fm 90-8 counter guerilla operations

8/14/2019 FM 90-8 Counter Guerilla Operations

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F M 9 0 - 8

Preface

T his is an other type of war new in its in tensity,ancient in its origins war by guerrillas, subver-

sives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambushinstead of by combat; by infiltration, instead ofaggression, seeking victory by eroding and ex-hausting the enemy instead of engaging him...itrequires in those situations where we must counter

it. ..a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different

kind of force, and therefore a new and whollydifferent kind of military training.

John F. Kennedy, 1962

The aims, objectives, and methods of guerrilla warfare differ greatlyfrom those of conventional warfare. To be successful in countering this

type of war, the planners of counterguerrilla operations mustunderstand the enemy and the unique environment in which heoperates.

This manual provides commanders and staffs of brigade elements and

below with concepts and doctrine concerning the conduct of counter-guerrilla operations by US forces in insurgency and conventionalconflict environments. It provides a general overview of US counterin-surgency strategy and the impact that strategy has on counterguerrilla

operations. It provides planning, training, and operational guidancefor commanders and staffs conducting counterguerrilla operations.

The doctrine provides principles to guide the actions of US forcesconducting counterguerrilla operations. In applying these principles,the commander must be aware that the situation in each counterguerrillaoperation is unique. Techniques and tactics applied successfully in onesituation may not be suitable if applied in the same manner in anothersituation. The principles in this manual are guides to be adapted toeach counterguerrilla situation.

The proponent of this publication is HQ TRADOC. Submit changes for

improving this publication on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes

to Publications and Blank Forms) and forward to the Commandant,US Army Infantry School, ATTN: ATSH-B-ID, Fort Benning, GA31905.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, bothmen and women are included.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Section I. General

1 - 1 . O v e r v i e w .

This chapter discusses the type of activity that is characteristic of aninsurgency. A general overview of insurgency is provided to introducethe planner of counterguerrilla operations to the insurgent. The hostgovernm ent s met hod to defeat th e insur gency is discussed, as is the

difference between counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla operations.

The methods of response by United States (US) forces, and the generaldoctrine for their use, are also presented.

1-2. Types of conflict .

a. The risk to nat ional survival is greatest in a convent iona l conflict,but the probability of such conflicts occurring is relatively low. On

the other hand, the risk to national survival is not as great in acounterinsurgency conflict, but the probability of these types ofconflicts occurring is much greater.

b. Convent iona l conflicts imp ly a sta te of open belligerency betweennations and a direct confrontation of their armed forces. Aninsurgency implies a situation where a country is threatened byan internal attempt, frequently assisted by external support, tooverthrow the legitimate government. counterguerrilla situations

faced by US forces are likely to occur in an insurgency environment,but may also occur in conventional conflict environments.Counterguerrilla operations in support of a conventional conflict(such as the partisan operations that occurred behind Germanlines during World War II) are discussed in Chapter 4.

Section Il. Insurgency

1-3. Concept .

a. The concept of resistance applies to an organized effort by someportion of the civil population of a country to resist, oppose, or

overthrow the existing government. Many of the methods ofresistance are part of the stock-in-trade of revolutionary activity.There can be no revolut ion without a resistance movement, but

there can be a resistance movement without a revolution when theobjectives of the resistors do not envision a reallocation of power.

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b.

b. This concept applies to an organ ized insur gent movement th atseeks to overthrow the established government. In this manner,an insurgent organization can be considered a type of resistance

organization.

1 - 4 . P r e r e q u i s i t e s .

There are three requirements that must exist before an insurgency can

occur.

a. Vu l n e r a b l e p o p u l a t io n . For wha tever th e rea sons social,political, or economic th e populat ion is gener ally open tochange. The insurgents will offer hope for change and exploitdissatisfaction with the current government.

Leade rsh ip ava i l ab le fo r d i rec t ion . A vulnerable populationalone will not support an insurgent movement. There must be aleadership element that can direct the frustrations of a dissatisfied

populace along the lines delineated by the overall insurgentst rategy.

c. Lack o f govern men t con t r o l. Lack of government control maybe real or perceived. The greater the control the government hasover the situation, the less likely are the chances for insurgentsuccess The opposite is also true: the less control the governmenthas, the greater is the chance for insurgent success.

1 -5 . O t h e r r e q u i r e d c o n d i t i o n s .

There are a number of other conditions that must exist or be produced

for an insurgent movement to succeed.

a .

b.

c.

d.

e.

P o p u l a r s u p p o r t . Support can be passive or active. It is n otnecessary that the entire population actively support aninsurgency, but th e ma jority of the population must passivelysupport it.

Unit y of e ffor t . The overall thru st of an insur gent movementmust provide a strength of unity that dedicates those involved toachieving the same goal.

Will to r esist . It is not enough for the population to resist theirgovernment passively; at least a portion must be willing to resist

actively.

L e a d e r s h i p . The activities and effort of the insurgent movementmust be properly directed through the exercise of effectiveleadership.

Disc ip l ine . The aspect of the movement must be stronglymaintained to ensure security and obedience.

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f. In t e l l i g en ce . Because the insurgent movement is usuallyinferior in nu mbers a nd combat power in relation to governmentforces, the intelligence effort must provide security for theinsurgent organization and information to conduct successful

operations.

g. P r o p a g a n d a . It is used t o gain popular su pport an d intensifyth e populaces dissat isfaction with th e govern men t.

h . Fa v o r a b l e e n v i r o n m e n t . This includes attitudes of the people,the political environment, and the economic situation.

i. E xterna l suppor t . The preceding eight conditions are theoreticallythe only ones that an insurgency must have to succeed.Historically, however, there seems to be one additional conditionthat must exist the condition of external support. This supportmay be physical or psychological. Examples of physical external

support are equipment, weapons, supplies, ammunition, sanctuaries,

personnel, and combat units. Examples of psychological externalsupport include the political support given to the resistance whena country recognizes that movement in the world arena and thepressure a government might exert politically or economically toinfluence world opinion in favor of the movement.

1 - 6 . I n su r g e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n .

An insurgent organization may have both an overt and a covertelement. The overt element, the guerrilla, is readily identified. It is

supported by a clandestine element which mak es up th e insurgentinfrastructure. The insurgent organization also has political andmilitary structures.

1-7 . Phases o f deve lopment .

a. Once an insurgent organization is established and begins itsactivities, it progresses thr ough severa l pha ses in its effort tooverthrow the government. When the insurgency moves from one

phase to another is difficult to determine. The activities that occurin the earlier phases will continue through the later phases. These

phases range from the weak insurgent movement until the timethe insurgent can confront government forces directly.

b. There is also the possibility that an insurgency may move directly

from Phase I to Phase III. Additionally, depending upon the lack

of success of the movement, there may also be a reversion fromPha se III to Phase II or even back to Phase I.

(1) P h a s e I: L a t e n t a n d i n c i p i e n t i n s u r g e n c y . Activity inthis ph ase r an ges from subversive activity th at is only apotential threat to situations in which frequent subversive

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incidents a nd activities occur in a n organized patt ern. Itinvolves no major outbreak of violence or uncontrolledinsurgent activity. The guerrilla force does not conductcontinuous operations but rather selected acts of terrorism.

(2) P h a s e I I : G u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e . This phase is reachedwhen the insurgent movement, having gained sufficientlocal or external support, initiates organized continuousguerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against thegovernment. This is an attempt to force government forcesinto a defensive role. As the guerrilla becomes stronger, hebegins to conduct larger operations.

(3) P ha se I I I : War o f movemen t . When the guerrilla attainsthe force structure and capability to directly engagegovernment forces in decisive combat, then he will progres-sively begin to use more conventional tactics and may obtaincombat forces from an external source. He may also begin to

conduct more extensive defensive operations in this phase toprotect the areas he controls.

c. The goal of the insurgent movement, if achieved, will result in thereplacement of the established government with a governmentstructure developed by the insurgent movement. If this occurs, it

is a political victory for the insurgents. The insurgent movementdoes not need to defeat host country forces to accomplish this. Apar allel or shadow governm ent ma y also be developed by aninsurgent force. It must, however, win the support of the peopleaway from the established government to achieve this politicalvictory.

Section Ill. Counterinsurgency

1 - 8 . T h r e e t a r g e t g r o u p s .

The governments weapon to combat insurgency is counterinsurgency(COIN). The COIN mission includes a full range of measures used by agovernment to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness,

and insur gency. They are a ctions tak en by a n at ion t o promote itsgrowth by building viable institutions (political, military, economic,social) that respond to the needs of the people. There are three targetgroups that the government addresses: the population, insurgents, and

external actors.

