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Forced Displacement & Development Public-Private Partnerships for Sustainable Solutions EARTH SECURITY BRIEF Developing solutions to resource pressures in host countries Collaborating on innovative and entrepreneurial growth models Focusing the private sector on sustainable and inclusive businesses

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1FORCED DISPLACEMENT & DEVELOPMENT

Forced Displacement & DevelopmentPublic-Private Partnerships for Sustainable Solutions

EARTH SECURITY BRIEF

Developing solutions to resource pressures in host countries

Collaborating on innovative and entrepreneurial growth models

Focusing the private sector on sustainable and inclusive businesses

2FORCED DISPLACEMENT & DEVELOPMENT

1 Regional Outlook: Middle East 1.1 Theinternationalfocus

ontheSyriancrisis 1.2 EarthSecurityoutlook:

Eightconvergingpressures inhostcountries

2 Jordan: Building sustainable solutions

2.1 Water:Theexpansionof hydroponicagriculture

2.2 Energy:Financingsolar energyentrepreneurship 2.3 Housing:Anationalstrategy forgreenaffordablehousing 2.4Theneedfor entrepreneurship

3 A critical factor to achieve the 2030 Agenda

3.1 Fivereasonswhyforced displacementwilltransform the2030Agenda

4 PublicationDetails

5 Notes

Audience

The brief is a strategic input to international efforts by the United Nations and multi-stakeholder actors to define a global cooperation framework to address forced displacement in partnership with the private sector.

Itshowsthatfindingsolutionscannotbedoneinisolationbuthastoberootedintheeconomic,social,andenvironmentalrealityofeachcontext,andcontributetoacomprehensivesustainablegrowthstrategy.Thebriefappliesaninnovativemethodforidentifyingresourceprioritiesandpartnershipopportunities.ItfocusesontheregionaloutlookfortheSyriancrisis,andacasestudyofJordan,withconclusionsandkeymessagesthataregloballyapplicable.

Content

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Key Messages

1Forced displacementisreinforcingcomplexdevelopmentchallengesinhostcountries.Buildingsocialcohesionbetweenrefugeesandhostcommunitiesrequireswin-winsolutionsthataddressresourcepressures.

2Public-private partnershipsareneededinordertocreate,andmaintain,themomentumforinnovativeandentrepreneurialsolutions,whichcomplementothermeasuresneededforacomprehensiveresponse.

3The international communitymustpartnerwiththelocalandinternationalprivatesectortopromotethedevelopmentandmainstreamingofsustainableandinclusivebusinessesinindustriesthatemployrefugees.

3FORCED DISPLACEMENT & DEVELOPMENT

1.0 Regional Outlook: Middle East An integrated view of resource pressures across the countries most impacted by the Syrian conflict reveals key factors that will undermine the resilience of host countries to deal with forced displacement.

4FORCED DISPLACEMENT & DEVELOPMENT

Theplanidentifiesthreecriticalenablersneededtosucceed:16

1 Changingtheprevailingperceptionstowardsrefugees.

2 Creatinganenablingenvironmentforprivatesectorinvestment.

3 Adoptingcreativelabourpoliciesthatalsoconsiderunemploymentinhostcountries.

The role of private sector partnerships

Inlinewiththe2030AgendaforSustainableDevelopment,the3RPtakesa‘leavenoonebehind’approach,emphasisingtheneedforinnovativepartnershipsandmodelsofjobsandlivelihoodgenerationthataddresstheneedsofbothrefugeesandhostcommunities.Inparticular,engagingtheprivatesectorisviewedasfundamentaltothisholisticapproach.Privateinvestmentandtheprivatesectorareneededtosustainthegrowthofopportunitiesovertime.Public-privatepartnershipsarebecomingacriticalpartofthelandscapegoingforward.

Inthefinancesector,innovative‘blendedfinance’approachescreatewaysforpublicfinancingtocatalyseprivatelending.Forexample,theWorldBank’sConcessionalFinancingFacility,inpartnershipwiththeUNandtheIslamicDevelopmentBank,aimstomobilisefinancingtostrengthenthecapacityofcountriesandcommunitieshostingrefugeesandIDPs.17Public-privatepartnershipsfocusedontechnology,logisticsandtelecommunications,arealsoplayingarole.Forexample,CairoAmmanBankispioneeringtheuseofbiometricsinitsbankingsystemtosupportUNHCR’scashassistanceprogramme.Theseandotherexamplesdiscussedinthisbriefillustratetheprivatesector’sabilitytoworkcreativelyandefficientlytocreatelong-termmarketsolutionstothischallenge.18

The Syrian conflict is the largest, most protracted and complex humanitarian emergency of our time, and the world’s single largest driver of displacement. Syria has become the world’s top source country for refugees, overtaking Afghanistan, which had held the position for more than three decades.1 Every year of the conflict has seen an exponential growth in refugees. In 2012, there were 100,000 refugees; by April 2013 there were 800,000; four months later in August 2013 that doubled to 1.6 million.2 A staggering 6.6 million people have been displaced within Syria. Syria accounted for more than half of new refugees in 2015, registering an additional one million in the last year.3

Syria’simmediateneighbours—Turkey,Lebanon,Egypt,JordanandIraq—havetogetheracceptedover4.7millionSyrianrefugeessincetheconflictbegan.4LebanonandJordannowhavethehighestpercapitaratiosofrefugeesworldwide,and,alongwithfellowneighbours,Turkey,EgyptandIraq,haveprovidedthemostsignificanthumanandfinancialresourcesfortheresponse.5Forthesecountries,theeffectsoftheSyrianrefugeecrisisareincreasinglyspillingoverintotheeconomicandsocialspheres.6ThecombinationofrefugeeflowsanddecreasedeconomicactivitywithSyriahaveaffectedgrowth,economicperformance,fiscalhealthandtheprovisionofbasicservices,stressingthealreadystrainedeconomicandresourceinfrastructureofthesehostcountries.7Todate,asaresultofthewarinSyria,thecombinedeconomiclossesofSyriaanditsdirectneighboursare$35billion.8

Therapidinfluxofrefugeesisincreasingpopulationnumbers,shiftingthedemographicsofhostcountries(age,educationlevel,familysize)andacceleratingunemploymentandurbangrowth.Forexample,inJordanandLebanon,over80%ofSyrianrefugeesareundertheageof35andliveinurbanareas.9/10

Thischallengestraditionalencampmentapproaches.Vulnerablerefugeesendupcompetingwithequallyvulnerablelocalpopulationsforalreadystrainedresources,infrastructure,services,andlivelihoodopportunities,underminingsocialcohesioninhostcountries.11

The move towards a ‘resilience approach’

Thereisgrowingconsensusintheinternationalcommunityontheneedtomovefromshort-termhumanitarianapproachestowardslong-termsolutions.A‘resilienceapproach’isemerging,whichseekstoensurethatbasicresourcesandinfrastructure,andultimatelysocialcohesion,canberesilientinthefaceofgrowingpressuresfromforceddisplacement.12Thegreateralignmentofhumanitariananddevelopmentspheresisvitaltoconfrontingtheincreasinglyprotractednatureofforceddisplacement.

AnexampleofthisparadigmshiftistheRegionalRefugeeandResiliencePlan(3RP)inresponsetotheSyriacrisis.LaunchedbytheUnitedNationsinDecember2014,the3RPseekstostrengthenthecapacityofnationaldeliverysystemsinthefivemostaffectedcountriesbytheSyrianconflict.Itisacoordinatedresponsetodelivera$5.78billionappeal,builtonnationalresponseplansineachofthecountries,andbringingtogethermorethan200humanitariananddevelopmentpartners,includinggovernments,UNagencies,andNGOs.13

ThehumansecurityofdisplacedpeoplefromSyriaisworseningastheirsavingsaredepletedandtheyfacelimitedemploymentopportunities.14Thegrowingperceptioninhostcommunitiesisthatrefugeesareathreat;competingforjobsincountriesthatalreadyhavehighunemployment.15TheincreasingdistressandvulnerabilityofSyrianrefugeesandthenegativeperceptioninhostcommunitiesisariskthatunderminessocialcohesionintheregion.The3RP2016-2017,hasatargettohelp282,000peopleaccessemploymentopportunities.

1.1 The international focus on the Syrian crisis

5FORCED DISPLACEMENT & DEVELOPMENT

The sustainable development challenges in host countries of the Middle East – from youth unemployment to water scarcity – were already significant before the Syrian conflict began. Forced displacement is now increasing the pressure on these challenges, which threaten social, economic and political stability.

Themaponthenextpagesummarisestheconvergenceofeightsocialandresourcetrendsthatmayunderminetheresilienceofhostcountries.Theseare:youthunemployment;urbanpopulationpressure;ashortageofskillsinthepopulation;waterscarcityandpollution;fiscalinstability;andadependenceonimportedenergyandfood.Thesearecriticallyinter-relatedandwillseverelyconstrainthelong-termdevelopmentprospectsandstabilityofthesecountriesunlesslong-termactionsaretakentoaddressthem.

