Caltex Philippines, Inc., petitioner-appellee

Vs.

Enrico Palomar, in his capacity as The Postmaster General, respondent-appellant

FACTS:

In the year 1960, Caltex Philippines conceived and laid the ground work for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. The contest was entitled Caltex Hooded Pump Contest, which calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters as hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specific period.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing. This was formalized in a letter sent by Caltex to the Post master General, dated October 31, 1960, in which Caltex, thru its counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not violate the The Anti-Lottery Provisions of the Postal Law.

Unfortunately, the Palomar, the acting Postmaster General denied Caltexs request stating that the contest scheme falls within the purview of the Anti-lottery Provision and ultimately, declined Clatexs request for clearance.

Caltex sought reconsideration, stressing that there being no consideration involved in part of the contestant, the contest was not commendable as a lottery. However, the Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves consideration, or even it does not involve any consideration it still falls as Gift Enterprise, which was equally banned by the Postal Law.

ISSUE:

Whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief?Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law?HELD:

I.

By express mandate of Section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court which deals with the applicability to invoke declaratory relief which states: Declaratory relief is available to person whose rights are affected by a statute, to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the statute and for a declaration of rights thereunder.

In amplification, conformably established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain conditions:

There must be a justiciable controversy. The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse.The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy.The issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.With the appellees bent to hold the contest and the appellants threat to issue a fraud order if carried out, the contenders are confronted by an ominous shadow of imminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a declaration. And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past when it can rightly be said that merely the appellees desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others which admittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of right which is actually contested.

Construction

Is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.

It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just reached is not without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged in promotional advertising was advised by the county prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales promotion were conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal prosecution, it was held that the corporation was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief action against the county prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales promotion plan.

II.

Is the Contest Scheme a Lottery?

Lottery

Extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance

e.g. policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles and fairs as well as various forms of gambling.

Three Essential Elements:

Consideration Prize3. Chance No, according to the Supreme Court, the contest scheme is not a lottery but it appears to be more of a gratuitous distribution since nowhere in the rules is any requirements that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any services be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. Since, a prospective contestant has to do is go to a Caltex Station, request for the entry form which is available on demand and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner. Because of this, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery.

Moreover, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but it does condemn as criminal scheme in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.

Is the scheme, as sales promotion which would benefit the sponsor in the way of increased patronage be considered as a consideration and thus violates the Postal Law?

No, the required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the sponsors of the contest. The true test lies on whether or not the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance of winning and not whether or not those conducting the enterprise receiver something of value for the distribution of the prize.

Is the Contest Scheme a Gift Enterprise?

Even if the term Gift Enterprise is not yet defined explicitly, there appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is common applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement to purchase the product, the purchaser is given a chance to win a prize.

And thus, the term of gift enterprise cannot be established in the case at bar since there is not sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestant irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellees products.

The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is that every case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision. It is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith.

In the end, the Supreme Court ruled out that under the prohibitive provision of the Postal Law, gift enterprise and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration. Finding non in the contest, it was ruled out that the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for the purpose thereof.

PCFI v. NTC

Statutory Construction. Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire. PCFI v. NTCG.R. No. L-63318 November 25, 1983

FACTS:Private respondent PLDT filed an application with the NTC for the approval of a revised schedule for its Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP). The NTC issued an ex-parte order provisionally approving the revised schedule which, however, was set aside by this Court on August 31, 1982. The Court therein ruled that "there was necessity of a hearing by the Commission before it should have acted on the application of the PLDT. On November 22, 1982, the NTC rendered the questioned decision permanently approving PLDT's new and increased SIP rates. It is the submission of petitioner that the SIP schedule presented by the PLDT is pre-mature and, therefore, illegal and baseless, because the NTC has not yet promulgated the required rules and regulations implementing Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 217.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion when it approved the Revised Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP) of respondent PLDT in the absence of specific rules and regulations implementing Presidential Decree No. 217.

HELD:There is merit in the contention of petitioner that it is the duty of respondent NTC to promulgate rules and regulations. In the separate opinion of Justice Abad Santos, it is said that the case involves a simple problem of statutory construction - that of Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 217. The decision sustained the petitioner's contention that it is the duty of NTC to first promulgate rules and regulations. The resolution does not subscribe to the view that the NTC should or must promulgate rules and regulations because the decree must be given its ordinary meaning; the word used is the permissive "may" and not the mandatory "shall." The non-unanimous resolution thus relies on the canons index animi sermo est (speech is the indication of intent) and a verba legis non est recedendum (from the words of the statute there should be no departure). Any lawyer of modest sophistication knows that canons of statutory construction march in pairs of opposite. Thus with the canons above mentioned we have the following opposite: verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire (words ought to be more subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words). It is an elementary rule in statutory construction that the word "may" in a statute is permissive while the word "shall" is mandatory. The rule, however, is not absolute. The literal interpretation of the words of an act should not prevail if it creates a result contrary to the apparent intention of the legislature and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of a construction which will effectuate the legislative intention. In the case at bar compelling reasons dictate that the provision of the decree should be construed as mandatory rather than merely directory. There is no justification for the rate increase of the revised schedule of PLDT's SIP. It is untimely, considering the present economic condition obtaining in the country. The approved rate defeats the purpose of the decree which is to spread ownership among the wide base of investors. Accordingly, the decision of NTC is annulled and set aside.

