as in earlier times. n short4 it

can be said that there is hardly any political and diplomatic support that our country

as/ed for and did not get from :frica. hat thiopia is the seat of the :frican ;nion

<:;* is a reflection of this fact. Naturally this entails that ,e carry a special

responsibility for the organisation.



ven though thiopia en7oys healthy diplomatic and political relations ,ith other

:frican countries4 there have been limitations resulting from the overall challenges

:frica faces in fostering unity. Averall economic ties bet,een :frican countries are

,ea/ and thiopia does not have economic relations of note ,ith :frican countries

e0cept those in the 6orn of :frica. he :frican ;nion should have4 but has not

fulfilled its role to be the forum of debate in the struggle to enhance :fricas share4

and that of member states4 in the process of globaliation. ven in the promotion of

peace4 the :; has sho,n that it has serious limitation4 although it has made important

efforts in this area.

'+' Si)nifi*an*e of t.e re$ations

he general and regional conditions favourable to our peace and stability have been

nurtured by the positive relations ,e have managed to maintain ,ith other :frican

states. his ,ill continue in the future as ,ell. Aur desire is to focus on development4

and on development only. @e ,ish to avoid any and all conflicts4 and to respond to

those ,ho ,ish to launch conflicts against us by offering the possibility to resolve

problems through discussion and political means. n this regard4 ,e can count on the

support of :frican countries and the :frican ;nion.

#urthermore4 the influence and support ,e gain from :frica ,ill help us indirectly as

,e try to ma/e ourselves heard in other parts of the ,orld. he :frican ;nion can

play an important role in supporting our efforts in economic development and

democratiation4 by contributing to the creation of favourable political conditions4

including the resolution of conflicts by peaceful means.

6ome to small and fragmented mar/ets4 the :frican countries cannot benefit as theyshould form the era of globalisation. he creation of strong economic lin/s among

:frican countries in the long run4 ,ill contribute significantly to the development of

:frica. @e ,ill also benefit from this. )ut in the short and medium terms4 it is

difficult to envisage that trade relations bet,een :fricans states ,ill bring about

significant change to the situation.

An the other hand4 all the negative effects of globalisation that affect thiopia also

apply to other :frican countries. he ,orld mar/et remains inaccessible to :frican



become the forum that ,ill ensure a better place for our continent and to fulfil its

mission ,ith distinction.

n our time efforts are being underta/en to build the :; so that it can better fulfil its

political and developmental mandate. o this end4 ,e ,ill staunchly support the

ob7ectives of the :;4 7ust as ,e bac/ed the A:;. n addition4 ,e have to be in the

forefront in supporting N:D and related programmes designed to transform the

:frican economy. #or this purpose4 ,e have to have a policy of co-operating ,ith all

:frican countries4 particularly ,ith those ,ho have the commitment and the capacity

to contribute significantly to the realiation of :fricas ob7ectives.

0+ Re$ations 2it. Co!ntries of t.e Mi""$e East

0+, Genera$ Po$i*y

he &iddle ast has both positively and negatively influenced our history due to our

pro0imity to the region. n fact4 the impact of the &iddle ast on thiopia is more

prominent than that of the :frican countries.

he great religions that originated in the &iddle ast have had a great impact on our

country since ancient times. t is noted that as a political community4 thiopia

embraced +hristianity preceded by only :rmenia and +onstantinople. +hristianity

came to thiopia from the &iddle ast4 and for more than 1($$ years4 thiopias

religious leaders4 the patriarchs of the Arthodo0 church4 came from gypt.

+hristianity4 besides being the religion adhered to by millions of thiopians4 has

formed an integral part of our history and culture. slam may have been born in !audi

:rabia but thiopia ,as the first country to allo, its adherents to practice it4 even

before !audi :rabia did. )ecause they ,ere persecuted in their o,n country4 the

follo,ers of the rophet &ohammed ,ere ordered by him to see/ refuge in thiopia.

t ,as after this that the rophet ordered his follo,ers not to touch the :byssinians

e0cept in self-defence4 a clear illustration of the regard ,ith ,hich slam vie,ed

thiopia. !ince then4 slam has not only become the religion of millions of thiopians

but also has come to form an integral part of our history and culture. !imilarly4 an

ancient version of the =e,ish religion ,as practiced in thiopia and this too had some



influence on our history and culture. his is the bac/drop for thiopias long-standing

relationship in language4 history and culture ,ith the &iddle ast.

An the other hand4 there are negative elements in our relations ,ith the &iddle ast .

Ane of the issues that strained relations bet,een thiopia and the &iddle ast ,as the

issue of the ,aters of the Nile. he Nile had a special place in the thousands-of-years

long relationship bet,een thiopia and gypt. he gyptians have been imposing

their ,ill so that no one but themselves ,ould use the ,aters of the Nile. An the other

hand4 thiopia has struggled to ensure that its rights to the use of the Niles ,aters are

respected. :s gypt too/ the mantle of leadership of the :rab ,orld4 the sub7ect of the

Nile ,aters began to influence thiopias relations ,ith that region and still continues

to do so.

Neither ,as religion free of casting a negative influence. here ,ere t,o main

sources for thisL slamic e0tremism4 and thiopias susceptibility to danger. Ane of the

differences bet,een &uslim e0tremists4 and moderate &uslims concerns their

differences on the sub7ect of thiopia. he moderate &uslim believes that thiopia is

a country ,hich received the first follo,ers of the rophet4 the first hijira

<pilgrimage* country4 a respected country ,hich a believer should not touch if it does

not touch him. :s a result of this4 he prefers to consider it a special place different

from other countries. he e0tremist4 on the other hand4 preaches that it ,as the

thiopian /ing ,ho gave refuge to the follo,ers of the rophet and that he had been

converted to slam4 though he did not ma/e it public for fear of the people. !o4 the

people are the enemy. thiopia should be categorised as the first C:ndalusiaC4 the land

,hich betrayed slam. !o it has come to pass that ,hen the e0tremist line prevails4

thiopia becomes susceptible to dangerF and ,hen moderation reigns4 thio-:rab

relations improve.

