FOREICN INTELLICENCEORCANIZATIONS

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FOREICN INTELLICENCEORCANIZATIONS

J EFFREY T. RTCHELSON

BALLINGER PUBLISHING COMPANYCam bridge, Massachu setts

A Subsidiary of Harpor & Row, publishers, lnc.

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Copyright O 198s by Ballinger Publishing Company. All rights reserved-No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval sys-tem, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,photocopy, recording or otherwise, without the prior written consent ofthe publisher.

InternationalstandardBookNumbe''3-8383ii3:'r'rl, jrtrlf,lLibrary of Congress Catalog Card number z 88-923

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Richelson, Jeffrey.Foreign intelligence organizations.

Includes index.1. lntelligence service. 2. Espionage-United States.

I. Title.uB25o.R53 1988 327.12 88-923rsBN 0-88730-L2t-5ISBN 0-88730-tz2-3 (pbk.)

CONTENTS

List of Figures

List of Tables

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

Acknowledgments

Chapter 1lntroduction

Chapter 2United Kingdom lntelligence Organizations

OriginsIntelligence and Security Organizations

Government Communications HeadquartersSecret Intelligen ce ServiceDefense Intelligence StaffJoint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence CentreSecurity ServiceSpecirl Brunch, Scotland yrrd

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VI CONTENTS

Management StructureLiaisonThe Falklands War

Chapter 3Canadian lntell igence Organizations

OriginsIntelligence and Security Organizations

Canadian Security Intelligence ServiceCommunications Security EstablishmentDepartment of National Defence IntelligenceForeign Intelligence Bureau, Department of External AffairsPolice and Security Branch

Management StructureLiaisonMonitoring the Oceans

Chapter 4Italian I ntelligence Organizations

OriginsIntelligence and Security Organizations

Service for Information and Democraric Security (SISDE)Service for Information and Military Security (SISMI)Military Service Intelligence UnitsOffice of Foreign Statistics, Foreign Ministry

Management StructureLiaisonP-2, Italian Intelligence, and Agca

Chapter 5 ,,,West German lntelligence Organizations

OriginsIntelligence and Security Operations

Federal Intelligence Service (BND)Office for Radio Monitoring, BundeswberFederal Armed Forces Intelligence Office

CONTENTS

Military Screen Service (MAD)Federal office for the protection of the constitution (Bfv)

Monitoring of the Baltic

Chapter 6French lntelligence Organizations

OriginsIntelligence and Security Organizations

General Directorate of External Security (DGSE)Radio-Electric Communications Group iCCn)Military IntelligenceDirectorate for Surveillance of the Territory (DST)General Intelligence Directorate

Management StructureLiaisonRainbow Wanior

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67737379808183858992

151

151r57157168169172L76177L77181

101

101111111113115r16r76118118

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Chapter 7lsraeli I ntell igence Organ izations

OriginsIntelligence and Security Organizations

Central Institute for Intelligence and Special DutiesIsraeli Defense Forces Intelligence Branch (AMAN)Air Force IntelligenceNaval IntelligenceResearch and Political planning Cenrer

- -General Security Service (Shin Beth, or SHABAK)Management StructureLiaisonU. S.-Israeli Intelligence Relations

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L9Lt95(Mossad) 1952to2172L822022222923L233

Chapter 8,f apanese I ntell igence Organizations

OriginsIntelligence and Security Organizations

Cabinet Research Office (Naicho)

249

249254254

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VlIl CONTENTS

Second Section, Investigation Division, Ground Self-Defense Forces

Annex Chamber, Second Section, Investigation Division,Ground Self-Defense Forces (Chobetsu)

Intelligence Division, Air Self-Defense ForcesIntelligence Division, Maritime Staff Office, Maritime

Self-Defense ForcesInformation Analysis, Research and Planning Bureau,

Ministry of Foreign AffairsMinistry of International Trade and IndustryPublic Security Investigation AgencyNational Police Agency

LiaisonJapanese Intelligence and Flight 007

Chapter 9Chinese I ntel ! igence Organ izations

OriginsIntelligence and Security Organizations

International Liaison DepartmentUnited Front Work DepartmentMinistry of State SecurityMilitary Intelligence DepartmentTechnical DepartmentNew China News AgencyResearch Institutes

,,Management StructureLiaisonChinese Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Operations Against the United States

Chapter 10Conclusion

lndex

About the Author

255

256258

259

26t263263265265267

273

27327827828t28t287291293294295296

297

307

313

331

LIST OF FIGU RES

2-1 Organization of the Government Communications Head-quarters

2-2 Organization of the Secret Intelligence Service2-3 Organization of the Security Service2-4 Management Structure of the British Intelligence and

Security Community 393-1 Organization of the RCMP Security Service, 197g 7T3-2 Organization of the Foreign Intelligence Bureau,

Political Intelligence Division gz3 -3 Management Structure of the Canadian Intelligence and

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34

Security Community5 -1 Organization of the RSHA, I93g-455 -Z Organization of the Abwehr5 -3 Organization of the BND, 19725 -4 Organization of the BfV6-l The SDECE in tgtt7 -l Organization of the Mossad, 19777 -Z Organization of AMAN ,1977

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LIST OF FIGURBS

7 -3 Organization of Naval Intelligence,I9TT7 -4 Organization of the Shin Beth, 19777 -5 Structure of the Israeli Intelligence Community8-1 Japanese Ocean Surveillance and SIGINT Sites9 -1 Organization of the Social Affairs Department, 19429-2 Ground Tracks of Chinese Photographic Reconnais-

sance Satellite Orbit, October 2L, L9859-3 Location of Chinese SIGINT Sites

219223

230262275

290292

LIST OF TABLES

3 - 1 Table of Contents of "soviet Intelligence-RelatedOr ganization, Structure and Methods"

4-l Number of Individuals by Government Ministry onP-2 Membership List, 1981

6-7 Red Hand Assassination and Sabotage Operations6-2 French Court Cases Involving Espionage,l976-g56-3 DST Estimate of Intelligence and Diplomatic personnel

from Non-USSR Soviet Bloc Diplomatic Establishmentsin France, 1986

9-1 Basic Data on Chinese Photographic ReconnaissanceSatellites

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONSAND ACRONYMS

Amt frir Fernmeldwesen BundeswehrAgaf ModiinArab News AgencyAustralian Secret Intelligence ServiceBritish Broadcasting ServiceBureau Central de Renseignement et d'ActionBureau of Economic IntelligenceBundesamt filr VerfassungsschutzBureau of Intelligence Analysis and SecurityBu ndesnach richtendienstBritish Security CoordinationChief of the Secret ServiceCommunications Branch, National Research CouncilExecutive Committee for Intelligence and Security ServicesCurrent Intelligence GroupCommander-in-Chief Pacific FleetCommander-in-Chief Self-Defense FleetComit6 Interministeriel des RenseignementCampaign for Nuclear DisarmamentCommunications Security EstablishmentCentral Spcciol lntclligencc DepartmentCanatlisn Sccurity lntelligence ServiceDepurtrrrent of llxte rnsl Affeirs

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AFMBWAMANANAASISBBCBCRABEIBfVBIASBNDBSCC, or CSSCBNRCCESIScrGCINCPACFLTCINCSDFLTctRCNDcsEcsrDcsrsDTiA

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xlv LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

Drug Enforcement AgencyDirectorate General for Studies and DocumentationDirection Generale des Etudes et RecherchesDirector General of IntelligenceDirection G6n6rale de la S6curit6 ExtdrieureDirection G6n6rale des Services Sp6ciauxDefense Intelligence StaffDefence Signals DirectorateDirectorate for Surveillance of the TerritoryForeign Broadcast Information ServiceForeign and Commonwealth OfficeFremde Heere Ost-Foreign Armies EastForeign Intelligence BureauFront de Libration NationalNational Liberation Front of CorsicaFront for the National Liberation of AngolaGovernment Communications HeadquartersGroupement de Communications Radio-ElectriquesGroupement Interministeriel dds CommunicationesChief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General StaffGeneral Security ServiceHigh-Frequency Direction-FindingIntelligence Advisory CommitteeInlichtingendienst BuitenlandIndusuial Intelligence CentreInternational Liaison DepartmentIntelligence Policy CommitteeInternational Regulations on SIGINTInter-Services Intelligence CommitteeJapanese External Trade OrganizationJoint Intelligence BureauJoint Intelligence CommitteeJoint Intelligence OrganizationJapanese Red ArmyJoint Technical Language ServiceLeshkat Kesher MadaoLong-Range Technical SearchLondon Signals Intelligence BoardLondon Signals Intelligence Committee (Defence)Militarischer Abschirmdienst

LIST OF ANBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

Ministry of Economic WerfcreMinistry for State SecurityMilitary Intelligence DepartmentMinistry of Popular CultureMinistry of International Trade and lndustryMinistry of DefenceMarine Observation SatellitePopular Movement for the Liberation of AngolaMinistry of Public SecurityMaritime Self-Defense ForcesMinistry of State SecurityMilizia Volontaria Sicurezza NazionaleNational Council for Civil LibertiesNew China News AgencyNational Research CouncilNational Security AgencyNational Security ServiceOverseas Economic Intelligence CommitteeSupreme High CommandVoluntary Organization for the Repression of AntiFacismPopular Front for the Liberation of PalestinePortuguese Internal Police for the Defense of the StatePublic Security Investigation AgencyPermanent Under Secretaries Committee on IntelligenceServicesRoyal Canadian Mounted PoliceRenseignement G6n6raleReichssicherheitshauptamtSecurity Advisory CommitteeSocial Affairs DepartmentSpecial Air ServiceNational Security and Information Organization (Iran)Special Boat SquadronService de Documentation Extdrieure et de Contre-EspionageSherut Bitachan KlaliSherut YdiothServizio Informazioni AeronauticheServizio Informszioni DifesaServizio lnformrzioni Forze ArmateScrvizio lnformrzioni Generrli e Sicurezza Interna

