flickers of freedom and moral luck 1. introductionsartorio.arizona.edu/files/flickers.pdfall roads...
TRANSCRIPT
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FlickersofFreedomandMoralLuck*
1.Introduction
Thethoughtthattoomuchmoralluckisunacceptablehasledsometoshrinkthelocusofour
moralresponsibility.Forexample,followingtheKantiantraditionofthe“goodwill”astheonly
thingthathasmoralworth,somehavesuggestedthatallthatwecanberesponsibleforis
mentalactslikedecisions,orforthecharactertraitsissuinginthosedecisions,giventhatthese
arelessdependentonexternalinfluencesandthuslessvulnerabletocertainformsofluckthan
otherthings(see,e.g.,Richards1986,Thomson1989,Graham2014,andRivera-López2016).
Theliteratureonthefreewillproblemcontainsasimilarmovementinsupportofshrinkingthe
locusofourresponsibility.Ontheseviews,whatwearetrulyorultimatelyresponsibleforis,
notwhatwedecidetodoperse,butsomethingmorefine-grainedandarguablyevenmore
immunetoluckthanourdecisions:whatwedecideonourowntodo.Inwhatfollows,I’llrefer
tothisviewastheTripleOview.TheTripleOviewcomesupinadefenseoftheclassicalmodel
offreedom(whichunderstandsfreedomintermsofalternativepossibilities)fromFrankfurt’s
famousobjection(Frankfurt1969),asaversionoftheso-called“flickersoffreedom”replyto
thatobjection(see,e.g.,vanInwagen1983,Naylor1984,O’Connor2000,Speak2002,Timpe
2006,Robinson2012,andCapesandSwenson2017).1Althoughtheconnectionwiththemoral
*ThankstoJustinCapes,AndrewKhoury,MichaelMcKenna,MichaelRobinson,andPhilipSwensonforhelpfulcommentsanddiscussion.1Theterm“flickersoffreedom”isfromFischer1994:137-47,anditreferstothosealternativepossibilitiesthatallegedlyremainopentoagentsinFrankfurt-stylecases.
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luckproblemissomewhathiddeninthesedebates,thereisclearlyaconnection,andoneworth
exploringinmoredetail.
Thegoalofthispaperistoexaminethisissue,bylookingataseriesofinterrelated
questions.Firstofall,whatmightbemeantbythecentralclaimoftheTripleOview:theclaim
thattheultimatelocusofourresponsibilityismakingdecisions“onourown”?Also,what
motivationcouldtherebeforthisview,andhowplausibleisit,attheendoftheday?In
particular,howplausibleisitasanapplicationoftheideathatourmoralresponsibility
shouldn’tbetoovulnerabletoluck?
2.TheTripleOView
Let’sstartwithabriefoverviewofhowtheTripleOviewcameintoexistence.vanInwagenfirst
suggestedaviewofthiskindinresponsetoFrankfurt’sargumentagainsttheclassicalmodelof
freedom(theconceptionthatunderstandsfreedomintermsofalternativepossibilities).
Frankfurt’sargumentappealedtospecificcounterexamplestothatconception—examplesthat
sincethenhavebeencalled“Frankfurt-style”cases.AFrankfurt-stylecaseisascenariowhere
anagentseemstomakeadecisionfreely,completelyonhisownandonthebasisofhisown
reasons,butitisadecisionthathecouldn’thaveavoidedmaking.Thereasontheagent
couldn’thaveavoidedmakingthedecision,thestandardstorygoes,isthataneuroscientist
whohadbeenmonitoringtheagent’sbrainwouldhaveensuredthathemadethesame
decision(bymanipulatinghisbrainintherequiredway)ifhehadn’tmadeitonhisown.
Frankfurtnotedthatscenariosofthiskindseemtounderminetheclassicalmodeloffreedom
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becausetheysuggestthatthekindoffreedomrelevanttoresponsibilitydoesn’trequirehaving
alternativepossibilities.
Inturn,vanInwagen(1983)respondedtoFrankfurtindefenseoftheclassicalmodel.
Hisresponseiscomplex,butpartoftheresponseappealedtotheideathatincertaincases
whereitmighthaveseemed,atfirst,thatagentsareresponsibleforunavoidablebehaviorsor
statesofaffairs,thoseagentsarenotactuallyresponsibleforthosebehaviorsorstatesof
affairs(sincetheywereunavoidable);instead,theyareresponsibleforhavingdonethemor
broughtthemaboutontheirown(wherethisissomethingthattheycouldhaveavoided).
