focible entry en banc cases

7/27/2019 Focible Entry en Banc Cases

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EN BANC

G.R. No. L-17468 July 31, 1963

PILAR T. DEL ROSARIO, MARIANO V. DEL ROSARIO and SALVADOR V. DELROSARIO, petitioners-appellants,

-versus-HON. DAMIAN L. JIMENEZ, as Judge of the Municipal Court of Quezon City, Branch

III,SANCHO R. JACINTO and DOMINGO BASCARA, respondents-appellees.

Cornelio S. Ruperto for petitioners-appellants.Vicente M. Magpoc for respondents-appellees.Damian L. Jimenez in his own behalf as respondents-appellees.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This case is before us on appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (BranchII), dated June 4, 1960, dismissing appellants' petition for certiorari and mandamus to reviewfour orders of the municipal court of Quezon City (Branch III) in civil case No. 5039 entitled"Sancho R. Jacinto, et al. vs. Pilar T. del Rosario, et al." That case was one of forcible entryunder Rule 72, involving two parcels of land of which the plaintiffs, Sancho R. Jacinto andDomingo C. Bascara, now respondents-appellees, are the registered owners under transfercertificates of title Nos. 26531 and 26532, both issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.These lands had been acquired by them through purchase from the previous registered owner,J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. In their answer to the complaint the defendants, now petitioners-appellants, claimed ownership of the same properties by purchase from one Macaria Fulgencioand her husband Carlos Javier and alleged that they were and had been in actual physicalpossession thereof even before the purchase from J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. by appellees.

Appellants, after a second amended complaint had been filed by appellees, submitted theiranswer thereto dated October 2, 1958, including a "third-party complaint" against the plaintiffsthemselves as well as against J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc., from both of whom they prayed for anaward of damages.

In the meantime, after the action of forcible entry was filed, herein appellants commenced asuit for "reconveyance and/or recovery" of the same properties against appellees in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (No. 5230), and then, on November 4, 1958, filed a motion in themunicipal court to suspend proceedings in the summary action before it until after thetermination of the case in the Court of First Instance.

On October 7, 1958 the municipal court denied admission of the third-party complaint; and onthe following November 6 it likewise denied the motion to suspend proceedings. In both


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instances appellants moved to reconsider and were turned down in two other separate orders,dated October 24 and November 27, 1958, respectively. These are the four orders subject of appellants' petition for certiorari and mandamus , which was dismissed by the Court of FirstInstance of Rizal and now on appeal before us.

The third-party complaint was improperly brought against appellees Jacinto and Bascara, sincethey were themselves the plaintiffs in the forcible entry case, as to whom a mere counterclaimwould suffice. Insofar as J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. was concerned, the allegation against it is thatit had entered into a compromise agreement with a certain Deudor in four civil cases in theCourt of First Instance of Quezon City, whereby it agreed to give priority to occupants of landsinvolved therein (including those now in dispute) in the matter of their purchase and that theejectment suit filed by herein appellees was a violation of that compromise agreement. We failto see how such "agreement to which appellees were strangers, could have anything to do withtheir right of action to recover the material possession of the lands in question. The prayer inthe third-party complaint that J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. be sentenced to pay damages should bethe subject, if at all, of a separate action so that matters extraneous to the issue of possessionmay not unnecessarily clutter the forcible entry case. The admission of a third-party complaint

is discretionary with the court, and in the present instance there was no abuse of discretion inthe order of denial complained of.

With respect to the other order that denying appellant's motion to suspend proceedings itis enough to point out, first, that the action for "reconveyance and/or recovery" in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which appellants claim should take precedence, was filed by them whenthe forcible entry case was already pending, and was obviously intended to delay theproceedings therein; and secondly, that the issue involved in the later action, which is one of title, is not prejudicial to the determination of the issue of summary possession. The verypetition for mandamus and certiorari the dismissal of which is the subject of this appeal islikewise dilatory in nature, as shown by the fact that it is only one of the numerous actionspreviously resorted to by appellants and decided unfavorably to them. There was special civilaction No. 5318, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, dismissed by Judge Andres Reyesfor lack of jurisdiction and then refiled in Branch V (Quezon City), but again dismissed by JudgeNicasio Yatco on July 2, 1959; and subsequently, there was special civil action No. 5500, Courtof First Instance of Rizal, dismissed by Judge Felix R. Domingo on July 8, 1959. Both of theseactions were instituted after the ejectment case was filed by herein appellees and sought tosuspend the trial thereof. There must be an end to the litigious rigmarole pursued byappellants.

The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes,Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-11114 December 27, 1957

CRESENCIANO TORREFRANCA, ET AL. plaintiffs-appellants,vs.FILOMENO ALBISO, defendant-appellee.

David C. Ocangas for appellants.Sofronio T. Camacho for appellee.

REYES, A., J.:

The question for determination in this case is whether a justice of the peace court has theauthority to revive its own judgment.

It appears that on March 22, 1950, a judgment was rendered by the justice of the peace courtof Carmen, Bohol, ordering the defendant in a forcible entry and detainer case to restorepossession of a piece of land and pay damages to the plaintiffs. The judgment having remainedunsatisfied for more than five years, the plaintiffs, on October 22, 1955, brought the presentaction to have it revived in the same justice of the peace court. The defendant opposed theaction, but the court, after hearing, declared the judgment revived and again ordered what was

necessary to be done in compliance therewith.

The defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance, but as he failed to file a supersedeasbond, the plaintiffs asked for a writ of execution. With that motion still pending determination,the defendant on his part filed a motion for the dismissal of the case, contending that the Courtof First Instance, as an appellate court, had no jurisdiction to try it because, according to him,the justice of the peace court itself did not have jurisdiction to entertain an action for the revivalof a judgment. Upholding this contention and also holding the plaintiffs guilty of laches forfailing to secure a writ of execution within five years, the Court of first Instance ordered thecase dismissed. From that order, the plaintiffs appealed directly to this court, and we see thatthe question involved is purely legal.

The appeal is well taken. Matters pertaining to the "execution, satisfaction and effect of judgments", are governed by the provisions of Rule 39, and Section 6 of that ruleprovides: lawphi1.net

SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action . A judgment may be executedon motion within five years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, andbefore it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.


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This provision, and for that matter the whole of Rule 39, is applicable in inferior courts as Rule4, which governs the procedure in those courts, expressly declares in its section 19. Thatsection reads:

SEC. 19. Application of certain rules. Rules 10, 12, 13, 14, 18, 28, 29, 30 and 39applicable in inferior courts in cases falling within their jurisdictions and in so far as theyare inconsistent with the provisions of this rule.

We see nothing in section 6 of Rule 39 that is inconsistent with Rule 4.

Furthermore, the Judiciary Act of 1948 gives justice of the peace courts jurisdiction over actionsof forcible entry and detainer and also empowers them (in its section 91) to issue all "processnecessary to enforce their orders and judgments". Needless to say, the revival of a judgment isa necessary step in its enforcement where, as in the present case, the judgment, which hasremained unsatisfied for more than five years, can no longer be executed upon mere motionand has to be enforced by action as provided in section 6 of Rule 39.

The authority of a justice of the peace of court to revive its own judgment being clear, it waserror to dismiss plaintiff's action on the theory that such authority did not exist.

Holding the plaintiffs guilty of laches for failing to secure a writ of execution within five yearsfrom the entry of judgment, the lower court would also, on that ground, deprive them of theirright to have the judgment revived. To that we cannot agree. It is clear that section 6 of Rule39 gives the plaintiffs not only the right to enforce the judgment through the mere motion forexecution within five years, but also, after the expiration of that period without the judgmenthaving been satisfied, the right to bring an action for its enforcement within the time prescribedby the statute of limitations. We would be construing the section arbitrarily were we to holdthat the right to bring that action is forfeited if the right to move for execution has not been

exercised.

In view of the foregoing, the order of dismissal is set aside and the case remanded to the courtbelow for further proceedings. Costs against the defendants. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.


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purpose. Petitioner likewise asks that the respondent municipal judge be prohibited from takingfurther cognizance of the case.

Respondent filed an answer, also alleging the facts above stated.

On the date set for the hearing of the case before this Court, counsel for the partiesappeared and argued the case.