6o,ever4 even though it has been a defining characteristic of our history and culture4

there are sometimes conflicts bet,een the follo,ers of the t,o religions. arious ,ars

,ere ,aged at different times bet,een &uslim sultanates that ,ere flourishing in

different regions and +hristian /ings4 to achieve supremacy over the other. n the

process4 the systems of governance in thiopia evolved into ones ,here e>uality of

religion ,as not realied for a long time. his situation triggered an internal struggle



development. &oreover4 the policy ,e pursue to,ard the &iddle ast must be based

on /no,ledge and must be supported by appropriate research and study. )y no means

should ,e be guided by feelings or ,hims. Aur policy should aim at reducing the

negative effects of the problems that hinder the development of our relationship. Aurs

has to be a policy of considerable detail4 ,hich ta/es into account the particular

conditions of each country in the &iddle ast.

0+' Re$ations 3it. E)y%t

a7 Histori*a$ &a*=)ro!n" an" %ro&$ems re)ar"in) t.e re$ations

#rom its inception4 the gyptian civilisation is based on the ,aters of the Nile. Not

less than "5J of the ,ater that enters gypt originates from thiopia. t can therefore

be said that from the very beginning4 the t,o countries have been intimately lin/ed by

nature. he problem thiopia faces regarding the use of the Niles ,aters is

principally a problem ,ith gypt. Due to the influence of gypt in the :rab ,orld4

the issue of the Nile also affects thiopias relations ,ith other countries. @hen

e0tremism gains ground in gypt4 the relations ,ith thiopia are aggravated even

more. Needless to say4 a fair amount of ignorance has also contributed to this

problematic relationship.

he gyptians for a long time have continuously laboured to prevent thiopia from

using the Niles ,aters4 particularly for irrigation purposes. hey have suffered under

the belief that gypt ,ill be e0posed to tremendous danger if thiopia starts to use the

,aters of the Nile. he agreement signed bet,een gypt and he !udan in 1959 does

not provide for thiopia to use even a single litre of ,ater. he gyptian mentality is

framed by the mantra Cif thiopia uses the ,ater4 gypt ,ill be endangered. f gyptis to use it4 thiopia has to ta/e her hands off the ,ater.C he gyptian scenario

regarding the Nile is a classic e0ample of the politics of C ,in if you loseC4 the ero-

sum game.

An the other hand4 gyptians believe that the Niles ,aters are not sufficient for all.

)ut on the other4 they utilise the ,aters e0travagantly. he :s,an Dam4 ,hich is built

in the middle of the desert is sub7ect to massive evaporation resulting in loses of more

than 1$ billion cubic metres of ,ater annually. his is more than the annual volume of



the e/ee 'iver-no less rresponsibly lavish ,ith their use of the ,ater4 the

gyptians have been diverting the Nile from its natural basin4 east to the !inai desert4

and ,est in the osh/a canal in the ,estern desert of gypt.

6o,ever4 those persons ,ho have studied the issue in depth e0press the vie, that the

interests of thiopia and gypt regarding the benefits of the Nile ,ater are not

irreconcilable. #or instance4 thiopia can help stop the silting4 ,hich is causing

considerable problems in gyptian and !udanese dams by rehabilitating the natural

environment of the ;pper Nile basin. !uch a measure ,ould4 at the very least4 benefit

thiopia and gypt. f fluctuations in flo, of the Niles ,aters are tamed4 !udan ,ill

be safe from the annual floods and all countries could be able to get cheap electricity

services. :dditionally4 since the ,ater ,ould not be e0posed to e0treme evaporation if

dammed upstream4 at least 3 billion cubic meters of ,ater could be saved and shared

by the countries in the basin. he amount of thiopian land in the basin that can be

developed through irrigation is relatively small. he ,ater that can be saved by

building dams in thiopia4 and the ,ater that is inappropriately ,asted in gypt4

could together be enough to satisfy thiopias irrigation needs. &oreover4 as the

mainstay of gypts economy changes from agriculture4 t ,ill have the ability to use

the ,ater economically4 ,hile its dependence on irrigation ,ill be lessened. n this

,ay4 there ,ill be the opportunity to save the ,ater that gypt is using e0travagantly

at the moment. n short4 this illustrates that the interests of t,o countries in the use of

the Niles ,aters can be reconcilable.

@hile the interests of the countries could be made compatible4 gypt has been

pursuing a policy of systematically preventing riparian states4 especially thiopia4

from utilising the ,aters of the Nile. :n important element in this policy has been the

promotion of instability in thiopia and the 6orn. :lthough gypt may not be the

primary cause for instability in the region4 it has contributed to the instability by

fanning the flames and aggravating the conflicts because it believes that such a

situation serves its interests. gypts assumption is that ,hen thiopia is ,rac/ed by

,ar it cannot focus its efforts on development. :lthough thiopia may ,ish to

develop4 leaving poverty behind4 it ,ill not be able toF and gypt ,ill continue to

have unfettered access to the Niles ,aters.



he other gyptian strategy has been to see to it that thiopia does not manage to

secure aid and loans to utilise the Nile ,aters. A,ing to its influence in the :rab

,orld4 it has managed to prevent thiopia from receiving grants and credits from any

:rab nation. t has also laboured to perpetuate hostility and suspicion to ,ards

thiopia. gypt has also more or less4 succeeded by using its influence as leader of

the :rabs in bloc/ing thiopia from obtaining aid and loans form other sources to

e0ploit the ,ater resources of the Nile. gypts belief has been that thiopia4 mired in

poverty and embroiled in endless conflict4 could not develop the basin on its o,n4 and

that ,ith4 the opportunities for aid and credit closed4 thiopians ,ill have no choice

but to sit and ,atch the river flo, to those ,ho can then put it to good use.

