financing women-owned smes: a case study in ghana

CONTRACTOR

The QED Group, LLC 1250 Eye Street Suite 1100 Washington, D.C. 20005

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Heather Kipnis is an international finance and development specialist with nine years of comprehensive experience in private wealth management, microfinance, impact investing, SME banking, and gender finance across Europe, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East. Currently a SME Banking Consultant with the International Finance Corporation, she has worked with the Inter-American Development Bank, Guatemalan Ministry of Economy, and Vital Voices. She has an MBA in Global Development and Entrepreneurship from Thunderbird School of Global Management.

Financing Women-Owned SMEs in Private Education: A Case Study in Ghana 1

FINANCING WOMEN-OWNED SMES IN PRIVATE EDUCATION:

A Case Study in Ghana


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Special thanks are due to the following people who provided valuable assistance without which this report could not have been completed. Any faults that remain are the sole responsibility of the author.

• Representatives from Opportunity International Savings & Loan (OISL), especially the Education Finance Team who provided invaluable administrative and logistic support to the consultancy while in-country.

• Former staff of OISL

• Former Mitchell Group Program Coordinator, Mr. Baba Anaba

• Representatives from private business development services provider, Blue Alliance

To those people and all others who contributed to the provision of information to the consultant, thank you. The attached Annex lists key people interviewed.


CONTENTS

ACRONYMS ....................................................................................................................................................................... 5

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................................. 6

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................................ 9

BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................................................. 12

FINDINGS ......................................................................................................................................................................... 16

RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................................................. 25

ANNEX .............................................................................................................................................................................. 27

WORKS CITED ............................................................................................................................................................... 28


ACRONYMS

APS Affordable Private Schools Pilot Program

BDS Business Development Services

DCA USAID’s Development Credit Authority

ED USAID’s Office of Education

GES Ghana Education Services

GNAPS Ghana National Association of Private Schools

IFC International Finance Corporation

MFI Microfinance Institution

MPEP USAID’s Office of Microenterprise and Private Enterprise Promotion

MSME Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises

OI Opportunity International

OISL Opportunity International Savings & Loan

PAR Portfolio at Risk

NBFI Non-banking Financial Institutions

NPL Non Performing Loan

SME Small and Medium Enterprises

TA Technical Assistance

TMG The Mitchell Group

WLSME Women Leadership in Small & Medium Enterprise Initiative

USAID United States Agency for International Development


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

According to World Bank estimates, micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) contribute about 70 percent to Ghana’s GDP and account for about 92 percent of businesses in Ghana.1 Forty-four percent of these enterprises are female-owned.2 Women control more than 50 percent of informal sector businesses.3 About 58 percent of women-owned MSMEs face limited or no access to credit, severely inhibiting firm growth.4 Women continue to encounter difficulties in accessing credit compared to their male counterparts, such as (1) land tenure issues, (2) low awareness of business laws, (3) lack of education and skills in financial transactions and sound business practices, and (4) risk aversion transitioning from micro to SME-size businesses.5 According to International Finance Corporation (IFC), a significant improvement in gender equity in Ghana will have significant beneficial effects on economic growth rates, estimated to be about 2.5 percent a year.6

Education is a key focus for the Government of Ghana.7 A 2005 study, Private Education is Good for the Poor,8 indicates that the private sector is significantly contributing to the provision of education: private, non-governmental, and/or unregistered schools serve low-income, underserved populations throughout Ghana. Many of these private schools are unregistered SMEs that started as day care centers run by women and have grown in response to the need for schools within close proximity to rural villages. Women’s high participation rates in Ghana’s education sector are also consistent in other Sub-Saharan countries, where female low-income private school ownership in Malawi and Uganda are 60 percent and 50 percent, respectively.9 The existing literature shows that low-fee, non-governmental schools play an important role in the Ghanaian education system—one that may provide higher quality education than the public sector.

Since 1999, USAID has used its Development Credit Authority (DCA) to issue partial credit guarantees to leverage private capital for development objectives. A DCA guarantee is a risk-sharing agreement with partner financial institutions, investors, and development organizations to unlock financing for entrepreneurs in the developing world. DCA guarantees provide a partner financial institution with partial guarantee coverage (typically 50 percent) on a loan or portfolio of loans in a given sector (e.g. agriculture, health, energy) that the lender perceives as too "risky." DCA guarantees mobilize private sector lending with minimal U.S. Government funding that is only used as a set-aside in the case of potential defaults. From FY1999 – FY2012, DCA has mobilized over US$2.7 billion in private capital with a budgeted subsidy cost of only US$118 million. Since FY1999, DCA geographic coverage has expanded to over 70 countries.

1 World Bank Development Indicators, Ghana, 2007 2 Ibid. The definition of a woman-owned SME is based on the World Bank Enterprise survey definition, which asks whether at least one of the owners is female, or whether any of the females are owners. 3 Voices of Women Entrepreneurs in Africa, IFC, 2007 4 Ibid 5 Ibid 6 Ibid 7 Government of Ghana, Education Strategic Plan , 2003 – 2015 8 Ibid 9 Interviews with Opportunity International, 2013 Financing Women-Owned SMEs in Private Education: A Case Study in Ghana 6

In Ghana, the DCA Agreement with Opportunity International Savings & Loan (OISL) was programmed to enable unregistered, C and D private schools gain access to formal credit financing with a 50 percent risk-share of potential net losses on principal. By guaranteeing loans up to US$2.5 million from 2009 to 2016 for expansion purposes, USAID and OISL not only plan to stimulate the flow of affordable growth capital to private education, but also improve quality, affordable private school education overall.

FINDINGS

OISL’s motivation to partner with USAID and utilize a risk-sharing guarantee targeting the private education sector can be attributed to: 1) the need and desire to hedge the risk of entering a new market and, 2) the organization’s commitment to its social mission of transforming lives.

Under the DCA Agreement, loans to women and men-owned schools are similar in loan tenor and interest rates, with marginal differences in size of loan disbursement, size of business (determined by number of employees), and purpose of loan; differences are found in collateral pledged.

Ownership by Gender: The number of women-owned SME schools and the value of portfolio allocation to women are 43 percent and 45 percent, respectively, suggesting that loan sizes to women-owned SMEs are similar to men-owned SMEs.