1 - 9 . P o p u l a t i o n .

The government must win back the support of the people. It does thisthrough providing them security and showing an honest effort tocorrect those conditions which caused dissatisfaction.

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1 - 1 0 . I n su r g e n t s .

a. The government must isolate the insurgent from the population,both physically and psychologically, thereby denying himpersonnel, materiel, and intelligence support.

b. The COIN str at egy is based on the concept of balan ced development ,mobilization, and n eutr alization. These th ree components ar einterdependent and must occur simultaneously. If COIN strategy

achieves its goal, the government will regain populace support.

c. The military assists the COIN program through the conduct of six

major operations: intelligence, psychological operations, civilaffairs, populace and resources control, advisory assistance, andtactical operations. The successful employment of these operationscontributes to the success of the COIN program. They arenormally conducted simultaneously, in conjunction with each

other, and require close coordination of diverse governmentagencies.

1-11 . Ex te rna l ac to r s .

Current insurgencies target on external actors for support, passive oractive. Both the government and the insurgents use this tactic. Theinsurgent tries to separate the government from its foreign support.The government seeks to retain its support and separate the insurgentfrom his foreign support.

1 -12 . C o u n t e r i n su r g e n c y c o u n t e r g u e r r i l la .

There is a difference in the t erm s counterinsurgency and counter-guerrilla. The internal defense and development (IDAD) program isgeared to counter the whole insurgency. It does this throughalleviating conditions which may cause insurgency. This program,which addresses both the populace and the insurgent, can be termedcounterinsurgency. Counterguerrilla operations are geared to theactive military element of the insurgent movement only. To this end,counterguerrilla operations are viewed as a supporting component ofthe counterinsurgency effort.

Section IV. Foreign Internal Defense

1 - 1 3 . U S a s s i s t a n c e .

a . All civil military action by a government to assist a hostgovernmen t an d t o achieve a st an dar d level of protection fromlawlessness, subversion, and insurgency is termed foreign

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internal defense (FID). The Unit ed Sta tes (US) Arm y has beenassigned a major role in providing military assistance to selectednations in support of US national interests. The degree ofparticipation by US Army units is determined by US policy and

interests, an analysis of the insurgent threat, and the capabilitiesand desires of the host countrys government.

b. The int roduction of US combat forces int o an insu rgency tocondu ct coun terguerr illa operat ions is something th at is donewhen all other US and host country responses have beeninadequat e. US combat forces ar e never th e first unit s into acountry. They are normally the last. Preceding them is an array ofadvisors, security assistance forces, mobile training teams,combat service support units, and combat support units. Combatcommanders deploying to conduct counterguerrilla operationsshould understand this and the fact that neutralization of theguerrilla is only one-third of the COIN strategy. Balanced

development of the country and mobilization of the populaceagainst the insurgents must occur simultaneously for theinsur gency to be defeated.

1-14. US act ivi t ies.

a. When deployed in FID operations, US forces ensure t hat th eirplanned activities support the goals and consequences of the host

countrys COIN program. Actions by US forces must notundermine or be detrimental to COIN goals.

b. The response of US forces in an y given situa tion mu st meet th efollowing requirements:

(1) B e a p p r o p r i a t e response is appropriate to the level ofthreat and activity.

(2) Be jus t i f iab le actions taken are justifiable in the eyes ofthe host countrys population and the US public.

(3) Use minimum force the goal is to restrict the use of force

and th e level of commitm ent to th e minimum feasible toaccomplish the mission. However, the principle of minimumnecessary force does not always imply minimum necessarytroops. A large number of men deployed at the right time may

enable a commander to use less force than he mightotherwise have done, or even to avoid using any force at all.

Commanders must, however, keep in mind that a peaceful

situ at ion could become h ostile becau se of the p rovocativedisplay of an overlarge force. Doing too much may be agreater danger than doing too little.

(4) Do maximum bene f i t US forces should select operationsso they accomplish positive benefit for the population. If this

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is not possible then the operational concept is wrong andshould not be executed.

(5) D o m i n i m u m d a m a g e US forces ensure that operations

preclude unnecessary damage to facilities, activities, andresources. Since this is almost an impossibility, compensationfor any damage to property must be made and the propertyrest ored, as m uch as possible, to its original stat e. In an ycase, a major consideration is to plan activities to limitdamage.

Section V. AirLand BattIe and Counterguerrilla Operations

1-15 . Cha l l enges .

AirLand Battle is the Armys operational concept for combat. It isdesigned to deal with the worldwide challenges the Army faces. The

four basic challenges to the Army are the battlefield, leadership,readiness, and training. The basic concepts of AirLand Battle doctrinecan be applied to counterguerrilla operations.

1-16. The ba t t le f ie ld .

The Army faces an enem y tha t m ay str ike from an y direction. It m ustconten d n ot only with m ilitary considerations in t his environment but

with the political, economic, and social considerations which mayoftentimes outweigh military considerations. The Army must be ableto operate in all geographical areas and climates, and on all types of

terrain, with only the weapons, tactics, and assets permitted by the

political, social, and economic environment. The enemy will strike atweak points and seek to avoid direct combat.

1 - 1 7 . L e a d e r sh i p .

The complexities of counterguerrilla operations place a premium oninformed and trained leadership and independent operations. These

conditions demand more leader expertise and the ability to operateindependently at lower command levels than do higher levels ofconflict. The leader applies skill, imagination, and flexibility. Heeffectively leads his troops and helps them to understand the problemsof counterguerrilla operations. He must be willing to reorganize hisassets to better accomplish his mission.

1 - 1 8 . R e a d i n e s s .

Units tasked to conduct counterguerrilla operations are prepared todeploy and operate on short notice. Each soldier is prepared for battle

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and is able to perform his duties. Units train to operate in areas of theworld where they may be tasked to fight.

1 - 1 9 . T r a i n i n g .a .

b.

Training is the cornerstone for success and a full-time job forcommanders. The commander ensures that soldiers are proficient

in traditional, basic skills and also familiar with more complexskills r equired for success in a count erguerr illa en vironment .These skills include intelligence, civil affairs, populace andresources control, psychological operations, and advisoryassistance.

AirLand Battle concepts outline the principles the Army mustapply when engaged in combat. Combat operations based on thisdoctrine seek to locate, harass, and neutralize the guerrilla force

and deny it the capability to conduct offensive actions bysevering its linkage with the population. Coordinated efforts ofmilitary and civilian organizations are required to achieve theoverall objective.

1 -2 0. Op e r a t i on a l c o n c e p t s f o r Ai r L a n d B a t t l e .

a .

b.

Generally, the purpose of military operations is to defeat theopposing force. The use of armed forces in a counterguerrilla roleis primarily to provide enough internal security to enable the host

country to initiate counterinsurgency programs and pursuenational objectives.

The final resolution will not be by military means, but by

political, social, an d economic action. With t his in mind,successful military operations are a means to an end. Success incombat depends on the basic tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine:initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization.

(1) I n i t i a t ive . To preserve the initiative, subordinates actindependently within th e cont ext of th e overall plan . Theoverall attitude of the Army is one of action, not reaction, to

the enemys initiatives. The characteristics of improvisation,initiative, and aggressiveness, tempered with intelligent andprudent decision-making, must be strong.

(2) D e p t h . This refers to time, distan ce, and resources. Thecommander is able to operate overlarge areas with minimum

logistical support while retaining the ability to react tounexpected attacks. This battle-in-depth is designed to delay,

disrupt, or destroy the guerrillas uncommitted forces andbase areas. Reserves are kept to a minimum to allowmaximum use of the force, while still retaining the capabilityto meet most threats.

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(3) Agility. This r equires flexible organ izations an d leader swho can quickly adapt to changing situations. The factors ofmission, enemy, terrain (and weather), troops (available),and time (available) (METT-T) and the way they interface

with environmental considerations determine the type oforganization involved. The leader is innovative and flexible,

and he adapts to different situations. Mobility enhances theagility of the force engaged in counterguerrilla operations,

but the force is not tied to its vehicles. At a minimum, theforce has mobility equal to that of the guerrillas.

(4) S y n c h r o n i z a t i o n . This means more than coordinatedaction to achieve maximum combat power. In the counter-guerrilla environment, it encompasses the effective, coordi-nated use of available combat power and its interface withnoncombat operations. Tactical and nontactical, civilianand military, host country and US force operations are

coordinated and supportive of each other to achieve theoverall objective. Additionally, US military operations arealigned with US policy and aims in the host country. This inturn may place certain restrictions on US forces.