National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. EismaGR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 concur with comments, 1 took no part, 1 on leaveFacts:On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment(Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City), a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusivecollective bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees at the Lumbayao manufacturing plantof the Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. (Zambowood). On 17 April 1982, such employees charged the firmbefore the same office for underpayment of monthly living allowances. On 3 May 1982, the union issued anotice of strike against the firm, alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said localunion; unfair labor practice; nonpayment of living allowances; and employment of oppressive alienmanagement personnel without proper permit. The strike began on 23 May 1982.On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against the officers and members of theunion, for damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/orrestraining order. The union filed a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restrainingorder, and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, contending that the incidents of picketing are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa 227 (LaborCode, Article 217) and not to the Court of First Instance. The motion was denied. Hence, the petition forcertiorari.Issue:Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.Held:The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation comeonly after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority whichorganizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred bylaw in words that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derivedexclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue should be resolved on the basis of the law or statutein force. Therefore, since (1) the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdiction;since (2) Presidential Decree 1691 reverted the jurisdiction with respect to money claims of workers orclaims for damages arising from employer-employee relations to the labor arbiters after PresidentialDecree 1367 transferred such jurisdiction to the ordinary courts, and since (3) Batas Pambansa 130 madeno change with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to moneyclaims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations; Article 217 is to beapplied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided forexplicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judgenow, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained thesuit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike.The Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of certiorari, and nullified and set aside the 20 July 1982 orderissued by the court a quo. It granted the writ of prohibition, and enjoined the Judge of said court, orwhoever acts in his behalf in the RTC to which this case is assigned, from taking any further action on thecivil case (Civil Case 716 [2751]), except for the purpose of dismissing it. It also made permanent therestraining order issued on 5 August 1982.Paat v CA (Natural Resources)PAAT v CAG.R. No. 111107January 10, 1997

FACTS:

On May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck.

LOWER COURTS:

* CENRO: Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation.

* RED- DENR: On June 22, 1989,i[1] Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan's action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12, 1989.ii[2]

* DENR-SECRETARY (Pending resolution)

* RTC (action for replevin): denied motion to dismiss by Paat (DENR-RED)

* CA (review): denied, has legal questions involved.

ISSUES & RULINGS:

(1) Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?

NO, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action.

(2) Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?

YES.

SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter. (Underline ours)

It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or otherforest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase to dispose of the same is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.

SECTION 68. xxx

xxx

The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (Underline ours)

A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private respondents' thinking not only because the aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor include conveyances that can be the subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact that private respondents' interpretation of the subject provision unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A.

It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not only conveyances,' but forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest products by the court' in a criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power on confiscation cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section 68, then Section 68-A would have no purpose at all.

it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D. 705, as amended.

Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence , no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.

OBITER DICTA:

(1) the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded

(1) when there is a violation of due process,(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,(5) when there is irreparable injury,(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter,(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

(2) the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

(3) The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunityto explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing.

People of the Philippines vs. M. MapaG.R. No. L-22301August 30, 1967En Banc

Facts:The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and further amended by R.A. 4. On August 13, 1962, the accused was discovered to have in its possession and control a home-made revolver cal. 22 with no license permit. In the court proceeding, the accused admitted that he owns the gun and affirmed that it has no license. The accused further stated that he is a secret agent appointed by Gov. Leviste of Batangas and showed evidences of appointment. In his defense, the accused presented the case of People vs. Macarandang, stating that he must acquitted because he is a secret agent and which may qualify into peace officers equivalent to municipal police which is covered by Art. 879.

Issue:Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper defense to illegal possession of firearms.

Ruling:The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower courts decision. It stated thatthe law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition."The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties.The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it in the list therefore the accused is not exempted.

Leveriza vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 282 (1988)FACTS:This case involves three contracts of lease:1) Contract A: executed between Civil Aeronautics Administration (lessor) and Rosario Leveriza (lessee)2) Contract B: executed between Leveriza (lessor) and Mobil Oil (lessee)3) Contract C: executed between CAA (lessor) and Mobil Oil (lessee)When Leveriza subleased the property to Mobil Oil (Contract B) without permission from the lessor, CAA cancelled Contract A and executed Contract C with Mobil Oil. Leveriza contended that Contract C was invalid not only because it was entered into by CAA without approval by the Department Secretary but also because it was not executed by the President of the Philippines or officer duly designated. Accordingto Leveriza, the officer duly designated to cancel the contract is not the Airport General Manager but the Secretary of Public Works and Communication or the Director of the CAA.ISSUE:W/N Contract C was validly entered intoHELD:SC held that the Airport General Manager had authority to enter into contracts of lease. In executing Contract C, the Airport General Manager signed for the Director of the CAA, who subsequently ratified thesame.Under sec. 567 of the RAC, a contract of lease may be executed by: (1) President; (2) officer duly designated by him; and (3) officer expressly vested by law. Under sec. 32 (24) of RA 776, the Director of the CAA is one such officer vested by law.Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San NicolasGR L-34568, 28 March 1988 (159 SCRA 369)

Facts:

On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte seeking the adoption of minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. However, minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein filed an opposition to the said adoption. They contended that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Article 335 of the Civil Code, which provides that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or children by legal fiction cannot adopt.