AccordingtovanInwagen,onewaytomotivatethistypeofdistinctionisbyreflecting
onexamplesofthefollowingkind:
AllroadsleadtoRome:Ryderisridinganout-of-controlhorse,Dobbin,whenhegetsto
aforkinthepath.RydercannotstopDobbinbuthecanchoosewhichdirectionhewill
gobyusingthebridle.AlthoughheissurethatoneofthepathsleadstoRome,heis
unsureabouttheotherpaths.RyderhatesRomans,andpredictsthatsomeRomanswill
gethurtbythepassageofthehorse,sohemakesDobbingointhedirectionofthepath
heknowsleadstoRome,andsomeRomansgethurt,aspredicted.Asitturnsout,
however,allpathsledtoRome.(vanInwagen1983:176-7;thelabelismine)
AsvanInwagenpointsout,RyderseemsnottoberesponsibleforDobbin’spassingthrough
RomeorfortheRomansgettinghurt.ThesearebothoutcomesthatRydercouldn’thave
avoided.WhatRyderisclearlyresponsibleforisthehorse’stakingaparticularrouteorforthe
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Romansgettinghurtasaresultofthehorsetakingthatparticularroute.Butthesearemore
fine-grainedoutcomesthathecouldhaveavoided.Sothisexamplesuggeststhat,atleastin
somecaseswhereagentscouldhaveavoidedonlythemorefine-grainedoutcome,whatthey
areinfactresponsibleforisthemorefine-grainedoutcome(theonethattheycouldhave
avoided),andnotthemorecoarse-grainedoutcome(theonethattheycouldn’thaveavoided).
vanInwagenthensuggeststhatthisgeneralizestootherkindsofcases.Forexample,
thesamegoes,hesuggests,foracaselikethis:
GunnarandRidley:GunnardecidesonhisowntoshootRidley,butifhehadn’tdecided
thatonhisown,someexternalforcewouldhaveforcedhimtoshootRidley,andsohe
wouldhaveendedupshootinghimanyway.(vanInwagen1983:181;thelabelismine)
vanInwagensuggeststhatasimilaranalysisshouldbeofferedofthiscase:whatGunnaris
clearlyresponsibleforis,notthefactthatheshotRidley,whichissomethingthathecouldn’t
haveavoided,butthefactthatheshotRidleyonhisown,orwithouthavingbeencausedtodo
sobyanexternalforceoutsidehiscontrol(whichissomethingthathecouldhaveavoided).
AftervanInwagen,severalothershavemadesuggestionsalongsimilarlines.In
particular,Naylor(1984)offeredasimilaranalysisofthefollowingcase:
Honestchild:Achilddecidestotellthetruthonhisown,buthisparentswouldhave
forcedhimtotellthetruthifhehadchosentolie.(Naylor1984:251;thelabelismine)
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Naylorsuggestedthat,whereasitisobviousthatthechilddeservesmoralcreditfortellingthe
truthonhisown,itismuchlessobviousthatinthosecircumstanceshedeservesmoralcredit
fortellingthetruthsimpliciter.Inparticular,Naylornotedthatthechildcanberesponsiblefor
themannerinwhichhetoldthetruth(fordoingit“willingly”,or“bychoice”,or“justbecause
hewantedto”)withouttherebybeingresponsiblefortellingthetruth,whichhecouldn’thave
avoided.
Inturn,Robinson(2012)givesasimilaranalysisofthefollowingcase:
Box:Anevildemoncreatesaworldinwhichallthatexistsisalargeboxcontaininga
singlehumanbeing,Jack.ItisphysicallyimpossibleforJacktoleavethebox.However,
Jackneverattemptstoleavetheboxandspendshiswholelifehappilyinsidethebox.
(Robinson2012:181)
RobinsonsuggeststhatJackisnotresponsibleforstayinginthebox;whatheisresponsiblefor
isdecidingonhisowntostayinthebox,nottryingtoleavethebox,ortheparticularwayin
whichhestaysinsidethebox.
AndCapesandSwenson(2017:976)offerasimilaranalysisofacasediscussedin
FischerandRavizza(1998:125):
Sharks:Johnseesachilddrowningintheseaanddecidesnottojumpintosavehim.
Thechilddrowns.UnbeknownsttoJohn,somehungrysharkswouldhaveattackedhim
andpreventedhimfromsavingthechildifhehadtried.
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CapesandSwensonsuggestthat,althoughJohnisnotresponsiblefornotsavingthechildin
thiscase,heisresponsibleforfailingonhisowntosavethechild—thatistosay,withouthaving
beenforcedtodosobythesharks.
Thecommonideabehindalloftheseresponsesseemstobethethoughtthat,onceone
distinguisheshavingdonesomething(amorecoarse-grainedbehaviororfact)fromhaving
doneitonourown(amorefine-grainedbehaviororfact),itbecomesmuchlessclearthat
agentscanberesponsibleforinevitablebehaviors.Onthatbasis,then,wecanbuildadefense
oftheclassicalmodeloffreedomfromFrankfurt’sattackbyarguingthatFrankfurthasn’t
successfullyshownthatwecanactfreelywhilelackingalternativepossibilities.Whatis
sufficientlyclearaboutFrankfurt-stylecases,theargumentgoes,isthattheagentsinthose
casesareresponsibleforhavingmadethedecisionontheirown,orwithoutthehelpofthe
intervener(whichissomethingthattheycouldhaveavoided).Itismuchlessclear,however,
thattheyareresponsibleforhavingmadethedecisionsimpliciter.Thus,itismuchlessclear
thattheyareresponsibleforanyunavoidablebehaviors.
