G.R. No. 82310 June 18, 1990

FEAGLE CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.GAVINO GAYDA, ELPIDIO AGPALAYA, MIGUELITO BATOON, ELIGIO CUENCO, CLARO CUNANAN, SANTIAGO CURAMENG, MANUEL DACO, EDUARDO DEPONE, RAYMUNDO ERVERA, JOSE ESTABILLO, ROGELIO FIGUEROA, ARTEMIO HULINGNGA, JORGE ITING, EMILIANO NACAM, ALEXANDER MAPUTOL, AVELINO MENDOZA, ROGELIO NOO, ROLANDO PATINIO, VITALIANO PENA, ROLLY PERALES, DOMINADOR STA. CATALINA, ARSENIO SANTOS, FELIPE TESADO and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.

G.R. No. 87998 June 18, 1990

FEAGLE CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.JOSEPH ORPILIA AND NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.

Jacinto D. Jimenez for petitioner.

Millora, Nario, Canto & Pontejos for private respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The singular issue in this case is whether or not petitioner may be held solidarily liable with the foreign employer for any unpaid claims of private respondents against their foreign principal employer for any unpaid claims of private respondents against their foreign principal employer even as they have a stipulation to this effect.

This petition (G.R. No. 82310) was previously dismissed on March 23, 1988 for failure of Petitioner to sufficiently to show that the respondent Commission had committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering its questioned judgment. 1 An amended petition was filed on April 4, 1988. 2 The amended petition was given due course on July 4, 1988. 3

Petitioner questions the decision of the First Division of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission 4 dated January 29, 1988 in POEA Case No. L-86-10-971, which modified the decision dated July 20, 1987, of Commissioner Tomas D. Achacoso of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration dated July 20, 1987, excluding petitioner's officials Florentino Aguila and Rene Aguila from liability, but affirming the liability of the petitioner to private respondents on the ground that petitioner is solidarily liable together with the private respondents' foreign employer-Algosaibi-Bison Ltd., Dammam, Saudi Arabia. 5

The modified decision of administrator Achacoso has the following dispositive portion.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents Feagle Construction Corporation, Florentino Aguila and Rene Aguila and its (sic) foreign principal Algosaibi Bison, Ltd., Dammam, Saudi Arabia are hereby held jointly and severally liable to pay herein complainants within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order, the peso equivalent at the time of actual payment of the sum appearing opposite complainants' names representing their total claim for unpaid salaries/wages, remittances and other benefits, to wit:

1. Elpidio Agpalza

S.R. 19,245.00

2. Miguel Batoon

9,433.00

3. Eligio Cuenco

18,015.00

4. Claro Cunanan

16,409.00

5. Santiago Curameng

13,065.00

6. Manuel Daco

9,062.00

7. Eduardo Depone

24,038.00

8. Raymundo Ervera

15,235.00

9. Jose Estabillo

9,358.00

10. Rogelio Figueroa

19,554.00

11. Gavino Gayda

14,977.00

12. Artemio Hulingnga

8,581.00

13. Jorge Iting 18,436.00

14. Erqiliano Macam

13,436.00

15. Alexander Maputol

16,394.00

16. Avelino Mendoza

8,124.00

17. Rogelio Noo

18,930.00

18. Rolando Patinio

18,598.00

19. Vitiliano Pena

16,187.00

20. Rolly Perales

10,713.00

21. Dominador Sta. Catalina

12,767.00

22. Arsenio L. Santos

17,708.00

23. Felipe Tesado

14,236.00

TOTAL S.R. 342,501.00

We take note that complainants have been paid of (sic) their plane fare bonds as evidenced by check vouchers duly signed by individual complainants, hence, such claim is considered settled and/or fully paid.

Respondent are further ordered to pay attorneys fees equivalent to five percent (5%) of the total amount of the claims.

All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

No pronouncement as to cost. 6

A temporary restraining order was issued by this Court on September 12, 1988 and the petitioner filed the required bond in the amount of P50,000.00. 7 The following antecedent pertinent facts are not disputed:

1. Private respondents have been employed with Algosaibi-Bison, Ltd. in Saudi Arabia for three to five years working on construction projects for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

2. Sometime in 1983, Algosaibi-Bison, Ltd. started encountering financial difficulties because of the drop in the price of oil. Because of the drop in the price of oil, the income of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia plunged from about one hundred billion dollars a year to eighteen billion dollars a year. As a result, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia encountered financial difficulties in paying Algosaibi-Bison, Ltd. for its construction projects.

3. Starting in 1983, the remittance of the allotments of the beneficiaries of Filipino workers employed with Algosaibi-Bison, Ltd. was delayed. Although all the allotments for 1983 and 1984 were eventually paid, all these payments were delayed.

4. During all these years petitioner never charged Filipino workers like private respondents a single centavo for sending them to work for Algosaibi-Bison, Ltd. Petitioner advanced all mobilization expenses out of its funds.

5. Because of its financial difficulties, Algosaibi-Bison, Ltd. could not even reimburse petitioner for the mobilization expenses petitioner advanced, such as passport fees, medical fees, and visa application fees. Petitioner insisted that Algosaibi-Bison, Ltd. should give top priority to the payment of the wages and the allotments of the Filipino workers employed with it.

6. Because of this development, petitioner decided to stop sending back Filipino workers to work with Algosaibi-Bison, Ltd. Workers are given a one-month vacation after a year with re-entry visa.