Issue: Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are disqualified to adopt under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil Code.

Held:

The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word descendant, found in the Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned, to children. The children thus mentioned have a clearly defined meaning in law and do not include grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subjects of statutory construction. In the present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys.The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Special Proceedings 37), wthout pronouncement as to costs.

DANILO E. PARAS,petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent.Ponente: FRANCISCOFACTS:Petitioner was the incumbent Punong Barangay who won during the last regular barangay election.A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay.At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law.Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition and set recall election date. To prevent the holding of recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for injunction which was later dismissed. Petitioner filed petition forcertiorariwith urgent prayer for injunction, insistingthat the recall election is barred by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election under Sec. 74(b) of Local Government Code (LGC) which states that no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.ISSUE:Whether or not the prohibition onSec.74(b) of the LGC may refer to SK elections, where the recall election is for Barangay post.HELD:NO. But petition was dismissed for having become moot and academic.RATIO:Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the officials replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election.It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.By the time of judgment, recall was no longer possible because of the limitation stated under the same Section 74(b) now referred to as Barangay Elections.CONCURRING OPINION:DAVIDE:Aregularelection, whether national or local, can only refer to an election participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and who are registered voters. One of the requirements for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he can vote is that he be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in the Omnibus Election Code (Section 113-118).Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec. 424, Local Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many who are not qualified to vote in a regular election,viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18. In no manner then may SK elections be considered a regular election (whether national or local).

PERFERCTO FLORESCA VS PHILEX MINING CORPORATIONFACTS:On June 28, 1967, some employees of Philex Mining Corporation died asa result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the copper mine (Tuba,Benguet) during underground operations. Allegedly, Philex was in violation ofgovernment rules and regulations for negligently and deliberately failing to takethe required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working underground. The Petitioners (Floresca et al) are the heirs of the deceased employees ofPhilex Mining Corporation. Petitioners moved to claim their benefits pursuant to theWorkmens Compensation Act before the Workmens Compensation Commission. Theyalso petitioned before the regular courts and sued Philex for additional damages. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners havealready claimed benefits under the WCA.ISSUE: Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue.HELD: Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filedfor benefits under the WCA then they will be prohibited from proceeding with a civil casebefore the regular courts. On the contrary, if they sued before the civil courts then theywould also be prohibited from claiming benefits under the WCA. The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency dueto ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed ofsuch a remedy. The SC ruled that the dismissal of the case in the lower court bereversed and case is remanded for further proceedings.However, if in case the petitioners win in the lower court, whatever award may begranted, the amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SCemphasized that if they would go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of thelaw may be defeated. (Refer to excerpt below)WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURTS ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED ANDSET ASIDE AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD AGREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS, THEPAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM PURSUANT TO THE WORKMENS COMPENSATION ACTSHALL BE DEDUCTED. NO COSTS.Justice Gutierrez dissentingNo civil suit should prosper after claiming benefits under the WCA. If employers arealready liable to pay benefits under the WCA they should not be compelled to bear the cost of damage suits or get insurance for that purpose. Theexclusion provided by theWCA can only be properly removed by the legislature NOT the SC.China Banking Corporation vs Ortega DigestFacts:

Vicente Acaban won in a civilcase forsum of money against B & B Forest Development Corporation.To satisfy the judgment, the Acaban sought the garnishment of thebank depositof the B & B Forest Development Corporation with the ChinaBanking Corporation(CBC). Accordingly, a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and served on said bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. Liong was ordered to inform the Court whether or not there is a deposit in the CBC of B & B Forest Development Corporation, and if there is any deposit, to hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order from the Court. CBC and Liong refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgmentdebtorby invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 ( Secrecy ofBank DepositsAct) which allegedly prohibits the disclosure of any information concerning to bank deposits.

Issue:

Whether or not abanking institutionmay validly refuse to comply with a court processes garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405.

Held:

No. The lower court did not order anexaminationof orinquiryinto deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for the purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order. It is sufficiently clear that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into bank deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case, and the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process.It is hard toconceivethat it was ever within the intention of Congress to enabledebtorsto evade payment of their just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient ofconvertingtheir assets into cash and depositing the same in a bank.(China Banking Corporation vs Ortega, G.R. No. L-34964, 31 January 1973)