Actually,therearedifferentwaysofcashingthisideaoutmoreprecisely,andthus
differentversionsorformulationsoftheTripleOview.Theseareallwaysofexpressingthe
thoughtthatthe“ultimatelocus”ofourresponsibility,atleastincasesofthiskind,ismaking
decisionsonourown,notmakingdecisionssimpliciter.Inthefirstplace,theoriginaland
simplestversionoftheview,suggestedbybothvanInwagenandNaylor,isthatanagentina
Frankfurt-stylecaseisonlyresponsibleformakingthedecisiononhisown,andnotatallfor
makingthedecision,sincehecouldn’thaveavoidedmakingit.TheresponsetoFrankfurt’s
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argumentofferedbythisviewissimplythatFrankfurtiswronginthinkingthatanagentina
Frankfurt-stylecaseisresponsibleforhisunavoidablebehavior;whatheisresponsibleforisa
morefine-grainedstateofaffairsorfactthathecouldhaveavoided:havingmadethedecision
onhisown.
Inturn,asecondandmorerecentversionofthisview,onesuggestedbyCapesand
Swenson(2017),agreeswiththesejudgments,butatthesametimedrawsonadistinctionthat
isfamiliarintheliteratureonmoralluck:thedistinctionbetweenthescopeandthedegreeof
one’sresponsibility(see,e.g.,Zimmerman2002).Accordingtothisview,eventhoughtheagent
inaFrankfurt-stylecaseis,again,notresponsibleformakingthedecisionthathemade,forit
wasinevitable,thisiscompatiblewithclaimingthatheisjustasblameworthyashewouldhave
beenintheabsenceoftheintervener.Theunderlyingthoughtisthatluckcanaffectwhatyou
areresponsibleforwithoutaffectingthedegreeofyourresponsibility,whichwouldremainthe
sametotheextentthatyoumadethedecisiononyourown.Thisviewhasthepotential
advantagethatitallowsaproponentoftheTripleOviewtocapturemoreofFrankfurt’s
originalintuitionsaboutFrankfurt-stylecases,whichmanypeoplehavefoundconvincing.Forit
allowsustosaythatthereisasenseinwhichagentsinFrankfurt-stylecasesarejustas
blameworthyasiftheyhadbeeninordinarycircumstances,althoughtheyareresponsiblefor
fewerthings.
Finally,athirdandinsomewaysimportantlydifferentversionoftheTripleOview,
whichisformulatedanddefendedinRobinson(2012,2014,andForthcoming),istheviewthat
anagentinaFrankfurt-stylecaseisinfactresponsiblebothformakingthedecisionandfor
makingitonhisown,butheisonlybasicallyresponsibleformakingitonhisown,andonly
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derivativelyresponsibleformakingthedecision.AsRobinsonnotes,themostplausible
interpretationoftheprincipleofalternativepossibilities(theprincipleaccordingtowhich
responsibilityrequiresalternativepossibilitiesofaction)isonethattakesittobeaprinciple
aboutbasicresponsibilityonly.Otherwise,forexample,drunkdriverswouldbeoffthehookfor
causinganaccidentsimplyonthegroundsthattheycouldn’thaveavoidedcausingitatthe
timeoftheaccident,whentheywerealreadydrunk.Byrestrictingtheprincipleofalternative
possibilitiestobasicresponsibility,weavoidthisunacceptableresult(for,evenifdrunkdrivers
couldn’thavedoneotherwiseatthetimeoftheaccident,theycanstillbederivatively
responsiblefortheharmtheycausedbecauseoftheirearlierdecisiontodrinkanddrive,ifthey
couldhaveavoidedmakingthatdecision).Giventhis,Robinsonsuggests,ifwhatanagentina
Frankfurt-stylecaseisbasicallyresponsibleforisonlyhavingmadethedecisiononhisown,it
followsthatFrankfurt-stylecasesdon’tunderminetheprincipleofalternativepossibilitiesthus
understood(sincethoseagentscouldhaveavoidedmakingthedecisionontheirown).Notice
thatthisviewhastheaddedpotentialadvantagethatitallowsproponentsoftheTripleOview
tocaptureevenmoreofFrankfurt’soriginalintuitionsaboutFrankfurt-stylecases,ascompared
totheversionssuggestedbyvanInwagenandNaylor,andbyCapesandSwenson.Foritallows
themtoagreewithFrankfurtconcerningtheagents’responsibilityfortheirdecisions;the
disagreementonlyconcernsthelocusoftheirbasicresponsibility.