Median Loan Size: The median loan size for female-owned schools is higher than male’s, at US$4,214 versus US$3,556. However, this changes depending on the size of each business (defined by number of employees). Understanding the different loan sizes per gender at different stages of growth could provide insight into the most appropriate financing for women-owned SMEs.

Size of Business: 94 percent of the schools, both men and women-owned, are small enterprises including between 6 and 50 employees. Schools that include between 11 and 50 employees are the highest represented across genders: 67 percent of women-owned schools and 63 percent of men-owned schools in the program fall within this size category.

Purpose of Loan: More women finance construction and land ownership/rental projects through education loans than do their male counterparts.

Collateral: As a percentage of the loan value, collateral is greater than 200 percent for 62 percent of loans of the 290 loans in the DCA program. A higher amount of women-owned schools are affected by the collateral issue: 66 percent of women borrowers pledging greater than 200 percent of collateral. Moreover, 19 percent of men-owned schools under the DCA guarantee pledge less than 100 percent of collateral, compared with only 13 percent of women clients.

The representation of women beneficiaries under the DCA guarantee is likely a factor of OISL’s business model. Most of OISL’s clients are women because a focus on them is inherent in the microfinance business model and its social goal of empowering women. Although the DCA guarantee has mitigated some risks


associated with launching a new product, it has been a secondary factor in lending to the private education sector and has not influenced OISL’s credit underwriting policies or interest towards women.

In terms of distinctions between the gender of the business-owner, there is no observed difference in the business models of the men and women-owned private schools. There is, however, higher involvement of women school proprietors in the day-to-day operations of the schools versus men. Furthermore, loan officers reported that women are a preferred client segment, despite lower repayment rates in the education sector and aversion to risk. Under the DCA guarantee program, there have been approximately six defaults claimed (four were women-owned schools and two were men-owned schools) and current PAR > 90 (Portfolio at Risk) value is 0 percent. Despite the marginally higher defaults among women, they are viewed as preferred clients. Credit officers tend to prefer working with women clients because they are more proactive communicators, whereas men require additional follow-up time and effort.

Marketing to men and women-owned firms revealed some contrasts. For example, women and men responded differently to marketing approaches. Outreach to male school proprietors tended to focus on making the financial business case for taking out a loan with OISL and participating in trainings; whereas outreach to women was more focused on how financial and business management benefits could contribute to their social vision and the needs of the children and the greater school. Outreach strategies for the technical assistance (TA) component did not explicitly report on gender of school proprietors. Rather, a coordinated and targeted approach was critical to reaching unregistered C and D schools.

Overall, OISL’s staff has noticed a positive change in women borrowers due to TA, particularly increased confidence and improved ability to understand cash flows. The low-income, unrated C and D segment of the education sector has attracted the attention of other lending microfinance institutions; however, the competition seems to be more intense in the A and B segment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Gather gender-disaggregated data to assess how a gender component may influence a program.

2. Incorporate gender-sensitive sales techniques in program outreach efforts to women-owned SMEs.

3. Include training modules specific to the targeted sectors in TA activities, in addition to business and financial management capacity building.

4. Clearly define targets in terms of gender.

5. Examine collateral requirements, for the remaining lifetime of the credit guarantee, to understand why current and historic percentages of collateral have been required on loans under DCA guarantees.

6. Explore innovative pricing strategies, alternative collateral requirements (e.g., movable), and financial products that promote asset-building for women borrowers.


INTRODUCTION

With its new Gender Policy,10 the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is interested in gender integration to support effective development assistance across sectors, including in broad-based economic growth. USAID’s Microenterprise & Private Enterprise Promotion (MPEP) Office has commissioned two case studies of guarantees delivered through USAID’s Development Credit Authority (DCA) and accompanying financial sector projects that targeted or benefited women-owned SME borrowers in Ethiopia and Ghana.11

Since 1999, USAID has used DCA to issue partial credit guarantees to leverage private capital for development objectives. A DCA guarantee is a risk-sharing agreement with partner financial institutions, investors, and development organizations to unlock financing for entrepreneurs in the developing world. DCA guarantees provide a partner financial institution with partial guarantee coverage (typically 50 percent) on a loan or portfolio of loans in a given sector (e.g. agriculture, health, energy) that the lender perceives as too "risky." DCA guarantees mobilize private sector lending with minimal U.S. Government funding that is only used as a set-aside in the case of potential defaults. From FY1999 – FY2012, DCA has mobilized over US$2.7 billion in private capital with a budgeted subsidy cost of only US$118 million. Since FY1999, DCA geographic coverage has expanded to over 70 countries.

This case study focuses on USAID’s DCA guarantee program with Opportunity International Savings & Loans (OISL) in Ghana, and the accompanying Technical Assistance (TA) project implemented by The Mitchell Group (TMG). The DCA guarantee and TA project target the private education sector. This case study explores the following questions, with a focus on women school proprietors. The lessons learned from this study are aimed at informing the future design of similar donor activities in a range of contexts, including in Ghana as well as other countries:

• What were the partner MFI’s reasons for utilizing a DCA guarantee to target low-income private schools?

• How do the partner MFI’s loans to women borrowers differ from men borrowers (in terms of size, sector, number of disbursed loans, repayment patterns, previous experience borrowing, etc.), and why do stakeholders think that is the case?

• How does the above pattern compare to the proportion of women running private schools in Ghana in general? Globally? How does it compare to women’s access to SME credit in Ghana in general?

10 http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/policy_planning_and_learning/documents/GenderEqualityPolicy.pdf 11 To support the work that is being done, and that has already been done, in the areas of gender and SME development, USAID’s Microenterprise & Private Enterprise Promotion Office (MPEP) launched the Women’s Leadership in SMEs online community platform, www.wlsme.org. The site allows practitioners in the development community to further the discussion around these issues and to generate a growing body of knowledge on how to address limitations to women’s SME growth. Financing Women-Owned SMEs in Private Education: A Case Study in Ghana 9

http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/policy_planning_and_learning/documents/GenderEqualityPolicy.pdf

• Has the DCA influenced the partner MFI’s credit underwriting policies, especially with regard to collateral and cash-flow-based lending? How has the DCA influenced the partner MFI’s business interest towards women-owned SMEs? Has a business case successfully been made?

