first with the most - fort benning · presence of mechanized forces has discouraged bravado, and...

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

GORDON R. SULLIVANGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

MILTON H. HAMILTONAdministrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army07352

Too bad American forces haven’t been flyingcommercial the past few years, for our soldierswould have accumulated some serious frequent-flyer miles. Last year saw infantry and light cavalryforces trying to restore order in Somalia, and in thisissue as well as the last, ARMOR covered thoseoperations. It’s beginning to look as if we learnedsome expensive lessons about the role of armor insupport of Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Icertainly hope so, for at press time we find U.S.forces once again on foreign soil. This time it’sHaiti, and the thugs who have been displaced frompower down there have got to feel rather foolish. Ayear ago they jumped up anddown along the dock, fired theirweapons in the air, and turnedback a ship containing sometwo-hundred U.S. personnel of-fering humanitarian assistance. Ayear later we came back with20,000 and we didn’t wait for aninvitation.

One thing that seems to theoutside observer to be differentabout this operation is the pres-ence of M551 Sheridans rum-bling through the streets of Port-au-Prince. I don’trecall seeing such a visible, active mechanizedforce in the Somalia operation, and I must admitthat to a former member of that Sheridan battalion,those old track-slappers look pretty good. Whenthe evening news offers a glimpse of the vehicles, Ifind myself straining to spot my old track fromCharlie company (I wonder if they ever got the fan-tower problems solved?).

While the military police probably face the great-est challenge in Haiti — that of maintaining orderwithout turning into the local sheriff — I stronglysuspect, though they might not admit it to a tanker,that those MPs and infantrymen are comforted bythe clatter of track and the presence of big guns...just in case. Although the armor threat in Haiti hasproven to be little more than a reinforced 4x4 (lessthe spotlights and winch), one thing is clear. Thepresence of mechanized forces has discouragedbravado, and that may prove to save Americanlives. For there is just something about armor roll-ing along in column that makes a thug with a hand-

gun feel weaker than a teabagin the Mississippi River. OurSheridans overwatching infan-trymen in a clearing operation— like a big brother observing aschoolyard altercation — makethe bully think twice aboutthrowing the first punch. Some-times the best defense is ob-tained without firing a shot. Tothat extent, those old Sheri-dans—the vehicles we weretalking about scrapping back in

1979 — have more than earned their keep. Like anold cavalry steed that some outpost trooper can’tbear to put out to pasture, we keep mounting upon those 551s for “one more ride.” And maybe it’sjust me, but those old campaign horses seemed tobrighten up and regain their spirit when theysensed the smell of powder and the roar of a maingun.

— J.D. Brewer

First With The Most

The Real Issue is Wargaming Synchronization is a hard subject to discuss, and even harder to train and execute. Too much of the synchronization process occurs on those charts hanging around the TOC and they (I suspect) are frequently thrown out or put away because no one has the time to digest the plethora of paperwork higher-level staffs throw at people. As I have stated before, a properly written Commander's Intent and Concept of the Operation will show how the commander expects the battle to be synchronized. The real issue, as I see it, and MAJ Cloy alludes to this, is wargaming.

lems that surface during rehearsals are found there instead of during the wargame. More than a few that I have met refuse to wargame a course of action. To run a wargame requires an eye for the map, an understanding of the friendly force, the enemy force, and the capabilities of all the weapons and other support systems that the battalion task force employs or gets information from. To learn to do this takes time and training that the young officers who are S3-airs or brigade planning officers frequently do not have. Many planners evaluate courses of action on "gut feeL" I know, because as the brigade S4 at an NTC rotation, I lost patience with our plans officer.

Dear Sir:

I enjoyed nearly every article in the JulyAugust issue of ARMOR. I especially enjoyed the articles on digitization and synchronization. If your readers have not already done so, I strongly recommend the book Hammer's Slammers to them. It is about a mercenary armored regiment in the far future, a completely digitized and lethal force. It is written by David Drake, a member of the 11th ACR in Vietnam.

Many officers do not know how to properly wargame, and that is why the prob-

2

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Editor-in-Chief Major J. D. Brewer Managing Editor Jon T. Clemens Editorial Assistant Vivian Thompson Production Assistant Mary Hager Staff Illustrator Mr. Jody Harmon

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questions concerning doctrine, training, organizations, and equipment of the Armor Force.)

u.s. ARMY ARMOR SCHOOL

Commandant MG Larry R. Jordan

Assistant Commandant BG Lon E. Maggart

Chief of Staff, Armor School COL Fred A. Treyz III

Command Sergeant Major CSM Ronnie W. Davis

Armor School Sergeant Major CSM Henry F. Hurley

16th Cavalry Regiment COL Don Elder

1st Armor Training Brigade COL Henry Hodge

Directorate of Combat Developments COL Edward A. Bryla

NCO Academy CSM Stephen R. Morgan

Reserve Component Spt Div LTC Bennett 1. Mott

TRADOC System Manager for Abrams and Armored Gun System COL Charles F. Moler

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ARMOR - November-December 1994

Then, I took over the planning session toshow how to run a wargame (to theamazement of the O/Cs and my XO’samusement).

Ideally, you should be able to imagine,without the use of a map, the ebb and flowof the battle and the effects of, at least,major weapons and supporting systems.Then, with the use of a map or terrainmodel, refine that picture. How, then, canwe obtain this training and use it on thebattlefield?

First, officers should play wargames. Howmany of us will spend hours playing TrivialPursuit or watching a football game andnever think to play a wargame? In myyears of service, when I mentioned that Iplayed wargames to my commander orpeers, I invariably received a response of“You do what?” However, I believe that war-gaming enables me to understand terrain,friendly and enemy units, and weapons ef-fects. There are several commercial boardgames that portray an accurate repre-sentation of the battlefield, such as GDW’sSands of War.

Second, we have several computer war-games in the inventory that allow us to war-game courses of action. The Brigade/Bat-talion Battle Simulation (BBS) and JANUSimmediately come to mind. These simula-tions allow us to rapidly play (and replay)several courses of action and evaluatethem. It is probably seldom used for this,and in preparing for an NTC rotation itwould be of limited use because we cannottake all the equipment with us. Still, for thefirst mission a brigade could actually fightthrough several courses of action in a dayand use that in its staff process. It must beemphasized that a success in a simulatedbattle does not necessarily equal a successon the battlefield. For the simulation tohave any hope of portraying a possible re-sult on the battlefield, the OPFOR must bethoroughly professional and trained in OP-FOR doctrine and tactics.

This lack of portability drives a require-ment for a simple, easy-to-use computersimulation. It should fit into one to fourlinked laptop/notebook computers thatwould enable a staff to input their informa-tion and rapidly play out different coursesof action. Currently, there are no militarysimulations that are capable of this. Nocommercial game I have evaluated does,either. There are some new ones comingonto the market that may start to meet therequirement. Currently, commercial gamesdo not support actual terrain in the detailwe require, but I see this changing.

In the meantime, break out the boardgames and adapt them to your training ar-eas by using clear hex sheets over themap. Use BBS as a training tool for staffsto evaluate courses of action, and perhapseven sponsor some wargame tournamentsin your units.

MICHAEL K. ROBELMAJ, Armor, USAR

Birmingham, Ala.

British Mark VII Tank —First in Flight

Dear Sir:

In reference to the interesting article,“When Tanks Took Wings,” by Colonel Ray-mond Battreall in the May-June 1994 issue,this was not “the first combat-operationalairlift of tanks in the history of warfare” asclaimed. British Mark VII Light Tanks, Tet-rarch, were carried in Hamilcar gliders toNormandy on June 6, 1944. About half-a-dozen tanks were involved, including onethat was reported to have fallen throughthe nose of its glider over the EnglishChannel. Some of the Tetrarch guns werefitted with the coned-bore Littlejohn muzzleadapter which, firing special projectiles,doubled the armor penetration perform-ance, but I do not know if any of thosetanks taken to Normandy were fitted in thismanner.

While on the subject of Normandy and D-Day, some American authors were criticalof the Sherman DD (Duplex Drive) tanksbecause nearly all of those launched atOmaha Beach “sank like stones.” Althoughthe idea was to save tank landing craftfrom the risks involved close to shore, inthe prevailing rough sea they should nothave been launched 6,000 yards out. Ac-cording to “Armoured Fighting Vehicles inProfile, Vol. 3" (1976), at Utah Beach 30DD tanks of the 70th Tank Battalion werelaunched at 3,000 yards from shore with al-most all reaching the beach. Although therough sea delayed their arrival until afterthe infantry had landed, they did give vitalsupport.

Certainly, the invasion demonstrated thatarmor is essential to effective infantry op-erations, but armor itself needs support ve-hicles. Reportedly, General Bradley was of-fered specialized armored vehicles by theBritish, but he declined to accept them.These vehicles, which included crab flailtanks (minesweeping tanks) and Crocodileflame-thrower tanks, were used effectivelyby the British and Canadians and wouldprobably have reduced the casualties sus-tained by the Americans at their beaches.In the end, of course, it was the courageand determination of the Allied fighting menthat carried the day, in spite of all the un-foreseen adverse situations.

LEONARD E. CAPONMesa, Ariz.

More on MILES as IFF

Dear Sir:

It was with amazement that I read 1SGHecht’s letter about using MILES sensorsas a part of an IFF system (July-August1994 ARMOR). I had just that day spent a

great deal of time discussing the same ideawith a colleague at work. I applaud thethought that has gone into this; however, Iwould like to make some modifications to1SG Hecht’s suggestions.

First of all, when I was involved with theOT III testing of MILES in Germany in1979, I knew in my heart that this systemwas going to be an integral part of anyArmy training program in the future. If thiswas going to be the case, then why not in-tegrate this into all vehicles produced forthe field? Operationally, it doesn’t detractfrom the vehicle, except when the lasersystems are installed. Additionally, havingthe system integral to the vehicle wouldsave on maintenance by not having to in-stall and remove the system every time theunit went to the field for training (especiallythe onerous task of always having to reap-ply the Velcro to the vehicle!). Finally, thecrew would be as familiar with the MILESsystem as they were with the vehicle itself,and would know how to fight their vehiclewith either MILES or live ammo.

As for how to integrate this into an effec-tive IFF system, this would involve severalitems:

First, all laser designator systems wouldhave to have a basic IFF code integratedinto them. There also would need to be an-other programmable code integrated intothe system. This programmable code wouldbe changed on a periodic basis andpassed through IVIS or VINSON channels.The purpose of this additional code is that,should the base code be compromised(which given sufficient time will be, byeither analysis or OPSEC violation), friend-ly vehicles could still be differentiated fromenemy ones that might be able to detectand react to being lased. Also, for units op-erating on the flanks of divisional or higherunits (where most fratricide incidents occur)some type of identification response wouldbe received from these vehicles.

Second, a transponder would be required,either a return laser signal or a digital radioburst on a set frequency. In the first case,this could be done as an addition to thecrosswind sensor and would consist of arotating mirror synchronized to a laser thatwould pulse when the mirror was orientedin the direction that the original lase camefrom. In the second case, this would re-quire either a separate system or integra-tion into the IVIS network, with a separateprotocol established within the system tohandle this information.

With either of the systems, the opera-tional scenario would be as follows:

The firing tank acquires the target andthe TC initiates the fire command. The gun-ner lases to the target. The TC must ac-knowledge and enter the range. If the tar-get is a friendly that has both the base andprogrammable codes, it responds to thelasing with a proper coded laser or radioburst. A RED light would then show on the

Continued on 0

ARMOR — November-December 1994 3

The introduction of the M1A2 tankand other digitized weapons platformssuch as PALADIN has heralded the ar-rival of Information Age warfare andthe first equipment fielded for ForceXXI. The Abrams M1A2 is a vastquantitative and qualitative improve-ment in lethality. The addition of theCommander’s Independent ThermalViewer and other fire control enhance-ments make it a much more capablefighting machine than the combatproven M1A1. Survivability enhance-ments provide it the capability to carryout its mission in the most dangerousof environments.

Perhaps the most significant enhance-ments come in the form of battle com-mand improvements. POSNAV andsteer-to capability provide the crew un-precedented ability to precisely maneu-ver. The situational awareness, report-ing, orders issuance, and graphics capa-bilities provided by IVIS enable leadersto exercise battle command in a man-ner and to a degree never before possi-ble. In the hands of well-trained sol-diers, it is the world’s best main battletank. In the hands of competent andadaptive leaders, it is a tremendous21st Century command and control en-hancement that can fundamentally alterour ability to dominate land combat.The United States is building and field-ing 1,079 of these superb tanks.

The technology that enabled us tobuild the Abrams M1A2 continues tomove forward and is increasingly avail-able around the world. The currentspread and pace of technological ad-vances, coupled with the increasing de-velopment and proliferation of explo-sive reactive armor, means that theM1A2’s qualitative advantage over po-tential adversaries could be at risk bythe time tank #1,079 is produced andfielded in the middle of the next dec-ade. That sobering thought caused meseveral months ago to ask the question,“What should tank #1,080 be like?”

Conceptually, Tank 1,080 is the ve-hicle that will provide the combatpower and technical superiority be-tween the fielding of the M1A2 andthe eventual fielding of the FutureMain Battle Tank. The potential capa-bilities we will face in the middle ofthe next decade require significant en-hancements in lethality, target acquisi-tion, crew protection, system surviv-ability, sustainability, decision supporttools, and information management.Tank 1,080 will incorporate emergingtechnologies to enhance the fightabil-ity of the current Abrams variant, andspearhead their inclusion in the FutureMain Battle Tank, anticipated by the2015 time frame.

Combat developers are exploringmany possible features for inclusion on

Tank 1,080. While many of these ef-forts are classified, the general areas ofconcentration are not. Tank 1,080 willhave armament enhancements in termsof main gun and other weapons. Re-search is varied and ranges from im-proved penetrators and warheads toelectric gun technology. To capitalizeon these improvements, we will usetechnological advancements in sensorsand processors to automate some of ourtarget acquisition and fire control func-tions. These improvements will signifi-cantly contribute to a high and accuraterate of fire, and extend our engagementranges. Similar work is ongoing in bal-listic protection. Coupled with signa-ture reduction efforts to reduce detec-tion by thermal imagery, radar, aural,magnetic, or visual means, this effortshould produce dramatic improvementsin hit avoidance and survivability.Suites of sensors and active counter-measures round out Tank 1,080’s abil-ity to prevail on the future battlefield.Less glamorous but equally as impor-tant are efforts to provide advancedpropulsion systems and both embeddedtraining and diagnostics.

Tank 1,080 will be an impressive andvery necessary follow-on to the M1A2.It will point the way for mobile pro-tected firepower far into the 21 Cen-tury.

COMMANDER’S HATCH

Tank 1,080:Follow-on to M1A2

MG Larry R. JordanCommanding General

U.S. Army Armor Center

4 ARMOR — September-October 1994

All soldiers adhere to guidelines fromtheir technical manuals to prevent theirvehicles from becoming deadlined.Doesn’t your career deserve the samelevel of attention? The Army is prepar-ing to publish in FY95 the NCO Pro-fessional Development Guide, DAPAM 600-25, which will become a‘TM’ for your career.

DA PAM 600-25 will be theenlisted companion to existingDA PAM 600-3, the Officer Pro-fessional Guide. The focus of theguide is to provide enlisted sol-diers with a reference manual toguide them through their careers.It will have seven introductorychapters providing an overallphilosophy of enlisted careermanagement, leader manage-ment, education, promotion, andevaluations. In addition, it willhave a chapter specifically de-voted to Reserve ComponentNCO development.

The remainder of the pamphletconsists of individual chaptersdevoted to each career managementfield (CMF). The focus for the Armorsoldier will be in chapter 8, CMF19.The Armor Chapter provides the sol-dier with a definition of success foreach rank in terms of the key leader-ship assignments, NCOES training, andself-development. In addition, it speci-

fies the key indicators that separate the‘exceptionally’ qualified soldier fromhis peers. The ideas that DA PAM600-25 presents are not new, but thefact that they are specifically outlinedin a Department of the Army pamphletthat will provide guidance to Armorsoldiers and their leaders is new.

Soldiers shouldn’t stop at DA PAM600-25. There are numerous sourcesavailable to assist soldiers in planningtheir careers:

•••• Armor officers and senior NCOs•••• The Armor Enlisted Professional

Development Guide (Published by

Office, Mounted Battlespace Inte-gration at Ft. Knox)

•••• Installation Education Center•••• Career Advisors in Armor Branch,

PERSCOM

While you can rely on the greatwealth of knowledge availablefrom a wide range of sources, thecentral focus of any career plan-ning effort is you. Take the in-itiative to become actively in-volved in the career path youchoose. Give your career thesame attention and effort yougive to your vehicle. Ensure thatyou...

•••• Work in your PMOS•••• Seek challenging assign-

ments•••• Attend the NCOES course at

your first opportunity•••• Review/update your official

military personnel file•••• Attend civilian education

classes.

Most important, don’t be a casual ob-server; actively plan your career. Don’tbecome ‘deadlined’ because you didn’tfollow the preventive maintenancechecks and services required for yourcareer.

DRIVER’S SEAT

What Are You Going To Do About It?

ARMOR — September-October 1994 5

CSM Ronnie W. DavisCommand Sergeant MajorU.S. Army Armor Center

It’s Your Career,

Border’s Edge 86

The Border’s Edge (Bordkante) seriesof exercises held by the staffs of theNVA, the East German FrontierTroops, and the Soviet Group of Forcesin Germany between 1985 and 1988dealt with operations against a majorurban area. While a cover identity waspresented in each case (Border’s Edge1985 and 1986 dealt with operations inthe East German city of Magdeburgwhile Border’s Edge 1987 and 1988concerned operations in Leipzig), thereal focus of all exercises was WestBerlin.4 This becomes clear if one stud-ies the records. A glimpse at the files ofthe exercise from which the most docu-ments remain, Border’s Edge 86, sub-stantiates that Berlin was the real focusof the exercise and illustrates exactlyhow Berlin was to be occupied.

Border’s Edge (Bordkante) 86 washeld between 30 June and 2 July 1986.The purpose of the exercise was to im-prove the “decision-making, planning,and organization of mixed assault for-mations engaged in joint operationsagainst a major urban area... causing acollapse of enemy resistance throughthe occupation of urban districts, im-portant facilities, and the city center.”5

Documents from the exercise allude tothe capture of Magdeburg, a regionalcapital in the Western portion of theGerman Democratic Republic. The ac-companying map of Magdeburg indi-cates that it was defended by an Ameri-can, a British, and a French brigade.The locations of the Allied Komman-datura, the headquarters of the SocialDemocratic Party of Germany and theFree Democratic Party, the Abgeord-netenhaus, the Regierender Bürger-meister; and border crossing check-points were also marked6 — the exer-cise certainly concerned West Berlinrather than Magdeburg.

The scenario at the commencement ofthe exercise was described as follows:“Western provocations cause increasingtensions in the international sphere.NATO utilizes the cover of large-scaleexercises scheduled for mid-June in or-der to rapidly expand its forces inEurope. A “Basic Alarm” order is is-sued [by NATO] on the evening of the28th June. Steps are taken to reinforcethe troops in Magdeburg... with addi-tional forces.”7

“Eastern” forces number 35,000 men.These consist of the NVA’s 1st Motor-ized Rifle Division — composed ofthree motorized infantry regiments, anarmored regiment, and an artillery regi-ment — the Soviet 6th IndependentMotorized Rifle Brigade stationed inEast Berlin, nine regiments of EastGerman Frontier Troops, a paratroopbattalion, an additional artillery regi-ment, a mortar section, a fighter-bomb-er squadron, a transport helicoptersquadron, three helicopter sections, tworeconnaissance airplanes, an assault en-gineer battalion, a bridge-laying battal-ion, and three “People’s Police AlertUnits” (each equivalent to an infantrybattalion). These units as a whole weretermed the “Special Group” which wasto be protected from aerial assault by aSAM brigade and fighter aircraft.8 To-tal hardware consisted of 334 tanks,186 armored personnel carriers, 36MiG-21 bombers, 2 reconnaissance air-planes, 52 helicopters, 354 guns andmortars above 82mm, and 189 antitankpieces.9

The fighter-bomber squadron wouldinitiate combat operations with a 9-minute strike against Allied commandposts, communication facilities, and theairport. This would be followed bythree artillery bombardments of 11, 8,and 16 minutes. The goal of the artil-lery bombardments would be the de-struction of enemy artillery and mortarbatteries, antitank and antiair units, and

6 ARMOR — November-December 1994

East German Plansfor the Conquestand Occupationof West Berlinby Dr. Otto Wenzel, translated by Douglas Peifer

Author’s Note

A tendency is emerging in Ger-many of downplaying the very realdangers that existed in the ColdWar in the interest of national andinternational reconciliation. Mem-bers of the former East GermanNationale Volksarmee (NVA) pub-licly claim that their military, justlike that of West Germany, servedthe interest of peace by promotinga continental balance of power.1At a Christmas service in the Ber-lin Cathedral last December,members of the French, British,American, and Russian forceswere all thanked for their contri-butions to peace over the last 40years.2 Wary of aggravating thewounds left by the Cold War, someseek to claim that NATO and theWarsaw Pact were mirror imagesof each other, equally dangerousand yet equally stabilizing.

While the details of NATO’s warplans remain shrouded in officialsecrecy, it is now possible to re-construct many of the plans of theWarsaw Pact. Among the most in-teresting of these were the con-tinually updated plans of the EastGerman government regardinghow West Berlin would be occu-pied and administered. Berlin hadlong been a bone in the throat ofthe East German government, andthe records reveal that plans forits conquest were being main-tained well into the 1980s. Thelatest East German plans for Ber-lin’s occupation can be recon-structed from existing exercisedocuments of the NVA,3 the state-ments of former NVA officers, andthe files of the Ministry for StateSecurity.

the tactical nuclear weapons assumedto be stationed in the city. Follow-ontasking included containing Alliedbreakout attempts. The helicopter andfixed wing transports would land andsupply airborne troops, as well as con-duct aerial reconnaissance and artilleryspotting tasks.10

Ground forces were to move alongeight different routes to their jumpingoff positions. The timetable allottedseven hours for troop movement fromassembly areas to the line of departure.Another three hours were set aside forfinal preparations. In order to maintainsecrecy, the line of departure was atleast 1 to 3 kilometers from the EastGerman-“Magdeburg” frontier.11

Twenty-nine minutes before the startof the operation, combat engineerswould ready border crossing points andconduct breaches through border instal-lations. On Day 1 and Day 2 of the as-sault, the “Special Group” would split“Magdeburg’s” defenders into twogroups. Defending units that continuedto resist would be destroyed on Day 3and 4, and the entire city would be oc-cupied. An order of the commander ofthe “Special Group” instructed that theNational Library, the Museum, the Ca-thedral, and the State Library should beregarded as cultural treasures whosedestruction should be avoided if com-bat operations permitted.12

The division of enemy forces was theprimary task of the first day of opera-tions. The primary assault, intended todrive a wedge between the British andAmerican brigades, was entrusted tothe First Motorized Rifle Division, itsarmored regiment, and a regiment ofFrontier Troops. Once the British andAmerican brigades were divided, theywere to be subjected to a second blowdesigned to shatter resistance. Assess-ments of enemy capabilities judged that“Western” forces in “Magdeburg”would only be able to “build up a hastyand provisional system of strongpoints.A withdrawal of enemy forces from pe-ripheral defenses into the city centerwas to be prevented. Bloody house-by-house combat was to be avoided byskillful application of force.13

The role of the various Politorgans(Political Organs) in the conquest ofWest Berlin is especially interesting.One of their primary missions was toweaken the resolve of the enemy Alliedsoldiers and West German police in

“Magdeburg,” who were to be con-vinced that it was futile to “sacrificetheir lives in a hopeless struggle.”French soldiers were to be persuadedthat they were defending Americanrather than French interests, a task un-worthy of them. The British were like-wise to be induced against forfeitingtheir lives for American war goals.Americans were to be reminded thattheir forces had never triumphed oversocialist forces.14

The Politorgans also planned to ma-nipulate the German civilian popula-tion, encouraging both active and pas-sive resistance to a bloody and pro-longed defense of the city. A propa-ganda section — complete with mobileprinting-press, editorial facilities, and apamphlet mortar for “agitation gre-nades” — would be responsible for ra-dio and loudspeaker announcementsand leaflet distribution. Leaflets wouldalso be distributed by aircraft. The po-litical departments were to have over70,000 safe-passage passes ready fordistribution. Another 90,000 instructionsheets were to be on hand, providingguidance to the civilian population per-taining to conduct in war zones and be-havior toward the troops of the GDRand Soviet Union.

The third task of the Politorganswould be to encourage NVA troops inthe performance of their soldierly du-ties. The commander of the First Front,a Soviet general, would issue an appealto the troops which would be recordedon 50 tapes and played to all elementsof the assault force. Lest motivation de-generate into rampage, 10,000 hand-bills were to be prepared and distrib-uted concerning “Conduct toward theCivilian Population of the Enemy.”15

The preceding summary of Border’sEdge (Bordkante) 86 is illustrative ofthe various exercises focusing on thecapture of West Berlin. While the exer-cises in 1985 and 1986 allegedly con-cerned the capture of Magdeburg, andthose of 1987 and 1988 the occupationof Leipzig, an analysis of “enemy”forces, the layout of the city, and gov-ernment structures reveals that Berlin

was the focus of the entire Border’sEdge series of exercises. Another Bor-der’s Edge exercise was to have beenstaged in late October 1989. As in theprevious two years, the focus of opera-tions centered on the capture of“Leipzig.” NATO forces consisted ofthe 28th U.S. Infantry Division and ele-ments of the 194th Armored Brigade ofthe I U.S. Army Corps. Following thecontainment of a NATO attack, theseforces were to be encircled and cap-tured.16 While a staff exercise was heldbetween the 17th and 18th of May1989, the exercise itself was neverstaged. The tumultuous chain of eventsthat led to German unification, in late1989 and the first half of 1990, ensuredthat no further Border’s Edge exerciseswere staged.