:lthough this ,as not translated into action4 gypt had at one time4 threatened

military action in the event any country used the ,aters of the Nile ,ithout see/ing

prior permission from +airo. here are those ,ho argue that gypts ,ar preparations4

involving a huge army trained in bush ,arfare and for a country that is essentially

desert4 is evidence of gypts militaristic intention. here are also those ,ho maintain

that these are 7ust verbal threats unli/ely to lead to real aggression.

t should be noted that there are gyptians ,ith a different outloo/4 ,ho believe that

the idea of eternally preventing thiopia from using the Niles ,aters is unrealistic.

here are also those ,ho contend it is unacceptable that the people of thiopia4 the

main source of the Nile4 should face endless drought4 famine and death. here are also

those ,ho believe a compromise formula can be ,or/ed out ,ith respect to the use of

the Niles ,aters. n this connection4 an understanding ,as recently reached bet,een

gypt4 he !udan and thiopia regarding development activities along the Nile. he

pro7ects include natural conservation and e0porting hydroelectric po,er in e0cess of

the actual needs of thiopia to gypt and he !udan4 as ,ell as engaging in e0tensive

irrigation pro7ects. hese pro7ects call for 7ointly see/ing aid and credits4 as ,ell as

private investment.

his agreement may be vie,ed as a remar/able and even historic development in the

utilisation of the Niles ,aters. #or the first time in history4 this treaty demonstrates

gypts confirmation that the interests of riparian states could be reconciled. he

agreement also demonstrates that the soil and natural resources conservation along the



o ensure rapid development4 thiopia needs to appropriately utilie and4

simultaneously conserve its natural resources. :bove and beyond satisfying its o,n

electric po,er needs4 thiopia must be able to sell po,er to he !udan and gypt4

generate foreign currency and pursue economic integration in the 6orn of :frica. t

needs to develop its irrigable land and protects its soil and other natural resources. t

also needs to provide sufficient ,ater supplies to its rising population and industrial

development needs. t is difficult to see all this happening ,ithout sufficient

utiliation of the ,aters of the Nile. thiopia can ensure rapid development only if it

can e0ploit its rivers4 including the Nile river. his can and should be done ,ithout

affecting gypts fundamental interests and through the balancing of benefits. ;nless

,e move on this issue our development and national security interests ,ould be

gravely harmed.

f gypt really has a desire to see the fair and e>uitable use of the Nile resources4 it

,ould refrain from frustrating thiopias efforts to secure funds for development

activities and4 beyond this4 evolve in to a development partner. gypt could play an

important role in bringing peace and stability to the 6orn. :lso4 since it has a

relatively big mar/et4 it can considerably contribute to our development. f

moderation and democracy ,in the day in gypt4 e0tremism in the &iddle ast ,ould

ebb4 ,hich ,ould contribute importantly to our security. Generally4 our relations ,ith

gypt are significant and relevant to our national security and development.

*7 Po$i*y Dire*tion

@hether ,e li/e it or not4 the issue of the Nile river ,ill remain central to our

relations ,ith gypt. Aur policy is to deal ,ith the Nile issue by balancing interests

and4 by peaceful negotiation4 leading to a solution that does not harm our

development activities. Kuestions raised regarding this issue need to be addressed in a

proper time frame. arallel to this4 ,e need to adopt a policy that helps manage

threats and reduce vulnerability.

n our relations ,ith gypt4 li/e in other foreign policy matters4 ,hat is critical ,ill be

our handling of important issues on the domestic front. f ,e ensure that democracy

ta/es rootF and ,e resolve outstanding national issues in a peaceful mannerF deal ,ith

issues involving neighbouring countries through dialogue and assure them that our



interests do not go beyond our development and democracyF and implement this free

of emotion and ,ith our long term interest in mind4 our vulnerability emanating from

issues revolving around the Nile ,ill be drastically reduced. @e can emerge from

unending ,ar and concentrate our efforts on development. ;sing our human resources

and our gro,ing economic strength4 ,e can e0pect to develop our nation including

the Nile basin. :long ,ith this4 ,e should be able to bolster our defence capability

commensurate to the threats ,e face4 enabling us to respond appropriately.

he ,or/ ,e carry out on the domestic front4 as stated before4 ,ould help us achieve

our development ob7ectives ,ith speed and in addition ,ould help us resolve the Nile

issue by balancing different interests. !uch a policy ,ould remind gypt that

engaging thiopia in different disputes and ensuring that it is mired in poverty ,ould

not ,or/4 gypt needs to realise that the option of force and intimidation ,ill not

yield fruit. @hat ,ill ta/e us for,ard is if gypt can be convinced that force and

intimidation should be replaced by negotiation and balancing the interests of all

concerned.

:long ,ith our o,n internal efforts4 ,e need to ,or/ to create a regional and

international atmosphere suitable for an e>uitable utiliation of the ,aters of the Nile.

@e should indicate une>uivocally that ,e have no intention of obstructing the

development endeavours of others4 but that ,e aim to ensure that our development

needs are met4 and that the solution must balance interests. @e must sho, that such an

alternative e0ists. @e need to be able to clearly sho, the in7ustice of any attitude

,hich does not respect thiopias right to use the Nile to fight its recurring problems

of drought and famine4 and underline that such a position is unacceptable. his should

be communicated to donor countries and institutions4 re>uesting them not to ,ithhold

their support and to play their part in reaching a solution regarding the ,aters of the

Nile. @e also need to see/ the political and diplomatic support of our :frican brothers

and sisters to the same effect. ffort is also re>uired to e0plain our ob7ectives and to

see/ at best the support of the gyptian people4 of the :rab ,orld or at the very least

to ensure that they overcome their fears and bring their opposition to an end.