DEADGEDDGERDGIDGSEDGSSDISDSDDSTFBISFCOFHOFIBFLNFLNCFNLAGCHQGCRGICGRUGSSHF.DFIACIDBIICILDIPCIRSIGISICJETROJIBJICJIOJRAJTLSLEKEMLRTSLSIBLSIC(D)MAD

MEWMfsMIDMINICULPOPMITIMODMOS-1MPLAMPSMSDFMSSMVSNNCCLNCNANRCNSANSSOEICoKwOVRAPFLPPIDEPSIAPSIS

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

Servizio Informazioni MilitaireServizio Informazioni Operativo SituazioneServizio Informazioni SegretoServizio per le Informazione e la Sicurezza DemocraticaServizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza MilitareSecurity Planning and Research GroupSysteme Probatoire d'Observation de la TerreSecret Intelligence ServiceService de RenseignementTechnische Informatie Cenuale VerwerkingEnterprise des Travaux RurauxCentral Office of InvestigationsUnited Front Work DepartmentNational Union for the Total Independence of Angola

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A large number of individuals aided me in writing this book-provid-ing articles, documents, critigues, leads, and the names of potentialcontacts. Included in this group are William Arkin, Desmond Ball,Duncan Campbell, Andrew Cockburn, Seymour Hersh, David Kahn,Steve Rosen, Paul Rusman, Roberto Suro, Wesley Wark, and Owenwilkes. Paul stares produced Figure 9-2. r'd also like to thank thePeace and Disarmament strategy Study unit in Tokyo as well as thehistorical sections of the Departments of National Defence andExternal Affairs in Canada for their assistance.

Special thanks go ro Joseph Pittera, who translated books andarticles in French, German, and Italian and thus allowed me to gobeyond English{anguage sources.

John Martin, John Tucker, and Stephen poston are also gratefullyacknowledged for ryping several drafts of the manuscript.

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INTRODUCTION

one hundred years ago the intelligence and counterintelligence com-munities of major and middle-ranking powers were in a primitivestage of development. Intelligence units were underfunded and under-staffed. They were subject to the technological limitations of theirtime, dependent on information from often unreliable human agenrsand from diplomatic intercepts. The type of information sought waselso limited, involving mainly diplomatic maneuvering, military hard-ware, and war plans. Today, intelligence has become an integral partof the national security and international operations of even sm"lletnations. Both the scope and means of collection in the 1980s far sur-pass those of the 1880s.

The complexity and diversity of modern military hardware requireI greater effort to collect information in order to produce a compre-hensive order of batrle, particularly regarding nations with highlysecretive nuclear weapons programs.

The role of intelligence in conducting foreign policy has also grownas nations have broadened their contacts with the rest of the world.The ease of international communication and travel in today's worldhas encouraged closer global ties. More important, the numerousrepercussions that events in a far corner of the world can have on acountry's physical or economic security require that nations main-

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2 poRErcN TNTELLIGENCE oRcANIzATIoNS

tain a large number of diplomatic contacts. Finally, the advent of avariety of regional and international organizations has engendered aneed for nations to determine the way in which member states arelikely to align on specific issues.

Economic interests, too, have become a significant stimulant tointelligence activity. In some instances, the object is to determine thelikely availability of natural resources, which might be affected bynatural depletion, competition, political change, or military conflict.In other cases, participation in economic negotiations, or the acquisition of advanced technoloW may be the stimulus. On some occa-sions, the technology may be desired for its military applications-such as its role in the construction of an atomic bomb. But it is justas likely that technology is being sought to enhance industrial capa-bilities and to gain an advantage in the marketplace.

Intelligence concerning the sociological conditions of foreign na-tions has also gained importance. Internal strife, class conflicts, andmorale all influence the course of a nation's foreign policy and itsability to conduct military operations.

Another concern that is far greater today than one hundred yearsago is terrorism. Terrorist attacks may be motivated by ideological orethnic conflict and carried out by domestic groups, exiles, or foreigngroups. Intelligence and security services seek to identify such groups,their personnel, sources of support, weaPons, and likely targets.

To deal with all of these concerns, intelligence communities engagein a wide range of activities-clandestine and open source collection,signals intelligence, ocean surveillance, photographic reconnaissance,counterintelligence, covert action, liaison, and analysis. The specifictargets of such activities reflect both their national interests and their

. obligations under international intelligence or military alliances.In intelligence matters, the United Kingdom is closely tied to

the United States and several other Anglo-Saxon countries by sucharrangements as the UKUSA signals intelligence treaty and the Com-monwealth Signals Organization. Arrangements like these make theUnited Kingdom responsible for signals 'intelligence collection againstsome targets, such as Chinese sPace oPerations, that are not greatlyrelevant to British national security decision-making. At the sametime, the activities of the Irish Republican Army-whether in lreland,Britain, or overseas-are a matter of national concern and thus a tar-get of British Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service, and Gov-ernment Communications Headquarters oPerations. Likewise, inter-

rNTRoDUcrroN 3netionel economic events that threaten the far from healthy Britisheconomy must be of critical interest to Her Majesty's government.

Although Canada may seem like a nation with little need for anintelligence service-for years it has done without a foreign clan-destine collection agency-its proximity to the United States, bothculturally and geographically, has given it a common interest inthe defense of North America (as expressed in its participation inNORAD) and some common intelligence responsibilities. Canada isalso concerned with the passage of U. S. and Soviet submarinesthrough the Canadian Arctic. Moreover, Canada is a major home forexpatriate Sikhs, including those who have visions of turning India'sPunjab state into the independent Sikh nation of Khalistan. Themost extreme Sikhs have resorted to a variety of terrorist acts insideend outside India, apparently including the destruction of an AirIndia flight that took off from Toronto, killing more than 300 peo-ple, as well as an attack on a Punjabi cabinet minister in Vancouver.rAs a result, Sikh activity in Canada is a target of Canadian Securitylntelligence Service surveillance.

Italy, too, has internal security concerns. Its role in NATO, itshosting of U. S. intelligence and military bases (including several atwhich nuclear weapons are stored), makes it a prominent target ofSoviet bloc espionage activities. Italy has also been plagued by ter-rorist incidents, including assassinations, political kidnappings, andbombings. Some of these incidents were the responsibility of the RedBrigades. Others were the work of right-wing groups acting, unfortu-nately, with some degree of support from the very security servicescharged with preventing such actions. And although ltaly's foreignintelligence concerns are somewhat less obvious, they surely includedrug trafficking, Middle Eastern events that may affect the Italian oilsupply, and the activities of foreign terrorist groups that may actagainst ltalian targets.

West Germany's intelligence and security agenda is a function ofits industrial status and its unique position in the East-West conflict.Intelligence related to West Germany's international trade position,as well as to its supply of energy and raw materials, is undoubtedlya key concern. At the same time, West Germany's intelligence net-work must focus a significant portion of its collection and analyticalresources on events in the Soviet bloc, particularly East Germany,Czechoslovakia, and Polsnd. Events in those countries or in theSoviet Union can have notablc implications for the success of Ger-

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+ FoREIGN INTELLTGENCE oRcANIzATroNs

many's policy of Ostpolitik as well as for its military security. Tacti-cal military intelligence-produced by signals intelligence stations andaircraft-is also a necessity, given the imposing Warsaw pact presenceacross the border.

Internally, West Germany is burdened by many of the same prob-lems experienced by other western European nations-threats of ter-rorist attacks (such as the attack on a West Berlin nightclub in April1986) and Soviet bloc espionage activities. Indeed, West Germanybecause of rather obvious factors is a major targer for both the Sovietand East German intelligence services. Additionally, West Germanyhas the burden of its Nazi past and the need to see that neo-Nazigroups do not attempt to do more than propagandize.

As a somewhat independenr middle-ranking power with wide-spread interests, France has assigned to its intelligence and securiryservices a broad range of responsibilities. Internally, France has hadto deal with a large-scale Soviet intelligence effort, much of itdirected at obtaining scientific and technical intelligence, as well asterrorist bombings. Externally, France's role in Africa and the Mid-dle East has required the Directorate G'eneral of External Security(DGSE) to maintain substantial nerworks, particularly directed to-ward Chad and Libya. An even greater intelligence requirement isimposed by France's nuclear status. In 1983 France possessed 285nuclear warheads, divided between strategic and tactical warheadsand between land-based and sea-based weapons. It is projected thatin the mid-1990s this number will grow to more than 1,000, ofwhich approximately 700 will be strategic.2 Such a force srructureimposes a variety of intelligence requirements, rarget identificationbeing one and Soviet ballistic missile defense and antisubrnarine war-

" fare efforts being two others.

Another aspect of France's nuclear activities that impose intelli-gence requirements is its South Pacific testing program. Even presum-ing that such follies as the Rainbow Wanior incident are avoided inthe future, the DGSE will be expected to keep informed about theactivities of peace and environmental ,ijroups opposed to France'snuclear-testing activities.

In the case of Israel, little explanation is needed of the central roleplayed by intelligence in Israeli security policy. Since pre-Indepen-dence days, covert activity has been crucial to the Zionist movement.Israel has employed its intelligence community to conduct avaietyof covert operations, including the assassination of Arab terrorists

rNTRoDUcrroN 5and the meintenance of relations with nations unwilling to officiallyrecognize Israel..