ThecentraltenetoftheTripleOview,then,istheclaimthat,atleastinthesekindsof
cases,theultimatelocusofourresponsibilityisnotmakingdecisionsbutmakingthemonour
own.Aswehaveseen,thiscanbeinterpretedeitherastheclaimthat(atleastinthesekindsof
cases)makingdecisionsonourownistheonlythingthatwecanberesponsiblefor,orasthe
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claimthatthisiswhatfixesthedegreeofourresponsibility,orastheclaimthatthisiswhatwe
arebasicallyresponsiblefor.Ourfocus,then,isafamilyofviewsratherthanasingleview.
Notethatalloftheauthorsthatwehavereviewedarespecificallyconcernedwith
responsibilityinscenarioswithinevitableoutcomes(Frankfurt-stylecasesbeingjustonetypeof
exampleofthatkind).Onenaturalquestionthatarises,then,iswhetherthoseauthorswould
wanttoextendtheirclaimstootherkindsofscenarios.Thatistosay,arewesupposedto
concludefromtheiranalysesthatitisingeneralthecasethatallthatwecanbetruly
responsibleforismakingdecisionsonourown,andnotmakingdecisions?Orthatthisiswhat
fixesthedegreeofourresponsibility?Orthatthisiswhatwearebasicallyresponsiblefor?Of
course,iftheseclaimsholdgenerally,thepositiononFrankfurt-stylecasesjustfollowsasa
specialcase.Asaresult,ifthegeneralclaimweresufficientlywellmotivated,thiscouldhelp
reinforcetheplausibilityofthisstyleofresponsetoFrankfurt’sargument.
Now,Iamnotclaimingthatalloftheseauthorswouldnecessarilybetemptedto
embracethemoregeneralclaims.2But,assuggestedabove,itisinterestingtonotethatthe
generalclaimcanatleastbemotivatedbymoralluckconsiderations.3Frankfurt-stylecases
seemtosuggestthatwecansometimesbemoreincontrolofwhetherwewillmakeadecision
onourownthanoverwhetherwewillmakethatdecision.So,bylimitingtheultimatelocusof
ourresponsibilitytowhatwedecideonourowntodo,astheTripleOviewdoes,wecan
2Infact,CapesandSwenson(personalcommunication)rejectthegeneralizationofatleastsomeoftheirviewstoothercases.3ThemoralluckconsiderationsIhaveinmindarediscussedinRobinson2012:187,CapesandSwenson2017:974-5,andRobinsonForthcoming:n.16.
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protectourresponsibilityfromcertainformsofluckthatsomemayfindproblematic.Thisisthe
kindofmotivationfortheTripleOviewthatIaminterestedinexamininghere.
3.Responsibilityfordeciding“onourown”
Now,howexactlyshouldweunderstandtheproposalthattheultimatelocusofour
responsibilityisnotmakingdecisionsbutmakingdecisionsonourown?Whatarethe
conditionsforbeingresponsibleformakingadecisiononourown?
The“onourown”locutionmightmeandifferentthingsindifferentcases.4Butnote
that,onaverynaturalinterpretation,inthiscontextdoingsomethingonyourownhastodo
withyourdoingitasaresultofacertainsetofmotivationsorcausalinfluences.Whenyoudo
somethingonyourown,youracthasaparticularkindofcausalhistory:onethatcontainsyour
owndeliberationandreasons,andonethatdoesn’tcontainexternalforcesormanipulatorsof
acertainsort.Forexample,inNaylor’sexampleofthehonestchild,thechildtellsthetruth“on
hisown”inthesensethatheismotivatedbyhisownreasonstotellthetruth,andisnotforced
byhisparentstodoso.Thatistosay,hetellsthetruthonhisowninthesensethathistelling
thetruthhastherelevantkindofcausalhistory.Arguably,thesamegoesfortheother
exampleswehavereviewedandthatwerediscussedbytheproponentsoftheTripleOview:in
vanInwagen’sGunnarandRidleyexample,GunnardecidestoshootRidley“onhisown”inthe
sensethatheismotivatedbyhisownreasonstoshoothimandnotbyexternalcoerciveforces;
inRobinson’sBoxexample,Jackdecidestostayintheboxmotivatedbyhisownreasonstostay
4Forexample,insomecontextsitseemstomeansomethinglike“alone,orunaccompaniedbyothers”,aswhenwesayofashypersonthatwhatshelikesmostisspendingtimeonherown.
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andnotcausedtodosobyexternalphysicalforces;etc.Thisisinlinewithwhatmostofthe
advocatesoftheTripleOviewexplicitlysay.Forexample,CapesandSwensonidentifytheclaim
thattheagentmakesthedecisiononherownwith“anobservationabouttheetiologyof[the
agent’s]decision,viz.,thatitwasnottheresultofoutsidecoercionorforce”(Capesand
Swenson2017:978;seealsoCapes2014:433).AndRobinsonsaysthatwhatitmeanstosay
thatanagentdecidesonhisowntoAis“simplythathedecidestoAandthathedoesso
withoutbeingcausallyforcedorinterferedwith”(RobinsonForthcoming:n.31).