7. Sometime in July, 1984, the Filipino workers employed with Algosaibi-Bison, Ltd. who had returned to Manila, including private respondents, requested for a meeting with the management of petitioner. About forty (40) Filipino workers attended the meeting. During the meeting, the workers requested petitioner to return them to their job site in Saudi Arabia. Mr. Florentino B. Aguila, the president of petitioner, informed the workers that petitioner did not want to send back any workers to Saudi Arabia because of the big risk due to the financial difficulties of Algosaibi-Bison, Ltd.

8. However, the workers pleaded with Mr. Florentino B. Aguila to send them back to Saudi Arabia. They explained that they were jobless in the Philippines, because of the depressed economic condition of the country. Rather than remain jobless, they would rather to take a chance in Saudi Arabia. They assured petitioner that they were willing to assume the risk in case the remittance of their salaries would be delayed. They emphasized that they were willing to sign a written statement indicating that they would not hold petitioner liable for any delay or non-payment of their salaries and any amounts due them from Algosaibi-Bison, Ltd. In accordance with their commitment, the said workers, including private respondents, signed a Statement .... Moreover, the workers stated they would seek the help of Saudi labor authorities individually in the event they would not be paid.

9. It was under the foregoing circumstances that petitioner reluctantly agreed to send back private respondents to Saudi Arabia to help them in their dire financial need if they would sign the aforementioned 'Statement' ... before they leave for Saudi Arabia. ...

10. While the Filipino workers were in Saudi Arabia, they received their salaries directly from Algosaibi-Bison, Ltd.

11. When Algosaibi-Bison, Ltd. went into bankruptcy in 1986, all the Filipino workers in its employ, including private respondents dealt with the liquidator directly and in their individual capacities. They filed their claims with the liquidator, and the liquidator issued to each of them a certificate stating the amount payable to each of them as soon as funds are available. The said Filipino workers, including private respondents, agreed that the liquidator would pay them directly and individually through their bank accounts in the Philippines. ...

12. Just the same, to assist the workers, petitioner has written the liquidator to follow up the claims of the Filipino workers, and the liquidator has replied to it. The reply of the liquidator confirmed the individual agreement of the said workers, including private respondents, that they would be paid by the liquidator directly and individually. Thus, petitioner has nothing to do with the remittance of the payments due private respondents. In fact, the liquidator even refused to furnish the petitioner a list of their individual claims and corresponding amounts due each of them. The liquidator considered these information confidential and privy to said workers. ...

13. Under the law of Saudi Arabia, the claims of the Filipino workers of Algosaibi- Bison, Ltd. has first priority for payment in the bankruptcy proceeding. Article 15 of the Labor Law of Saudi Arabia provides:

The amounts to which the workman or his dependents are entitled under the provisions of this Law shall be considered first class privileged debts, and for the recovery thereof the workman or his heirs shall have a priority rights over all the employer's property.'

14. On October 3, 1986, private respondents filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration a Complaint against petitioner for the payment of their claims with the liquidator of Algosaibi-Bison, Ltd.

15. On December 2, 1986, petitioner filed its Answer. In its Answer, it pointed out that it was never furnished with a copy of any Complaint from private respondent Artemio Hulingnga.

16. On July 20, 1987, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration rendered a Decision in favor of private respondents, including respondent Artemio Hulingnga, although petitioner was never furnished with a copy of his Complaint.

17. On August 7, 1987, petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission (hereinafter referred to as respondent Commission).

18. On January 29, 1988, respondent Commission rendered a Decision affirming the Decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration with the modification that the 'president' and the 'vice president for administration and finance' of petitioner were exempted from liability for the claims of private respondents. ...

18. On February 11, 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. ...

19. On February 29, 1988, respondent Commission issued a Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration. ...

20. On March 8, 1988, before receipt of the aforementioned Resolution of respondent Commission, petitioner filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. ... Petitioner received the said Resolution of respondent Commission only after petitioner had filed its Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration." 8

The petition is impressed with merit.

We agree with Public Respondents that the general rule as provided for in Section 1, Rule II of the rules and regulations of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration is that

every licensed private recruitment agency shall be jointly and solidarity liable with the employer for all claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with the implementation of the contract of employment.

In this case, however, We find it necessary to deviate from the general rule. First, because of changed circumstances, and second, because of individual agreements between petitioner and private respondents which cannot be considered void because the same cannot be considered contrary to law.

It is the uncontradicted contention of petitioner that 13 of private respondents filed their claims for salaries due in January, February and March of 1986, when their contracts of employment expired in 1985. 9

It is also clear that private respondents executed new and different contracts of employment directly with Algosaibi-Bison, Ltd. without the participation and consent of the petitioner. The former contracts with the petitioner expired and private respondents entered into new contracts of employment with the Algosaibi-Bison, Ltd., without the participation of petitioner.

The claims of private respondents were made directly with the liquidator of Algosaibi- Bison, Ltd. and they agreed to wait for the promised payment. Again the petitioner had nothing to do with those claims.

We simply cannot ignore that petitioner was reluctant to send the private respondents back to Saudi Arabia because as early as 1983, the Algosaibi-Bison, Ltd. started encountering financial difficulties because of the drop in the price of oil. Private respondents were the ones who insisted that they be allowed to resume employment. They were informed of the risks involved relating to the financial reverses of the employer. They insisted to return to Saudi Arabia and they agreed to sign individual statements, which they did, to the effect that each one of them did not hold petitioner responsible for delay or non-payment of their salaries and any amounts due them from Algosaibi-Bison, Ltd.