The Destroyed Operational Plans

The scenario envisioned in the exer-cise Border’s Edge 86 closely resem-bled the concrete operational plans forthe conquest of West Berlin. The writ-ten documents concerning these planswere destroyed in 1990 as unificationloomed closer, but several former offi-cers of the NVA have been willing todiscuss the actual plan of operation.17

The operational plan was code named“THRUST” (German: STOSS). It con-cerned the occupation of West Berlin“within the scope of preventive actionsfollowing prior aggression by NATOoutside the Central European area, forexample an attack by Turkey on Bul-garia.” Berlin was to be occupied“while NATO was transporting its rein-forcements from overseas and beforethe opening of military operations”along the intra-German and Czechos-lovakian-German borders.18 In 1987,following the introduction of the newSoviet military doctrine, certainchanges were made. The plan was re-named “CENTER” (German: ZEN-TRUM), and West Berlin was now tobe occupied only “following NATO ag-gression resulting in the violation ofstate [East Germany] borders.”19


Following the political decision to oc-cupy West Berlin, a “Berlin Group”field command would be formed out ofthe East German Army High Com-mand, located in Wildpark West nearPotsdam.20 The “Berlin Group” com-mand was to direct over 32,000 EastGerman and Soviet troops in operationsagainst an estimated 12,000 Alliedtroops and 6,000 West Berlin police-men. The equipment levels used inBorder’s Edge 86 would be signifi-cantly raised in real operations — ap-proximately 390 tanks, 450 guns andmortars, 400 antitank units, and 400 ar-mored personnel carriers would becommitted.21

The plans envisioned splitting WestBerlin into two sectors. The sectorboundary ran from Konradshöhe in thenorthwest along the Autobahn ring roadfrom Charlottenburg to Schöneberg,ending at Lichtenrade in the south. Thearea to the west of the divide was des-ignated as Sector I, while that to theeast was Sector II. These sectors didnot correspond to, and should not be

confused with, the British, French, andAmerican occupation sectors.

The occupation of Sector I was to bethe task of the NVA’s 1st Motorized Ri-fle Division (minus its 1st Regiment),the 5th Regiment of Frontier CommandNorth, the 34th and 44th Regiments ofFrontier Command Central,22 an assaultengineer battalion of the 2d EngineerBrigade, and four battalions of Pots-dam’s paramilitary “Combat Groups ofthe Working Class.”23 The 3d Regimentof the 1st Motorized Rifle Division,flanked by the 5th Frontier Troop Regi-ment to its left, was to push from thewest along Bundesstraße 5 towardSpandau, where the majority of theBritish Brigade’s facilities were lo-cated. The 34th Frontier Troop Regi-ment would move out of Kladow in thewest toward the British military airportat Gatow. In the southwest, the 44thFrontier Regiment was to roll alongBundesstraße 1, penetrating the Ameri-can sector at Zehlendorf, while the 1stArmored Regiment thrust directly to-ward the city center. The 2d Regimentof the 1st Motorized Rifle Division wasto move out of Teltow in the south to-ward Steglitz, thereby completing theoccupation of Sector I.

Sector II, the eastern portion of WestBerlin, would be occupied as follows:The Soviet 6th Independent MotorizedRifle Brigade, part of the Soviet Groupof Forces in Germany, would roll pastthe Brandenburger Gate, proceed downthe Avenue of the 17th of June to ErnstReuter Plaza, and continue down Bis-marck Street until it reached the Kais-erdamm Bridge. The 18th People’s Po-lice Alert Unit and the 33d FrontierTroop Regiment were to provide flankprotection. The 1st Regiment of the 1stMotorized Rifle Division would assaultout of Pankow toward Tegel Interna-tional airport, while the 38th and 40thFrontier Troop Regiments occupiedReinickendorf, part of the French sec-tor. The 35th, 39th, and 42d FrontierTroop Regiments would close in onNeukölln and Kreuzberg, areas withinthe American sector. Support for theseassaults would be provided by the 40thArtillery Brigade, an assault engineerbattalion of the 2d Engineer Brigade,and propaganda detachments.

The two major assault thrusts, onefrom the east and one from the west,were to meet at the KaiserdammBridge near Radio Free Berlin, therebycutting the city in two. Tegel airport, inthe French sector, was to be capturedby two airborne companies while Tem-

pelhof Airport in the American sectorwas to be captured by another. The 1stBattalion of the 40th Air Assault Regi-ment and parts of 34th HelicopterTransport Squadron would provide thenecessary forces. Reserve forces in-cluded the 40th Security Battalion, the

19th People’s Police Alert Unit, andfour battalions of the (East) Berlin“Combat Groups of the WorkingClass.” The 40th Signal Battalion wastasked with providing reserve assets forall communication requirements.

Any military worth its salt has pre-pared contingency plans for operationsfollowing the outbreak of war. The So-viet Union and its satellites alwaysclaimed that both the structure andplanning of the Warsaw Pact revolvedaround a commitment to defeat the en-emy on his own territory following en-emy aggression. The initial scenario inthe Border’s Edge exercises postulatedaggression by NATO, provoking acountermeasure by the Warsaw Pact.Former NVA officers stand by the es-sentially defensive nature of Pact offen-sive plans. Yet oddly, little attention ispaid to containing and defeating NATOoffenses. In fact, East German intelli-gence evaluations concluded thatNATO forces in West Germany lackedthe structure and equipment for deepoffensive operations in the eastern di-rection.24 In short, taken at face value,the NVA laid meticulous plans for exe-cution of an operation for which the of-ficially proclaimed premise, aggressionby NATO, was evaluated as unlikely atbest.

Ministry of State Security’s Role

A clear picture can be reconstructedof how the NVA intended to subdueBerlin. The procedures to be carriedout following occupation of the city areof equal interest and can be found inthe files of the former East German


“Former NVA officers stand bythe essentially defensive natureof Pact offensive plans. Yetoddly, little attention is paid tocontaining and defeating NATOoffenses. In fact, East Germanintelligence evaluations con-cluded that NATO forces in WestGermany lacked the structureand equipment for deep offen-sive operations in the eastern di-rection....”

Ministry of State Security, or “Stasi.”25

These files show that the Ministry hadprepared a comprehensive blueprint forthe communist takeover of power inWest Berlin.

A report by the XVth (Intelligence)Department of the [East] Berlin DistrictArea of the ministry (dated 5 May1978) listed 170 West Berlin facilitiesthat were to be occupied by the Stasiduring or immediately after the con-quest of the city. The list was detailedand specific, as the following summa-tion for the American sector indicates.In Zehlendorf, the following Americanfacilities were to be occupied as soonas possible: the U.S. Brigade’s Head-

quarters and Staff Buildings at Clay-allee, the Turner Barracks (Armoredelements of U.S. Brigade) and theammo dumps at Holzungsweg, Hütten-weg, Grunewald Jagen 73, Stahnsdor-fer Damm and Potsdamer Chaussee. InSteglitz, the McNair, Andrews, andRoosevelt Barracks were to be occu-pied, as well as the ammo and fueldump at Goerzallee, the fuel dump atDahlemer Weg, and the freight railroadstation at Lichterfelde West.

Planning for the occupation of WestBerlin continued into the period ofdétente, indeed becoming more elabo-rate and detailed. A two-page reportsigned by the District Leader of the

Berlin Area of the Ministry of State Se-curity, Lieutenant-General WolfgangSchwanitz,26 on 5 August 1985 elabo-rates exactly how the Stasi would dealwith the challenges of occupation.

Schwanitz ordered that after com-mencement of operations all “signifi-cant enemy centers” would be occu-pied. These specifically included intel-ligence and counterintelligence facili-ties, police stations, archives, andstaff/planning centers such as “state of-fices, research centers (academies anduniversities), company headquarters,party offices, organization centers,headquarters of anti-communist organi-zations, and data banks.” It is of inter-


est that the various facilities of the Al-lied Brigades in Berlin were not on thislist — they presumably would be occu-pied by the Soviets, the NVA, or theFrontier Troops rather than by the Min-istry for State Security.

From the very first, the Stasi’s mostimportant assignment was to be the ar-rest and detention of “enemy persons.”A former Stasi lieutenant, WernerStiller, has indicated that the Ministryof State Security had compiled “exten-sive files on West German citizens,which would have been of special in-terest during selection procedures.”27

The Schwanitz Report suggests that de-tainees would include members of theintelligence communities, leaders ofanti-communist organizations, seniorpolice officials, leading politicians, sen-ior civil servants, and persons sus-pected of having knowledge of busi-ness, scientific, or technical secrets.Journalists known to have anti-leftistleanings would also be arrested. De-tainees were to be brought to intern-ment camps for immediate questioning.The information gained from thesehearings would be used to build up an“effective locating program” aimed at“rendering enemy persons who hadgone underground ineffective.”

Offices of the Ministry for State Se-curity were to ensure the continued op-eration of all vital services and themost important production facilities.Special attention was to be directed tosecuring all supply warehouses and re-serve depots, essential service facilities(electricity, gas, and water), the postal,communication, and transportation sys-tems, and radio and television stations.Important centers of production, espe-cially those “sabotage-sensitive,” wereto receive attention. Banks, stock andsecurity centers of deposit, technicaland scientific record collections, busi-ness account repositories, the federalprinting office, museums, galleries, andlibraries were all to be secured againsttheft, destruction, plunder and fraud.

All weapons, ammunition, and explo-sives which had escaped confiscationby the military were to be seized by theMinistry of State Security. Handguns,hunting rifles and shotguns, industrialexplosives and poisons were all to beturned over to the Stasi.

Political resistance was anticipatedand would be countered. The Stasi’sunofficial assistants28 in East and WestBerlin were to “infiltrate... enemyforces” and neutralize them. A list

specifies activities that would be con-fronted: “Espionage, sabotage, diver-sion, [acts of] terror, propaganda, un-derground political activity, rumor-mongering, and false reporting leadingto unrest, plundering, strikes, and ri-ots.” Based on the above quotations, itis reasonable to conclude that the WestBerlin media would be subjected torigorous censorship.

Naturally, a communist administrationwould be set up immediately. The Stasiwould be responsible for selecting andcontrolling the leadership and person-nel of this “democratic organ.” Mem-bers of the communist administrationwere to be protected from “enemydefamation” and “terrorist attacks.”Border installations were also to besafeguarded, indicating that the wall di-viding East and West Germany was toremain in place, even after a commu-nist takeover.

The structure of the Stasi organizationin West Berlin was also set forth. Acentral “Leadership Group for the WestBerlin Operational Area” and local of-fices for each of Berlin’s 12 boroughswould be set up. Stasi bureaucratsplanned for every contingency. Theplanned vacancies in West Berlin wereto be filled by 604 members of theMinistry of State Security. Stasi work-ers would be provided with militaryranks and designations.

The Leadership Group, headed by acolonel, would exercise control overthe Stasi organization in West Berlin.This organization would consist of thecolonel and his staff, five operationalgroups, three working groups, a cryp-tography/postal/courier group, andguard/security forces. The operationalgroups corresponded to the “field” de-partments within the Ministry for StateSecurity. These were Field II (Counter-espionage), VII (Protection of the Or-gans of the Ministry of the Interior),XVIII (Protection of the Economy),XIX (Protection of the TransportationSystem), and XX (Defense against “po-litical-ideological diversions” and “un-derground political activities”).

Sixty-five of the 80 billets within the“Leadership Group” were already filledwhen Schwanitz authorized the reportin August 1985. The manpower planlisted billet, rank, first and last name,and personal identification number.

The 12 borough offices (one for eachWest Berlin borough) would each bemanned with between 42 and 47 per-

sonnel. A lieutenant colonel wouldhead the office in larger boroughs suchas Reinickendorf and Neukölln, whilein smaller boroughs a major would bedesignated as the commanding officer.In addition to the commander and dep-uty commander, each office had an ex-

pert for Information and Analysis, theArmed Forces, Economic Affairs, andInternal Security. Each borough officealso had communication and cryptogra-phy specialists, as well as a watch andsecurity detachment. The expert forArmed Forces probably would haveserved as a liaison between the Sovietand East German forces. Plans formanning the borough offices were notas developed as those for the “Leader-ship Group” — only six billets withineach borough office were alreadyfilled.

It should be noted that the names en-tered beside the various billets in themanpower plans were not fictitiousnames entered for training purposes,but were the names of actual Ministryfor State Security personnel. The offi-cer who would have been appointed incharge of the Charlottenburg (WestBerlin) borough office of the Ministryfor State Security, a certain MajorZeiseweis, had been the head of theStasi’s Treptow (East Berlin) boroughoffice in 1985 before his promotion tolieutenant-colonel and designation asdeputy to the Stasi’s District Leader forthe Berlin Area in 1986. He recentlyparticipated in a broadcast focusing ontopics related to the former GermanDemocratic Republic (OstdeutscheRundfunks Brandenburg, 31 Januaryand 15 February 1994), but made nomention about his planned function fol-lowing an East German occupation ofWest Berlin. His superior, LieutenantGeneral Schwanitz, was more candidduring a speech before the study group“Zwiegespräch” (Dialogue) on 20 May1992, when he passingly noted thatamong the tasks of the Berlin DistrictArea office of the Ministry for State


All weapons, ammunition, andexplosives which had escapedconfiscation by the military wereto be seized by the Ministry ofState Security. Handguns, hunt-ing rifles and shotguns, indus-trial explosives and poisonswere all to be turned over to theStasi.

Security were “measures supporting theoccupation of West Berlin in the eventof an aggression directed against theGerman Democratic Republic.”29

Conclusion

The detailed and specific plans of theNVA and the Ministry for State Secu-rity for the occupation of West Berllnwere never executed. Does this bearout claims that these plans were merelydefensive contingencies, similar in na-ture to the operational plans laid byNATO during the same time period? Atleast in the case of the Berlin opera-tion, one thing stands clear: all recordsand statements indicate that no seriousoffensive on the part of the French,British, and American brigades in Ber-lin was anticipated. Instead, NVA andSoviet units anticipated cutting the cityin two in one day and completing oc-cupation by the end of the third day. Itis highly questionable to claim nowthat such planning contributed to thepeace and stability of Berlin andEurope.

East German plans concerning the oc-cupation of West Berlin must be evalu-ated in context with higher-level War-saw Pact plans pertaining to the Fed-eral Republic of Germany and WesternEurope in general. The operationalplans remain tightly classified secretsof the Russian Defense Ministry, yetreports of various exercises give an in-dication of what was envisioned. OnJuly 1, 1983, East German Minister ofDefense Hoffmann made a report tothe National Defense Council of theGerman Democratic Republic regard-

ing the upper-level Warsaw Pact staffexercise “SOJUS-83.” The task as-signed to the players representing theUnified Forces of the Warsaw Pact wasthe conquest of the Federal Republic ofGermany, Denmark, Belgium, theNetherlands, and France within a pe-riod of 35 to 40 days from start of op-erations.30

NATO and West German officialswere unwilling to make any commentsabout their knowledge and evaluationof Warsaw Pact operational plans.Western intelligence reports regardingthe various Border’s Edge (Bordkante)exercises remain inaccessible. The ex-tent to which East German operationalplans were known to the West, as wellas the defensive planning of Allied andWest Berlin forces, remains currentlyclassified.

The East German leadership believedthat the occupation of West Berlin wasa serious possibility well into the1980s, as is made apparent by the enor-mous material and human resourcesthat were devoted to the planning ofsuch occupation. Every conceivablepreparation was made. Three examplesillustrate this. On the 23d of June 1980,the National Defense Council orderedthat 4.9 billion DM of GDR currency(emission 1955) be stored as “militarymoney” to be used as “a secondarycurrency valid in the territory of the en-emy and equivalent its currency.”31 Onthe 25th of January 1985, the NationalDefense Council ordered that a newmedal for bravery in war be designed(the Blücher Medal for Bravery), ofwhich 8,000 were to be minted imme-diately.32 Last, new regulations for“warfront reporting” were issued on 5

December 1986.33 Until the very lastsession of the National Defense Coun-cil on the 16th of June 1989, all EastGerman ministers, as well as the chair-men of the 15 “District DefenseBoards,”34 had to submit reports attest-ing to the war readiness of their minis-tries or districts. Party Chairman andHead of State Erich Honecker continu-ally reminded both military and civilianorganizations to maintain a “wartimestate-of-mind.”35

The final decision to launch an inva-sion of West Berlin never lay in thehands of East Germany, but always de-pended on Soviet approval and support.The party chairmen and leaders of theSoviet Union, who controlled the War-saw Pact and who would have had toissue the necessary orders for an as-sault, were not reckless gamblers.“Stalin and all his successors wouldhave preferred to achieve their aims —the supposedly inevitable spread of So-cialism to the rest of the globe, accord-ing to Marxist-Leninist teaching — bypolitical/economic means alone.”36

Their alternate plan, a military solutionto the East-West global competition,consumed immense amounts of treas-ure, talent, and attention, but was neverexecuted. The precondition of a suc-cessful offensive war, a decisive edgein the military balance, could never beattained. The catastrophic conditions ofthe communist economies, coupledwith an escalation in the cost and tech-nological level of the arms race, causedthe Soviet leadership to finally castaside an offensive conception of war-fare in 1987.

Notes

1Statement by a former NVA colonel at thefirst Commander Meeting of the new Bunde-swehr East Command, 10 October 1990. TheBundeswehr East Command was the compro-mise solution reached regarding German unifi-cation and the military question in Germany:the Bundeswehr was to assume response for thedefense of East German territory but the facili-ties and personnel in the new territories were toremain outside the NATO structure. See OttoWenzel’s “So sollte in West-Berlin einmar-schiert werden,” Berliner Morgenpost. 18 April1993.

2Bishop Dr. Martin Kruse, Advent Service atthe Berlin Dom, 9 December 1993.

3The operational plans of the Warsaw Pactwere destroyed or turned over to the Sovietsduring the period prior to German unification,


yet the other records of the NVA, including ex-ercise and training records, became property ofthe West German government. Many of theNVA’s records are now open to public scrutinyat the Militärarchiv-Bundesarchiv, AbteilungPotsdam (formerly the Militärarchiv der DDR).Footnote 25 discusses the files of the Ministryfor State Security, which became the propertyof the West German government. The latestEnglish-language study of the NVA was pub-lished prior to the collapse of the GDR — seeThomas M. Forster, The East German Army:The Second Power in the Warsaw Pact (Lon-don: Allen & Unwin, 1980).

4Federal Archive - Military Archive, PotsdamSection (hereafter cited as BA-MAP), VA-10-20750, VA-10-22942, VA-10-22939 and VA-10-23894.

5BA-MAP, VA-10-22942, pp. 14, 295. Seealso Otto Wenzel, “Der Tag X. Wie West-Ber-l in erobert wurde,” Deutschland Archiv.12/1993, pp. 1364-1367.

6The names of these institutions and organiza-tions apply specifically to West Berlin institu-tions and are not used in other German cities:for example, only in West Berlin is the Munici-pal Assembly termed the Abgeordnetenhaus andthe Mayoralty the Regierender Bürgermeister.The map and exercise plans are found in BA-MAP, VA-10-22942. Map Nr. 282.

7BA-MAP, VA-10-22942, p. 297.8Ibid., pp. 15, 39.9Ibid., pp. 17, 20, 45.10Ibid., pp. 68, 89, 91.11Ibid., p. 305.12Ibid., pp. 19, 85, 91, 272, 309.13Ibid., pp. 307, 310, 311.14Ibid., pp. 56, 123.15Ibid., p. 58.16BA-MAP, VA-10-25911, pp. 1, 14-.17The former officers of the NVA who have

assisted Dr. Wenzel in his research wish to re-main anonymous for personal reasons. See alsoWenzel, “Der Tag X,” Deutschland Archiv,12/1993, p. 1362, and “Die Eroberung West-Berlins,” Berlin ’93. Das Jahr im Rückspiegel(Berlin: Ullstein, 1993), pp. 152-157 andHelmut Göpel, “Die Berlin-Operation,” DieNVA - Anspruch und Wirklichkeit nach aus-gewählten Dokumenten, Ed. Klaus Naumann(Berlin/Bonn/Herford: E.S. Mittler & Sohn,1993), pp. 286-299.

18Göpel, pp. 289-95.19Göpel, pp. 287, 293.20An alternate headquarters would be situated

in a bunker in the area of Blankenfelde to thesouth of Berlin.

21Göpel, “Die Berlin-Operation,” p. 289.22A Frontier Command of the East German

Frontier Troops was comparable to a division; itwas commanded by a major-general.

23The mechanized battalions of the “FightingGroups of the Working Class” were equippedwith armored personnel carriers, artillery, an-tiair, and antitank weapons (Fiftieth Meeting ofthe National Defense Council of the GDR, 18November 1976. See Microfilm BA-MAP, VA-01/39495, p. 271).

24Walter Jablonsky, “Die NVA im Staat derSED,” Die NVA, Ed. Klaus Naumann, p. 56. Inshort, while publicly maintaining that NATOwas preparing for a war of aggression againstthe nations of the Warsaw Pact, the East Ger-man Politburo understood that NATO’s plans offorward defense and engagement of the “fol-low-on-forces” were not equivalent to offensivewar planning.

25These files are currently being evaluated bythe West German “Federal Commission for theFiles of the Ministry of Security of the formerGerman Democratic Republic” usually simplyreferred to as the “Gauck Commission” afterthe name of its chairman. Copies of these filesare in the possession of Dr. Wenzel.

26Between 1986 and 1989, Schwanitz wasone of four deputies for the Minister of StateSecurity, General Erich Mielke, a member ofthe Politburo of the SED. The last communisthead of government of the GDR, Hans Mo-drow, appointed Schwanitz Director of the Of-fice of National Security, a cabinet-level posi-tion.

27Stiller was a lieutenant in the Ministry ofState Security who defected to the West in1979. As a protective measure, he was providedwith a alternate identity and resided in theUnited States for ten years. Werner Stiller, ImZentrum der Spionage, 5th ed. (Mainz: Haase,1986), p. 158.

28German: Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter, abbrevi-ated IM.

29Zwie Gespräch 9. Beiträge zur Aufarbeitungder Staatssicherheits-Vergangenheit, (Berlin:1992), p. 12.

30The National Defense Council of the Ger-man Democratic Republic was headed by Chair-man of the SED party and Head of State ErichHonecker and at that time consisted of 10 mem-bers of the Politburo of East Germany. See re-cords of the 67th session of the National De-fense Council, BA-MAP, VA-01/39528, p. 77.

3161st session of the National Defense Coun-cil, BA-MAP, VA-01/39522, p. 69-.

3269th session of the National Defense Coun-cil, BA-MAP, VA-01/39530, p. 161-. BerlinerMorgenpost, 17 November 1991.

3373d session of the National Defense Coun-cil, BA-MAP, VA-01/39534, p. 4.

34The German term, “Bezirkseinsatzleitun-gen,” has no English equivalent. A Bezirksein-satzleitungen consisted of the district partychairman, the commander of the military dis-trict, the leader of the district Ministry for StateSecurity office, commander of the district Peo-ple’s Police organization, the district council

chairman, and the leader of the SED party’s se-curity division.

3566th session of the National Defense Coun-cil on 17 September 1982, BA-MAP, VA01/39527, p. 70.

36Beatrice Heuser, “Warsaw Pact MilitaryDoctrines in the 70s and 80s: Findings in theEast German Archives,” Comparative Strategy,Nr.4/Vol. 12 (November 1993).


Otto Wenzel was awarded aPh.D. from the Free Universityof Berlin in 1955 for his disser-tation on “The German Com-munist Party in 1923.” He pur-sued a career in education,serving as the director of asecondary school from 1966to 1970, and until 1985 head-ed the department for schoolsand culture for the Weddingborough of Berlin. He has in-structed political science at theTechnische FachhochschuleBerlin since 1986. His publica-tions about communist societyhave appeared in numerousGerman periodicals and news-papers since 1954. Since1991, he has researched War-saw Pact planning, especiallyEast German plans regardingoperations against West Ber-lin. He is preparing an upcom-ing publication about the EastGerman National DefenseCouncil.

Douglas Peifer received aB.A. in economics and historyfrom Miami University in 1985.He was commissioned an offi-cer in the U.S. Navy, servingas boilers officer and navigatoraboard the Sixth Fleet flagshipfrom 1986 to 1989. He earnedan M.A. in European historyfrom the University of NorthCarolina at Chapel Hill in1991, and has written aboutthe Kriegsmarine. He spent1993-94 in Berlin conductingresearch for his dissertationentitled “The Development ofTwo German Navies, 1945-1961.”


“Lieutenant Carlson’s platoon estab-lished a strongpoint around a farm-house overlooking a sunken road.Around nightfall the unit underwent abrief mortar barrage with no losses.Just before midnight, without artillerypreparation, an enemy force estimatedat company strength launched aground assault from the cover of thesunken road. The attack was repulsedwith grenades and small-arms fire af-ter a sharp half-hour firefight. In themorning, the platoon counted four en-emy bodies left behind around its po-sition. There was no further contact,and the platoon withdrew on companyorder at 1430.”

* * * * *“The enemy attempted a local coun-

terattack at 0130, with approximatelya battalion of infantry supported bythree or four tanks and an equal num-ber of assault guns. The assembly wasspotted by a recon patrol from A Com-pany, and pre-planned artillery fireswere called in with devastating effect.The disorganized foe withdrew with-out launching the attack.”

* * * * *“Three enemy tanks with infantry on

board succeeded in infiltrating thebattalion’s lines under cover of dark-ness and a diversionary artillery bar-rage on B Company’s exposed posi-tion. Reports of an enemy armoredbreakthrough, considerably exagger-ated in the retelling, sparked a hastydisplacement of the battalion com-mand post. Shortly after dawn, an ar-tillery spotter plane discovered thehostile tanks concealed under treesbeside a farm road 600 meters behindour forward positions. The spotterplane directed a fighter-bomber strikethat destroyed all three tanks. Laterthat morning battalion outposts madefour prisoners among enemy survivorstrying to exfiltrate on foot.”

* * * * *“Sergeant Smith’s cavalry vehicle

entered the town unhindered at 0845.

After weeks of bitterbatt le for the ap-proaches, the objec-tive had ‘fallen’ withbarely a whimper.Smith’s men set up astrongpoint at the bat-tered railroad station,covering the main roadjunction, and radioedthat reinforcementscould enter the townby District Road 17.By 1100 two compa-nies had followed andcleared the town with-out encountering anyreal opposition asidefrom scattered sniperfire. Two Americansoldiers and three en-emy troops were killedin a cops-and-robberstype shootout when anelement of C Com-pany stumbled across a party of en-emy stragglers trying to leave townwith a handcart full of foodstuffs. Thetown was declared secure at 1800. Itsnew U.S. garrison went to sleep to thetune of heavy small-arms fire from thecontinuing struggle for Hill 232 fourkilometers away.”

The above vignettes are fictional-ized, but not unrealistic, composites ofactions one can read about in anynumber of after-action reports and of-ficial histories from recent Americanwars.

The striking thing about reports fromthe down-and-dirty “sharp end” ofwar is how casual, even trivial, theyoften sound.

Where is the clash of mighty armies,the fierce unyielding fury of divisionsand corps locked in death struggles,the sweep of the 1,000-kilometerfront? Tactical reports often soundmore like police blotters than classicalbattle narratives.

Indeed, experts stress that much ofwhat goes on in low-intensity militaryactions — peacekeeping, guerrillaconflicts, and the sort — really is po-lice work: ferreting out an enemycadre in one village, uncovering an“arms cache” with two rifles and 20rounds in another, guarding a medicalclinic in a third.