• How have the technical assistance activities target men versus women private school proprietors, especially at the SME level? What are the unique marketing challenges for these women compared to male counterparts?

• Did the technical assistance change the behavior women school proprietors after participating in the project? How does this compare to men participants’ behaviors? Are there different modes and content of training that work better for the women participants as compared to men? Are there any differences in how certification or fee-for-training might work (or not) between the genders?

• What were the specific technical assistance needs unique to private education, compared to other sectors?

• Were there any commonalities in business models for the most successful women proprietors, i.e., those who were able to grow their private schools most in terms of enrollment and employees?

• Since the end of the TA project in 2010, are private business development services, especially in training, being offered to private school proprietors? Why or why not? Has there been interest from any other lenders in this sector, and why?

• What are the lessons learned about targeting women-owned SME borrowers with a guarantee and with technical assistance in the Ghanaian context? Are there lessons for gender integration in future design of other USAID programs/projects in SME development? Are there any unintended consequences of the DCA guarantee?

• Are there any recommendations for the remaining lifetime of the credit guarantee in this respect?

The Ghana project was chosen as a focus case because it is one of very few USAID DCA Agreements benefiting a high number of women-owned SME borrowers without explicitly seeking to benefit women SME entrepreneurs.12

Reporting constraints

Given that the TA project unexpectedly ended in 2010, not all relevant stakeholders could be interviewed nor could some information be collected. Data on the TA activities was limited to an internal USAID assessment, written by TMG in February 2010, and anecdotes from interviews. Due to limited time in-country, interviews with Ghana Education System (GES) and the Ghana National Association of Private Schools (GNAPS) were not possible. This limited data collection did not provide enough information to assess the

12 One or two other similar projects were not chosen for the case study because USAID has commissioned performance evaluations of those. Financing Women-Owned SMEs in Private Education: A Case Study in Ghana 10

effectiveness of the trainings in terms of preferred training methodologies and perceptions of the fee-for-training model.

Case study activities

The activities undertaken to conduct this case study consisted of desk research, in-country interviews, and an analysis of confidential DCA guarantee portfolio data. Approximately 20 interviews were conducted with relevant stakeholders. Interviews with USAID’s Office of Education and USAID/DCA staff were held in Washington, D.C., and one week was spent in-country interviewing stakeholders. Individuals that were not available to meet during the in-country visit were interviewed over the phone.


BACKGROUND

WOMEN SMES AND ACCESS TO CREDIT

Ghana is one the fastest growing economies in Africa, experiencing strong growth over the past decade with per capita income of US$1,410, higher than the regional average of US$1,257. GDP is forecasted to grow 7 percent in the coming year.13 According to World Bank estimates, micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) contribute about 70 percent of Ghana’s GDP and account for about 92 percent of businesses in Ghana.14 Forty-four percent of these enterprises are female-owned.15 Although such figures are impressive for the Sub-Saharan region, there is still a visible gender gap in women’s economic participation and opportunity. Ghana is ranked 71st out of 135 countries in the 2012 World Economic Forum Gender Gap Report, and number 10 out of 25 ranked in the Sub-Saharan Africa region.16 Women control more than 50 percent of informal sector businesses,17 and women continue to encounter difficulties in accessing credit compared to their male counterparts. The lack of access to finance, especially for women engaged in micro- and small-scale enterprises in rural communities, is a major impediment to the country’s economic development.18 According to International Finance Corporation (IFC), a significant improvement in gender equity in Ghana—be it in terms of human capital accumulation, women’s economic participation or otherwise—will have significant beneficial effects on economic growth rates estimated to be about 2.5 percent a year.19

Women are particularly disadvantaged in meeting their business growth needs as they face a number of difficulties, including: (1) land tenure issues stemming from their treatment under existing land tenure customs, (2) low awareness of business laws, (3) lack of education and skills in financial transactions and sound business practices, and (4) risk aversion in transitioning from micro to small and medium-sized businesses.20 An IFC survey conducted in 2007 indicated that approximately 58 percent of women-owned MSMEs perceived limited or no access to credit as a severe barrier to growth.

PRIVATE EDUCATION SECTOR

Education is a key focus for the Government of Ghana.21 Many observers believe that the private sector has very little to offer in terms of reaching the country’s educational needs, especially the poor.22 However, the 2005 study Private Education is Good for the Poor,23 indicates that the private sector is significantly contributing to the provision of education: private, non-governmental, and/or unregistered schools serve low-

13 The Little Data Book on Gender, World Bank, 2013 14 World Bank Development Indicators, Ghana, 2007 15 Ibid. The definition of a woman-owned SME is based on the enterprise survey definition which asks whether at least one of the owners is female, or whether any of the females are owners. 16 The Global Gender Gap Report, World Economic Forum, 2012 17 Voices of Women Entrepreneurs in Africa, IFC, 2007 18 Ministry of Women and Children's Affairs. Republic of Ghana, 2010 19 Voices of Women Entrepreneurs in Africa, IFC, 2007 20 Ibid 21 Government of Ghana, Education Strategic Plan , 2003 – 2015 22 Tooley and Dixon, CATO Institute, 2005. 23 Ibid Financing Women-Owned SMEs in Private Education: A Case Study in Ghana 12

income, underserved populations throughout Ghana. Private schools educate 22 percent of all school-enrolled children in Ghana.24 This figure only captures data for registered schools.25 The same 2005 study estimated that 22.7 percent of the private schools in the Greater Accra area were unregistered. Many of these schools started as day care centers by women and have grown in response to the need for schools within close proximity to rural villages. Gender disaggregated data on private school ownership in Ghana is not available, but interviews suggest that many of these schools are owned by women, and of those schools owned by males, the majority are managed/run by women. This high participation of women in the education sector is also consistent in other Sub-Saharan countries—female low-income private school ownership in Malawi and Uganda is observed to be 60 percent and 50 percent, respectively.26 The existing literature shows that low-fee, non-governmental schools play an important role in the Ghanaian education system—one that may provide higher quality education than the public sector. Parents cite school quality as their main reason for sending their children to low-cost, private schools instead of public schools.27

However, low-income schools face severe constraints to growth: low capacity of teachers to ensure positive academic outcomes, low capacity of schools to raise sufficient funds, low capacity of parents to pay tuition on time and in full, low capacity of the government to support the private sector, and low capacity of school owners to run effective schools.28 Another critical challenge stems from limited resources, including books, computer and science labs; libraries for students; and inadequate infrastructure. Since these schools cater to the poorest communities in Ghana, cash flows are erratic. Term fees are often covered on informal payment plans that align with the parents’ income generation. In every school interviewed, the poorest children are often sponsored by the owners.

