financial stability and central bank governance stability and central bank governance∗ michael...
TRANSCRIPT
Financial Stability and Central BankGovernance∗
Michael Koetter,a,b Kasper Roszbach,c,d andGiancarlo Spagnoloe,f,g
aFrankfurt School of Finance and ManagementbHalle Institute for Economic Research
cUniversity of GroningendSveriges Riksbank
eUniversity of Rome Tor VergatafSITE, Stockholm School of Economics
gCEPR
The financial crisis has ignited a debate about the appropri-ate objectives and the governance structure of central banks.We use novel survey data to investigate the relation betweenthese traits and banking system stability, focusing in particu-lar on their role in micro-prudential supervision. We find thatthe separation of powers between single and multiple bank
∗We are grateful to Franklin Allen, Mats Bergman, Mathias Dewatripont,Francesco Giavazzi, Iman van Lelyveld, Enrico Perotti, Marco Pagano, RobertoRocci, two anonymous referees, the editor (Andy Levin), and participants atseminars at Maastricht University, De Nederlandsche Bank, the 2004 Tor VergataConference, the 2006 Bocconi conference on Regulation and Supervision, the 2006Riksbank conference on the Governance of Central Banks, ASSA-AFA 2007, the2007 Central Banking Seminar in Cambridge, the Federal Reserve Bank of SanFrancisco, the 2012 conference on Corporate Governance of Financial Institutionsat De Nederlandsche Bank, and the 2013 Bocconi/Finlawmetrics conference onCentral Banking, Monetary Stability and Systemic Risk for comments and discus-sions on both early and more recent versions of work with these data. Particularthanks go to Lars Frisell, with whom Roszbach and Spagnolo conducted the sur-vey underlying this paper. We are also indebted to the BIS and Tonny Lybek atthe IMF for making their data available to us, and to David Slutsky, Karl Harmen-berg, Harvey Migotti, Mats Levander, and Mattias Quiroz for research assistance.Finally, we thank all central banks that participated in our survey. The viewsexpressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and shouldnot be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Executive Board of SverigesRiksbank. In an early stage, fragments of this paper circulated under the title“Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central Banks.” Author e-mails:[email protected], [email protected], [email protected].
31
32 International Journal of Central Banking December 2014
supervisors cannot explain credit risk prior to or during thefinancial crisis. Similarly, a large number of central bank gov-ernance traits do not correlate with system fragility. Only theobjective of currency stability exhibits a significant relationwith non-performing loan levels in the run-up to the crisis. Thiseffect is amplified for those countries with most frequent expo-sure to IMF missions in the past. Our results suggest that thecurrent policy discussion on whether to centralize prudentialsupervision under the central bank and the ensuing institu-tional changes some countries are enacting may not producethe improvements authorities are aiming at. Whether otherpotential improvements in prudential supervision due to, forexample, external disciplinary devices, such as IMF conditionallending schemes, are better suited to increase financial stabil-ity requires further research.
JEL codes: G18, G34, G38, E58.
1. Introduction
The recent crisis intensified an already open debate on the appro-priate set of central banks’ objectives and tools, in particular withrespect to the prevention and management of future crises. Rethink-ing the overall financial market regulation, many economists andpolicymakers are asking whether new tools and mandates for pru-dential regulation and systemic financial stability should be givento central banks and, if so, then how to regulate the inevitable con-flicts between monetary policy, macro-systemic stability, and micro-supervisory objectives.
The UK government recently removed the full separationbetween the Bank of England and micro-prudential supervisorytasks allocated to the Financial Services Authority (FSA) abouttwo decades ago. This separation was considered ineffective in lightof the financial crisis, in particular in preventing Northern Rockand the Royal Bank of Scotland from taking too much risk. Part ofthe supervisory tasks will be moved to a subsidiary of the Bank ofEngland called the Prudential Regulation Authority. The previousseparation, however, was introduced in 1997 for the same reason:supervision under the Bank of England was judged ineffective withrespect to preventing excessive risk taking at the Bank of Credit
Vol. 10 No. 4 Financial Stability and Central Bank Governance 33
and Commerce International (BCCI), Barings, etc.1 Moreover, theperception that assigning bank supervision to the central bank is apoor institutional arrangement was so widespread before this crisisthat Norway (1900), Sweden (1907), Denmark (1919), and Canada(1925)2 assigned financial stability tasks to a separate supervisor,and Australia (1998), Japan (1998),3 Korea (1998), Iceland (1999),Austria (2002), and Germany (2002) transferred some responsibili-ties out of the central bank (see Herrero and del Rio 2005).
Notable commentators recently suggested that this widespreadperception was wrong (and so were all the mentioned institutionalreforms), i.e., that it is very important that central banks keepresponsibility for financial supervision (e.g., Davies and Green 2010).However, other at least as prominent observers suggest precisely theopposite, i.e., that an independent bank supervision authority ispreferable and only the new macro-systemic stability tasks and toolsshould be assigned to central banks (e.g., Goodhart 2010, Buiter2011).