1-21 . Comba t impera t ives .

a . The seven combat imperatives of AirLand Battle doctrine findtheir basis in the principles of war. These imperatives are:

(1) Ensu re u n i ty o f e ffo r t . The principles for this imperativeare the objective, unity of command, and simplicity. Unity of

effort requires the commander to understand the overall USobjective and how his operations support that objective. Heapplies the principles underlying this imperative in such away that the effects of his operations are not a detriment toattaining the overall US objective.

(2) D ir e c t f r i e n d l y s t r e n g t h s a g a in s t e n e m y w e a k n e s s e s .The principles for this imperative are maneuver andsurprise. The commander minimizes and protects hisweaknesses and uses his str engths aga inst th e guerr illasweak points. To do this, he knows the enemys organization,equipment, and tactics. In addition to knowing how theguerrilla fights, it is important for the commander toundersta nd why t he guerrilla fights.

(3) D e si gn a t e a n d s u s t a i n t h e m a i n e ffo r t . The principlesfor this imperative are mass and economy of force. The Armycannot be everywhere a t once. It can not do everything a tonce. Priorities are set at tactical and operational levels todetermine where the main effort is to occur and what goal isto be achieved.

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(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

S u s t a i n t h e f i g h t . The force may have to operate forextended periods on limited logistics. To sustain momentum,

the commander deploys forces in adequate depth andarranges for service support when needed. The commanderis audacious and presses soldiers and systems to the limits of

endurance.

Move fa s t , s t r ike ha rd , and f in i sh r ap id ly . The principlesfor this imperative are maneuver and mass. Speed andmobility are essential. To avoid detection, US forces employdeception techniques, communications security (COMSEC),and operations security (OPSEC). While the overall conflictmay be prolonged, the tactical operations are executed withspeed to retain initiative and freedom of action. This isbalanced against the need for patience.

U se t e r r a i n a n d w e a t h e r . The guerrilla force is familiar

with the terrain and comfortable with the climate. Recon-naissance and intelligence (if accomplished effectively) givethe commander a decisive edge in anticipating difficultieswith terra in and weath er. He uses both to his advant age.

P r o t e c t t h e f o r c e. Successful comm an ders pr eserve thestrength of their force. They do so through security, keeping

troops healthy and equipment ready, and by sustainingdiscipline and morale. The guerrilla seeks to degrade themorale of the force through the use of psychologicaloperations (PSYOPS) and harassment. His tactics aregeared to wear down his opponents will to fight. Thecommander trains his soldiers and constantly reminds themof exactly what th e mission is an d why it is import an t t ocomplete the mission.

b. Doctrine is a guide that delineates principles and fundamentalconcepts. The comm an der uses th ese principles a nd conceptswhen analyzing the situation and then uses them as a guide inselecting his actions.

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CHAPTER 2

The Threat

Section I. General

2 -1 . O p e r a t i o n s .

a . The guerrilla must be understood before he can be defeated. This

chapter discusses the characteristics, tactics, and environment of

guerrilla operations.

b. The guerr illa is th e overt combat element of th e insur gentorganization. The members of the guerrilla force are organizedunder military concepts to conduct military and paramilitaryoperations. Their duties usually include all the overt actions that

are conducted by the insurgent organization but may includecovert and clandestine operations. They are usually most active

in insurgent-controlled or contested areas. However, when theinsurgency calls for operations in government-controlled areas,

the guerrilla may conduct these operations.

2 -2 . A i m s a n d g o a l s .

a .

b.

c.

d.

e.

Su p p o r t o v e ra l l g o a l o f t h e i n s u r g en t m o v em en t . To thisend, the guerrilla operates to support the major goal of theinsurgent movement to replace the established government.

Ga i n s uppo r t f or i n s u r ge n t m ovem e n t . The guerrilla tries togain support for the insurgent movement through propaganda,

coercion, and terror. If he cannot gain active support, then he will

seek passive support: Silence on the part of the populaceconcerning insurgent activities is considered passive support forthe insurgent.

In c r eas e p o p u l a t i o n s v u l n e r ab i l it y . Through the use ofselective terrorism, the guerrilla attacks or destroys economic andpolitical symbols upon which the government is founded.Overreaction on the part of government forces or other elementsof au th ority contribut es to th e populations dissat isfaction withthe government and its subsequent support to the insurgency.

L e ss e n gove r nm e n t c on t r o l. By defeating small governmentforces and striking where government forces are not, the guerrilla

adds t o th e perception t ha t th e governm ent cann ot or will not

provide security for the population and its property. This adds tothe perception that the government cannot control the insurgents.

Prov ide psycho log ica l v ic to r ies . To th is end, the guer rillaseeks to gain victories that psychologically benefit the insurgent

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movement, whether or not these victories are significant in termsof material damage to the government or its armed forces. It is the

psychological advantage the guerrilla seeks.

f. T i e u p g o v e r n m e n t r e s o u r c e s . By forcing the government toexpend resources on military operations against the guerrilla, theguerrilla seeks to tie up resources that could best be utilized by the

government in development programs.

g. Weaken resolve of government mi l i ta ry forces . By defeatingsmaller elements of the governments military forces, theguerrilla further weakens the usually limited assets the governmenthas available. He also psychologically weakens the governmentforces resolve to continue waging war.

Section Il. Environment

2 - 3 . F a c t o r s .

The environment that the guerrilla operates in must be examined frommore than a geographical point of view. While terrain and climate areimportant factors, the political, sociological, and economic aspects ofthe environment take on added importance.

2 - 4 . T e r r a i n .

The r ur al guerr illa will prefer to cont inue t o live in h is own h ome. Hewill go to camps if security does not permit him to live at home. Hefavors level, well-drained campsites with good water supply, naturalfuel, cover, and adequate vegetation to provide concealment from

aerial observation. The preferred camps are also chosen with a viewtoward easy a ccess t o the t ar get population, access to a friendly orneutral border, good escape routes, and good observation of approachroutes used by government counterguerrilla forces. When counterguerrillaoperations by government forces force the guerrilla out of his preferred

base camps, he tends to establish camps in rugged inhospitable areasnot easily penetrated by government forces.

2 - 5 . C l i m a t e .

The fact that the guerrilla is usually a native to the area and is used to

the climate gives him an added advantage. If the government forcesare also familiar with this type of climate, then the advantage to theguerrilla is lessened. If the government forces are not familiar withoperating in the climate, then the advantage to the guerrilla increases.

Generally, the climate of the area does not favor either the guerrilla orthe government forces to any great degree unless there are extremesinvolved. Then the impact is on the logistical systems.

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2-6. Pol i t ica l fac tors .

The am ount of governm ent control in a given a rea directly impacts onthe ability of the guerrilla to operate. The more government control, the

less successful are guerrilla activities, whereas less governmentcontrol of an area improves chances for guerrilla success. The guerrillawill attempt to disrupt normal government functions and destroy keygovernment facilities and personnel to reduce the level of governmentcontrol in an area.

2-7. Sociological factors.

The more fragmented a society is, the greater the opportunity fordissatisfaction among the populace. The guerrilla will attempt toincrease friction between different groups in society. These groups may

be aligned along racial, ethnic, religious, or social lines. Language

differences or tradition may also be a reason for alignment. Religiousinfluences may play a significant role in the sociological factors thataffect the guerrilla.

2-8. Economic fac tors .

Low standards of living and desires for economic reforms may bepopular causes of dissatisfaction with the government. As withpolitical and sociological factors, the greater the degree of dissatisfactionwith the governments economic policies, the better the guerrillaschances for success. The guerrilla seeks to exploit this situationthrough the use of psychological operations. Since the guerrilla derives

a major portion of his logistical support from the local economy, he will

normally not disrupt it drastically. Guerrilla forces will destroy a localeconomy of an area as a lesson to the people living there to exact moresupport or obedience from them.

2 - 9 . I m p a c t .

a . The impact that each of the factors has on the guerrilla, and hisability to successfully operate, changes in each situation. Acareful ana lysis by the comma nder an d his st aff of each of thefactors is necessary to determine what the impact of each is prior

to conducting counterguerrilla operations. In all cases, eachfactor must be analyzed to determine the peculiarities, weaknesses,

and st rengths it m ay have in relation t o the guerrilla.b. In plann ing for coun terguer rilla operat ions, th e comma nder

exploits disclosed guerrilla weaknesses and deprives theguerrilla, wherever possible, of any opportunities to exploitgovernment weaknesses.