Arguably,then,theclaimthattheultimatelocusofourresponsibilityismakingdecisions
onourown(insteadofmakingdecisionssimpliciter)hastobeinterpretedastheclaimthat
whatweareultimatelyresponsibleforis(notourdecisionsbut)afactaboutthecausalhistory
ofourdecisions:thefactthatourdecisionswere(orwerenot)causedinacertainway.This
seemstobe,atleast,themostnaturalinterpretationofthesuggestionmadebyTripleOviews,
andthebestwayIseetomakesenseofit.5So,inwhatfollows,I’lladoptthisinterpretationand
examineitsprospectsofsuccess.(Ofcourse,ifI’mwrongandthisisnotwhatsomeofthese
5Naylorseemstobeexplicitlyembracingthisinterpretationwhenshesays:“Ifsomeoneismorallyresponsiblefordoingsomethingonhisown,thenevenifheisnotmorallyresponsiblefordoingwhathedid,hecanstillbemorallyresponsibleforthemannerinwhichhedidit.”(Naylor1983:257).Capesalsoseemstobeembracingthisinterpretationwhenheclaimsthatwhattheagentisresponsibleforisnotadecisionbutamorepreciseormorefine-grainedfact:thefactthathedoesitonhisown(Capes2014:433).Robinsonsayshewantstoremainneutralontheissueof“justwhatitmeanshereforanagenttodecideonhisowntoA”,butoneofthepossibleinterpretationshementionsistheinterpretationaccordingtowhichdecidingonone’sowntoAis“justawayofdecidingtoA”(RobinsonForthcoming:n.14).vanInwagenisaspecialcase,Ithink,inthatheembracesaformofcausalessentialismabouteventsthatentailsthatyourdecisionwouldhavebeenadifferenteventifithadbeencausedinadifferentway(vanInwagen1983:169).Onthisview,yourdecidingonyourowncouldjustbetheactualeventofyourdecision.(ThisviewisalsosuggestedinthefirstpartofRobinson2012.)Butmostpeoplefindcausalessentialismabouteventstobehighlyimplausible,andIagree.(Capesmakesthispointtooinhis2014:section3.)
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authorshaveinmind,thisshouldbetakenasaninvitationtosaymoreabouthowweshould
interpretthecentralclaimoftheTripleOviews.)
Let’sstartbyasking:Couldweberesponsibleforfactsaboutthecausalhistoryofour
decisions?And,ifso,how?
Thefirstthingtonoteisthatafactaboutthecausalhistoryofadecision(amentalact)
isnot,itself,anact(ofanykind).Itisnotsomethingthatwedo,butafactaboutsomethingthat
wedo:afactaboutwhyitisthatwedowhatwedo.Butaprettystandardassumptionof
theoriesofresponsibilityisthatwhatwearebasicallyresponsibleforis(ifanything)certainacts
ofours(perhapsincludingactsofomission);mostcommonly,thesearetakentobementalacts
suchasdecisions.Asaresult,thereisapotentiallyseriousproblemhere.Theproblemisthat
theTripleOviewwantstosituatetheultimatelocusofourresponsibilityinthingsthatarenot
acts(ofanykind),but“features”ofacts,orfactsconcerningthecausalhistoryofacts.And
thesearenottypicallyregardedasthekindsofthingsthatwecanbebasicallyresponsiblefor.
Asaresult,itishardtoseehowtheycanbetheultimatelocusofourresponsibility,asthe
TripleOviewsays.6
Toclarify,Iamnotdenyingthatwecanberesponsibleforthingsthataren’tacts.In
particular,Iamnotdenyingthatwecansometimesberesponsibleforfactsaboutthecausal
6Forarelatedobjection,seeStump1999:301-2.StumpsuggeststhattheTripleOviewcouldonlyworkifdoinganactonone’sownwereanact,andonethatisdifferentfromtheactthattheagentwouldhaveperformedotherwise(sheisskepticaloftheseassumptions).ForaresponsetoStump,seeCapes(2014).Therearesomeviewsaccordingtowhichwecanbebasicallyresponsibleforthingslikecharactertraitsormentalstatesthatarenotacts(see,e.g.,Adams1985,Smith2005,andGraham2014).Note,however,thatfactsaboutthecausalhistoryofourdecisionsareverydifferentfromthingsofthatkind.So,whatevermotivationtherecouldbeforacceptingcharactertraitsandthelikeasthingsthatwecanbebasicallyresponsibleforwouldn’tobviouslycarryovertocausal-historyfacts.