It is well-established doctrine in this jurisdiction that, in a forcible entry and detainercase, in any municipal court or justice of the peace court, when the case is dismissed, on theground of lack of jurisdiction, and an appeal is taken to the Court of First Instance, the onlyquestion to be determined is whether or not, the inferior court has jurisdiction to try the caseon the merits (Rule 92; Carroll vs. Paredes, 17 Phil., 94; Davis vs. Director of prisons, 17 Phil.,168; U.S. vs. Bernardo, 19 Phil., 265). If the Court of First Instance should decide that themunicipal court or justice of the peace court has jurisdiction to try the case, as correctly held inthis case, it must be remanded to said court, for trial on the merits (Lucido vs. Vita, 25 Phil.,414). The order of the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, theHon. Pompeyo Diaz, remanding the case to the municipal court, for its trial on the merits, isstrictly in accordance with the law and authorities above cited.

In order that a petition for certiorari may prosper, it is absolutely necessary to show thatthe respondent judge acted without jurisdiction or in excess thereof (De la Cruz vs. Moir, 36Phil., 213). In the instant case, the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance has actedstrictly in accordance with law.

The petition for certiorari and prohibition, being completely and absolutely devoid of merits, it is hereby dismissed, with costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon and Briones, JJ., concur.Moran, C.J., I hereby certify that Mr. Justice Hilado voted for the dismissal of the petition.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., concurring:

Respondent Mossesgeld filed in the Municipal Court of Manila a complaint for forcibleentry against the petitioner. The municipal court, after hearing, dismissed the case on theground that it lacked jurisdiction in view of the allegation of ownership made by the petitioner.


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The plaintiffs appealed the case to the Court of First Instance of Manila, which uponmotion of plaintiffs, ordered, on July 31, 1945, the case remanded to the municipal court,directing it to hear and make the necessary adjudication after finding that the municipal courthad jurisdiction over the case.

The defendant appealed from said order and filed a record on appeal, but the Court of First Instance disapproved the same for the reason that its order of July 31, 1945, wasinterlocutory in nature and no appeal would lie therefrom.

We do not agree with this opinion. The order of July 31, 1945, is not interlocutory innature. It disposed of finally the appeal interposed by plaintiffs against the order of dismissalissued by the municipal court. If, instead of appealing, plaintiffs had file petition for mandamusto compel the municipal court to proceed with and decide the forcible entry case, the decisionof the Court of First Instance granting the petition would be substantially the same as the orderof July 31, 1945. Undoubtledly, the decision granting the petition for mandamus would beappealable. The allegation of respondents to the effect that the order of July 31, 1945, did notdispose of finally the case in untenable. The same thing would have happened if, instead of appealing, plaintiffs resorted to a mandamus proceeding. The question presented in the appeal,or which would have been presented in the mandamus proceeding, would be exclusivelywhether of or not the municipal court had jurisdiction to try the forcible entry case, and thatquestion was decided finally in the order of July 31, 1945, as would be in a decision grantingmandamus for the same purpose. lawphil.net

If petitioner had filed before this Court a petition for mandamus to compel the Court of First Instance of Manila to approve his record on appeal and give due course to his appeal, hisaction would, undoubtedly, have prospered.

The petitioner decided to follow a different course by presenting squarely, in these

certiorari proceedings, the question whether or not the municipal court has jurisdiction to tryand decide the forcible entry case. In this question, our conclusion is not favorable to thepetitioner.

It appears that the plaintiffs filed the complaint, alleging that on May 7, 1945, they weredeprived by force of the possession of the property in question. If this is the fact, the plaintiffsare entitled to respect in their possession. The possessors are entitled to be protected in theirpossession even against the real owner who ousted them by force. No one has a right to take

justice in his own hands.

The main purpose of the summary proceedings in a forcible entry case is to preserveorder and peace.

In view of the foregoing, we concur in the denial of the petition.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 47833 August 17, 1942

SALUD LIZO, plaintiff-appellant,vs.CAMILO CARANDANG, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Aurelio Palileo for appellant.Rosales, Alampay and Alvero for appellees.

BOCOBO, J. :

1. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINEE; WHAT DETERMINES JURISDICTION OFTHE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURT. It is well established that what determinesthe jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court in a forcible entry and detainer case isthe nature of the action pleaded in the complaint. If the facts therein alleged constituteforcible entry and detainer, the justice of the peace court may validly try and decide thecase, regardless of whether the facts pleaded are or are not proved at the trial. If, as inthe instant case, the cause of action set forth in the complaint is one of forcible entryand detainer, although the facts proved at the trial do not support the cause of actionthus alleged but one of reivindication, the court has jurisdiction to dismiss the action onthe merits for lack of evidence. The dismissal, therefore of the action ordered by the

justice of the peace court in this case upon failure of proof, was right and proper, but its

further pronouncement that it had no jurisdiction over the question of ownership arisingfrom the facts proved was immaterial.

2. ID.; ID.; APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE. Asimilar confusion appears in the decision of the Court of First Instance which, actingupon the stipulation of facts on appeal, affirmed the conclusion of the justice of thepeace court that it had no jurisdiction and, what is worse, upon that ground it dismissedthe appeal. Affirmance of the judgment and dismissal of the appeal are two utterlyincompatible ideas. By affirming the judgment, the Court of First Instance exercises itsappellate jurisdiction, whereas by dismissing the appeal, it refuses to exercise appellate

jurisdiction.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TRIAL "DE NOVO." Generally, the jurisdiction of a Court of FirstInstance on appeal is to hold trial de novo (Rule 40, section 9, Rules of Court), and bytrial de novo is meant that the Court of First Instance shall try the case without regardto the proof presented in the justice of the peace court or to the conclusions reached byit. The Court of First Instance, therefore, should not affirm, reverse, or modify the rulingof the justice of the peace court, but it should make its own findings, lay down its ownconclusions, and dispose of the case as if the same had never been tried before and hadbeen originally commenced therein.


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4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The only instance in which the Court of First Instance mayaffirm, reverse, or modify the ruling of the justice of the peace court is where the latterhas disposed of the case upon a question of law without any trial. (See Rule 40, sections10 and 11.) For instance, if a motion to dismiss is filed in the justice of the peace courton the ground that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and the motion is granted, the case being consequently dismissed, the Court of First Instance, on appeal by the plaintiff, can only review the ruling of the justice of thepeace court and affirm or reverse it as the facts and the law of the case may warrant.

Again, if the justice of the peace court refuses to try the case because it has no jurisdiction over the same according to the facts pleaded in the complaint, andaccordingly dismisses the action, the Court of First Instance, on appeal by the plaintiff,can only review the ruling of the inferior court on the question of jurisdiction and affirmit if such order is right, or reverse it if it is wrong, in which event the case should beremanded to the inferior court for further proceedings.

5. ID.; ISSUE INVOLVED IS POSSESSION IN FACT, OR PHYSICAL POSSESSIONOF REAL PROPERTY. In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the only issue is

possession in fact, or physical possession of real property, independently of any claim of ownership that either party may put forth in his pleading. If plaintiff can prove priorphysical possession in himself, he may recover such possession even from the owner,but, on the other hand, if he cannot prove such prior physical possession, he has noright of action for forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the owner of theproperty.

6. ID.; SUMMARY PROTECTION OF MERE FACT OF POSSESSION. Both inprinciple and on policy, the mere fact of possession should be summarily protected andupheld by the courts, independently from the question of ownership.

7. ID.; ID.; ONE OF THE REASONS FOR SUMMARY PROTECTION OF MEREFACT OF POSSESSION. To allow citizens to arrogate unto themselves the right topass judgment upon their own claims of property rights would give rise to no end of turbulent wrangles and affrays. Precisely, justice of the peace courts, which are theinstrumentalities of justice most available to the people, are called upon to settlequestions of possession in a manner that brooks no delay, so that the community maynot be continually thrown into a turmoil by violent acts of dispossession. For this reason

justice of the peace courts should not so readily decline to exercise jurisdiction on theground that the case involves a question of ownership.