Many of these challenges are due to a lack of access to credit. Private schools at the lower end of the market have a difficult time accessing finance, due to their inability to provide collateral, a lack of access to information, and limited financial and business management skills. Financial institutions, particularly commercial banks, are reluctant to extend loans to these clients because of the high risks.29 Given the importance of private schools, USAID launched the Affordable Private Schools Pilot Program (APS) in 2007 to address the need and market opportunity for private schools in Ghana at scale.

PROGRAM HISTORY

In 2007, USAID launched the APS project in Ghana, in partnership with the Opportunity International Development Foundation. The overall learning objectives of the pilot program were to:

24 Calculated with 2010-2011 data from Ministry of Education of Ghana http://moe.gov.gh/docs/Basic/2010-2011/Basic%20National%20Profile.pdf 25 Private schools must be registered with Ghana Education Services (GES). Depending on the quality of the infrastructure, facilities, student/teacher ratios, and exam scores, schools received an A, B, C, or D rating with A being the highest rating obtainable. 26 Interviews with OI, 2013 27 The Search for Effective EFA Policies: The Role of Private Schools for Low income Children, TMG, 2011 28 Ibid 29 Ibid Financing Women-Owned SMEs in Private Education: A Case Study in Ghana 13

http://moe.gov.gh/docs/Basic/2010-2011/Basic%20National%20Profile.pdf

http://moe.gov.gh/docs/Basic/2010-2011/Basic%20National%20Profile.pdf

• Stimulate affordable private financing for private schools;

• Build the business, managerial, and teaching capabilities of private schools;

• Build banks’ capacity to develop appropriate credit products for private schools;

• Develop mutually beneficial relationships between private schools and the Ministry of Education

This project targeted government-certified private schools in the “C” and “D” grades to focus on a burgeoning market since the IFC had earlier targeted larger, private schools (“A” and “B” grades) with more access to capital.30 The project included a US$5 million DCA credit guarantee to OISL for equipment and construction for private schools and TMG’s accompanying technical assistance project. The latter project partnered with the Ghana National Association of Private Schools (GNAPS) to build private school proprietors’ capacity and advocate for policy support. The technical assistance component ended unexpectedly in 2010 due to contract ceiling issues, and at close-out there was an effort to transition the training activities to private providers. The DCA credit guarantee will run until 2016.

DCA guarantee with OISL

OISL is a leading regulated, non-bank financial institution (NBFI) in Ghana and an operating partner of the Opportunity International (OI) network.31 OISL was licensed by the Bank of Ghana in June 2004 and began operating in savings and loans in September 2004. By 2011, they operated with a gross loan portfolio of US$25.2 million and served 57, 865 borrowers.32 OISL provides a number of financial products targeting the private education sector, ranging from salary loan products for teachers, credit for tertiary students, and term loans for private school proprietors.33 The DCA Agreement with OISL was programmed to help unregistered, C and D private schools gain access to formal credit financing with a 50 percent risk-share of potential net losses on principal. By guaranteeing loans up to US$2.5 million from 2009 to 2016 for expansion purposes (i.e., construction, expansion of classrooms, school bus purchases, etc.), USAID and OISL not only plan to stimulate the flow of affordable growth capital to private education, but also improve quality and affordability overall.

Technical assistance activities

A key objective of the APS program was to address the challenge of limited business knowledge amongst private school proprietors. The TA component of the pilot aimed to support the private education sector by:

30 GES assigns a rating system to private schools, which goes from A through D in descending order of quality and serves to place limits on private school tuition. “A” schools are allowed to charge the highest tuition, while “D” schools and unrated schools the lowest. Grading criteria is not defined or consistent, but generally is dependent upon infrastructure, facilities, and test scores. Unrated schools are unrecognized or unregistered private schools that have not applied to be registered, as well as those unable to meet the registration criteria. (Tooley & Dixon, 2005, CDC Consult Limited, 2010) 31 OI provides significant back-office support and assists in product development for individual institutions like OISL in its network. OI’s investment arm is Opportunity Transformation Investments (OTI), which is the majority owner of OISL. (USAID DCA Ghana Risk Assessment, 2008) 32MFI Report: Opportunity International Savings and Loans-Ghana, 2011 33 Interview with OISL Education Finance team, 2013 Financing Women-Owned SMEs in Private Education: A Case Study in Ghana 14

(1) providing direct support to selected schools to improve their ability to access finance; (2) building the business, managerial, and teaching capabilities of private schools; and (3) developing local capacity and a business model to continue support for the schools after the completion of the pilot program. USAID implementer, TMG, coordinated with private business development service (BDS) providers to conduct the trainings and to pilot a certification scheme with a fee-for-training business model. Trainings were conducted throughout the country. In Accra, four to five seminars were conducted over the course of the two-year pilot with an average 40 participants.34 The trainings included strategic planning, accounting and financial management, education management and information systems, human resource management, and curriculum and learning management. The unexpected end to the TA component in 2010 ended plans for capacity building activities scheduled with private BDS providers.

34 Interviews with Blue Alliance, TMG, and OISL, 2013 Financing Women-Owned SMEs in Private Education: A Case Study in Ghana 15

FINDINGS

OISL’S MOTIVATION TO PARTNER WITH USAID’S DCA GUARANTEE PROGRAM

An objective of USAID’s APS Pilot Program was to stimulate affordable private financing for private schools. The purpose of the DCA guarantee was to absorb some of the risk of this asset class for OISL, thereby encouraging them to lend more to the sector. All interviews indicated that OISL’s interest in the private education sector was in SME lending rather than expanding reach to women-owned enterprises via the private education sector. OISL’s motivation to partner with USAID and utilize a risk-sharing guarantee targeting the private education sector can be attributed to: (1) the need and desire to hedge the risk of entering a new market, and (2) the organization’s commitment to its social mission of transforming lives. For OISL, at least, serving women borrowers was part of their social mission, but also an implicit side benefit of the guarantee’s focus on private education.