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Section Ill. Characteristics

2 - 1 0 . C o n s i d e r a t i o n s .

a . By understanding the general characteristics of the guerrilla, it iseasier to determine strengths which must be reduced or avoidedand weaknesses which can be exploited.

b. The characteristics discussed are general, and the commanderplanning counterguerrilla operations must analyze a particular

situation to discover how these considerations apply.

2-11 . Guer r i l l a s t r eng ths .

a . I n t e l l i ge nc e . The intelligence networks in th e infra str uctur eusually provide continuous and current information on government

force dispositions, strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities. Theneed for secrecy as an element of survival for the insurgentorgan ization ma kes governmen t penet ra tion a nd disrupt ion ofthese intelligence networks difficult. However, their structuresare vulnerable to penetration and careful, detailed analysis.Intelligence collecting and analyses must be placed on a robustfooting early to build data bases. Pattern analysis and othertechniques can rob the guerrilla of this advantage. counterguerrillaforces can also overcome th is intelligence advant age t hr ough th ecomprehensive use of deception, operations security, andcommunications security.

b. I n d i g e n o u s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .

(1) Guerr illas usually ha ve th e ability to blend with the local

populace. In many cases they are part of the local populace.This enhances their capability to operate with secrecy in agiven area.

(2) The counterguerrilla force must identify the guerrilla andremove him from the civilian populace. This is bestaccomplished through the effective use of population andresources control.

(3) Care must be ta ken to ensur e th at civilians are not injured or

mistreated as a result of counterguerrilla operations.

c. K n o w l e d g e .

(1) The guer rillas knowledge of th e local populace and ter ra in is

a strength. It gives him the ability to utilize psychologicaloperations effectively. The guerrilla can usually develop aworking relationship with the populace because theyidentify to some degree with his cause. If he cannot persuade

them, he has the force to coerce them. The counterguerrilla

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d.

e.

f.

g.

force must tr y to overcome t his a dvant age by foster ing astrong relationship between the government forces and thepopulace. The creation of a local civilian defense force by the

government and the counterguerrilla forces cooperationwith it is one way to do this.

(2) By knowing th e environmen t he operat es in, the guerilla has

a major advantage. This advantage may be overcome bycontinuous counterguerrilla operations in a given area by aperma nent ly stationed coun terguer rilla force and skillfuluse of native assets.

Mot iva t ion and d i sc ip l ine . The guerrilla leaders are trainedan d motivated. They reinforce motivat ion with in th e guerr illaforce through the immediate application of discipline. Usually,the guerrilla is devoted to a cause almost to the point offanaticism.

Limi ted re spons ib i l i t i e s . The guerrilla usually does not havethe responsibility to maintain normal governmental obligationstoward society. This frees all his efforts to conduct operations insupport of the insurgency goals. However, the guerrilla force may

be tasked to perform certain political services (such as taxcollection) by the insurgency shadow government.

Tact ics . The guerrilla can utilize a broad range of tactics, fromterror and sabotage through conventional warfare. This enableshim to escalate or deescalate antigovernment activity almost atwill.

Phys ica l cond i t ion .

(1) Guerrillas are usually of an age which places them in theiryears of greatest physical stamina. One of the majoradvantages the guerrilla has is his ability to endurehardship. Usually, because of the situation, he has to makedo with less. This forces him to adapt and be innovative.

(2) The general strengths described are designed to provide abase to analyze the specific guerrilla threat. No two guerrillaforces are identical. These strengths are applied against thespecific situation being addressed. Whatever the results ofthat analysis, the obvious strengths must be reduced orcircumvented.

2-12 . Guer r i l l a weaknesses .

a . L im i t e d p e r s o n n e l a n d r e s o u r c e s . The guerrilla normallylacks the personnel and the logistics to intentionally becomedecisively engaged with government forces. Difficulty inrecruitment and resupply to replace his combat losses in

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personnel and m at eriel may limit his operat ions. The coun ter-guerrilla force should exploit these weaknesses by interdictingsupply routes and facilities, forcing desertion because ofhardships; and by inflicting combat losses that are hard toreplace.

b. I nd iv idua l f a c to r s . Basically, the guerrilla endures a life ofphysical danger and privation. These stresses can be exploited bycounterguerrilla forces. Numerically inferior to the governmentforces facing him, fear of being treated as a criminal if captured by

the government, and fear of violence to himself and his family(imposed by the guerr illa organ ization to ensu re h is cooperat ion)ar e str ess factors in addition t o const an t combat an d a h ostileenvironm ent th at weaken guerr illa r esolve. In some societies,good treatment, pardon, protection, food, shelter, and participation

in the government may be stronger incentives than the fear ofcriminal punishment to induce guerrilla desertions.

c. Ope r a t iona l f a c to r s . Operational weaknesses may includesecurity, which requires extensive resources and slows downresponsiveness; bases that are difficult to acquire and operate;and the lack of technology or ability to maintain capturedhigh-technology items. The dependence of the guerrilla onpopular support is also a weakness, since if that support wavers oris withdrawn, then the guerrilla will not be able to operateeffectively. Another operational weakness may be the lack ofsophisticated communications, which could require the guerrillato spend an excessive amount of time preparing to launch anoperation.

2-13 . Guer r i l l a suppor t .

A major concern common to all guerrillas is support. Support can bedivided into two general categories.

a. P o p u l a r s u p p o r t .

(1) As discussed previously, th e guerr illa mu st ha ve either t heactive or passive support of the populace to succeed. Popularsupport alone will not ensure the success of guerrillaoperations. Ineffective operations, unwise decisions, andpoor leadership are examples of deficiencies that wouldpreclude his success. Popular support should be viewed,instead, as a condition that must exist for the guerrilla to

initiate and conduct operations in a given area over a periodof time. If popular support does not exist or is withdrawn, theguerrilla will not be able to conduct operations with any hope

of success. Therefore, one of the prime considerations for thecounterguerrilla force is to gain and maintain the support of

th e populace. Area s wher e active support is given to th e

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(2)

guerrilla are excellent targets for psychological operations.Populace and resources control operations will play a vitalrole in winning support away from the guerrilla.

In areas where only passive support is given to the guerrilla,

then government efforts through psychological operationsand civil affairs, as well as the provision of security, must beinitiated to gain active support and trust of the government.

In areas that the government controls and where thepopulace supports the government, increased emphasis isplaced on all six major operations in IDAD to maintain thatsupport .

b. L o g i s t i ca l s u p p o r t .

(1) This is one of th e guer rillas most vulner able areas. In earlyoperations, the guerrilla relies on his base of popular support

for logistical requirements. As the guerrilla force develops

and expands, its logistical needs may increase to the pointthat the internal support base can no longer provide for all ofthe guerrillas logistical requirements. If the insurgentmovement has not reached the point where the attainment ofits overall goals is imminent, then the guerrilla may have to

receive additional logistical support from another source.

(2) If th e guer rilla receives support from extern al sour ces, th enhe is faced with the problem of security for supply lines,transport means, and storage facilities. External supportshould not be considered a prerequisite for the initiation ofcounterguerrilla operations. It is an additional factor that, if

present and effective, will enhance the capabilities of the

guerrilla. In any case, the counterguerrilla force should seekto interdict the logistic support that the guerrilla is receiving,whether it be internal or external.

(3) Since th e guer rilla operat es along militar y lines, he willusually have temporary sites for headquarters, installations,facilities, and operational units. These temporary sites arecalled guerr illa base camps. It is in these camps th at th eguerrilla has his command posts, training areas, communi-cations facilities, medical stations, and logistics centers. Theguerrilla may a lso use th ese camps for r est, retra ining, andreequipping.

(4) It must be under stood that th ese camps do not equat e with

conventional force operational bases since the guerrilla doesnot seek t o defend t hem if th ey are discovered. They aretemporary and depend on secrecy for their existence. Ifdiscovered, the guerrilla will usually abandon the site andmove his operation. These bases are kept small, and usually

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th ere is more tha n one base in th e guerr illas ar ea of oper-ation.

(5) Char acteristics of a base camp a rea a re:

(a) C ove r a n d c onc e a lm e n t . The guerrilla will attemptto locate base camps in areas where cover and con-cealment provide security against detection.