The issue is all but obvious, as reasonable theoretical arguments(and models) exist in support of both views. This poses the impor-tant empirical question, which institutional arrangement performsbetter in terms of preventing financial distress, particularly in thewake of a financial crisis: micro supervision to a specialized authorityor to the central bank?
In this paper we try to answer this question by looking forempirical support for one policy or the other. We ask if systematicdifferences across central banks regarding their objectives, supervi-sory mandate, and some other relevant governance features help toexplain banking system fragility prior to and during the crisis. Tothis end, we use a new survey data set providing detailed informationon these central bank traits.
1 Although the FSA in the United Kingdom adopted its name in 1997, it didnot receive its current statutory powers until January 1, 2001.
2For Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Canada we are referring to the estab-lishment of the legal predecessors of the current FSAs. Each of these countriesmerged its banking supervision authority with one or more other financial sectorsupervisors between 1986 and 1990 and renamed its national authority.
3Until 1998, Japan had a Banking Commission that was an agency of theMinistry of Finance.
34 International Journal of Central Banking December 2014
We first describe the pre-crisis situation in terms of micro-financial supervision and the other central bank governance vari-ables for a set of forty-seven central banks as collected through ourad hoc survey.4 Then we focus on credit risk and regress mean sharesof non-performing loans (NPL) as a measure of financial fragility ona number of proxies for the governance and institutional traits ofprudential authorities.
Univariate analyses show that the correlation between both thegovernance of supervisory institutions and policy objectives withnon-performing loans is weak.
Multivariate regression analyses highlight that only the objec-tive of currency stability exhibits a consistently negative relation-ship with credit risk prior to the financial crisis. Neither indicatorsof institutional separation (or unification) of prudential and mone-tary policy nor proxies for the quality of governance at regulatorsand central banks influence average credit risk significantly. Over-all, a country’s legal origin, income dispersion, historical levels ofcredit risk, and OECD membership explain most of contemporane-ous credit risk realizations. For the crisis period itself, however, eventhese links break down. We find that countries participating in Inter-national Monetary Fund (IMF) support programs since 1964 mostfrequently are significantly more likely to adhere to explicit foreign-currency objectives. Potentially, the negative relation between cur-rency objectives and lower credit risk in the financial system mighttherefore reflect an improved and more stringent prudential attitudeadopted during longer exposure to disciplining IMF missions.
1.1 Related Literature
A large number of authors, starting with the classic papers by Kyd-land and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983), and Rogoff(1985), have investigated how central bank objectives ought to beshaped for the purpose of monetary policy under the risk of politicalcapture by the government and of a consequent political inflationarybias. Persson and Tabellini (1993) and Walsh (1995), among others,
4Some tables, figures, or regressions may be based on fewer observationsbecause data were not available for—or a question did not apply to—a specificcentral bank.
Vol. 10 No. 4 Financial Stability and Central Bank Governance 35
have extended this work and studied the optimal contract for inde-pendent central bankers.5 Their focus, however, remains limited to“the commitment problem,” i.e., to the relevance of independentinstitutions for optimal monetary policy. Surprisingly, the designof the optimal contract for the supervisory tasks, historically theprime activity of many central banks, the possible trade-offs betweenmonetary policy, financial stability, and banking sector efficiency,as well as the link between central bank independence, account-ability, and supervisory performance, have received relatively littleattention.
One exception is Taylor and Quintyn (2002), who argue that“regulatory and supervisory independence” is important for finan-cial stability for the same reasons that central bank independenceis important for monetary stability. They list a number of dimen-sions of regulatory and supervisory independence—for example,budgetary freedom—but also contend that for the agency to befully effective, a supervisor’s independence in general needs to gohand in hand with accountability checks. These authors concludethat improper supervisory arrangements have contributed signifi-cantly to the deepening of several recent systemic banking crises.6
Still, in these papers the concept of “independence” remains focusedon independence from the political process, as a remedy for the riskof capture by the government. On the other hand, the literature onregulatory agencies has emphasized the risk of capture from the reg-ulated firms. Ensuring regulators’ independence from the industrythey regulate—by, for example, limiting revolving doors arrange-ments and post-employment possibilities—may therefore be crucial.Considering the enormous pressure to which central bank governorsare subjected by the financial sector in crisis situations—e.g., to bailout troubled institutions or to cut interest rates—the need to guar-antee this alternative kind of independence appears to have beenexcessively downplayed by the literature on central banks.
5A rich literature has developed out of these seminal contributions, includingrecent work such as Keefer and Stasavage (2001), looking into the importance ofchecks and balances; Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (2002), discussing the need formore transparency in the decision-making process; and Moser (1999), studyingthe factors that empirically determine independence.
6See also Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004).
36 International Journal of Central Banking December 2014
The issue of effective central bank governance and regulationbesides monetary policy tasks is not of purely theoretical interest,because it can affect the quality of bank regulation and supervision.Giannone, Lenza, and Reichlin (2011) show that the intensity andquality of bank regulation in a country are crucial for explaining themagnitude of damages caused by the recent financial crisis to thatcountry. Abstracting from most recent events, empirical work byDemirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2004), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt,and Levine (2006), and particularly Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales(2007) suggests that through its effect on the allocation of financialresources, the quality of bank regulation and supervision may havedramatic effects on economic growth.