Hedge risk associated with entering a new market

In 2008, OISL was investigating scaling up microfinance operations into SME lending. The NBFI found that the private education sector offered an opportunity to develop specific SME products and target a new, underserved market. Their research demonstrated that low-income-serving, unrated, and C- and D-grade schools were not an attractive market for commercial banks due to their limited potential fee revenue and inability to provide sufficient collateral.35 This opened a window of opportunity for OISL. OISL’s lending model entails accepting vehicles for collateral and requiring credible information instead of formal financial statements, which most low-income schools do not have and do not know how to prepare. Nevertheless, since OISL is a regulated NBFI and does lend from the deposits it has mobilized, hedging risk and ensuring financial performance were critical in assessing whether to serve this new target market. The guarantee was helpful in this regard.

Social performance

The mission of OISL is to transform the lives of its clients. Serving the education sector, in particular private schools in underserved areas targeting low-income students, was an opportunity for OISL to turn the institution’s social commitment into results by improving education.

DCA GUARANTEE INFLUENCE ON OISL AND WOMEN SMES

Under the DCA Agreement, loans to women and men-owned schools are similar in loan tenor and interest rates, with marginal differences in size of loan disbursement, size of business (determined by number of employees), and purpose of loan; differences are found in collateral pledged. As of March 2013, OISL has disbursed over 290 DCA-guaranteed loans, totaling approximately US$1.96 million. Of these loans, 65 were repeat loans to existing DCA guarantee beneficiaries. Of the repeat borrowers, 23 percent hired new employees since their first OISL loan. Additionally, repayment rates have been high for the portfolio with no current, non-performing loans (i.e., loans without interest or principle payments for more than 90 days). The

35 Interview with OISL, 2013 Financing Women-Owned SMEs in Private Education: A Case Study in Ghana 16

claimed default rate to date is 2.1 percent. These statistics demonstrate demand for private school finance and that the low-income private school sector is creditworthy.

In terms of ownership, women-owned private schools represent about 43 percent of the beneficiaries under the DCA Agreement (Figure 1). In terms of loan value, 45 percent of portfolio allocation was to women-owned schools (Figure 2). This suggests capital allocation to women-owned SMEs is similar to men-owned SMEs and that the size of loan disbursements is similar for men and women.

Loan size

The median loan size for women-owned private schools is higher than men-owned schools (see Table 1). This is consistent with findings across DCA’s Global Portfolio where the median loan size for women-owned SMEs in the education sector is also higher than men-owned SMEs.36 This may be explained by the purpose of loans per gender, whereas women school proprietors in Ghana tend to invest more in capital intensive projects such as construction and land ownership and men invest more in transportation services for the school. The purpose of loans under the DCA guarantee with OISL is explained in detail later in this report. It is interesting to note the differences in median loan size within the different bands of school sizes. Women-owned schools with 1-5 employees37 and 11-50 employees have higher median loan sizes than men-owned schools with 6-10 employees. A reason for this could be that among the women-owned schools, there is a higher proportion of schools with 1-5 and 11-50 employees; whereas there is a higher proportion of male-owned schools with 6-10 employees (see Table 2). According to OISL, there are no observable differences in the business models of men and women-owned schools, but further investigation into the characteristics of each school at different levels of growth (determined by number of employees) may help explain the differences in the median loan sizes. Understanding these differences could provide insight into the most appropriate types of financing for women-owned private schools at different stages of growth.

36 Storm, 2013 37 Private schools with 1- 5 employees were considered in this report because the size of loans disbursed to these schools was greater than US$2,000. For the purpose of the Global DCA Portfolio Analysis, USAID defines an SME as borrowing US$2,000 or greater.

55.0%

45.0%

Figure 2: Portfolio Value by Gender Ownership

Male-owned

Women-owned57.2%

43.4%

Figure 1: Number of Loans by Gender Ownership

Men-owned

Women-owned


TABLE 1: MEDIAN LOAN DISBURSEMENT BY SIZE OF BUSINESS AND GENDER

Size of Business Male-Owned Woman-Owned Total

>100 $ 993.4 $ 0 $ 993.4

51–100 $ 2,954.2 $ 0 $ 2,954.2

11–50 $ 3,526.5 $ 4,267.6 $ 4,071.5

6–10 $ 4,474.9 $ 2,848.3 $ 3,644.3

1–5 $ 2,755.0 $ 4,267.6 $ 3,912.0

All $ 3,556.3 $ 4,214.4 $ 3,757.0

TABLE 2: PERCENTAGE OF LOANS BY SIZE OF BUSINESS AND GENDER

Size of Business Male-Owned Woman-Owned Total

>100 0.6% 0.0% 0.3%

51–100 1.2% 0.0% 0.7%

11–50 62.8% 66.7% 64.5%

6–10 32.9% 24.6% 29.0%

1–5 2.4% 8.7% 5.2%

All 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%


Size of business

Global research on women-owned SMEs indicates that women typically own smaller businesses than their male counterparts. According to OISL’s Edufinance38 team, among their clients, male school proprietors have larger schools with more full-time employees.39 However, under the DCA guarantee, female-owned schools represent a similar distribution in size of business, defined by number of employees, when compared to male-owned schools. In general, the schools are small with less than 50 full-time employees. This is due to the criteria that only unrated schools and C- and D-grade schools are eligible for the DCA guarantee. Such schools are typically smaller than A- and B-grade schools. As the private schools grow and meet higher infrastructure and quality of education standards, they climb the grade scale to earn A and B ratings. Once a school has graduated from a C rating, it is moved out of the DCA guarantee coverage and into OISL’s greater Edufinance SME loan portfolio. Or, the client may leave and become a client of competing commercial banks.40

Portfolio data indicates that 94 percent of the schools, both men and women-owned, are small enterprises with between 6 and 50 employees. Schools that include between 11 and 50 employees are the highest represented across genders: 67 percent of women-owned schools (Figure 3) and 63 percent of men-owned schools (Figure 4) in the program fall within this size category. One reason there are more smaller, women-owned businesses with 1 to 5 employees may be that women tend to start their schools as informal day care centers that then grow into the unrated, C, and D private schools targeted by the DCA Agreement. Overall, schools with 11 to 50 full-time employees represent most of men and women-owned private schools in the program.