8. ID.; ID.; ANOTHER REASON FOR SUMMARY PROTECTION OF MERE FACT OFPOSSESSION. The fact of possession in itself has a positive value and is endowedwith a distinct standing of its own in the law of property. True, by this principle of respect for the possessory status, a wrongful possession may at times be upheld by thecourts, but this is only temporary and for one sole and special purpose, namely themaintenance of public order. The protection is only temporary because it is intendedthat as soon as the lawless act of dispossession has been suppressed, the question of ownership or of possession de jure is to be settled in the proper court and in a properaction. The larger and permanent interests of property require that such rare andexceptional instances of preference in the courts for the actual but wrongful possessor


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be permitted. Possession is at once the basis and the outward manifestation of ownership. It is the foundation upon which property rests because without possession,personally held or through an agent, or granted by contract to a lessee or usufructuaryor the like, the right of dominion would become a delusion. For how else could theowner enjoy his lands and tenements? Consequently, to leave possession exposed to allmanner of danger and threat would be to undermine property itself. The same reasonsfor safe-guarding ownership hold for guaranteeing possession.

9. ID.; ID.; ID. As an external expression of dominion, possession ought to beshielded. This visible sign or symbol of ownership should be preserved from all violenceor chicanery because of the probability, nay the certainty in most instances, that thepossessor is either the true owner or is entitled to the right of possession, as is the caseof a lessee or a possessor in good faith. The ordinary course of affairs is that the actualpossessor is either the owner or the holder of possession de jure. Hence, thepresumption of ownership or of rightful possession. It would be a short-sighted norm toleave this token of the right of property unguarded just because of the scant possibilitythat the possession may be unlawful. It is wiser, by far, to risk such exceptional

possibility, in order that the security of property in general may be the better cementedand consolidated. The law looks to the usual rather than the unusual state of humanaffairs.

10. ID.; ID.; ID.;MERITS OF CASE AT BAR. According to the facts agreed upon,the plaintiff was at most only a copossessor of A. C., and as such she could lay no claimto the exclusive possession of the property to the detriment of the defendants who hadacquired the rights of A. C. Moreover, plaintiff was in truth no longer a copossessor,because of her refusal to return to the house at the request of A. C. and of the townmayor. Plaintiff having thus given up and abandoned her original right of copossession,there is no reason why the present possessors should be ejected from the property.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22984 March 27, 1968

MARGARITO SARONA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,vs.FELIPE VILLEGAS and RAMONA CARILLO, defendants-appellees.

Aportadera & Palabrica for plaintiffs-appellants.Castillo Law Offices for defendants-appellees.

SANCHEZ, J.:

The key question thrust upon us is whether the present is a case of forcible entry or oneof unlawful detainer.

The problem arose because on January 28, 1963, plaintiffs lodged with the MunicipalCourt of Padada, Davao, against defendants as complaint, styled "Unlawful Detainer." 1 Theythere aver that they are the absolute owners and in possession of a parcel of land in Paligue,Padada. Their complaint then proceeds to recite:

3. That on April 1, 1958, defendants entered upon said land Lot "F" constructedtheir residential house thereon and up to date remain in possession thereof, unlawfullywithholding the possession of the same from the plaintiffs;

4. That the reasonable rental for said Lot is P20.00 per month;

5. That on December 28, 1962, plaintiffs demanded of defendants to vacate thepremises and to pay the rentals in arrears but then defendants failed to do so; thatdefendants' possession thus became clearly unlawful after said demand;

x x x x x x x x x

They asked that they be restored into possession, and that defendants be made to payrents, attorneys' fees, expenses of litigation, and costs.

Defendants met the complaint with a motion to dismiss on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction of the municipal court. They say that the case is one of forcible entry, and thereglementary one-year period had elapsed before suit was started.

The municipal court overturned the motion to dismiss.


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On May 15, 1963, defendants registered their answer. They reiterated the court's lack of jurisdiction, and by way of affirmative defenses, stated that plaintiffs have no cause of action,and that "the present residential house of the defendants was transferred to the present siteafter plaintiffs sold to defendants a portion of their land, which includes the site of the presenthouse and from and after said sale, defendants have occupied the said portion legally and withthe knowledge and consent of plaintiffs." They counterclaimed for damages.

The municipal court's judgment directed defendants to vacate the premises, to payplaintiffs a monthly rental of P10.00, from April 1, 1958 until possession is restored, andP200.00 as attorneys' fees, and costs.

Defendants, on appeal to the court of First Instance of Davao, 2 renewed their bid tothrow out of court plaintiffs' complaint for want of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs' opposition anddefendants' reply thereto were also submitted.

On December 26, 1963, the Court of First Instance of Davao dismissed the case. Thecourt reasoned but that the suit was one of forcible entry and was started beyond thereglementary one-year period.

Plaintiffs appealed to this Court.

Plaintiffs' position is that the municipal court had original jurisdiction; that consequentlythe Court of First Instance had appellate jurisdiction. Their theory is that suit was well withinthe one-year period. They say that the parting date is December 28, 1962, when plaintiffsdemanded of defendants to vacate the premises and pay rentals in arrears; and that thecomplaint was registered in court on January 28, 1963.

Solution of the problem turns on this question: Is the complaint one of forcible entry or

unlawful detainer? 1wph1.t

1. Section 1, Rule 70 (formerly Section 10, Rule 72) of the Revised Rules of Court, statesthat a person deprived of possession of land "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, orstealth," or a person against whom the possession of any land "is unlawfully withheld after theexpiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express orimplied," may at any time "within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper inferior court against the person or persons unlawfullywithholding or depriving of possession." The next legal precept, Section 2 of the same Rule,provides that the landlord may not sue his tenant for ejectment "for failure to pay rent due orto comply with the conditions of his lease, unless the tenant shall have failed to pay such rentor comply with such conditions for a period of fifteen (15) days, or five (5) days in the case of building, after demand therefor, . . . ."

It is plain that the foregoing rules define two entirely distinct causes of action, to wit: (a)action to recover possession founded on illegal occupation from the beginning forcible entry;and (b) action founded on unlawful detention by a person who originally acquired possessionlawfully unlawful detainer. 3


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The law and jurisprudence leave no doubt in our mind that what determines the causeof action is the nature of defendants' entry into the land. If entry is illegal, then the cause of action which may be filed against the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, onthe other hand, entry is legal but thereafter possession became illegal, the case is one of illegaldetainer which must be filed within one year from the date of the last demand.

2. We observe a lack of precision-tooling in the complaint. Defendants' alleged entry intothe land is not characterized whether legal or illegal. It does not say how defendants enteredthe land and constructed their residential house thereon. It is silent, too, whether possessionbecame legal before plaintiffs made the demand to vacate and to pay rentals.

Nor does the complaint as much as intimate that defendants are plaintiffs' tenants. Sothat the case would not come within the coverage of Section 2 of Rule 70 (summary action bylandlord against tenant).

Failure to specifically aver in the complaint facts which definitely show that plaintiffs'action is for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, is not to be lightly treated. Jurisdiction here challenged in a motion to dismiss depends upon, factual averments. The jurisdictional factsmust appear on the face of the complaint. Where, as here, the only definite ultimate factsaverred are that on April 1, 1958, defendants entered upon the land and constructed theirresidential house thereon, remained in possession thereof, and that demand to vacate and payrentals only was made on December 28, 1962, well beyond the one-year period, the municipalcourt of Padada did not have jurisdiction.

The want of jurisdiction is the more accentuated when we consider the facts thatsurfaced during the trial as found by the municipal court, viz :

In the course of the hearing of this case it is clear that, according to the plaintiff,

Margarito Sarona, the defendants transferred their house on April 1, 1958 to thelitigated area which is designated as Lot F, (Exhibit "C-1") without their consent andpermission. At that time he was just living 200 meters away from the lot. He requestedthe defendants not to place the said house in the litigated area but the defendantsrefused. He did nothing and only on December 28, 1962, when the formal letter of demand to vacate and to pay rental was made by the plaintiff through their lawyer, Atty.Palabrica, and addressed the said letter to the defendants but the defendants refused tovacate the area and to pay a rental of P20.00. . . .

It is then too plain for argument that defendants entered the land on April 1, 1958without plaintiffs' consent and permission; that plaintiff Margarito Sarona "requested thedefendants not to place the said house in the litigated area but the defendants refused."