More important, Israeli intelligence has been given the responsibil-ity of providing up-to-date information on the activities of the pl-oend Arab nations, both for combating their activities diplomaticallyend for providing warning of. any impending attack. When Jordan, ina series of mediation missions, appears close to healing a six-year riftbetween Iraq and syria, Israeli leaders wanr to be fully informed andmay well approve a covert operation to block such an occurrence.when syria begins digging rrenches for tanks, bunkers for soldiers,and emplacements for artillery some ten to fifteen miles north of theIsraeli-Lebanese border (as it did in May t986), Israeli leaders expectto be kept fully informed of such activity.3 when the soviet unionend syria sign a treary-as they did with the october 19g0 soviet-syrian Treary of Friendship and cooperation-some Israeli leadersworry whether there is a secret annex to the treaty allowing the sta-tioning of Soviet forces in Syria.a

In the event that war does occur, Israeli strategic doctrine calls forthe defense forces to achieve a rapid and decisive victory over theArab forces. A rapid victory is imperative to avoid s.u.re financialend manpower losses; a decisive victory is believed necessary ro pre-vent the war from becoming a drawn-out slugging match ,rrd .rr.orrr-aging the adversary to try again at a later date. To accomprish suchobjectives, Israel's military leaders must have adequate early warningof attack and also detailed information on rhe military capabilitieiend tactics of the Arab forces. one crucial piece of information, at-tainable only by human sources or signals intelligence, is the extentto which Arab forces have mastered the advanced equipment pro-vided by the Soviet Union and other countries.s

Japan's intelligence concerns involve both securiry and economicissues. Japan's aggressive exporr policy and its ability to compete inthe production of high-technology items require, at rhe very least,analysts who can provide studies and estimates of foreign reactionsto Japan's trade policies and advances in computer technology. SinceJapan is virtually totally dependent on Middle Eastern oil to fuel itsindustrial machine, intelligence on political and military events in theMiddle East, such as the lran-Iraq war and the likely responses ofArab nations to any Japanese dealings with Israel rs of considerableimportance.6

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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONSu'slil

Japan's military activities were highly restricted by the Peace Con-stitution imposed by the United States. And while Japanese govern-ment and ruling party leaders recently agreed to abandon a long-heldpolicy that limited the military to one percent of the country's GNP,Japan is hardly likely to embark on a massive buildup requiring newintelligence activities.T But Japan's limited military forces and itsstatus-due to the U. S. facilities there-as a major wartime Soviet tar-get have made creation of an efficient intelligence and warning net-work imperative. Thus, Japan operates an extensive technical collec-tion network to monitor Soviet activities in the Soviet Far East andthe immediate vicinity of Japan.

China, unlike many European powers, meets some of the require-ments for twentieth-century superpower status, including a largepopulation and extensive natural resources. China is, however, a longway from such status-due in large part to its economic backward-ness. The need to advance in great leaps fuels one portion of China'sforeign intelligence activities: its focus on the acquisition of advancedtechnologies, often those which Western nations place off limits tothe People's Republic of China. Of coirrse, China's adversary statuswith the USSR also imposes intelligence requirements, one being themonitoring of Soviet military forces on the Sino-Soviet border andanother being the acquisition of target data. China's adversary statuswith the USSR not only has made the Soviets a primary intelligencetarget but also has made the United States a major intelligence ally.

China's new openness to the West has produced an internal coun-terreaction, particularly within the Ministry of State Security. Theministry has been active in seeking not only to prevent foreign espio-nage activities but also to limit contacts between Westerners (particu-larly journalists) and Chinese citizens. The ministry's activities haveoften been the most visible sign of internal splits within the Chineseleadership over the question of modernization and relations with theWest. In addition to real or imagined internal threats, China is obvi-ously a target of both U. S. and Soviet intelligence activities, as evi-denced by U.S. penetration of the Chinese nuclear program and thelarge number of Soviet agents periodically rounded up by the statesecurity forces.

As a result of internal and external necessities, of threats real andimagined, all of these nations have engaged in extensive intelligenceand security operations. In some cases, their activities have beendictated solely by national interest; in other cases, by international

commitments. In some cases, their octivities have marginally increasedthe intelligence available to the united states; in o-ther cases, theyhave,provided dramatic new information. As we will see in chapter10,.fu-ture dwelopments in these nations' intelligence capabilitiescould have a substantial impact on international relitions.

INTRODUCTION

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

"Spies Under .Fire," Macleaz's, September 2g, I9g7, pp. L2_L4.

Robbin F. Laird, "France's Nuclear Furure,', in Robbin F. Laird, ed., Frencbsecurity Policy: From Independence to Interdependence (Boulder, colo.:Westview, 7986), p. 69.charles P. wallace, "lraq-Syria Rift May Be Near End," ros Angeles Times,May 29, 1986, pp. l, 10; Thomas L. Friedman, ,,Syria Is Said to pressTrench Work," New york Times, May 2I,79g6, p. A12.David Shipler, "To Israelis war in Gulf Is opportunity for west,,' New yorkTfuaes, November 1, 1980, p.4.Yoav Ben-Horin and Barry posen, Israel's Strategic Doc*ine (Santa Monica,Calif.: Rand Corporarion, September 19g1), pp. 6, 1g.william R' campbell, "Japan and the Middle East," in Robert s. ozaki andwalter Arnold, ed,s., Japan's Foreign Relations, A Gtobal searcb for Eco-nomic Securiry (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 19g5), p. 133.clyde Haberman, "Japan to Scrap Formula for Limiting Arms Budger,',New York Times, January 24,1987, p.3.

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UNITED KINGDOMORGANIZATIONS

INTELLIGENCE

ORIGINS

while the origins of today's British intelligence and securiry commu-nity can be traced to the early part of the-twentieth century, Britainhas been conducting organized intelligence activities since the latesixteenth century.

In 1570 Francis walsingham (later Sir) was appointed Ambassadorto France. During his tenure in paris, he began"to build up an intelli-gence network at home and abroad that included a numbir of agentsin France' ln r5z3 walsingham returned to England

"r,d b..r-.Principal .secretary and a mimber of the privy cJuncil. Among theduties assignedto him was "tohave care to theintelligence abroald.,,1

ny lfz the system had become a full-fledged intiligence appara-tus.. walsingham had sufficient reporrs conc,-erning Erigland's iival,spain, to establish that spain was amassing a vast" fleei of ships toattack England. As a result, he drew up whit was surely orr. of Brit-ain's first intelligence,requirement documenrs, rhe plit for Intelli-gence out of spain. The prot specified a variety of tasks ftr walsing-ham's agents:

r The need ro obtain somc correspondence from the French Am-bassador in Spain

-"S&u", fr.

10 FoRErcN TNTELLTGENcE oRGANrzATroNso To take orders with some at Rouen to have frequent advertise-

ments from such as arrive out of Spain at Nantes, Havre, andDieppe

o Sir Edward Stafford (English Ambassador in France) to obtaininformation from the Venetian Ambassador

o To set up an Intelligence post in Cracow for receiving reports onSpanish matters coming from the Vatican

r To nominate persons (French, Flemish, or ltalians) to travel alongthe Spanish coasts and report what preparations are being made atports, furnishing them with letters of credit as a cover

r To obtain intelligence from the Court of Spain and from Genoar To arrange Intelligence at Brussels, Leydon and in Denmark2

When Walsingham died in 1590 Britain returned, for the timebeing, to the pre-Walsingham tradition of relying on its ambassadorsfor the bulk of intelligence

The forerunner for Britain of a techqical collection service was theagency involved in cryptanalysis. When the first such British agency,the Decyphering Branch, was created in 1703 there was no electronicmeans of transmitting diplomatic messages; messages to be deci-phered had to be purloined and copied by British agents or obtainedby recruiting a foreign cipher clerk. The Decyphering Branch wasclosed down in 1844, just at the time the electric telegraph wasabout to make the transmission and interception of diplomatic mes-sages much easier.3

One hundred years after the formation of the Decyphering Branch,the first military intelligence organization was established by theQuartermaster General. Titled the Depot of Military Knowledge, theorganization had as its primary function the collection from overtsources of maps and information on the military resources and to-pography of foreign powers. In 1855 a successor organization, theTopographical and Statistical Department of the War Office, wasestablished. Its Topographical Section was responsible for collectingforeign military maps and plans, while its Statistical Section was re-sponsible for gathering and collating intelligence on foreign militaryforces. The primary sources for the Statistical Section were the re-ports of military attachs and foreign publications.a

Beginning in the 1870s, the term intelligence began creeping intothe titles of military organizations. Thus, in 1873 the Topographical

UNI'TT:D KTNGDOM TNTSLLICNNCE ORGANIZATIONS 11

rnd statistical Department was renamed the Intelligence Branch (andsubsequently the Inteligence Division-and the tn?eiligence Depart-ment). In 1883 the Admiralty established , F;;;-ig:"-Inteltigencecommittee that eventualry became the Naval rn,.r-r"ig.n.. Depart-ment's. subsequently, thi Military Inteiligence Depi.tment wentFrgugh a series of

.mTgerl and seiar"tions-with other deparrmentsbefore-it reemerged, ii tglg, as the Military tntelligerrce Depart-ment. In addition, an Irish special Branch of the Metro"politan policewas formed in 1883 to combat Fenian bombing in r-ona'on. Arthoughthe.bombings ended on January 31, 1gg5, as of lggg the activitiesof the branch went beyond the'Irisrr and the word Irisb was droppedfrom its title. subsequently, the Special Branch became the mostvisible British organizition lnvolved in counterintelligence, counrer-subversion, and VIp protection.6_

Th: origins of the present Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) andsecurity service can be traced to 7909, when a subcommittee of thecommittee of Imperial Defence was estabrished to examine ,,the na-ture and extent of the foreign espionage that is "r

pr.r.n, takingplace within this country anl the danger to which it may exposeu.t.:'t. A.mo{rg the discovlries that alarmed rhe committee was Brit-ein's lack of a single agent on the European continent. It was there-rore recommended that a Secret Service Bureau be estabrished.Initially divided into military and naval secrions, the bureau,s organi-zation evolved within , yi^, into a Home section and a Foreignsection. Placed under the control of the war office, the bureau hadthree funcdons,

l. to be a screen between the Service departments and foreign spies;2' to be the intermediary between the service d.pr.t--.r,t, and Britishagents abroad; and

3. to take charge ofcounterespionage,Eoler the subsequent years, the Home Section evolved into Mo_5,MI-5 and finally the,civilian_ security Service. Likewise, th. nor.ig'section evolved into MI-1c, MI-6 ani eventuaily the civilian sIS.e,

World War I provided 1 m.ajor impetus for'incr.rsi;;. size ofthe servi-ces;-by the armistice in Nov.muer 19rg, MI-5,s"original war-time staff of 19 had grown to g44.ro The war also provided-a consid-erable boost to technicar collection activities. fil R;.r Flyingcorps flew its firsr reconnaissance missions on August 19, rgr5. Thenext day, it observed n corumn of troops passini through'Louvain

-

-.,.*diEerq-.