AreviewoftheRegionalRefugeeResponseandResiliencePlan(3RP)showsthatsomeofthesepressuresarebeingincorporatedintolonger-termobjectives.Infact,35%of3RPprogrammingisdirectedatresilience,focusingonchallengessuchaswaterandsanitation,andfoodsecurity.Thetotalappealremainsunderfundedby70%onaverage.The3RP’slivelihoodcomponentisacornerstoneoftheagenda.Itseekstoassistwageemploymentandpromotesocialcohesionthroughcommunityprojectsandaccountsfor25%ofthebudget.However,withafundinggapof93%,itremainsthemostunderfunded.

Theshortfallinfundinghasseverelyconstrainedprogressontargets.Only1%ofthetargetforindividualsassistedtoaccesswageemploymentopportunitieshasbeenachieved,reaching3,149peoplebymid-2016.19

Promotingtheresilienceofhostcountriesrequiresthattheireconomicgrowthissustainable,inparticularinindustrysectorssuchasenergy,agricultureandinfrastructure.Donorsmustconsiderhowtheirengagementwithprivatesectorpartnershipscanbedirectedtowardsinclusiveandenvironmentally-responsiblegrowth,promotinggreenjobsforhostcommunitiesandrefugeesinwin-winmodels,andenablingentrepreneurshipasameanstoaddresslong-termsustainabilitychallenges.

1.2 Earth Security outlook: Eight converging pressures in host countries

“We are witnessing a paradigm change, an unchecked slide into an era in which the scale of global forced displacement as well as the response required is now clearly dwarfing anything seen before.” António Guterres Former UN High Commissioner for Refugees 20

6FORCED DISPLACEMENT & DEVELOPMENT

Environ-mental

Social

Governance

Energy

ThecountriesimpactedbytheSyrianconflictrevealcommontrendsinthesocialandresourcepressuresbeingexperienced.Eightpressuresarehighlightedacrosstheregion.FormoreinformationontheEarthSecurityIndextool,pleasevisit:http://earthsecuritygroup.com

Thecountrydiagramusesofficialcountrydatatovisualisetheperformanceofcountriesacrossthe24issueareas.Higherscoresrepresenthigherlevelsofpressure.Avisualbenchmarkhighlightsthosedimensionswhosescoresexceedvaluesof50%.

Figure1Earth Security outlook: Eight converging resource pressures in host countries

ThemapoppositedisplayscountryprofilesusingtheEarthSecurityIndex2016.Thetoolidentifiescriticalresourcepressuresacrosssocial,environmental,energyandgovernancedomains.

Syrian Refugees Numberofpeople3RPMid-YearReport2016,UNHCR&UNDP

Syrian Refugees %oftotalpopulationOnthebasisoftotalpopulationdatafromWorldBank,2015

Funding Gap of 3RP %oftotalappealby31May20163RPMid-YearReport2016,UNHCR&UNDP

Water Scarcity Basedonthresholdof1000m³totalrenewablewaterresourcespercapitaAQUASTATDatabase,FAO,2014

Water Pollution %ofuntreatedwastewaterEnvironmentalPerformanceIndex2016,YaleUniversity

Cereal Import Dependence %ofcerealdemandimportedFoodSecurityIndicators,FAOSTATDatabase,2009–2011

Skills Gap Rankingoutof109inGlobalTalentCompetitiveIndexSource:GlobalTalentCompetitivenessIndex2016,INSEAD

Youth Unemployment %ofyouthunemployedKeyIndicatorsoftheLabourMarketDatabase,2014

Urban Population Growth AveragerategrowthperyearWorldUrbanizationProspects,TheWorldBank,2013–2015

Government Debt %ofGDPWorldEconomicOutlookDatabase2015,IMF,2014

Energy Import Dependence BasedonenergybalanceInternationalEnergyAgencyStatistics,OECD/IEA,2013

Lebanon

Scarce

45%

88%

77

21%

6%

133%

Veryhigh

Lebanon

1,048,275

17.9%

62%

Syria

Scarce

52%

43%

N/A

30%

–2%

N/A

Medium

Syria

N/A

N/A

N/A

Iraq

Vulner-able

90%

57%

N/A

35%

3%

39%

Low

Iraq

247,339

0.7%

56%

Egypt

Scarce

72%

44%

88

42%

2%

90%

Low

Egypt

117,702

0.1%

80%

Key Issues VisualisedindiagramoppositeSources

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Refugees

Jordan

Extremely scarce

81%

96%

70

29%

3%

89%

Veryhigh

Jordan

655,217

8.6%

77%

Turkey

Nearing vulner-ability

68%

1%

63

18%

2%

34%

High

Turkey

2,743,497

3.5%

74%

7FORCED DISPLACEMENT & DEVELOPMENT

Water Virtual Imports

Water Pollution Water In

security

Land D

egradat

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Energy Import D

ependence

Electricity Blackouts

Electricity Access

Carbon Intensity Rule of Law

Political Accountability

Inflation

Government Effectiveness

Fiscal Sustainabilit

y

Weather Extremes

Skil

ls G

ap

Poverty

Land Tenure Insecurity Gender Inequality

Food Insecurity

Food Import Dependence

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Water Pollution Water In

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Political Accountability

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Land Tenure Insecurity Gender Inequality

Food Insecurity

Food Import Dependence

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Water Virtual Imports

Water Pollution Water In

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Carbon Intensity Rule of Law

Political Accountability

Inflation

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Land Tenure Insecurity Gender Inequality

Food Insecurity

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Water Pollution Water In

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Political Accountability

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Land Tenure Insecurity Gender Inequality

Food Insecurity

Food Import Dependence

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Water Virtual Imports

Water Pollution Water In

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Carbon Intensity Rule of Law

Political Accountability

Inflation

Government Effectiveness

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Land Tenure Insecurity Gender Inequality

Food Insecurity

Food Import Dependence

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Water Pollution Water In

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Carbon Intensity Rule of Law

Political Accountability

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Turkey SyriaLebanon

Iraq Jordan Egypt

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8FORCED DISPLACEMENT & DEVELOPMENT

2.0 Jordan: Building sustainable solutionsGiven Jordan’s social and resource priorities, enabling entrepreneurship in sustainable business sectors is key to long-term stability and growth.

9FORCED DISPLACEMENT & DEVELOPMENT

Governance Social

Environmental

Energy

Water Virtual Imports

Water Pollution Water In

security

Land D

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Political Accountability

Inflation

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apP

overty

Land Tenure Insecurity Gender Inequality

Food Insecurity

Food Import Dependence

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Figure2Earth Security Index 2016: Jordan country profile

TheEarthSecurityIndex2016forJordanidentifiescriticalresourcechallengesandconvergingpressuresacrosssocial,environmental,energyandgovernancedomains.

FormoreinformationontheEarthSecurityIndextool,pleasevisithttp://earthsecuritygroup.com

ThediagramusesofficialcountrydatatovisualiseJordan’sperformanceacrossthe24issues.Higherscoresrepresenthigherlevelsofpressure.

Jordan’s resource pressures

Fiscal SustainabilityJordan’sdebtiscloseto89%ofGDPmainlyduetoenergycosts29

Un-employmentJordan’syouthun-employmentis29%27

Urban Population PressureJordan’surbanpopulationisgrowingover3%peryear28

Gender Inequality17%ofwomeninJordanworkformallycomparedto70%ofmen25

Energy Import DependenceJordanimports97%ofitsenergysupply,mostlyoilandgas30

Skills GapAhighemigrationofJordanians(345,760in2011)26

Climate Infrastructure Risk Jordaniandamsareoperatingathalfcapacityduetodrought21

Virtual Water Imports Jordanishighlyrelianton‘virtualwater’embeddedinimportedcereals23

Food Import DependenceJordanimports96%ofthecerealsitconsumes24

Water InsecurityBy2060,Jordan’sfreshgroundwatersuppliescouldbecompletelydepleted22

10FORCED DISPLACEMENT & DEVELOPMENT

2.1 Water: The expansion of hydroponic agriculture

Jordan is depleting its scarce water resources. The influx of refugees has triggered over a 20% average increase in water demand. In the north, the increase in demand has reached up to 40%, with instances where water is being distributed as little as once every two weeks.31 Most of Jordan’s water comes from underground aquifers and the vast majority is used for agriculture. Water is being withdrawn twice as fast as it can replenish, relying on subsidised electricity to pump groundwater, with a consequent steep growth in electricity used for water production and supply.32

Priortothecrisis,theGovernment’sstrategyfocusedonincreasingwatersupplythroughlarge-scaleinfrastructure.Desalinationinvestments,suchasRedSea-DeadSeaconveyance,areintendedtoprovidemuchneededfreshwatersupplies,butfaceconsiderableenvironmentalandfinancialchallenges.Theyarestillyearsawayfromcompletion,raisingdoubtsthatsuchinvestmentscanprovidethewaterJordanneeds,fastenough.33