The findings of the municipal court itself may not be downgraded in the present case. And this, for the reason that the complaint did not specifically state the manner of entry of defendants into the land legal or illegal. Since the parties went to trial on the merits, and itcame to light that defendants' entry was illegal at the inception, the municipal court shouldhave dismissed the case. That court cannot close its eyes to the truth revealed by plaintiffs' ownevidence before it. A court of limited jurisdiction, said municipal court, should not haveproceeded to render an on-the-merits judgment thereon. 4


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Clearly, plaintiffs' case fits in the jurisprudential precept of forcible entry. Because the entry is forcible. Long had it been made evident that in forcible entry cases, no force is reallynecessary

In order to constitute the use of "force," as contemplated in this provision, thetrespasser does not have to institute a state of war. Nor is it even necessary that heshould use violence against the person of the party in possession. The act of going onthe property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies theexertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary. Under the statuteentering upon the premises by strategy or stealth is equally an obnoxious as entering byforce. The foundation of the action is really the forcible exclusion of the originalpossessor by a person who has entered without right. The words "by force, intimidation,threat, strategy or stealth" include every situation or condition under which one personcan wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had priorpossession, therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the veryeyes of the person already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes such prior possessor from the property,

the action of forcible entry and detainer can unquestionably be maintained, even thoughno force is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied from themere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party. 5

3. But plaintiffs would want to make out a case of illegal detainer upon their belatedclaim that they tolerated defendants' possession. To be observed on this point is that there hasbeen no allegation in the complaint, and no showing during the trial in the municipal court, thatpossession of defendants ever changed from illegal to legal any time from their illegal entry tothe demand to vacate. No averment there is in the complaint which recites as a fact anyovert act on plaintiffs' part indicative of permission to occupy the land. Without resorting tomind-reading, we are hard put to conclude that there was such a change from illegal to legalpossession of defendants until the demand to vacate was made.

But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still,distinction should be made.

If right at the incipiency defendants' possession was with plaintiffs' tolerance, we do notdoubt that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior courtunder Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate. Because,from the date of demand, possession became unlawful. And the case is illegal detainer. 6

But will this rule as to tolerance hold true in a case where there was forcible entry at the start , but the lawful possessor did not attempt to oust the intruder for over one year, and onlythereafter filed forcible entry suit following demand to vacate?

Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are "those which byreason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or anotherperson to do on the property; they are generally those particular services or benefits whichone's property can give to another without material injury or prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy." 7 He adds that: "[t]hey are acts of littledisturbances which a person, in the interest of neighborliness or friendly relations, permits


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others to do on his property, such as passing over the land, tying a horse therein, or gettingsome water from a well." And, Tolentino continues, even though "this is continued for a longtime, no right will be acquired by prescription." 8 Further expounding on the concept, Tolentinowrites: "There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts which are merely tolerated. Thus,not every case of knowledge and silence on the part of the possessor can be considered mere tolerance . By virtue of tolerance that is considered as an authorization, permission or license,acts of possession are realized or performed. The question reduces itself to the existence ornon-existence of the permission." 9

A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our viewheretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possessionsought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for tworeasons: First . Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor.

Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior court provided for inthe rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then theremedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek

relief in the inferior court. Second . If a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed afterthe lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry canreally prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff willmerely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court upon a plea of tolerance to preventprescription to set in and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion isunreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entryand unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to the suit is butin pursuance of the summary nature of the action. 10

It is well to remember that after the lapse of the one year period, suit must be started inthe Court of First Instance in an accion publiciana .

Jurisdiction in the case before us is with the Court of First Instance.

For the reasons given, the order of the Court of First Instance of Davao of December 26,1963 dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction in the Municipal Court of Padada, is herebyaffirmed.

Costs against plaintiffs-appellants. So ordered. 1wph1.t

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Angeles and Fernando, JJ. concur.Castro, J., took no part.Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1Civil Case 164, Municipal Court of Padada, Davao entitled "Margarito Sarona, AnteroSarona, Ireneo Sarona, Lucila Sarona, Francisco Sarona, Felisa Sarona, and MontanaSarona, Plaintiffs, vs. Felix Villegas and Ramona Carillo, Defendants."


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2Civil Case 4184, Court of First, Instance of Davao Sarona, et al., plaintiff, versus Villegas, et: al., defendants. 1wph1.t

3Medel vs. Militante, 41 Phil. 526, 530; Dy Sun vs. Brillantes, 93 Phil. 175, 177.

4

Cf . Iigo vs. Estate of Adriana Maloto, L-24384, September 28, 1967, citing cases .5Mediran vs. Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752, 756-757, quoted with approval in Santos vs.Santiago, 38 Phil. 575, 577-578.

63 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 287, citing Minute Resolution in Amis vs. Aragon, L-4735-4736-4684, April 28, 1951.

7II Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1963 ed., p. 227, citing I Ruggiero 843;Emphasis supplied.

8Id ., citing 2-II Colin & Capitant 911; emphasis supplied.

9Ibid ; emphasis supplied.

10Monteblanco vs. Hinigaran Sugar Plantation, 63 Phil. 797, 802-803.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1855 June 22, 1949

FELIPE C. ALVIAR, ET AL., petitioners,vs.SANTOS B. PAMPOLINA, Justice of the Peace of San Pablo, Laguna, RURALPROGRESS ADMINISTRATION and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF LAGUNA, respondents.

Juan S. Rustia for petitioners.Luis M. Kasilag and Lorenzo B. Vizconde for respondent Rural Progress Administration.

MORAN, C.J. :

On May 25, 1935, more than 720 tenants filed an action (civil case No. 6663) in the Court of First Instance of Laguna against Colegio de San Jose, praying that defendant be compelled torespect its contracts of lease with plaintiffs on some parcels of lands located in San PedroTunasan, Laguna. After trial, judgment was rendered declaring that plaintiffs and their privies oragents had no longer any right to continue occupying the property in litigation and they wereordered to vacate and deliver the same to the defendant. On appeal, the judgement wasaffirmed by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on July 31, 1940.

The property was later purchased by the Commonwealth of the Philippines and came under the

direct and exclusive management of the respondent Rural Progress Administration. On October9, 1946, an action was filed in the Court of First Instance of the same province against theRural Progress Administration and others by numerous plaintiffs allegedly the same plaintiffs inthe former civil case No. 6663, or their agents or successor in interest. In this new complaint,registered as civil case No. 8039, it is prayed that the title of Colegio de San Jose on theproperty in the litigation and the sale in favor of the Commonwealth of the Philippines bedeclared null and void. Apparently, this second complaint was dismissed on notion of the RuralProgress Administration on the ground of res judicata and lack of cause of action, and from theorder of dismissal an appeal was taken to this Court.

Upon the other hand, the Rural Progress Administration filed several complaints for forcibleentry and detainer of the same property and against the same plaintiffs, their agents orsuccessors in interest in the justice of the peace court of San Pedro Tunasan, Laguna. To thesecomplaints, the defendants filed motion for dismissal alleging that the justice of the peace courthad no jurisdiction because there was already an action for title pending then in the Court of First Instance, which was civil case No. 8039 above mentioned. The justice of the peace deniedthe motion for dismissal on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaints constituteforcible entry and detainer falling within his jurisdiction. Wherefore, the defendants filed theiraction for certiorari in the Court of First Instance, which was dismissed after trial upon theground that the proper remedy was appeal, and that, furthermore, the respondent justice of


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the peace had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the persons of the parties. Theorder of dismissal was appealed to this Court.

In the meantime, the cases for the forcible entry and detainer were tried by the justice of thepeace court and judgment were rendered therein against the defendants which have becomefinal and executory, some of them having been already executed and the others about to beexecuted. The defendants asked for suspension of execution, but because said petition wasdenied they filed the present petition for certiorari .

There is no doubt that the justice of the peace court of San Pedro Tunasan, Laguna, had jurisdiction over all the cases for forcible entry and detainer filed with it by the Rural Progress Administration. The pendency of an action for title filed but he defendants against the plaintiffsin the Court of First Instance is no good ground for impugning the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace of the court. Furthermore, well known is the rule that an action for ownership is not abar to an action for forcible entry and detainer. Whether title is necessarily involved in an actionfor forcible entry and detainer is a question of fact to be determined from the evidencepresented by both parties at the trial, and that question can be reviewed only on appeal andnot by certiorari proceedings in the Court of First Instance.