FL2 FoREIGN INTELLIGENcE oRGANIZATIoNS

and "stretching as far as the eye could see." When trench warfare wassuperseded by a war of movement in the spring of 1918, aerial re-connaissance became more important than agent reports.ll

Even more significant was the development of communicationsintelligence. Both the Army and the Navy established cryptographicunits to attack diplomatic and military ciphers. The Navy organiza-tion, Room 40, became Britain's single most imPortant intelligenceasset during the war.12 Among its accomplishments was the decipher-ing of the Zimmerman Telegram, in which Germany proposed thatMexico attack the United States to recover lost territory. The revela-tion of the contents of the telegram helped propel the United Statesinto the war.13

In 1919 the remnants of Room 40 and MI-8 (the Army's cryPto-graphic organization) were combined into the Government Code andCypher School, located at Bletchley Park. The school's publicly an-nounced function was "to advise as to the security of codes andcyphers used by all Government departments and to assist in theirprovision."la The school's unannounced function, of course, was tointercept the communications of foreign governments and to decipher the messages obtained. In this area the Government Code andCypher School had several early successes. The American diplomaticcode, which was reciphered quarterly, was broken in time to provideintelligence on U.S. policy during the Washington Naval Conferenceof. L92L-22. Later in the decade the school achieved notable succes-ses against Soviet diplomatic ciphers. Some of the deciphered mes-sages were made public by British leaders to support their accusationsof Soviet espionage/subversive activities in Britain-an act that led toSoviet adoption of the unbreakable "one-time pad" system.rs In1942 the school became the Government Communications Head-quarters (GCHQ), which remains its present name.16

ln t928 the Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries Subcom-mittee of the Committee on Impeirial Defense was established to re-port on foreign industrial mobilization plans in the event of war. InMarch 1931 the subcommittee established the Industrial IntelligenceCentre (IIC), with responsibilities for studying the vulnerability offoreign nations' industry to attack, the potential expansion of armsindustries in war, and the possibility of uncovering war preParationsthrough the continuous study of imports of raw materials and ma-chinery. Between 1931 and 1939 the IIC's responsibilities grew-replacing, for example, the Board of Trade as the principal authority

uNtrEDKtNcDoMtN,rnt.LtcENcEoRGANrzArroNs 13

on wartime trade questions. At the outbreak of world war II, it be-came part of the Ministry of Economic warfare (MEw), and wasebolished, along with MEW, at the end of the war. 17It was not until 193 5 that the Air Ministry had any sort of intelli-gcnce organization. The resurgence of the i.r-"n Air Force led tothe establishment of a Deputy Dit..tor of Intelligence, subordinateto the Directorate of operations and Intelligence."upon outbreak ofthe war, an independent Air Intelligence Branch was established.ls

In January t936 an attempt was made to ensure better coordina-tion

.o_f intelligence activities. An Inter-services Intelligence commit-tee (ISIC) was established with the approval of the Lni.r, of staffand the committee on Imperial Defince. The ISIC was srillborn,however, and in JT.

_1ll1was replaced by the Joint Intelligencesubcommittee of the chiefs of staff, which normally mer at leastonce a month and included the head of the IIc,re The subcommitteesubsequenrly became the Joint Intelligence commimee and includedthe heads of the Security Service and ihe SIS.

Naturally, world war II expanded the size of the British intelli-gence community. New organizations, such as the Special operationsExecutive, established to conduct subversive operations, were formedand then dismantled after the war. In addition, the already-existingorganizations-sIS, the security service, GcHe, and the

-ilit"ry r.rlvice intelligence departments-grew in size. The most signiiicantachievements were those of GcHe, particularly irs success in deci-phering German military communicatlon, to produce uLTRA intel-ligence information.20 To collect the German signals, GcHe set upan extensive nerwork of listening stations in lngland, Scotland^,Northern lreland, and other locations. Also of great"importance wasthe security service's success in capturing .u..y German agent infil-trated into Britain and then mainiaining an eiaborate doible-crosssystem that permitted the British authorities to regularly pass dis-information back to German intelligence.2r

In addition to the area of communications intelligence, world warII produced much British activity in other "r.", Jf what came tobe known as rechnical collection. Much of this activity involved at-

tempB to locate and destroy German radar and navigation stations.In order-to guide thcir bombers to target, the Gerrians had devel-oped a long'rangc blind bombing system named Knickebein. Aground transmitter radisted c besm to mark a flight path for aircraft,with Morse tlots on one ritle of thc bcnm and lntori. dashes on the

.'''. -'

l+ FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

other. In the center lane, the dots and dashes merged to give a steadytone. To fly the beam, pilots had simply to stay in the zone wherethey heard the steady note signal.22

Armed with evidence that the Knickebein system used transmis-sions in the vicinity of 30 MHz, the British Air Ministry bought sev-eral receivers from ham radio enthusiasts that covered the 27- to t43-MHz band. One was installed in an Anson twin-engined reconnais-sance aircraft to be used in what became the first British airborneelectronics intelligence mission. During its third flight, on June 21,1940, a full pattern of Knickebein signals aligned over Lincolnshirewas found, with Morse dots to the south, dashes to the north, and asteady note signal running up the middle. With the informationacquired, the Royal Air Force (RAF) began to jam the Knickebeinsystem.2 3

The British employed both photographic reconnaissance and elec-tronic intelligence (ELINT) as part of an operation code-namedOCCULIST. RAF reconnaissance aircraft flew carefully plannedtracks over occupied Europe, photographing the territory below so asto provide an accurate record of their tracks. In addition, Germanradio reports of the aircraft's flight paths were intercepted and de-coded. By back-plotting the distances and bearings, given by theradar stations, intelligence officers were able to find the positions ofseveral of the German stations.24

By the end of World War II, the three most important British intel-ligence and security agencies of the postwar era-SIS, GCHQ, andthe Security Service-were in place. Additionally, Britain had be-come heavily involved in the types of technical collection activitiesthat were to revolutionize postwar intelligence collection: airbornephotographic and electronic reconnaissance and land-based signalsinterception.

One further significant change in the British intelligence commu-nity involved the military service intelligence departments. At theend of World War II, the Army War Office had its Military Intelli-gence Department, the Admiralty its Naval Intelligence Division, andthe RAF the Air Ministry's Air Intelligence Directorate. ln 1946 asmall coordinating unit known as the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB)was created and headed by Kenneth Strong, who had been DwightEisenhower's chief intelligence officer in World War IL The scope ofJIB went beyond providing analysis based on military considerations;rather, JIB was also to cover political, economic, and psychological

uNt.[nDKtNcDoMtNTfl,l,tcriNcnoRcANtzATtoNS 15factors connected with the national interest. rn 1964 JIB was re-placed by the Defense Intelligence Staff (DIS), which not only ab-sorbed JIB's analytic and coordinating role but actually absorbedthe service intelligence departments themselves.2 s

Thus, as of. L987 the British intelligence and security communityconsisted of a variety of collection, analytical, and management orga-nizations, including the Government communications Fleadquarters,the secret Intelligence Service, the Defense Intelligence staff, theJoint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence centre, the security service,the special Branch of scotland Yard, and the Joint Intelligence orga-nization of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITYORGANIZATIONS

Government Communications Headquarters

The Government communications Headquarters is located at chel-tenham, Gloucestershire, and maintains a London office at Z-gPalmer Street, SWl. Between 5,000 and 8,000 individuals work arheadquarters, with another 5,000 to 8,000 others (primarily service-men) at field stations. GCHQ spends approximately $700 million ayear. Its officially defined mission is the "reception and analysis offoreign communications and other electronic transmissions for intel-ligence purposes."26 A more detailed description of GCHe,s com-munications intelligence (COMINT) role has been offered by TonyBunyan: "GCHQ monitors and decodes all radio, telex and tele-gram communications in and out of Britain, including the messagesof all foreign embassies in Britain, finance and industiial companiesand individuals of interest to state agencies."2?

In addition to its signals intelligence activities, GcHe also "has theresponsibility for developing codes and procedures to safeguard Brit-ish Government communications."2s A specialist unit of GCHe, theDiplomatic Telecommunications Maintenance Service, has the re-sponsibility for the debugging of whitehall offices, outstarions, andBritish embassies.2e

At the top of the present GcHe strucrure is the Director, subordi-nate to whom are four principal directorates-the Directorate ofSIGINT Plans (DP), the Direcrorate of SIGINT Operations and Re-

Staff OfficerLStB + LS|C(D)

Director ofCommunications

Directorate ofSIGINT Plans

(DP)Directorate of

SIGINT Operationsand Requirements

Directorate ofOrganization and

Establishment (DOE)Directorate of

CommunicationsSecurity

Director ofPlans and

Policy Staff

16 FoRErcN TNTELLIGENcE oRGANTZATToNS

Figure2-1 . Qrlanization of the Government communications Headquarters.