Asaresult,thefocusisnowshiftingtowardsthesustainableuseofremainingwaterresources.Millionsofcubicmetersofwaterarewastedthroughinefficientagriculturaltechniques.Muchofitisusedtoirrigatewater-intensivehighlandcrops,suchasoliveplantations,whichproducelittlecropvalueforlocalfarmersortheircommunities.34Increasingresidentialwateruseisreducingtheallocationforagriculture.Consequently,cultivatedlandinJordanhasfallenfrom49,000hain2010to36,000hain2012.Thishasresultedinincomelossesforsome57,000Jordaniansmall-scalefarmers.35

ThenumberofSyrianrefugeehouseholdslivinginJordaniancommunitieswhoareeitherfoodinsecureorvulnerabletofoodinsecurityincreasedfrom48%in2014to86%in2015.36Refugeeslivinginhostcommunitiesnowspend51%oftheirhouseholdbudgetonfood,whichconstitutesa20%increasesince2014.37Withlimitedbudgets,donorswillstruggletomaintainlevelsoffoodassistance.Alreadyin2015,theWorldFoodProgramme(WFP)wasforcedtocut229,000refugeesfromfoodvouchersandreducethevalueofremainingvouchersto$14perpersonpermonth.38

Withlesswateravailableforirrigation,foodinsecuritywillriseuptheagenda,andjobsinagriculture,asectorthatemploysmigrants,willbevulnerable.Bothwillworsentheprospectsforrefugeesandhostcommunities.Efficientirrigationtechnologieshaveproventheircapacitytosubstantiallyreducethewaterneededtogrowcrops.However,despitetheirpotential,thescalingofthesetechnologiesremainsconstrained.Thebarriersincludethelackofwillingnessoflargefarmstostartthisprocessandswitchtolesswater-intensivecrops,theslowdisseminationofthebenefitsthroughlimitedawareness-raisingcampaigns,alackofsuppliersprovidingone-stopshopstothetechnologies,andthelackoffinancingavailable.

Groundwater depletion is a critical issue. 40% of Jordan’s groundwater could be depleted by 2030 and, at current rates, Jordan’s supply of fresh water would be completely depleted by 2060.39 / 40

Case StudyKhalifa Fund for Enterprise Development

IntheUnitedArabEmirates,theKhalifaFundforEnterpriseDevelopmentisfunding130farmsusinghydroponictechnologyaspartofaninitiativetoreducewaterconsumptionandenhancefoodsecurity.Thefundalsoworksoncreatinganationalstandardforhydroponicfarmingtoguaranteethatthequalityoftheproductsisalignedwithinternationalstandards.41

11FORCED DISPLACEMENT & DEVELOPMENT

The international community can create a hydroponic enterprise programme, which fosters the awareness and willingness of Jordan’s main agricultural actors to improve water use efficiency; and further develops, diversifies and streamlines the technology offerings, incentivising access to finance for farmers and customers. As part of the programme, an enterprise development fund can support local banks to finance SMEs to expand Jordan’s hydroponic industry.

Withsavingsinwateruserangingbetween50%and80%,hydroponicfarming,whichusesmineralnutrientsolutionsinsteadofgrowinginthesoil,mustbewidelyadoptedacrossJordan.InZarqa,forexample,a300m2greenhousecanproduce29,000headsoflettuce(6harvestcycles)usingonly216m3ofwaterperyearthroughhydroponics,whichwouldrequire1,160m3ofwaterusingconventionalirrigationinthesoil.43Theapplicationsofhydroponicsinnovationsapplytoawiderangeofvegetables,leafycrops,herbs,andbarleyandcattlefood.ImprovingwaterefficiencywouldreducegroundwaterabstractionsparticularlyinthehighlandsandprotectJordan’spreciousanddeclininggroundwaterresources,whicharecurrentlyover-utilisedwithsubsidisedelectricityrates.Inurbanandruralareas,hydroponicfarmingcanbealsousedtoenablefamiliestogrowfoodandincreasetheirincome.

AgricultureisasignificantemploymentsectorforrefugeesandvulnerableJordanians.Innovationinagriculturehasthepotentialtocreateupto15,000jobsinJordan,accordingtoUSAID.44Refugeecampscouldalsobenefitandaddresstheprospectofinsufficientfoodassistance.InacamplikeAzraq,whichhaslittletonoopportunitiesforsustainablelivelihoods,anagriculturalprogrammebuiltaroundhydroponicfarmingcouldcreatejobs,improvefoodsecurityandestablishmarketlinkstosurroundingcommunities,withoutfurtherpressureonlocalgroundwatersources.

Thevaluechainassociatedwithefficientirrigation,fromsupplierstofarms,meansthatthisnascentsectorcanofferjobopportunitiesinawiderangeofskilllevels,withapositiveimpactonrefugees,womenandyouth.45However,agreateraccesstofinance,developmentofinfrastructure,andtrainingisneededacrossthevaluechain,fromfarmers,equipmentsuppliers,andpackingtomarketingbusinesses.TheprevailinglackoffinanceforSMEsinJordan(SMElendingremainsasmallproportionat6-12%oftotalbanklending)constrainsthedevelopmentofthehydroponicmarket.Therisk-takingcapacityoffinancialintermediariessuchaslocalbanksremainsacriticalbarriertothisdevelopment.46

RecommendationA hydroponic agriculture enterprise fund

USAID’sHydroponicGreenFarmingInitiativeinJordanhasdemonstratedtheeconomicsandviabilityofthesenewfarmingmodelstogetherwithlocalfarmingentrepreneurs.47TohelpconsolidateJordan’snascenthydroponicindustry,anenterprisedevelopmentprogrammeshouldhelptomainstreamtheawarenessandwillingnessofmainagricultureactorsandpolicy-makerstochangefarmingpractices.Partnershipswithmunicipalities,localfarmingassociations,andagriculturevaluechainpartnerscanbeusefulchannelstodisseminateawareness.ThesecandrawontheeffectivedemonstrationworkshopsthathavebeensuccessfullyorganisedbyECOConsult,theimplementingpartneroftheHydroponicGreenFarmingInitiative.TheinvolvementofJordan’sWANAInstitute’sgreeneconomydivisioncanhelptodevelopandmainstreamawarenessonthedriversofculturalchangewithdominantagriculturalactorsonwatersecurity.48

Inadditiontotheknowledgedisseminationandbehaviouralchangecomponent,theavailabilityoffinancingisacriticalbarriertoscalingthistechnology.AfundthatfacilitatesSMEfinancetosuppliersandcustomerswouldenableserviceproviderstosupportgrowthalongthehydroponicsvaluechain–fromfarmers,tothesuppliersofgreenhousesandnutrients,topackinghousesandcoldstoragefacilities.Theprogrammeshouldcoordinatethreekeyplayerstoencouragescale:

1 EnablingtheJordanianLoanGuaranteeCorporation,whichoffersSMEguarantees,tofocusonhydroponics.

2 WorkingwiththeJordanEnterpriseDevelopmentCorporation(JEDCO)andtheAgriculturalCreditCorporation,toaddressgapsinaccesstofinanceinthegovernorateswherethebusinessenvironmentisparticularlydifficult.

3 LiaisingwithmicrofinancelenderslikeFINCAJordan,targetingentrepreneursthatarenotbankableinatraditionalenterpriselendingmodel.

“Scaling hydroponic agriculture is the best shot at containing Jordan’s water crisis, and increasing agricultural productivity to create prosperity.” Raed Daoud Chief Executive, ECO Consult 42

12FORCED DISPLACEMENT & DEVELOPMENT

Jordan is one of the world’s most energy insecure countries. It imports 97% of its energy at a cost of nearly 20% of its GDP.49 Energy demand is expected to grow at least 50% over the next 20 years.50 Residential energy consumption almost doubled between 2011 and 2012. Much of this has been attributed to the influx of displaced people from Syria even though refugees are estimated to have 25% less energy per capita consumption than the general population.51

Thehighcostsofenergyimportsareaburdenonpublicfinances.Theelectricitysubsidyjumpedfrom$226.4millionin2010to$1.5billionin2011.52By2014,over80%ofJordan’sdebtwasusedtocoverthelossesoftheNationalElectricPowerCompany(NEPCO).ThegovernmenthassetoutanambitiousNationalEnergyStrategytoharnessthepotentialofthekingdom’ssolar,shaleoil,andnuclearresources.However,thelasttwoarehighlywater-intensiveandtheirpromotioncouldfurtheraccelerateJordan’simpendingwatercrisis.53

ThestrainonenergyresourcesisreducingthefinancialabilityofJordantocopewiththeinfluxofrefugees.In2015,theelectricitybilltotheUNHCRfortheZa’ataricampinJordanwas$8.7million,whichledtheagencytocutimprovisedconnectionsforrefugeehouseholdsandbusinesses.54Renewableenergyequipmentandservicesinrefugeecamps–fromcleancookstovestosolarlanterns–arebeingdonatedbyNGOsandsocialenterprises.However,theseprojectsoftenfailduetolackofsustainedfundingorbecauseofthelackofmaintenanceforequipment.