: central component of our policy should be to fully implement the agreement

recently reached bet,een he !udan4 thiopia and gypt. @e need4 based on this

agreement4 to build a climate of trust among the countries. @e need to introduce4 step-



by-step4 issues of economical and fair utiliation of the ,ater resources. @e need to

gradually broaden opportunities produced by the agreement. @e have to ,or/ hard to

involve the peoples of thiopia and gypt as ,ell as countries in the region and the

international community to e0ert a constructive influence on the Nile issue. Aur

policy and its implementation should ta/e into account the fact that time and 7ustice

are on the side of thiopia and its development agenda.

hrough our readiness to address the Nile issue in a positive frame,or/4 ,e need to

demonstrate our support to the efforts in gypt to accelerate development and the

prevalence of moderation and democracy. o benefit from the gro,ing gyptian

mar/et4 ,e need to steadily establish strong economic ties ,ith gypt ,ithout

disregarding our security concerns. @e also need to replace the policy based on

ignorance and suspicion ,ith an informed policy. t is important that ,e adopt a

policy and have implementation strategies that4 focusing on security4 development4

democracy and peace4 engage gypt patiently and far-sightedly. Aur policy should

utilie our capacity to resolve problems fairly4 for ,e4 and our abilities4 ,ill be 7udged

on this issue.

0+0 Re$ations 2it. t.e Ara&ian Penins!$a Co!ntries

a7 Histori*a$ &a*=)ro!n" an" %ro&$ems in t.e re$ations

Af the countries of the eninsula 4 it is ,ith Eemen that thiopia has historically

closet relations. 6istory sho,s evidence that Eemen had at one time been part of the

:0umite /ingdom. )ut before and since4 there ,ere strong historical relations

bet,een the t,o countries. Eemenis have been /no,n traders in thiopia. his could

be the reason ,hy Eemen has a more positive attitude to,ards thiopia than the other countries in the eninsula . Aur relations ,ith !audi :rabia are also of a longstanding

nature. An the other hand the /no,ledge of and ties ,ith other eninsula !tates have

been reciprocally very limited.

he relationship ,e have ,ith the eninsula !tates varies from one country to the

other and the problems are also different. !ome countries sho, hesitation in forging

any /ind of meaningful relationship ,ith thiopia4 mainly o,ing to the influence



gypt has over them. nfluenced by slamic e0tremism and doubtful of religious

e>uality in thiopia4 some states have problems in understanding thiopia.

here are countries ,hich e0hibit suspicion and hostility to,ard thiopia in

connection ,ith the :rab-sraeli dispute. :ll told4 countries in the eninsula in

general have limited /no,ledge of thiopia and this has contributed significantly to

the lac/ of development in our relation ,ith these states.


&any of the eninsula !tates are rich in petroleum ,hich obviously ma/es them an

attractive source of investment and finance for development. hese countries have the

possibility of becoming important mar/ets for our agricultural products. n sum the

eninsula !tates could have an important contribution to our development.

eace and stability in the eninsula is lin/ed to that in the 6orn of :frica4 and

cooperation in assuring peace and stability is important to our national security. An

the other hand4 the gro,ing spectre of e0tremism in the region is potentially a serious

threat to our national security. n light of the important role that the eninsula

countries can play as regards our development and national security4 our policy

should4 as a matter of priority4 ta/e the initiative to improve and intensify our relations

,ith them .

*7 Po$i*y Dire*tion

'egarding our relations ,ith these countries4 ,e need to consider ho, best to reduce

our vulnerabilitys to threats4 ,hile raising our level of understanding about them. @e

cannot say today that our professionals let alone our people4 have ade>uate /no,ledge

about these states. here is no research or study of real ,orth that is underta/en on the

eninsula . :s a result4 the relations are hobbled by emotions and conclusions reached

,ithout the benefit of accurate information. his needs to be replaced by proper

research and study. olicyma/ers4 professionals4 and our people as a ,hole4 need to

build their /no,ledge about the eninsula region.

Aur foreign policy regarding the eninsula countries must duly consider the /ey role

these countries can play in our economic development4 and focus on see/ing



development4 finance4 investment4 and mar/ets for our products. Aur diplomacy

should clearly e0plain our policies ,ith regard to the resources of the Niles ,aters4

and the e>uality of religions in thiopia. @e need to sho, the economic benefits that

the relationships could bring and concentrate on overcoming the obstacles that have

been hindering the development of economic lin/s. @e should consider launching a

campaign to correct the distorted image the governments and peoples of the region

have about thiopia4 and4 in particular4 strive to correct the negative role played by the

:rab media4 either by its silence4 or its distorted portrayal of our country.

:ssuring peace and security for the eninsula region has attracted the attention of

po,erful countries in the ,orld. thiopia too could play a significant role in this

regard and4 as much4 should cooperate ,ith those countries that are contributing to the

establishment peace and stability in the region.

0+4 Re$ations 2it. Nort. Afri*an Co!ntries

&any of the North :frican countries have good political and diplomatic ties ,ith

thiopia in :frican fora. :lthough the issues that negatively affect our relations ,ith

the &iddle ast do influence our relations ,ith the northern :frican states4 most

countries in this region have a positive attitude to,ards thiopia. he opportunities to

cooperate economically are not negligible4 but so far4 not much has been done.

Aur relations ,ith these countries ,ould be mainly of a political and diplomatic

nature4 ,hich is e0pected to be pursued ,ithin the frame,or/ of the :frican ;nion.

he /ind of relation ,e promote to,ards the North :frican countries should be able

to favourably influence our ties ,ith the :rab ,orld. @e also need to e0ert utmost

efforts to create and strengthen our economic intercourse ,ith the countries of theregion as much as conditions permit.