But the vignettes above are notbased on low-intensity conflicts. Theyare based on “conventional” experi-ence in World War II’s EuropeanTheater and in the Korean War, as re-lated in official Army reports (see, forexample, the St. Lo campaign book)and Brig. Gen. S.L.A. Marshall’s in-terview-based histories.

The old TV series “Combat” wassometimes humorously described as“An Account of the Role of the Inde-pendent Rifle Squad in the EuropeanTheater of Operations.” Reading after-action reports, one wonders if that isreally off the mark. If not squad level,

The Medieval Ironyof Modern Battleby Harry F. Noyes III

the war seems to have been fought notmuch above company level.

What, then, is the role of higherechelons? Without trying to definewords like “tactics” and “operationalart,” we might say that higher eche-lons move and sustain forces. War is“maneuvered” at higher levels, but theexperience of “fighting” is usually —not always — a company/platoon/squad-level experience, with the bat-talion level joining or dropping out ofthat array, depending on the nature ofthe war and local circumstances.

But, one might protest, what is thecurrent relevance of all this? With theSoviet threat converted to a merepolitical and economic-develop-ment challenge, how likely are weto fight World War II again? Andif we will only face low-intensityconflicts in the foreseeable future,isn’t this just rehashing the obvi-ous? Why debate the primacy ofsmall units in small-scale opera-tions when everybody alreadyknows that will be the decisivelevel?

Yet the future is never clear or cer-tain. While it may seem silly to pre-dict that we will fight World War IIIsoon, it is suicidal to assume wemight not. It only took six years(1933-1939) for Hitler to turn an agethat seemed more peaceful than oursinto a wholesale calamity. It took onlya couple of days for Saddam Husseinto catapult us unexpectedly into whatwas, in terms of troops engaged, oneof the biggest wars we ever fought.

Battle accounts of the Korean War— still a viable candidate for a se-quel, unfortunately — show the samepattern as World War II reports. SeeMarshall’s The River and the Gaunt-let.

Anecdotes from the Gulf War showthat even its glorious image as abumper-to-bumper charge by thou-sands of armored vehicles — underthe best possible conditions for divi-sion-and corps-level fighting — can-not completely withstand close exami-nation.

There were times when our bally-hooed technology went on the fritz orgot shot up, people got lost, commu-nications failed, and individual pla-toons and even single vehicles foughta lonely war in which victory rode onwho shot first in a Dodge City show-down. It would be foolhardy to thinkwe might not face such a war again. Ifwe do, our soldiers must understand

that, while they may start into battlelooking like a mighty host, they mustbe prepared to end up fighting like aSWAT team.

AirLand Battle doctrine, developedto defend NATO against a WarsawPact attack, recognized this. It rightlyenvisioned battle as whirling, swirl-ing, helter-skelter, pulsing turmoil.

Unfortunately, there appears to be areal danger that we may lose this bat-tle-winning, life-saving insight.

There is a lot of loose talk about“new-age” or “Third Wave” warfareand a “digitized” Army in which

every soldier will see the overall bat-tle situation through electronic links tohigh-speed battle-management com-puters of awesome power. Everyonewill know the position of every vehi-cle at all times, we are told.

Perhaps. No one doubts technologywill give us a big edge over less-so-phisticated foes. Perhaps technologywill indeed restore the elegance of18th-century war, when a generalstanding on a hill could see his wholearmy and guide it from afar.

Yet, somehow, I doubt it. I cannothelp remembering that smoke ob-scured those 18th-century battlefieldsafter the first volley, the bad guys hada habit of appearing from hiddenplaces behind hills, and the Frenchand Indians liked to hide in forests.

Today’s high-tech promises willprobably go the way of those made by19th-century machine gun advocates,who said machine guns would makewar impossible by inflicting 100-per-cent casualties.

Soldiers are tough and smart. Theenemy will find a way to blunt ourtechnology. He will develop new,cheap, effective ways to jam our elec-tronic links (smoke up the battlefield).

It will still be harder to see at nightthan in day. Clouds and fog will stillhamper operations. Maps will still bemisread. Machines will still break.Combat will still isolate small units.

The enemy will find tactics to copewith our technology (i.e., he will finda way to hide in the forests, so tospeak).

He may break into small units dis-guised as civilian traffic. Don’t mis-take this for guerrilla warfare. A trueguerrilla war is a slow-percolating po-litical revolution run by military ama-teurs who use guns mainly for adver-tising, not to destroy enemies in bat-tle. It is tricky to fight, but low-inten-sity and slow-paced. Counterguerrillaforces have time to develop responses.

What we are discussing here issomething quite different: the use of

guerrilla-like concealment tacticsby a highly trained, professionalenemy to launch devastating at-tacks designed to win the old-fashioned way, by shattering ourforces in battle. Their approachmight look like the gathering ofthe flock at Woodstock, but thefighting might well resemble theBattle of the Bulge.

This is not an essay on futurewarfare, however. Predicting how anenemy might fight our “digital” Armyis beyond the scope of this article. Weaddress the point only to stress that,based on history, we must assumeenemies will find ways to lock us inbitter battles decided at foxhole level,despite our technology.

Such battles look neat on theater-level maps, where linear fronts aredrawn and inconvenient gapssmoothed out. At grunt level, they arehard to visualize. Good tactical mapsshow that the “linear” front is really ajagged series of isolated company,platoon and even squad positions.That “bold thrust” portrayed by a bigarrow on the map at the theater presscamp turns out, on close inspection, tobe one platoon surrounded on a hill-top (probably the wrong hill), allalone, hungry and thirsty, tired, andwishing with all its heart it were backat Fort Hood.

Neither of these versions is wrong.The tactical maps just show how elu-sive the “big picture” can be at thegrunt level.

The foxhole soldier is like a water-bug trying to relate to a map of theMississippi River. The map is accuratein a strategic way. The river really fol-lows that course, and the map is use-ful to a boat captain (general). But itmeans little to the waterbug (captain,lieutenant, or sergeant), whose tactical

“...Based on history, we mustassume enemies will find waysto lock us in bitter battles de-cided at foxhole level, despiteour technology.”


problem is coping with local ripplesand eddies caused by a passing boat.

“Uh, well, there was a lot of shoot-ing and when it was over, it seemedwe had won,” sums up the waterbug-level view of a big battle about as ac-curately as can be done.

The general and his staff stitch allthese confusing little pictures togetherinto a big picture so that they can planfuture actions and give upbeat brief-ings to civilian leaders, media, andpublic. (Ironically, the closest front-line fighters may come to the “bigpicture” is seeing it in civilian andmilitary media.)

Modern soldiers — forced to dis-perse by the range, power, and firingrate of modern weapons — rarely cansee more than a few of their fellowsoldiers, even before shooting breaksout. Almost everything that affectsthem goes on beyond their sight.

For the sake of generals and privatesalike, the U.S. Army is striving might-ily to counter this with modern tech-nology — with navigation technologyto fix the positions of even the small-est units, surveillance technology tofix enemy units, computers to keepeverything straight, and communica-tion links to let everyone supply little-picture inputs and see big-picture out-puts.

Yet, the changes that may really helpthe most in battle are the ones de-signed to make small units and sol-diers less dependent on higher-levelguidance: better unit cohesion, morerealistic combat training, enhancedprofessionalism of soldiers at all gradelevels, and continued emphasis ontroop initiative and communication ofintent through mission-type orders.

Ironically, modernity is bringing bat-tle full circle. In medieval times, dueto indiscipline rather than technology,commanders also tended to lose con-trol over battle once they had deliveredtheir troops to the point of contact.

Battles broke down into a series ofman-to-man fights, with the outcomedependent on the cumulative effectsof the quality of the individuals’ fit-ness, training, and courage.

Today, the fighting is usually small-unit to small-unit, and there is an ef-fort to harness it to a larger scheme.But the general tenor is remarkablylike those long-ago days. Modern bat-tle is a soldier’s battle, from private toperhaps captain, or occasionally lieu-tenant colonel.

This implies that the general’s mostimportant duties come before contact— training, informing, motivatingtroops; supplying and positioningunits; etc. When the bullets fly, he canhelp with his reserves, artillery, sup-plies, aviation, etc., but the battle isbasically in the soldiers’ hands.

Two of the first and greatest moderngenerals knew this. Napoleon saidsometimes you just have to give battleand see what happens. Robert E. Leesaid he tried to get his army to thebattlefield in the most favorable possi-ble circumstances and then trusted inGod and his subordinates. Nothinghas happened in this century, or islikely to happen in the next, to changethat.

It is vital, but not sufficient, for gen-erals to understand this. Individualsoldiers must also recognize their piv-otal role and how much their actionscan matter even when they don’t knowwhat’s happening.

They must be self-conscious abouttheir decisiveness. They must knowthat they can help win the war —even when they feel most “out of it,”most isolated, most forgotten, mostvulnerable, most unimportant. Theymust take to heart British Maj. Gen.J.F.C. Fuller’s vivid maxim: “When indoubt, hit out.”

That doesn’t mean to act blindly.One should always gather all the in-formation one can with one’s own re-sources and within the time availablebefore acting. However, having donethat, one should act, even if the rest ofthe situation is hopelessly muddled.Do something to the enemy. Some-times seemingly trivial action can un-expectedly exert decisive leverageagainst the foe.

Some fine examples come from theBattle of the Bulge, where numeroustiny, isolated, unsupported Americanunits, led by junior officers and ser-geants, battled hugely superior Ger-man forces and disrupted the timeta-ble on which German victory de-pended.

There was Capt. Charles MacDon-ald’s I Company, which held out in abitter forest fight longer than anyoneexpected. Finally, it ran for dear life,and MacDonald was sure he hadfailed. In fact, his small fight hadbought vital time for higher-ups tomove other units into deeper blockingpositions.

Then there was 291st EngineerCombat Battalion. In isolated pennypackets independently led by lieuten-ants and sergeants, these 600 rela-tively green troops stood up to the su-perior armored force of JochenPeiper’s SS Kampfgruppe. Sometimesfighting, sometimes blowing bridgesin Peiper’s face, they brought his dan-gerous thrust to a whimpering, inglo-rious end.

There is no way these men couldhave known how vital their actionswould be. But they knew to act, andthe results exceeded what anyonecould have asked or expected. In othercircumstances, their deeds might havebeen less decisive, but the point isthat, in battle, one often can learnwhere the greatest leverage lies onlyby trying. “When in doubt, hit out!”

If each unit fights its own lonely lit-tle fight — however trivial it seems atthe time — energetically, aggressively,and as smartly as it can, the cumula-tive effect at the “big picture” levelwill be victory. Then, when all is over,the soldiers can stand up and saywonderingly, as soldiers always have,“There was a lot of shooting andwhen it was over, it seemed we hadwon.”


Harry F. Noyes III is a Armycivilian in the Public AffairsOffice, U.S. Army Health Serv-ices Command, including du-ties as assistant editor of amonthly newspaper. Pre-viously, he was PAO, 300thMP Command, a five-statecommand headquartered inInkster, Mich., 1977-84, andeditor of the Wiesbaden Mili-tary Community newspaperin West Germany, 1984-89.He served in the Air Forcefrom 1967-71 leaving activeduty as a captain. He cur-rently holds the rank of majorin the Individual Ready Re-serve. He holds a BA Degreein history from the Universityof the South, Sewanee,Tenn. and a MA Degree inAsian studies from the Uni-versity of Hawaii, Honolulu.

Last April, we witnessed in NTC Ro-tation 94-07 the most significant ex-periment the Army has conducted sincethe Louisiana Maneuvers in 1940.Most first-hand observers will agreethat the experiment was a success anddigitization is here to stay. The need forvisual, real-time information-sharing onthe battlefield is critical to successfulmission accomplishment at minimumcost to soldiers and equipment.

One of the NTC’s charters during thisexperiment was to identify what the fu-ture digital “end-product” should looklike and be capable of. To accomplishthat and help facilitate the experiment,many of us received hands-on trainingat Fort Knox on both the IntervehicularInformation System (IVIS) and Brigadeand Below Command and Control(B2C2) computer systems to better un-derstand their capabilities and limita-tions. Throughout this training and ex-periment, I analyzed these systems anddeveloped a list of capabilities thatmust be incorporated in future digitalC2 systems. I based my observations on

my experience with the Army’s premier“digital” system — the NTC Instru-mentation System (NTC-IS) and itssubsystems. In this article, I will iden-tify the capabilities future C2 systemsshould have and discuss how these sys-tems could help the commander “visu-alize the battlefield.”

In order to better understand the capa-bilities future C2 systems must have, Iwill briefly explain the NTC-IS. TheNTC-IS is composed of six major sub-systems. The capabilities of two of thesesubsystems, the Core InstrumentationSubsystem (CIS) and the Range Data

Measurement Subsystem (RDMS), couldbe applied to future digital systems.The CIS is the networked computersystem that performs real-time dataprocessing, including position location,direct fire event pairing, and indirectfire processing. The distinguishingcharacteristic of CIS is its real-time in-teractive software. The software con-tains map control, graphic controlmeasures, OPFOR and BLUEFORsymbology, audio control, and E-mailcapability. The RDMS provides posi-tion location and firing data that in-cludes player unit identification, loca-tion in UTM grid coordinates, aircraftaltitude, and time of a position fix foreach player unit. These two subsystemsare the backbone of the NTC-IS andenable the observer controller to rap-idly analyze the cause and effect ofeach battle and provide near real-timefeedback to the player unit leaders.

To revolutionize the way we plan andprepare for missions on the future bat-tlefield, we must eliminate the time-consuming way we pass out informa-tion from higher to lower with papercopy OPORDs and acetate graphics.Our future C2 system must be powerfulenough to accomplish this. It musthave a map capability that can be up-dated for any location in the world, in-clude standard Army map scales from1:25,000 to 1:250,000, be able to zoomin and out from 1X to 8X, and includeboth grid and contour lines (Figure 1).The future system should have a lim-ited word processing and E-mail capa-bility to send messages, standard re-ports, and OPORDs/FRAGOs/WAR-


Future Command and Control SystemsIVIS and B2C2 Only Scratch the Surface

by Major Timothy D. Cherry

Figure 1. Map Control function allows operators to select map type, scale, feature and zoom.

Photo by Greg Stewart

NOs. The system should include a fullcomplement of graphic symbols straightfrom FM 101-5-1 (both enemy andfriendly) (Figure 2). Graphics shouldbe entered into the system at the appro-priate level from top to bottom andmust allow a unit/vehicle to displayany BLUEFOR graphics in the file. Afree-draw light pen capability would al-low the user to enter graphics quicklyand accurately.

All combat vehicles and aircraft shouldhave a GPS-initialized, POSNAV-fedposition locator that is tracked by satel-lites or mobile locator stations throughtriangulation. These stations could bemounted in either airborne or vehicularplatforms. For situational awareness,each unit/vehicle should be able to se-lectively display any or all friendly ve-hicles and aircraft from platoon tocorps level (Figure 3). Each combat ve-hicle and aircraft should also display a“firing vector” when firing to allow thecommander and staff to observe thevolume of fire in their unit. Units mustalso have the capability to “blackbox”friendly vehicles once destroyed by theenemy to visually show currentstrength. Enemy vehicles should be intwo colors, yellow for templated andred for actual/confirmed locations. TheG2/S2 at each level prepares a situationtemplate in yellow and once confirmedby our intelligence systems, the G2/S2changes the color of enemy vehicles tored and this appears on every computerscreen instantly. The system on our di-rect fire vehicles and aircraft (tanks,IFVs, attack helos) should have a lasercapability like IVIS with one improve-ment. Once an enemy vehicle is lased,the TC/BC should be able to select anenemy icon (T72, BMP, BRDM, etc.)to appear in red on the computerscreen. Vehicle/aircraft commandersmust also be able to blackbox enemyvehicles that are destroyed (Figure 4).The G2/S2 can use this to determineBDA, confirm the sittemp, determineenemy courses of action, and thus ad-vise the commander better.

There are several hardware require-ments needed for our future C2 system.There are two types of computer sys-tems: one basic system for combat ve-hicles and aircraft that is hardened, hasa small screen, and does not have aprint capability; and one advanced sys-tem for command and control elementsthat has a big screen (30" or larger), asmall color printer, and a large colorprinter (3’ x 5’). Combat vehiclesshould also have a flat panel computerdisplay that is movable and allows the


Figure 2. Symbols and graphics show up on the screen just as theyappear in our current doctrinal manuals.

Figure 3. BLUEFOR symbology function allows operators to selectively dis-play any or all friendly vehicles.

Figure 4. Vehicle and aircraft commanders can “blackbox” enemy vehicles thatare destroyed to visually display battle damage assessment (BDA).

vehicle commander to view the screenwhile fighting from outside his turret.Finally, all of the digital informationmust be sent and received using a sepa-rate digital radio that does not interferewith voice traffic. With advances intechnology come changes in organiza-tions and tactics, techniques, and pro-cedures. This new capability forces usto look at new ways to operate. Everycombat vehicle (to include scout, ADA,engineer, artillery, mortar, chemical,etc.) should have a basic computer sys-tem. The TF TOC should have threeadvanced computer systems (S3, S2,FSE). The CTCP and field trains CPshould also each have an advancedcomputer system. Each staff sectionwould display the graphics and sym-bols necessary to track its part of thebattle. During battles, each would trackthe battle “real-time” without the needfor maps, acetate overlays, and havingto move map symbols. The staff couldthen analyze the battle from their BOSperspective to help the commander“visualize the battlefield.” The com-mander can fight out of his tank/IFV ora BCV-type command and control ve-hicle. This dynamic system will auto-matically update its screen with newfriendly and enemy information, allow-ing the commander to see the enemy,the terrain, and his unit, and the rela-tionship of all three at the same time(Figure 5). This type of accurate visualinformation will enable the commanderto make the right decision with regardto maneuver, fire distribution, commit-ment of forces, and use of combat mul-tipliers — and he can access this infor-mation from his computer without hav-

ing to talk to any of his subordinatecommanders or staff (he does not haveto ask for anything!).

The future C2 system will enhancethe way we conduct our orders process.For example, brigade would call thetask force to tell them that brigadegraphics and OPORD are in the com-puter. The TF TOC would display thebrigade graphics and print out a largegraphic picture in color and theOPORD on 81⁄2 x 11" paper minuteslater. The staff would use the large pic-ture with brigade graphics (to includeintel, fire support, engineer, and CSS)to conduct mission analysis, COA de-velopment, and wargaming. Once thecommander decides on a course of ac-tion, the staff would complete theOPORD, input the TF graphics andOPORD into the computer, and notifyco/tms and slice. Co/tms and slicewould display the TF graphics, printout the OPORD, and begin their ordersprocess. Co/tm and slice commanderswill still go to the TOC for OPORDbriefings and face-to-face guidance,while their XOs plan concurrently.With this technology, the staff andcommanders will be able to accesshigher echelon plans and orders, givingthem the ability to conduct concurrentplanning at all levels. One change thisfuture C2 system requires is that theco/tm XOs can no longer fight from acombat vehicle. They must process in-formation and run the co/tm commandpost (CP) as they do in cavalry troops.Co/tm and slice CPs would have an ad-vanced computer system, along withboth a large and small printer. Once the

co/tm OPORD and graphics are com-plete, the XO inputs them into thecomputer. OPORD/overlay distributionis simplified at all levels becausegraphic pictures and OPORDs can beprinted for each leader in the unit,quickly and accurately. Leaders can usethis graphic picture (showing friendlygraphics, enemy sittemp, indirect fireplan, engineer obstacles, and CSS plan)for planning and rehearsals. This alsoeliminates the need for manual produc-tion and distribution of OPORDs andacetate graphics.

I have only scratched the surface withthe capabilities a future C2 system likethe one I have described can provide toBOS synchronization during all phasesof mission planning, preparation, andexecution. I have described the capa-bilities our future digitial command andcontrol systems should have. Our cur-rent C2 systems are cumbersome, andfail at their primary task — to help thecommander “visualize the battlefield.”Future systems must help the com-mander see the enemy, see the terrain,and see his unit at critical points duringthe battle so he can make the right de-cision to positively influence the out-come of the battle. As witnessed duringRotation 94-07, IVIS and B2C2 are astep in the right direction, but our fu-ture digital systems must be improvedto truly revolutionize the way we fight.


Major Tim Cherry was com-missioned in Air Defense Artil-lery from Florida State Uni-versity in 1979. A graduate ofADOBC, AOAC, and CGSC,he served as a SHORAD pla-toon leader, XO, asst. S3,and C Battery commanderwith 1-59 ADA; as asst. S3,adjutant, B Troop command-er, and regimental asst. S3with 3d ACR; as brigade asst.S3 with 5th ID and squadronS3 with 2d Squadron, 1stCavalry; and most recently asthe senior battle staff analystfor the Armor Task ForceTraining Team (COBRAs) atthe National Training Center.He is currently the XO/CSStrainer for the Armor TaskForce Training Team.

Figure 5. Commanders at all levels will be able to see the enemy, the terrain, and theirunit, and the relationship of all three.

Auftragstaktik is a German term used quite freely in our army,particularly in the armor/mech community, as a description of howwe do business. But what, exactly, does this word mean? Tomany, it means nothing more than its rough, literal translation —“mission-type orders,” or orders giving great latitude to subordi-nates in regard to mission accomplishment. The subordinate isgiven a mission, and left to his own initiative in its execution andaccomplishment. But a closer examination may reveal that this isan imprecise and incomplete understanding.

The most reliable source for an explanation of auftragstaktik,would be the originators of the term — the German Army. Duringa recent staff ride conducted with the Bundeswehr, German offi-cers gave the following explanation to a group of American offi-cers about the German concept of the term: Auftragstaktik is com-prised of four essential elements — obedience, proficiency, inde-pendence of action, and self-esteem. In order for auftragstaktik toexist, all four elements must be present.

Obedience. In the framework of auftragstaktik, obedience refersto strict adherence to the intent of the higher commander, ex-pressed in terms of purpose, method, and endstate. The methodwill probably be the least specific of the three, giving subordinatesthe maximum opportunity to exercise initiative in pursuit of theendstate. The subordinate ensures that any initiative he exercisesadheres to and supports the commander’s intent.

Proficiency refers to technical and tactical competence on thepart of leaders at all levels. In order for auftragstaktik to work,leaders must be well grounded in their profession, understandingnot only their own branch’s capabilities, but also the capabilitiesof other branches. They must understand the application of all bat-tlefield operating systems and be able to synchronize all availablecombat multipliers. The educational system of the Army must fos-ter this. Training must focus on combined arms. Proficiency buildsoutside the school system and unit with a rigorous program ofprofessional self-development. The end result is a leader capableof taking broad guidance and exercising initiative in an intelligent,effective manner, reflecting the intent of the higher commander.

Independence of action. The four elements which compriseauftragstaktik are equally important, but if one element is at the“heart” of the term, it would be independence of action. Thehigher commander allows his subordinate a great deal of latitudein the execution of a mission, allowing the subordinate to seize theinitiative as it presents itself. This necessitates leader presence for-ward, at the decisive place on the battlefield. From this vantagepoint, he can exercise the freedom he has been given to influencethe battle, tailoring the actions of his unit to take advantage of thetactical situation he sees.

Self-esteem. The subordinate leader must possess a high degreeof self-confidence, and he must feel that his superiors have anequal degree of confidence in his abilities. This develops throughtraining. During training exercises, superiors encourage the subor-dinate leader to exercise initiative in the execution of a mission,and he is not penalized if his initiative fails. He is not made to feelthat he personally is a failure. Leaders analyze his actions, identifyhis shortcomings, and from this, a lesson is learned. Honest mis-

takes are survivable and accepted as part ofleader development. This is crucial if subor-dinates are expected to exercise initiative.

This explanation makes it clear thatAuftragstaktik is not simply a term describ-ing a method of operating as a unit. It is aculture. Taken in its purest form, as it wasoriginally conceived, the word describes a

culture within the profession of arms. We cannot wake up onemorning and decide we are going to practice mission-type ordersthat day. Cultures develop over long periods of time, and if notpracticed are soon extinct. We must practice mission-type ordersevery day, in everything we do as an Army.

Our present educational system fulfills the elements of profi-ciency and obedience. Young officers receive a thorough ground-ing in the technical aspects of their branch in the Basic Course.When they graduate, they are reasonably proficient in the basicskills of their trade, and additional proficiency comes with experi-ence at their first duty station. Branch advanced courses bring agreater understanding and appreciation of the commander’s intent,which is addressed as the focal point for all tactical and opera-tional planning. At this point, we have an officer who knows howbest to employ his weapon systems to achieve the desired endstateof his superior commander.

The final elements necessary to practice the culture of mission-type orders are the most difficult to develop. The desire to succeedtends to quell our willingness to allow subordinates independenceof action. The old maxim — about wanting something done rightand doing it ourselves — trips us up every time. We feel that bycontrolling every aspect of what our subordinates do, our intentwill be more readily accomplished, but in doing this, we fail todevelop our subordinate leaders. We must allow subordinates todevelop their own methods to accomplish given missions. Whenthey fail, we must allow them to survive and learn from their mis-takes. We must continue to develop them without crushing theirself-esteem and willingness to take risks.

Auftragstaktik works, and is borne out by historical examplesranging from Napoleon’s marshals to the German storm troop de-tachments of the World War I. Well-trained small unit leaders,accustomed to seizing the initiative and exploiting it, are the keysto successful military operations, and in the fast-paced world ofarmor-mechanized operations, such leaders are crucial. Given this,we must fully understand and correctly implement the mission-type order culture that we are so quick to embrace as our way ofdoing business. We must practice it on a daily basis. We mustdiscipline ourselves against the tendency to micro-manage. In oursubordinates, we must foster the willingness to take calculatedrisks. Then we must take the time to evaluate their successes andmistakes, and develop them accordingly. When we do this in ourregular course of business, then we have truly understood andadopted the mission-type order culture. The dividends which willfollow on future battlefields will be well worth the effort.

Captain Ronald J. Bashista received his Regular Army commis-sion in Armor as a 1989 Distinguished Military Graduate of WesternNew England College ROTC. He served as a tank platoon leader inDESERT STORM with 1-35 Armor, 1st AD. He has also served asa scout platoon leader, tank company executive officer, HHC ex-ecutive officer, and battalion motor officer. He is a graduate ofAOBC, BMOC, AOAC and FAOAC. While attending AOAC, he par-ticipated in the Huertgen Forest Staff Ride with the Bundeswehr.He currently serves as the adjutant for 3-8 Cavalry, 1st CD.

Auftragstaktik:It’s More Than Just a Wordby Captain Ronald J. Bashista


The announcement that the 10thMountain Division had been selected todeploy to Somalia came as a surprise.Although we are a rapid deploymentcontingency force, our focus had beentoward fighting dismounted light infan-try in a constricted environment. Eventhough specific units beyond the divi-sion ready force (DRF) Infantry Battal-ion had not been designated to deploy,all units began preparations, includingthe divisional cavalry squadron, the 3dSquadron, 17th Cavalry, which rede-ployed from a field training exercise on2 December 1992.