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historiesofouracts.Itcertainlyseemsthatwecanbe,inthesamewaywecanberesponsible
forothermoreordinaryeventshavingthecausalhistoriesthattheydo.Butthepointisthat
thesedon’ttendtobethingsthatwearebasicallyresponsiblefor;rather,ourresponsibilityin
thosecasesisinheritedfromotherthingsforwhichweareresponsible.
vanInwagen’s“AllroadsleadtoRome”caseisagoodillustrationofhowwecanbe
responsibleforafactaboutthecausalhistoryofanordinaryevent.Inthiscase,asvanInwagen
notes,RyderisnotresponsiblefortheeventoftheRomansbeinghurt.Butheisresponsiblefor
theRomanshavingbeenhurtasaresultofthehorsetakingacertainpath(theonlyonehe
recognizedasleadingtoRome).SoRyderisresponsibleforafactaboutthecausalhistoryof
theeventconsistingintheRomansbeinghurt.But,ofcourse,inthiscase,hisresponsibilityfor
thisfactisnotbasic,butinheritedfromtheearlierdecisiontoturnthehorseinthatdirection.
Sharksisasimilarcase:theagent,John,isnotresponsibleforfailingtosavethedrowningchild,
andheisresponsibleforthefactthatthesharkswerenotpartofthecausalhistoryofhis
failuretosavethechild.Butthisisbecauseheisresponsibleforhisdecisionnottoattempta
rescue,whichinturnresultedinthesharksnotpreventingtherescue.7
Similarly,therecouldbecaseswhereweareresponsibleforafactaboutthecausal
historyofourdecisions.But,inthosecasestoo,ourresponsibilitywouldhavetobederived
fromotherthingswedid(orfailedtodo)andforwhichwearebasicallyresponsible.For
example,athiefcouldberesponsibleforthefactthathisdesiretostealcausedhisdecisionto
7Inmyview,exampleslikevanInwagen’sGunnarandRidleycasearedifferent,inthatIthinkGunnarisresponsibleforRidley’sdeath,andnotjustforafactaboutthecausalhistoryofRidley’sdeath.ThebasicdifferenceisthatGunnarcausesRidley’sdeath;incontrast,theagentinSharksdoesn’tcausethechild’sdeath,andRyderdoesn’tcausetheharmtotheRomans.IdiscussthesignificanceofdifferencesofthiskindinSartorio2016,chapter2.
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steal,butthiscouldbebecausehefailedtoresistthat(resistible)desire.Inthatcase,Isubmit,
heisbasicallyresponsibleforhisfailuretoresistthedesiretosteal,andonlyderivativelyfor
thefactaboutthecausalhistoryofhisdecision.Asanillustration,imaginethatthethiefknows
thatheisgenerallyabletoresisttheurgetostealifhelooksatapassageonKantianphilosophy
fromamoralphilosophytextbook,andonthatparticularoccasionhedecidednottolookatthe
passage,whichresultedinhisstealingact.Clearly,whatheisbasicallyresponsibleforinthis
caseishisdecisionnottolookatthepassage.Healsoseemsresponsibleforthefactthathis
desiretostealwascausallyefficacious;however,hisresponsibilityforthisfactisinheritedfrom
hisresponsibilityforthedecisionnottolookatthepassage.
Ingeneral,then,itishardtoseehowwecouldbebasicallyresponsibleforfactsabout
thecausalhistoriesofourdecisions,sincethesearefactsthatwetendtoberesponsibleforina
derivativeway.ButthismakestroublefortheTripleOview.Forimaginethatwewantedtosay
thattheagentinaFrankfurt-stylecaseisnotresponsible,ornotbasicallyresponsible,for
havingmadethedecisionthathemade,butonlyforhavingmadeitonhisown.Howcouldthis
be,ifthisisafactaboutthecausalhistoryofhisdecision?Presumably,ifhewereresponsible
forthatfact,hisresponsibilitywouldhavetobeinherited,asintheexamplesabove,fromother
thingsforwhichheisbasicallyresponsible.Butthereisn’tanysuchthing;afterall,theseare
supposedtobecasesofbasicmoralresponsibility.(Recallthattheyhavetobe;otherwisethey
wouldhavenobearingontheprincipleofalternativepossibilities,sincethisprincipleis
restrictedtobasicresponsibilityonly.)
Atthispoint,theproponentoftheTripleOviewmightprotest:But,surely,theagentin
aFrankfurt-stylecaseisresponsibleformakingthedecisiononhisown!Thismuchseemsclear.
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So,giventhatmyreasoningabovesuggeststhatheisnot(giventhatthereisnothingfrom
whichthatresponsibilitycouldbederived),theremustbeaflawinthatreasoning.
Itis,indeed,temptingtothinkinthisway.But,asIgoontosuggestinthenextsection,
thiswayofthinkingreliesonaconfusion.Uncoveringthatconfusionwillallowustocomeup
withadiagnosisthatwillhelpusseemoreclearlybothwhytheTripleOviewfails,andalsowhy
itmayhaveseemedattractive.