These individual statements voluntary signed by the private respondents to convince the reluctant petitioner to send them back to Saudi Arabia, notwithstanding their knowledge of the financial reverses of this employer, are eloquent individual waivers of their rights against petitioner. They were informed of the risk involved in returning to an employer in serious financial distress. They insisted on returning to work, even persuading petitioner to allow them to do so, by waiving the possible liability of petitioner. Under these circumstances, when private respondents were insisting to return to work despite the warning, We cannot consider their written waivers as to petitioner's responsibilities void. They were not victims of deceit or deception. They entered into those waivers with open eyes and clear minds. They were aware of the imminent danger and the great risks involved in their renewed ventures.

We also consider that as of record in the past, petitioner never took advantage of private respondents. They were always treated fairly and in accordance with law. Private respondents did not question the good faith of Petitioner. Their former employer Algosaibi-Bison, Ltd. went into bankruptcy in 1986 and petitioner had nothing to do with that. Private

respondents filed their claims directly with the Liquidator of their former employer Algosaibi-Bison, Ltd. They were given certificates of the amounts due them, to be given preference under the laws of Saudi Arabia. They were to be paid directly, again without participation of the petitioner. Petitioner wrote the Liquidator just to help private respondents, so that their claims may be expedited.

Holding, therefore, that in view of the circumstances proven in this case, and the very clear waiver of liability individually signed by private respondents in favor of petitioner, the petitioner cannot be held jointly and solidarity liable with the employer Algosaibi-Bison, Ltd. for the claims of private respondents. All other issues need no longer be discussed.

WHEREFORE, the temporary restraining order issued on September 12, 1988, is made permanent and the bond filed of P50,000.00 by petitioner is canceled. The questioned decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated January 29, 1988, and the order denying the motion for reconsideration of the same in POEA Case No. L-86-10-971, are modified, in that petitioner and its officials are not solidarily liable with petitioner with the Algosaibi-Bison, Ltd. on the claims filed by private respondents. Costs against private respondents.

This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 79560 : December 3, 1990.]

191 SCRA 823

ANDRES E. DITAN, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ASIAWORLD RECRUITMENT, INC., AND/OR INTRACO SALES CORPORATION, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CRUZ, J.:

The petitioner had the rare experience of being taken hostage in 1984, along with a number of his co-workers, by the rebels in Angola. His captivity for more than two months and the events that followed his release are the subject of the present petition.

Andres E. Ditan was recruited by private respondent Intraco Sales Corporation, through its local agent, Asia World, the other private respondent, to work in Angola as a welding supervisor. The contract was for nine months, at a monthly salary of US$1,100.00 or US$275.00 weekly, and contained the required standard stipulations for the protection of our overseas workers.

Arriving on November 30, 1984, in Luanda, capital of Angola, the petitioner was assigned as an ordinary welder in the INTRACO central maintenance shop from December 2 to 25, 1984. On December 26, 1984, he was informed, to his distress, that would be transferred to Kafunfo, some 350 kilometers east of Luanda. This was the place where, earlier that year, the rebels had attacked and kidnapped expatriate workers, killing two Filipinos in the raid. Naturally, Ditan was reluctant to go. However, he was assured by the INTRACO manager that Kafunfo was safe and adequately protected by government troops; moreover — and this was more persuasive — he was told he would be sent home if he refused the new assignment. In the end, with much misgiving, he relented and agreed.: nad

On December 29, 1984, his fears were confirmed. The Unita rebels attacked the diamond mining site where Ditan was working and took him and sixteen other Filipino hostages, along with other foreign workers. The rebels and their captives walked through jungle terrain for 31 days to the Unita stronghold near the Namibian border. They trekked for almost a thousand kilometers. They subsisted on meager fare. Some of them had diarrhea. Their feet were blistered. It was only on March 16, 1985, that the hostages were finally released after the intercession of their governments and the International Red Cross. Six days later, Ditan and the other Filipino hostages were back in the Philippines. 1

The repatriated workers had been assured by INTRACO that they would be given priority in re-employment abroad, and eventually eleven of them were taken back. Ditan having been

excluded, he filed in June 1985 a complaint against the private respondents for breach of contract and various other claims. Specifically, he sought the amount of US$4,675.00, representing his salaries for the unexpired 17 weeks of his contract; US$25,000.00 as war risk bonus; US$2,196.50 as the value of his lost belongings; US$1,100 for unpaid vacation leave; and moral and exemplary damages in the sum of US$50,000.00, plus attorney's fees.

All these claims were dismissed by POEA Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso in a decision dated January 27, 1987. 2 This was affirmed in toto by respondent NLRC in a resolution dated July 14, 1987, 3 which is now being challenged in this petition.

Going over the record, we find that the public respondent correctly rejected the petitioner's claim for paid vacation leave. The express stipulation in Clause 5 of the employment contract reads:

Should the Employee enter into a further 9 to 12 months contract at the completion contract, he will be entitled to one month's paid vacation before commencement of his second or subsequent contract.

It appears that the petitioner had not entered into a second contract with the employer after the expiration of the first. Such re-employment was not a matter of right on the part of the petitioner but dependent on the need for his skills in another project the employer might later be undertaking.