(b) R ough , i na c c e s si b le t e r r a i n . Usually, the rougherthe terrain, the less likely is the chance of beingsurprised by government forces. Terrain is chosen toprovide security against detection. Key terrain, as seenby the conventional force, is usually avoided. Whileguerrillas avoid defensive combat, they emphasizeshort-term defensive action in the base camp vicinity toaid evacuation, if necessary.

(c) Sui tab le for b ivouac . The area selected is a suitable

bivouac area. Consideration is given to food and watersupply, grade or slope of terrain, access to trails, andprotective environment.

(d) R e m o t e n e s s . Base camps ar e usua lly in relativelyremote areas for security. To preclude accidentaldiscovery, base camps are not usually near inhabitedarea s. However, becau se the guer rilla m ust be able tofill his logistical needs, his base camp usually will not

be more than one days march from a village or town. Ifthe counterguerrilla force can locate and disrupt thesecamps, then the guerrilla can be kept off balance andon the run, allowing the counterguerrilla force to gain

the initiative.

Section IV. Tactics

2 - 1 4 . T e r r o r i s m a n d h a r a s s m e n t .

a. When guerrilla forces first become operational, they usuallyengage in limited or small-scale activities and operations. If theyreach more sophisticated levels of organization, equipment, andtraining, then larger operations utilizing more conventionaltactics may be expected.

b. Guerrilla tactics are characterized by elusiveness, surprise, and

brief, violent action. These tactics in the early phases can bedivided into terrorism and harassment.

(1) Ter ro r i sm. The guerrilla may use terrorism if it fits a given

situation and accomplishes his goals. Terrorist techniquesinclude bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, threats,

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mutilation, murder, torture, and blackmail. It must berecognized that all guerrillas do not use terrorism as a tool. Ifterrorism is utilized, it is usually for coercion, provocation, orintimidation.

(a ) Coerc ion . This is used to persuade individuals to actfavorably in given situations toward the guerrilla orthe insurgent movement. As an example, terrorismmight be used to persuade a local mayor to revise policyconcerning the guerrilla.

(b) P r ovoc a t i on . This is used to provoke an overreactionon the part of government forces so that the populationwill be alienated by government forces actions.Targets ar e usu ally government soldiers, leaders, orpolicemen.

(c) I n t i m i d a t i o n . This is used to modify behavior.Usually, threats or fear of harm, either to the individualor his family and friends, are used. Intimidation can beused to induce the populace to silence or noncooperationwith government forces. It is used to discouragecompet ent citizens from acceptin g critical low-levelgovernmental positions.

(2) H a r a s s m e n t .

(a) Most guer rilla opera tions ar e offensive, not defensive.There is seldom an attempt to seize and defendobjectives for any length of tome.

(b) The guerrilla uses dispersion during his movements,but near the target area, small guerrilla elements massand then conduct operations.

(c) While th e guerr illa is out nu mber ed by governm entforces, he seeks to attain local numerical superiority. Inthis way he can attain victory over small elements ofthe government forces. These tactics, if successful,compel government forces to commit larger elements todefensive tasks. Once government forces move to thedefensive, they lose the initiative and become reactive.This allows the guerrilla time and space to develop to apoint where he has the capability to engage largergovernment forces with more conventional tactics.

(d) The most comm on techn iques employed by th e guerr illaare the ambush, raid, and small-scale attacks. Thesetechniques are usually targeted against security posts,small forces, facilities, and lines of communication.

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(e) Ha ra ssing ta ctics ar e ut ilized to keep governmen tforces on the defensive. If successful, they makegovernment forces react to guerrilla operations, taking

away the governments ability to conduct offensive

operations that would prevent successful guerrillaoperations.

(f) Har assing ta ctics ar e also effective in weakening th egovernments resources and disrupting lines of com-munication. One advantage of harassment is theperceived image it gives of the guerrilla being able tostrike anywhere at will. It also makes the governmentappear ineffective and incompetent by continuouslylosing small battles.

2-15. Ma os p r in cip les.

The principles of guerrilla tactics have been stated by Chinas MaoTse-Tung:

Enemy advances, we retreat.

Enemy halts , we harass .

Enemy tires, we att ack.

Enemy retreats , we pursue.

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CHAPTER 3

Counterinsurgency Operations

Section I. General

3-1. Dif ferent condi t ions .

a . As described in chapters 1 and 2, the nature of counterguerrillaoperations differs from the conditions most soldiers expect to face

in combat. The counterguerrilla commander faces an enemywhose objectives, tactics, and concepts are usually different from

his own.

b. This cha pter exam ines the role of ta ctical coun terguer rilla

operations in relation to the COIN program. In addition, itdiscusses planning considerations and principles for thesuccessful conduct of counterguerrilla operations, as well asrelated operations that the counterguerrilla force must beacquainted with.

3-2. US role .

The most common role in which US forces will conduct counter-guerrilla operations will be as a foreign internal defense (FID) force.The F ID is designed to su pport t he h ost countr ys n at ional objectivesand COIN plan. Two of the primary considerations for the FIDcommander are the final goals of the host country COIN program and

how to coordinate his operations to support hose goals.

Section Il. Considerations

3-3 . FID opera t ions .

a . Most US forces conducting counterguerrilla operations will bepart of an FID force. The commander must understand how FIDoperations support the host country COIN plan. In this sense, thegoals of the host country COIN plan become the goals for the FIDforce and the counterguerrilla commander.

b. The prima ry considerat ion when planning count erguerr illa

operations is the effect operations will have on the populace.Commanders must attempt to win the active support of thepopulation for the government. At a minimum, counterguerrillaactivities must eliminate incidents which the guerrilla mayexploit in his psychological operations.

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probably involve elements of the five other operations tosome degree. The commanders guidance for counterguerrillaoperations is more detailed and comprehensive than formore conventional operat ions an d mu st accommodate all

operational aspects inherent in brigade counterguerrillaoperations.

(3) Before receipt of a specific mission, the commandersguidance and subsequent planning is based on all probablemissions, to include supporting consolidation operations orconducting strike operations, as well as on the specificcharacteristics of the guerrilla, terrain, and population in thespecific opera tional a rea . After r eceipt of th e mission, hisguidance becomes more specific and includes the extent towhich th e brigade will become in volved in each of the sixareas of FID operations.

b. Enemy. When evaluating the guerrilla capabilities and limitations,the commander considers:

(1) National and regional origins.

(2) Organizat ion, t o include effectiveness a nd un ity of comma nd.

(3) Stren gth, morale, an d sta tus of training.

(4) Tactics being employed and tactical proficiency.

(5) Capability to at ta ck, defend, a nd r einforce.

(6) Resources available:

(a) Food and water.

(b) Arms, ammunition, demolitions, fuels, medicines, andneclear, biological, chemical (NBC) protective equipment(agents, detection devices, and employment assets);external support personnel, mat eriel, and m orale.

(7) Leaders and their personalities.

(8) Relations with th e civilian population.

(9) Status of supplies.

(10) Effectiveness of communications.

(11) Effectiveness of intelligence and counterintelligence, toinclude t he exten t of infiltra tion of host coun tr y civil an d

military establishments.(12) Lines of communications.

(13) Vulnerabilities.

(14) External support.

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(3)

(4)

(5)

3-7.

a .

b.

c.

successful FID forces ar e militar ily, the ins ur gency is notdefeated until the political, economic, and social problemswhich led to it ar e corr ected or significan tly alleviat ed. Thisusually takes a considerable length of time.

In the area of tactical operations, time available for planningand execution varies. When planning for long-term actions,such as consolidation campaigns, a long lead time isnecessary to permit planning in meticulous detail. However,when planning shorter term actions, such as strike campaignsor offensive operations against fleeting guerrilla targets,planning time is usually short.

Commanders at all levels can use the time available to themmore efficiently by planning for contingency missions. Lackof hard information precludes planning in detail, but routinetasks common to similar missions should be codified instanding operating procedures (SOP) and understood by all

concerned. When the need to execute a contingency missionarises, the basic plan can be reviewed and planningexpedited by making minor adjustment as required.

Planning time is often extremely limited. Warning andoperation orders are normally issued orally. In theseinstances, the one-third rule applies: the commander utilizesone third of the available time for his own planning andallows two thirds of the available time for his subordinates todevelop their plans and issue their orders. In many cases,

planning time will be so limited that formal planning isprecluded. In these instances, commanders direct theirsubordinates by using fragmentary orders.

R e s t r i c t i o n s .