0+5 Re$ations 3it. Israe$

thiopias historic relations ,ith srael go as far bac/ as those ,ith other countries of

the &iddle ast. : significant number of persons follo,ing the =e,ish faith lived in

thiopia4 though most have moved to srael. @hile our diplomatic relations ,ith



srael had been severed for some time4 presently our overall political and diplomatic

relations have in general been >uite healthy.

&inor disagreements and contradictions had surfaced regarding the movement of

thiopian =e,s <)ete-sreal* to srael4 but in light of the fact that under the thiopian

+onstitution4 any citien has freedom of movement4 the problem has been dealt ,ith.

he main problem of relations bet,een thiopia and srael is that created by the :rab-

sraeli conflict.

!ome countries4 even those ,hich have strong diplomatic ties ,ith srael4 ob7ect to

the positive nature of thio-sraeli relations. hese countries ,ould li/e us blindly to

stand against srael. +onversely4 there are also pressures of this nature that originatefrom the other side4 from srael4 against thio-:rab relations.

ven though it has a small population4 srael is an economically prosperous4

technologically advanced nation4 ,hich could play an important role as a gro,ing

mar/et opportunity for our e0ports and a source of investment and various types of

technical support for our economic development. Ane cannot identify a security threat

for thiopia emanating from srael. herefore4 from the economic and to some e0tent4

from the security perspective4 ,e should establish strong and healthy relations ,ith

srael.

he rationale for our relations ,ith srael is clearly based on our national interest4 our

development and national security. !ince srael could4 in the first place economically4

and to some degree security-,ise4 ma/e a positive contribution4 the establishment of

strong ties serves our national interest. Aur policy should be geared to,ards this. ery

little has been done in the economic field so far. herefore action should be ta/en thatfocuses on trade4 investment and technical support.

he conflict bet,een the sraelis and :rabs basically concerns the conflicting parties.

thiopia4 ho,ever4 ,ill continue to ensure4 in her relations ,ith both parties4 that her

national interests relating to both sides are protected. @e should not follo, a policy to

please one and anger the other.



roceeding from this and committed to the respect for international la,4 ,hich gives

prominence to the peaceful resolution of disputes ,hich is in our national interest4 ,e

need to advocate that the alestinian issue be resolved in accordance ,ith these

principles. @e should support the right of the alestinian people to self-determination4

and that the problem be solved peacefully and 7uridically. Aur position should anger

no oneF ,hether it does or not4 ,e should pursue this line because it is in our national

interest to do so. Aur relation ,ith the :rabs or srael must not be sub7ected to the

fluctuations of their relations ,ith each other. @e should4 on the basis of our defined

national interests4 e0pand our co-operation ,ith both4 and e0plain our position to both

sides to gain their understanding.

0+8 Re$ations 2it. T!r=ey an" Iran

ur/ey is one of the countries in close pro0imity to the &iddle ast ,ith a large

population and a relatively advanced economy. ur/ey is also one of the countries

,hich has been engaged in building democracy. t poses no threat to our national

security. :t this time ,e do not see any obstacle to developing good relations bet,een

thiopia and ur/ey. ts large mar/et and relatively developed economy can ma/e an

important impact to our development. +ommitted to the principle of e>uitable

utiliation of ,ater resources among countries4 and opposed to religious e0tremism4

ur/ey is ,ell disposed to,ards thiopia. he only problem bet,een us is that4 in the

face of all the possibilities for economic cooperation4 ,e have not yet begun to

scratch the surface.

ur/ey is a country not far from us4 ,ith a large mar/et that recently e0perienced rich

economic development. t represents in some areas a source of investment and

technical assistance. Noting this and ta/ing into account its favorable disposition

to,ards thiopia4 it is essential that ,e draft and implement a policy to,ard ur/ey

that focuses on the economy and aims at fostering strong ties. conomic diplomacy

should focus on inviting ur/ish investors to thiopia4 the promotion of our products

and facilitating the establishment of firm contacts bet,een the thiopian and ur/ish

business community. @e should strive to intensify diplomatic and political relations

and see/ technical assistance in some areas. @e should consider the fact that our

relations ,ith ur/ey have the potential for ma7or gro,th4 but have not been given

ade>uate attention so far.



ran4 li/e ur/ey is located in pro0imity to the &iddle ast4 has a large population4

and advanced economy. 0cept for problems that could indirectly be raised by4 and

founded on4 e0tremism4 ,e do not see a security threat coming from ran. here are

possibilities to e0pand economic relations ,ith ran4 and our policy should focus on

that aspect of our relations.

4+ E!ro%e

4+, T.e E!ro%ean Union 6EU7

he uropean ;nion4 ,hich currently comprises 15 affluent uropean countries4

constitutes a huge mar/et and is poised to accept 1$ more members. his mar/et is

comparable in scope and prosperity to that of the ;.!. and in due course4 it could

surpass the ;!. Ne0t to the ;.!.4 it represents the second most po,erful mar/et4

determining the rules governing globaliation. t is also note,orthy that the ; has as

its main ob7ective4 the establishment of peace and democracy. he development aid

,e receive from its member states4 added to that coming from the ; <+ommission*

itself4 places the ; as our largest source of aid. t is also the main destination for our

products. :s regards investment4 although it is regrettable that the results are so far

not encouraging4 there is no doubt that the ; continues to be a huge source of

investment opportunities for our country. #urthermore4 this region remains to be a

critical source of assistance for our development endeavor. :t this time ,e do not see

the ; as posing a security threat to thiopia. o the contrary4 as the ; and its

members have the ob7ective of ensuring the respect of international la, and the

promotion of peace and democracy4 ,e consider them as partners and sources of

support in our effort in this area.