Upon notification of deployment forOperation RESTORE HOPE, ATroop/3-17 Cavalry, the organization’sground troop, began preparing for thepotential missions we might be calledupon to execute. Focusing on the So-malia mission as a humanitar-ian/peacekeeping operation, special at-tention was paid to training for check-point operations. This task was not in-cluded in our Mission Essential TasksList, and consequently had not beenpreviously trained. Drawing on the ex-

perience of our DESERT STORM vet-erans, FM 7-98 (Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict), the initial plan ofthe 10th Mountain Division’s SecondBrigade, and the principles of METT-T,A Troop established an SOP for con-ducting checkpoints.

A Troop deployed at approximately60 percent strength. This reduced usfrom our authorized 18-man, 6-HMMWV platoons to 12-man, 4-HMMWV platoons. Our vehicles werearmed with TOW 2 missile systems,MK 19 grenade launchers, M2 .50 cali-ber and M60 machine guns. The TOWsystem could be dual mounted with anM60.

Our initial threat analysis was verylimited. The Marines had experiencedonly light resistance in their occupationof Mogadishu, and we expected to en-counter even less in the rural environ-ments we were to operate in. However,the potential for strong opposition wasalways present. Thus, we planned forthe greatest amount of control and se-curity possible with our limited man-ning strength.

With the initial intent of securing hu-manitarian relief organizations, ratherthan actively pursuing unlawful ele-ments, we anticipated that our check-points would be set up on a one-wayroad, such as the entrance to an assem-bly area or feeding center. We also an-ticipated that the checkpoints would bein built-up areas during daylight. Ourplan called for the use of available bar-rier materials — concertina wire, logs,rocks, and debris — to slow and chan-nel vehicles into an inspection zone(Figure 1).

A minimum of six personnel, or ascout section, would operate the check-point. After guiding the vehicle to theproper location, a four-man inspectionteam would search the vehicle and itsoccupants. Two members of the teamwould conduct the actual inspection(Figure 1, items 2 and 4), while theother two provided close support withM16 rifles (items 3 and 5). A crew-served weapon mounted on aHMMWV positioned at the exit of thecheckpoint would provide a show offorce and added firepower. The other

Ground CavalryCheckpoint OperationsIn Somaliaby First Lieutenant John Williamson

Running Checkpoints Was a New Mission forThe 10th Mountain Division’s 3-17 Cavalry,But Such Missions May Become Common


section of the scout platoon would besome distance away, ready to doublethe strength at the checkpoint, ifneeded. Our manning strategy allowedfor a 12-man platoon to conduct acheckpoint for approximately 12 to 18hours. As a final precaution, weplanned to dig shoulder-depth bunkerswithin the checkpoint area to protectdismounted personnel if an intense fire-fight erupted. If available, we wouldemplace claymore mines as a last re-sort. Fortunately, the troop had overthree weeks to train before deployment,exercising our checkpoint SOP numer-ous times.

When A Troop arrived in Somalia on7 January 1994, we immediately beganconducting convoy security and zonereconnaissance missions out of the bri-gade assembly area at Bale Dogle, anold Soviet air base 70 miles west ofMogadishu. In mid-January, the troopdeployed to a rural area southwest ofMogadishu to participate in a week-long squadron zone reconnaissance.The area was flat, with scattered vil-lages, each ranging in population from50 to 5,000. Our primary objective wasto display a military presence withinthe sector in order to frustrate themovements of unlawful elements anddiscourage banditry. A major north-south MSR passed through the sector,

and it was believed that bandits used itat night to harass the local villages andto travel to and from Mogadishu. In ad-dition to its other missions, A Troopwas ordered to establish checkpointsalong this route. The commander’s ro-tational schedule called for two pla-toons conducting reconnaissance mis-sions during the day with the third pla-toon executing a checkpoint along theMSR at night.

As with all missions, the factors ofMETT-T influenced our execution, andadjustments to our plan had to bemade. The mission did not call for con-trolling access to a fixed base, butrather inspecting all civilian traffic forweapons, obtaining human intelligenceand discouraging bandit movement.

At this point, our threat analysis haddeveloped into a clearer picture. Therehad been very little violent activity out-side of the population centers ofMogadishu and Kismayu. The inci-dents that had occurred in the rural ar-eas had been between local civilians.There had been no coordinated or evenrandom violent acts directed towardU.S. forces in the troop sector. On thecontrary, the vast majority of So-malians had been extremely friendlyand receptive to our presence.

In planning for the checkpoint, one ofthe most significant concerns was ex-peditiously processing vehicles. ManySomali trucks carried as many as 20 to30 passengers and the process of un-loading, inspecting, and releasing a ve-hicle could take considerable time.Therefore, we attempted to develop afaster system.

Another unexpected development wasthat we were not establishing thecheckpoints in a built-up area, as wehad planned. Nor was the road the one-way street we had expected. Further-more, the road was so deteriorated that,during daylight hours, vehicles wouldtravel on improvised “camel paths sev-eral meters to each side of the mainthoroughfare. These factors made it dif-ficult to channel traffic. The limitedbarrier materials available, and the tem-porary duration of the checkpoints, re-stricted us to the use of concertina wireand our HMMWVs to channel the ve-hicles into the inspection area.

Although we had planned for it, wehad not anticipated conducting check-points at night. The issue of effectiveobservation for our overwatch elementswas critical due to our limited night vi-sion capabilities. The troop wasequipped with only PVS-5s and PVS-2s.

In executing our night checkpoints,we stuck with our basic plan — onesection conducted the search and pro-vided close support while the otherprovided additional overwatch and rein-forcement. We selected checkpoint loca-tions away from population centers toreduce civilian foot traffic. Next, wetied in our positions with natural barri-ers, such as irrigation canals, in orderto restrict the movement of vehicles offthe road. Finally, to counteract limitedvisibility, we improvised, using vehicleheadlights to control traffic and TOWmissile thermal sights to provide effec-tive overwatch.

The section conducting the check-point would stagger two HMMWVs onthe road, oriented in opposite directions(Figure 2). These HMMWVs wouldmount an M60 machine gun and anM2 .50 cal respectively. This configu-ration provided headlight illuminationin both directions and provided over-


watch and immediate suppressive firesfrom both weapon systems, regardlessof the direction of approaching traffic.

The section would maintain strictlight discipline until a vehicle ap-proached to within about 25 to 50 me-ters. Then the OIC would direct the ve-hicle headlights to be turned on and aninterpreter gave instructions to the ve-hicle occupants. This inevitably caughtthe approaching traffic by surprise andbrought it to a halt. While the crew-served weapons provided overwatch,the inspection teams approached thevehicles and searched them. As re-hearsed, each inspector had an M16armed guard. The inspectors carried 9-mm pistols to allow more freedom ofmovement and to reduce the risk of ahostile Somalian seizing a rifle when inclose contact.

The TOW missile thermal sights pro-vided an unanticipated advantage. Setapproximately 100 meters off the road,the reinforcing section was positioned

with a TOW missile thermal sight anda Mark 19 grenade launcher. The gre-nade launcher provided extra punch forany long range contacts, while theTOW sights acted as the eyes of theoverwatch element, allowing it to gaindetailed information about approachingtraffic. Before a vehicle came within2,000 meters, the inspection team knewthe type of vehicle and the number ofoccupants to expect. A proficient TOWgunner could even determine the loadbeing carried in a farm produce truck.

Interpreters were of immeasurablevalue at our checkpoints. A counter-in-telligence team of two personnel andone Somali interpreter was usually at-tached to each platoon when conduct-ing missions. The interpreter generallyaccompanied the checkpoint OIC andinterrogated the vehicle occupantswhile other inspection team memberssearched the vehicle. A close workingrelationship developed with the morereliable interpreters. Although A Troopcould have conducted checkpoints

without the interpreters’ assistance, wewould have obtained much less humanintelligence, given our limited languageskills.

Upon redeployment, A Troop revisedthe Mission Essential Tasks List to in-corporate lessons learned in Somalia, toinclude checkpoint operations. Al-though a keen eye will be able to dis-cern several weaknesses, A Troop’scheckpoints were successful and themission was accomplished.

A cavalry scout platoon operating in amore hostile or constrictive environ-ment would undoubtedly need furtheradjustments. Ultimately, A Troop exe-cuted numerous day and night check-points, resulting in the seizure of sev-eral weapons and the gathering of criti-cal human intelligence regarding banditactivity. Human intelligence gatheredfrom a checkpoint operated by A Troopled to the discovery on the followingday of one of the largest weaponscaches seized during Operation RE-STORE HOPE.

Ground components of A Troop, 3/17Cav recently deployed to Haiti andwere stationed in Port-au-Prince asthis issue neared publication.


First Lieutenant John Wil-liamson received his ROTCcommission from DartmouthCollege in 1990. He holds aBA degree in Government. Agraduate of Armor OfficerBasic Course, Scout PlatoonLeader Course, Junior Main-tenance Officer Course, andAirborne School, he servedas platoon leader of 2d Pla-toon, A Troop, 3-17 Cavalryfrom Jan 92 to Jan 94, andas squadron maintenance of-ficer (BMO) from Jan 94 tothe present.

The term Operational ManeuverFrom the Sea (OMFTS) is new tomost soldiers. A wargame at the Ma-rine Corps Combat Development Cen-ter, in Quantico, Virginia, tested thiswarfighting concept in December1992. In analyzing power projectionissues, the game players emphasizedthe need for flexibility, tactical sur-prise, and speed relative to the en-emy.1 The purpose of this article is todiscuss the role of the Army’s ArmorForce in OMFTS andits ability to contributeto battlespace domi-nance in the littoral re-gions.

Armor has tradition-ally played a support-ing role in amphibiousoperations. However,the scope of these op-erat ions has rangedacross the full opera-t ional spectrum. InWorld War II, the cen-ter task force thatseized Oran, Algiers,included the 1st Infan-try and 1st ArmoredDivisions. The tacticalscheme involved adouble envelopment ofthe city, with the infan-try on the inner ringand the armor on theouter ring. This effortplaced 3,245 vehicles ashore and cov-ered an area 70 miles wide by 15deep.2 By present standards, this land-ing was a herculean effort.

As the armed forces continue todraw down, each component will finditself facing new and expanding dutiesto met national strategy commitments.The requirement for the Army to pro-vide heavy forces in the conduct ofOMFTS is real. A recent memoran-dum of understanding between theArmy and the Marine Corps high-lights the tasks ahead needed to en-sure a power projection capability

consistent with the operational de-mands of an uncertain world.

The Nature of Maritime Campaigns

In the past, the focus of an amphibi-ous assault was the Force BeachheadLine (FBHL). The intent of such anoperation was to gain a lodgementarea of sufficient size to ensure unen-cumbered unloading of combat power

ashore. This approach is passive inexecution if the landing force looksinward toward geographical objectivesthat fail to meet the operational de-mands of the campaign. The Anziolanding is an example of the stagna-tion that can result from turning in-ward.

OMFTS envisions a disconnectedand non-linear battlefield. The princi-pal defeat mechanism of the landingforce is coherent maneuver against theopponent’s center of gravity. The limi-tations of constrained shipping de-

mand that ground combat power onlybe employed against high-value objec-tives. A digitized battlefield is usedonly to focus on the enemy and massthe effects of combat power to disrupthis operational tempo. Sensors arefused onto a common battlefield pic-ture that guides decentralized executionby combat forces ashore and afloat.These actions are consistent with thecommander’s intent, as they are basedon a common command architecture.

OMFTS envisionsavoiding enemy com-bat strength while de-stroying the political,military, and economicsources of suchstrength.

As with airborne op-erations, combat powerduring OMFTS mustbe built up from zero.The project ion ofground combat poweris directly tied to theship-to-shore move-ment. This process is,in turn, linked to thecharacteristics of thelanding craft that movethe troops and their as-sociated equipment tothe beach. The interac-t ions between thesecraft and the uniqueenvironmental setting

of a scenario drive the feasible opera-tional schemes open to a commander.

Figure 1 outlines the build-up ofcombat power ashore over time. Thetransition has two phases. In the surgephase, the early part of the landing,assault assets are moved ashore asrapidly as possible. In this phase, lim-its on landing craft, both surface andair, coupled with the queuing dynam-ics of assault shipping, constrain theability of the commander to placecombat power ashore. Following theinitial surge, landing assets that willcomplete the transfer of combat and

The Army’s New Mission — Backing Up a Marine Amphibious Landing

Armor in Support of OMFTSby Major R.W. Lamont


supporting units circulate between thetransport shipping and the landingsites.

The Role of Marine Armor

Three types of Marine armor play akey role in the surge phase. The firstis the Light Armored Reconnaissance(LAR) unit, a combined arms forma-tion built around the Piranha family ofwheeled fighting vehicles. They canmove ashore by helicopter or LandingCraft Air Cushioned (LCAC). Theseunits perform cavalry functions, andserve as an advanced force shapingthe battlefield for the heavier forcesthat follow. They use speed and theirability to call in massed indirect firefrom aviation and Naval Surface FireSupport to offset their light weightand relatively few numbers.

The second player in the surge pe-riod is the Assault Amphibious Vehi-cle (AAV), a tracked APC unique tothe Marine Corps that serves to moveinfantry directly across the beach andinto the zone of action. These vehiclesare attached to infantry units to formmechanized infantry capable of keep-ing pace with the other mounted play-ers on the battlefield. Tanks, combatengineers, and other arms are task-or-ganized into the habitual combinedarms teams built around these mecha-nized infantry formations. AAVs re-quire no lift assets to make their ship-to-shore movement, so they contributedirectly to the large spike of combatpower during the surge phase.

Finally, Marine tanks move ashoreon LCACs to support and maneuverwith the other players in the MarineAir/Ground Task Force. These M1A1s

have communication packages that al-low the tank company commander tocall for the massive volumes of sup-porting fires needed to ensure maneu-ver in the face of superior numbersashore. Their ability to dominate thedirect-fire envelope ensures theMAGTF commander will present hisenemy with expanding tactical threatsthat are difficult to counter.

One key to Marine armored warfareduring OMFTS is the combined armsnature of its organization and opera-tions. The LAR unit provides thetimely information fast-paced opera-tions demand. Combined arms teams,backed by a full array of indirect firesystems, are able to mass and strikeenemy weakness. They then dispersebefore presenting a high-value targetto the opponent’s fires. Habitual rela-tionships, forged during deploymentsand combined arms exercises, providethe glue needed to hold these forma-

tions together in the chaos of the earlyhours ashore.

The Role of Army Armor

Under the Army and the MarineCorps memorandum of understand-ing, the Army will provide additionalarmor to support OMFTS. Since theMarine Corps has organic armor bat-talions, the Army will normally beproviding a brigade-size force OP-CON to the MEF commander. It isenvisioned that the armor brigade willnot make amphibious assaults, butwill fight inland as part of the expedi-tionary campaign. This approach isconsistent with the Army’s experiencein World War II. During the Sicilylanding, a brigade of the 2d ArmoredDivision was held off Licata as thefloating reserve for the 3d InfantryDivision.3 It is expected that the ar-mor brigade will transition ashore dur-ing the circulation phase of the land-ing process. Finally, this brigade willnot subdivide its units, except engi-neer and field artillery, during opera-tions inland.

Three OMFTS principles are directlysupported by the capabilities of the ar-mor brigade: exploiting gaps, flexibil-ity, and momentum. The notion of ex-ploiting a gap is not new to Army op-erations. In the past, these gaps havebeen largely geographical and physi-cal in nature. The armor brigade isable to push through or around an en-emy that has been fixed in position.Further, it has the mobility to carrythe battle deep beyond the groundstriking range of some MEF assets.


Figure 1

Build-up of Combat Power Ashore Over Time

Photo courtesy of General Dynamics

But exploiting gaps is not limited tothe context of time and space. Theremay be exploitable gaps in the en-emy’s warfighting ability — perhaps aweakness in his night fighting capabil-ity or an overly centralized commandand control system — that may be tar-gets for the armor brigade.

OMFTS demands flexibility to pro-vide the commander a wide range oftactical options. Increasing the avail-ability of armor-protected, highly ma-neuverable, and hard-hitting units sup-ports battlefield dominance by givingthe ground commander a wide arrayof options to throw at, and around, theenemy. This in turn complicates theenemy’s dispositions, since he cannever be certain which course of ac-tion his opponent will execute.

Momentum is improved since the ar-mor brigade is adept at concentratingcombat power at the decisive point inthe battle. Its actions fix, confuse, andneutralize the enemy by integratingfires and maneuver at a tempo the en-emy will find hard to counter. In addi-tion, Marine ANGLICO (Air and Na-val Gunfire Liaison Company) detach-ments can provide the means for thearmor brigade to tap naval fire sup-port and further improve the weightand momentum of the brigade’sblows.

The interactions between the armorbrigade and the Marine Ground Com-bat Element (GCE) can force the en-emy into a dilemma: if he concen-trates his combat power to face thefull weight of the armor brigade, hewill have to uncover areas along theshore, opening gaps that Marine unitscan exploit, either operating from thesea or in a shore-to-shore mode, tostrike at his rear areas. Conversely, ifhe disperses to cover the seaward ap-proaches, the armor brigade is pre-sented an opportunity to overwhelmor bypass his defenses and crush himagainst the beach.

If, during the surge phase of the op-eration, a port is captured intact, con-ditions may allow integration of theArmy’s PREPO Afloat brigade di-rect ly into the ongoing OMFTSscheme. This approach is potentiallythe quickest way to counter an armor-heavy threat operating in the littoralof interest. Once ashore, this jointforce is able to conduct a series of op-erations intended to strike overland atthe enemy’s key centers of gravity

while being supported by a full rangeof naval power offshore.

Conclusions

Seafaring nations have always prof-ited by exploiting the inherit strategicmobility afforded them by using thesea as an avenue of approach. Theability to dominate the land and strikethe enemy’s center of gravity is con-tingent on projecting a GCE with theprerequisite strength and mobility atthe deceive moment. Some scenarioswill require the Army to provide addi-tional armor support to the MarineCorps to achieve this battlespacedominance.

The roles and requirements de-manded of Marine and Army armor,within the context of OMFTS, are dif-ferent and unique. Each is a keyplayer in the various phases of powerprojection into the littoral regions ofthe Third World. This difference is re-flected in the dynamics of our simplecombat power build-up model and inthe way these forces are trained,equipped, and organized. These subtledifferences in operational charac-teristics must not be lost as we re-structure our armor forces for the wayahead.

The inherent capabilities of the ar-mor brigade are consistent with theprinciples of OMFTS. The potentialrole of the armor brigade to exploit oropen gaps in the enemy’s defense canensure conflict termination on ourterms. The flexibility and momentumthat an armor brigade brings to the lit-toral region are an important step to-ward battlespace dominance in the ex-panded operating area envisioned withOMFTS. This increases in relevanceif the enemy has mechanized forma-tions that can oppose the maneuver ofthe GCE.

In future operations, all servicesmust seek ways to support the na-tional strategy and maximize theircontribution to the joint battlefield.OMFTS is a concept that calls for theintegration of all services in the litto-ral region to achieve battlespacedominance and victory. One of thekey players on this future battlefield isthe Army’s armor brigade, supportingthe dynamic operations which arelaunched “...from the sea.”

Notes

1“Operational Maneuver From The Sea 29Nov-4 Dec 92,” Studies and Analysis Division,MCCDC, Feb 1992, p. ii.

2Howe, G.F., Old Ironsides, Combat ForcesPress, Washington, D.C., 1954, pp. 21-47.

3D’este, Carlo, Bitter Victory, New York,N.Y., Harper Collins, 1988, p. 146.


Major R.W. Lamont, a 1978graduate of the United StatesNaval Academy, was commis-sioned a 2LT in the USMC. Af-ter completing The Basic Schoolat Quantico, Virginia, he at-tended a similar program at FortKnox, was designated a tank of-ficer, and was assigned to the3d Tank Battalion, TwentyninePalms, Calif. He served as atank platoon leader and XO forboth a tank and headquarterscompany, and participated inthe formation of the Near TermPreposition Ship (NTPS) pro-gram and Mechanized TestPhase IV, which demonstratedthe Marine Corps’ ability to con-duct large-scale mounted opera-tions. He also served as MarineDetachment executive/guard of-ficer on the USS CONSTELLA-TION (CV-64), and was combatcargo officer on the USS CLEVE-LAND (LPD-7), involved in 31amphibious landings. In August1985, he returned to the 3dTank Battalion as the assistantoperations officer and tank com-pany commander. He returnedto Fort Knox as an instructor forthe Armor Officer Basic Course,then the Armor Officer Ad-vanced Course. After receivinghis Master of Science Degree atthe Naval Postgraduate School,he was assigned to the Studiesand Analysis Division of the Ma-rine Corps Combat Develop-ment Command. He currently isthe lead Marine analyst support-ing the Joint Air Defense Opera-tions/Joint Engagement ZoneTest Team (JADO/ JEZ).

SSG Hughes did not like what hewas seeing. His infantry squad waspinned down, and he no longer hadcommunications with the vehicles. Theenemy small arms fire that kept hiselement suppressed was the least ofSSG Hughes’s worries. The BMPoverwatching the trail was his biggestconcern because he had no way towarn the approaching Bradleys of thedanger — the company had changedfrequencies and the RTO didn’t havethe new one. One more time, SSGHughes swore at his element for leav-ing the antiarmor weapons on theBradleys. If they had their Dragons,or even the AT-4s, that BMP wouldnot be a threat to the rest of his pla-toon. His thoughts of improving thePCIs and rehearsals were interruptedby the all-too-familiar sound of an M-2 moving deeper into the defile andthe sight of the BMP as it openedfire...

This event has not occurred in com-bat yet, but it does occur monthly atthe National Training Center. Opera-tional results indicate that there is alack of understanding throughout theArmy about how to execute this mis-sion. This article provides the com-pany/team commander with tactics,techniques, and procedures to success-fully attack a defile defended by anenemy force. It is not the only way toaccomplish this mission, but it willserve as a primer until you developtactics and techniques you are com-fortable with.

Defiles and their impact on com-pany/team operations are often ig-nored unless the commander conductsa thorough mission analysis. Once thisanalysis is complete, and the com-mander determines he has the missionto clear a defile, he must accomplishseveral steps prior to crossing the lineof departure. The first of these is theanalysis of the situation.

Analyze the Situation

Few leaders would argue the impor-tance of an intelligence preparation ofthe battlefield (IPB) when planning anoperation. An equal number will alsotell you there is not enough time to doeverything required. It does take timeto do a detailed IPB, but it is timewell spent. With practice and the useof field manuals, you can completeyour analysis fairly quickly. Focusyour effort on the terrain, weather,and enemy, emphasizing their effectson the operation.

Terrain and Weather

The defile drill is required becauseterrain has so limited your actions thatyou must completely change move-ment formations, techniques, battledrills — virtually all aspects of howyou plan to fight. It only makes sensethat a mission so dominated by terrainwould focus on terrain analysis. Whenconducting your analysis, focus on themilitary aspects of terrain by usingOCOKA, considering these things thatare unique to defiles.

Observation and fields of fire favorthe enemy. You must neutralize thisadvantage.

• Identify deadspace where the en-emy cannot see or engage you withdirect fire.

•Template overwatch positionswhere you can place forces to sup-port maneuver (this is critical be-cause reaction time is decreasedand our weapons standoff is nulli-fied in the defile).

Cover and concealment

•Cover and concealment are nor-mally abundant for infantry butscarce for trail bound vehicles.

•Lack of vehicle cover makes themexcellent ATGM targets.

•Available cover often precludes en-emy engineer survivability effort.These assets can be used else-where.

Obstacles

•Both man-made and natural obsta-cles influence the maneuver of anyelement entering the defile.

•Obstacles will reduce your abilityto maneuver, improve the enemy’sability to engage your element, andwill assist any enemy withdrawal.

Clearing the Defile:A Doctrinal Discussionby Captain John W. Miller III


•Defiles can be easily reinforcedwith wire, mines, and log cribs.

•Defiles occurring in ridges or rockformations may have bedrockfloors, preventing effective use ofditches and craters.

Key terrain

•Terrain that dominates, controls, orinfluences avenues of approach.

•The defile you have been tasked toclear is higher headquarters keyterrain.

•Focus on terrain that affects thefight in the defile.

•Consider terrain overlooking ap-proaches to the defile and terrainthat dominates the defile exit.

Avenues of approach

•Evaluate to determine degree ofcanalization, trafficability, andamount of maneuver space in thedefile.

•Conduct an analysis of time andspace factors, determine the lengthof the defile and how long it willtake to clear.

•Determine slow-go and no-go ter-rain — this helps you determinewhat type of force leads and when(infantry vs. vehicles).

Detailed terrain analysis requirestime to consider each of these factorsand is essential to mission success.The commander suddenly issued aFRAGO to clear a defile may nothave the time required to thoroughlyanalyze all aspects of the terrain.There are some aspects of OCOKAthat are more pertinent when planningto clear a defile than others. It is criti-


cal that the commander have a de-tailed understanding of the avenues ofapproach leading to, through, and ex-iting the defile to ensure he properlysequences his forces into the fight.

He must also understand which ter-rain is key, i.e., the terrain that con-trols or dominates the fight in the de-file. This will provide terrain-orientedobjectives for subordinate units toseize, facilitating clearance of the de-file. Finally, focus your analysis onthe identification of man-made andnatural obstacles. This is vital infor-mation when developing your schemeof maneuver and establishing the con-ditions that must be set prior tobreaching obstacles in the defile.When conducting the analysis of thesituation, consider the effects ofweather and its influence on your op-eration. Consider the trafficabilityalong avenues of approach and in thedefile itself, for both mounted and dis-mounted forces. Analyze visibility todetermine how obscurants will per-form and the effects on optics (i.e.,binoculars, day sights, etc.). Will ther-mals be required for vehicles, and ifso, what about night vision devicesfor soldiers and small arms? Howlong will NBC agents be effective?You must consider the effects on yoursoldiers. What will the temperaturebe? Will you need more water or awarming plan? What MOPP is re-quired, and how long can troops fightin MOPP IV? Also consider the ef-fects on equipment, especially in ex-treme conditions. Do weapons requirespecial lubricants? What is the tem-perature and barometric pressure? Andis there a plan for periodic updates? Itis not enough to publish informationon wind speed and light data withouttelling your units the effect of theweather on the operation.

Enemy Situation

Complete the analysis of the situ-ation with a thorough study of the en-emy forces, focusing on composition,strength, disposition, capabilities, andcourses of action. Decide what the en-emy can do to you and determine howyou can best react to his actions. Usethe task force S2’s situational tem-plate, his analysis (paragraph 2 of theOPORD), and subsequent intelligenceupdates to accomplish this.