38 Edufinance refers to OISL’s entire portfolio of education financial products and services for private schools, including DCA guarantee. 39 Interviews with OISL Edufinace team, 2013 40 Thirty-seven percent of loans in OISL’s Edufinance portfolio have graduated to higher ratings and OISL has retained 65 percent of these clients.

0.0% 0.0%

66.7%

24.6%

8.7%

Figure 3: Women-owned Private Schools

by # of Employees

>100

51--100

11--50

6--10

1--5

0.6% 1.2%

62.8%

32.9%

2.4%

Figure 4: Male-owned Private Schools by # of Employees

>100

51--100

11--50

6--10

1--5


Purpose of loan

Eighty-two percent of the DCA portfolio is for school construction projects, including expanding the number of classrooms, replacing wood infrastructure with cooler cement for Ghana’s hot climate, and building facilities (i.e., libraries, science and computer labs, washrooms, clinics, and kitchens). Interestingly, more women finance construction and land ownership/rental projects through education loans than do their male counterparts (see Table 2). Although men also invest in these activities, a higher proportion of male school proprietors invest in transportation. Interviews suggest that male school proprietors use a portion of education loans for other, albeit related, entrepreneurial ventures. Also, Ghana’s land titling issues—more severe for women—may provide more motivation for women to invest in land ownership/rental projects.

TABLE 3: PURPOSE OF LOAN

Construction Transportation

Land (Purchase/Rental)

Working Capital

All

Men-owned 80.1% 12.2% 3.8% 3.8% 100.0%

Women-owned 84.3% 6.7% 5.2% 3.7% 100.0%

All 82.1% 9.7% 4.5% 3.8% 100.0%

Collateral

In Ghana, land titling challenges are common among all business-owners regardless of gender; however, women are disproportionately affected because women’s property rights in and out of marriage are unclear.41 For first-time women borrowers, it is often more difficult to put down collateral than for men because they have more funding options (e.g., friends or other business ventures).42 OISL’s competitive advantage in private education loans is their ability to accept lower amounts of collateral for the riskier segment of the education sector, and the NBFI does so for 16 percent of loans under the DCA portfolio. Yet, the portfolio data indicates that collateral as a percentage of the loan value is greater than 200 percent for 62 percent of loans in the DCA program.43 It seems that a higher amount of women-owned schools are affected by this with 66 percent of women borrowers pledging greater than 200 percent of collateral. Moreover, 19 percent of men-owned schools under the DCA guarantee pledge less than 100 percent of collateral, compared with less than 13 percent of women clients (see Table 4).

41 Voices of Women Entrepreneurs in Africa, IFC, 2007 42 Interviews with OISL, 2013 43 Although 62 percent may seem high, additional data on OISL’s collateral requirements for OISL’s Edufinance loans outside of the DCA guarantee portfolio would need to be compared across C and D schools and by gender for full interpretation. This data was not available for this case study. Financing Women-Owned SMEs in Private Education: A Case Study in Ghana 20

TABLE 4: COLLATERAL AS A % OF LOAN DISBURSEMENT VALUE

<100% 100%-200% 200+% Grand Total

Men-owned 19.2% 22.4% 58.3% 100.0%

Women-owned 12.7% 20.9% 66.4% 100.0%

All 16.2% 21.7% 62.1% 100.0%

The representation of women beneficiaries under the DCA guarantee is more likely a factor of OISL’s business model. As of March 2012, 83 percent of OISL’s clients were female.44 Interviews suggest that this proportion may now be upwards of 93 percent. Many of OISL’s female clientele are beneficiaries of group lending mechanisms from OISL’s microfinance operations. Supporting women entrepreneurs with access to credit and TA is seen as integral to the social mission of the organization. Although country-wide gender disaggregated data is not available for private school ownership, OISL’s first-hand observations suggest that women own a greater proportion of low-income private schools. Many of the schools were day care centers started by women that have grown organically over time into private schools.45 Given that, in Ghana, women are typically the caretakers of children, OISL believes that women have been able to recognize the gaps in education and safety issues (e.g., sending children far away for school) and have taken action to address these gaps by starting private schools. Also, many of the schools are run by women because of the social goal of improving access to and quality of education. By and large, serving women clients is inherent to OISL’s business model, so there were no specific activities targeting women for Edufinance or the DCA guarantee.46

Although the DCA guarantee has mitigated some risks associated with launching a new product, it has been a secondary factor in lending to the private education sector and has not influenced OISL’s credit underwriting policies or interest towards women. Most of OISL’s clients are women, because a focus on them is inherent in the microfinance business model and its social goal of empowering women. The MFI’s business interest towards women was already present before the DCA guarantee. In terms of underwriting policies, according to OISL, the guarantee has had very limited impact on the MFI’s credit requirements for schools. Internal credit policies and assessments of credit need and borrower risk profiles are the same across individual lending products. There has been no special treatment for loans under the DCA guarantee. Within the Edufinance portfolio, the only difference in required loan criteria is school rating (i.e., unrated, C, and D grades).47

Women are a preferred client segment, despite lower repayment rates in the education sector and aversion to risk. According to OISL, under the DCA Program, women have demonstrated higher repayment rates than men. However, although currently there are no loans with payments in arrears for more than 90 days (PAR > 90), an analysis of the portfolio demonstrates that slightly more women have defaulted on private education finance loans. Of the six loan defaults that have been claimed, four were women-owned schools and two were

44 (OISL) Social Rating Report, MicroRate, 2012 45 Interview with former OISL staff, 2013 46 Interview with former OISL staff, 2013 47 Interview with OISL Credit Department, 2013 Financing Women-Owned SMEs in Private Education: A Case Study in Ghana 21

male-owned schools. Interviews suggest that despite the marginally higher defaults among women, women are viewed as preferred clients. According to OISL branch staff, there have been more repayment issues among male-owned private schools than women-owned ones, creating a tendency for credit officers to be stricter in credit analysis with men. One OISL branch manager suggested that credit officers tend to prefer working with women clients, because they are more proactive communicators, whereas working with men requires additional time and effort that is invested in following up. If a male proprietor is past due on loans, credit officers must invest more time in collection. If a woman proprietor is past due, she will usually call and ask for advice. Interaction with women clients tend to focus on the vision and social transformation aspects of the school, whereas with men, the appraisal process focuses more on the quantitative assessment of their ability to pay and the collateral they can provide. This may be a result of OISL’s experience and comfort in lending to the women entrepreneurs’ market, and is not necessarily attributed to the DCA guarantee.

