211

Step Three: The Air War

(A) Aerial Bombardment

An intensification of aerial bombardment of rural areas in

the five northeastern provinces where the rebels were most active

began in late 1983, as the National Campaign of pacification was

winding down. According to Pentagon figures, average flying hours

for UH-1H helicopters and A-37 strike aircraft -— the core of El

Salvador's air attack capability -- increased by over 220 hours

per month between July, 1983 and February, 1984. UH-1H flight hours

increased 60 percent (from 364 to 582 per month), and A-37 flight

hours increased 68 percent (from 31 to 52). (35) Britain's Jane's

Defence weekly also reported an increase in A-37 air strikes,

citing U.S. military sources for a figure of 227 air strikes in

all of 1983 (an average of 19 each month), versus 74 air strikes

in the month of June, 1984, alone. (36) Air attacks from UH-lHs

were especially heavy during the election period of March-May,

1984, when helicopters were flying at three to four times their

previous frequency. (37) The stated aim was to enhance security

for the elections.

U.S. officials categorically deny that U.S. personnel have

in any way advised or encouraged the Salvadoran Air Force to bomb

rebel zones to disrupt life there and drive out civilians. But

while there is no direct evidence that U.S. advisers encouraged

the strategy, there is little doubt that U.S. aid provided the

ways and means to carry it out. (See Figure 2 and Table 8.)

Through U.S. military aid, El Salvador received seven A-37s

since 1982 (three more are on their way in 1985), and (in 1982)

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