If the justice of the peace court had jurisdiction over the forcible entry and detainer cases, thenit had jurisdiction to try and render judgments therein and order the execution had been filed inthe Court of First Instance to set aside the order of the justice of the peace court by which itassumed such jurisdiction; but if no writ of preliminary injunction was issued therein by theCourt of First Instance against the justice of the peace court, the latter could continue tryingand deciding the said cases and order the execution of the judgments rendered therein.

Petition is dismissed with costs against petitioners.

Paras, Feria, Perfecto, Bengzon, Tuazon, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.Moran, C.J. , Justice Pablo voted for dismissal.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19370 April 30, 1964

GENARO PRADO, plaintiff-appellant,vs.

APOLINARIO CALPO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Romulo M. Abarcar for plaintiff-appellant.Tadeo and Tadeo, Jr. for defendants-appellees.

PAREDES, J.:

On May 24, 1957, plaintiff Genaro Prado, filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of SanJacinto, Pangasinan, a forcible entry case against the defendants. On June 6, 1957, defendantspresented their Answer, and interposed special and affirmative defenses, among which was theclaim that defendant Dalmacio Cabrera was the owner of the property allegedly occupied bysaid defendants, having purchased the same from the Marciana Calpito, as evidenced by aDeed of Absolute Sale (Exh. 1) and for which he (Cabrera) was issued a TCT No. 23006 for saidland in his name (Exh. 2). The Answer also averred that the Justice of the Peace Court had no

jurisdiction to entertain the case, because it involved question of title over the property. Acounter-claim in the sum of P500.00 for damages and P300.00 for attorney's fees, was alsointerposed.

Before trial, defendants filed a Petition for Dismissal dated July 25, 1959, on the principalground that since the question of title and/or ownership was necessarily involved, the JP Courthad no jurisdiction thereof, for to determine who had the right of possession (the issue inforcible entry cases), a finding as to the title or ownership was imperative. Plaintiff opposed,claiming, among others, that the ground on which the same was based could only be resolve ina trial on the merits, for, whether title is necessarily involved in an action for forcible entry ornot is a question of fact. On August 28, 1957, the JP Court denied the Petition for Dismissal andset the case for trial on the merits.

On November 21, 1957, the JP Court rendered judgment, the pertinent portions of which read:

A careful study of the evidence adduced by both parties, testimonial and documentary,clearly shows that the preponderance of evidence is in favor of the plaintiff. This Courtcan not see with valid reason the justification of the defendants in not presenting thesupposed predecessor or predecessors of defendant Dalmacio Cabrera. ... .

... In action for forcible entry and detainer, the only issue is possession in fact, orphysical possession of real property, independently of any claim of ownership and eitherparty may put forth in his pleading, If plaintiff can prove prior physical possession inhimself, he may recover such possession from the owner, ... .


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vendor of plaintiff (Exh. D); and the deed of sale and transfer certificate of title No.23006 in the name of defendant Dalmacio V. Cabrera (Exhs. 1 and 2). These proofscenter on the ownership of the property described in the complaint which issue thepower court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby dismissed with costs against theplaintiff.

Plaintiff moved for the reconsideration of the above Order, stating that trial on the merits wouldhave been more consistent with law and equity. On January 16, 1959, the trial court denied themotion for reconsideration. Thus, this appeal, plaintiffs-appellees alleging that the lower courtcommitted three (3) errors, which center on question of whether or not, under the facts of thecase, the JP Court had jurisdiction to entertain the case and CFI could legally take cognizance of the appeal. 1wph1.t

The CFI erred in quashing the case, upon a mere motion to dismiss. The findings of the JPCourt clearly show that the plaintiffs had prior physical possession of the disputed property andthe alleged circumstance that the defendant Cabrera was the registered owner of the property,did not detract from the fact that plaintiffs had a right possession thereof which should beprotected. Incidentally, We note that the Certificate of Title in the name of Cabrera was issuedonly on February 17, 1956; whereas the plaintiffs' right to occupy the premises was evidencedby a Deed of Sale of the property to them, dated November 28, 1947, executed by VenturaGarcia and his wife Maria Consuelo Frianeza, who bought the same property Gonzalo Sandoval,by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated May 2, 1938. When possession is the issue, an action forForcible Entry and Detainer is the proper remedy. The CFI should have heard the case on themerits, and find whether the findings and conclusions of fact of the JP, regarding the priorpossession of the plaintiffs and their subsequent dispossession by the defendants are correct ornot. Insofar as the appeal with the CFI is concerned the latter did not have to delve into the

issue of ownership, which could be threshed out in an action, to quiet title. Forcible entry anddetainer lies even against the very owner of property.

CONFORMABLY WITH THE FOREGOING, the Order of the CFI of Pangasinan, dated December17, 1958, ordering the dismissal of the case, is hereby set aside and another entered,remanding the case to the said Court, further appropriate proceedings. No specialpronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23756 December 27, 1969

JOVITO P. DIZON, plaintiff-appellant,vs.

AGAPITA CONCINA, FLORENCIO PONGPONG, ANANIAS CONCINA and ROSITAREMITIR, defendants-appellees.

D. F. Valer for plaintiff-appellant.Ernesto P. Pilapil for defendants-appellees.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Suit for forcible entry. The land involved is located in barrio Telegrafo, San Jose, Camarines Sur,bounded on the northeast by Cornelia and Marcelina Prado, Jovito P. Dizon and Felizardo Cilot,on the northwest by a canal, Jovito P. Dizon and Heirs of Lucio Pande, on the southeast by

Asuncion Fuentebella and on the southwest by Rangas River and Felipe Capus before, nowJovito P. Dizon. The complaint filed on September 3, 1960 before the Justice of the Peace(Municipal) Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, avers that on April 3, 1960, defendants,confederating together and helping one another, by means of force, strategy and stealth,unlawfully entered the southwestern portion of the property just described, having an area of 75 acres, more or less, ejecting therefrom plaintiff's encargado and depriving plaintiff of thepossession thereof. Defendants' answer in the inferior court dated October 13, 1960 describes

in paragraph 3 thereof two parcels of land both bounded on the north by Rangas River which isthe southwestern boundary of plaintiff's land, and avers "[t]hat if the plaintiff refers to the landdescribed in paragraph 3 hereof, he has no right over the same." The judgment of the inferiorcourt, after trial, went for plaintiff. Defendants appealed.

In the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, defendants in their new answer repeated theaverments just mentioned.

Then, on February 12, 1963, defendants filed an amended answer in the Court of FirstInstance. Their two parcels of land described as such in paragraph 3 of the two previousanswers were there also in paragraph 3 consolidated into one. To be noted is that thisconsolidated parcel describes the boundary on the north by Rangas River (before), by Jovito P.Dizon (now). Then followed the following material amendments: "5. That during the strongtyphoon sometime in the year 1948, the Rangas River which, prior thereto, was the naturalboundary between the estates of the parties herein, suddenly changed its course by traversingthe northern portion of the defendants' land separating from it the northern portion thereof; 6.That the old river bed has become dry and defendants have taken possession thereof and havenever abandoned the possession of the segregated northern portion; 7. That if the plaintiff refers to the land described in paragraph 3 hereof and referred to in the two precedingparagraphs, then he has no right whatsoever over the same." This amended answer was


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admitted by the court on February 28, 1963, the court stating that the claim of ownership was"only for the purpose of showing the character and extent of possession."

On March 23, 1963, plaintiff filed his amended complaint which repeats the description of hisland showing that the southwest portion thereof is bounded, amongst others, by Rangas River.The disputed paragraph 3 of the amended complaint reads: "3. That on the SW which isbounded by the Rangas River and Felipa Capus now of the plaintiff there existed a portionwhich was periodically covered by water during rainy season and hence it was not included inthe survey but later became higher thus forming an accretion to the plaintiff's property thru thegradual effect of the current of said river from which time then it was dedicated to pasture andto cassava and camotes up to April 3, 1960." Then follows the allegation of forcible entry.

On May 13, 1964, defendants moved for the dismissal of the action, in the words of counsel,"for lack of jurisdiction because the land litigated before this Honorable Court by virtue of theamended complaint has not been litigated in the inferior court", and that there was "a changeof theory and cause of action." They directed their criticism against paragraph 3 of theamended complaint just adverted to.

On July 20, 1964, the trial court, declaring that "it was obvious that there is a change of subjectmatter which this court, as an appellate court has no jurisdiction", and that "there is a changeof theory and cause of action, now that the plaintiff is proving that there was accretion which isdifferent from that of the original case", dismissed the complaint, and directed the plaintiff "toreimburse the defendant Agapita Concina the sum of P300.00 representing the costs of surveyof the property of the plaintiff.