Composition and Strength

•Determine what type of force youare facing and what type of equip-ment they have.

•Determine the number and types ofvehicles and personnel in your areaof operation.

• Identify the type of reserve avail-able.

Disposition

•Template enemy positions down tovehicle/key weapon level.

•Determine locations of kill sacksand subsequent positions.

• Identify type and location ofOP/CSOP.

Capabilities

•How much artillery is in supportand where will he employ it?

•Does the enemy have NBC, andwill he use it?

•Can he reinforce his defense of thedefile?

Now that you have answered thesequestions, you can start to figure outhow the enemy will conduct the de-fense. Initially, focus your effort onwhat he will most likely do. Find outwhat the enemy wants to do and howhe will accomplish it, given his doc-trine. From this you can depict howhe would position his forces withoutregard to terrain. Ask yourself what heis most likely to do, based on doc-trinal norms. Where will he positionhis weapon systems, and why? Is hepart of a security zone or the mainbelt, and how does this affect his ac-tions? Once this thought process is

complete, you have essentially devel-oped a doctrinal template. Modify thistemplate, based on the enemy’sstrength and the terrain to develop asituational template that you cangraphically depict and hand to yoursubordinate leaders (Fig. 1).

The situational template focusesyour forces and graphically depictswhere they should look for enemy po-sitions while avoiding his kill sack. Itprovides the basis for your observa-tion and direct fire plans and also pro-vides requirements for indirect fireplanning. Leaders at all levels mustconfirm or deny the situational tem-plate quickly in order to change or ad-just the plan as required.

You must also determine the en-emy’s most dangerous course of ac-tion. This will depict your worst casescenario and will allow you to de-velop a plan in case the enemy is un-cooperative and does not do what youexpect. Ideally, your scheme of ma-neuver will be able to defeat both en-emy courses of action. You mustevaluate the chances of the enemyconducting what you consider to bethe most dangerous course — thehigher this percentage, the more yourscheme of maneuver must focus ondefeating this COA.

Normally, a comparison of owntroops available with the enemy’scomposition and strength provides thecommander with an accurate force ra-tio. But typical force ratios may notbe as significant when fighting in thedefile. You want a 3:1 force ratio dur-


Figure 1. Example of a SITEMP for a defile clearing operation.

ing attacks against a defending enemy,but terrain in the defile will limit thesize of the force you can introduce atany given time. Terrain is neutral,however, and will also limit the de-fender from employing all of his as-sets against you.

Plan to utilize available combat mul-tipliers to isolate enemy formations.Set conditions for assaults against por-tions of the defending force, ensuringthat other enemy positions are isolatedby effective suppression and/or obscu-ration, or masked by intervening ter-rain. Determining how you can obtainan advantageous force ratio brings usback to the importance of terrainanalysis and detailed depiction of theenemy situation. These efforts willprovide you with enough informationto develop a scheme of maneuver thatmasses your combat power and de-stroys isolated enemy positions untilhe is forced to withdraw or die in thedefile.

Fundamentals for Clearing a Defile

The actual business of clearing thedefile is time-consuming and re-source-intensive. There are certainfundamentals that optimize thechances of success. The three phasesof the operation are shown below withthe tasks to be accomplished and theconditions that should be set beforestarting the next phase.

Phase 1 - Approach

•Establish support-by-fire to sup-press or destroy enemy forces.

•Position infantry to clear the defile.•Secure a foothold, and begin clear-

ing operation.

Phase 2 - Clear

• Infantry conducts movement tocontact to make contact or seizeobjectives.

•Mounted/dismounted integrationdevelops the situation.

•Clear defile of all enemy and by-pass or create lanes through all ob-stacles.

Phase 3 - Secure

•Establish support-by-fire positionson far side to:- Defeat enemy counterattack.- Protect obstacle reduction effort.- Support continuation of TF attack.

•Hand over battle totask force.

•Continue the mission.

Phase 1 focuses on get-ting combat power intothe defile and postured tobegin clearing operations.The commander mustfirst establish overwatchand destroy or suppressany known enemy posi-tions to allow forces toapproach the defile unim-peded. Arti llery andsmoke can be used withgreat effect to assist thiseffort. Determine whatelement will lead yourmovement, based on theenemy situation. Plan fordismount points, ensuringthat your force is coveredby direct fire as it movesto these points. Dismountthe infantry and get themoriented to the ground asthe Bradleys providecover. This dismountpoint should be in a posi-tion that will secure afoothold for the com-pany/team to continuethe attack to seize the de-file. The first phase ofthe operation is completeonce the infantry is pre-pared to conduct themovement to contact.

The second phase of theoperat ion, the actualclearing of the defile, be-gins as quickly as thefirst phase ends. The dis-mounted infantry movesforward on both sides ofthe defile high up on thewalls. This provides themwith excellent visibilityand prevents the enemyfrom firing down on your infantry,and possibly pinning them down. It isalso easier to clear from top to bottomthan the other way around.

Assign the dismounted element thetask of seizing objectives at the farend of the defile. They then conduct amovement to contact to clear the de-file, which should be cleared once theobjectives are seized. The dismountsconduct the clearing operation, main-taining communications with the

Bradleys. As the infantry comes to abend in the trail, or a terrain featurethat would provide cover, they call thevehicles forward. This variation ofbounding overwatch should continueuntil the defile is clear or contact ismade (Fig. 2).

Phase lines can be used to control themovements. The key is to clear withinfantry, the smallest element makingcontact first, and then bringing theBradley into the fight as needed. Upon


Figure 2. Dismount element clears pass forBradleys.

making contact, the dismounted leadermust assess whether he can destroy orforce the withdrawal of the enemyforce. The commander must committhe Bradleys to support the clearingoperation if he cannot. This requirescrosstalk between mounted and dis-mounted elements.

The Bradley will be entering thefight without an exact location of theenemy and is relying on the dis-mounts to point them out. This mustbe done through spot reports based onplanned graphic control measures oridentifiable terrain features. The dis-mounted leader has to quickly orientthe BFV because exposure increasesvulnerability. The dismounts providesuppression as the BFV attempts todestroy the enemy position (Fig. 3).

The commander will normally havesome form of indirect fire at his dis-posal but must consider the effects ofthese systems in constricted terrain.

Dismounted and mounted infantrymust be mutually supporting andshould have, as much as possible,equal capabilities. Dismounted sol-diers should have antiarmor weaponsand sufficient class V to sustain thefight and provide suppression to allowthe mounted element to acquire andengage enemy vehicles. They shouldhave a forward observer and the abil-ity to breach wire and mine obstacles.

It is a good technique to dismountan engineer squad with sufficient dem-olitions to clear several obstacles, us-ing the infantry to provide suppres-sion, obscuration, and security as theengineers breach and reduce the ob-stacle.

The third phase of this operation isto secure the far end of the pass untilthe task force can pass through andpick up the fight. The company/teammust posture itself to defeat a possibleenemy counterattack, protect the re-duction of the obstacles in the pass toallow the TF unimpeded movement,and support the continuation of the TFattack with direct and indirect fires.The commander must develop controlmeasures to orient his platoons asthey exit the pass. The dismountsshould move to a position that allowslong-range observation and wherethey can provide early warning of anenemy counterattack. The Bradleysoccupy support-by-fire positions withdesignated sectors of fire. The tankplatoon exits the pass to occupy asupport-by-fire position and is pre-pared to provide security for the restof the company/team as the infantrybegins to reorganize and consolidate.

The commander has to ensure that hecan defeat an enemy counterattackand support the continuation of thetask force attack while preparing tofollow on in support of the task force,as required (Fig. 4).

Tactics and Techniques

The defile drill requires a great dealof centralized planning and execution.The commander should determine hiscritical tasks and assign these to eachsubordinate element. Determine thecritical event, and assign this as theprimary task and purpose to the pla-toon that will be your main effort.Once this is decided, it is relativelyeasy to determine the primary taskand purpose for the other elements tosupport the main effort’s mission.

As a general rule of thumb, tanksshould initially provide overwatch toallow infantry to enter the defiles.They should also be prepared to as-sault an objective on the far side tosecure the defile or defeat an enemycounterattack. Infantry should alwaysbe considered as two distinct maneu-ver elements, one mounted, the otherdismounted. Dismounted infantry isbest while on the ground, clearing thedefile to allow unimpeded movementfor vehicles. Bradleys provide greaterfirepower and protection against smallarms and indirect fires in the defileand are better equipped to continuethe fight on the far side. They shouldbe used to support the dismounted


Figure 4. The defile is clear and the co/tm is postured to continue the mission.

Figure 3. Dismounted Infantry and BFVs work together to clear the defile.

troops, as required, and to provide thebasis for the initial support-by-fire po-sitions as the company/team exits thedefile. The company/team commanderwill have a command and controlnightmare if he does not plan the op-eration adequately and redundantly.This type of operation is best exe-cuted when centrally controlled. Thereare many systems moving and shoot-ing in a small area. Additionally, therewill probably be engineers withdemolitions or a Combat Engineer Ve-hicle that can further complicate theoperation. The fratricide risk is high,and only increases if the operation isnot controlled by one person. Assign-ing task and purpose goes a long waytowards clear understanding of com-mander’s intent. The commandershould receive briefbacks from subor-dinates upon completion of the opera-tions order to show they understandthe plan and their responsibilities. Heshould periodically check on the de-velopment of platoon orders to ensurehis intent is being met. Another effec-tive C2 tool is a set of complete anddetailed graphics that are drawn andissued as part of the order. Eachleader should enter every fight with aset of maneuver graphics, enemy situ-ation template, fire support overlay,and CSS graphics. These graphicsshould extend down to the Bradleycommander and dismounted squadleader level. A properly prepared setof graphics provides guidance and il-lustrates the commander’s plan betterthan words in an operations orderstanding alone (Fig. 5). The graphiccontrol measures will vary by opera-tion, but should include whatever willensure execution of the plan as in-tended. Ensure that support-by-fire

positions are established throughoutthe zone of attack. These may moveonce the position is occupied or ob-served. Subordinate units must under-stand that the intent is to put effectivesuppressive fire on the enemy. Subor-dinate leaders must understand theycan move to accomplish this, if re-quired. Phase lines are used to controlmovement and fires. Fratricide risksare decreased if the dismounts under-stand that they are to clear up to PLCarp and the FSO knows that artilleryfires cannot land short of PL Pike.

Dismount points designate where thedismounting infantry will get off thevehicles and start to lead the move-ment. This is developed using thesituation template and terrain analysis,and obviously does not prevent the in-fantry from dismounting sooner. Thecommander can also establish objec-tives and an axis of advance to orientand direct the infantry clearing opera-tion. He must also develop direct firecontrol measures that will allow himto lift, shift, distribute, and mass di-rect fires throughout the zone of at-tack.

No discussion on command and con-trol would be complete without talk-ing about communications. Every ele-ment must be able to talk to the other.The commander must ensure all sys-tems are operating either secure ornon-secure, but not a mixture of both.Every leader and RTO should havecomplete SOI information for the cur-rent and subsequent time periods. Thecompany/team is operating in a pass,and the topography may affect radiooperations. The commander must planfor redundant communications, themost common method being the use

of pyrotechnic signals. A colored staror parachute flare can signal that alane is established as easily as a radiotransmission. In fact, the pyro signalcan inform everyone of a specificevent if they know what the signalsmean. Colored smoke and VS-17 pan-els are other methods of communica-tion; you are limited only by what isavailable.

PCIs and Rehearsals

The importance of proper pre-com-bat inspections (PCIs) is illustratedover and over again at the NTC. It iscritical that leaders check soldiers andequipment. This sounds rational, andmost leaders would agree, but one ofthe first events to go out the windowduring a time crunch is the PCI. Thecommander must provide guidance forthe PCI by establishing what shouldbe inspected, who will inspect, andwhen inspections will be complete. Aprioritized, comprehensive list will as-sist the conduct of a PCI and stand-ardize what is checked for each mis-sion. PCI checks should include, butare not limited to, some of the follow-ing items:

•Dismounted breach kits (ensurekits are man-packable and includesmoke pots)

•Radio checks and SOI data•Boresights/zeros on all weapon

systems•Uniform common to all•Graphics and maps•Demolitions and engineer equip-

ment•Night observation devices•Vehicle tow hooks, pintles, pins,

tow bars, and cables

Rehearsals are based on the timeavailable. There is no substitute for arehearsal, especially if units are notused to working with each other(newly attached engineers, for exam-ple). Focus the rehearsal on keyevents and tasks, consider the enemy’scourse of action, and incorporate com-bat multipliers that are available toyou. The commander will have to de-termine what type of rehearsal he willbe able to conduct, but he should usean actions and orders format. This for-mat develops the situation and enablesleaders to issue their orders based onthat development. Rehearse the criti-


Figure 5. Graphics illustrate the plan and aid understanding during all phases ofthe operation.

cal event, even if that is all you havetime for. It is detrimental to missionsuccess to have the movement to theL/D well rehearsed but not the actionson the objective. Never assume thatthe enemy will do what you haveplanned, and rehearse contingencies toincrease your flexibility to respond toa new development. Leaders at theplatoon level should rehearse “full-up” as much as possible to discoverproblems early on. Commanders canfacilitate this by setting out a priorityof work in the warning order that fo-cuses the dismounts in the proper di-rection. Dismounted infantrycan practice movement tech-niques, actions on contact, andbreach drills. FM 7-7J hasseveral battle drills that areapplicable to actions that pla-toons can expect to execute ina defile. Dismounted leadersensure each soldier rehearsesdismounting with requiredequipment and weapons.Bradleys rehearse, as a mini-mum, dismounted/mounted in-tegration (for example, dis-mounts calling forward vehi-cles and orienting them to a specifictarget), direct fire control, actions insupport-by-fire positions, and actionson contact.

Logistic Considerations

There are some unique considera-tions when planning to support a de-file-clearing operation that may re-quire additional assets from higherheadquarters. Identify these early, andsubmit requests so the affected agen-cies can respond in time. A chief con-cern in a defile is medical evacuationof wounded soldiers, a problem com-pounded by inaccessibility and thefact that traffic is one-way until thetask force has cleared the restrictedterrain. Logistics planners have to de-velop an evacuation plan. A goodtechnique is to request additional am-bulance support from the task forceand establish a casualty collectionpoint (CCP) as close to the mouth ofthe pass as possible, while still allow-ing vehicular movement to the rear.Provide lead elements with medicsand litters, establish litter teams, andevacuate casualties that require imme-diate evacuation back to the CCP.Combat lifesavers must be trained and

equipped with their bags to provideimmediate attention, and the medicsshould stay forward as long as possi-ble to sustain medical support. If pos-sible, organize litter teams fromsources other than dismounted infan-try or vehicle crewmen.

Recovery is another concern basedon trafficability. You don’t really wantto recover for maintenance reasons,but you do want to be able to pull avehicle blocking the lane out of theway. It is not feasible to bring an M-88 up to recover a disabled or dam-aged vehicle, so you have to plan for

like-vehicle recovery. Ensure that eachvehicle has toe pintles and hooksmounted prior to the operation andhas tow cables readily accessible.Crews have to be proficient in hook-ing vehicles up and quickly pullingthem out of the way. These vehicles,once out of the way, can later be re-covered by maintenance assets. Theyalso make a good covered position toplace less critically wounded person-nel awaited evacuation. Plan as wellfor emergency resupply of both ClassIII and V. The dismounts may requireresupply while in the pass, while theBradleys probably won’t need it untilthey are through the pass. Dependingon the time it takes to clear the pass,tanks will probably only require fuel.

Small arms resupply should be con-figured for use, not given to dis-mounts while still in the shippingcrates. Plan to cross-level ammunitionas soon as possible to continue themission on the far side of the pass.This will sustain your operation if thefuel and cargo HEMTTs are bumpedby combat vehicles coming throughthe pass.

Bradleys will require an HE-ITheavy mix of 25mm Class V whenconducting defile clearing operations.Dismounted infantry will need addi-

tional hand grenades, M203 rounds,and plenty of SAW/M60 ammunition.One way to resupply infantry forwardis to use empty litters to transportClass V. Two men bearing a litter cancarry more ammo than two men withtheir hands and this gets two neededassets forward, the Class V and thelitter.

Conclusion

Understanding the terrain and enemysituation and applying the fundamen-

tals of defile clearing will go along way towards ensuringyour unit doesn’t end up likeSSG Hughes’s. This mission,like any other, requires focusedplanning and detailed prepara-tion. Company/team command-ers must ensure they enter a de-file with a well-thought-outplan, supported by graphic con-trol measures. The integrationbetween infantry and infantryfighting vehicles is not some-thing that can be achieved theday prior to leaving the L/D.

Commanders must fully develop thiscritical cohesion as soon as possible.The proper employment of the correcttactics, techniques, and proceduresduring planning, preparation, and exe-cution will maximize your ability todefeat the enemy while protectingyour men and equipment. They arethe keys to mission accomplishment.


Captain John W. Miller III re-cently served as a live-firemechanized infantry companyteam observer/controller at theNational Training Center. Hepreviously commanded com-panies in 3d Battalion, 7th In-fantry, 24th Infantry Division(M), including a tour duringOperations DESERT SHIELDand DESERT STORM. Hisfirst assignment was with 2dBattalion, 30th Infantry, 3d In-fantry Division (M) in Ger-many. He is a 1984 graduateof Old Dominion University. Heis currently a small group in-structor for the Armor OfficerAdvanced Course.

The integration between infantry andinfantry fighting vehicles is not some-thing that can be achieved the day priorto leaving the L/D. Commanders mustfully develop this critical cohesion assoon as possible.

Since Operation DESERT STORM,the subject of fratricide has been dis-cussed nearly constantly. Much ofthe discussion has centered on rec-ommended technological solutions tothe problem.

The generally accepted view is thatthe majority of the fratricide inci-dents during DESERT STORM re-sulted from a disparity between therange of modern weapons systemsand the resolution of our optical andthermal sighting technology. The im-plication is that most of the tank-in-itiated fratricide during DESERTSTORM occurred because tank com-manders and gunners engaged targetswhich they were unable to positivelyidentify as enemy. My own experi-ence, however, leads me to believethat at least some of the tank-initi-ated fratricide during that war oc-curred at ranges close enough to al-low positive identification of vehicleby type. I feel that at least some frat-ricide incidents were the result of ourown tank gunnery training methodol-ogy. If we want to reduce the inci-dence of fratricide in future conflicts,we must improve the way we con-duct tank gunnery training. Specifi-cally, we need to include friendly tar-get arrays in the intermediate tankgunnery tables.

The Nature of the Problem

It is a cliché to describe the opera-tion of a fully-trained tank crew as a

“well-oiled machine.” The cliché isuseful, however, for understandingthe need to change our gunnery ta-bles. The correct method for firingthe tank is set forth in our gunnerymanuals, and has been developedinto a standard drill. The “well-oiledmachine” is the tank crew that,through use of drill, has reached thelevel at which engaging a target is anearly reflexive process. Throughrepetition and incentives, crew mem-bers develop conditioned responses,such as reaction to a fire command.This level of conditioning is seen asprotection against the fear and confu-sion of combat.

FM 17-12-1-1, 19 March 1993,Tank Gunnery (Abrams) Volume 1,describes accepted principles of tar-get acquisition and correct tech-niques for initiating direct fire at thetank crew level. Chapter 6 describesthe six steps of the target acquisitionprocess: crew search, detection, loca-tion, identification, classification,and confirmation. Identification isdefined as “the friendly, hostile, orneutral character of a detected poten-tial target determined by its physicaltraits (such as size, shape, functionalcharacteristics).”1 Crews rely upontheir ability to recognize armoredfighting vehicles and aircraft in orderto identify the specific type of target,or at least to “identify friend, foe, orneutral.”2

The ability of a crew member toperform this step properly depends

upon his individual armored fightingvehicle and aircraft recognitionskills. This step is conducted prior tothe conduct of fire; that is, before theinitial fire command is given.

The final step of the target acquisi-tion process is target confirmation.This step is conducted during theconduct of fire, or after the initialelements of the fire command but be-fore the command of execution. It isdefined as “the rapid verification ofthe initial identification and classifi-cation of the target,” and it is con-ducted by both the TC and the gun-ner.3

The complete target acquisition andengagement process for a precisionmain gun engagement usually fol-lows this pattern: search, detection,location, identification, classification,initiation of the fire command (alert,ammunition, description), confirma-tion, command of execution. Thisprocess includes two steps — identi-fication and confirmation — whichshould prevent engagement of friendlyvehicles or troops.

Effective tank gunnery training isdesigned to translate this process, in-cluding these two critical steps, intothe series of conditioned responsesdescribed above.

Our tank gunnery manuals andArmy regulations ensure a minimumstandard for tank crew proficiencythroughout the armor force. Theyalso have the effect of establishing


It’s Time to Include Friendly Target Panels in Tank Tables VII and VIII

Training Target Confirmationby Captain Robert S. Langol

performance during tank gunnery asthe common yardstick by which tankcrews and units are measured andcompared. For example, no sanemember of the armor force shouldsuggest that as much emphasis isplaced on UCOFT as on Tank TableVIII.

Although there is often institutionalpressure to reach a certain reticle aimlevel, few battalion or brigade com-manders have the time to watch eachof their crews every time they fire aUCOFT exercise. The point is that,since the live fire training is per-formed under great scrutiny, any les-sons learned on the range are likelyto have a greater impact on the crewthan those learned elsewhere.

Currently, our intermediate tankgunnery tables do not contain friendly

target arrays. Our crews learn ar-mored fighting vehicle identification(AFVID) in garrison and are testedon it during the Tank Crew GunnerySkills Test (TCGST). Tank com-manders and gunners also train theentire acquisition and engagementprocess in the UCOFT. However,these training events don’t carry thesame weight as live fire training. Aswe don’t present friendly target ar-rays on individual tank crew ranges,we don’t force crews to practice tar-get confirmation. Furthermore, scor-ing is based on a combination oftime and target hits (with adjust-ments for safety, proper procedures,etc). In short, during the culminatingevent of all tank gunnery training,when the pressure is really on, weteach tankers to shoot the first bighot spot down range.

Recommended Solution

We fight as we train. It is unreason-able to expect a tank commander orgunner in combat to remember totake an extra second to confirm histarget if his training never before re-quired him to do so. If we want ourtank crews to perform target confir-mation, we should test whether ornot they do so during the intermedi-ate tank gunnery tables.

I propose that friendly target arraysbe presented during Tank Tables VIIand VIII. I believe that friendly pan-els should be raised in addition tothe enemy target panels during theexisting tasks. Including a friendlyvehicle panel as a separate task (as isdone in UCOFT exercises) would al-low crews to stop confirming targets


after completing the “friendly task,”and would be rendered useless if adistinct scenario cue were read.However, if friendly vehicle panelswere presented at the same time asthe enemy on all orsome of the engage-ments, then the tankcommander and gun-ner would have toconfirm each targetbefore firing. Engage-ment of a friendlypane l would be acrew duty failure, re-su l t ing in a thi r typoint crew cut.4

Creation of friendlypanels would be arelatively simple task.Panels would nothave to be perfectreplicas of friendly vehicles. It wouldsuffice to have panels with distinctlydifferent shapes and thermal signa-tures then those being used as enemytarge ts . The cost of procuringfriendly (or enemy) panels suffi-ciently detailed for target identifica-tion training would probably be costprohibitive. Remember, the TCGSTcertifies a crew member’s AFVIDskills, and passing the TCGST is aprerequisite for participating in live-fire training. Tank commanders andgunners with weak AFVID skillsshould never be allowed to fire liverounds. The purpose of addingfriendly panels is to reinforce targetconfirmation as an essential elementof the acquisition and engagementprocess.

Friendly panels for ranges equippedwith New Standard Targets could bedesigned as shown in Figure 1.5 TheM1A1 panel is taller and wider thanthe T72, and displays a larger, angu-lar turret. It would require the devel-

opment of a new thermal panel forthe turret, unless two TU-2 panelscould be overlapped. The M2/M3panel uses the M5 BTR panel, butdisplays the turret off-set to the right.

Ranges equipped with older targetpanels could also present panels toreplicate friendly vehicles. If, for in-stance, enemy vehicles were repre-sented by rectangular panels, thenfriendly vehicles could be octagonalpanels (see Figure 2). The exactshape used for friendly and enemypanels is irrelevant. As long asfriendly panels can be distinguishedfrom enemy, tank commanders andgunners presented with both will beforced to perform target confirma-tion.

Conclusion

As armor leaders, we must be cer-tain we are not taking the easy wayout by accepting technology as thesolution to the fratricide problem.The world may not wait for us to de-velop and field such a system beforeour tanks once again board fastships. Furthermore, no new system is

perfect, and even an electrical firinginhibitor can be overridden. By em-phasizing the importance of targetconfirmation during tank gunneryqualification, we can significantly

decrease the risk offratricide in futureconflicts.

Notes

1FM 17-12-1-1, TankGunnery (Abrams) Volume1, 19 March 1993, p. 6-1.

2FM 17-12-1-1, p. 6-22.

3FM 17-12-1-1, p. 6-25.

4Crew duties penaltypoints are listed in FM 17-12-1-2, Tank Gunnery

(Abrams) Volume II. 19 March 1993, pp. 16-13and 16-14.

5New Standard Targets are depicted in FM17-12-7, Tank Combat Training Devices, 11March 1992, pp. 3-4 through 3-23.


Captain Bob Langol wascommissioned through Du-quesne University Army ROTCin 1989. He served as a tankplatoon leader and tank com-pany XO in 2-66 Armor, 2AD(FWD), and as mortar platoonleader in 1-70 (CATF), 194thSAB. A graduate of the ArmorOfficer Basic and AdvancedCourses, he is currently as-signed to A Troop, 3/16 Cav-alry, Ft. Knox, Ky.

The staff ride hasbeen used for manyyears as a teachingvehicle within theArmy’s professionalmilitary school sys-tem. Some readersmay have partici-pated in a staff ridewhile attending abranch school ad-vanced course or atCommand and StaffCollege and know that a well-exe-cuted staff ride requires a good dealof individual study, preparation, andlogistical support, all of which areavailable within the Army school sys-tem. Outside the “schoolhouse,” theoverhead required to conduct a goodstaff ride may appear too extensiveand time-consuming to commandersof units with ongoing operational ortraining missions. But the “school-house” need not be the only place forthe staff ride. It can be tailored tomeet the needs of leaders in compa-nies, battalions, and brigades in thefield as an integral part of a unit’s Of-f icer Professional Development(OPD) Program. The purpose of thisarticle is to show how one battal-ion/task force (Task Force 4-64 Ar-mor (TF TUSKER)) used the staffride concept to enhance its OPD pro-gram and generate participant interestin using military history as a profes-sional development aid.