Withover300daysofsunshineintheyear,andoneofthehighestsolarincidenceratesintheworld,Jordan’srenewableenergyindustryhasoneoftheMiddleEast’shighestpotential.55

Jordanisonitswaytoachieveatotalsolarpowergenerationcapacityof12%in2020.56Large-scalesolarprojectsarethrivinginJordan,asfinancingfromcommercialbanksisencouragedbylegalandtaxframeworks.However,small-scalesolarPVisunderdeveloped,asbanksarenotwillingtolendduetosmallprojectsizes,longpaybackperiodsforthelocalmarketcontextandthelackofguarantees.

2.2 Energy: Financing solar energy entrepreneurship

Giventheprojectedenergydemand,encouragingthegrowthofwell-functioningmarketsforrenewableenergyisvitaltoensureJordan’slong-termenergysecurity.Small-scalesolarenergyhasthecapacitytoaddressbothJordan’senergydeficitaswellascreatejobsforrefugeesandJordaniansacrossthevaluechain.

Case StudyZa’atari Refugee Camp

Qatar-basedrenewableenergydeveloper,GreenGulf,Inc.partneredwiththeNorwegianRefugeeCounciltoinstallsolarpowersystemsattheZa’atarirefugeecampinJordan.Theprojecthastrainedyoungrefugeesinsolarenergyinstallation,inordertocreateacareerpathwaytoelectricalengineeringinthesector.58

“The centrality of energy costs to the public budget threatens to derail the development trajectory of the country unless urgent actions are taken.” Jordan Response Plan 57

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The international community can help to create a solar entrepreneurship programme, which builds momentum for the development of technical skills, enterprise development and financing of small-scale, decentralised solar energy enterprises and related jobs. New credit lines and seed funding for entrepreneurs that have enrolled in technical training programmes would enable them to develop small enterprises.

Withphotovoltaic(PV)technologycostsfallingby50%inthelast3years,theresidentialandcommercialsolarmarketispoisedtogrow.Jordanalreadyleadstheregioninutility-scalesolarinstallations.Theopportunityforgrowthinsmallandmedium-sizedsolarenergydependsonapurposefulbridgingofthegapinSMEfinanceandpromotingenterprises.60

Investmentsinrenewableenergygeneratetwiceasmanyjobsperdollarinvestedthanthoseinthehydrocarbonindustry.61Some30,000directjobscouldbecreatedinthesectorby2050.62Recentprojectsdemonstratethepositiveimpactofskills-trainingprogrammes,particularlythosetargetedatwomenandrefugees[seecase],onprovisionofenergyandeconomicdevelopmentinvulnerablecommunities.63

InnovativecompanieslikeMASE,whodeliveredtheaward-winning“RooftopSolarProject”to400low-incomehouseholds,andYellowDoorEnergy,whoispioneeringaleasingmodelforrooftopinstallations,havethecapacitytorapidlyscalethemarketforsolarenergy,buttheyneedsupporttogrow,alabourforcethatmeetsthemarket’sneeds,andcustomerswhohaveaccesstofinancing.64/65

Akeyconstraint,giventheupfrontcostsofcapitalforthesecompanies,isaccesstofinance.Roughly90%ofdomesticlendinggoestothetop50firmsinJordan,despitethefactthat98.6%ofJordan’sindustrialfirmsareclassifiedasSMEs.66ThecommonbarrierstoSMEfinance–suchasshortloantenorsandcollateralrequirements–arecompoundedbybanks’insufficienttechnicalexpertiseintherenewableenergysector.

RecommendationA solar entrepreneurship fund

Atargetedprogramme,featuringasolarentrepreneurshipfund,canhelpbridgethegapinSMEfinancetosolarenergycompaniesandtocustomers,accelerateimplementationofsolarprojects,andfocusskills-buildingprogrammesforyoungentrepreneurstosetupsmallbusinesses.

AfundwouldleverageexistingeffortsbydonorstostimulatetheJordanianbankingsector,suchastheFrenchDevelopmentAgencycreditlinetoCairoAmmanBankandCapitalBankofJordan,67andgovernment-backedfinanceinitiativesliketheJordanRenewableEnergyandEnergyEfficiencyFund,tofacilitateSMEs’accesstoriskcapitalandbuildthecapacityoflocalbankstodevelopnewfinancialproducts.

NationalcreditcorporationsingovernorateshaveaprioritytofinancelocalSMEsandshouldbeinvolvedinthisfocusedeffort.AnewgovernmentprogrammeworthJD25million($35.2million)bytheDevelopmentandEmploymentFundforsoftloanstoyoungpeopletoestablishproductivebusinesses,canbenefitfromatargetedfocusedonsolarenergy.68Aninitialstudyshouldbecommissionedtoevaluatethesmallcompaniesthatareprovidingsolarpowerequipmenttohousesandbusinessinordertounderstandthespecificchallengestheyfaceinestablishingandsustainingtheirbusinesses.

Anentrepreneurshipprogrammeshouldstrivetoenableskillsbuildingprogrammesamonglocalentrepreneurs.Threeinitiativescanbebroughttogethertoaligntheirsupportforyoungentrepreneursinbusinessskills-buildingandmentoringtoset-up,manageandfacilitateseedinvestmenttosmallsolarenergybusinesses:Theseare:TheEDAMAinitiative,agovernmentpartnershipwiththeprivatesectortodevelopenergyandwatertechnologies;Jordan’sYoungEntrepreneursAssociationandtheentrepreneurshipincubatorOasis500.69

“Solar energy is capable of transforming lives and driving entrepreneurialism. From construction to maintenance, it offers a range of new opportunities to develop skills and employment.” Raed Byakrat First Solar 59

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2.3 Housing: A national strategy for green affordable housing

The arrival of more than 657,000 Syrian refugees since 201170 has placed considerable stress on Jordan, particularly its northern municipalities.71 The northern governorates of Mafraq, Irbid, and Zarqa have seen the greatest proportion of Syrian arrivals relative to their pre-crisis populations.72

Housingisthemostcommonlycitedissuelinkedtosocialtensionswithinhostcommunities.Thelocalhousingmarkethasbeenunabletocopewiththenumbersofpeople.In2015,therewasashortfallofatleast48,000housingunits.73Thishasdrivenuprentlevels.Insomeareas,rentalpricesdoubledandeventripledbetween2012and2013.74Rentisthesinglehighestexpenditureforthemajorityofrefugeeslivingoutsidecamps,representingbetween50%–90%oftheirmonthlyhouseholdincome.Oneintenfamiliesreportthattheydonotknowwherethemoneyfortheirnextrentwillcomefrom.75

AccesstoaffordablehousingisoneofthecriticalenablersoflivelihoodsforbothJordaniansandSyrians,providingnotjustshelterbutalsoanaddress,whichpeopleneedinordertoworkandaccessservices.However,whileshelterisalsoakeycomponentoftheJordanResponsePlatformandthe3RP,ithasbeenoneofthemostunder-fundeddimensionsoftheresponse.76Despitedonoractivitiestoprovideemergencyshelterandcash-for-rentassistance,thereremainsasignificantneedtoupgradesubstandardhousing,andbuildnewaffordablehousingunits.77

However,newstrategiesandpartnershipstobuildaffordablehousesmusttakeaccountofJordan’snaturalresourcepressures.TheresidentialsectoraccountsforaquarterofJordan’stotalenergyuse,equaltothatoftheindustrialsector.78Thegrowingdemandforhousingisalsoincreasingpressuresonwaterandland.Thehousingsectorrequiresanacceleratedresponse,butonethatprovidesasustainableapproachtonewbuildingstoensurethataffordablehousing,andthejobsinconstructionassociatedwiththem,canbedrivenbya‘green’buildingsector.79

Case StudyJordan Affordable Housing Programme

TheJordanAffordableHousingProgrammeisapartnershipbetweentheMinistryofPublicWorksandHousingandUN-HabitatfundedbytheSwissGovernment.Itseekstoenableaffordable,sustainablehousingunitsforlowincomeJordaniansandavailableforrenttorefugeesataffordableprices.Thedemonstrationunits,unveiledinJune2016,aretobefurnishedbyIKEA.Thedemonstrationunitsarenowopenforthepublictoprovidefeedbackandexpressinterestinfuturepilotprojects.80

Rapid population growth in Jordan’s cities has strained basic services and infrastructure. A shortage of housing supply and skyrocketing rental prices, alongside with competition for jobs, are primary drivers of tension between displaced persons and host communities.