Ane main concern regarding our relationship ,ith urope has to do ,ith our failure to

ma/e ma0imum use of the opportunities that the region offers. :dmittedly4 ,e have

not done enough in terms of e0ploring sources of credit and aid to finance our

development plans and ensuring that the money thus obtained is properly used. &ore

importantly4 there has been some failure to gear our relations ,ith the ; to,ard

e0panding trade and investment in the country. he main reason for this is our poor

image in urope. thiopia is perceived as a country ,rac/ed by protracted ,ar and

poverty rather than a potential destination for investment and trade4 and the efforts



deployed to correct the image have not been ade>uate. #urthermore there has been

little effectively planned ,or/ done in terms of creating an environment conducive to

attracting investment.

!ince the ; represents one of the po,erful agents shaping the rules governing

globaliation4 there is li/ely to be a tendency to regard the ; as a source of the

negative influences associated ,ith the phenomenon. 6o,ever4 it is encouraging to

see that the ; has recently agreed to allo, poorer countries4 including thiopia4 free

access to its mar/et ,ithout any tariff and >uota on entering goods. Nevertheless the

subsidy the ; provides to its firms ,ith ,hich ,e ,ould have to compete4 and other

practices relating to trade and investment4 are having a negative effect on the

development of the poor countries.

@ith respect to bilateral relations4 there are problems caused by attempts to impose

options that contradict the political and economic strategies that ,e carefully designed

to suit our conte0t.

he strengthening of our relations ,ith ;4 and the ma0imiation of the benefits ,e

could gain for our development and security4 are predicated on the domestic ,or/ ,e

carry out in thiopia. mportant are the efforts ,e deploy to implement the

development and democratiation strategy ,e have adopted. @e should thus identify

gaps in the resources needed to implement the development plan ,ith a vie, to

determining the /ind of assistance the ; can provide to help fill the gap. &oreover4

,e should be prepared to engage in consultative meetings ,ith ; member states and

e0plain our strategies. Given the fact that our development strategies are based on

democratic principles and are to be implemented ,ithin the frame,or/ of

globaliation4 ,e do not e0pect them to be in conflict ,ith the fundamental interests

of uropean countries. t should also be our policy to try and resolve differences

through dialogue and mutual understanding in a manner that does not 7eopardie or

compromise our fundamental strategies and goals.

@e should strive to ac>uire from uropean states credits and grants for the

development and technical assistance re>uired by our initiatives4 and ,or/ hard to

ensure ma0imum and effective utiliation of the resources secured. n due course4 our

main focus should shift to trade and investment. )ased on detailed and continuing



research4 and study ,e should4 find mar/ets for our products and e0port those that are

in demand in urope. @or/ along these lines ,ill also re>uire us to establish and

maintain close contact and cooperation ,ith private investors4 NGAs and states that

are ready to contribute. !imilarly4 steps should be ta/en to establish through research

the parties that can help us in our efforts to attract the type and amount of investment

,e desire4 and to ,or/ together ,ith them in a more coordinated fashion. @e need to

,or/ hard to change conditions ,ithin thiopia and cooperate ,ith those that can

help in changing the image of our country.

urope has a significant role to play in efforts aimed at ensuring peace4 stability and

democracy in our region. hus4 ,e believe that there is a clear need on our part to

ma/e sure that member countries have a firm grasp of our interests and role in

maintaining the security of the region. @e need to consult on issues that crop up on

different occasions4 and ensure that ,e receive sustainable political and diplomatic

support.

Government-to-government relations are /ey in our overall relations4 but ,e cannot

e0pect to get comprehensive benefits in the confines of state sectors. he greatest

benefits come form trade and investment4 and the /ey here is in the hands of the

private business community. @e therefore need to ,iden our focus to include the

governments4 the NGAs and the private sector. Aur diplomacy in urope should aim

at involving and even coordinating all three sectors4 based on detailed and continued

research studies and analysis. +onsidering the ; as a union may be correct4 but the

role member states play are not the same. @hile ,e should ,or/ to maintain good ties

,ith all ; members states4 ,e should focus on cultivating e0tensive ties ,ith ma7or

countries4 and those better disposed to,ards thiopia.

Differences that could arise ,ith urope have to do ,ith differing appreciations of the

policies ,e pursue to promote development and democracy in thiopia. !ome policies

may not be pleasing to uropean businessmen. Aur policies should be dra,n carefully

and on the basis of detailed study. !hould better options be identified4 they should be

pursued unreservedly. @e should also be prepared to defend fundamental policy

matters to ,hich ,e are deeply committed4 and ,e should try to resolve such

differences in opinion by sho,ing the significance and validity of the policy causing

disagreement.



he ; is beginning to ta/e some positive steps to mitigate the negative influences of

globaliation. @e are also a,are that the people of urope and non-governmental

organiations hold vie,s that are more supportive to,ards poorer countries. @e

believe ,e have to ta/e advantage of this and push hard to persuade urope to ,or/

to,ards creating a more favorable condition for thiopia and the ,hole of :frica.

fforts along this line can bear fruit only ,hen :frican countries 7oin hands under the

frame,or/ of the :frican ;nion.

4+' T.e R!ssian Fe"eration

here is no doubt that 'ussia has had to confront great challenges in its effort to effect

the transition into a free mar/et and a democratic system. n spite of this4 ho,ever4'ussia remains a great country and is li/ely to continue to play a significant

international role. here e0ist long standing cultural ties bet,een the people of 'ussia

and thiopia4 and 'ussians have a ,arm disposition to,ards thiopia. 'ussia can

contribute to our economic development in terms of providing a mar/et for our

e0ports4 and a source of investment4 and technical assistance. +onsidering its

commitment to peace4 stability and democracy4 'ussia has a significant contribution

to ma/e to,ards our efforts to achieve peace4 both in our country and the ,hole of

our region. 'ussia has been supporting our efforts to enhance the capacity of our

defense forces as ,ell as our efforts to resolve conflicts through 7ust means4 his is

li/ely to continue ,ith greater strength in the future.