During the planning for BRIGHTSTAR ’94, a biannual combined exer-cise with the Egyptian Army, leadersof the 4th Battalion, 64th Armor Regi-ment recognized that the force-on-force maneuver area was located nearEl Alamein, site of the decisive battleof World War II’s North AfricanTheater of Operations during the fallof 1942. What a great opportunity fora tank battalion/task force to be ableto stand on the ground where mobilearmored warfare was practiced to per-

fection by Rommel, Montgomery,Bayerlein, and others! In consideringhow to take advantage of this oppor-tunity, we selected the staff ride toglean lessons of desert warfare thatmight apply to our own training mis-sion in BRIGHT STAR ’94. Further,to narrow the scope of a staff ride to amanageable and meaningful exercisefor the junior officers of a battalion-size unit, we settled on the Battle ofAlam Halfa Ridge, one of the seriesof preliminary actions that set theconditions for the decisive El Alameincampaign. Rather than focusing onstrategic and operational issues, AlamHalfa would allow us to study tacti-cal-level operations on the sameground we would have to “fight” onin our own training exercise. Wewould be able to examine operationsbelow the division level, where wecould readily grasp the lessons learnedby soldiers like ourselves who foughtthere over 50 years ago.

Our primary reference for planningand conducting the staff ride, and inwriting much of this article, was theU.S. Army Center for Military His-tory’s brochure, “The Staff Ride,” byDr. William G. Robertson. This book-let outlines the fundamentals of plan-ning, preparation, and execution of astaff ride, and is required reading forany unit or class planning one.

To better understand how TF TUS-KER conducted its staff ride, we willbegin with some background and abrief discussion of the battle. Then,

we will define thestaff ride, discussour objectives, theimportance of thesite/battle selection,why we choseAlam Halfa, andhow we conductedthe three principalphases of the staffride.

BackgroundIn March 1941, after the Germans

intervened in North Africa to preventan Italian defeat by British forces,German and Italian forces under thecommand of Field Marshal ErwinRommel began a protracted and suc-cessful campaign against the BritishEighth Army. With wide flanking ma-neuvers and surprising counterattacks,Rommel pushed the Eighth Army to adefensive line at El Alamein by June1942. At El Alamein, he was only 60miles from his objective, the port ofAlexandria. From there, Rommelplanned to drive to the heart of theMiddle East — the Nile Valley,Cairo, and the Suez Canal.

Axis forces tested the Alamein linefrom June to August 1942 with littlesuccess . Bri t ish defenses grewstronger with each passing day whileboth Churchill and Hitler urged theircommanders to attack. It was duringthis period that Churchill placed Ber-nard Law Montgomery in commandof the Eighth Army. Shortly after as-suming command, Montgomery andthe Eighth Army fought the battlesome historians call the “beginning ofthe end” for Rommel in Africa.

The Battle of Alam Halfa

By August 1942, Montgomery’sEighth Army occupied a defensiveline from the small trading post of ElAlamein on the Mediterranean Sea

The Task Force Staff Ride:Enhancing Professional Developmentat the Battalion Levelby Lieutenant Colonel Guy C. Swan III and Captain Neal D. Norman


TF 4-64 Armor, gathered for a staff ride at Alam Halfa Ridge in Egypt.


•

The Battle of~~ " , .. Alam Halfai

[Q] ROMMEL

\ xxx

\I,~ I AFR'"A

\ \ "I

"\ \\ '\

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south some 60 km to the impassable Qattara Depression, which is just south of the area shown on the map above. Rommel. outnumbered in tanks and infantry, planned to concentrate his forces and penetrate the British defenses in the south (as he had done several times earlier that summer) during hours of darkness on 30 August. The Afrika Corps (OAK) would then rapidly exploit the penetration and move east 40 km into the Eighth Army's rear. At dawn, German forces would drive north to envelop the surprised defenders, enabling them to be defeated in detail.

Montgomery expected an attack in the south and put most of his armor behind the forward defensive positions on or near the Alam HaIfa ridge. His units in the south were to delay the advancing Germans while the Royal Air Force (RAF) attacked the panzer columns. Montgomery anticipated that Rommel would be forced to tum north prematurely toward Alam Haifa, where the 22nd (Br) Armored Brigade (under the command of Colonel G.P.B. "Pip" Roberts) and the

38

AI edite.lTllllellll

44th Infantry Oivision had prepared strong defenses.

The attack began as scheduled at around 2400 hours on 30 August 1942. Rommel's plan went awry early, as his lead units experienced difficulty negotiating complex obstacles previously reported as lightly defended and easily breached. Units spent most of the night in the obstacles and minefields. severely disrupting Rommel's meticulously planned time schedule. Bogged down by the obstacle belt and soft terrain, and hit hard by the RAF, the OAK had moved east only 15 km by daybreak, instead of the anticipated 40 km. To make matters worse for Rommel, the 21st Panzer Division commander was killed and the OAK commander was seriously wounded in the night's fighting. At approximately 1200 hours on 31 August, Rommel considered calling off the attack. Surprise was lost, the fuel situation was critical, and casualties were quickly mounting. However, instead of calling off the attack, Rommel changed the OAK objective to the Alam Haifa ridge.

The British 22nd Armored Brigade was defending on the southwest end of the ridge, oriented south. The two panzer divisions of the OAK moved northeast and attacked. The numerically inferior but better equipped OAK began to take its toll on the British, though the 22nd Brigade held them off with the skillful commitment of its reserve and by repositioning armor on its vulnerable left flank. When darkness fell, the panzers were still south of the ridge and easily detected by the RAF night bombers.

By morning on 1 September, only an understrength division of the OAK could make any offensive effort. The 22nd Brigade's dug-in forces held them off the ridge while the RAF continued to pound them from the air. This, compounded by the Germans' shortage of fuel, kept them from making a serious effort to take the ridge, and Rommel broke off the attack, ordering his forces to withdraw. The German High Command had assured Rommel that fuel would be available to his forces during the battle, but the fuel never made it to the front. Rom-


Above, LTC Swan and several olher members of his unit visit the EI A1amein Military Museum, where lhey met LTC EI Khoney, ttIe museum curator. Above right , the graceful arches atlhe entrance to Ihe war cemetery near the battle site. At right, Swan and CPT Norman prepare to brief other unit members at one of the instructional points 00 A1am Haifa Ridge.

mel conducted a phased retrograde while receiving only limited anacks from Allied ground forces. Montgomery attacked the retrealing Gennans. mainly with artillery and air. while conserving his ground forces for a later offensive.

The Staff Ride

Although the conduct of the staff ride has evol ved since its inception in the mid-nineteenth century. the con· cept has remained basically the same - to place students on termin. con· front them with a situation. and stimu· late them to reach conclusions from the historical perspective. This methodology differs significantly from two other teaching vehicles. the tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) and the hi storical battlefield tour.

A staff ride uses the historical scenario as the principal teaching tool. Set on the specific terrain on which that scenario took place. a staff ride also involves a significant degree of preparatory study to full y draw out the lessons learned from an historical action. A TEWT. on the other hand. uses termi n as its focus. combining doctrine and a hypothetical scenario to develop its lessons. Whi le also fo-

cused on termin. historical baulefield tours do not usually involve system· alic study and preparation. These vis· its will often stimulate thoughtful dis-cussion. but the objectives of such a tour are much simpler than for either a staff ride or TEWT.

A staff ride consists of the system· atic preliminary study of a selected campaign or battle. followed by an extensive visit to the actual battlefield. It concludes with an opportunity to integrate the lessons derived from the home-study and on-the-ground experi· ences. It envisions maximum student involvement before visiting the battlefield to guarantee thoughtful analysis and discussion at the site. as well as during the later integration phase.

The staff ride can be easily tai lored to focus on the training objectives set by the command. It is a versatile process that allows the participants to orchestrate the event to account for limited available study lime or other competing training requirements. For example. our objectives for the Alam Haifa staff ride were:

• To take advantage of a unique opportunity 10 visit the site of one of the most crucial mechanized battles fought in the North Africa theater of operations during World War II.


• To better understand the human dimension of desert warfare operations.

• To review the lessons of WWTI desert operations and compare with current U.S. Anny doctrine and lessons learned al the NTC and during DESERT STORM.

• To show the effects of termin on plans and their execution.

• To provide a case srudy in how logistics operations affect tactical operations.

• To encourage the officers of TF TUSKER to study their profession through the use of military history.

Selecting a Battle

Since each battlefield or campaign offers its own lessons. there are sev· eral fac tors involved in selecting the staff ride bailie. These are additional reasons we chose Alam Haifa:

• Access. TF TUSKER's deployment to Egypi gave us access to a bal· tlefield with historical significance.

• Echelon of Command. The echelon of command we studied (brigade and division) corresponded favorably with the experience level of the task force officers. This is an important factor to keep in mind. Select

39

a battle, or aspects of a battle, that are appropriate for the target audience.

• Type of Terrain. Select battles that occurred on the type of ground on which your unit may be called to fight. The Egyptian desert supported our objectives nicely as our unit is focused on the Southwest Asia AOR.

• Type of Unit. Most battlefields can support the training objectives of any type of unit combat, combat support, or combat services support. Our focus was on mechanized operations, but we also learned significant lessons in each of the battlefield operating systems.

• Integrity of Historical Setting. Battlefields range from totally undisturbed and well-preserved to nearly obliterated by urbanization or other factors. The Egyptian desert offered us the chance to see a relatively unchanged battlefield. Though time and weather had covered the holes, old fighting positions and trench lines were clearly visible. Memorabilia like rusty disintegrating fuel cans and even half of a British helmet found by a soldier added to the excitement of the staff ride! We were, however, slightly limited in our exploration of the battlefield because we could not enter certain areas. As many as a half mil-

lion mines laid on the Alamein defensive line were never cleared.

• Source Availability. Staff rides require some research and reading by all participants. This is necessary even in a unit-run staff ride so that instructors, students, and role players can adequately prepare for the field study phase. Sources can include history books, biographies, journals, documentary videos or films, newspaper articles (microfiche) or interviews, and should address not only the chronology of the battle, but contemporary doctrine and equipment. With assistance of the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth and the British Armor School at Bovington, our project officer found adequate material on Alam Haifa to help us prepare at Fort Stewart. We also distributed photographs, diagrams, and characteristics of the armored vehicles used in the battle to provide additional context and frames of reference.

Preliminary Study Phase

Preliminary study at home station prepares the participants for the field study phase. Otherwise, the staff ride becomes little more than a battlefield

Lieutenant Colonel Guy C. Swan III was commissioned in Armor upon graduation from the U.S. Military Academy in 1976. He served as a tank platoon leader in 1 st Bn, 72d Armor, 21D in Korea; as a cav platoon leader, troop XO, and adjutant for 3d Sqdn, 3d ACR; as commander A Co, 2d Bn, 77th Armor, and as aide-de-camp to the CG, 9th ID (Motorized) at Ft. Lewis, Wash.; and as an Armor Branch assignment officer at MILPERCEN. His more recent aSSignments include chief, G3 Plans, lAD, Ansbach, Germany, and lAD deputy G3 in Southwest Asia during DESERT STORM; XO, 1st Sqdn, 11th ACR, Fulda, Germany; and regimental XO, 11 th ACR. He is currently the commander of 4th Bn, 64th Armor, 24th ID (M) in Ft. Stewart, Ga. He is a graduate of AOBC, IOAC, Ranger School, CGSC, AOAC, Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course, the Air and Staff College, and the Defense Strategy Course. He holds a Master of Arts degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown University and a Master of Military Art and Science degree from the School of Advanced Military Studies.

Captain Neal Douglas Norman was commissioned as a Distinguished Military Graduate from George Mason University in 1987. After completing the Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course, he was assigned as a detachment commander, USASSD, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md. He served as electronic warfare platoon leader and company XO with Co C, 102d MI Battalion, and then as battalion assistant S3. After completing the Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course, he served a~ 1st Bde assistant S2 until assuming his current position as battalion S2 for 4th Bn, 64th Armor.

tour if the participants are not prepared. And in the case of TF TUSKER, that battlefield tour would have degenerated into a useless walk in the desert. We used a combination of selected readings, group lectures, and OPD-type seminars beginning eight weeks prior to our deployment. The battalion commander designated four company commanders as principal role players for Rommel, Montgomery, Roberts, and Colonel Fritz Bayerlein, Chief of Staff of the DAK who commanded the DAK during the battle. During this phase the battalion commander facilitated discussion on topics concentrating on:

• Order of Battle. Unit sizes, designations, armament, previous experience, qualitative advantages/disadvantages.

• Main weapon characteristics. • Biographical background of key

leaders (role players). • Doctrine and tactics of opposing

forces. • Terrain analysis of the area of op

erations. • Weather and light data for the

campaign. • Chronology of the campaign

events leading up to the battle of Alam Haifa.

• Opposing commanders' intents, objectives, and goals of the opposing forces, and end state sought by both sides.

• Role and influence of allies. • Service support considerations

and logistics.

A variety of audio-visual training aids can make the field study phase of the staff ride more interesting, adding a sense of realism. Period maps, photographs, drawings, newspaper headlines/articles, tape recordings, and terrain boards help to augment the readings assigned in the preliminary study phase.

TF TUSKER was to operate in the same area during BRIGHT STAR, so we had our own exercise map sheets as visual aids for the Alam Haifa battlefield. And while history books also provide a good source of maps or sketches, "GI-issue" military maps, overlayed with operational graphics. unit locations, and other designations significantly enhance the picture for the participants. Our project officer went so far as to convert the historical maps of Rommel's and Roberts' battle plans to acetate overlays. When placed over the exercise maps, the time-space aspects of the battle of

40 ARMOR - November-December 1994

Alam Haifa became instantly real to all participants.

Field Study Phase

After arriving in Egypt, TF TUSKER divided the field study phase into six segment.,.

• At Stand I, on the hill where the 22nd Brigade actually defended, "Colonel Roberts" and "General Montgomery" led a discussion of the British tactical scheme. The stand was reconnoitered in advance by the battalion scout platoon and the 22nd's subunit battle positions staked out.

• The German attack plan was briefed by "Field Marshal Rommel" and "Colonel Bayerlein" at Stand 2, in the vicinity of the DAK penetration of the Alamein defensive line.

• Travelling in HMMWVs over the DAK attack route to Deir el Ragil (where the Afrika Korps turned north toward Alam Haifa) gave participants appreciation for the difficult trafficability facing the German advance.

• A follow-up discussion by role players on the situation half-way through the battle from British and German perspectives took place at Stand 3, near the 22nd Brigade's battle position.

• Another HMMWV ride over the DAK attack route to the position south of the ridge took us to the point where the German advance was stopped.

• A final group discussion of lessons learned, conducted from Stand 4 at a vantage point atop Alam Haifa Ridge, concluded the field study phase of the staff ride.

At each opportunity, the role players discussed the battle from their perspective and read selected passages from memoirs and unit journals to further illustrate the commanders' plans and concerns on the battlefield.

During this phase, task force officers specifically addressed the chronology of the battle, as well as the role of fire support (artillery and air), obstacles and barriers, defensive theory versus the offense, the role of intelligence and reconnaissance, and the effects of morale and human factors on the opposing forces.

Integration Phase

Integration allows all participants to review the experience together. We

had our final staff ride session after returning to Fort Stewart. At this point, we concentrated on tactical-operational-strategic linkages, lessons learned from both forces by BOS, and the conduct of combined arms operations in a desert environment. We also took the opportunity at this session to solicit comments from the participants on the actual conduct of the staff ride and suggestions for future staff rides.

The Battle of Alam HaIfa staff ride was a great learning and team-building event, and we had fun in the process. Each officer in the group had positive comments and expressed appreciation for the lessons learned. We kept our slice elements involved from the beginning and their participation helped solidify our unit relationships.

Our goal was not to create a group of military historians, but to learn from history and apply the lessons to our profession.

The next TF TUSKER staff ride is now in the early planning stages and because our experience in Egypt was so successful, several officers have already volunteered to assist in the planning and execution of our next staff ride. Drawing upon the historical battle experiences of others is crucial in the development of professional soldiers, particularly for those with little or no combat experience. The staff ride offers a unique, rewarding, and fun way to apply military history to a unit Officer Professional Development Program.

Office, Mounted BaHlespace Integration (OMBI)

Effective immediately the Office of the Chief of Armor (OCOA) is subsumed within the Office, Mounted Battlespace Integration (OMBI). This change is designed to better fulfill CG TRADOC intent for the United States Army Armor Center (USAARMC) to be the doctrine, training, leadership, organization, materiel, and soldier integrator for mounted warfare and mounted battlespace.

OMBI is responsible for several functions. Foremost, it serves as the primary point of contact and prinCipal entry point into USAARMC for coordination of mounted issues that cut across proponent or functional lines. However, agencies external to Fort Knox are still encouraged to coordinate directly with Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD), Mounted Warfighting Battlespace Lab (MWBL), TRADOC System Manager-Abrams/Armored Gun System (TSMABRAMSlAGS), and the Armor School on issues within their specific areas of responsibility .

OMBI contains the USAARMC Battle Lab Support Element (BLSE) within the Mounted Battlespace Initiatives Division to coordinate support to other TRADOC battle labs, the Armor Proponency Division continues fulfilling AR 600-3 and AR 5-22 responsibilities, and the ARMOR Magazine.

COL Gary Krueger is Chief, Office of Mounted Battlespace Integration (OMBI). File symbol remains ATZK-AR. DSN 464-7809/1961/5155.

In conjunction with the organization of this new office, USAARMC has activated a Mounted Battlespace Integration Bulletin Board. This BBS has been set up as a computer assisted information tool to support the Mounted Force as it moves into the 21st Century. It has been established by the Chief of Armor to provide a central automated information collection and dissemination point for people throughout the Mounted Force. Users of this board will be able to:

• Download professional files such as: - The Armor Enlisted Professional Development Guide - The Excellence in Armor Guide - The Officer Professional Development Guide

• Download information papers that the Chief of Armor publishes . • Interact with others through information forums (message bases).

To access the office of Mounted Battlespace Integration BBS: • Set your modem to 8-N-1. • Dial commercial 1-502-624-3305 or DSN 464-3305.

ARMOR - November-December 1994 41

During the month of September1993, the Kuwaiti 8th Tank Battalion,35th ‘Al Shaheed’ Brigade, andAmerican Task Force 2-37, 3d Bri-gade, 3d Infantry Division, conductedjoint training maneuvers during Exer-cise INTRINSIC ACTION 3-93. Partof INTRINSIC ACTION was fourdays of ‘force-on-force’ where Ameri-can M1A1/Bradley company teams at-tacked Kuwaiti company teamsequipped with Yugoslavian M84 tanks(a T-72 variant) and BMP-2s in thedefense. In order to make the exerciseas realistic as possible, we installedMILES gear on both the Americanand Kuwaiti armored vehicles.

The task of adapting U.S. MILESbelts to Soviet bloc armored vehiclesfell to the Special Forces teams work-ing with the Kuwaiti 8th Tank Battal-ion. Along with SSG Lenny Miles andMr. Rick Harmon, MILES TrainingDirector, Europe, we spent many longhours tracing the wiring systems inthe M84 and the BMP-2, and redes-igned the MILES belts so that theywould work on these two vehicles.We came up with a method to operatethe M84 and the BMP-2 with MILES.In the course of our investigation, wealso discovered a much more stableinstallation for the MILES tank trans-mitter that can be adapted to the U.S.M1- or M60-series tanks.

The current method of installing theMILES transmitter in American tanksis a multi-part system that mounts thelaser transmitter in the breech assem-bly. This mounting allows the systemto vibrate, and it will lose its zero af-ter even a short movement by thetank. Currently, tankers wedge piecesof cardboard in and around the mountin order to hold it securely in thebreech.

Instead, we mounted the transmitterson “aft caps,” the stub bases of maingun cartridges that are left after firinga round. We used a 125-mm aft capfor the M84, and a 120-mm aft capfor the M1A1.

In developing a mount to install themain gun/coax laser transmitter intothe breech of the 125-mm main gunused by the M84, we were using theM60A1/A3 MILES system. The trans-mitter and retainer assembly wouldnot fit into the breech, so we took a125-mm aft cap and modified it tomount the main gun/coax laser trans-mitter inside.

We drilled the base of the aft caparound the primer to 5-5⁄16“ in order tosecure the laser transmitter inside. Wedrilled and tapped holes into the cas-ing to firmly secure the transmitter.Finally, we made a 2" x 1⁄2” weld atthe bottom rear of the aft cap. Withthis system installed, the breech iseasily closed by hand, resting on theweld at the bottom. This holds thetransmitter solidly in the breech as-sembly.

We installed the Hoffman device onthe barrel of the main gun, and se-cured the Atwess light on the left

front of the turret using existing at-tachment points.

The detector belt fits the turret thesame way it does on an Americantank. We glued Velcro tape around theturret and adjusted the belts to fit.

The BMP-2 presented a completelydifferent problem: the electrical powercircuit for the BMP-2 is different thanthe Bradley and it was only after con-siderable research and testing that wewere able to install the BradleyMILES on the BMP-2.

To accommodate the laser transmit-ter designed for the 25-mm Bradleymain gun in the BMP2’s larger 30-mm main gun, we removed the smallsecuring blocks on the laser transmit-ter and the Atwess light and wrappedpieces of rubber inner tube around thetransmitter to secure it in the largerbarrel.

The detector belts fit the BMP-2 asthey do on the Bradley, with the TOW

MILES Warfare with the Yugoslavian M84Tank and the Russian BMP-2by Staff Sergeant (P) Earl Barner and Chief Warrant Officer Two Bryan Jay Hinkel


Prior to the Gulf War, Kuwait purchased a fleet of Yugoslavian M-84s, a variant of the T-72.They were adapted to use the MILES system for greater realism in a recent exercise in Ku-wait with TF 2-37, 3d Brigade, 3d ID.

belt going across the top of the turretand in front of the TC/gunner hatch.

Power for the MILES transmittercame from the BMP-2 turret powerfuse box in the back of the turret com-partment. The 50 amp fuse was theonly one that would not blow whenwe hooked up the MILES gear.

For easy access and less wiring, weused the BMP-2’s coax trigger powerto fire the main gun MILES transmit-ter. Since the voltage from the coaxtrigger on the BMP-2 was 24.32 volts(2 amps), and the voltage from theBradley computer to fire the maingun/coax transmitter is only 9 volts (2amps), we reduced the voltage by us-ing 5 watt 120 ohm resisters in a se-ries circuit.

Because of time restraints, we didnot hook up the missile system for theBMP-2. Given more time, we are surethat it can be done (for INTRINSICACTION, the observer/controllersused their controller guns to determineATGM hits).

With the proper equipment and moretesting, the Bradley MILES systemwill adapt and work on the BMP-2 us-ing all weapons systems and the inter-com to fight or defend in a tacticalbattle using the MILES system. Thesystem we have developed will enablethe BMP-2 to engage targets withMILES using its 30-mm main gunand register hits.

For INTRINSIC ACTION 1-94, theSpecial Forces team working with theKuwaiti 15th Brigade will use our de-sign for the M84 MILES to equip thatunit with MILES. We have also sub-mitted the complete design for theM84/T72, the M1A1, and the BMP-2to the Army suggestion program in or-der to improve the MILES hardwarecurrently being used.

Comments, suggestions, and requestsfor the complete write-up on how tomount the MILES gear in these vehi-cles is available by writing my de-tachment at:

Commander SFODA 576A Co, 3d Bn, 5th SFG(A)ATTN: SSG Earl Barner [MILES Gear]Fort Campbell, KY 42223-5000

Our final product was a MILES sys-tem that worked with the Kuwaiti ar-mored vehicles and enabled them toconduct realistic training with TF 2-37during INTRINSIC ACTION 3-93.The Kuwaitis loved the MILES gearand truly enjoyed the chance to pit

themselves against the AmericanM1A1. Without the MILES, I am surethat the Kuwaitis would have neverapproached this joint training with themotivation and enthusiasm they had.


SSG(P) Earl Barner is aSpecial Forces Engineer as-signed to ODA 576, A Co, 3dBn, 5th Special Forces Group(Airborne), Fort Campbell, Ky.He and the 5th Specia lForces Group trained with theKuwai t is dur ing DESERTSHIELD, fought with themduring DESERT STORM, andhave been conducting an on-going training program withthe Kuwaitis for the past 3years. In addition to his train-ing as a Special Forces Engi-neer, SSG Barner has re-ceived extensive armor train-ing from the Kentucky Na-tional Guard, the 100th Divi-sion (Tng) AR at Fort Camp-bel l, and from the ArmorSchool at Fort Knox, Ky. Hisprevious assignments include3d Bn, 75th Infantry RangerRegiment and the 197thMechanized Infantry Brigade.

CW2 Bryan Jay Hinkel iscurrently assigned to Co A,3d Bn, 5th Special ForcesGroup (Airborne) as the SFTechnician for ODA 576.Over the course of the last 11years with the 5th ‘Legion,’ hehas worked as a detachmentcommander on an A Team,as an operations sergeantand communications supervi-sor on a B Team, and per-formed the duties of opera-tions sergeant, intelligencesergeant, communications su-pervisor and heavy weaponssergeant on an A Team. Hisarmor experience includesworking with the Kuwaiti 7thand 8th Tank Battalions, 35thBrigade last summer and withthe Egyptian 4th Armor Divi-sion during Operations DE-SERT SHIELD and DESERTSTORM.

As an Added Benefit,Auxiliary Power UnitsReduce Tank ThermalSignature, Tests Show

Auxiliary Power Units (APUs) nowunder development for the M1A2 tankwere supposed to save fuel and reducemaintenance, saving an estimated$167 million a year. But tests areshowing an added, unexpected benefit:running the tank on its APU, ratherthan its main engine, reduces its ther-mal signature, making the tank muchless vulnerable to detection by thermalimagers and destruction by a new gen-eration of smart weapons.

The original concept of the APU wasto allow shutdown of the main enginewhile the tank was not moving, so asto supply the crew’s power needs, ra-dios, and computers while saving fuel.Current research and developmentcould lead to adoption of the units asearly as 1995.

The “thermal cloaking” discoverygrew out of experiments at Eglin AFB,Fla., where research was underway toteach new smart weapons to recognizevarious thermal signatures. Tanks run-ning on their main engines emit a heatplume several stories high, creating avulnerability to heat-seeking arma-ments. Armored vehicles running ontheir APUs were almost thermally un-detectable.

-Adopted from Inside the Turret, theFort Knox weekly newspaper.

Armor School Essay ContestDraws 44 Entries ProbingEffect of the Information Age

The recent Armor School Essay Con-test on the subject “What Does the In-formation Age Mean to Armored Warfare” drew 44 entries.

The winner in the officer categorywas LTC Mark P. Hertling, com-mander of 1-16 CAV. The NCO cate-gory was submitted by a group, AlphaSection of 1st Platoon, ANCOC Class94-1D, who will share their prize. Thethird $100 winner was Mr. Michael O.Kelley, chief of the Combined ArmsTraining Division, 16th CAV, FortKnox. Copies of all entries were re-viewed and evaluated for useful ideasby several post directorates and thedeputy CG, BG Lon E. Maggart.