UNITED KINGDOM INTELLTGANCE ORGANIZATIONS T7

Foreign office, and the military services, as welr as from ffade andeconomic ministries. It also maintains liaison with a variety of for-eign SIGINT agencies.3o

J Division concentrates on the interception of Soviet bloc signals.With approximately 900. employees, it is one of the lrrg.st GCHedivisions. K Division dears wiih a[ other geographical area"s as wel aswith_interclpted commercial messages. e-ong K Division sectionsarc K25, which monitors the commrinications Jf sub-saharan Africa,and K11, which coordinates the detailed monitoring anJ tasting ofth.e intercept stations. Actual code-breaking activity"; ;. responsi-bility of H Division, while X Division operates the GCHe compurersystem. Among the computers employ.d

"r. a vafiety oi U.S._b,ril,

computers-including huge IBM 36b and IBM 370 -".hin.r, at leastone Cray, and a computer known as Tandem Nonstop_that analyzethe data collected at the GCHe intercept stations.3t

The search Technology Division is concerned with the means oflocating a signal rather iiran its interception-an activitf known as.Long-Range Technical search (LRTS). This activity is intended tocounter aftemp* by Soviet and other foreign communications bu-reaus to give further_protecrion, beyond encription, to theii commu-nications by concealing the very ixistence of the signal, either byspreading.the signal_so thinly across a range of freq"uencies that itPrrgr:r indistinguishable from the backgro"und noirJ o, by buryingit within other transmissions.32 According to James Bamford:

LRTS operators search for any unusual signal above 3o megahertz. once theydiscover one which has not previously bee=n logged tt.y pt itograph it, take itdown to the intermediate frequencies, and pass it through various specializedfilten' . . . The "complete picture" of the signal is then studied . . . in order

ljt5l:t equipment to better capture it and extract usable inteligencetrom lt.-".

similarly, the statistical operations Division is not concerned withdecryption, rather, its focus is on traffic analysis-studying the ,,ex-ternals" of a message (its source, destination, pri;rii:".tc.) as ameans of obtaining information, even from encrypted messages thatcannot be decrypted' such externals can providi information abouttroop movements, for example, or the imminence of an attack or::h:t "rjlilary operations. The communicarions Division is responsi-ble for delivering the rignrb intelrigence to its final consumer.3d

The second mout importrnt dirictorete of the GcHe is itre nirec-torate of conrnrunicrtionr security. until 1969 the fun-ctions of this

StatisticalOperations (S)Requirements/

Liaison and Foreign (Z)Communications (W)

Search Technology (U)

SpecialsrctNT (J)GeneralsrGtNT (K)Cryptanalysis (H)ComputerServices (X)

Overseas Staff (C)Personnel (E)Finance and Supply (F)Technical (Q)Management and General (G)Mechanical Engineering (M)Security (R)

quirements, the Directorate of organization and Establishment' (DoE), and the Directorate of communications security. Attachedto the Director's office is a staff officer representing the London sig-nals Intelligence Board and the London signals Intilligence commii-tee (Defence), which are discussed later in this chapter. Figure 2-1shows the organizational structure of the GCHe.

The Directorate of SIGINT operations and Requirements is cen-tral to GCHQ activities and is subdivided into eighi divisions: statis-tical operations (S), Requirements/Liaison and Foreign (z), specialSIGINT (J), General SIGINT (K), Communications (W), Cryptanaly-sis (H), compurer services (X) and search Technology iu). t.-itthrough Z Division that detailed UKUSA (discussed later in thischapter) as well as other SIGINT requirements are determined. ZDivision receives target requests from the Ministry of l)ef'ence, the

- _ "**rytre& ."'

18 FoREIGNINTELLIcENcEoRGANIZATIoNS

directorate were performed by a separate agency, the London Com-munications Security Agency, which operated under "cover" as theCommunications-Electronic Security Department of the ForeignOffice. ln 1969, however, it was decided to merge the agency intothe GCHQ, partly as a means of ending the bitter and recurrent feudsbetween the two organizations.3s

The Directorate of Organization and Establishment is the admin-istrative directorate, responsible for Personnel (E), Mechanical Engi-neering (M), Finance and Supply (F), Management and General (G),Technical (Q), and Security (R). It is also responsible for the Over-seas Staff (C), the division that assigns intercept operators to clan-destine listening posts within British embassies. The Directorate ofSIGINT Plans, consisting solely of the Plans and Policy Staff, is re-sponsible for long-range planning for intercept stations and otherSIGINT activities.36

Finally, subordinate to the GCHQ is the Joint Technical LanguageService (JTLS), which consists of translators of a wide variety of lan-guages who can transcribe the intercepted voice conversations result-ing from COMINT activities.3? These conversations may include, forexample, those of Soviet pilots and army commanders on maneuversor of oil ministers of the OPEC countries.

GCHQ directs the activities of all Arm/, Navy, and Air Forcemonitoring organizations and stations, having won a battle to takecontrol of such stations in 1963. GCHQ set up the Composite Sig-nals Organization to run the stations, which are located both in Brit-ain and overseas. More than a dozen stations are located in Britain.Among the currently operating ground stations is a satellite groundstation at Morwenstow, near Bude, Cornwall. One of the Morwen-

" stow station's functions is the interception of COMSAT and INTEL-SAT communications. This task is accomplished with the aid of qinesatellite dishes at the site, two of which are 100-foot aerials. Anotherfour dishes are planned. A GCHQ London site at the Empress StateBuilding in Earls Court has been used since the 1970s to interceptInternational Leased Carrier cable and telex traffic. A station atCulm Head hosts a 150-man CSO contingent. The antennas at C.ulmHead are of the rhombic variety, which can only listen to transmis-sions coming from a known direction.3s

A fifty-man contingent at Brora uses High-Frequency Direction-Finding (HF-DF) equipment to listen to and pinpoint the location ofSoviet ships in conjunction with Norwegian listening posts at Nam-dalen and Randaberg. The Norwegian stations can triangulate on a

uNtrEDKtNcDOMtNTnt.l.tcBNcEoRcANtzArtoNs t9soviet ship by listening to its shortwave signals but have brind spotsin the North sea and North Atlantic that can conveniently be cov-ered by Brora. A station at lrton Moor is primarily engaged in inter-cepting the communications of Soviet, East German, and Dofish navaland shipping traffic in the Baltic Sea.3e

Facilities at Hawklaw (in Fife) and cheadle (in staffs) have verydifferent targets. Hawklaw intercepts international telecommunica-tions traffic. cheadle was set up during world war II to monitor thecommunications of the German Air Force, and its initial post-world war II duties were apparently the interception of the shott-wave signals of warsaw Pact aircraft. currently, its staff of 340 isprimarily involved in intercepting Irish communications.ao

At Saxa Vord, Unst, Shetland, the RAF's 91 Signals Unit maymonitor the electronic emissions from Soviet aircraft being trackedby the RAF radar site there. In addition there is a remote unmannedHF-DF installation at saxa vord to monitor naval movements in theNorwegian Sea.4r

The primary mission of the Blakehill (Wilts) CSO station, whichis tied into the NsA satellite communication intercept network, isto intercept Soviet Mohniya satellite communicationi. RAf Digby(Leicester) is responsible for the inrerception of soviet and EastEuropean air communications.a2

GCHQ also maintains several offices and stations outside of theunited Kingdom. In addition to u.K. liaison offices ar the canadiancommunications security Establishment in ottawa, the AustralianDefence Signals Directorate (DSD) in Melbourne, and the U.S. Na-tional Security Agency (NSA) ar Fort Meade, Maryland, GCHemaintains several stations in Europe and Asia. Located in Birgelen,West Germany, is the Army's 13th Signal Regiment, which concen-trates on the HF intercept of soviet Army and related activity inthe western ussR and Forward Area. The regiment maintains out-stations at Dannenberg, Jever, and West Berlin (Teufelsberg).a3

At Celle/Scheuen, Ironside Barracks, the Army's 14th Signal Regi-ment' specializes in mobile vHF/uHF and ELINT interception.other intercept locations in west Germany include Langeleben andWesendorf, which engage in VHF/UHF COMINT interception andtactical ELINT interception, respectively.aa

A GCHQ unit esteblished in 1983 at Gibraltar is engaged inCOMINT and HF-DF monitoring. At Ayios Nikoaos near Farmagustain Cyprus is the Army'r 9th Signal Regiment, also known as the Med-iterranean Field lntercept Sr&rion for GCHQ and as UKM 252 in the

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20 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS UNIT&D KTNCDOM INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS 27ligence organizations. In rg76, during south Africa's intervention inAngola, GCHQ in-tercepted and decfrhered south African militarycommunications. s o

In addition to ground srations, GCHe uses aircraft for signalsintelligence colection. under the tasking tr ccue, the Rep's No.51 squadron, based at wyton, operates a small number of BAe Nim-rod aircraft modified for electronic reconnaissance.sr

The Nimrod R1 was formally commissioned into squadron serviceon May 70, 7924. That aircraft was virtually indistinluishable fromthe standard maritime reconnaissance airframe, with th? exception ofthe installation of radomes at the tail (replacing the rur"g*tii Anom-aly Detector housing) and on rhe noses oi the fro .*r.i'n"l wing fueltanks and extensive work around the original weapons Ury, pr.ru__ably to allow for the installation of the necessary electronicsgear.s2Modification in the early 19g0s resulted in tirree