It is now plaintiff's turn to appeal on purely questions of law.

1. No serious question arises as to plaintiff's cause of action. It is forcible entry. The subject

matter thereof merely is the material possession or possession de facto over the real property.Ownership or the right of possession as an attribute of ownership is not to be determined. 1 Thequestions to be resolved simply are these: First , who had actual possession over the piece of real property? Second , was the possessor ousted therefrom within one year from the filing of the complaint by force, threat, strategy or stealth? And lastly , does he ask for the restoration of his possession? 2 Mere posture of ownership by plaintiff or defendant does not take the case outof the jurisdiction of the trial court, unless the issue of material possession necessarily dependsupon the question of ownership, 3 which is not the case here. Any controversy over ownershiprights could and should be settled after the party who had the prior, peaceful and actualpossession is returned to the property. 4

Here, plaintiff averred prior material possession; that he was ousted therefrom by means of force, strategy or stealth; and that this usurpation was done within the one year period prior tothe filing of the suit in the inferior court.

Succinctly did this Court explain in one case the nature of the forcible entry action: "In givingrecognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer the purpose of the law is to protect theperson who in fact has actual possession; and in case of controverted right, it requires theparties to preserve the status quo until one or the other of them sees fit to invoke the decisionof a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. It is obviously just that the


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FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the order of the trial court of July 20, 1964 dismissingplaintiff's complaint and ordering him to reimburse defendant Agapita Concina in the sum of P300 is hereby set aside, and this case is hereby remanded to the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur with instructions to proceed until the determination thereof on the merits.

Costs against defendants-appellees. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 See for example : Mediran vs. Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752, 757; Masallo vs. Cesar, 39 Phil.134, 137; Fuentes vs. The Justice of the Peace of Pila, 67 Phil. 364, 365-366; Lizo vs.Carandang, 73 Phil. 649, 650; Maddammu vs. Judge of Municipal Court of Manila, 74Phil. 290, 231; Pitargue vs. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5, 13; Arsenio vs. Marino, L-9299, December18, 1956; Lequigan vs. Katalbas, 105 Phil. 645, 647; Subano vs. Vallecer, 105 Phil.1264, 1265; De la Cruz vs. Burgos (1969), 28 SCRA 977, 983.

2 See : Section 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court.

3 Fuentes vs. The Justice of the Peace of Pila, supra , at p. 366.

4 Mediran vs. Villanueva, supra , at p. 757; De la Cruz vs. Burgos, supra , at p. 483 (sic).

5 Mediran vs. Villanueva, supra , at p. 757.

6 This land is titled under the Torrens system.

7 Subano vs. Vallecer, supra , at pp. 1264-1265.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14889 April 25, 1960

NORBERTO LOPEZ, ET AL., petitioners,vs.HON. AMADO SANTIAGO, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

Magno, Estacio and Association for petitioners.Felix D. Soriano for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J .:

This is an original action for a writ of certiorari and mandamus .

Petitioners Norberto Lopez and Gregorio Lopez Jr., were plaintiffs in an action for forcible entry,docketed as Civil Case No. 55 of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alcala, Pangasinan.Respondent herein, except respondent Judge Honorable Amando S. Santiago, were thedefendants therein. In due course said court rendered judgment on July 3, 1958, which wasamended on July 16, 1958, sentencing the aforementioned to vacate the land in dispute and topay to Norberto and Gregorio Lopez P100 a month from May 28, 1958 until the return of theland to the latter, plus P5.00, the value of a tree destroyed by said defendants, and attorney'sfees. The defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan presided over byrespondent Judge, in which the case was docketed as Civil Case No. U-221 thereof. Sometime

before October 14, 1958, Norberto and Gregorio Lopez filed with the latter court a motion forthe executive of the aforementioned judgment, owning to the failure of the defendants to payor deposit the amount of said monthly rental or compensation. By an order dated October 14,1958, the motion was granted.

Prior thereto, or on October 1, 1958 said defendants had moved for the dismissal of the caseupon the ground that the subject-matter of litigation is a public land; that an investigation wasthen being conducted by the Bureau of Lands, in connection with a free patent application, filedby said defendants, covering the property in dispute, and a protest or opposition thereto filedby Norberto and Gregorio Lopez; and that all administrative remedies should first be exhaustedby the latter before seeking recourse in civil courts. On November 10, 1958, respondent Judgeissued an order denying the motion to dismiss, but reconsidering and setting aside said order of October 14, 1958 and holding in view of the administrative proceedings pending in the Bureauof Lands. A reconsideration of his last order having been denied by respondent Judge, thepresent case was instituted by Norberto and Gregorio Lopez, with the prayer that judgment berendered.

(a ) setting aside the order of the respondent Judge of November 10, 1958, in Civil CaseNo. U-221 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan insofar as it reconsider and setaside the previous order of execution of the judgment of the Justice of the Peace Court


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of Alcala, Pangasinan, with respect to the possession of the land involved in thelitigation;

(b ) ordering the execution of the judgment of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alcala,Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 55 of said court, not only with respect to the damagesadjudicated therein but also with respect to the possession of the parcel of land involvedin the litigation;

(c ) ordering the respondent Judge to proceed with the hearing on the merits of thecase; and

(d ) condemning respondents Jose Nato, et als. to pay the costs.

It is well settled in the jurisdiction that, when the decision of a justice of the peace or municipalcourt in the forcible entry case is adverse to the defendant, and the latter has appealedtherefrom, but fails, during the pendency of appeal, to pay the amount of the rental due fromtime to time under the contract or the reasonable value of the use and occupation of thepremises, under the conditions set forth in Section 8, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, it is themandatory duty of the court of first instance to order the execution of the judgment appealedfrom (Arcilla vs. Del Rosario, 74 Phil., 445; Cunanan vs. Rodas, 78 Phil. 800). Yet, respondentJudge revoked the order for the execution of the aforementioned judgment of the Justice of thePeace Court of Alcala, despite the failure of the main respondents herein, as defendants in thecase above referred to, to make the payment required in said section 8 of Rule 72, upon thefollowing ground;

It appearing that an order for the issuance of a writ of execution was issued by thisCourt on October 14, 1958, on the premise that the land in dispute is a private land andin view of the fact that the attention of this Court was called for the first time in the

instant motion to dismiss that the land is a public land, the decision of the inferior courtcan not be executed, although the same becomes final, because the Director of Landshas direct executive control of the disposition and management of public lands. (Sec. 4,Commonwealth Act No. 141; Hernandez, et al. vs. Clapiz, et al., No. L-6812, March 26,1956). Hence the order for the issuance of a writ of execution issued on October 14,1958 is hereby reconsidered and set aside insofar as the restoration of the possession of the land in question is concerned.

Respondent Judge thus seems to be under the impression that Rule 72 of the Rules of Court,relative to forcible entry cases, is applicable only to private lands, and that decision renderedagainst the defendants in such cases may not be ordered executed, the provisions of said Ruleto the contrary notwithstanding, when the property involved is a public land. This view fails toconsider in its true light the philosophy underlying the law on forcible entry cases. Commentingthereon, former Chief Justice Moran has the following to say:

. . . the action for forcible entry and detainer is of statutory origin. Its purposeregardless of the actual condition of the title to the property , is that the party inpeaceable and quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence orterror. In affording this remedy of restitution the object of the statutes is to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of


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the remedy , and the reasonable hope such withdrawal would create that someadvantage must accrue to those persons who, believing themselves entitled to thepossession of property, resort to force to gain possession rather than to someappropriate action in the courts to assert their claim. Such is the philosophy at thefoundation of all action of forcible entry and detainer which are designed to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claim ishis.

It has been held that the determination of the respective right of rival claimants to public land is different from the determination of who has the actual physical possession or occupation with a view to protecting the same and preventing disorder and breaches of the peace. A judgment of the court ordering restitution of the possession of a parcel of land to the actual occupant, who has been deprived thereof by another through the use of force or in any other illegal manner, can never be "prejudicial interference" with the disposition or alienation of public lands. On the contrary, if courts were deprived of

jurisdiction over the cases involving conflicts of possession, the threat of judicial action against breaches of the peace committed on public lands would be eliminated, and a

state of lawlessness would probably be produced between applicants, occupants or squatters, where force or might, not right or justice would rule. (Comments on the Ruleof Court by Moran, Vol. 2 [1957 ed.], pp. 284-285; emphasis ours.)