4.Adiagnosis
Therootoftheconfusion,itseemstome,couldbethatinthesecasesofbasicresponsibilityit’s
easytoconflatewhatweareresponsibleforwithwhyweareresponsible—thatistosay,with
thegroundsofourresponsibility.Recallthat,onwhatseemstobethemostnatural
interpretationofthe“onourown”locution,beingresponsibleformakingadecisiononour
ownamountstobeingresponsibleforafactaboutthecausalhistoryofthedecision.Thecausal
historyofthedecisionmadebyagentsinFrankfurt-stylecasesisonethatincludestheirown
deliberationandtheirownreasons.So,inorderforagentsinFrankfurt-stylecasestobe
responsibleformakingthedecisionontheirown,theywouldhavetoberesponsibleforthe
factthattheirdecisionhadthatcausalhistory.But,dowereallythinkthatagentsinFrankfurt-
stylecasesareresponsibleforthisfact?Thatis,dowereallythinkthattheyareresponsiblefor
thefactthattheirownreasonsanddeliberationbroughtabouttheirdecision?
It’snotatallclearthatwedo.Whatmostpeoplewouldcertainlywanttosayisnotthis
but,instead,thattheagentisresponsibleforhisdecisionbecausehisownreasonsand
deliberationbroughtabouthisdecision.Thatistosay,thefactaboutthecausalhistoryofthe
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agent’sdecisionisnotsomethingthattheagentisresponsibleforbut,instead,somethingthat
groundshisresponsibilityforthedecision.IfanagentinaFrankfurt-stylecasemayhave
seemedresponsibleformakingthedecisiononhisown,then,perhapsthiswasjusttheresult
ofconflatingthegroundsofhisresponsibilitywithsomethingthatheisresponsiblefor.
Inacoupleofrecentpapers,Robinsonofferedanargumentthatisrelevantforour
purposeshere(seeRobinson2012andForthcoming).Thisisanargumentforthethirdversion
oftheTripleOviewdiscussedabove:theviewthat,althoughagentsinFrankfurt-stylecasesare
responsiblebothformakingthedecisionandformakingthedecisionontheirown,theyare
onlybasicallyresponsibleformakingthedecisionontheirown.Thatistosay,althoughtheyare
responsibleformakingthedecision,theirresponsibilityforthedecisionisderivedfromtheir
responsibilityformakingthedecisionontheirown,whichisthe“ultimatelocus”oftheir
responsibility.Robinsonnotesthat,ifthoseagentsareresponsibleforboththings,makingthe
decisionandmakingitontheirown,thenthesefactsmustbeeitherunrelatedoronemust
explaintheother(hedoesn’tconsiderthepossibilitythattheymaybothbeexplainedbythe
agent’sbeingresponsibleforathirdthing,probablybecauseit’sunclearwhatthatthirdthing
couldbe).AsRobinsonnotes,itseemsimplausibletosuggestthattheyareunrelated.Sothat
leavestwopossibilities:either(i)theagent’sresponsibilityforthedecisionexplainshis
responsibilityformakingthedecisiononhisown,orit’stheotherwayaround:(ii)theagent’s
responsibilityformakingthedecisiononhisownexplainshisresponsibilityforthedecision.
But,Robinsonargues,(ii)ismuchmoreplausiblethan(i).Fordecidingonourownseemstobe
morebasic,ormorewithinourcontrol,thandecidingsimpliciter.So,inthesamewaythatour
responsibilityforovertbodilyactionsisderivedfromourmorebasicresponsibilityforour
17
antecedentdecisionsormentalactions(whicharemorewithinourcontrol),itseemsthatwe
wouldhavetoconcludethatourresponsibilityforourdecisions,too,isderivedfromourmore
basicresponsibilityformakingdecisionsonourown.(AccordingtoRobinson,thisgoesatleast
forFrankfurt-stylecases,ifnotmoregenerally,foranycasewhereweareresponsiblefora
decision.)
Asexplainedabove,IthinkthatRobinson’sinitialassumptionisnotquiteright:itisnot
thecasethatagentsinFrankfurt-stylecasesareresponsibleforboththings,makingadecision
andmakingitontheirown.Instead,theyareonlyresponsibleformakingthedecision.Still,we
canexplainawaytheappearancethatisarguablydrivingRobinson’sargumentinthefollowing
way.ItistrueofFrankfurt-stylecasesthatagentsmakethedecisionsthattheymakeontheir
own.Anditistruethat,insomesense,thisisa“morebasic”ormorefundamentalfactthan
theirresponsibilityforthosedecisions.Itisamorebasicormorefundamentalfactinthatit
groundstheirresponsibilityforthedecisions.Butitdoesn’tfollowfromthisthatitismorebasic
orfundamentalinthesensethattheagents’responsibilityfortheirdecisionsisderivedfrom
theirresponsibilityforthoseotherthings,whichiswhatRobinsonwantstosay.