As regards the cost of his belongings, the evidence shows that they were not really lost but in fact returned to him by the rebels prior to their release. If he had other properties that were not recovered, there was no proof of their loss that could support his allegations. They were therefore also properly rejected.:-cralaw

We find, though, that the claims for breach of contract and war risk bonus deserve a little more reflection in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case.

The fact that stands out most prominently in the record is the risk to which the petitioner was subjected when he was assigned, after his reluctant consent, to the rebel-infested region of Kafunfo. This was a dangerous area. This same place had earlier been the target of a rebel attack that had resulted in the death of two Filipino workers and the capture of several others. Knowing all this, INTRACO still pressured Ditan into agreeing to be transferred to that place, dismissing his initial objection and, more important, threatening to send him home if he refused.

We feel that in failing to provide for the safety of the petitioner, the private respondents were clearly remiss in the discharge of one of the primary duties of the employer. Worse, they not only neglected that duty but indeed deliberately violated it by actually subjecting and exposing Ditan to a real and demonstrated danger. It does not help to argue that he was not forced to go to Kafunfo and had the option of coming home. That was a cruel choice, to say the least. The petitioner had gone to that foreign land in search of a better life that he could share with his loved ones after his stint abroad. That choice would have required him to come home empty-handed to the disappointment of an expectant family.

It is not explained why the petitioner was not paid for the unexpired portion of his contract which had 17 more weeks to go. The hostages were immediately repatriated after their release, presumably so they could recover from their ordeal. The promise of INTRACO was that they would be given priority in re-employment should their services be needed. In the particular case of the petitioner, the promise was not fulfilled. It would seem that his work

was terminated, and not again required, because it was really intended all along to assign him only to Kafunfo.:-cralaw

The private respondents stress that the contract Ditan entered into called for his employment in Angola, without indication of any particular place of assignment in the country. This meant he agreed to be assigned to work anywhere in that country, including Kafunfo. When INTRACO assigned Ditan to that place in the regular course of its business, it was merely exercising its rights under the employment contract that Ditan had freely entered into. Hence, it is argued, he cannot now complain that there was a breach of that contract for which he is entitled to monetary redress.

The private respondents also reject the claim for war risk bonus and point out that POEA Memorandum Circular No. 4, issued pursuant to the mandatory war risk coverage provision in Section 2, Rule VI, of the POEA Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, categorizing Angola as a war risk took effect only on February 6, 1985, "after the petitioner's deployment to Angola on November 27, 1984." Consequently, the stipulation could not be applied to the petitioner as it was not supposed to have a retroactive effect.

A strict interpretation of the cold facts before us might support the position taken by the respondents. However, we are dealing here not with an ordinary transaction but with a labor contract which deserves special treatment and a liberal interpretation in favor of the worker. As the Solicitor General observes in his Comment supporting the petitioner, the Constitution mandates the protection of labor and the sympathetic concern of the State for the working class conformably to the social justice policy. This is a command we cannot disregard in the resolution of the case before us.

The paramount duty of this Court is to render justice through law. The law in this case allows two opposite interpretations, one strictly in favor of the employers and the other liberally in favor of the worker. The choice is obvious. We find, considering the totality of the circumstances attending this case, that the petitioner is entitled to relief.

The petitioner went to Angola prepared to work as he had promised in accordance with the employment contract he had entered into in good faith with the private respondents. Over his objection, he was sent to a dangerous assignment and as he feared was taken hostage in a rebel attack that prevented him from fulfilling his contract while in captivity. Upon his release, he was immediately sent home and was not paid the salary corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract. He was immediately repatriated with the promise that he would be given priority in re-employment, which never came. To rub salt on the wound, many of his co-hostages were re-employed as promised. The petitioner was left only with a bleak experience and nothing to show for it except dashed hopes and a sense of rejection.

In these circumstances, the Court feels that the petitioner should be paid the salary corresponding to the 17 unserved weeks of his contract, which was terminated by the private respondents despite his willingness to work out the balance of his term. In addition, to assuage the ordeal he underwent while in captivity by the rebels, the Court has also decided in its discretion to award him nominal damages in the sum of P20,000.00. This is not payment of the war risk claim which, as earlier noted, was not provided for in the employment contract in question, or indemnification for any loss suffered by him. This is but a token of the tenderness of the law towards the petitioning workman vis-a-vis the private respondents and their more comfortable resources.: nad

Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less privileges in life should have more privileges in law. That is why our judgment today must be for the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the challenged resolution of the NLRC is hereby MODIFIED. The private respondents are hereby DIRECTED jointly and severally to pay the petitioner: a) the current equivalent in Philippine pesos of US$4,675.00, representing his unpaid salaries for the balance of the contract term; b) nominal damages in the amount of P20,000.00; and c) 10% attorney's fees. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRIME MARINE SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, R & R MANAGEMENT SERVICES INTERNATIONAL, and NAPOLEON CANUT, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision, dated February 21, 1991, of the National Labor Relations Commission, dismissing the appeal of petitioner Prime Marine Services, Inc. from the decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration in POEA Case No. (L) 88-10-850, as well as the resolution, dated March 26, 1991, of the NLRC, denying reconsideration.