US forces engaged in counterguerrilla operations function underrestr ictions n ot encount ered in other types of warfare. Theserestrictions may appear to hamper efforts to find and destroy theguerrilla. For example, the safety of noncombatants and thepreservation of their property is vitally importan t to winningthem over to the governments side.

The guerrilla knows this and will attempt to capitalize on it byengaging US forces at locations where US fire would endangercivilians or damage their property. While the temptation to returnfire may be great, a few dead or injured enemy will in no way

compensate for the ill will of the local populace if some innocentcivilians are killed or injured or their homes and propertydestroyed.

Political considerations influence the conduct of counterguerrillaoperations. It is essentially a contest between the host government

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and guerrillas concerning political, social, religious, or economicissues. The government and its representatives must presentthem selves and t heir program a s th e better choice.

d. Comma nders must be prepar ed to operat e in a broad ra nge ofpolitical atmospheres. The host countrys form of governmentmay be anything from an absolute, and not too benevolent,dictatorship to a democracy struggling to establish itself, oranything in between.

e. No matter what political atmosphere prevails in the host country,the brigade commander must engage the guerrilla with everyasset at the commanders disposal. He must realize thatdemocratic principles may not be immediately applicable.However, he should act within the limits of his authority toimprove the circumstances of the government he was sent tosupport. Any incidents of deep-rooted corruption, gross inefficiency,

or violation of human rights should be documented and reportedto higher headquarters. The commander can also offer otheralternatives to accomplish the same objective. I t i s t he r e s pon -s i b i l i t y o f t h e US Go v e rn m en t t o i n f l u en ce t h e h o s tgove r n m e n t s a t t i t u de t owa r d de m oc r a t i c p r i nc i p l e s; i t i sno t t h e r e s pons i b i li t y of t he c om m a nd e r .

f . There will be situations where well-defined responsibilities in alocal area may not be readily apparent. It is the duty of the higherheadquarters to determine these responsibilities and make themknown prior to the insertion of US forces, especially in theexecution of strike missions. However, there maybe eventualitiesin which the counterguerrilla force commander may be required to

coordinate with numerous governmental officials to locatesources of authority and decision. If the commander encountersgovernment officials who habitually hinder operations againstthe guerrillas through incompetence, self-interest, or suspectedsympathy for the guerrilla cause, he should document his caseand forward it to the next higher commander for disposition.

3- 8 . Ope r a t i ng p r inc ip l e s .

a. In t e l l i g en ce . Tactical intelligence is the k ey to defeat ing th eguerrilla. It provides the commander with information aboutguerrilla locations, activities, strengths, weaknesses, and planswhich enable th e comma nder to seize t he initiat ive. With outintelligence sources, the chances of success (particularly inoffensive operations) are limited and the commander must reactto guerrilla initiatives rather than controlling the situation in thearea of operations. Every relevant source of information about thecomm an ders a rea of operation sh ould be exploited a nd include:

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(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

The brigade intelligence section (and augmentation):

(a) Ground surveillance radar (augmentation fromdivision).

(b) Ground sensors (augmentation from division).(c) Long-range surveillance unit (augmentation from

division).

(d) Aviation assets (augmentation from division).

(e) Aerial imagery reconnaissance (from corps).

The maneuver battalions intelligence section and recon-naissance platoons.

The maneuver companies sightings and reports (combatinformation).

Combat support units tar get acquisition batt eries, military

police, chemical reconnaissance units (if available), andsightings and reports (combat information).

Combat service support units sightings and reports (combatinformation).

Other sources:

(a )

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)(f)

(g)

Local populace.

Intelligence agents (from division and corps).

Host government civilian agencies.

Captured enemy documents (from division and corps).

Enemy prisoners (from division and corps).Intercepted enemy communications (from division andcorps).

Special operation forces.

b. T ac t i ca l s i t u a t i o n . The organization for, and conduct of,counterguerrilla operations is dependent on the tactical situation.Units are organized and employed to counter the current guerrillathreat. For example, if guerrillas are operating in platoon-sizeunits, then platoon- or company-size units are used against them.These units conduct independent operations such as patrols andambushes, under centralized control (company or battalion). This

enables them t o cover more area simu ltaneously tha n a la rgerunit and still have the firepower to deal with the typical guerrillaunit they might encounter. Employing a large force to counter a

significantly smaller guerrilla force is inefficient because itcompromises the chance of achieving surprise, reduces the area

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that can be covered at any one time, and is more difficult to move(than a smaller force) if it is required elsewhere. However, sendinga small force to counter a significantly larger guerrilla force mayprove disastrous unless the smaller force is supported by fire or

can be rapidly reinforced.

c. Flexibi l i ty . Forces engaged in counterguerrilla operations areflexible and capable of adapting to rapidly changing tacticalsituations. The nature of counterguerrilla warfare necessitatesbeing able to ma ke swift tr an sitions from large t o small unitoperations; to adjust to extremes of terrain, weather, andvisibility; to move on foot, by vehicle, or by aircraft; and tofunction in offensive or defensive modes. Adapting to changing

tactical situations keeps the guerrilla force off balance andprevents it from developing effective tactical operations.

d. M o b i l i t y .(1) Counter guerr illa forces most possess mobility equa l to or

greater than that of the guerrilla in order to find, fix, fight,and pursue him. Since the guerrilla is primarilly footmobile,counterguerrilla forces equipped with motorized, mechanized,or air transportation assets would appear to have asignificant mobility advantage. However, the guerrillatypically operates from terrain that precludes (or severelylimits) speed on a ground approach. The counterguerrillaforces mobility advantage may not be as great as it firstappear s to be. When terra in, weather, or the guerrilla forcedisposition precludes closing on guerrilla positions byhigh-speed air or ground tr ansport, th en count erguerr illaforces should be moved by the fastest available transportation

to the nearest suitable, safe area to launch footmobileoperations. A well-trained, footmobile counterguerrilla force,that can use terrain better than the enemy, can achieve atactical mobility advantage.

(2) Comm an ders should not overbur den soldiers with excessiveloads because th e guerrillas will be able to outr un them .Soldiers should carry only the things they need to find andfix the guerrilla. Once this is accomplished, they can beresupplied by ground or air.

e. Minimum use of force .

(1) Only th e minima l firepower needed to accomplish a givenmission is employed. If US forces come under guerrilla fire,

and if by returning fire noncombatant civilians maybeinjured or their homes and property destroyed, then only theamount of fire necessary to protect US forces is returned.Under these circumstances, the commander attempts tosuppress the guerrillas with minimal return fire (possibly

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using snipers) and moves his forces to advantageouspositions from which he may engage the guerrillas while notendangering civilian life or property. He may use smoke and,

if authorized, riot control agents to facilitate maneuver. If

the guerrillas cannot be engaged without endangeringcivilian life or property, the commander moves his forces(over covered or concealed routes) to positions that cut offtheir escape routes and encircle them. Then he begins totighten the ring around them.

(2) The un rest ricted use of firepower in th e vicinit y of civiliansor their property will result in turning their anger toward the

government and may turn them to the insurgent cause. USsoldiers must understand this and follow strict rules ofengagement. However, the right to self defense is neverdenied.

(3) All available fire ma y be brought t o bear on guerr illas whenit does not endanger civilian life or property. However, theexpenditure of ammunition should be appropriate: mortarsto knock out a ma chine gun position; small ar ms t o kill asniper. The use of indirect fire, while effective in some cases,

is not a substitute for maneuver.

f. Pa t i e n c e . Counterguerrilla forces must anticipate long periodswithout making contact. The guerrilla knows he is outnumberedand outgunn ed and avoids engagement un less it is on his term s.Counterguerrilla forces should not develop a false sense ofsecurity if it appears the guerrilla has ceased operations in theirarea. It must be assumed that the guerrilla is always observingthe operating patterns of the counterguerrilla force for weakpoints, and waiting for lax security to strike with minimum risk. Aguerrilla attack must be expected at any time.

g. R e s e r v e s .

(1) The commander always maintains a reserve to takeadvantage of sudden opportunities, and to counter guerrillainitiatives. The size of the reserve depends on the size of itsparent unit and the tactical situation.

(2) In offensive operat ions, a compa ny might keep a squa d inreserve; battalions, a platoon; and brigade, a company.

(3) In defensive operations, because of the need for 360-degree

security, a reserve at company and battalion is complicatedby the fact that the on-line strength of the perimeter isreduced.