In other words, public interest, public policy and public order demand that the party in peacefulpossession of a land, independently of whether it is private in the nature or part of he publicdomain, be not ousted therefrom by means of force, violation or intimidation, regardless of thequality of his alleged right to the possession thereof, and that, whoever claims to have a bettertitle or right thereto should seek, from the proper authorities, the legal remedies establishedtherefor, instead of taking the law into their hands.

In view of the foregoing, the order of respondent Judge, dated November 10, 1958, insofaronly as it reconsiders and sets aside the aforementioned order of October 14, 1958, directingexecution of the judgment of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alcala, is hereby annulled andsaid order of October 14, 1958, is, accordingly, reinstated, with costs against the mainrespondent herein. It is so ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Barrera, JJ., concur.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-17468 July 31, 1963

PILAR T. DEL ROSARIO, MARIANO V. DEL ROSARIO and SALVADOR V. DELROSARIO, petitioners-appellants,vs.HON. DAMIAN L. JIMENEZ, as Judge of the Municipal Court of Quezon City, BranchIII,SANCHO R. JACINTO and DOMINGO BASCARA, respondents-appellees.

Cornelio S. Ruperto for petitioners-appellants.Vicente M. Magpoc for respondents-appellees.Damian L. Jimenez in his own behalf as respondents-appellees.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This case is before us on appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (BranchII), dated June 4, 1960, dismissing appellants' petition for certiorari and mandamus to reviewfour orders of the municipal court of Quezon City (Branch III) in civil case No. 5039 entitled"Sancho R. Jacinto, et al. vs. Pilar T. del Rosario, et al." That case was one of forcible entryunder Rule 72, involving two parcels of land of which the plaintiffs, Sancho R. Jacinto andDomingo C. Bascara, now respondents-appellees, are the registered owners under transfercertificates of title Nos. 26531 and 26532, both issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

These lands had been acquired by them through purchase from the previous registered owner,J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. In their answer to the complaint the defendants, now petitioners-appellants, claimed ownership of the same properties by purchase from one Macaria Fulgencioand her husband Carlos Javier and alleged that they were and had been in actual physicalpossession thereof even before the purchase from J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. by appellees.

Appellants, after a second amended complaint had been filed by appellees, submitted theiranswer thereto dated October 2, 1958, including a "third-party complaint" against the plaintiffsthemselves as well as against J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc., from both of whom they prayed for anaward of damages.

In the meantime, after the action of forcible entry was filed, herein appellants commenced asuit for "reconveyance and/or recovery" of the same properties against appellees in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (No. 5230), and then, on November 4, 1958, filed a motion in themunicipal court to suspend proceedings in the summary action before it until after thetermination of the case in the Court of First Instance.

On October 7, 1958 the municipal court denied admission of the third-party complaint; and onthe following November 6 it likewise denied the motion to suspend proceedings. In bothinstances appellants moved to reconsider and were turned down in two other separate orders,dated October 24 and November 27, 1958, respectively. These are the four orders subject of


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appellants' petition for certiorari and mandamus , which was dismissed by the Court of FirstInstance of Rizal and now on appeal before us. 1wph1.t

The third-party complaint was improperly brought against appellees Jacinto and Bascara, sincethey were themselves the plaintiffs in the forcible entry case, as to whom a mere counterclaimwould suffice. Insofar as J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. was concerned, the allegation against it is thatit had entered into a compromise agreement with a certain Deudor in four civil cases in theCourt of First Instance of Quezon City, whereby it agreed to give priority to occupants of landsinvolved therein (including those now in dispute) in the matter of their purchase and that theejectment suit filed by herein appellees was a violation of that compromise agreement. We failto see how such "agreement to which appellees were strangers, could have anything to do withtheir right of action to recover the material possession of the lands in question. The prayer inthe third-party complaint that J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. be sentenced to pay damages should bethe subject, if at all, of a separate action so that matters extraneous to the issue of possessionmay not unnecessarily clutter the forcible entry case. The admission of a third-party complaintis discretionary with the court, and in the present instance there was no abuse of discretion inthe order of denial complained of.

With respect to the other order that denying appellant's motion to suspend proceedings itis enough to point out, first, that the action for "reconveyance and/or recovery" in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which appellants claim should take precedence, was filed by them whenthe forcible entry case was already pending, and was obviously intended to delay theproceedings therein; and secondly, that the issue involved in the later action, which is one of title, is not prejudicial to the determination of the issue of summary possession. The verypetition for mandamus and certiorari the dismissal of which is the subject of this appeal islikewise dilatory in nature, as shown by the fact that it is only one of the numerous actionspreviously resorted to by appellants and decided unfavorably to them. There was special civilaction No. 5318, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, dismissed by Judge Andres Reyesfor lack of jurisdiction and then refiled in Branch V (Quezon City), but again dismissed by JudgeNicasio Yatco on July 2, 1959; and subsequently, there was special civil action No. 5500, Courtof First Instance of Rizal, dismissed by Judge Felix R. Domingo on July 8, 1959. Both of theseactions were instituted after the ejectment case was filed by herein appellees and sought tosuspend the trial thereof. There must be an end to the litigious rigmarole pursued byappellants.

The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes,Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10313 March 28, 1960

ISIDORA S. VDA. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,vs.LUCIANO DE LA CRUZ, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Crispin D. Baizas for appellants.Valentin, Castro and Maranan for appellees.

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J .:

This is an appeal from an order of dismissal.

It appears that in a forcible entry case filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of San Antonio,Nueva Ecija, by Isidora S. Vda. de Jesus, et al. against Marcosa Villaronte and 11 others,

judgment was rendered by said court on October 5, 1954 ordering the defendants to vacate theparcel of land involved in the case and restore possession thereof to the plaintiffs and also paythe latter five cavans of palay per hectare for the use of the land for each agricultural yearbeginning 1954-1955.

In due time the defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance and the case was theredocketed as Civil Case No. 1637 of that court. Thereafter, defendants filed their answer with a

counterclaim and plaintiffs on their part filed an answer to the counterclaim.

With the appealed case still pending trial, the plaintiffs asked for immediate execution becauseof the alleged failure of the defendants to file a supersedeas bond and to deposit the value of the use of the land as fixed in the judgment. The defendants opposed the motion, but on April29, 1955 the court ordered the issuance of a writ of execution to have the defendants vacatethe land and restore possession thereof to the plaintiffs. On May 19, 1955, the writ of executionwas served on the defendants and all adverse occupants of the land but they all refused tovacate the premises. However, on June 9, 1955, plaintiffs were able to obtain an alias writ of execution and this time the sheriff, with the aid of the Philippine Constabulary, was able to ejectthe defendants and the other adverse occupants from the premises and to place the plaintiffs inpossession thereof.

Alleging that after the sheriff and the Constabulary had left the premises the defendants andthe other adverse occupants re-entered the land, threatened the plaintiffs with physical harmand continued to occupy and exercise acts of possession and ownership over the land to theexclusion of said plaintiffs, the latter, on July 11, 1955, petitioned the court to declare thedefendants and the said other occupants guilty of contempt of court. Acting upon the petition,the court in its order dated October 3, 1955, cited "over 20 persons" (actually 25, see briefs of the parties) including six of the twelve defendants to appear and show cause why they should


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not be dealt with in contempt. Not content with the contempt proceeding they had instituted,plaintiffs, on November 11 of that same year, filed a motion alleging that the defendants andother adverse occupants, after re-entering the land, cultivated and planted the same in badfaith and consequently lost or forfeited what was planted by them without right of indemnity inaccordance with Article 449 of the new Civil Code. For prayer, plaintiffs asked that the courtorder the Philippine Constabulary to supervise the harvest and threshing of the palay on theland, and that the palay harvest be deposited either with the Constabulary or in any bondedwarehouse. Acting upon the motion, the court on November 29, 1955, denied the prayer thatthe harvest be deposited in a bonded warehouse on the ground that the questions of thealleged re-entry and bad faith were to be decided in the contempt proceeding, but granted theprayer for the detail of Constabulary soldiers in the premises to maintain peace and orderduring the harvest and threshing of palay.

