8/12/2019 Flixborough Disaster Presentation

1/6

Flixborough Disast1974

By: Tan Yong Chai

Lim Soon Yee

Lee Hon Kit

GEET GOVIND A/L ASOKUMAR

SHIVANANDAA A/L CHANDRASEAGAR

SITI NURZHAHIRAH BINTI GHUFRAN

NURUL ADINA BINTI MOHAMED RAZIFUDDIN

8/12/2019 Flixborough Disaster Presentation

2/6

Background Studies The chemical plant, owned by Nypro UK and in operation since 1967, pr

70000tons per year of caprolactam, a precursor chemical used in the

manufacture of nylon 6.

The process involved oxidation of cyclohexane with air in a series of six to produce a mixture of cyclohexanol and cyclohexanone.

8/12/2019 Flixborough Disaster Presentation

3/6

How did it happened?

Reactor1

Reactor1

ReaReactor5

Reactor1

Reactor4

Two months prior to the explosion, a crack was

discovered in the number 5 reactor.

It was decided to install a temporary 50 cm (20 inch) diameter

pipe to bypass the leaking reactor to allow continued operation

of the plant while repairs were made. The pipe connecting the

reactor supposedly 28inch in diameter.

Failure of bypass pipe in controlling the pressure and temperature

causing the temporary pipe to crack and rupture. Operating condition at

155C and 7.9atm

At 16:53 on Saturday 1 June 1974, the temporary bypass pipe ruptured,

possibly as a result of a fire on a nearby pipe which had been burning

for nearly an hour.

8/12/2019 Flixborough Disaster Presentation

4/6

Within a minute, about 40 tonnes of the p

store of cyclohexane leaked from the pipe

a vapour cloud 100200 metres in diamet

the area of football field.

The cloud, on coming in contact with an ig(probably a furnace at a nearby hydrogen

exploded, completely destroying the plant

The fuel-air explosion was estimated to be

tonnes of TNT. Blast Radius is about two fo

diameter. The blast can be heard and felt o

1800 buildings around 1.6km from the site

28 people died and seriously injured 36 in

the control room and on site worker.

The Plant Site contain excessively large inventory of dangerous chemic

gallon of cyclohexane, 66000 gallon of naphtha, 11000 gallon of tolue

benzene and 450 gallons of gasoline. Resulting fire raged in the area fo

8/12/2019 Flixborough Disaster Presentation

5/6

ConsequencesThe bypass pipe had failed due to unforeseen lateral stresses in the pipe d

the a pressure surge.

No

Experience!

No Plan nor

Calculation!

No

pressure

Test!

No proper

support for the

pipe!

These shortcomings led to a widespread public outcry over industrial plant safety and significant

UK governments regulations covering hazardous industrial processes.

8/12/2019 Flixborough Disaster Presentation

6/6

What can be done to avoid the samdisaster from happening?

Safety officer to carry out routine checking. Strict legislation.

Professional engineer in plant design and modification.

Use appropriate equipment and connection.

Safety Test

24-hour monitoring.

Shift work.

Case studies.