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The international community can help Jordan to make sustainable and affordable housing the central part of a revised national housing strategy. This should provide a framework for greening the construction sector, which employs the most refugees. A priority is to build the capacity of Jordanian policy-makers to achieve a sustainable housing policy.TheacutedemographicpressuresandneedforhousinginJordan,coupledwithcriticalsustainabilitychallenges,requiredefinitionofasustainablegrowthtrajectoryforcities.Greenbuildings–whichdrawonsustainablematerialsandtechnology,useonaverageathirdlessenergy,upto20%lesswater,andcangenerateupto60%lesswaste.82

ThenewAbdaliMall,thefirstlarge-scalecommercialcomplexinJordan,hasanintricatesystemofnaturalheatingandcooling,waterrecyclingandsolarpanels,andfeatureslocalmaterials.83Jordan’sfirstlowenergyhouse,theAqabaResidence,openedin2010demonstratingthecosteffectivenessofdesignandconstruction.84UNHCRandIKEA,theglobalhomefurnishingcompany,organisedadesigncompetitionforinnovationsthatcanbenefitbothrefugeesandlocalcommunities,includingshelter.Fivefinalistsfromover630entrieswilldevelopworkingprototypes.85

Jordan’sconstructionsectorcontributed$3billiontoGDPin2014.70%ofjobsaretakenbylow-skilledforeignworkers,whichmakesthissectorparticularlyrelevanttoopportunitiesavailabletorefugees.86AccordingtoRubaAl-Zu’bi,CEOofEDAMA,Jordan’ssustainabledevelopmentpartnership,Jordanmustfocusmoreongreenbuildingsatthegrassrootslevel:“Whatwewantistochangethewholevaluechain…YouactuallywantgreenmaterialcompaniestoopenupinJordantointroduceanewsectorwhichwillcreatejobs.”87

However,thelackofknowledgeaboutsustainabledesignandconstructionandtheperceivedhighcostsareobstaclestoscale.Asurveyofengineeringfirmsrevealedthatlessthanhalfhadprofessionaltrainingingreenapplications.88Similarly,thereisashortageofcontractors,technicaltrainingcapacity,andsupplyofgreenbuildingmaterials.TheHousingandUrbanDevelopmentCorporationisresponsibleforexecutingthegovernment’spolicyandvision.Anationalstrategyongreenandaffordablebuildingswouldexpandopportunitiesacrosstheconstructionvaluechain,addingthepotentialtocreatenewjobsforJordaniansaswellasforforeignworkers.89

RecommendationA national strategy for green and affordable housing

Jordan’sNationalHousingStrategy,lastratifiedin1989,mustberevisedtofocuscentrallyongreenandaffordablebuildingsasawaytoencouragethesustainablegrowthofitstownsandcities.90TheinternationalcommunitycanpartnerwithinstitutionssuchastheJordanGreenBusinessCouncil(JGBC)toencouragethedevelopmentofpolicyproposals.In2012,JGBCconductedatrainingprogrammeonsolarwaterheatersandinsulationandtrained1,500engineers,contractorsandbuildingowners,whichreflectedtheinterestofpolicy-makersandprivatecompanies.91

AkeypriorityistobuildthecapacityoftheHousingandUrbanDevelopmentCorporationtoupgradetheNationalHousingStrategywithafocusongreenbuildings;tofacilitateprivatesectorpartnershipswithcompaniesinthegreenconstructionvaluechainaswellasotherinternationalcompanieswithexpertiseinsustainablecities,suchasArup,theglobalengineeringfirm.

Asustainablehousingpolicyshouldfocusonincentivisingawholenewgenerationofvocationalandprofessionaltrainingingreentechnology,eco-design,andeco-construction,acrossdemographicgroups,includingJordanianyouthandrefugees.TheworkofJordan’sCenterfortheStudyoftheBuiltEnvironment(CSBE)andtheinterestininnovationofglobalcompaniessuchasIKEAcanbefurtherharnessedtosupportsuchcompetitions.

Aspartofsuchanoverarchingprogramme,financingcanbeprovidedtotheJordanAffordableHousingProgrammeandarangeoflocalcommercialbankstodevelopthenecessarysustainablefinanceinnovationstoencouragegreencreditacrossthevaluechainfromdeveloperstodwellers,cateringtodifferentlevelsofcustomers.

“Investing in green buildings can deliver a win-win of affordable housing, sustainable energy and greener jobs in the informal sector. It is the way to turn the shortfall of housing into a long-term opportunity.” Mohammad Asfour, former Chairman, Jordan Green Building Council 81

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Peak demographics and social cohesion

TheSyrianrefugeepopulationinJordanisequivalenttoroughly10%ofthetotalpopulationofJordanpriortotheSyrianconflict.93Ofthemorethan657,000SyrianrefugeesregisteredinJordansince2011,only20%resideinitstwoprimaryrefugeecamps,Za’atariandAzraq.80%ofSyrianrefugeesinJordanliveintownsandcitiesinJordan’snorthernbordergovernorates,andinthelightofgreaterpressuresonbasicservices,thegoodwillofhostcommunitiesiswaning.94Almost70%ofJordaniansareundertheageof29andyouthunemploymentisacriticalchallenge:atprojectedgrowthrates,theJordanianeconomywillonlycreatehalfofthejobsthatareneeded.95/96

AstheSyrianconflictentersitssixthyear,theeffectofthecrisisontheJordanianlabourmarketisincreasinglyfeltonwagelevelsandworkingconditions.97TheimpactofrefugeesonJordan’sjobopportunitiesisoneofthemostcontroversialissuesunderminingsocialcohesionandstability.AsurveyofJordanianworkersbytheInternationalLaborOrganizationin201598foundthat:

—95%believethatSyriansweretakingjobsfromJordanians.

—93%believethatSyriansweresuppressingJordanianwages.

—85%believethatSyriansshouldnotbeallowedtoenterthecountryfreely.

—65%believethatallSyriansshouldlivewithinrefugeecamps.

TheperceptionsaredifficulttomeasuregiventhatnearlyhalfthelabourmarketinJordanisalreadyintheinformalsector.99Inthelastfewyears,thegrowingtensionandoccasionalscufflesbetweenhostcommunitiesandrefugeesinbordercitiessuchasMafraqhavebeenastarkreminderthatsocialcohesionisthegluethatsustainspoliticalstability.100

Competition for jobs

Therearesome1millionmigrantworkersinJordanbutjustover324,000haveofficialworkpermits.101MostcomefromEgypt(68%),followedbySriLanka(9%),Indonesia(8%)andotherAsiancountries(15%).102Jordan’sgarmentindustryisalmostentirelydependentonmigrantworkers.Todaythesectoraccountsfor20%ofJordan’sGDPandemploys55,000people,75%ofwhomareforeignworkersfromBangladesh,India,SriLanka,MyanmarandMadagascar.103

2.4 The need for entrepreneurship

MigrationisnotnewtotheKingdomofJordan.ItslabourmarkethasbeenshapedoverthepastdecadesbyaninfluxofrefugeesfrommajorregionalconflictssuchasPalestineandIraq.104Today,itisestimatedthat160,000SyriansworkinginJordanhavetakenjobsinsectorsthatJordanianstendtoavoid,displacingnotJordaniansbutratherotherlabourmigrantsinlow-wagejobsinagriculture,manufacturing,constructionandservicesliketourism.105OfthedisplacedSyrianslivingoutsidethecamps,90%ofthoseworkingdonothaveworkpermits.106

Thiscompetitionforinformal,low-skilledlabourbetweenrefugeesandeconomicmigrantshasblurredthedistinctionbetweenthesetwotypesofmigration.Itrequiresnewapproachesthatconsiderbothonequalfootingwhenitcomestojobs.107

DespitelabouragreementswithEgypt,SriLanka,Bangladeshandothers,since2016,JordanhasgivenSyriannationalspriorityoverothermigrantworkerstoobtainjobsinconstruction,hospitalityandagriculturesectors.108TradeincentivesfromtheinternationalcommunitysuchaswiththeEuropeanUnion,havefocusedonthejobmarket,seekingtosupportJordantoreachitstargetofbringing200,000Syrianstoformalwork.109ThiscouldimplyreplacingsomeofJordan’sforeignworkers,mostlyfromEgyptandAsia.110

Many of the 50,000 young people entering the labor market annually will not find decent work.92

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TheGovernmentofJordanisfacilitatingthetransitiontolegalemploymenttohelprefugeesbecomemoreself-reliant.Thiscouldseeupto50,000SyriansabletoworklegallyinJordanintheshortterm,withthousandsmoreinthecomingyears.111GovernmentinitiativesincludetheintroductionofagraceperiodandwaivedfeestoobtainworkpermitsforSyriansandregularisetheiremployment.SinceMarch2016,SyrianscanusetheiridentitycardsissuedbytheMinistryofInteriortoobtainworkpermits,whilethoseregisteredwithUNHCRcanusetheirservicecards.112Furthermeasuresincludedelinkingworkpermitapplicationsfromanemployerinagriculturebyleveragingaroleforcooperatives,aswellasinconstruction;increasingthenumberofpermissionstoleaverefugeecampstogotowork;andsocialsecurityreformsforrefugeeworkers.113

Leveraging the momentum for green jobs

Refugeespredominantlyliveinurbanandperi-urbanareas,manyininformalsettlements.114Thestrainonmunicipalservicesandinfrastructureisincreasinglyevident,aspeoplefindmorerecurrentwaterandelectricityshortages,over-enrolledschools,insufficientgarbagecollection,overwhelmedhealthcentres,andrisingfoodandfuelprices.Theseissueshavethepotentialtoamplifytheprospectsofsocialconflict.115Jordanisoneoftheworld’smostwater-poorcountries,withrapidlydecliningwateravailabilitypercapita.116Itcurrentlyreliesentirelyonimportedoilandgastomeetitsgrowingenergydemand.117Lessthan5%ofthetotallandareainthecountryisconsideredarable,andthislandisunderpressurefromclimatechangeandrapidurbansprawl.118

TheInternationalLabourOrganization’s(ILO)projectshaveraisedawarenessoftheneedfornewjobopportunitiestocontributetoagreenereconomy.AseriesofILOpilotprojectsseektocreatejobopportunitiesthroughskillstraininginrenewableenergyandwaterefficiency,andconnectingjobseekersdirectlywithemployers.119Theseprojectsperfectlyillustratethekindofjoined-upthinkingthatisneeded.

