fmea presentation
TRANSCRIPT
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
FMEA: A Problem Prevention Tool
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
(*) Missile Defense Agency
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
We have designed a 5-floor commercial aircraft that has-tennis courts-restaurants-boutiques
The only problem is that we haven’t verified if it can fly!!!
A story…
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
Quality “Control”
RELIABILITY-fmea
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
The production elements
1.- Men2.- Materials 3.- Machines and equipment 4.- Methods 5.- Information
NKS/Factory Magazine (1988)
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
Information Materials Machines
MenMethods
An important missing element. What is it?
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
CONTROLCONTROL
Information Materials Machines
MenMethods
…right!
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
What does Control mean?
To take actions to keepa situation in a certain
desired state
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
A systemized group of activities designed to 1. RECOGNIZE and EVALUATE the POTENTIAL FAILURE of a PRODUCT/PROCESS and its EFFECTS 2. IDENTIFY ACTIONS WHICH COULD ELIMINATE or REDUCE the CHANCE of POTENTIAL FAILURE OCURRING
3. DOCUMENT the PROCESS
(D,F,GM. FMEA, 2001)
Definition of FMEA Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
Two types of FMEA
-Design FMEA or DFMEA
-Process FMEA or PFMEA
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
Characteristics of FMEA
-It looks to minimizeminimize the probabilityprobability of a failure, or tominimizeminimize its effects
-Should be initiated before or at design concept finalization (DFMEA), or before production starts(PFMEA)
-It is an endless iterative process
-It is a way to document processes and designs
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
The DFMEA evaluates what can go wrongwith the product during its use andits use and
during its manufacturingduring its manufacturing as a consequenceof design weaknesses
(Aldridge, Taylor 1991)
The PFMEA focuses on the reasons ofpotential failures during manufacturingduring manufacturing as a result
of not complying with the original design or failing to meet the design’s specifications
(Aldridge, Taylor 1991)
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
History of FMEA
Originally used by NASA during the 60s. Ford Motor Co. started using it
during the 70s
(Gilchrist, 1993)
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
FMEA benefits
-Reduction of internal cost due to re-work for notdoing things right the first time -Reduction of the number of complaints and warranty costs
-Increase of customer satisfaction
-Confidence that a company’s products are based in reliable and robust production methods
(Aldridge, Taylor 1991)
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
Item Potential Potential
Sev
Class
Occur
Current
Detec
RPN
ResponsibilityActions Results
Failure Effect(s) of Recommended & TargetFunction Mode Failure
Potential Causes/Mechanisms(s)
FailureControls
Action(s) Completion DateDet
Occ
RPN
ActionsTaken
Sev
What are the functions, featuresor requirements?
What can go wrong?
- No Function
- Partial/ Over/ Degraded Function
- Intermittent Function
- Unintended Function
What are the
Effect(s)?
How bad is it?
What are the Cause(s)?
Howoften does
ithappen?
How can this be preventedand detected?
How good is
this method
atdetecting
it?
What can be done?
- Design changes
- Process changes
- Special controls
- Changes to standards, procedures, or guides
Prevention/Detection
(D,F,GM. FMEA, 2001)Summary of DFMEA/PFMEA
Who is goingto do it andwhen?
What did theydo and what
are theoutcomes
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
Definitions
Failure Mode:Failure Mode: is the way in which the failure is manifested
Failure effect:Failure effect: is the consequence of the failure
Failure cause:Failure cause: is what induces the failure
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
Example (Ford, 1991; D,F,GM. FMEA,2001) PFMEA
Manual application ofwax inside door
Insufficiente waxcoverage overspecified surface
7 Manually insertedspray head notinserted far enough
To cover inner doorlower surfaces at min.wax thickness toretard corrosion
Process/ Op.description and purpose
Potentialfailure mode
Potentialfailure effects
C Potential causes/
mechanismof failures
lSev
as
Deteriorated life ofdoor leading to:
Unsatisfactory appea-rance due to rust through paint overtime
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
O D R
c e Pu t Nr er c8 Visual inspection
every hour. Verify thick-ness and coverage with gauge once per shift.(D).Test spray pattern atstart-up and after idleperiods. (P).