(4) The compa ny or bat ta lion comman der ma y ha ve to spreadhis forces thin to protect his perimeter. In these instances,the commander has four options: establish a small, centrally

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(5)

(6)

(7)

located reserve at the expense of on-line strength; establishno reserve but specify units on-line to be prepared to shift a

portion of their strength to other sections of the perimeter;establish no reserve but reinforce the most heavily contested

section of the perimeter by fire; and consider reducing thesize of the perimeter.

Brigades too should maintain a company in reserve indefensive operations. This mission should be rotated amongcompanies, with the company that has spent the most timein the field (or that has seen the heaviest action) beingdesigna ted as t he reserve. The reserve company can rest ,rearm, and train during the time it has the reserve mission.

The reserve unit should be highly mobile. Air transport is the

preferred method for moving the reserve because it is fastand not dependent on open ground routes as are motorized ormechanized modes of transport. Whatever its mode oftransportation, the reserves vehicles are dedicated to thereserve and immediately available for employment.

Reserve units are prepared for contingency missions. If thereserve is committed, the commander designates a newreserve. In th is case, his least comm itted u nit is t he firstchoice.

Section III. Strike Campaigns

3 - 9 . T a r g e t s .

This section provides guidance on the organization, missions,concepts, and operations of strike campaigns. Strike campaignsconsist of a series of major combat operations targeted againstinsurgent tactical forces and bases in contested or insurgent-controlled

zones. Other intern al defense activities ma y support tactical forcesduring strike operations. Strike campaign operations are usually ofrelatively short duration (generally, one day to several weeks). Whileth e guidance out lined h ere is focused on th e infantr y brigade, th issection may be extended to apply to any combined arms organizationconducting counterguerrilla operations.

3- 10 . Or gan iza t i on .

Brigades assigned strike campaign missions either are relieved fromarea responsibility in advance of the mission or, preferably, areconstituted as specialized forces held at the national or regional levels.Brigade strike forces are organized as self-sufficient task forcescapable of operating in areas remote from logistical bases. Brigadesare assigned support bases in secure areas for elements not committed

to operations.

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3 - 1 1 . Mi s s i o n s .

Str ike cam paigns ar e conducted a gainst guer rilla forces and ba ses.They serve to keep guerr illa forces moving an d off bala nce. St rikecampaign areas are usually outside of those undergoing consolidationor those under friendly control. Ground or water means of entry maybe

used, but air assault or parachute deliveries can be employed.

3 - 1 2 . C o n c e p t s .

a. Str ike cam paigns include offensive ta ctics such as raids,reconnaissance in force, hasty or deliberate attacks, and pursuit(or combinations of these operations).

b. Brigade strike campaign operations are conducted to:

(1) Harass the guerrilla to prevent the buildup of personnel andlogistical resources.

(2) Destroy the guerrilla force and its base complexes.

(3) Demonstrate support for the government and for thepopulace in t he local a rea .

(4) Expand consolidation areas.

3 - 1 3 . Op e r a t i o n s .

a . Brigades committed to strike campaigns are assigned a tacticalarea of responsibility. The brigade commander normally assignsoperational areas to the subordinate battalions which, in turn,may assign areas to companies. Company commanders may

assign specific areas to platoons at times; however, platoons arenormally assigned specific missions rather than operationalareas. Each battalion normally establishes a separate operationalsupport ba se (OSB). Compa nies norma lly opera te from pat rolbases, but at times ma y operate separ ate compan y OSBs. Whenthe areas assigned to units are too large to be reconnoiteredconcurrently by subordinate units, commanders establish anorder of priority for reconnaissance of the areas.

b. Battalion commanders maintain reserve forces (ready forces) toreact quickly to situations requiring an immediate response. Eachrifle company patrols its area of operations continuously andaggressively. The locat ion of the compa ny pa tr ol base and pat rolroutes are varied to ensure complete coverage of the area.

c. The rifle company moves to, secures, and occupies the companypatrol base with sufficient supplies to permit limited independent

operations. If it is to operate in the same area for a period of time, itshould consider establishing small ration and ammunitionreserves.

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d. The company area is patrolled to provide complete coverage day

and night with emphasis on night patrols. Generally, platoon-size

patrols have sufficient firepower to handle the situation if aguerrilla force is encountered. If additional support is needed, the

company commander may maneuver his other platoons againstthe guerrillas, or he may request assistance from the battalion

reserve (ready force). Emphasis is placed on engaging theguerrilla with organic means of fire and movement (if required)and on employing supporting artillery and air support.

e. Orders issued to the company commanders include the areaassigned and resupply instructions. The conduct of operations isbased on decentralized planning and execution. Companycommanders plan and coordinate platoon activities to ensurecompletion of the overall company mission. Platoons on patrolcarry light rations and store unneeded equipment at OSBs.

f. Rifle compa ny mort ar s ma y (at tim es) be located in bat ta lionOSBs while fire support teams (FIST) move with the companies. Ifthe terrain and situation permit, battalion OSBs may be moved as

the companies move their patrol bases. If civilian communitiesare in the area, and if security conditions permit, battalion bases

may be n ear (but not within) the commu nity. Here, the bat talionmay conduct psychological, intelligence, and military-civicaction operation.

g. Brigade commanders use all available means to locate guerrillaforces and bases, and they give priority to destroying the guerrilla

forces. An attack on a guerrilla force normally requires superiorcombat power. Reserves (ready forces) attempt to immediatelyengage and destroy moving guerrilla forces before they candisperse. Depending on the situation, either hasty or deliberateattacks are made on guerrilla bases that contain fortifications.

After a su ccessful att ack on guer rilla forces, troops thorough lysearch the area for guerrilla personnel, supplies, equipment, anddocuments. Pursuit operations are undertaken to destroy orcapture forces attempting to flee. Artillery, air support, and airassau lt forces support ground pursu it.

h. The brigade does not norm ally occupy th e area defensively for anextended time following a successful attack. Operations to search

out guerrillas continue. Elements of the brigade may be rotatedthrough the brigade support base for periods of rest and training.

i. Speed and surprise are important in strike operations, especially

when attacking a known guerrilla stronghold. The sudden andunexpected delivery of combat forces into a guerrilla-held or

cont ested ar ea pr ovides significan t a dvant ages to th e coun ter-guerrilla commander. If caught by surprise, the guerrilla maybeun able to react in t ime to save himself. He is confused initially and

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3- 15 . P r epa r a to r y phas e .

Consolidation campaign plans are detailed and provide for long-rangecommitment of both personnel and materiel. Plans are coordinated

with all agencies involved in the consolidation campaign. In additionto plann ing, the brigade condu cts n ecessary t ra ining an d becomesengaged in intelligence and other FID activities.

3-16. Offens ive phase .

a . The offensive phase of a consolidation campaign involvesmoving t he civil-milita ry t ask force into th e operational a rea,neut ra lizing guerr illa forces and sympat hizers, and r emovinginsurgent personnel who may have infiltrated the local govern-ment .

b. Pa tr olling, ar ea sur veillance, am bush es, an d other sma ll-un it

actions are used extensively. Offensive operations, such asmovements to contact, hasty or deliberate attacks, raids, orpursuits follow the small unit reconnaissance as targets arelocated.

c. Care is taken that once cleared, the friendly, controlled areas arenot allowed to revert to guerrilla domination.

3- 17 . Deve lopm en t and com ple t i on phas e s .

a . During the development and completion phases of a consolidation

campaign, brigade operations involve holding an area to permit

government agencies to conduct their internal defense anddevelopment programs. Operations also involve training localforces to assum e th e defensive and secur ity missions from t heregular armed forces. Aggressive defensive operations providesecurity against guerrilla attack, deny guerrillas access tosupport, an d provide a secure base from which t o expand th econsolidated areas. Offensive action is continued to destroyguerrilla forces; however, defense must be provided for population

centers, tactical bases, logistical installations, airbases andairfields, and lines of communication.

b. Defensive actions ar e cond ucted to accomplish one or more of th efollowing:

(1) Destr oy or captu re gu err illa forces.(2) Reduce guer rilla capability an d opport un ity for offensive

action.

(3) Deny guerr illa entr y into an ar ea.