JordanhasmadeprogresstowardsdevelopingaGreenEconomyStrategy.120TheEDAMAInitiativeisthegovernment’spartnershipwiththeprivatesectorthatseekstopromoteinvestmentinJordan’senergy,water,andenvironmentalsectors.121Jordanisalreadydemonstratingthepotentialtobecomeahubforrenewableenergyandclean-techproduction,salesandresearchintheregion.TheMa’anDevelopmentArea(MDA),forexample,wassetupinthesouthofJordantofosterrenewableindustries.TheMDAincludesa750,000squaremeterindustrialparkandlinkswithKingHusseinBinTalalUniversitytoenhanceknowledgeandcapabilityinthefieldsofmanufacturing,science,engineeringandrenewableenergy.122

Inclusive industrial development

OneproposalforformalisingemploymentandprovidingrefugeeswithopportunitiesistheuseofSpecialEconomicZones(SEZs)–industrialparksbestowedwithlowexporttariffstoEurope.SEZshaveplayedamajorroleinthepastinattractingforeigninvestmenttoamanufacturingsector.123EmploymentforbothSyriansandJordanianswouldbeguaranteedthroughaquotasystem(yettobedetermined).InvestorswouldenjoytaxbreaksaswellasavailabilityofSyrianworkers,manyofwhomhavepreviousmanufacturingexperience.

Beforetheybecamerefugees,SyrianswholiveoutsidecampsinAmman,IrbidandMafraq,mainlyworkedinindustriesofconstruction(23%),wholesaleandretailsale(23%),manufacturing(16%),transportationandstorage(10%),andagriculture,forestryandfishing(9%).124

AUNHCR/ILOpilotprojectwaslaunchedinApril2016toprovide2,000SyrianswithemploymentinJordan’sapparelindustryandisprogressingslowly.125However,ifsuccessful,SEZswouldallowrefugeestotransitionfromdependencyonhumanitarianaidtowardsself-reliance.126

CriticsofthemodelpointoutthatexistingSEZsinJordanthathavecontributedtoitsmanufacturingboom,havethrivedonthebackofpoorworkingconditions,extremelylowwagesanddifferentformsofhumanrightsabuses.127TheselectionofindustriesandsectorstobeincentivisedaspartofnewSEZplansmustbeconsideredcarefully,bothfortheirresourceintensity(e.g.wateruse)aswellastheenforcementofprinciplesofdecentwork,toensurethechoicespromoteJordan’ssustainablegrowth.

ThisbriefisintendedtoinformthestrategicsupportforinclusiveindustrysectorsinJordan,inthefaceofpressuresfromforceddisplacement.However,itshouldalsobeseenasaguidetoinformfuturestrategicindustrychoicesthatwillbemadeaspartofSEZs’proposals.

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3.0 A critical factor to achieve the 2030 Agenda Forced displacement crises are becoming lengthier, and fewer crises are being resolved in their first few years. The prospect of more protracted displacements is challenging traditional humanitarian models and bringing the longer-term needs of affected populations, both displaced persons and host communities, into a sharper focus. This has significant implications for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

19FORCED DISPLACEMENT & DEVELOPMENT

3.1 Five reasons why forced displacement will transform the 2030 Agenda

1Forced displacement on the rise

Bytheendof2015,over65millionpeoplewereforciblydisplacedduetoarmedconflicts,persecution,generalisedviolence,orhumanrightsviolations.Thatisoneinevery113peopleontheplanet.Thisfiguregrewbymorethan50%since2011.Throughout2015,12millionpeoplewereforciblydisplaced,anaverageof24peopleeveryminute.128

Regionbyregion,forceddisplacementisontherise.Inthepastfiveyears,15neworre-ignitedconflictshaveeruptedacrossAfrica,Asia,EuropeandtheMiddleEast.129Ofthetotaldisplacementnumberstoday,themajorityareinternallydisplacedpeoplewithinthebordersoftheircountries(40.8million),thesecondlargestgroupsarerefugees(21.3million),withasmallerproportionofasylumseekers(3.2million).130Afurther19.2millionpeople,spreadacross113countries,wereforcedtofleetheirhomesasaresultofdisastersandextremeweathereventsin2015alone–afactorthatillustratesthegrowingimportanceofclimatechangetotheforceddisplacementagenda.Overthepasteightyears,thetotalnumberofdisaster-relateddisplacementsamountedto203.4millionoranaverageof25.4millionannually.131

2The crises are becoming lengthier

Almosttwo-thirdsofallrefugeeshavebeendisplacedforatleastthreeyears,andhalfofallcurrentrefugeeshavebeendisplacedforovertenyears.132Inaddition,decades-oldinstabilityandconflictincountrieslikeAfghanistan,Iraq,Somaliaandelsewheremeansthatmillionsofpeopleremainonthemoveor–asisincreasinglycommon–strandedforyearsontheedgeofsocietyaslong-termrefugeesorinternallydisplacedpersons(IDPs).133

Morethanhalfofalldisplacedpeoplecomefromthreecountriesexperiencinglong,drawn-outconflictsandinternalviolence:Syria(4.9million),Afghanistan(2.7million)andSomalia(1.1million).

Inturn,mostinternallydisplacedpeoplewereinColombia(6.9million),Syria(6.6million)andIraq(4.4million).Colombiaisedgingtowardsaresolutionoftheconflict,butotherwiseveryfewofthesecriseshavebeenresolvedandgeneratecontinueddisplacement.In2015,onlysome200,000refugeeswereabletoreturntotheirhomecountries.134

3A small number of developing countries carry most of the responsibility and burden

Sevencountries–Syria,Iran,Pakistan,Lebanon,Turkey,PalestineandJordan–arehostingmorethan50%ofallrefugeesworldwide.135Developingcountrieshostedover86%oftheworld’srefugeesunderUNHCRmandate.Leastdevelopedcountrieshosted26%.Onthecountrylevel,Turkeyistheworld’sbiggesthostwith2.54millionrefugeesin2015.Inrelationtoitsnationalpopulation,Lebanonhoststhelargestnumberofrefugees,with183per1000inhabitants,followedbyJordanandNauru.Ethiopiapaysmostforrefugeesinrelationtothesizeofitseconomy.136

Forciblydisplacedpeoplefacedangerousconditionsandabusealongtheirjourneysanduncertaintyuponarrival.Therisingnumberofchildren,manyunaccompanied,intheselargemovementsisofparticularconcern–roughlyhalfofallregisteredrefugeesgloballyarechildrenandyouth.Thisisthehighestfigureforchildrefugeesinmorethanadecade.137

4Seeing opportunities for sustainable solutions

Citiesarethetopdestinationfortheforciblydisplaced.60%oftheworld’srefugeesand80%ofinternally-displacedpeoplesettleincitiesinsearchofgreateropportunities.138InJordan,forexample,morethan80%ofSyrianrefugeesresideoutsideofrefugeecampsinurbanareas.139Ascitiesovertakerefugeecamps,refugeesrelylessonaidagenciesandmoreonministries,municipalauthorities,theprivatesector,civilsocietyandcommunitygroups.

ThelatestguidancefromUNHCRencourageslocalcommunitiestohostrefugeesasamoredurablesolutionthancamps.140Refugeesattendlocalschools,seekmedicalcareinpublicclinicsandhospitals,renthousingfromthehousingmarket,benefitfromexistingwaterandsanitationsystems,andfindjobswithlocalbusinesses.Whererefugeenumbersarelarge,thepressureonlocalresources,basicservicesandinfrastructureisbeingacutelyfelt.141Governmentsinhostcountriesareincreasinglyfacingthetensionofattendingtothevulnerabilitiesofdisplacedpopulationswhilemaintainingsocialcohesion.142

5A critical factor to achieve the 2030 Agenda

Forceddisplacementcarrieshugeimplicationsforthe2030AgendaforSustainableDevelopment.143Achievingitsgoalswouldhelpreducetherootcausesofdisplacement,suchasconflicts,fragility,humanrightsviolations,orclimatechange.However,statesthataredisproportionallyaffectedbyforceddisplacementwillseetheircapacitytoachievethesegoalsseriouslydiminishedwithoutcomprehensivesupportbytheinternationalcommunity.Migrants,refugees,displacedpersons,orpersonsaffectedbyconflictandoccupation,mustbeconsideredcentrallyinthesustainabledevelopmentagenda.144

Migrationcanalsobeapositiveforceforsustainabledevelopment.Forexample,researchontheeconomiclifeofrefugeesinUgandabytheHumanitarianInnovationProjecthasdebunkedtheconventionalconceptionofrefugeesasbeinguniformlyaburdentohostcountries.Understandingthewaysinwhichrefugeecommunitiescontributepositivelytoanationaleconomyisnecessaryinordertoturncurrenthumanitarianchallengesintosustainableopportunities.145