On December 17, 1955, with the main case and the petition for contempt still pending hearing,the plaintiffs filed in the same Court of First Instance another civil action, which is now thesubject of the present appeal. The new action is directed against 65 defendants, three of whomwere already defendants in the former case. The complaint alleges that in the months of July,

August and September, 1955, in disobedience to the orders of the court, and against thevigorous objection of the plaintiffs, defendants unlawfully and in bad faith occupied andcultivated the land in question and made plantings on the same, thereby depriving the plaintiffs who were themselves ready to cultivate and plant the said property of its use andenjoyment; that the defendants, despite the fact that they were sowers in bad faith andtherefore not entitled to what they had planted, were harvesting the products of the land andappropriating them for their own use in violation of plaintiffs' rights. The complaint prayed (1)that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued immediately enjoining all the defendants and anyother adverse occupant from taking and appropriating for their own use and consumption thepalay being harvested from the land in question for the agricultural year 1955-56, after fixingthe amount of the bond to be executed in favor of the defendants; (2) that the palay harvestedbe ordered deposited in any bonded warehouse or any place deemed convenient; (3) that aftertrial, a judgment be entered ordering that the palay harvested from the land in questionforfeited by defendants in favor of plaintiffs without any right of indemnity; and (4) thatdefendants be restrained from further re-entering and cultivating the land in question.

Answering the complaint, the defendant set up defenses which, as later supplemented, are tothe effect that three of them, namely, Ruperto Tayao, Gavino Magno and GregorioMangulabnan, together with their co-defendants in the former case, have been in possessioneither by themselves or through their predecessors in interest, of the said land in question ashomesteaders since 1914; that the said land being public land, they engaged the services of

Atty. Teofilo de Jesus, plaintiffs' predecessor in interest, for the said attorney to secure a freepatent for them on condition that his services would be paid with a portion of the products of the land, but that the said attorney, instead of complying with his trust, declared the land in hisname for taxation purposes, had it also surveyed in his name, and instead of claiming the landfor his clients in the Cadastral Case, he filed a claim in his own name, all this without theknowledge of the defendants, who discovered the same only recently; that defendants wereplanters in good faith; that they had not been legally dispossessed of the land by virtue of analias writ of execution obtained by plaintiff; that they have been in continuous possession of theland in the belief that they have the right to do so as homesteaders and, also to harvest thesame as such; that there was already a pending case (referring to Civil Case No. 1637) between


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the same plaintiffs and the three abovenamed defendants, the rest of their co-defendants,aside from their co-defendants in that former case," "being only paid workers and/or harvesters(manggagapas) of the defendants in Civil Case No. 1637 so that this case is but a duplication of said Civil Case No. 1637, and therefore, should be dismissed." In a supplemental pleading laterfiled, defendants also set up the defense that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdictionover the case.

At defendants' instance, a hearing was held on the affirmative defenses. After said hearing, thecourt below sustained defendants and dismissed the complaint on the grounds that there ispending another action involving the same subject matter and issue and that it lacks jurisdictionto take cognizance of the case because it is in effect one for forcible entry within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court. From that order, the plaintiffs appealed directly tothis Court.

The appeal is without merit.

Plaintiffs' complaint in the present case is predicated on the allegations that defendants, afterre-entering the land in question, cultivated and planted the same in bad faith, thereby forfeitingin plaintiff's favor whatever they may have planted. These allegations, it will be observed, arethe same allegations plaintiffs have made in their motion for contempt, which is still pendinghearing, and in their motion of November 11, 1955 both in the forcible entry case (Civil CaseNo. 1637). The two cases involve the same parcel of land and, apparently, the same plantings,the acts complained of in the present action being alleged to have been committed in July,

August, and September, 1955, or before plaintiffs filed their incidental motions in the forcibleentry case. To allow, therefore, the present complaint to be prosecuted as a separate andindependent action would only encourage, instead of avoid, a multiplicity of suits. As ruled bythe court in the forcible entry case when it acted upon plaintiffs' motion of November 11, 1955,the questions of the alleged re-entry and bad faith on the part of defendants are to be decided

in the contempt proceeding. Obviously, the decision therein will necessarily dispose of theissues in the present complaint and conclude the controversy between the parties.

Plaintiffs-appellants argue that they had never asked, as they could not, for the forfeiture of thepalay harvest in the forcible entry case and that only 3 of the 65 defendants in the presentaction are defendants in that case. The contempt proceeding, however, filed by them in theformer case is civil in nature, the object being the enforcement of their civil rights andremedies. The punishment would, accordingly, be remedial and for the benefit of thecomplainants. (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271.) Considering that in saidproceedings complete restitution to the injured party may be decreed (sec. 6, Rule 64), andthat a judgment, except in default cases, may grant the relief to which the party in whose favorit is rendered is entitled even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings, oreven if the complaint contains no prayer for relief (Rule 35, sec. 8) there is no reason whyforfeiture of the palay harvest, if warranted, may not be obtained by plaintiffs in their favor. Atany rate, the contempt proceeding is still pending. If necessary, pleadings may still be amendedto include the prayer for forfeiture.

As to the alleged non-identity of parties, while only 3 of the 12 defendants in the forcible entrycase and 20 of the persons cited for contempt therein are among the 65 defendants in thepresent case, it should be noted that the acts now complained of are the same acts alleged by


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plaintiffs in their incidental motions in the said forcible entry case. It is, therefore, difficult tosee, as observed by the court below, how about 42 new occupants could have come in as to

justify the filing of a new action. On the other hand, we are inclined to believe that, as allegedin the answer to the complaint, these additional defendants are mere hired workers or"harvesters (reapers) of the defendants in the former case and consequently cannot be heldanswerable for the palay allegedly harvested. Their inclusion as defendants in this case,apparently, is but an attempt to circumvent the proceedings in the forcible entry case, the courthaving previously denied plaintiffs' incidental motion therein to place the harvest in a bondedwarehouse.

In any event, even assuming that the 45 additional defendants are not mere workers buttrespassers and strangers to other defendants, the allegations in the complaint filed in this case(as held by the court below), clearly make out an action for forcible entry. Paragraph 5 of thesaid complaint alleges that the defendants "without the consent and against the vigorousobjection of the plaintiffs unlawfully and in bad faith occupied and cultivated the land inquestion." To exclude plaintiffs against their vigorous objection necessarily implies the use of acertain degree of force and/or intimidation. (Moran's Rules of Court, 1957 ed., Vol. 2, pp. 296-

297.) And the date of unlawful entry having been made, according to the complaint, in July, August and September, 1955, or within one year prior to the filing of the complaint, the sameshould therefore be filed with the Justice of the Peace Court which has exclusive jurisdictionover such cases. The fact that bad faith in planting is alleged and forfeiture of the harvest isprayed for would not take the complaint outside the jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace Court.

. . . where the occupant has built on the land, especially where said building issubstantial and valuable, the courts even in ejectment cases are bound to takecognizance of said fact and when they find that the construction or planting had beeneffected in good faith, instead of dismissing the complaint and suggesting to the partiesto observe and follow the provisions of Art. 361 or Art. 448 of the old and the new CivilCode of the Philippines, respectively, and if they cannot agree, to file a new action, notonly to enforce or defend the respective rights of the parties but to assess the value of the land of the improvement as well, the courts in order to avoid mutiplicity of actionsand to administer practical and speedy justice may, as was done in this case, apply theprovisions of the Civil Code relative to builders specially since there is no question as tothe ownership of the land as shown by the certificate of title, and the ownership of thebuildings. (Tayag et al. vs. Yuseco, et al., 97 Phil., 712.)

In view of the foregoing, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costsagainst appellants.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Barrera, JJ., concur.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-31822 July 31, 1972

JOSE SALCEDO QUIMPO, petitioner,vs.CATALINO DELA VICTORIA and FRANCISCA O. DELA VICTORIA, respondents.

Jose P. Arro for petitioner.

Garcilaso F. Vega for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.: p

Petition to review the following orders of the Court Of First Instance of Davao, 16th JudicialDistrict, Branch 11, in its Civil Case No. 6473, entitled Catalino dela Victoria, et al. vs. Jose Salcedo Quimpo : order of 29 Ju

focible entry en banc cases

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