Private respondent Napoleon Canut was recruited to work as a Tug Master for Arabian Gulf Mechanical Services and Contracting Co., Ltd. (Arabian Gulf) by R & R Management Services International (R & R Management) for a period of 18 months, commencing June 15, 1988. Private respondent’s employment was, however, preterminated allegedly on the ground that he was incompetent. He was repatriated to the Philippines on September 26, 1988. i[1]

When private respondent reviewed his employment papers, he discovered that while R & R Management had acted as recruitment agency in processing his application, it was actually petitioner Prime Marine Services, Inc., as deployment agent, which had processed his papers and facilitated his going abroad. Further investigation showed that R & R Management was not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment. Accordingly, private respondent filed a complaint before the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salaries, and recruitment violations against petitioner, R & R Management, and Arabian Gulf.ii[2]

Petitioner denied that there was any employer-employee relationship between it and private respondent. It pointed out that private respondent admitted he had applied with and paid his placement fee to R & R Management. Petitioner likewise denied that it had any part in the processing of private respondent’s papers and argued that only Arabian Gulf and R & R Management should be held liable to private respondent. For this reason, petitioner filed a cross-claim against R & R Management seeking reimbursement for any amount which petitioner may be held liable for to private respondent. iii[3]

iiiG.R. Nos. 90394-97 February 7, 1991

HERMINIGILDO ILAS, GLICERIO BELARMINO, MARIO BARBOSA and TEODORO ENRIQUEZ, petitioners,

R & R Management, on the other hand, averred that it referred private respondent to petitioner in order for the latter to facilitate private respondent’s employment abroad and consequently worked in conjunction with petitioner in processing private respondent’s deployment.iv[4]

On October 13, 1989, Deputy Administrator Cresencio M. Siddayao of the POEA rendered a decision disposing of the case as follows:

vs.THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ALL SEASONS MANPOWER INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, respondents.

Cielo B. Pre for petitioners.

Horacio R. Viola, Sr. for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:p

Can a recruitment agency be liable for unpaid wages and other claims of certain overseas workers who appear to have been recruited by its agent without its knowledge and consent? This is the focal issue in this petition.

Petitioners applied for overseas employment in Doha, Qatar, with CBT/Shiek International, an unlicensed recruitment agency, under the management of spouses Francisco Ngoho, Jr. and Corazon Ngoho. To enable them to leave, they were assisted by Eddie Sumaway and Erlinda Espeno, the latter being a liaison officer of private respondent All Seasons Manpower International Services, a licensed placement agency. Petitioners filed their application papers and paid their placement fees with the Ngohos. However, it was Espeno who processed their papers and gave them travel exit passes (TEPS). They were made to sign two-year contracts of employment but they were not given copies thereof. Subsequently, they were deployed to Doha, Qatar, where they worked for four (4) months without being paid. They sought the assistance of the Philippine Embassy and were able to come home to the Philippines with the help of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).

Hence, they filed a complaint to recover their unpaid salaries and for wages covering the unexpired portion of their contracts against private respondent.

On June 30, 1989, the POEA rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the respondent to refund to complainants Bonifacio Gagascas, Herminigildo Ilas, Diosdado Galang, Antonio Frias, Perfecto Lora, Jr., Rolando Ernacio, Emmanuel

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Prime Marine Services, Inc., R & R Management Services, Int’l and Arabian Gulf Mechanical Services and Contracting Co. Ltd., are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay complainant the following in Philippines Currency at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment:

SR 33,750.00 - representing salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract for 15 months at SR 2,250.00 a month;

Padilla, Andres Lontabo, Juanito Cueto, Camilo Pastrana, Mario Barbosa, Romeo Muldong, Arnold Cresidio, Dominguez de la Cruz, Samuel Leaño, Teodoro Enriquez and Jaime Ramos, the amount of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P2,500.00) each, representing placement fees.

The claims for the salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of the complainant's contracts are hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The claims of Pedro Pabillonia, Glicerio Belarmino, Jaime Ramos, Rodolfo de Jesus, Romeo Toledo, Pedro Sagayap, Macario Valdez, Benjamin Julio, Ernesto Yadao, Severino Pilon are hereby ordered severed from the other complaints in view of settlement.

SO ORDERED. 1

Both parties appealed to public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which in due course rendered a decision on September 23, 1988 modifying the appealed decision to the effect that petitioners were adjudged entitled to their four (4) months unpaid salaries to be paid by private respondent but the refund of placement fees was deleted.

A motion for reconsideration thereof was filed by private respondent. On April 28, 1989, a decision was rendered by public respondent setting aside the decision dated September 23, 1988 and dismissing the case for lack of merit. 2 A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied in a resolution dated June 7, 1989. 3

Hence, the herein petition for certiorari wherein it is alleged that public respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion in setting aside its decision dated September 23, 1988 and rendering the questioned decision dated April 28, 1989.

The petition must fail.

No rule is more settled than that this Court is not a trier of facts and that the findings of facts of administrative bodies, as public respondent, shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that it committed a grave abuse of discretion or otherwise acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction. In this case, petitioners failed to discharge their burden to

350.00 - representing salary differential;

5% percent Attorney’s fees of the award.

Furthermore, R & R Management Services International is referred to the Anti-illegal Recruitment Branch of this Office for appropriate action.

Finally, the cross claim of Prime Marine Services, Inc. against R & R Management Services International is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

warrant a departure from this rule.

All evidence indicate that private respondent cannot be held liable for the claims of petitioners.

Firstly, petitioners applied for overseas deployment with CBT/Shiek International through spouses Francisco and Corazon Ngoho, Eddie Sumaway and Erlinda Espeno. They never transacted their business with the office of private respondent.

Secondly, when they worked at Doha, Qatar, their employer was CBT/Shiek International who failed to pay their wages.