The foregoing is a somewhat humor-ous and simplistic view of a majorproblem that has faced the mountedwarrior since the beginning of the Ar-mored Force. As technology expandsand the capability of the soldier in-creases, so does the amount of equip-ment required to accomplish the mis-sion, and this all has to be carriedsomewhere in order to be availablefor use when needed.

The problem facing the mounted sol-dier of today is, where do I put it?

The obvious answer is to carry itsomewhere on the tank or BFV. How-ever, almost every vehicle producedover the history of armored warfarehas not had built into it the capacityto store everything that is added onthe vehicle by and for the crew.

Granted, there is a place for every-thing associated with the vehicle’s Ba-sic Issue Items (BII), and these are in-tegrated into the design of the vehicle.But, those items such as CTA 50-900

and personal gear, as well as the itemsmentioned in our small parable, areobviously not fully integrated into thesystem.

A classic example of this is the M1.When first fielded, the M1 had an an-gled slope to the rear of the turret. Onthis slope were numerous “footloop”fastening locations for a net-like cov-ering that was supposed to act like abustle rack. Gone, too, were the famil-iar sponson boxes that lined the sidesof the M60-series vehicles then inservice. However, the amount of equip-ment wasn’t reduced one bit.

Nor is the M1 unique in this regard.A look back shows that the M47 wasone of the first vehicles to have adedicated storage area built on to therear of the turret. And like the crewsof today, crews then solved the prob-lem by improvising storage schemesand load plans. The resultant “gypsycaravan” look of armored columns isone that has persisted throughout the

world. The alternative to carrying allthis equipment was that items per-ceived as having limited use usuallybecame “combat losses,” sometimesweeks prior to any actual combat!

Vehicles currently in development,such as the AGS and LOSAT, alsosuffer from this problem. Current con-figurations of AGS do not have anytype of bustle rack, and there appearsto be a similar approach to externalstowage as was originally placed onthe M1.

LOSAT’s design precludes any ex-ternal stowage at all, yet has a three-man crew. The pop-up design of thelauncher will not allow the storage ofanything on top of the vehicle. Aswith all Bradley chassis-based de-signs, anything carried on the front ofthe vehicle interferes with accessibil-ity to the engine compartment andpossibly blocks the driver’s vision.

In order to have a feel for the size ofthe problem, consider the amount of

In the beginning, there was the Sol-dier and his “stuff,” and this wasgood.

Then there was the vehicle, and thevehicle could carry the Soldier and his“stuff,” and that too, was good.

When it was found that the vehiclecould carry the Soldier and his“stuff,” the Engineer quoth, “Give to the Soldier camouflage nets, poles, picks, shovels, mines, stakes, and wire with whichto protect himself, and all manner of detectors to find those mines which would do him harm.”

The Logistician quoth, “Give to the Soldier oil, grease, hydraulic fluid, track blocks, road wheels, center guides, endconnectors, and endless number of tools with which to care for the vehicle, along with food and water with which to sustainhimself.”

The Chemical Guru quoth, “Give to the Soldier all manner of detectors and accessories to protect him from the harmfulvapors and chemicals to be found in the hands of our enemies.”

And, yea, verily, it was good to have said equipment to protect life and limb and to provide sustenance for the Soldier.Finally, the Commander said, “You shall carry all these things and your “stuff” upon your vehicle and you shall do so in a

secure and orderly manner, so as to please the Sergeants Major and the First Sergeants by its appearance.”The Soldier looked upon the prodigious pile of things given unto him, his “stuff,” and his vehicle, and wailed, “There ain’t

no !#$^%$* way!!.”Thus was born the Bustle Rack.

by Major Michael Mergensand Captain William K. Weldon


Now, Where Do We Put It?

“stuff” a typical M1 crew has to carry.According to the M1A1 Combat LoadPlan, ST 17-184-1A1, dated Novem-ber 1987, each crewmember is allot-ted for their CTA 50-900 and personalitems 1 each, ALICE Pack, duffle bag,and flight helmet bag. In most in-stances, the flight helmet bag is car-ried inside the vehicle and doesn’t en-ter into this discussion.

The approximate dimensions of theduffle bag are 14" in diameter and 38"tall for a volume of about 5,850 cubicinches or 3.4 cubic feet. The ALICEPack is about 14" x 10" x 28", 3,920cubic inches or 2.3 cubic feet. There-fore, a crew of four needs 4 x 5.7 cu-bic feet or 22.8 cubic feet of totalstorage for personal gear. The currentbustle rack is about 15" x 14" x 112"for an available volume of 13.6 cubicfeet; which translates to a 10.1 cubicfoot shortfall! Crews have solved thisby standing the duffle bags up insidethe bustle rack and attaching theALICE Packs to the outside.

An alternative is to have the com-pany trains carry the extra duffle bagsand to have the first sergeant bringthem forward when needed. For atypical company this would require 56duffle bags or 190 cubic feet of stor-age volume. A typical 21⁄2 ton (M35series) has a carrying volume of 444cubic feet, which would mean onehalf of the truck would be filled withduffle bags. How many companycommanders have this much excesscarrying capacity in their companytrains?

The loading scenario describedabove, along with the stacking ofitems and tying them down to the tur-ret roof, etc., has an added effect of

blocking the view of the TC andloader, both in the open hatch andclosed hatch configurations. This hasobvious implications in safely operat-ing the vehicle and in the operationaleffectiveness of the crew. Anothersafety-related problem with this man-ner of stowage is the obstruction ofthe ammunition compartment blowoutpanels and crosswind sensor.

Nor is the storage area of the bustlerack sacrosanct. Presently the ExternalAuxiliary Power Unit (EAPU) is de-signed to reside in the bustle rack.This unit takes up approximately 11.3cubic feet (although it extends about11" above the bustle rack, for an ef-fective loss of 6.25 cubic feet).

Any type of system that is designedto alleviate this storage problem hasseveral key requirements. First, itmust be strong enough to carry a sig-nificant load, 400 to 500 lbs typically.It also has to be strong enough towithstand additional loads induced byshock while driving over rough ter-rain. This shock loading can be threeto four times as great as the staticload, or about 1,500 lbs.

Second, it must be large enough thatit significantly increases the amountof storage volume. Ammo cans and lo-cally produced brackets, althoughcheap, do not increase the storage vol-ume more than 10 percent. Any sys-tem must increase the volume at aminimum of 75 percent, preferably150 percent.

Any type of storage system must it-self be able to be stored or removedwhen not being used for its intendedpurpose. This feature facilitates theloading of vehicles in confined spaces

for deployment, such as ships or air-craft. It also remains out of the wayduring routine maintenance operationswhile not in the field or being used.

Finally, any system must be easilyinstalled and not require major modi-fications to the vehicle. Extensive usemust be made of all available hard-ware and existing features of the vehi-cle as attachment points. These attach-ments must also be strong enough tocarry the load and secure the deviceduring rough maneuvering.

Although there is little that can bedone with regard to lessening thenumber of items to be carried, therehave been several attempts at solvingthis problem that range from locallyproduced brackets to specially de-signed carriers.

The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) hasbuilt several different types of vehicleracks. One type hangs off the sides ofthe M113 and significantly increasesthe amount of material that can becarried. The MERKAVA’s speciallydesigned hammock-type arrangementhas a hinged bottom that drops therucksacks of the infantry once theydeploy from the vehicle.

These designs are tailored to the re-quirements of the IDF in that they ex-tend beyond the sides of the vehiclesand are constructed of metal. For ar-eas in which the IDF operates — de-sert, sparse vegetation, and urban ter-rains — this is acceptable. However,the U.S. Army requires that we alsooperate in close vegetation, such asforests and thick brush.

In this environment, a rigid system,or one that extends beyond the sidesof the vehicle, are prone to being

Above, an M1A1 Abrams with the Abrams Bustle Rack Extensionmounted to the fixed bustle rack.


Individual crewman’s equipment bags provide greater protection andeasier access than does the current duffle bag.

snagged and damaged, especiallywhen the driver of the vehicle is un-sure of the location of his fenders andthe TC/BC is occupied in navigatingand directing the vehicle. A prime ex-ample of what can happen is evi-denced by the large number of reportsof survey and statements of chargesfor lost tanker’s rolls and rucksackssnatched from bustle racks whilemoving along tree lines during exer-cises such as past REFORGERs.

One system specifically designed forthe M1, and in development, is theAbrams Bust le Rack Extension(ABRE). This is a system made of du-rable webbing, capable of supporting3,000 lbs/web and attaches directly tothe top rail of the existing bustle rack.It also attaches to the bottom andsides for stability during maneuvering.

The device includes four 27" x 14" x14" individual equipment storage bags.A piece of 3⁄8“-thick fabric-reinforcedrubber forms the bottom of the com-partment, gives shape to the device,and prevents it from sagging belowthe bottom of the bustle rack and in-terfering with the operation of the tur-ret.

Being made of rubber and fabric, thedevice is designed to resist damagewhen caught on trees or brush, orthrough contact with more solid ob-jects. If damaged, repairs are muchsimpler than they would be for an all-metal device.

For the protection of the individualcrewmember’s personal items, a wa-terproof/NBC protective bag is avail-able. This bag is made of butyl-coatednylon, the same material found in

camouflage covers, and is designed tobe removed from the device for indi-vidual packing and storage. Twostraps secure each bag to the device.Rucksacks can be attached to the ex-terior of the device, as is currentlydone in most unit load plans.

Placing mostly personal gear in thestowage device frees up space in thebustle rack for heavier items. Theseheavier items then would not have tobe stored on top of the blowout pan-els, increasing the safety of the crew.This would also lower the profile ofstored items and allow the crew betterall-around observation.

The entire device weighs only about40 lbs and can be attached in aboutfive minutes by a single crewman.The primary means of attachment isby hooks that go over the top rail andsecure with a ring.

The device is laterally secured bymeans of adjustable side straps andhook straps on the bottom that attachto existing eyes welded to the bottomof the bustle rack to prevent the de-vice from bouncing off. These bottomstraps are loosened when the device isfolded flat against the bustle rack forstorage.

Velcro along the entire bottom of thedevice facilitates the mounting of therear turret belt for MILES. Also,mounting points can be added for ve-hicle identification signs, gunnerylights, etc. This basic design can beadapted to any number of vehicles. Aprototype was developed for the LAV-25, while concepts for the Bradleyand AGS are currently being devel-oped.

The system is an inexpensive solu-tion to an age-old problem. Any num-ber of load plans cannot escape thesimple fact that there is just too much“stuff” and nowhere to put it. Futuresystems have to be designed with thesimple fact in mind that the soldierand his noncombat equipment must becarried by the vehicle because it is hishome. The logistics system is stretchedto its limits just providing fuel, ammo,and food for the soldier, let alonedragging his clothes around.

The ABRE, as designed and devel-oped by Oceaneering Space Systemsof Houston, Texas, could be procuredas early as 1995, if funds were avail-able.


Captain William K. Weldon was commissioned in 1985 from the U.S.Military Academy at West Point, N.Y. He has served in a number ofArmor positions, including tank platoon leader, support platoon leader,and company executive officer while at Fort Polk, La. He was then as-signed to Camp Casy, Korea where he served as battalion supply officerand later commander of C Company, 1-72 Armor. He recently served asthe Materiel Branch Chief of the Directorate of Combat Developments atthe Armor Center, Ft. Knox, Ky. He is currently an advisor for the 3-116Cavalry (ARNG) in La Grande, Oregon.

Major Michael E. Mergens was commissioned through ROTC at TexasA&M University with a degree in Mechanical Engineering. He hasserved in a number of Armor positions including platoon leader, scoutplatoon leader, headquarters company commander, tank company com-mander, asst. brigade S3, and S3 air, and brigade S1. He is currently amember of the Texas Army National Guard serving as the operationschief, G-2 Section, 49th AD. In his civilian capacity, he works forOceaneering Space Systems (OSS) as a design and project engineeron the International Space Station Alpha refrigerator/freezer project. Heis also the senior project engineer for Armored Vehicle Habitability Up-grades for OSS.

The focal point for the identification of all support items for the MountedCombat Soldier is:

Materiel Branch, Soldier Support DivisionDirector of Combat DevelopmentsU.S. Army Armor CenterFort Knox, KY 40121

For further information and technical details about the ABRE, other similarstowage systems, or soldier-related support items, please contact thebranch chief at (502) 624-1750, DSN 464-1750.

“The deployment requirements of themodern Army mean that we have fullyintegrated force packages, each con-taining high priority Reserve Compo-nents (RC) units. We must tailor ourtraining and readiness policies to pre-pare the Total Force to meet thesenew requirements. Bold Shift is the ve-hicle to accomplish this most impor-tant task.”1

The phone rings in my office (it’sMarch, 1992), and it’s Armor Branch...it’s the captain’s assignment officer,who gives me a WARNORD for mynext assignment. I’m informed thatmy next assignment is in support of acongressionally mandated Active Com-ponent full-time support to ARNG(Army National Guard) as part of the

Bold Shift initiative. My mission willbe to advise and assist the commanderto implement training programs thatwill maximize the use of limited timeavailable to enhance pre-mobilizationtraining readiness.

“The Bold Shift effort is a top prior-ity throughout the Total Army. Its in-tent is to design those policies, proce-dures and execution techniques thatwill ensure high levels of training andreadiness. The year 1992 is a pilotyear in which selected high priorityReserve Component units, at least oneARNG unit per state and one USARunit per Major U.S. Army ReserveCommand (MUSARC), will partici-pate in Bold Shift. We will then assessperformance and develop a formalconcept and implementation actionplan that will produce and sustain

these higher levels of training andreadiness.”2

September 1992, I PCS to become a“Resident Training Detachment (RTD)Senior Trainer” for an M1A1 tankbattalion. Because this is a pilot pro-gram, I begin to lay the groundworkfor the implementation of the BoldShift initiative. I write my duty de-scription:

Senior Army Company Trainer for aRoundout MTO&E M1A1 tank battal-ion assigned to 1st ID(M). Responsi-ble for planning, conducting, andevaluating pre-mobilization tasks for atank company, battalion mortar pla-toon, and the battalion S3 section. As-sists in identifying and defining train-ing goals and ensures the trainingprinciples found in FM 25-100/101are instilled and utilized. Ensurestechnical and tactical proficiency ofleaders at all levels is met through rig-orous training exercise and AARs.Upon mobilization, assist in post-mo-bilization and deployment of unit.

I list my performance objectives:

• Be the expert on FM 25-100/101.• Assist in developing soldier,

leader, collective, and battle stafftraining.

• Assist in the preparation and exe-cution of collective training withemphasis on tank platoons andcrews.

• Teach leaders how to identify indi-vidual and collective tasks and in-tegrate them into training.

• Assist in the development of thecompany METL and training strat-egy based on last year’s AnnualTraining TAM results.

• Be able to support and observetraining and deliver an effectiveAAR.


Resident Training Detachment:A Captain’s Perspective — Two Years Henceby Captain (P) Leon I. Smith IV

RESIDENT TRAINING DETACHMENT (RTD)

Figure 1

• Prepare tank gunnery in the con-duct of tank maneuver/gunnerysimulation training.

• Plan for exercising mobilizationplans and assist in mobilization re-view.

• Assist in coordinating and certify-ing gunnery-related matters.

• Ensure gunnery training followsthe guidelines IAW 17-12-RC (Re-serve Component Tank GunneryTraining Program).

• Assist to make all OperationalReadiness Evaluations (OREs)successful.

• Assist the battalion commanderand staff in functional and tacticaltraining.

• Plan, evaluate and assess “PlatoonLanes” for the armor platoons andthe battalion mortar platoon.

• Assist in the implementation of allMCOFT/UCOFT training pro-grams.

• Plan and write MOIs for the tankplatoons and mortar platoon.

• Ensure training is always done tostandard.

• Ensure training meetings are con-ducted IAW TC 25-30 “A Leader’sGuide To Company TrainingMeetings.”

Initially, the RTD was a skeleton de-tachment. After six months, our man-ning distribution to support the Guardbattalion is pictured in Figure 1 andour rating scheme in Figure 2.

To avoid confusion and lack of in-formation throughout the Active

Army, let me ex-plain the RTD role(from a captain’sstandpoint) , as Iknow it.

First , an RTDquickly learns theRC acronyms andthe RC guidanceand directives de-scribed in FMs 25-100/101. Initially, Ireviewed the as-sessment of the pre-vious year’s train-ing and the existingyear’s training cal-endar with the bat-talion. Most of theMETL tasks wereassessed as a “P.”

The yearly training calendar is shownin Figure 3.

Expectations:

You will be assigned specifically totrain one or two tank companies and,possibly, one of the special platoonsin the HHC Company. Additionally,you can be expected to assist the bat-

talion commander in the battle stafftraining areas of emphasis.

Expect to train anyone from thecompany commander down to thelowest private in the company. Plan totrain more than one level down andevaluate two levels down. Prepareyourself to train company command-ers, XOs, PLs, PSGs, TCs, and pri-vates. At the same time, prepare your-self to assist in evaluating tank crewsduring TCGST, TCPC, STXs, etc. Youwill be asked to demonstrate yourskills to anyone and everyone in thecompany. The skill level of the sol-diers varies greatly and is not alwaysdependent on their grade. Some of theareas in which you may be expectedto train and/or evaluate are:

• Plan for an STX (Co Cdrs, PLs,PSGs, and TCs)

• Write OPORDs (Co Cdrs and PLs)• How to tank (everyone in the com-

pany, i.e. boresighting, maneuvertechniques, radio procedures, mapreading)

• How to prepare for an inspection(full-time personnel).

Do not expect to be an advisor to theunit. Keep in mind the word “advisor”is no longer a word used by the RTD.


Yearly Training Calendar1st Qtr 2d Qtr 3d Qtr 4th Qtr

100% SmallArms Qual

APFT(Diagnostic)

MaintTraining

ORE

MCOFT

Legal Briefs

Conduct ofFire Classes

Tgt AcqDrills

TCGSTTrain-up

TCGST

APFT(Record)

TCPC

AAC

TTV

TTVIIIRock Drills

Load forAnnual Tng

AnnualTraining(Ft. Stewart)

Post ATInventory

Plt STXs(Ft. Stewart)

SIMNETExercise

Figure 3

RTD RATING SCHEME(FOR THIS UNIT ONLY)

RATERINTERMEDIATE

RATERSENIORRATER

RTD CHIEF,MAJOR

RTD CDRLTC

*LETTER INPUTGUARD BN CDR

ADC(M)BG

RTD SENIORTRAINER,CPT

RTD CHIEFMAJ

N/A RTD CDRLTC

MAINT OFFICER,W-3

RTD CHIEFMAJ

N/A RTD CDRLTC

MASTER GUNNER,E-7

RTD SR.TRAINERCPT

N/A RTD SR.TRAINERCPT

*Letter input may be provided to Senior Rater by individualsholding position as RTD Chief.

Figure 2

As an RTD, the staff will quicklylearn to use the word “assist” in lieuof the old cliche “advisor.” You arethe person who has the expertise! Youhave the answers to assist leaders andsoldiers in the entire company. Youcan help the company or platoon inthe planning phase, which will aid intheir Inactive Duty Training (IDT)weekend. By providing your hands-onknowledge from your previous assign-ments, you can enhance the goals andaccomplishments of the Guard. Forexample, you can demonstrate the ef-fective use of rehearsals and rockdrills, which allows soldiers to in-crease their chance of success duringthe initial iteration of a collective task.

Plan on being the “battalion com-mander, company commander, platoonleader, supply sergeant, IG...etc.” Youwill wear many hats during your timein an RTD. Don’t get tunnel visionand cause yourself to miss impliedtasks! Remember, you are the expertwhen you arrive at this assignment;thus, the unit will expect you to pro-vide them with the correct answers.

Start preparing yourself now. Youwant to be the guy who can walk atank crew through the TTVIII RockDrills IAW 17-12-RC. Know the Re-serve/Guard roles and standards inconjunction with Army Regulations.

Be prepared to plan and execute anevent in 1-2 months. There will betimes when you have limited re-sources, but must help plan a task tobe executed the following month. Ex-pect to represent the “Senior Leader-ship” during many of the weekenddrills. You will be writing manyAARs during your tour, as you ob-serve training. Periodically, your inputwill be orally briefed to the Brigadecommander. The brigade commandermay expect you to be his “eyes andears” for training, as well as givinghim a pulse reading sometime duringthe training year.

One thing will always remain thesame. Don’t ever lower the standardsadopted for the training event (i.e.state or Army regulation). Maintainfocus, direction, and vision in every-thing you do as an RTD and don’t al-low anyone to use shortcuts. Alwaysbe the leader and mentor to those whoexpect nothing but the best from you.Remember, you represent the qualifi-cations of a typical active duty armor

captain in the U.S. Army. “The role ofthe RTD is to enhance the chain ofcommand, not replace it, and buildinga strong leader training program is thekey to building strong units.”3

Accomplishments:

They will be small. Small accom-plishments are your best measure foryour success; don’t expect to changeeverything. If you can improve plan-ning areas, i.e. leaders use “TC 25-30,” then you are on the right trackfor success. Never allow a trainingevent to be trained without a measur-able standard. Enforce task, condi-tions, and standards and don’t allowsoldiers to be satisfied with marginal“Go’s.” If you accept this, you will beallowing soldiers to train to die incombat.

Work on soldier and junior leaderdevelopment. Take the time to showthe company commanders how totrain their platoon leaders. This iswhere you can make a difference. Youmay see inexperienced company com-manders; but remember, no one tookthe time to train them. Do not beafraid to train the company com-mander on the duties. The commandermay be too shy to ask you openly forassistance, so take the initiative andfix the problem.

As I depart my two years as an RTDcaptain with a Guard tank battalion, Ithink of my significant contributions(remembering my small accomplish-ments are sometimes the biggest toconquer). Some of my small accom-plishments are:

• Teaching company-level juniorleaders how to execute trainingmeetings IAW TC 25-30.

• Enforcement of FMs 25-100/101during the year.

• Pushing leaders to have physicaltraining during every drill week-end.

• Providing a basic background toleaders on tactics, techniques, andprocedures.

• Executing training to standard, theway it was planned.

• Flexibility as changes occur.

Your assignment will be rewarding.Small accomplishments are RTDachievable; don’t try to defeat the

world. Leave with a feeling of accom-plishment. There will be soldiers whowill maintain those skills passed downby you. Someday, when the RTD goesaway, our job will not be left behind.There will be RC/Guard soldiers as-sisting the Army as part of a fully in-tegrated force package.

Notes

1Memorandum for Total Army Commanders,Subject: BOLD SHIFT Information letter, para.4, dated 10 August 1992, written by GEN Ed-win H. Burba, Jr., former FORSCOM com-mander.

2Ibid., para. 5.

3Active Army Orientation Course, Booklet H,Resident Training Detachment InformationPacket, National Guard Education Center, MOI,Subject: RTD, dated 20 July 1992, p. 2, writtenby COL Michael G. Jones, CofS, 4th ID(M).


Captain (P) Leon I. SmithIV was commissioned in1983 through Officer Candi-date School and has at-tended AOBC, JOMC, Air-borne, AOAC, and CAS3.He holds a BS Degree inmanagement from the Uni-versity of South Carolinaand a MA Degree in man-agement from Webster Uni-versity. He served with 1stSquadron, 11th ACR as atank platoon leader, scoutplatoon leader, and com-pany XO; commanded atank company with 4-40(now 2-35) Armor , 4thID(M); was a tactics instruc-tor for the Engineer OfficerAdvanced Course; andserved as a tactical advisorfor 3d Army for breachingoperations during DESERTSHIELD/DESERT STORM.He recently served as anRTD for 1st ID(M) with218th SHB(M). He is cur-rently attending the Com-mand and General StaffCollege.

laser rangefinder and lock out the firingtank’s firing controls. A manual overridewould bypass this lockout in case the TCcould positively identify the target. If the tar-get vehicle was friendly but didn’t have aprogrammable code, the laser rangefinderwould show an AMBER light, but not lockout the fire controls. If the target vehiclewas in fact enemy, A GREEN light wouldbe displayed and the rest would be, “FIRE!”“ON THE WAY” “TARGET, CEASE FIRE,DRIVER MOVE OUT.”

1SG Hecht’s suggestion of a tone gener-ated in the CVCs of the targeted crew is anexcellent one and could very easily be inte-grated into the system proposed here.

I’m sure that there are many other sce-narios possible with the technology avail-able today, but if we wait to evaluate all ofthem, we will probably lose more goodtankers to fratricide. We have the technol-ogy. Let’s finally put this problem behind usand concentrate on our real business, thatof being prepared to close with and destroythe enemy by means of fire and maneuverand shock action.

MICHAEL MERGENSMAJ, Armor, TXARNG

HQ, 49th Armored Division

More on “Champagne Campaign”

Dear Sir:

I am interested to see that my “11thPanzers in the Defense, 1944” (March-April1994 issue) has generated additional infor-mation about the 1944 campaigns, and Iam gratified that several veterans have ex-pressed an interest in contacting their foesof half a century ago.

It should be emphasized, however, thatthe article is not a detailed study of thevarious specific engagements, but rather anaccount of how the 11th Panzer Division at-tempted to carry out its missions undergenerally adverse conditions. There are anumber of detailed studies for the LorraineCampaign, especially Hugh M. Cole’s out-standing official U.S. Army history LorraineCampaign, published in 1950. But manyreaders may not be familiar with the re-cently published official history volume onthe Rhône Valley campaign, Jeffrey J.Clarke and Robert Ross Smith, Riviera tothe Rhine (Center of Military History, 1993).

Regarding the Meximieux fight on 1 Sep-tember 1944, for example, (Clarke andSmith p. 177) list casualties for both sides,including 185 Americans “missing andprobably captured,” this referring to F Com-pany, 2d Bn, 179th Regt (my p. 29); andthat the 11th Panzer thrust did “disruptpreparations” for a 179th Infantry attack,which “was von Wietersheim’s primary mis-sion.”

On 3 September at Montrevel, Troops Aand B of the 117th Cav put up a coura-

geous fight, but lost 35 vehicles and 126men captured (Clarke and Smith p. 180). VICorps commander Major General LucianTruscott was later critical of the cav squad-ron, but this was unjustified; he had simplyassigned missions “that were beyond itscapabilities,” and his criticism may reflecthis frustration at finding his flanking movesconstantly thwarted. The official historynotes that the 11th Panzer’s “primary mis-sion, protecting the retreating army’s flank,had thus been accomplished” (p. 180),though it also was taking losses.

Nothing but credit is due the GIs andGermans who fought these stiff clashes upthe Rhône Valley 50 years ago this autumn.