@e therefore believe that ,e should ma/e every effort to maintain and strengthen the

e0isting friendly ties bet,een the t,o countries. t is important to maintain and

strengthen our good relations in the diplomatic4 political and security fields.

:dmittedly4 ,e have not made satisfactory progress in the economic field4 and ,e

need to concentrate on promoting trade and investment. @e also need to encourage

and coordinate the activities of friends of thiopia in 'ussia to contribute to the

intensification of relations bet,een the t,o countries.

5+ Re$ations 3it. t.e Unite" States 6U+S+A7

o begin ,ith4 it has to be noted that the issues raised in connection ,ith our relations

,ith urope can also apply to our relations ,ith the ;.!. 'ather than repeating issues4



t can be assumed that a good number of those ,ithin the thiopian community in the

;.!. are professionals possessing a certain amount of capital. t is possible to facilitate

the deployment of their capital4 and the use of their /no,ledge in a ,ay that benefits

our country and themselves. n addition to their o,n individual investment4 they could

also team up ,ith ;.!. entrepreneurs to invest in thiopia. &oreover4 they could

contribute by e0ploring and identifying mar/et opportunities for thiopian products in

the ;.!.4 in cooperation ,ith thiopian e0porters. here is a clear need for the

government to ,or/ out a viable initiative aimed at dra,ing this sector of our society

into ma/ing a profitable investment in thiopias development. thiopians and people

of thiopian origin residing in the ;.! could serve as a strong bridge for trade and

investment. @e need to target our ,or/ to ensure this. #or such purpose4 the

government is re>uired to fully implement the la, it has enacted to promote the

economic activities of thiopians and persons of thiopian origin living outside the

country.

)ut this is not all. thiopia4 the people of thiopian origin residing in the ;.!. and

other friends of our country could participate in various development efforts in

thiopia4 and they should do so. hey could contribute funds and material to assist

development ,or/ in various parts of the country4 in the form that they choose. hey

could also solicit support from others as ,ell.

hose ,ho ,ish to do so can play a ma7or role is changing thiopias image in the

;.!.4 to promote trade and investment4 and to present thiopia accurately. hey could

help influence the media4 the legislatures and the government to be positively inclined

to,ards thiopia. @e should encourage this constituency in the ;.!. and facilitate its

,or/. !uch an approach is naturally relevant to thiopians ,ho live in other countries

as ,ell.

:s noted earlier4 the policy ,e have adopted in connection ,ith the peace and security

of our region is consistent ,ith that of the ;.!. here is no doubt that the ;.!. is the

most po,erful influence in todays ,orld4 and that it is playing a prominent role in the

&iddle ast. !ecuring the political and diplomatic support of the ;.!. has a great

bearing for the success of our efforts to achieve peace and security. t is clear that

,or/ing in consultation ,ith the ;.!. ,ould be necessary and beneficial. here ,ill

be occasions ,hen ,e shall have our differences4 and ,e ,ill need to try to bridge



them in the conte0t of the strategic value of the relationship. n our efforts to prevent

conflict in our region4 ,e need to consider ,hat role the ;.!. can play and resolve

differences that may emerge from time to time4 separating the ma7or issues from those

,hich are not so important. !trict adherence to such an approach is important.

8+ Asia

8+, Genera$

he ma7ority of the ,orlds people live in :sia. he second biggest and ,ealthiest

national economy in the ,orld4 the =apanese economy4 is also in :sia. he most rapid

and successful economic performances ,itnessed after @orld @ar came from

countries located in the eastern part of this continent. ,o countries that have a

population of over 1 billion each are found in :sia. +hina is gro,ing at a rate

unprecedented in history. ndia has emerged from decades of sluggish gro,th to an

accelerated development over the past ten years. f they continue at this rate4 the t,o

countries ,ill represent huge economies. f +hina maintains its current speed of

development4 it ,ill have an economy the sie of the ;.!. and urope combined in

thirty years. n short4 developments in :sia could change the ,orlds economic

balance.

:sia could play a very important role in our development. t provides the main

e0ample of successful development. n addition it is from :sia that ,e can get highly

trained manpo,er and technical assistance ine0pensively. @e also need to ta/e

advantage of the remar/ably gro,ing :sian economy. his region could provide

investment that suits our conte0t and level of development. :s regards development

aid4 it is mainly =apan4 and to a lesser e0tent +hina4 that provide financial assistance.his could continue and even e0pand. &ost :sian countries are in the developing

,orld and are our partners in the struggle to mitigate the negative effects of

globaliation. a/en in sum4 they too can ma/e a gro,ing contribution to our

development.

he countries in this region have been demonstrating their commitment to

international la, and order4 and are part of the fight against e0tremism and terrorism.

@e believe that they can assist in our effort to maintain our national security by



contributing to the creation of a conducive international political climate. !ome of

them could even go further and provide significant support for our efforts to achieve

sustainable peace.

o sum up4 ,e believe that our relations ,ith :sian countries merit far greater

attention because of the important significance :sia has for our development and also

our national security. @hile ,e should in principle be prepared to ,or/ closely ,ith

all countries that can ma/e a positive contribution to our efforts4 ,e need to

concentrate on the ma7or countries in the region.

8+' a%an

Aur friendship ,ith =apan dates bac/ to the years ,ell before @orld @ar . @e note

that >uite a number of =apanese people are positively inclined to,ards thiopia4 and

that presently =apan is providing us ,ith substantial development aid including

technical assistance. his strong development relationship should continue to gro,.