"ircr"ft 6'eing re_designated Nimrod R2s.An array of nine ,,inverted L,,shaped anten-nas above the forward fuserage, on both wing tanks, *J'"bou. th.tail planes were introduced, as were-equipmeni pods on the wingtips.The cabin layout itself was revised by removal of the cabin windowsforward of the wing, possibly indicating a reduction in the number ofsystems operations carried and the intioduction of more automatedequipment.s 3

The Nimrod R1/R2 aircraft have been most frequently spottedover the Baltic, suggesting interest in the activities of the warsawPact air defense network in East Germany, poland, Estonia, Lafria,and Lithuania and the soviet naval instailations around Leningrad.Further norrh, the installations around the white s." r.ra the raunchsite at Plesetsk would be of interest. outside the Europ.- th."t.r,Nimrod R2 aircraft can be expected to be active over the Mediterra-nean, with operating locations on Malta and cyprus, together withthe possible use of

.facilities in Turkey. such a'qpre^"a oF rotationalbases would be ideal for monitoring activities along tt. *utt.rn andeastern shores of the Mediterran.rn a, well as actiiities of the sovietBlack Sea Fleet.sa. ..Beginning in 1989, 9!Hq may also have a satellite SIGINT capa_bility. By that time GCHe will probably have zIRcoN available forlaunch-a SIGINT satellite to b. launched into a g.oryn"r,.onor*orbit and stationed at 53o east rongitude, placing it?*i ihe rndianocean 1nd giving it an electronic view oi the'."rt.rn half of thesoviet Union. 'l'hc r'tcllitc, expected ro cosr up ro $750 million,

UKUSA nerwork. This facility operares against the communicationsof Mediterranean and Middle Easiern strtJr, including the diplomaticand military communications of. Libya, Egypt,

"ndlr"q as well asfAT9 allies ltaly, Greece, and Turkey. -bttr.r major targe* aresaudi Arabia, Lebanon, syria, and navai and aircrafi movements inthe eastern Mediterranean, particularly those of the ussR. some sig-nals are also intercepted from Israel and lran.4s- _GCHQ also operates several joint sites overseas, including one withNSA and one with Australia. A site jointly operared wiitr Nse islocated at Two Boats on the Ascension Isles in the south Atlantic.This

.facility is primarily concerned with monitoring naval commu-nications in the South Atlantic.a6

The facility operated in conjunction with the Australian DSD wasupgraded in 7976 with construction of a huge new complex at TaiMo shan in the New Territories. Ther. ,r. cr.rrr.ntly twb interceptstations in- Hong Kong.. The Composite Signals Organization on HongKong itself houses administrative, signal rJcording]and cryptographilactivities; it was originally located at Little Sai fran but'r""r".nJu.dto a new site on the south coast of Hohg Kong Island in 19g3, withBritain paying for the move.4?

The New Territories outstarion at Tai Mo Shan has an aerial farmth.a1 is even larger than the one formerly at Little sai wan. until themid-1970s, the Hong Kong operation was directed almost entirelyagainst the People's Republic of china (pRc). The pRC, including iismilitary communications and weapons and its space activities, is-stillvery.mu.ch a turget, but the station is now also heavily involved inmonitoring soviet naval movements along East Asia from the majornaval bases at Vladivostok and petropovlovsk-Kamchatka to camRanh Bay in Vietnam.as

Two sites activated in r992-g3 are located in Latin America. Asmall Army tactical SIGINT site was established in Belize, in centralAmerica, and during 1983 an Ar-y SIGINT collection unit wasestablished on the Falklands.ae.

GCHQ also operares listeniag posts in a number of British embas-sies. and High Commission office, ou.rr."r, including Moscow, Nai_robi (Kenya), Pretoria, Lilongwe (Malawi), Lusaka ("Zambia), Blan-tyre (Malawi), Gabarone (Botswana), Mbabane (Swaziland), andprobably also Warsaw, Budapest, prague, Cairo, Freetown (SierraLeone), and Accra. In the earry rg7oJthe GCHe,s African starionswere involved in intercepting reports of regular tripartite securitymeetings among the portugu.i., Rhodesian, a'nd south Africsn intel-

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22 FoRErcN TNTELLTcENCE oRGANTZATToNS

was intended to be launched under the cover of the British SKYNETcommunications satellites, which also operate in geosynchronousorbit. s s

GCHQ has had a number of security problems in the 1980s, themost noteworthy of which concerned Geoffrey Prime, a formerGCHQ translator and section chief who was arrested in 1982 forhaving provided GCHQ marerial to rhe Soviet Union for fourreenyears.s6 Earlier it was charged that numerous classified documentshad disappeared from the GCHQ's station at Lirtle Sai Wan in HongKong. In addition, it appears that code word documents classifiedTOP SECRET UMBRA disappeared in 1981 from the Stanley Fortsatellite Station in Hong Kong, a station built specifically to inter-cept signals from Chinese space and missile launches. According toone former GCHQ official, the lost documents contained details ofhow to detect, follow, and understand radio signals from Chinesemissiles and satellites.sT

Secret Intelligence Service

The Secret Intelligence Service has both internal and external func-tions. Internally, it seeks to spot, assess, and recruit foreigners resid-ing in the United Kingdom for employmenr as agents when theyreturn to their native countries. Externally, it conducts a wide rangeof activities, including the collection of intelligence by clandestinemeans, counterintelligence operations, covrt action, and clandestinecommunications support. Naturally, it furnishes elements of the gov-ernment with the products of its intelligence collection.

The SIS is headed by the Chief of the Secret Service, also knownas C, or CSS. The second-ranking official in the SIS is the Director,who supervises its day-to-day operations. Under the Director are fourdirectorates and a group of controllers for the supervision of foreignoperations. The four directorates are the Directorate of Personneland Administration; the Directorate of Special Support, which pro-vides technical support for sIS activities; the Directorate of counter-intelligence and security, which handles both sIS internal securityand offensive counterintelligence operations; and the Directorate ofRequirements and Production, which is responsible both for deter-mining intelligence collection requirements and for producing intelli-gence reports.ss

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24 FoREIGN INTELLTcENcE oRGANrzATroNs

The sIS's foreign operations are under the supervision of sevencontrollers: controller/u.K., controller/Europe, controller/sovietBloc, controller/Africa, controller/Middle Easf, controller/Far East,and controller/western Hemisphere. The controller/U.K. is responsi-ble for spotting and recruiting foreigners residing in Britain to serveas agents in their native lands.se An organizational chart of the SISis shown in Figure 2

-2.In pursuit of its postwar clandestine collection activities, sls

established extensive networks in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East,although those networks are probably zubstantially smaller now thanin the 1950s and early 1960s, due to both limitei r.rour.., and thebetrayal of fo*y agents by George Blake. Among the East Europeancountries where there were extensive networks are czechoslovakiaand East Germany.

One East German agent, Hans Joachim Koch, served SIS from1951 until his arrest in 1955 while emptying a "dead-lerter box" inPankow Park. Koch, a wartime sergeant in the sS division prinePug:n, had provided "good services" during the East Berlin uprisingin 1953. Also arrested in 1955 was Johann Baumgart, an official o-fthe East German railways; Baumgarr had suppi=ied the sIS withtwenty-five extraordinarily detailed maps of thi East German trans-port system.6o

of course, the greatest British success in the area of human intelli-gence gathering was the joint operation sIS conducted with the cIAin running colonel oleg Penkovskiy of the GRU, the chief Intelli-gence Directorate of the Soviet General staff. Between the time ofhis beginning to work for the sIS and the cIA in early 1961 and hisarrest on october 22, 1962, penkovskiy provided copies of largenumbers of documents and manuals. Accoiding to Greville wynn-e,the material with which Penkovskiy provided the-west included,

o The names. . . and in many cases photographs of over 300 soviet agentsworking in western countries, In addition, several hundred agents undertraining in the soviet Union, czechoslovakia and other Eastein counrrieswere rnade known to the West. . . .

o Details of soviet rocket sites throughout the soviet Union, together withstatistical details of training manpower, weapon production, stock-pilingand drawing board designs for future programs.

o . . . information that Khrushchev had allowed most importanr controlequipment, which was in very short supply, ro be sent with rockets toCuba. . . .

uNtrEDKrNcDoMrNTE,LLrcENcEoRGANrzATtoNs 25

Photogrophic copies of reporrs which Khrushchev had given to the SovietPracsidium, purporting to be an accounr of a meeting between Kennedyand himself, and the ttalian Foreign Minister and himself.Statistics of agricultural production throughout the Soviet Union. . . .Production figures, location, lay-out and operating procedures for all themain Soviet industries, including the electronics industry, and the produc-tion of steel, aircrafr and military equipment.Considerable information dealing with the Soviet Union's relations withEastern European countries; photostatic copies of secret agreementsi de-tails of future policy of the Soviet Government towards those countries.6r

In addition to purely human source operations, the SIS has con-ducted a number of technical operations on both small and largescales. According to George Blake, a Soviet penetration agenr in theSIS from 7953 to 1961, he was involved in "Operation Contrary"-the placing of microphones in the office of the Polish Trade Missionin Brussels as well as the wiring of rooms at the Astoria Hotel inBrussels, used by trade representatives from Communist countries. Asimilar operation, according to Blake, was "Operation Fantastic"-the placing of hidden microphones ar the office of the Sovier com-mercial attache in Copenhagen. Other operations Blake claimed tohave been involved in included tapping the telephones of the Czecho-slovak Export Agency in Cairo and wiring the residence of a secondsecretary of the Bulgarian embassy in London.62