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Interviews

AhmadAwad,PhenixCenter;Ala’aAbdulla,JordanGreenBusinessCouncil;AlderBartlett,USAID;AlexanderAleinikoff,ColumbiaUniversity;AnikaSandlund,UNHCR;AyaMaraqa,SwissAgencyforDevelopmentandCooperation;CarolinevandenBerg,WorldBank;CatherineOsborn,NorwegianRefugeeCouncil;EllenHamilton,WorldBank;GregoryManiatis,UNGlobalForumforMigraiton&Development;HaneenAbuZaid,PhiladelphiaSolar;ImanBkayrat,HumanitarianMonitoringGroup;ImanZaki,UN-HabitatJordan;IssamGabara,Netafim;JeremyCrane,AdeniumCapital;JoelBell;JohnBingham,InternationalCatholicMigrationUniversity;KishanKhoday,UNDP;LindaAl-Kalash,Tamkeen;MarcoStella,UNDP;MarkusvonHaniel,AlcazarEnergy;MartaVallejo,UNDP;MattHuber,InternationalOrganizationonMigration;MichaelDoyle,ColumbiaUniversity;MichaelNewson,InternationalOrganizationonMigration;MohammadAsfour,WorldGreenBuildingCouncil;MyriamAbasa,WorldBank;NasredinHagElamin,FAO;NatyBarak,Netafim;NicholasGrisewood,InternationalLabourOrganization;OwenShumba,UNDP;PatriceMoix,SwissAgencyforDevelopmentandCooperation;PascalRaess,SwissAgencyforDevelopmentandCooperation;PaulStromber,UNHCR;PhilipFishman,InternationalLabourOrganization;PietroMona,SwissAgencyforDevelopmentandCooperation;RaedBkayrat,FirstSolar;RaedDaoud,ECOConsult,SarahCliffe,NewYorkUniversity;ScottChristiansen,USAID;SusanRazzaz,WorldBank;TareqKhalifeh,MASEEnergy;VictorMints,IFC;XavierDeVictor,WorldBank;YvonneDiallo-Sahli,SwissAgencyforDevelopmentandCooperation.

Photography

Cover©UNHCR/BrianSokol/Flickr

Page3©JoelCarillet/iStock

Page8©LorraineBoogich/iStock

Page18©JanossyGergely/Shutterstock

4.0 Information

Partner

ThisbriefhasbeenfundedanddevelopedincooperationwiththeSwissAgencyforDevelopmentandCooperation.

ESG Team

TheteamatEarthSecurityGroupthatdevelopedthisproject:AlejandroLitovsky(projectdirector);JilleneConnorsBelopolsky(projectmanager);RichardBurrett(senioradvisor);CarolineHambloch,OrlaithDelargyandSimonFellermeyer(analysts),RupertBassett(designer)andPabloOrvananos(operations).

Earth Security GroupBusinessadvisorsforsustainablegrowthearthsecuritygroup.cominfo@earthsecuritygroup.com

Copyright©EarthSecurityGroup2016ThemarksEarthSecurityGroupandlogotype,theEarthSecurityIndex,theradialdiagramandthepresentationoftheinformationinthisdocumentarethepropertyofEarthSecurityLtd.andcannotbereproducedwithoutpriorwrittenconsent.

DisclaimerTheviewsandopinionsexpressedintheEarthSecurityIndex2016reportreflectonlytheviewsandopinionsoftheEarthSecurityGroup.

NoteAllcurrency$referstoUSdollarsunlessotherwisestated.

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39 ‘Groundwater-leveltrendsandforecasts,andsalinitytrends.’Goodeetal,USGS,2013&‘JordanWaterSector,FactsandFigures2013’,MinistryofWaterandIrrigation,January2015.

40 ‘TappedOut:WaterScarcityandRefugeePressuresinJordan’,MercyCorps,2014.

41 ‘KhalifaFundapprovesfundingfor130farmsusingHydroponicssystem’,AMEinfo.com;19January2015.

42 InterviewwithEarthSecurityGroup,August2016

43 ‘HydroponicGreenFarmingInitiativeProgressReport:April–June2015’,USAID,2015.

44 ‘2030WaterResourcesGroupReport’,USAIDJordan,2013.

45 ‘WorkforceDevelopment’,HydroponicGreenFarmingInitiative,USAID,2015.

46 ‘Jordan:NeighbourhoodSMEfinancing’,EuropeanInvestmentBank,February2016.

47 ‘HydroponicGreenFarmingInitiativeProgressReport:April-June2015’,USAID,2015.

48 http://wanainstitute.org/en/focus_area/green-economy

49 ‘EnergySituationinJordan’,MinistryofPlanning&InternationalCooperation(MOPIC),July2013.

50 ‘TheNationalClimateChangePolicyoftheHashemiteKingdomofJordan2013-2020’,MinistryoftheEnvironmentofJordan,2013.

51 ‘NeedsAssessmentReviewoftheimpactoftheSyriancrisisonJordan’,MinistryofPlanningandInternationalCooperationofJordan(MOPIC),November2013.

52 ‘Impactofenergycrisismostevidentinrisingpublicdebt—report’,TheJordanTimes,12July2015.

53 ‘UpdatedMasterStrategyofEnergySectorinJordanforthePeriod2007-2020’,‘MinistryofEnergy&MineralResourcesofJordan,2007.

54 ‘Heat,LightandPowerforRefugeesSavingLives,ReducingCosts’,Lahn,G.andGrafham,O.,ChathamHouse,November2015.

55 ‘Developingrenewableenergyprojects:AguidetoachievingsuccessintheMiddleEast’,EvershedsandPWC,January2016.

56 ‘MENASolarOutlook2016’,MESIA,2016.57 MOPIC,2013.Seenote51.58 ‘QatarienergyconsultancyGreenGulf

bringssolartechnologyandtrainingtoSyrianrefugeesinJordan’,GreenGulfInc.,22November2015.

59 InterviewwithEarthSecurityGroup.

5.0 Notes

1 ‘GlobalTrends:Forceddisplacementin2014’,UNHCR,June2015.

2 ForuptodateUNHCRfiguresonSyriaRegionalRefugeeResponse:http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php

3 ‘GlobalTrends:Forceddisplacementin2015’,UNHCR,June2016.

4 UNHCR,2016.Seenote3.5 ‘3RPRegionalRefugeeandResilience

Plan2015-2016inresponsetotheSyriaCrisis’,UNHCR&UNDP,2015.

6 ‘TheILOResponsetotheSyrianRefugeeCrisis’,ILO,2016.

7 ‘Jordan’sRefugeeCrisis’,Francis,A.,CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,2015.

8 ‘OvertheHorizon:ANewLevant’,WorldBank,2014.

9 ‘TheWelfareofSyrianRefugees:EvidencefromJordanandLebanon’,Vermeetal,WorldBank,2016.

10 ‘UrbanRefugees’,UNHCR,2016.http://www.unhcr.org/uk/urban-refugees.html(accessed3June2016).

11 ‘Protracteddisplacement:uncertainpathstoself-relianceinexile’,Crawfordetal,OverseasDevelopmentInstitute,2015.

12 ‘AddressingProtractedDisplacement:AFrameworkforDevelopment-HumanitarianCooperation’,OCHA;UNDP;UNHCR;UNICEF;WFP;WorldBank,2015.

13 ‘3RPRegionalRefugeeandResiliencePlan2015-2016inresponsetotheSyriaCrisis’,UNHCR&UNDP,2015.

14 Vermeetal,2016.Seenote9.15 ‘ImpactofSyrianRefugeesonthe

JordanianLabourMarket,ILO&Fafo,2015.

16 ‘TheRegionalRefugeeandResiliencePlan(3RP)inresponsetotheSyriaCrisis:Mid-YearReport.’UNHCR&UNDP,June2016.

17 MENAFinancingInitiative2016.https://www.menafinancing.org(accessed3July2016).

18 ‘BiometricCashAssistance’,UNHCRInnovation,2016.http://innovation.unhcr.org/labs_post/cash-assistance(accessed16July2016).

19 UNHCR&UNDP2016.SeeNote16.

60 ‘OntheHorizon:Up-scalingSolarPVforSelf-ConsumptionintheJordanianMarket’,TheRegionalCenterforRenewableEnergyandEnergyEfficiency(RCREEE),2014.

61 ‘RenewableEnergyinJordan’,ClimateParliament,2013.

62 Jordan’sEnergyFuture’,Greenpeace,2013.

63 ‘RafeaUmGomar:ThefirstfemalesolarengineerinJordan’,UNWomen,1October2014.

64 JordanianMASEwinsMiddleEastSolarIndustryAssociationAwardforRooftopSolarProject’,MASE,13December2015.

65 YellowDoorEnergy,2016.http://yellowdoorenergy.com(accessed29June2016).

66 ‘StudyofmechanismstoincentivisethefinancialsectortoscaleupfinancingofgreeninvestmentinJordan’,AdamSmithInternational,May2013.