5 280 Add positive depth stopto sprayer
R. López
0X 10 15
Automatic spraying R. López
0X 12 15
Example (Ford, 1991; D,F,GM. FMEA,2001) PFMEA (cont)
Currentprocesscontrol
Recommendedactions
Responsibility& target
completiondate
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
A C T I O N R E S U L T SActions S O D Rtaken e c e P
v u t Nr c
Stop added, sprayer checked on line
Rejected due to complexity ofdifferent doors on same line
7 2 5 70
Example (Ford, 1991; D,F,GM. FMEA,2001) PFMEA
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
General Recommendations (Palady 1995)
1. To determine the effects it’s important to capture the finalcustomer experiences. Try to experiment what the customerwould feel. Otherwise severity may be underestimated.
2. To define severity, take into consideration safety issues as wellas costs.
3. The recommendations must be justified based on its cost-benefitrelationship, and must have a high degree of permanence.
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
Aldridge J., Taylor J.(1991) “The Application of Failure Mode and Effects Analysis at an Automotive Components Manufacturer”. International Journal of Quality and Reliability Management, Vol. 8 No. 3.
Chrysler Corp., Ford Motor Co., General Motors Corp.(1995). Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis. 2d. ed. A.I.A.G.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., Ford Motor Co., General Motors Corp.(2001). Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis. 3rd. ed. A.I.A.G.
Gilchrist W. (1993) “Modelling Failure Modes and Effects Analysis”. International Journal of Quality and Reliability Management, Vol. 10 No. 5.
NKS/Factory Magazine (1988). Poka Yoke. Improving Quality by Preventing Defects. Productivity.Palady P. (1995) Failure Modes And Effects Analysis. PT Publications, Inc.
Palady P. (1995) Failure Modes And Effects Analysis. PT Publications, Inc.
References
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
APPENDIX
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
Hazardous-withwarning
Very High
High
Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation without warning
Low
Very Low
Minor
Very Minor
None
Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation with warning
Vehicle/item inoperable (loss of primary function).
Vehicle/item operable but at a reduced level of performance. Customer very dissatisfied.
Vehicle/item operable but Comfort/Convenience item(s) inoperable. Customer dissatisfied.
Vehicle/item operable but Comfort/Convenience item(s) operable at a reduced level of performance. Customer somewhat dissatisfied.
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by most customers (greater than 75%).
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by 50% of customers.
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by discriminating customers (less than 25%).
No discernible effect.
10
8
7
6
3
2
1
Hazardous-withoutwarning
Moderate
4
5
EFFECT CRITERIA: Severity of Effect RANK
DFMEA SEVERITY EVALUATION CRITERIA
9
(D,F
,GM
. FM
EA
, 200
1)
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
Probability of Failure
Likely Failure Rates Over Design Life
Ranking
Very High: Persistent failures
100 per thousand vehicles/items 10
50 per thousand vehicles/items
9
High: Frequent failures
20 per thousand vehicles/items 8
10 per thousand vehicles/items
7
Moderate: Occasional failures
5 per thousand vehicles/items 6
2 per thousand vehicles/items
5
1 per thousand vehicles/items
4
Low: Relatively few failures
0.5 per thousand vehicles/items 3
0.1 per thousand vehicles/items
2
Remote: Failure is unlikely
0.01 per thousand vehicles/items
1
(D,F
,GM
. FM
EA
, 200
1)
DE
SIG
N O
CC
UR
RE
NC
E E
VA
LU
AT
ION
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
Detection
Criteria: Likelihood of DETECTION by Design
Control
Ranking
Absolute Uncertainty
Design Control will not and/or can not detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode; or there is no Design Control.
10
Very Remote
Very remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
9
Remote
Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
8
Very Low
Very low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
7
Low
Low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
6
(D,F,GM. FMEA, 2001)
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
Moderate
Moderate chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
5
Moderately High
Moderately high chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
4
High
High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
3
Very High
Very high chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
2
Almost Certain
Design Control will almost certainly detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
1
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
Effect
PROCESS ------------------------------------------------------ Criteria: SEVERITY of Effect
Ranking
Hazardous-withoutwarning
Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe operation and/or involves noncompliance with regulations without warning.Or may endanger operator without warning.