A technical SIS operation that occurred for certain and on alargerscale than the operations mentioned above was Operation SILVER.ln 1.949 the SIS purchased a house whose basement was abour sev-enty feet from the two cables connecting Vienna's Imperial Hotel(the Soviet command center in then occupied Austria) with theSoviet command in Moscow. After resurfacing the driveway withreinforced concrete the SIS dug a tunnel from the basement out tothe cables and tapped into the cables.63

In 1951 SILVER became a joint operation with the CIA. Bothcountries were able to benefit from the CIA's ability to read theplaintext of enciphered messages transmitted on land lines withoutsubjecting the messages to cryptanalysis, by reading the "transients"or "artifacts" of the clear-text messages being enciphered by theSoviets at the Imperial Hotel. Among the intelligence produced wasknowledgc that the Soviet Union would not commit itself to a mili-tary advancc tlrrough the Balkans, "a piece of intelligence holding

a

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26 FoRErcN INTELLTcENcE oRGANIzATToNs

e-nor-m9us significance for the disposition of American troops duringthe fighting in Korea."64

The sIS has also been heavily involved in covert action, known as"special political action" in British terminology. In the 1950s and1960s the sIS was engaged in substantial covert operarions in theMiddle East. The sIs 'financed the sharq al-Adna broadcasting station(later named the Near East Arab Broadcasting corporation), for ex-ample, to carry out pro-British propaganda. The SIS was also behindthe Arab News Agency (ANA), which had been ser up during theSecond world war to engage in anti-Nazi propaganda, and the Nearand Far Eastern News Agency (NAFEN). Both operared until 196g,when their assets were turned over to Forum worrd Features, a cIAproprietary.6s

The sIS was heavily involved in the overthrow of Iranian primeMinister Mossadeq in 1953 and his replacement by the shah. It wasMossadeq's nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian oil company thatled Britain to seek his overthrow. George Kennedy young, the Dep-uty Director of the SIS, played a leading role in the day-to-day plan-ning and liaison with the American cIA in the effort code-named"Ajax." Additionally, British agenrs played a significant role in day-to-day operations. when in April 1953 Mossadeq replaced the pro-American chief of Police with a new chief and assigned him the taskof purging pro-Americans, SIS agents kidnapped

"ttd kill.d the newlyappointed police chief. Additionally, the British-controlled Iraniannews media initiated abarcage of anti-Mossadeq propaganda.6d

In the mid-1960s Iraq was also a target of SIS-inspirid propaganda.The SIS stationed an experienced propagandist in beirui to organizethe publication of antigovernment pamphlets for circulation lnsideIraq. In Yemen in the 1950s and 1960s the srS was involved in Brit-ish military activities directed against Egyptian-backed insurgents andantiroyalists. Imam Ahmad of North yemen was overthiown byNasser-backed nationalists in r962. rhis led to a British attempt, witirIsraeli help, to tie down and harass large numbers of Egyptian troops.sIS officers aided special Air service soldiers in their operations.6T-

sIS operations in lreland have included both intelligence collectionand covert action. Its intelligence collection activities have been con-centrated in three areas: (1) matters connected with the North, (2)the threat of the soviet use of Ireland as a back door for spying onBritain, and (3) Irish politics and economics, especially in mattersconnected with the European Economic community or relations

uNtrIlDKtNcDoMtNTnt,LtcENcEoRcANrzArroNs 2Z

with other countries. SIS has apparently had some success in estab-lishing agents inside the Garda, the Irish Army, and governmenrdepartments.6s

One covert operation reportedly followed from the spotting, byan RAF maritime reconnaissance patrol, of a Soviet conventionalsubmarine broken down on the surface within sight of the Donegalcoast. Pictures taken by the patrol plane were passed to SIS, whichthen passed them to an agent who was a journalist. The agent wasable to place them with a Belgian news agency that sold them to theBritish Tbe News of tbe World, which published them on its frontpage with a story about the Soviet Union landing guns from sub-marines in Donegal.6e

It has been alleged that two individuals, Kenneth and Keith Little-john, participated in a number of criminal acts at the behest of theSIS in order to pressure the Irish governmenr to get tougher with theIRA. Included in the alleged acts were several bank robberies. SIS isalso reported to have instructed the Littlejohns to petrol-bombGarda stations.To

As with other intelligence services, the counterintelligence furgc-tion of the SIS involves it in collecting and analyzing informationconcerning the intelligence services of hostile and friendly govern-ments. In addition, it seeks to penetrate, when possible, the intel-ligence services of hostile governments. In that area it has achievedat least one major success. Oleg Gordievsky, who joined the KGBin L962, began operating as a British agent in 1966,at his own insti-gation, shortly after arriving in Denmark. Gordievsky served rwotours in Copenhagen as a press attache in the Soviet Embassy, from1966 to L97O and from 1972 to 1978. After a four-year rerurn tothe Soviet Union, Gordievsky was reassigned to London in 1982 asdeputy to the KGB resident. In April 1985 the KGB resident was ex-pelled after his name came up in the trial of a British Security Ser-vice employee who tried to sell secrets to the Russians, and Gordiev-sky took the resident's place.Tl

While in Copenhagen, Gordievsky established a reputation as aspecialist in the handling of East German illegals operating in westGermany and Denmark. During his tenure there, one Dane wasarrested for spying for the KGB and seven Soviet diplomats were ex-pelled. In addition, Gordievsky provided information vital to thearrest of Arnc 'l'rcholt, thc former Norwegian diplomat sentenced totwenty ycars in priron for spying for the Soviet Union. While sta-

- .:;*gii8bbau ,**'sreWq,"".,

28 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

tioned in London in 1982, Gordievsky alerted the British to the at-tempts of Security Service officer Michael Bettany to become aSoviet agent. Gordievsky was also able to provide SIS with positiveintelligence concerning Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev, his wife,personal aides, and the working of the Politburo.T2

After his promotion in 1985, Gordievsky was unexpectedly calledback to the Soviet Union-a recall that he soon determined was dueto his having fallen under suspicion. Gordievsky signaled British intel-ligence officers of his situation. SIS managed to exfiltrate Gordievskyclandestinely, spiriting him out of a Black Sea resort-reportedly viamotorboat. When his defection was announced, twenty-five allegedspies were expelled from the United Kingdom.T3

Another success in the counterintelligence area occurred in Gene-va. A GRU officer, Vladimir Rezun, operating under cover of the UNWorld Health Organization, was under SIS control for several yearsprior to defecting. Subsequently, he wrote a number of books on theSoviet military and the GRU under the name of Viktor Surorov.While he was considered a valuable source by those who debriefedhim, many of the claims in his books are considered questionable.Ta

The headquarters of the SIS are at Century House, 100 Westmin-ster Bridge Road, SE1. Its London Station facility is at 60 VauxhallBridge Road, SE1, and its Training Centre is at296-302 BoroughHigh Street, SEl. Sabotage and demolition are taught in Gosport atan undercover establishment called Fort Monkton. Additionally, theSIS has a joint office with the Security Service at 140 Gower Street,wc1.?s

Defense I ntelligence Staff

At the head of the Defense Intelligence Staff (DIS) is the DirectorGeneral of Intelligence (DGI), The Deputy to the DGI is also theDeputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence). Thus, in additionto his role as deputy, he reports directly on general and current intel-ligence matters to the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Chiefs of StaffCommittee, and other staffs in the Ministry of Defence.T6

The DIS is subdivided into four directorates: the Directorate ofManagement and Support of Intelligence (DMSI), the Directorateof Scientific and Technical Intelligence (DSTI), the Directorate ofService Intelligence (DSI), and the Directorate of Economic Intelli-gence.77

I'NITRD KINGDOM INTELLIGENCE ORCANIZATIONS 29

The DMSI provides the central staff support for the DGI and Dep-uty Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence) (DCDS(I)) in handlingsubstantive intelligence business, with the exception of current intel-ligence. It coordinates the intelligence reporting required by DIScustomers as well as the DIS input into the Joint Intelligence Com-mittee (discussed later in this chapter). DMSI is also responsible forDIS long-term studies on such matters as U.S.-Soviet relations andthe Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).?8

The DSTI is responsible for producing intelligence concerning elec-tronics, chemical and biological weapons, missiles, atomic energy,and the basic sciences. The DSI is responsible for producing intelli-gence on broad military aspects of the defense forces and policies offoreign countries; it also produces the coordinated DIS output ofintelligence for the Assessment Staff. The Directorate of EconomicIntelligence is responsible for studying the general economic develop-ments in Communist countries; armaments production and support-ing industries worldwide; and the military and economic aid activitiesof Communist countries.?e

A job circular for DIS officers suggests that. . . specialist knowledge and experience is desirable in the fields of rranspor-tation systems, ports, beaches, power and water supplies, ammunition andordnance, POL installations, airfields and supporting infrastrucrure commandand control facilities, civil defence, telecommunications systems, the militaryapplications of space, guided missile systems, anti-aircraft and other defensivesystems as well as associated radars.Eo

DIS publications include Air Intelligence Review, Army TecbnicalIntelligence Digest, Army Weapons Intelligence Reaiew, and NaaalI ntellige nc e Re p ort.8t

Joint Air Reconnaissance lntelligence CentreThe Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre, run by the RAFand located at Brampton, handles two aspects of Britain's airbornephotographic reconnaissance activities. It manages the photographicreconnaissance missions conducted by Canberra aircraft and, untilrecently, Vulcan bombers. It also provides photographic interpreta-tion of the imagery derived from British missions as well as someU.S. missions.62

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5U FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

-In January and May 1982, two photographic reconnaissance unirs-13 squadron (which emproyed ttre canuerra pR MK 7 aircraft) and3 Squadron (which employed the pR MK 9)_were disbanded. Thisleft the PR MK 9-equipped No. I photographic Reconnaissance unitas the only strategic reconnaissance unitln existence. That unit oper-ats from wyton and coltishal. seven of its aircra ft arc to be fittedwith advanced radars in-a program called cASToR (c;i; AirborneStand-Off Radar). The fixed wing jet will fly

", "n .*rrJ-e altitudeof some sixty- thousand f..t, cirrying a high-definition synthetic

aperture radar.E3

Security Service

Just as the sIS evolved from the Foreign section of the secret ser-vice Bureau, the Security Service evolved from the bureau,s Homesection. As noted earlier, the Home section remained within the waroffice when the Foreign section was rransferred to the contror ofthe Admiralty. In 1916, when the war office creared the MilitaryIntelligence Department, the Home Section became p"rt of the de-partment, as MI-5.8a.