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(4) Pr ovide secur ity an d th us develop favora ble conditions forother IDAD operations.

c. The normal defense in consolidation campaign operations

employs small-unit tactics, using air assault and other reserveforces (rea dy forces) to immed iat ely react t o int elligence or a ninsurgent at tack. Artillery and air support is prear ran ged to thedegree possible, and plans are adjusted as required.

d. Security forces conduct extensive patrolling throughout the area.The bulk of the brigade force may be assigned areas of responsibilityand be heavily engaged in patrolling and supporting efforts oflocal security forces.

e. The composition of the brigade reserve varies with the size of thearea, nature of the enemy threat, and the terrain. Some brigadeunits may be fragmented into small elements and required todefend dispersed installations. In this situation, the reserveelements are assigned contingency missions to provide reactionforces for several installations.

f. Area coverage may require assignment of fire support units to amuch lower level than is normal in conventional operations. Tosupport dispersed security elements, decentralization of firesupport may be required. Direct fire supporting weapons(including artillery in the direct fire role) can be effective at short

ranges when using time and super quick fuze. Direct fire supportweapons ar e import an t if the guerr illa force moves within t heminimum range of indirect fire weapons.

g. All military and critical civilian installations and populationcenters m ust be protected against sabotage an d at tack.

h. The larger installations an d commu nities and the sur roundingsmaller ones mutually assist each other in their defense. Firesupport from several installations and communities can contributeto mutual defense.

i. The defense of communities is primarily the task of localparamilitary forces and police. The defense of communities isconducted with special emphasis on physical security andpopulace and resources control measures. In planning thedefense, military units may be required to secure lines ofcommunication in the area. They may do so by surveillance,occupation of tactical positions, or use of guards for convoy

security, patrolling, and security posts. Along lines of communi-cation, fixed security posts protect critical points such asterminals, tunnels, bridges, and road or railway junctions. Thesize of the security post depends on the mission and the type andsize of the hostile forces which may attack it. Security posts inremote areas are larger than those near supporting forces.

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Section V. Offensive Operations

3-18 . Three phases .

This section discusses offensive operations which brigades (andsubordinat e un its) may h ave to condu ct. F or pur poses of organizationand clarity, operations are discussed under those phases of aninsurgency in which they will most often have to be conducted.Depending on the tactical situation, these operations, or variationsand combinations of them, may be conducted during any of the threephases of insurgent activity: latent and incipient insurgency; guerrillawarfare; and war of movement.

3-19 . Phase I L a t e n t a n d i n c i p ie n t i n s u rg e n c y .

a . This phase ranges from subversive activity that is only apotential threat, latent or incipient, to situations in whichfrequent subversive incidents and activities occur in an organizedpattern. It involves no major outbreak of violence or uncontrolledinsurgency activity.

b. Possible insur gent activities dur ing Ph ase I include at ta cks onpolice forces, other terroristic activities, and some minor military

operations carried out to gain additional influence over thepopulation (or provide arms for the movement) and to challengethe governments ability to maintain law and order. Furthermore,groundwork is laid for extensive external materiel support which

is essential in most cases for the expansion of the insurgency andits eventual success.

3-20. Pol ice- type opera t ions .

a .

b.

c.

To cont rol the m ovement of insur gents or guerr illas, and th eirmateriel, police-type operations are conducted. These operationsar e execut ed by host coun tr y police, para military, or militaryforces. For various reasons, this may not be possible, and USforces may have to conduct police-type operations until hostcountry forces are available to relieve them. (Under US law, themilitary cannot advise or train foreign police forces.)

If US forces must conduct this type of operation, military policeunits are suitable for this function. If they are not available,combat forces do the job.

When conducting police operations, host government representativesare with US troops to serve as interpreters and advise on localcustoms and courtesies. When performing these duties, US troopstreat passive civilians and their property with as much courtesyand respect as the situation permits.

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3 - 2 1 . S e a r c h e s .

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

g.

h .

The need for a counterguerrilla force to conduct search operations

or to employ search procedures is a continuous requirement. Mostsearch operations support strike operations or consolidationoperations, or they may be conducted as the main effort inpopulace and resources control operations. A search maybeoriented to people, to materiel, to buildings, or to terrain. It usually

involves both civil police and military personnel.

Since misuse of search authority can adversely affect the ultimateoutcome of operations agtainst guerrillas, seizure of contraband,evidence, intelligence material, supplies, or minor items duringsearches must be accomplished lawfully and properly recorded tobe of future legal value. Proper use of authority in searches gains

the respect and support of the people. Abusive, excessive, or

inconsiderate search methods may temporarily suppress theguerrilla force or expose elements of it, but at the same time suchmethods may ultimately increase the civilian populationssympathy for and/or support of the guerrilla.

Authority for search operations is carefully reviewed. Militarypersonnel must be aware that they perform searches only in areaswithin military jurisdiction (or where otherwise lawful) forpurposes of apprehending suspects or securing evidence thattends to prove an offense has been committed. Usually, there arespecial laws regulating the search powers of the military forces.These laws are given wide dissemination.

Search teams have detailed instruction on controlled items. Lists

of prohibited or controlled-distribution items such as chemicals,medicines, machine tools, and other items should be distributed.The military or civil police who administer the populace andresources control program are contacted before the conduct ofsearch operations, or periodically if search operations are acontinuing activity.

Sear ch opera tions involving US forces ma ybe ineffective whenlanguage difficulties prevent full communication with theindigenous population. US units given a search mission areprovided with interpreters as required.

The pace at which a search operation is conducted is slow enough

to allow for an effective search but not so slow as to allow the

guerrilla force time to react to the threat of the search.

If active resista nce develops t o th e sear ch opera tion, offensiveoperations are conducted to eliminate the resistance.

Consideration is fiven to returning to a searched area after thecompletion of an initial search to surprise and eliminate

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guerrillas or their infrastructure that may have remainedundetected or may have returned.

3-22 . Sea rch o f ind iv idua l s .

The fact that anyone in an area to be searched can be a guerrilla or aguerrilla sympathizer is stressed in all search operations. However,searchers are tactful to avoid making an enemy out of a suspect whoma y, in fact, support t he h ost coun tr y governmen t. It is dur ing theinitial handling of a person about to be searched that the greatestcaution is required. During the search of an individual, one member of

a sear ch t eam a lways covers t he other m ember who makes the actualsearch. (For information on how to conduct searches, see Appendix G.)

3-23. Check poin t s , r oad blocks , an d veh ic le sea r ches .

a . It will be necessary to maintain a continuous check on roadmovement to apprehen d suspects an d to prevent smu ggling ofcontrolled items. This requires the use of checkpoints. Sincecheckpoints cause considerable inconvenience and even fear, it is

important that the civil population understands that checkpointsare a preventive and not a punitive measure.

b. Checkpoints maybe described as either deliberate or hasty. Thedeliberate checkpoint is positioned in a town or in the opencountry, often on a main road. It acts as a useful deterrent tounlawful movement. The hasty checkpoint is highly mobile and is

quickly positioned in a town or in the open country. The actuallocation of the hasty checkpoint is designed to achieve quick

success.

c. Concealment of a checkpoint is desirable, but often impossible.The location should make it difficult for a person to turn back orrever se a vehicle with out being observed. Culverts, bridges, ordeep cuts may be suitable locations. Positions beyond sharpcurves have the advantage that drivers do not see the checkpointin sufficient time to avoid inspection. Safety disadvantages mayoutweigh the advantages of such positions. A scarcity of goodroads increases the effect of a well-placed checkpoint.

d . A checkpoint requires adequate troops to prevent ambush andsurprise by a guerrilla force. An element of the checkpoint force is

positioned and concealed an appropriate distance (one hundred toseveral hundred meters) from the checkpoint to prevent the escapeof any vehicle or person attempting to turn back upon sighting the

checkpoint. The vehicle, driver, and passengers are searched. Ifthe checkpoint is manned for any length of time, part of the force

is allowed to rest. The rest area is located near the search area soth at th e tr oops can be assembled quickly as a reserve force. (For

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information on how to conduct checkpoints and roadblocks, seeAppendix G.)

3-24. S ea r ch o f bu i l t -u p a r ea s - co r d on a nd s ea r cho p e r a t i o n s .

a . T e c hn i que s . Search techniques in built-up areas are practicedby police and military forces operating in populated areas. Thesetechniques are required for searching either a few isolated huts orbuildings, or for sear ching well-developed u rba n sections. Sea rch

operat ions in built-up ar eas require th orough prepara tion a ndrehearsal. Special emphasis should be given to the following:

(1) Divide th e ar ea to be sear ched into zones, and assign asearch party to each. A search party consists of a searchelement (to conduct the search), a securit y elem ent (t oencircle the area and prevent entrance and exit, and to secure

open a reas), and a reserve element (to assist, as required).

(a ) The search element conducts the mission assigned forthe operation. Normally it is organized into specialte

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