Thirdly, in the TEPS provided by Espeno to enable them to travel, it was made to appear that private respondent was their agency/contractor of petitioners and Yacoub Trading Est. is their foreign employer. They were signed by petitioners knowing that private respondent was not their recruiter. Apparently, Espeno conspired with petitioners and Ngoho to enable petitioners to travel to the Middle East, ostensively under the name of private respondent as agent/recruiter.

Fourthly, it turned out that petitioners were recruited for Mabeco Trading and Contracting Establishment, as the foreign principal and not Yacoub Trading Est., which is the principal of private respondent.

Fifthly, in the very complaints filed by petitioners against private respondent they admitted that they applied for overseas employment with the CBT/Shiek International under the management of the Ngohos. 4

It is true that the rules and regulations of the POEA provide that the private employment or recruitment agency is made to assume full and complete responsibility for all acts of its officials and representatives done in connection with recruitment and placement. 5 However, when as in this case the recruitment was actually made by Espeno in behalf of CBT/Shiek International, not the private respondent, and the name of private respondent was only used as a means to enable petitioners to be issued TEPS for travel purposes, obviously without the knowledge and consent of private respondent, the latter cannot be held liable for the claims of petitioners.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the National Labor Relations Commission which the latter treated as an appeal. In its decision, dated February 21, 1991, the NLRC affirmed in toto the POEA’s decision. On March 26, 1991, it denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition containing the following assignment of errors:

I. Public respondent NLRC and/or POEA committed grave abuse of discretion when they ignored existing jurisprudence.

II. Dismissal of the cross-claim (against private respondent R & R Management) constitutes also grave abuse of discretion.

The observation of public respondent that the documents used in the deployment abroad of petitioners were all fake and that petitioners knew about it is borne by the records. They did not come to court with clean hands. Thus, petitioners should suffer the consequences of their wrongful acts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

IRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120095. August 5, 1996]

As to its first assignment of error, petitioner contends that the ruling of the NLRC goes against this Court’s decision in Ilas v. NLRC.v[5]

The contention has no merit. The case of Ilas simply held that a recruitment agency cannot be found liable for unpaid wages and other claims of overseas workers who have been recruited by its agent without its knowledge and consent. The Court’s ruling denying liability against the recruitment agency (All Seasons Manpower International Services) was based on the following factual findings of the POEA and the NLRC, which the Court affirmed:

JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., and KARY INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MA. NIEVES CONFESSOR, then Secretary of the Department of the Labor and Employment, HON. JOSE BRILLANTES, in his capacity as acting Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and HON. FELICISIMO JOSON, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

All evidence indicate that private respondent [All Seasons Manpower International Services] cannot be held liable for the claims of petitioners.

Firstly, petitioners applied for overseas deployment with CBT/Shiek International through spouses Francisco and Corazon Ngoho, Eddie Sumaway and Erlinda Espeno. They never transacted their business with the office of private respondent.

Secondly, when they worked at Doha, Qatar, their employer was CBT/Shiek International who failed to pay their wages.

KAPUNAN, J.:

The limits of government regulation under the State's Police Power are once again at the vortex of the instant controversy. Assailed is the government's power to control deployment of female entertainers to Japan by requiring an Artist Record Book (ARB) as a precondition to the processing by the POEA of any contract for overseas employment. By contending that the right to overseas employment, is a property right within the meaning of the Constitution, petitioners vigorously aver that deprivation thereof allegedly through the onerous requirement of an ARB violates the due process clause and constitutes an invalid exercise of the police power.

The factual antecedents are undisputed.

Following the much-publicized death of Maricris Sioson in 1991, former President Corazon C. Aquino ordered a total ban against the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other foreign destinations. The ban was, however, rescinded after leaders of the overseas employment industry promised to extend full support for a program aimed at removing kinks in the system of deployment. In its place, the government, through the Secretary of Labor and Employment, subsequently issued Department Order No. 28, creating the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), which was tasked with issuing guidelines on the training, testing certification and deployment of performing artists abroad.

Pursuant to the EIAC's recommendations,?[1] the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994, issued Department Order No. 3 establishing various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the former. Performing artists successfully hurdling the test, training and certification requirement were to be issued an Artist's Record Book (ARB), a necessary prerequisite to processing of any contract of employment by the POEA. Upon request of the industry, implementation of the process, originally scheduled for April 1, 1994, was moved to October 1, 1994.

Thereafter, the Department of Labor, following the EIAC's recommendation, issued a series of orders fine-tuning and implementing the new system. Prominent among these orders were the following issuances:

Thirdly, in the TEPS provided by Espeno to enable them to travel, it was made to appear that private respondent was their agency/contractor of petitioners and Yacoub Trading Est. is their foreign employer. They were signed by petitioners knowing that private respondent was not their recruiter. Apparently, Espeno conspired with petitioners and Ngoho to enable petitioners to travel to the Middle East, ostensibly under the name of private respondent as agent/recruiter.

1. Department Order No. 3-A, providing for additional guidelines on the training, testing, certification and deployment of performing artists.

2. Department Order No. 3-B, pertaining to the Artist Record Book (ARB) requirement, which could be processed only after the artist could show proof of academic and skills training and has passed the required tests.

3. Department Order No. 3-E, providing the minimum salary a performing artist ought to receive (not less than US$600.00 for those bound for Japan) and the authorized deductions therefrom.