Inotherwords,basicresponsibilityfactscan(ofcourse)begroundedinotherfacts.But
thoseotherfactsarenot,themselves,responsibilityfacts(otherwisetheywouldnotbebasic
responsibilityfactsbutderivativeresponsibilityfacts).Whatkindsoffactsarethey?Thisis
somewhatcontroversialbut,attheveryleast,itisclearthattheymustincludesomecausal
historyfacts(sincehowyoumakeadecision,orthecausalhistoryofyourdecision,isclearly
18
relevanttowhetheryouareresponsibleforit).8So,inparticular,factsconcerningthecausal
historyofdecisionswillhaveanimportantroletoplayingroundingtheagent’sbasic
responsibilityforthosedecisions,withoutbeingfactsthattheagentisresponsiblefor.9
Ontheotherhand,notethatifonefollowsRobinsoninsayingthattheagent’s
responsibilityformakingthedecisionderivesfromher(basic)responsibilityformakingthe
decisiononherown,thenthequestionarises:Whatcouldpossiblygroundthatbasic
responsibilityfact?Weseemtobeleftwithoutananswertothisquestion.10Whichmakesme
thinkthatwehavegonetoofar:weshouldhavestoppedearlier,atthegroundsoftheagent’s
responsibilityforherdecision.Inotherwords,whatweshouldhavesaidis,again,thatalthough
theagentisresponsibleforherdecisionbecauseofthewayshemadethatdecision,thisisn’t
aninstanceofderivedresponsibility,butafactaboutthegroundsofbasicresponsibility.
8Onmyview(developedinSartorio2016),causalhistoryfacts(togetherwiththegroundsofthosecausalhistoryfactsthemselves)areactuallytheonlyfactsthatarerelevanttothetypeofcontrolthatisrelevanttoanagent’sresponsibility.9AtonepointRobinsonraisesthechallenge:“Ifapersonisnotmorallyresponsiblefordoingathingonherown,itisdifficulttoseehowshecouldbemorallyresponsiblefordoingitsimpliciter.”(Robinson2012:186-7).AsIhaveargued,Ithinkthatthechallengecanbeansweredbypointingoutthatshecanstillbemorallyresponsiblefordoingitsimpliciter,aslongasherdoingitonherowngroundsherresponsibilityfordoingitsimpliciter.10Swenson(personalcommunication)notesthatonepossibilitywouldbetosaythatthecausalhistoryfactitself(thefactthattheagentmadethedecisiononherown)groundsthebasicresponsibilityfact(thefactthattheagentisbasicallyresponsibleformakingthedecisiononherown).Accordingtothissuggestion,therearesomefactsconcerningthewayinwhichdecisionsaremade,whentheyaremadeintherightway,thataresuchthatsimplybyobtainingtheycangroundtheagent’sbasicresponsibilityforthoseveryfacts.Althoughthisisaninterestingsuggestion,Iremainunconvinced.For,again,althoughit’sveryplausibletosaythatthefactabouthowthedecisionwasmadegroundstheagent’sresponsibilityforthedecision,itseemsmuchlessplausibletosaythatthefactabouthowthedecisionwasmadegroundstheagent’sresponsibilityforthatveryfactabouthowthedecisionwasmade.
19
5.Conclusions
Ihaveexaminedafamilyofviewsonresponsibilitythatwereoriginallyproposedinresponseto
Frankfurt’sargument,butthatcouldalsobemotivatedbygeneralconsiderationsofmoralluck.
Coulditbethat,astheseviewssuggest,theultimatelocusofourresponsibilityisnotmaking
decisionsbutmakingthemonourown?Ifso,thiswouldhelpprotectthesphereofour
responsibilityfromcertainformsofluckthatsomemayfindobjectionable(inadditionto
protectingtheclassicalmodeloffreedomfromFrankfurt’sobjection).Ihavearguedthatthose
viewsfailinthat,totheextentthatwecanmakesenseoftheconceptofbeingresponsiblefor
makingdecisionsonourown,itisnotsomethingthatcanconstitutethe“ultimatelocus”ofour
responsibility.
Still,Ihopetohavealsoshownthatthinkingabouttheseviewscanbeinstructiveinthat
itcanhelpshedsomelightonthestructurethatagoodtheoryofresponsibilitymusthave.One
thingthatcameupinourdiscussionistheimportanceofdrawingacleardistinctionbetween
twowaysinwhichresponsibilityfactscanbe“rootedin”otherfacts:oneiswhathappenswhen
ourresponsibilityisderivedfromotherthingsthatwearemorebasicallyresponsiblefor,and
anotheriswhathappenswhenourresponsibility(inparticular,ourbasicresponsibility)is
groundedinotherthings.Althoughthisshouldbearelativelyuncontroversialdistinction,itis
onethatcaneasilybeoverlookedinsomecontextsandthus,payingcloseattentiontoitcan
helpkeepourtheorizingaboutresponsibilityontherighttrack.11
11InSartorioMs.Iarguethatfocusingontheroleplayedbythenotionofgroundinourtheoriesofresponsibilitycanhelpusavoidotherimportantconfusionsconcerningtheconceptofresponsibility.
20
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