67 ‘Frenchinitiativetofacilitateloansforgreenenergyprojects’,Ghazal,M.,TheJordanTimes,25June2014.

68 ‘MinisterurgesBalqayouthstobenefitfromSMEloans’,TheJordanTimes,27July2016

69 http://www.edama.johttp://www.yeajordan.com/jordan-vision-2020/andhttp://www.oasis500.com/application-form

70 ThefigureofSyrianrefugeesinJordanis657,203(updated1August2016)‘SyriaRegionalRefugeeResponse-Inter-agencyInformationSharingPortal’,UNHCR,1August2016.

71 JordanResponsePlanfortheSyriaCrisis2016-2018’,MinistryofPlanningandInternationalCooperationofJordan(MOPIC),2016.

72 ‘SyrianRefugeesinJordanConfrontingDifficultTruths’,Carrion,D.,ChathamHouse,September2015.

73 ‘AccesstoHousingandTensionsinJordanianCommunitiesHostingSyrianRefugees:ThematicAssessmentReport’,REACHInitiative,June2014.

74 ‘IntegratedAssessmentofSyrianRefugeesinHostCommunities:EmergencyFoodSecurityandLivelihoods;Water,SanitationandHygiene;Protection’,OXFAM,March2013.

75 ‘HouseholdAssessmentDatabase,with4,964casesrepresentingcloseto42,000refugeesfromSyria’,NorwegianRefugeeCouncil,2014.

76 ‘JordanRefugeeResponseInter-SectorWorkingGroup’,UNDP,March2016.

77 MOPIC2016,seenote71.78 ‘Domesticenergyconsumptionpatterns

inurbanBhutan’,LhendupT.etal.,EnergyforSustainableDevelopment14,2010.

79 MOPIC,2016.Seenote71.80 ‘JordanAffordableHousingProgramme’,

UN-Habitat,2015.81 InterviewwithEarthSecurityGroup82 ‘Jordan’sGreenestBuildings.’Hosking,

J.,VentureMagazine,19October2015.83 ‘Jordan’snewestmalldebutslarge-

scalegreentechnology’,Quran,L.,AssociatedPress,7July2016.

84 ‘AREE–AqabaResidenceEnergyEfficiency’,Khasawneh,J.,TheCenterfortheStudyoftheBuiltEnvironment,October2011.

85 ‘WhatDesignCanDo,’2016.http://www.whatdesigncando.com(accessed1July2016).

86 ‘Governmentpreparing10-yearplanforconstructionsectorgrowth’,TheJordanTimes,26October2015.

87 Quran,L.,2016.SeeNote83.88 ‘GreenBuildingDevelopmentinJordan’,

RoyalScientificSocietyofJordanandtheFriedrich-Ebert-StiftungAmmanOffice,2013.

89 ‘SkillsandOccupationalNeedsinGreenBuilding’,ILO,2011.

90 ‘ShelterWorkingGroupMeeting:SyrianRefugeeResponseinJordan’,UNHCR,13March2014.

91 ‘WeSmart’,JordanGreenBuildingCouncil,2016.http://jordangbc.org/blog/project/we-smart(accessed5July2016).

92 ‘Jordan’sParadoxofGrowthwithoutEmployment:AMicrocosmoftheMiddleEast?’,TaghdisiRad,S.,SchoolofOrientalandAsianStudies,UniversityofLondon,August2011.

93 ‘ILO&Fafo,2015.Seenote15.94 ‘EvaluatingtheeffectoftheSyrian

refugeecrisisonstabilityandresilienceinJordanianhostcommunities’,REACHInitiative,2014.

95 ‘LabourmarkettransitionsofyoungwomenandmeninJordan’,Barcucci,V,andMryyan,N.,ILO,2014.

96 ‘Jordan’sfivebiggestchallenges,fromISIStothePalestinianquestion’,Awadallah,B.,CNN.com,23June2015.

97 ILO,2016.Seenote6.98 ‘ILO&Fafo,2015.Seenote15.99 ‘SyrianRefugeesinJordanConfronting

DifficultTruths’,Carrion,D.,ChathamHouse,September2015.

100 ‘InJordan,tensionsrisebetweenSyrianrefugeesandhostcommunity’,Luck,T.,WashingtonPost,21April2013.

101 WorkpermitsforSyrianrefugeesinJordan,InternationalLabourOrganization,RegionalOfficeforArabStates,2015

102 ILO&Fafo,2015.Seenote15.103 ‘MadeinJordan:InsidetheUnexpected

PowerhouseofGarmentManufacturing’,Williams,S.,TheBusinessofFashion,15September2015.

104 ‘Anationofrefugees:Jordanstruggleswiththosefleeingregionalcrises’,Su,A.,AlJazeeraAmerica:25July2014.

105 ‘MPCProfile:Jordan’,MigrationPolicyCentre,2013.

106 ILO&Fafo,2015.Seenote15.107 ‘LetthemWork’,Mansur,Y.,Venture

Magazine,10May2015.108 ‘Governmentsendsmessagesof

assuranceoverintegratingSyriansintolabourforce’,Obiedat,O.,TheJordanTimes,11February2016.

109 ‘EU-Jordan:towardsastrongerrelationship’,EuropeanCommission,20July2016.

110 ‘Jordantoallow200,000Syrianstoworklegally’,Laub,K.andMalkawi,K.,TheNationalWorld,5March2016.

111 ‘AccesstojobsimprovingforSyrianrefugeesinJordan’,Rummery,A.,UNHCR,19April2016.

112 Obiedat2016.Seenote108.113 Interviewsconductedbythe

EarthSecurityGroup.114 Vermeetal.,2016.Seenote9.115 ‘MunicipalNeedsAssessmentReport:

MitigatingtheImpactoftheSyrianRefugeeCrisisonJordanianVulnerableHostCommunities’,UNDP,2014.

116 ‘IsWaterScarcityDampeningGrowthProspectsintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica?’,Devlin,J.Brookings,24June,2014.

22FORCED DISPLACEMENT & DEVELOPMENT

23FORCED DISPLACEMENT & DEVELOPMENT

117 MOPIC,2013.Seenote51.118 ‘TheAlignedNationalActionPlan

toCombatDesertificationinJordan2015-2020’,MinistryofEnvironmentofJordan,2015.

119 ILO,2016.Seenote6.120 ‘TowardsaGreenEconomyinJordan’,

UNEP,2011.121 EDAMA,2016.

http://www.edama.jo(accessed17June2016).

122 ‘RiseandShine’,VerBruggen,S.,PVMagazine,April2012.

123 ‘SupportingSyriaandtheRegionConference’,February2016London,https://www.supportingsyria2016.com(accessed29April2016).

124 ILO&FAFO,2015,Seenote15125 ‘UNHCRWorkPermitPilotProjectto

SupportSyrianRefugeeEmploymentinJordan’sApparelIndustry’,BetterWorkJordan,ILO&IFC.http://betterwork.org/jordan/?p=1439(accessed2August2016).

126 ‘DevelopmentZonesforSyrianRefugees’,Brunnermeier,M.etal,CenterforInternationalGovernanceInnovation,7December2015.

127 ‘WorldBankWoosWesternCorporationstoProfitFromLaborofStrandedSyrianRefugees,Lazare,S.,Alertnet,24February2016.

128 UNHCR2016.Seenote3.129 UNHCR2015.Seenote1.130 UNHCR2016.Seenote3.131 ‘GlobalReportonInternal

Displacements’,InternalDisplacementMonitoringCentreandNorwegianRefugeeCouncil,19May2016.

132 Crawfordetal2015.Seenote11.133 ‘AddressingProtractedDisplacement:

AFrameworkforDevelopment-HumanitarianCooperation’,OCHA;UNDP;UNHCR;UNICEF;WFP;WorldBank,2015.

134 UNHCR2016.Seenote3.135 Crawford,etal.,2015.Seenote11.136 ‘Mid-yearTrends2015’,UNHCR,2015.137 UNHCR,2016.Seenote3.138 ‘UrbanRefugees’,UNHCR,2016.

http://www.unhcr.org/uk/urban-refugees.html(accessed3June2016).

139 UNHCRdatabase.http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php(accessed25April2016).

140 ‘UNHCRPolicyonRefugeeProtectionandSolutionsinUrbanAreas’,UNHCR,September2009.

141 ‘RethinkingCoordinationofServicestoRefugeesinUrbanAreas:ManagingtheCrisisinJordanandLebanon’,Culbertsonetal,RANDCorporation,2016.

142 ‘Resilience-baseddevelopmentresponsetotheSyriacrisis’,UNDP,2013.

143 ‘TransformingourWorld:The2030AgendaforSustainableDevelopment’,UnitedNations,2015.

144 ‘TheRoadtoDignityby2030:EndingPoverty,TransformingAllLivesandProtectingthePlanet.SynthesisReportoftheSecretary-GeneralonthePost-2015Agenda’,UnitedNations,December2014.

145 ‘RefugeeEconomies:RethinkingPopularAssumptions’,AlexanderBettsetal,HumanitarianInnovationProject,UniversityofOxford,June2014.

24FORCED DISPLACEMENT & DEVELOPMENT

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