4. Department Order No. 3-F, providing for the guidelines on the issuance and use of the ARB by returning performing artists who, unlike new artists, shall only undergo a Special Orientation Program (shorter than the basic program) although they must pass the academic test.

In Civil Case No. 95-72750, the Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP), on January 27, 1995 filed a class suit assailing these department orders, principally contending that said orders 1) violated the constitutional right to travel; 2) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of law. FETMOP, likewise, averred that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and "in gross violation of the constitutional right... to life liberty and property." Said Federation consequently prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the aforestated orders.

On February 2, 1992, JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. and Kary International, Inc., herein petitioners, filed a Motion for Intervention in said civil case, which was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 15 February, 1995.

However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an Order denying petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint.

On appeal from the trial court's Order, respondent court, in CA G.R. SP No. 36713 dismissed the same. Tracing the circumstances which led to the issuance of the ARB requirement and the assailed Department Order, respondent court concluded that the issuances constituted a

Fourthly, it turned our that petitioners were recruited for Mabeco Trading and Contracting Establishment, as the foreign principal and not Yacoub Trading Est., which is the principal of private respondent.

Fifthly, in the very compliant filed by petitioners against private respondent they admitted that they applied for overseas employment with the CBT/Shiek International under the management of the Ngohos.vi[6]

In contrast, both the POEA and the NLRC found that petitioner and R & R Management acted jointly in recruiting and deploying private respondent abroad, to wit:

valid exercise by the state of the police power.

We agree.

The latin maxim salus populi est suprema lex embodies the character of the entire spectrum of public laws aimed at promoting the general welfare of the people under the State's police power. As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually "extends to all public needs,"?[2] this "least limitable"?[3] of governmental powers grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the state, as parens patriae gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers.

Describing the nature and scope of the police power, Justice Malcolm, in the early case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro?[4] wrote:

"The police power of the State," one court has said...'is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed 'the law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.' Carried onward by the current of legislature, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual."?[5]

Thus, police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.

A thorough review of the facts and circumstances leading to the issuance of the assailed orders compels us to rule that the Artist Record Book requirement and the questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power.

In 1984, the Philippines emerged as the largest labor sending country in Asia dwarfing the labor export of countries with mammoth populations such as India and China. According to the National Statistics Office, this diaspora was augmented annually by over 450,000

This contention cannot be sustained. The records show that while complainant applied with respondent R & R, he was however deployed by herein movant Prime Marine and this was not rebutted during the proceedings below. Consequently, We find no sufficient reason to disturb the questioned decision. We, therefore, quote with approval and adopt as Our own the following findings of the POEA Deputy Administrator.

We find respondent R & R and prime Marine jointly and severally liable with complainant’s foreign employer, Arabian Gulf Mechanical Services and Contracting Co. Ltd. R & R is the recruiting agency while

documented and clandestine or illegal (undocumented) workers who left the country for various destinations abroad, lured by higher salaries, better work opportunities and sometimes better living conditions.

Of the hundreds of thousands of workers who left the country for greener pastures in the last few years, women composed slightly close to half of those deployed, constituting 47% between 1987-1991, exceeding this proportion (58%) by the end of 1991,?[6] the year former President Aquino instituted the ban on deployment of performing artists to Japan and other countries as a result of the gruesome death of Filipino entertainer Maricris Sioson.

It was during the same period that this Court took judicial notice not only of the trend, but also of the fact that most of our women, a large number employed as domestic helpers and entertainers, worked under exploitative conditions "marked by physical and personal abuse."?[7] Even then, we noted that "[t]he sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers" compelled "urgent government action."?[8]

Pursuant to the alarming number of reports that a significant number of Filipina performing artists ended up as prostitutes abroad (many of whom were beaten, drugged and forced into prostitution), and following the deaths of a number of these women, the government began instituting measures aimed at deploying only those individuals who met set standards which would qualify them as legitimate performing artists. In spite of these measures, however, a number of our countrymen have nonetheless fallen victim to unscrupulous recruiters, ending up as virtual slaves controlled by foreign crime syndicates and forced into jobs other than those indicated in their employment contracts. Worse, some of our women have been forced into prostitution.

Thus, after a number of inadequate and failed accreditation schemes, the Secretary of Labor issued on August 16, 1993, D.O. No. 28, establishing the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), the policy advisory body of DOLE on entertainment industry matters.?[9] Acting on the recommendations of the said body, the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994, issued the assailed orders. These orders embodied EIAC's Resolution No. 1, which called for guidelines on screening, testing and accrediting performing overseas Filipino artists. Significantly, as the respondent court noted, petitioners were duly represented in the EIAC,?[10] which gave the recommendations on which the ARB and other requirements were based.

Prime Marine is the deploying agency. Complainant alleged that he applied with R & R and the latter admitted that it “has facilitated and contributed efforts in conjunction with Prime Marine in sending the applicant complainant abroad under a contract.” Prime Marine did not rebut this allegation. It did not even explain or touch on the matter why it appeared as the deploying agent in the Crew Agreement exhibited by complainant. The foregoing leads us to the inevitable conclusion that there is a collusion between R & R and Prime Marine with respect to complainant’s application and deployment. Thus, its cross claim against R & R must necessarily fail because it is held jointly and severally liable with R & R and the foreign employer.vii[7]

Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to "high risk" destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.