A. HARDING GANZOhio State University,

Newark Campus

Post-Mobilization TTVIIIWould Lower Standards

Dear Sir:

Recently, I was able to see a partial after-action review for the 1st Army Armor Con-ference. One of the issues that was con-tained in the review had to do with the pro-posal of the National Guard Bureau topostpone Tank Table VIII to post-mobiliza-tion. This is disturbing because as it standsnow, Reserve Component tank crews andplatoons are supposed to maintain a crewlevel of proficiency at gunnery (TTVIII) andsustain the ability to fight/maneuver as aplatoon. This has been reinforced by ma-neuver lanes training and the requirementto qualify tank crews at TTVIII every otheryear. By postponing crew-level qualificationto post-mobilization, we lower the trainingstandards and deviate from the “Band ofExcellence” in accordance with FM 25-100.

If anything, we should try to make a pla-toon-level gunnery a requirement for thoseRC tank platoons. It could be done via sub-cal fire, MILES, or, for those lucky few, bySIMNET. A live-fire TTXI or TTXII is prob-ably not feasible with current budget re-straints. This would allow post-mobilizationtraining to progress further and shortentimes to deploy should that become neces-sary. We need to maintain ourselves at ahigher level of proficiency if the Total Forceis to be a reality.

Crew-level proficiency is a must, andlanes training is an excellent training toolfor platoons for gunnery and maneuver. Letus keep up that level of training and evenimprove it by having tank platoons showingup at mobilization stations fully ready tomove on with training.

JEFF M. ALSTON2LT, Armor

Wisconsin ARNG

What Can We Do Aboutthe Vulnerable Antenna?

Dear Sir:

I continue to read about all the amazingthings digitalization of the battlefield will dofor the Armored Force, but we seem tohave forgotten the oldest, most poorly-pro-tected component in this whole marveloussystem — the antenna.

All those boxes full of state-of-the-artelectronics and those advanced, multi-colordisplay screens will be useless when theantennas get blown off the outside of thevehicle! One accurate and cheap artilleryairburst can neutralize a million dollars ingizmos in the blink of an eye.

With all the portable telephones, transmit-ters and remote speaker systems that areavailable today on the commercial market,there must be some kind of unbreakableantenna out there that can be easily con-verted to military use.

Or, would it be possible to make the an-tenna(e) part of the vehicle/turret structure?

Could it be made retractable? It wouldunreel from its stowage area for bursttransmission, and then go to minimum ex-tension for reception.

A tank is only as good as its tracks, gun,and radios. If the radios can’t send and re-ceive because the antenna is easily dam-aged or destroyed, then digitalization is awaste of money.

GREGORY J. SAMSONClinton TWP, Mich.

Bring Back the Blues

Dear Sir:

Captain Barber’s article, “Bring Back theBlues” (Jan-Feb 93 issue), hit a spark in myspurs, so to speak. I had to convey mythoughts on this crucial reconnaissancesubject. You see, it is not an emotional pleaon my part for the past, but it was a realityfor me back in June 88-June 90. I was asquad leader with a long-range reconnais-sance platoon assigned to HHT 1/9th U.S.Cavalry, 9th ID (Motorized), Ft. Lewis,Wash. Our MTOE consisted of a 28+1-manplatoon with equipment varying from threecargo Hummers, one armored Hummer, sixUH1Hs, and 24 250cc motorcycles. Thisplatoon was a squadron reconnaissanceasset, sometimes used by the brigade. Themissions and capabilities of the platoonwould cover all types of reconnaissance, tolimited raids and ambushes of high prioritytargets deep across the FLOT.

The platoon in general would operate 5-15 kilometers across the FLOT with 24-hours active reconnaissance, unlike avia-

LETTERS (Continued from Page 3)


tion aircraft which are limited by weather,pilot fatigue, and the increasing cost ofmaintenance. This platoon allowed thesquadron and brigade commander to de-velop a mission plan much faster, with ac-curate intel being updated by the minute,and painted a more accurate picture of thesituation developing. This intel update wasnot possible with the LRSD teams becausethey worked for the MI battalion which, inturn, updated the division commander. Thedivision cavalry needs that intel first, beingthe most forward combat unit in the divi-sion. Our brigade commander, COL Crews,saw this need, as did our squadron com-mander, LTC Tadonnio. This superb leader-ship started at the platoon level with 1LTJohnson and later 1LT Barber, both Rangerqualified. Our PSG, SFC Lincoln, 1SGKaminski, and CPT Drumm allowed us togrow militarily, by far the best chain of com-mand anyone would envy.

I am not trying to plug these men, butsaying that it was this ideal command cli-mate that allowed SGT Johnson and me totrain our men to standard. Even knowingwe were 19Ds, we lived by the RangerHandbook and related publications. Withthe MTOE the way it was, our platoon didnot have to beg for support from otherunits, such as our helicopter support. Ourplatoon used this asset for 85 percent of allour insertions; this would not have beenpossible if not organic to our squadron. Ourpilots were so good that a CW4 with someengineering background fabricated mountson the birds to carry two motorcycles oneach aircraft. This gave each OP team afast, mounted reconnaissance asset to re-con all NAIs. With this well-proven concept,the 3d Brigade and Task Force Saber de-ployed to the NTC and, as noted from theOPFOR command general, did to the OP-FOR what the OPFOR reconnaissance hasbeen doing to the Blue Forces for years.

As far as the men go, we could not findmore than 20 or so troopers who couldkeep up with the high state of physical fit-ness necessary to perform our mission.The training was constantly demanding,with PT runs exceeding six miles daily andnever-ending road marches. All this wasnecessary, given the extreme distance andloads we had to carry. I do not understandwhy the Army has not kept this organiza-tion alive in the division cavalry. In my ex-perience, this asset is not only needed, butrequired in today’s cavalry. I do wait withexcitement to the day the Army realizes itsmistake and brings back the blues. ThisSSG stands by with a 4187 in hand for an-other chance to do it all over again. “ScoutsOut.”

SSG CHRISTOPHER AUDETTECavaly Scout

Korea


Battalion Motor Officer Course Prepares OfficersFor Unit-Level Maintenance Positions

The Battalion Motor Officer Course (BMOC) is designed for Active Army,Reserve Component, and National Guard units. The primary students areCPTs and LTs who have completed the Officer Basic Course and havebeen in the field for more than six months, warrant officers, and allied na-tions officers. BMOC is designed to prepare these officers for maintenancepositions at the unit (battalion and below) level, with emphasis on manage-ment and supervisory operations.

The compact four-week, two-day course is designed to give incentive tocommanders to allow the Active and Reserve Component officers attendingBMOC on TDY status to complete the course. Many commanders are hesi-tant to release officers for a nine- or six-week course, but are more willingto let them attend a four-week course. The new, shorter course will alsohelp RC and NG officers who must leave a full-time job to attend, becausemany civilian employers also find it difficult to release employees for thelonger courses.

The BMOC is now starting its 30th year of operation. The OrganizationalMaintenance Officer Course #1 was held in 1964. This course was an out-growth of the Armor Maintenance Officer Course, which was revised tocreate a course geared to all maintenance officers, regardless of branch. InJanuary 1972, the course became the Motor Officer Course. It was short-ened to four weeks and two days in 1992.

The BMOC course currently consists of 160 hours of instruction, and isdivided into two areas: 104 hours of classroom instruction and 44 hours ofspecific instruction on five different vehicles. Students receive trainingbased on the type of vehicle at their assigned unit. The five vehicles usedin training are the M1A1 Abrams tank, the M2/3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle,the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier, the M977 Heavy Expanded MobilityTactical Truck (HEMTT), and the M998 High Mobility Multi-PurposeWheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). The program of instruction emphasizes theuse of hands-on training and practical exercises. Classroom lectures areused to teach the proper maintenance procedures and the use of standardArmy forms, but most learning occurs in the maintenance bays on actualvehicles.

The main topics covered in classroom instruction are: Army MaintenanceSystem,operations records and dispatch procedures, maintenance records,maintenance publications, Materiel Condition Status Report, repair partssupply, tool and TMDE equipment, light schedule service, heavy scheduleservice, preventive maintenance indicators, hazardous materials, automo-tive electrical systems, safety, Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS), directvehicle recovery, and power plant troubleshooting.

CLASS REPORT START END

05-95 23 Jan 95 24 Jan 95 23 Feb 9506-95 14 Feb 95 15 Feb 95 17 Mar 9507-95 6 Mar 95 7 Mar 95 5 Apr 9508-95 27 Mar 95 28 Mar 95 26 Apr 9509-95 11 Apr 95 12 Apr 95 11 May 9510-95 4 May 95 5 May 95 6 Jun 9511-95 30 May 95 31 May 95 29 Jun 9512-95 19 Jun 95 20 Jun 95 21 Jul 9513-95 10 Jul 95 11 Jul 95 9 Aug 9514-95 31 Jul 95 1 Aug 95 30 Aug 9515-95 21 Aug 95 22 Aug 95 21 Sep 9501-96 4 Oct 95 5 Oct 95 3 Nov 9502-96 25 Oct 95 26 Oct 95 24 Nov 9503-96 13 Nov 95 14 Nov 95 15 Dec 95

For more information, call BMOC CW3 Peyton or SFC Snyder at DSN464-8119/7756 or (502)624-8119/7756.

Moving Mountains: Lessons inLeadership and Logistics from theGulf War by William G. Pagonis andJeffrey L. Cruikshank. Harvard Schoolof Business, Boston. 1992, 248 pages,$24.95.

Lieutenant General William “Gus” Pago-nis, one of the U.S. Army’s main architectsof victory during DESERT SHIELD/DE-SERT STORM, has written a masterful ac-count of the war from the viewpoint of alogistician. As is often the case, both thegenerals who fought the war and the mili-tary historians who analyze the conflicttend to concentrate on strategy, tactics,and equipment, often ignoring or downplay-ing the role of logistics or the personnelthat played an equal role. Pagonis’s Mov-ing Mountains, however, examines the roleof logistics by incorporating all of thesecategories into a single, highly readablevolume. The book likewise attempts to illus-trate how the techniques used to managethe rapid influx of materiel into the PersianGulf can have civilian applications. Theauthor specifically examines the logisticalaspects of the Gulf War from three distinctphases which includes DESERT SHIELD(August 7, 1990-January 15, 1991), DE-SERT STORM (January 15-March 4,1991), and DESERT FAREWELL (March-December 1991). General Pagonis explainsthat each phase had its unique aspectsand problems, and he illustrates their inter-relationship throughout the Gulf War and itsimmediate aftermath. This interrelationshipis best understood by the comment Gen-eral H. Norman Schwarzkopf made whilebriefing journalists on February 27, 1991:“...And I can’t give credit enough to the lo-gisticians and the transporters who wereable to pull this [the famous ‘End Run’] off.

Pagonis’s journey to command of the 22Support Command began with his commis-sioning in the Transportation Corps in1964, a move that he had some misgivingsabout, but nonetheless accepted. The earlyyears of General Pagonis’s career moldedhis concept of logistics and, above all else,leadership. Pagonis claims that these sameprinciples enabled him to undertake thetask of managing DESERT SHIELD andDESERT STORM 26 years later. Theauthor presents a convincing case for thislast statement. Throughout General Pago-nis’s early climb up the chain of command,a theme that is constantly repeated is“leadership by example.” Willingness totake risks early on provided Pagonis withthe motivation and desire to remain in theArmy despite his own periods of doubt asto whether or not to remain. He illustratesthis last point by recalling an incidentshortly after his return from Vietnam in the

mid-1970s when he served as a Congres-sional liaison officer. After heading a studythat saved the XM1 (later M1 Abrams), thegeneral turned down what was then an ex-tremely lucrative offer to remain in Wash-ington D.C. as a lobbyist for one of the BigThree automakers. He decided instead toremain in the Army.

General Pagonis, from the mid-1970s un-til 1988 when he was assigned to U.S.Forces Command (FORSCOM), served ina variety of assignments, all preparing himfor his role in DESERT SHIELD/DESERTSTORM. The general wrote that the twomost important assignments were his timeat Division Support Command at Fort Car-son, Colorado (DISCOM), and at the 21stSupport Command (SUPCOM) at Kais-erslautern, Germany. Pagonis wrote thatthese two assignments, more than any oth-ers, prepared him for the herculean tasksthat awaited him during the Gulf War. Thegeneral states that while commanding DIS-COM, he was able to learn the intricaciesof desert warfare and the problems associ-ated with supplying forces engaged in de-sert warfare at the National Training Centerat Fort Irwin, California. The author writes:“This gave me a thorough understanding ofhow things operated in the desert, and ofhow the desert challenges soldiers andtheir equipment.” After leaving DISCOM,Pagonis served as special assistant to thedeputy commanding general (DCG), andlater as deputy commanding general of the21st SUPCOM, where he was involved inseveral REFORGER exercises. In these,he gained valuable experience not only inutilizing host-nation resources, but in nego-tiating with local contractors. These wereskills extensively utilized during his 18-month stay in Saudi Arabia.

The importance attached to GeneralPagonis’s experience as DCG with the 21stSUPCOM is enhanced by military analystJohn A. Warden, who wrote in his bookThe Air Campaign: Planning For Combatthat the U.S. Armed Forces were betterprepared for the Gulf War due to the level

and amount of training they participated inbetween 1973 and 1990. Warden added:“The efficiency, camaraderie, and personalrelationships built by such exercises con-tribute immensely to combined combat ef-fectiveness when the forces are latermerged during a crisis or war. Even the lo-gistics of moving a corps out of one theaterand into another are practiced in the an-nual REFORGER exercise, a capability thatproved crucial to the deployment of VIICorps from Europe to Saudi Arabia in forty-five days.”

One of the book’s major shortcomings isin failing to discuss the creation of the fleetof Near Term Prepositioned Shipping in theearly 1970s. Pagonis makes only a vaguereference to the creation of the vital NTPSprogram, a critical omission since NTPSwas the forerunner of the Maritime Pre-Po-sitioning Shipping program that made DE-SERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM the suc-cess that it was. The author likewise fails todiscuss the reorientation of U.S. strategyduring the late 1970s from one of a land-based, Europe-first strategy to that of amaritime strategy. Historian Allan R. Millettwrote in Semper Fidelis that the emphasison a maritime strategy gave the UnitedStates the necessary “flexibility and strate-gic mobility” to respond to a variety ofthreats and crises outside of the NATOcontext. General Pagonis makes it soundas if MPS was a new concept when theRapid Deployment Joint Task Force wasfirst formed in 1980, In fact, it dates back to1970.

When Pagonis was assigned to the Officeof the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics asthe Director of Plans and Operations hebecame involved in contingency planningfor a possible Soviet invasion of SouthwestAsia. OPLAN 1002-90: The Defense of theArabian Peninsula, had been authored byGeneral Schwarzkopf. He was then trans-ferred to U.S. Forces Command (FOR-SCOM), at Fort McPherson, Georgia. Whileat FORSCOM General Pagonis served asthe J4-Director of Logistics. Little did he re-

Moving Bradleys, Beans, and Bullets to the Gulf


APCs unloading ata railhead in theBremerhaven Ter-minal near CarlShurz Kasernewere part of hun-dreds of trackedand wheeled vehi-cles loaded aboardships for transportto Southwest Asia.

Photo by SFC Dana Jacson

BOOKS

alize at the time that the experience gainedat the 21st SUPCOM, Office of the DeputyChief of Staff, and FORSCOM would allcome into play when Saddam Hussein in-vaded neighboring Kuwait on August 1,1990.

Moving Mountains provides an excellentoverview of those first few hectic dayswhen the United States course of actionwas still uncertain. Pagonis provides somelittle-known details of the confusion thatreigned in both the White House and withinGeneral Schwarzkopf’s headquarters as towhat, if any, response the United Stateswould make. When the U.S. decided to in-tervene militarily, Pagonis and his boss,Lieutenant General John Yeosock, weretasked by Central Command (CINCCENT)to come up with a “shopping list” of mate-riel that any U.S. force would require if “in-vited in” by the Saudi government. Pagoniswrote that it was a “shopping list” fit for aking. Prior to General Yeosock’s departurefor the desert kingdom, Pagonis was in-structed to begin preparing his command tomove large quantities of supplies in a hurry.It is here that military analysts and histori-ans will look back with pride upon the crea-tion of the NTPS/MPS program. Pagoniswrites that if any one factor contributed tovictory in the Persian Gulf, it was the avail-ability of these ships, which had been sta-tioned in the Indian Ocean (Diego Garcia),Somalia, and the Philippines.

General Pagonis provides an excellentoverview of the planning and deploymentof the tens of thousands of American sol-diers to Saudi Arabia during the firstmonths of DESERT SHIELD. He skillfully il-lustrates how he built a logistics infrastruc-ture with both active duty and reserve per-sonnel. Pagonis lavishes praise on theArmy’s Total Force Concept, which pro-vided so many personnel from the ArmyReserve side of the house, but he con-tends that, while this system worked ex-tremely well during the war in the PersianGulf, some of the more important elementsof the Army’s Combat Service Support(CSS) capability should be put back intothe active Army. This reviewer disagrees. Itmust be remembered that any future con-flict will be what Pagonis calls “a come-as-you-are party,” denying the Army its criticalCSS capability due to the legal ramifica-tions of activating the Reserves. In this ageof sudden mid- to low-intensity conflicts,the reserves of all services will serve as animportant “pool” for the active side to drawupon, as was seen during DESERTSHIELD/DESERT STORM. This aloneshould guide future Army contingency plan-ning by forcing Army planners to ask thecritical question, “What role will the re-serves play, if any?”

General Pagonis’s Moving Mountains rep-resents perhaps one of the better books onthe Gulf War since it blends the logisticalelement into the strategic, operational, andtactical concerns faced by men whoplanned the successful ground war. Despite

this, the book remains too parochial; ittends to concentrate on the Army’s roleand ignores the other services and mem-bers of the Allied coalition who played justas critical a role. For instance, little mentionis made of either the U.S. Marine Corps’unmet needs for JP4 fuel for its LAVs andAmphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs) andthe constraints that were placed on it justas the ground war was about to com-mence. General Pagonis likewise makes lit-tle mention of the shortage of spare partsthat occurred as a result of the centraliza-tion of the logistics effort in Southwest Asia.The issue of logistics in any future war willrequire addressing in this era of jointness.As one Marine Corps study states, “HadIraqi military forces been more aggressivein their defense, the lack of equipment,spare parts, and the frequent need to im-provise modifications on their armored ve-hicles would have held disastrous conse-quences for Marine armored units.” MovingMountains does mention that the Air Forcecame with its own support infrastructureduring the Gulf War because its logisticalneeds are different than that of the Army orMarines. Despite this, however, the bookcould have been more specific on the prob-lems associated with having three airforces in the theater of operations, eachwith its own unique requirements.

For the military historian and analyst,however, General Pagonis’s book providesa vast historical perspective that clearlyemphasizes the importance of logistics inwarfare. The general is lavish in his praiseof Alexander the Great and of the British8th Army during its desert campaign ofWorld War II. General Pagonis notes, forinstance, that he utilized the precedent es-tablished by Field Marshal Montgomery,famed commander of the British 8th Army,in the creation of mobile supply depots. Asthe 8th Army advanced, so did the suppliesnecessary for sustainment in the desert.The general admits that “The notion ofstripped-down, movable logistical baseswas a compelling one, much more compel-ling, for example, than the fire bases of Vi-etnam.” Pagonis says that perhaps themost significant book he read while prepar-ing the U.S. Army for battle in the PersianGulf was Donald E. Engels’s masterfulbook, Alexander the Great and the Logis-tics of the Macedonian Army. What im-pressed him the most, he says, was thesimple fact that supply was the basis of Al-exander’s strategy and tactics. Pagonis’sastute knowledge of military history en-abled him to organize and build the type oflogistics system necessary to fit Schwarz-kopf’s “End Run.”

General Pagonis’s chapter on DESERTSTORM, however, is one of the weakerchapters of an otherwise informative book.The general’s overall conclusion is that thesystem worked with minimal problems, butas Marines and other Coalition membersnow admit, the logistics effort was not with-out its problems.

Military analyst Bruce H. Watson wrote inhis Military Lessons of the Gulf War that,“Logisticians certainly provided Coalitionforces with the sustainability necessary toachieve a quick and decisive victory...”Watson, however, points out one noticeableomission from Moving Mountains in that itsauthor fails to discuss the “what-ifs” hadSaddam Hussein’s forces had been able toutilize their tactical air power or their SCUDmissiles more effectively against the Ameri-can logistical bases. Watson adds: “If theair situation had been one in which theCoalition did not enjoy air supremacy, thenthe Allies might have had problems. Cer-tainly, they would not have enjoyed the lux-ury of dispatching long columns of nose-to-tail vehicles to travel along in daylight.”

Moving Mountains, written under the aus-pices of the Harvard School of Business, isa book that does not confine itself to purelymilitary matters. While it is not a book thatcan assist in the increase of sales or widena company’s existing market, it does, how-ever, outline the basic principles of soundmanagement and leadership that everymanager and student enrolled in a Mastersof Business Administration program shouldbe familiar with.

Moving Mountains, however, is a bookthat all in the military and in the field ofmilitary history should read. Pagonis’sbook, like Martin Van Creveld’s SupplyingWar, brings to the forefront the problem ofcreating a logistical system to suit the op-erational-strategic goals of a commander.The general’s book does an excellent job inproviding both an operational and historicalcontext from which an officer can best de-termine his or her needs for a forthcomingoperation. Besides being a “must read” forthose individuals at the various Commandand Staff Colleges, Pagonis’s book shouldbe read by officers and staff noncommis-sioned officers alike before going to theNational Training Center or the MarineCorps equivalent at Twentynine Palms,California. Moving Mountains, similar in ap-proach and content with that of James R.McDonough’s Defense of Hill 781, is abook that transcends any one service andholds lessons for all to learn and put intopractice.

SSG LEO DAUGHERTY IIIThe History Department

Ohio State UniversityColumbus, Ohio


Ordering Informationfor Fields of Armor

To order the Fields of Armor videotape, reviewed in the July-August1994 issue, phone 1-800-635-6400.

Recently, I had the honor of attending a Memorial Day ceremonythat highlighted a Medal of Honor recipient who is also a prominentfigure in Armor history.

As an active duty advisor to a Marine Reserve unit in Gulfport,Mississippi, my mission is not only to train Reserve Marines forcombat mobilization, but also to maintain a rapport with the localcommunity. This is how I learned of Colonel Welborn’s resting placehere on the Gulf Coast.

My commanding general, Major General James E. LivingstonUSMC, was the guest speaker for the Biloxi, Mississippi VeteransAdministration Hospital and National Cemetery complex’s 1994Memorial Day Remembrance.

General Livingston is an Infantry officer and a Medal of Honorrecipient from the Vietnam War. As Commanding General, MarineReserve Forces, headquartered in New Orleans, La., he was invitedto speak at this occasion, honoring the dedication of a new head-stone for a distinguished Army Medal of Honor recipient, ColonelIra Clinton Welborn, Infantry, U.S. Army.

Local press commented:

“The ceremony singled out Col. Ira Clinton Welborn of Section 12,row 4, grave 12 as one of the nation’s highest military honorees forvalor during the Battle of San Juan Hill on July 2, 1898. On Mon-day (30 May 1994) there were no flags or floral arrangements atophis grave, but there was a new marker bearing a small gold replicaof the Medal of Honor. (Author’s note: This was written prior toSenator Cochran and Mrs. Elizabeth B. Welborn, daughter in-lawpaying their respects at the grave. The national colors were placedto honor Colonel Welborn).

“Officials learned in the last year that he received the Medal ofHonor during a distinguished military career that ended in 1932.”

Colonel Welborn was a member of the West Point Class of 1898.Assigned to the U.S. 9th Infantry Regiment, as an Infantry companycommander, 2LT Welborn participated in the Santiago Campaign,the Battle of San Juan. He was also recommended for two brevetsfor gallantry in the Battle of San Juan, July 1-2, 1898. During thisbattle, 2LT Welborn voluntarily left shelter and went under fire to theaid of a private of his company who was wounded. For this action,he was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.

Colonel Welborn’s later military career included further combat inthe Philippine Insurrection. Although not as well known as otherpioneers, his influence was profound in the infant stages of the TankCorps.

“...On 5 March [1918] the Secretary of War appointed LTC Ira C.Welborn, an Infantry officer awarded the Medal of Honor during theSpanish-American War, to serve as director of the Tank Service inthe United States.”1

As a mentor to a young Army officer, Dwight D. Eisenhower,Colonel Welborn also had a profound impact on another generationof fighting men in the Second World War.

Colonel Welborn, as a combat experienced officer, gave the admin-istrative oversight to produce tanks and train young soldiers to fightin France. He also had the foresight to believe that this new techno-logical invention, would require technically competent officers. Heendorsed the commissioning of Tank Corps enlisted soldiers into the

officer ranks to provide young, proficient, bold leaders with firsthandexperience.2

Although Colonel Welborn eventually returned to the Infantry, hisimpact on the “young Turks” of the World War I Tank Corps wasfelt for years to come.

Endnotes

1Treat ’Em Rough, The Birth of American Armor 1917-20 by Dale E.Wilson, 1990, Presidio Press, p. 31.

2Ibid., pp. 64-69, 82, 209, 217.

I would like to credit the following individuals: Mr. Charlie Byrd, Na-tional Cemetery, Biloxi, Miss.; Mr. Scott Taylor, ACAP, Ft. Knox, Ky.,coordinator for dedication of Welborn Hall 1992; and CWO4 Weis-neck, USMCR, Marine Reserve Forces, Public Affairs Office, NewOrleans, La.

Captain (P) William P. McLaughlin was commissioned through theNROTC program at The Citadel in 1983. He served in 2d MarineDivision (MD) as a plt. cdr. and S-3A to include a deployment asthe assault amphibian vehicle plt. cdr. for Marine Detachment,United American States XXVII to South America. He served as arifle plt. cdr. for Fleet Anti-Terrorist Security Team Company andlater as its XO and weapons plt. cdr., completing his tour at MarineCorps Security Force Battalion as the Security Force Training Cen-ter’s training and operations officer. After completion of AOAC at Ft.Knox, he served as CO, D Co., 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, 2dMD. He deployed with his company to Southwest Asia and sup-ported the 6th and 8th Marines, and also 2d Tank Battalion duringthe ground offensive. He also served as a U.N. Observer in the West-ern Sahara. He also served as the CO of HQSVC Co. and is pres-ently the inspector-instructor for 4th Plt. (Rein.) Co. A(-) 4th AA BN,4th MD, FMF, USMCR. He has been selected to attend the MarineCorps Command and Staff College in 1995.

Colonel Ira C. Welborn, Medal of Honor Recipient andTank Corps Pioneer, Honored in Memorial Day Ceremony

by Captain (Major-Select), W. P. McLaughlin, USMC

PIN: 073154-000