)ut ,e cannot say that enough has been done regarding trade and investment. @e

have not entered the =apanese mar/et in any meaningful ,ay. Nor have ,e received

=apanese investment of note. he lo, level of participation in this area is attributable4

partly to our failure to create a conducive environment for investment and partly to

=apans concentration on ast :sian countries4 not to mention the inaccessibility of the

=apanese mar/et to products from less developed countries. @e should ,or/ to

strengthen the good relations ,e have ,ith =apan. @hile deploying4 as in the case of

urope4 more effort to secure investment and trade possibilities4 ,e need to

concentrate on securing more financial and technical assistance and increasing the

effectiveness of such assistance.

8+0 C.ina

+urrently +hina has very good relations ,ith thiopia. +hina strongly supports

thiopias economic development4 using its limited financial means. t unreservedly

shares its development e0perience and provides technical support. n the political and

diplomatic sphere4 too4 +hina has been a good friend as our country strove to maintain

peace and secure its rights. +hina is a ne,comer to the ,orld of foreign investment4

so one cannot spea/ of results in this area. Neither can ,e say that ,e have4 in many



,ays4 accessed the +hinese mar/et4 for the same reasons that ,e have not succeeded

,ith =apan.

@e should give special attention to the strengthening of relations ,ith +hina. @e need

to fully utilie +hinese development e0perience as ,ell as training and technical

assistance possibilities. @e need to secure greater financial assistance if possible and4

failing that4 to improve the efficiency of ,hat is made available. 'ecently4 +hina has

stepped into the area of foreign investment4 and ,e have to do all ,e can to ta/e this

fresh opportunity to promote investment and trade. his4 among other things4 ,ill

re>uire us to cooperate closely ,ith the +hinese government. @e need also to ma/e a

ma7or effort to ,or/ ,ith the +hinese government and companies to secure a mar/et

for our products in that country.

8+4 In"ia

here have been long standing historical relations bet,een thiopia and ndia4 ,hich

have evolved into friendly relations follo,ing the independence of ndia. he

relationship ,ith ndia has gained momentum over the last decade. @e have managed

to ma/e some use of the ,ide opportunities for training of manpo,er that ndia

offers. 6o,ever4 ,hen ,e see ho, advanced countries li/e the ;.!. attract and ma/e

e0tensive use of ndian professionals4 ,e cannot say that ,e have ade>uately

benefited from ndia. &uch valuable development e0perience can be gained from

ndia4 but ,e have not made enough use of it.

he possibilities in the area of trade and investment are ,ide. ndia is at the forefront

of the struggle to reduce the negative impact of globaliation on developing countries.

he country has also distinguished itself in the campaign against e0tremism andterrorism. Aur national security interests can continually benefit from the important

role that ndia plays in creating a stable international environment.

n vie, of the points mentioned above4 ,e need to act to strengthen our relations ,ith

ndia in a ma7or ,ay. @e should ma/e greater effort to benefit from manpo,er

training and learn form ndias development e0perience. @e must attract ndian

investment and organie our efforts to access their potentially large mar/et. @e should

also e0pand our cooperation in the diplomatic and political arena.



9+ Internationa$ an" non:)o#ernmenta$ or)ani;ations

9+, Internationa$ or)ani;ations

thiopia is a member of the ;.N. and numerous other international organiations.

hese organiations formulate the la, as they affect inter-state relations and serve as

forums that oversee the respect of the rules of international engagement. nternational

organiations play an irreplaceable role in ensuring peace4 the primacy of

international la,4 and in strengthening the cooperation bet,een countries.

nternational organiations have been providing the forum ,here thiopia has been

see/ing to play by the rules in the ,orld of globaliation. t is here ,here ,e4 ,ith

other countries in similar conditions4 should ,or/ so that the rules of the game alsota/e our interests into account. he ;N and its specialied agencies4 and institutions

li/e the @orld )an/ provide important assistance to thiopias development. hat is

,hy thiopia should strengthen its cooperation ,ith these institutions4 to speed up

development4 protect national security4 and ,or/ for peace and respect for

international la,. he presence in thiopia of the ;.N conomic +ommission for

:frica as ,ell as other ;.N. institutions facilitates interactionF our policy of

cooperation should ta/e this into account.

9+' Internationa$ non:)o#ernmenta$ or)ani;ations

here is no doubt that international NGAs are no, playing a significant role in terms

of providing development and humanitarian aid. heir role may be limited but4 in

thiopia4 the contribution they ma/e is substantial. NGAs li/e AO#:& have gone

even further and engage themselves prominently in reducing the negative aspect of

globaliation on poorer countries li/e ours. hey have ta/en active part as allies of poorer countries in campaigns demanding the cancellation of debts and calling for

reform of the ,orld trading system in favor of the position of poorer countries.

@e understand that ,e have to be in constant readiness to ,or/ closely ,ith these

organiations on matters of consensus. @e should also be prepared to ,or/ in

partnership ,ith these NGAs to ensure greater assistance and effective utiliation of

the aid they provide. @e should support the initiatives they underta/e to promote the

collective interest of the under developed ,orld. @e should also ,or/ to,ards the



adoption and implementation of a policy that encourages a 7oint meeting ,ith them

,here ,e can present to them the vision ,e hold ,ith respect to the development and

democratiation of our country and e0change notes on relevant issues. &oreover4 the

policy ,e pursue should encourage tolerance in the event of differences and readiness

to concentrate on matters of consensus.

roceeding from this4 ,e need to step up our cooperation ,ith these organiations to

tac/le matters on ,hich ,e agree. ;rging them to step up their support4 ,e should

coordinate ,ith them to achieve better results in the delivery of their development

assistance. @e should support to the appropriate degree their activities favorable to

undeveloped countries. @e should carry out a policy that allo,s us to ,or/ closely

,ith them in areas of mutual agreement4 and to see/ to narro, differences ,hen they

arise. @e also need to learn form them on the presentational aspects of our vision for

development and democracy.

foreign policy and national security

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