10
Hazardous-with warning
Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe operation and/or involves noncompliance with regulations with warning.Or may endanger operator with warning.
9
Very high
Product/item inoperable, with loss of primary function. Or 100% of product may have to be scrapped or repair time >1h.
8
High
Product/item operable, but at reduced level of performance. Customer dissatisfied. Or product may have to be sorted and less than 100% scrapped. Repair time between 0.5 and 1h.
7
Moderate
Product/item operable, but comfort/convenience inoperable. Customer dissatisfied. Or a portion (less than 100%) of the product may have to be scrapped with no sorting. Repair time less than 0.5h
6
In th
e th
ird e
ditio
n th
is ta
ble
is pr
esen
ted
in tw
o co
lum
ns b
ut th
e in
form
atio
n is
the
sam
e(c
usto
mer
effe
ct a
nd m
anuf
actu
ring/
asse
mbl
y ef
fect
).
(D,F
,GM
. FM
EA
, 200
1)
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
Low
Product/item operable, but comfort/convenience operable at a reduced level. Or than 100% of the product may have to be reworked with no sorting. Repairing off-line.
5
Very Low
Fit and finish/squeak and rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by most customers (greater than 75%). Or product may have to be sorted with no scrap, and a portion (less than 100% reworked.
4
Minor
Fit and finish/squeak and rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by 50% of the customers. Or a portion (less than 100%) of the product may have to be reworked with no scrap. On-line but out-of-station.
3
Very Minor
Fit and finish/squeak and rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by discriminating customers (less than 25%). Or a portion (less than 100%) of the product may have to be reworked with no scrap. On-line but in-station.
2
None
No discernible effect. Or slight inconvenience to operation or operator, or no effect.
1
(D,F,GM. FMEA, 2001)
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
Probability of Failure
Likely Failure Rates Ranking
Very High: Persistent failures
100 per thousand pieces 10
50 per thousand pieces
9
High: Frequent failures
20 per thousand pieces 8
10 per thousand pieces
7
Moderate: Occasional failures
5 per thousand pieces 6
2 per thousand pieces
5
1 per thousand pieces
4
Low: Relatively few failures
0.5 per thousand pieces 3
0.1 per thousand pieces 2
Remote: Failure is unlikely
0.01 per thousand pieces
1
PR
OC
ES
S O
CC
UR
RE
NC
E R
AN
KIN
G
(D,F
,GM
. FM
EA
, 200
1)
Dr. Edgardo J. Escalante.
Detection Criteria A B C Suggested Range of Detection Methods Ranking
Almost Impossible
Absolute certainty of non-detection.
Cannot detect or is not checked. 10 Very Remote Controls will
probably not detect.
Control is achieved with indirect or random checks only. 9
Remote Controls have poor chance of detection.
Control is achieved with visual inspection only. 8
Very Low Controls have poor chance of detection.
Control is achieved with double visual inspection only. 7
Low Controls may detect.
Control is achieved with charting methods , such as SPC {Statistical Process Control}.
6
Moderate Controls may detect.
Control is based on variable gauging after parts have left the station, OR Go/No Go gauging performed on 100% of
the parts after parts have left the station.
5
Moderately High
Controls have a good chance to detect.
Error detection in subsequent operations, OR gauging performed on setup and first- piece check.
4
High Controls have a good chance to detect.
Error detection in- station, OR error detection in subsequent operat ions by multiple layers of acceptance: supply, select, install, verify. Can not accept discrepant part.
3
Very High Controls almost certain to detect.
Error detection in- station (automatic gauging with automatic stop feature). Can not pass discrepant part.
2
Almost certain Controls certain to detect.
Discrepant parts can not be made because item has been error proofed by process/product design.
1
Inspection types: A=Mistake-proofed, B=Gauging, C=Manual inspection
DETECTION CRITERIA FOR PFMEA(D,F,GM. FMEA, 2001)