T!. Security Service is still besr known by its MI*5 designation,despite the fact that it has not been part of tl,e Military inteiligenceDepartment for more than thirty y."tr. In 1951 it was responsibledirectly to the prime Minister. Ai that time the secretary of thecabinet, Sir Norman Brook, recommended that,tt. ..rponriuitity uetransferred to the Home secretary.s.!, shortly afterwaid, ih. Horn.secretary, sir David Maxwell Fyfe, issued to the Director General adirective making the Security seruice responsible to the Home secre-tary. Because the directive also serves ,s ih. charter for today,s Secu_

' rity Service, it is worth quoting in full:1' In your appointmenr as Director Generar of the security service, you willbe responsible to the Home Secretary personalry. The Security Serviceis not, however, a parr of the Home oiti... on appropriare occasions, you

will have right of direct access to the prime Minister.2' The Security Service is part of the Defence Forces of the country. Itstask is the Defence of the Realm as a whole, from external and internal

dangers arising from attempts at espionage and sabotage, or from acdonsof persons and organizations whether directed from within or without thecountry, which may be judged to be subversive of the state.

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UNI'I'IIDKIN(;TX)MIN'I'IiI.I.tCNN(:TIORGANIZATIONS 31

3. You will take special cere ro scc that the work of the security Service isstrictly limited to what is necessary for the purposes of this task.

4. lt is essential that the Security service should be kept absolutely freefrom any political bias or influence and nothing should be done thatmight lend colour to any suggestion that it is concerned with interests ofany particular section of the community, or with any other matter thanthe Defence of the Realm as a whole.

5. No enquiry is to be carried out on behalf of any Governmenr unless youare satisfied that an important public interest bearing on the Defence ofthe Realm, as defined in paragraph 2, is at stake.

6. You and yorir staff will maintain the well-established convention wherebyMinisters do not concern themselves with the detailed information whichmay be obtained by the Security service in particular cases, but are fur-nished with such information only as may be necessary for the determi-nation of any issue on which guidance is sought.E6

Despite its undeniable status as a government agency (as indicatedby the Fyfe directive), the Security Service is not recognized by law.As the 1963 Denning Report on MI-5 stated: ',The Security Service,in the country is not established by Statute nor is it recognized byCommon Law. Even the Official Secrets Act does not acknowledgeits existence."87 The report went on to note that:

The members of the Service are, in the eye of the law, ordinary citizens withno powers greater than anyone else. They have no special powers of arrestsuch as the police have. No special powers are given to them, They cannotenter premises without the consent of the householder even though they maysuspect a spy is there. If a spy is fleeing the country, they cannot tap himon the shoulder and say he is not to go, They have, in short, no executivepowers.6E

With the exception of conducting liaison operations with Com-monwealth and other security services through offices abroad, theprimary functions of the security service are internal. These func-tions include conducting counterintelligence and counterespionageoperations, supervising the security investigations of all employeeswho have access to sensitive information, and monitoring domesticmovements and organizations for possible subversive elements. Thesecurity service is also in charge of countersabotage activity and thesurveillance and control of resident and visiting foreign nationals,including those on diplomntic missions.

..ffix*.

32 FoRErcN TNTELLIGENcE oRGANrzATroNsIn the area of counterespionage, the security service's prime tar-

gts are the legal (diplomatic) and illegar (deep cover) opiratives ofthe soviet Union and other warsaw pait nations. In addition to theirnumerous penetrations of the British intelligence and security ser-vices themselves, the KGB and GRU have also had some successesagainst the British diplomatic and defense establishments. Johnvassall, a British embassy employee in Moscow beginning in igs+,was caught in a KGB homosexual honeytrap and submitied to theresulting soviet blackmail. In 1956 he returned to London and be-gan abstracting secret documents, handing some over to his KGBcontrollers and photographing others. It was not until 1961 that hisactivities were discovered. During the same period, the British Under-water weapons Establishment at portland, Dorset, was peneffated byHany.Houghton, who reported to a Soviet illegal, Konon Molodf,operating under rhe name of Gordon Lonsdal-; Houghton pmr.don information concerning antisubmarine warfare and-nuclear sub-marines.se

In the summer of 1986 the security Service placed under surveil-lance an East German agent, wolfgang Knoutzch, whose mission wasto obtain information on British Aerospace's Hotol spacecraft andadvanced compurer technology. Knoutzih was eventuaily arrested inWest Germany and convicted of espionage there.e0

In the area of countersubversion, the Security service has focusedon a wide range of individuals and groups, many of whom would notbe considered subversive by ,ny r-"sonrble difinition of the word.Among those groups are the National council for civil Liberties(NCCL) and the campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (cND). Groupsmay be designated by the security service as being subversive, sub-versive front, subversive dominated, or subversiv. p*.n.trrt.d; all butthe.last designation allows the security Service to op.n files on allnational and local officials as being ,t i."st subversive sympathizers.Th_e security service may also engage in acdons beyond file-opening;it has, for example, conducted surviillance of trade union leaders. tn7982 an MI-5 agent attended rhe national conference of the NccL.According to a former security Service officer, in the 19g0s the orga-nization infiltrated an experienced agent into cND's headquartersand tapped the home telephone of a ieading official. The same offi-cer also indicated that agents were infiltr"t.d into the NCCL and thatanyone who was on the National Executive of NCCL or who was abranch secretary would be placed on permanent record.el

r.,Nrtnt)KtNcDoMtNl'n,t,l(itlN(:tloRGANtZATIoNS 33

The watching of foreign diplomatic establishments that may beinvolved in supporting terrorist operations rather than conventionalespionage is a third function of Security Service operations. Oneeavesdropping operation, targeting the Syrian embassy, is reported tohave produced "conclusive evidence" of Syrian involvement in theattempt on April 17, 1986, to place a bomb on board an El Al jumbojet destined for Tel Aviv.e2

A February 1986 message from the Syrian embassy in London toAir Force intelligence in Damascus requested further assistance forNezar Handawi in putting the plan into operation. The communica-tion was intercepted by GCHQ and decoded with the assistance ofthe NSA. Hindawi was then placed under twenty-four-hour SecurityService surveillance. He was seen in frequent visits to the Syrian em-bassy and in meetings with Syrian diplomats. The Security Servicewas then give.n permission to bug some embassy rooms and telephonelines from the outside of the embassy.e3

Operations against diplomatic establishments have included thebugging of the diplomatic missions of both friendly and hostile coun-tries. In the late 1950s and 1960s the Security Service bugged theSoviet embassy and consulate in London as well as the Hungarian,Polish, Egyptian, Cypriot, and Indonesian missions there. An attemptto bug the West German embassy failed, while a similar effort againstthe French embassy succeeded. The latter action allowed Britain tolisten to French discussions about Britain's application to enter theEuropean Economic Community, as well as to gather and pass infor-mation to the CIA about the French independenr nuclear force.e4

Another trget for many years has been the Irish embassy in Gros-venor Place. In addition to intercepting communications betweenDublin and London, MI-5 has placed bugs within the embassy. It isalso believed that at one point the electronic emanations of elec-tronic typewriters were being overheard as well; as a result, the type-writers are no longer used for sensitive material. Additionally, since1977 lrish diplomats have been sending all their correspondence toand from London by Aer Lingus pilots and army dispatch riders.es

The Security Service is organized into six directorates. Director-ates A (Intelligence Resources and Operations), B (Staff Office andAdministration and Finance), and S (Support Services, Registry,Computer Ccntrc, and 'l'raining Office) are primarily administrativeand evaluativc tlirectorates, llasic Security Service operations are car-ricd out by rlirectorttrr (i (Protectivc Sccurity), F (Domestic Subver-

.---,*g8&ia- n .,

34 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

Figure 2-3. Organization of the Security Service (Ml-5).

sion), and K (counterespionage). These directorates are further di-vided into sections and subsections.e6

subsection A1A is responsible for official thefts and break-ins.A1B includes officials in other government departments, banks, andsimilar organizations who improperly pass orr confidential personalinformation. AlD is staffed with lockimiths, carpenters, and othercraftpersons who assist in break-ins and the inslalation of audiodevices. subsection A2A transcribes the product of telephone tapsand bugs. Directorate K has two subsections of particulai interest-K7 and K9. Subsection K7 is responsible for counterintelligencewithin the British intelligence services, while K9 investigates pioplewho unexpectedly resign or retire from sensitive positioni.e?

An organizational chart of the security service is shown in Figure2-3.

Headquarters for the security service are located at curzon streetHouse, Curzon Street, Wl, and 140 Gower Street (parts of F and Kbranches).e8

UNITED KINCDOM INTIII,I,tCENCE ORCANTZATIONS 35

Special Branch, Scotland Yard

Scotland Yard, or more properly the Metropolitan police