According to OISL, female school proprietors are cautious about taking out a loan. They only borrow what is required at the moment and try to pay off the loan as quickly as possible. Many women borrowers pay an early repayment penalty (equal to one monthly payment) to remove the “burden” of debt off their shoulders. OISL has observed that male proprietors, in contrast, tend to apply for as much financing as possible, and spread the loan proceeds across different entrepreneurial activities. According to stakeholders interviewed, the driving force behind men applying for maximum financing was credited to their less risk-averse nature and access to more entrepreneurial ventures.

There is no observed difference in the business models of the men and women-owned private schools. There is, however, higher involvement of female school proprietors in the schools day-to-day operations.48 Despite the fact that women tend to have lower levels of entrepreneurial experience and management skills, a higher percentage of women-owned schools across OISL’s entire education finance portfolio have moved up the Ghana Education Services (GES) grade rating scale when compared to their male counterparts.49 This success is attributed to women’s social commitment and passion for helping the children and tendency to be more hands-on in the operations of the private school.

Women and men respond differently to marketing approaches. Interviews suggest that a blanket outreach approach was not the most effective in marketing the loan opportunity and TA components of the APS program. Men were more profit- and fact-oriented. Outreach tended to focus on making the business case for taking out a loan with OISL and participating in trainings. Women were more focused on how financial and business management benefits could contribute to their social vision and the needs of the children and the greater school. Additionally, women asked more questions and inquired about credentials. The needs of each school and the solutions that TA and debt financing could provide had to be well anticipated for successful outreach to women, more so than men.50

48 Interviews with OI and OISL, 2013 49Of the private schools that have moved from C rating to a B and/or A, about 55 percent are women-owned. 50 Interviews with OISL Branch and former staff, and Blue Alliance, 2013 Financing Women-Owned SMEs in Private Education: A Case Study in Ghana 22

The low-income unrated, C, and D segment of the education sector has attracted the attention of other lending microfinance institutions; however, the competition seems to be more intense in the A and B segment. An unintended consequence of the DCA Guarantee is that the beneficiary private schools have outgrown the guarantee’s original targeting criteria. The risky segment is now perceived to be the A and B schools, as existing clients have moved up to A and B ratings due to improved infrastructure and facilities, but are ineligible for larger loans under the DCA guarantee. According to an IFC market research report51 and interviews with OISL and Sinapi Aba Trust (OISL’s sister MFI), the grading system is inconsistent across localities: it is possible that a school that receives a C rating in an urban area may be rated a B in a rural area. Additionally, A and B schools often still face the same resource challenges (e.g., limited collateral) as unrated, C, and D schools, yet need larger loans to finance growth. According to OISL, once clients reach the A and B status, commercial banks start poaching some of the clients. To date, OISL has only been able to retain 65 percent of these clients that have grown to an A and/or B rating.

TA ACTIVITIES INFLUENCE ON WOMEN-OWNED SMES

A survey conducted in 2010 found that the 61.2 percent of Ghanaian private school proprietors acknowledge that advisory services are very important for them.52 For the APS trainings, female school proprietors tended to demonstrate more interest in TA than male school owners—about 80 percent of participants were women, according to Blue Alliance. OISL staff also noted that for male-owned schools, wives and/or female staff usually attended the trainings on the male proprietor’s behalf. During the APS pilot (2009–2010), TA was provided to private school owners via private BDS providers. TMG coordinated the trainings throughout Ghana, partnering with GNAPS for facilities. OISL was the only financial institution that participated in the Accra-area trainings and the MFI’s role was to introduce TA participants to education finance loans and describe the concept of debt financing, the loan application process, and OISL’s criteria. The trainings also served as a marketing opportunity for OISL. According to OISL, the participants were a mix of current clients, clients of other MFIs, and potential first-time borrowers. An estimated 30 percent of the participants became new OISL clients from the trainings.53

Marketing and outreach strategies for the TA component were not explicitly targeted at school proprietors based on gender. Although more women than men participated in the technical assistance activities, outreach did not include any specific targeting activities based on gender. TMG’s coordination role was critical for the pilot in organizing outreach for the trainings. Outreach was conducted by word-of-mouth, school-to-school promotions, newsletters to registered schools through the partnership with GNAPS, and advertisements in newspapers. An OISL loan officer estimated that about 80 percent of participants in the trainings were owners and about 20 percent were family members acting as management, staff, and teachers.54 Moreover, for some male owners, women attended on their behalf. OISL and BDS providers suggested that this was because

51 Final Ghana Country Report: Market Research Project on Low Income Private Schools, Prepared by CDC Consult Limited for IFC, October 2010 52 Final Ghana Country Report: Market Research Project on Low Income Private Schools, CDC Consult Limited, 2010 53 Interview with former OISL Edufinance Program Manager, 2013 54 Interview with OSIL Loan officers, 2013 Financing Women-Owned SMEs in Private Education: A Case Study in Ghana 23

women are typically more involved in the operations of the school, passionate about the students, and committed to the social mission of providing and improving education.

The partner MFI’s staff have noticed a positive change in women borrowers, particularly increased confidence and improved ability to understand cash flows. A challenge faced by facilitators in the trainings was the misaligned expectations of the participants and lack of understanding of how training benefits can impact business growth, continuity, and professional development55. Most participants, both men and women, attending the fee-for-training workshops expecting funding in some form, whether via a grant or loan. Moreover, women participants also entered the trainings with a lower level of awareness and knowledge regarding business planning. Despite these challenges, OISL staff observed a demonstrated improvement in confidence among women beneficiaries in cash flow analysis and loan application completion, and an even stronger commitment to schools’ performance after the training.