Moreover, here or abroad, selection of performing artists is usually accomplished by auditions, where those deemed unfit are usually weeded out through a process which is inherently subjective and vulnerable to bias and differences in taste. The ARB requirement goes one step further, however, attempting to minimize the subjectivity of the process by defining the minimum skills required from entertainers and performing artists. As the Solicitor General observed, this should be easily met by experienced artists possessing merely basic skills. The tests are aimed at segregating real artists or performers from those passing themselves off as such, eager to accept any available job and therefore exposing themselves to possible exploitation.

As to the other provisions of Department Order No. 3 questioned by petitioners, we see nothing wrong with the requirement for document and booking confirmation (D.O. 3-C), a minimum salary scale (D.O. 3-E), or the requirement for registration of returning performers. The requirement for a venue certificate or other documents evidencing the place and nature of work allows the government closer monitoring of foreign employers and helps keep our entertainers away from prostitution fronts and other worksites associated with unsavory, immoral, illegal or exploitative practices. Parenthetically, none of these issuances appear to us, by any stretch of the imagination, even remotely unreasonable or arbitrary. They address a felt need of according greater protection for an oft-exploited segment of our OCW's. They respond to the industry's demand for clearer and more practicable rules and guidelines. Many of these provisions were fleshed out following recommendations by, and after consultations with, the affected sectors and non-government organizations. On the whole, they are aimed at enhancing the safety and security of entertainers and artists bound for Japan and other destinations, without stifling the industry's concerns for expansion and growth.

Although petitioner denied before the POEA and the NLRC any part in the processing of private respondent’s papers, it now admits that its general manager after all took part in the deployment of private respondent. However, it claims that its general manager was not authorized to do so and that she was in collusion with private respondent.viii[8]

It is sufficient in order to dispose of this new contention to say that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally held to be binding and even final so long as they are supported by substantial evidence in the record of the case.ix[9] This is especially so where, as here, the agency and a subordinate one which heard the case in the first instance are in full

In any event, apart from the State's police power, the Constitution itself mandates government to extend the fullest protection to our overseas workers. The basic constitutional statement on labor, embodied in Section 18 of Article II of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.

More emphatically, the social justice provision on labor of the 1987 Constitution in its first paragraph states:

The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

Obviously, protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone. Under the welfare and social justice provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the government's constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas. As this Court explained in Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI) v. Drilon,?[11] in reference to the recurring problems faced by our overseas workers:

What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home.

We now go to petitioners' assertion that the police power cannot, nevertheless, abridge the right of our performing workers to return to work abroad after having earlier qualified under the old process, because, having previously been accredited, their accreditation became a property right," protected by the due process clause. We find this contention untenable.

A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which

agreement as to the facts.x[10] This rule was, in fact, reiterated in the Ilas case which petitioner invokes:

No rule is more settled than that this Court is not a trier of facts and that the findings of facts of administrative bodies, as public respondent, shall not disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that it committed a grave abuse of discretion or otherwise acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction. In this case, petitioners failed to discharge their burden to warrant a departure from this rule.xi[11]

normally constitutes an actionable wrong.?[12]

Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.?[13]

In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider.?[14] To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions. Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. Seamen are required to take tests determining their seamanship. Locally, the Professional Regulation Commission has began to require previously licensed doctors and other professionals to furnish documentary proof that they had either re-trained or had undertaken continuing education courses as a requirement for renewal of their licenses. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. So long as Professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.

Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-impairment clause of the Constitution to support their argument that the government cannot enact the assailed regulatory measures because they abridge the freedom to contract. In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon, we held that "[t]he non-impairment clause of the Constitution... must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government."?[15] Equally important, into every contract is read provisions of existing law, and always, a reservation of the police power for so long as the agreement deals with a subject impressed with the public welfare.

A last point. Petitioners suggest that the singling out of entertainers and performing artists under the assailed department orders constitutes class legislation which violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. We do not agree.

It should be pointed out that petitioner belatedly claims that its general manager acted without authority and in collusion with private respondent apparently to bring this case within the ambit of Ilas which held that a recruitment agency is not liable for the unauthorized acts of its agents. This transparent effort to make the present case fit the ruling in Ilas is done without specifying the alleged evidence supporting such claim of collusion. Neither does petitioner even attempt to controvert the express finding of both the POEA and the NLRC that it failed to rebut R & R Management’s allegation that both of these firms jointly processed private respondent’s employment.

The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.?[16] We have held, time and again, that the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as such classification is based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation.?[17] If classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee.

In the case at bar, the challenged Department Order clearly applies to all performing artists and entertainers destined for jobs abroad. These orders, we stressed hereinbefore, further the Constitutional mandate requiring Government to protect our workforce, particularly those who may be prone to abuse and exploitation as they are beyond the physical reach of government regulatory agencies. The tragic incidents must somehow stop, but short of absolutely curtailing the right of these performers and entertainers to work abroad, the assailed measures enable our government to assume a measure of control.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision sought to be reviewed, petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

i

ii

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v

As to petitioner’s second assignment of error, such should be dismissed as its solidary liability with R & R Management and Arabian Gulf for private respondent’s claims is founded on the fact that both petitioner and R & R Management, and not the latter alone, processed private respondent’s recruitment and deployment abroad.

There is no question that a private manning agency, such as petitioner, can be held liable for private respondent’s claims. The Rules and Regulations of the POEA expressly provide that every applicant seeking a license or authority to operate a private employment, recruitment, or manning agency must submit, among others:

d. A verified undertaking stating that the applicant:

. . . .

(3) shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with the implementation of the contract of employment;xii[12]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

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