Currently, BDS provider Blue Alliance56 views the low-income, private education sector as a large market opportunity and is pursuing partnerships with universities to launch future fee-based programs to address all key roles within schools, including proprietors, management, head masters, teachers, and students pursuing a career in education. Today, private school beneficiaries of the OISL Edufinance loan portfolio (within and outside of the DCA guarantee) have the option to participate in an annual training organized by OISL and periodic trainings hosted by GNAPS.

55 Interview with BDS Provider, Blue Alliance, 2013 56 Other partnering BDS providers were not available for interviews. Financing Women-Owned SMEs in Private Education: A Case Study in Ghana 24

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Gather gender disaggregated data to assess the influence of programs incorporating a gender component. Financial institutions, including OISL, that gather gender disaggregated data should serve as examples for other programs. This is a critical capacity that must be developed with partners and stakeholders in parallel or before launching a gender-focused project.

2. Consider incorporating gender-sensitive sales techniques in program outreach efforts to women-led SMEs. The promising example of targeted outreach by OISL’s credit officers to women and men demonstrate that women respond differently than men to outreach strategies. In designing a financing project, USAID should assess the level of gender awareness within the business model of partnering financial institutions, and if necessary, include gender awareness training for front-line staff to successfully target women-owned SME clients. In other words, partner lenders may also need TA.

3. Include training modules specific to the targeted sectors in TA activities, in addition to business and financial management capacity building. Because women beneficiaries prefer relationship-based financial services, coupled with advisory support, they are more interested than male counterparts to participate in capacity building activities. However, in Ghana there is no one source to find training programs for all private school needs. GNAPS could serve this role but does not. BDS providers are exploring combined programs, including (1) business planning, continuity, and financial management for school proprietors, administrators, head masters, and teachers that have or may have some management responsibilities, and (2) training on teaching methodologies, children behavior, and curriculum. This will not only support women business owners, but also will help mitigate credit and operational risks.

4. Clearly define targets in terms of gender. Interviews suggested that the DCA guarantee has served as a tool to support OISL’s overall efforts in not only targeting a new market for the financial institution, but also in influencing positive social change through education. Yet, it is difficult to determine whether the DCA guarantee was critical in spurring financing specifically for women-owned private schools. For programs targeting women, future program design should include indicators on reaching women beneficiaries and measuring their growth, as well as gender-sensitive policies targeted for influence within the partner financial institution, to truly understand program’s effectiveness.

5. Examine collateral requirements, for the remaining lifetime of the credit guarantee, to understand why current and historic percentages of collateral have been required on loans under DCA guarantees. Unlike other markets in Africa where DCA programs are implemented, there has been no indication of financial regulations influencing steep collateral requirements in Ghana. Evidence clearly spells out the need to assess collateral levels across DCA guarantees, especially those targeting women, given the disproportionate effect collateral requirements have on


women’s access to finance. DCA should explore the provision of TA to partner financial institutions to support the adoption of sophisticated risk management mechanisms to address collateral challenges for the market segment of women. Of course, TA on risk management must be considered in the context of the partner lender’s current growth strategies and overall operations.

6. Explore innovative pricing strategies, alternative collateral requirements (e.g., movable), and financial products that promote asset-building for women borrowers. Performance among women clients suggest that there may be opportunities to reward lower risk profiles by factoring pricing benefits into interest rates and/or collateral requirements. Innovative product schemes (e.g., land loans) may also help women SMEs become more “bankable.”


ANNEX

INTERVIEW LIST

INSTITUTION TITLE

Opportunity International Savings and Loan (OISL)

Head of Education Finance

Education Finance Program Manager

Head of Marketing

Head of ISME Southern Sector

Chief Risk Officer

3 Loan Officers

Madina Branch Manager

Madina SME Manager

4 Private School Owners (2 Male and 2 Female)

2 Former OISL Staff

Opportunity International (OI) Head of Education Finance

Sinapi Aba Trust Chief Programmes Officer

The Mitchell Group (TMG) Former In-Country Coordinator

Blue Alliance President

USAID Office of Education Education Specialist

USAID/DCA USAID Portfolio Manager


WORKS CITED

Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Beck, T., & Honohan, P. (2008). Finance for All: Policies and Pitfalls in Expanding Access. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Retrieved March 21, 2008, from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTFINFORALL/Resources/4099583-1194373512632/FFA_book.pdf

Education Strategic Plan, Policies, Targets and Strategies, 2003 - 2015. Rep. Vol. 1. Ministry of Education: Government of Ghana, 2003 http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Ghana/Ghana%20Education%20Strategic%20Plan.pdf

Final Ghana Country Report: Market Research Project on Low Income Private Schools. Accra: CDC Consult Limited, 2010. http://www.idpfoundation.org/IFC%20Ghana%20Report%20October%202010.pdf

Hausmann, Ricardo, Laura D. Tyson, and Saadia Zahidi. The Global Gender Gap Report 2012. Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2012. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_Report_2012.pdf

Heyneman Stephen P., Smith, Thomas M., Stern, Jonathan M. B. (2011) The Search for Effective EFA Policies: The Role of Private Schools for Low-Income Children, The Mitchell Group Inc, Washington, DC, USA

MFI Report: Opportunity International Savings and Loans -Ghana. Rep. MixMarket, 2011. Web. http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/oisl

MicroRate.2012. Opportunity International Savings and Loans Limited (OISL) Social Rating Report. Ghana: March 2012. http://www.microrate.com/uploads/ratings/oisl_ghana/OISL_Summary_Social_Rating_Report1211.pdf

Ministry of Women and Children's Affairs. Republic of Ghana, 2010. Web. 31 May 2013. http://www.mowacghana.net/programs.html.

The World Bank. 2013. The Little Data Book on Gender 2013. Washington: The World Bank, 2013. http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/the-little-data-books-on-gender-2013.pdf

Voices of Women Entrepreneurs in Ghana. Rep. Washington, D.C.: IFC, 2007.

World DataBank. World Bank Group, n.d. Web. 1 May 2013. http://databank.worldbank.org


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financing women-owned smes: a case study in ghana

Economy & Finance