Several previous contributions specifically consider whether itis better to allocate financial supervision to a separate, specializedagency rather than to the central bank. One of the earliest studiesthat recognize the trade-off faced by a central bank when attemptingto attain a multiplicity of goals is Schoenmaker (1992). He acknowl-edges that a central bank with supervisory responsibility may chooseto hold down interest rates because of concerns with the bank-ing system, although purely monetary considerations suggest higherrates. Hence, simultaneously striving for price stability and finan-cial stability involves a time-dependent trade-off. In line with this,Haubrich (1996) and Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999) present evidenceof the inflation rate being higher and more volatile in OECD coun-tries where the central bank also has sole responsibility for bankingsupervision.7
Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell (1999) study how separating bank-ing supervision from monetary policy influences the effectiveness ofthe latter. They find that confidential supervisory information onbank ratings significantly improves forecast accuracy of variablescritical to the conduct of monetary policy. Their findings highlightthe informational synergies often mentioned in support of the argu-ment that central banks should have bank supervision responsibility.However, they do not study how this separation affects the qualityof bank supervision.
7 Whether such a higher rate of inflation is sub-optimal will depend, of course,on the exact weight the government attaches to the bank supervision (financialstability) objective.
Vol. 10 No. 4 Financial Stability and Central Bank Governance 37
Indeed, the main concern against assigning supervisory tasks tocentral banks, stressed once again in the recent theoretical analysisby Boyer and Ponce (2012), is the higher risk of regulatory captureit may generate, and appears to have generated in relation to, forexample, the savings and loans crisis in the United States and theBarings and BCCI cases in the United Kingdom.
Boot and Thakor (1993) provide another reason why supervi-sory tasks should be partially or completely separated from the cen-tral bank. They show that in the presence of uncertainty about thesupervisor’s ability (e.g., in evaluating the quality of banks’ assets),foreclosing a bank may signal poor monitoring ability. Hence, thesupervisor will tend to delay such decisions. Boot and Thakor (1993)suggest that the responsibility for bank closures should thereforebe separated from that for asset-quality monitoring. Naturally, effi-cient separation still requires a mechanism to induce the monitor totruthfully share its information with the regulator.
Kahn and Santos (2005) study the allocation of the lender-of-last-resort function, closure authority (supervision), and deposit insur-ance. They find that in the multi-regulator arrangement, it is bene-ficial to assign the supervision mandate to the deposit insurer. Thechoice between the unified-regulator arrangement and the multi-regulator arrangement involves a trade-off: The multi-regulatorarrangement reduces the forbearance problem at high levels of liquid-ity shortage but may exacerbate it at low levels. To our knowledge,there is not yet any empirical research that assesses the costs ofsupervision in different countries and relates these to the various out-puts of the supervisory system (e.g., official warnings, interventions,bank closures).
Finally, Hasan and Mester (2008) look at the effects of a num-ber of central banks’ organizational features on some performanceindicators in the 1990s, finding little association with the health ofthe commercial banking system as measured by the percentage ofproblem loans. They also find, however, that having financial super-vision as a main task of the central bank is associated with a worseperformance in terms of inflation.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section2, we explain our methodology and describe the data. Besidesconventional country-specific controls, we present data primarilysourced from our survey on central banks’ objectives, mandates,
38 International Journal of Central Banking December 2014
and governance structures. Section 3 discusses the results, and weconclude in section 4.
2. Methodology and Data
First, we explain how we measure banking system fragility and con-trol for country traits. Second, we discuss the survey design andpresent in more detail the data relevant to our study.
2.1 Fragility and Country Controls
We use average non-performing loans, a measure of financial sys-tem fragility, as our dependent variable. This very simple measureis part of the financial statistics provided by the World Bank andhas two main advantages. It is comparable across countries and isconsidered by both academics and policymakers a key indicator of(excessive) credit risk taken by the banking system of a country.8 Wefirst short-list variables from the data described below, which exhibitthe highest univariate explanatory power in OLS regressions. Wethen specify multivariate regressions with the mean non-performingloan share relative to total loans over the period 2004 until 2006(pre-crisis NPL) and over the period 2007 until 2009 (crisis NPL).Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and results from univariateOLS for all variables considered, which serve as a selection device ofcovariates in multivariate analyses.
Before turning to the (mostly) survey-based central bank traits,we briefly present the country controls specified in the cross-sectionalregressions. The sample size is at most forty-five, which is determinedby the authorities (countries) responding to the survey. Appendix 1shows all forty-four countries and the European Central Bank (ECB)considered here.
Better enforceability of contracts and protection of creditorsshould generally correlate negatively with the share of NPL. Wemeasure the level of creditor rights suggested initially by La Portaet al. (1998). We obtain data for the years 2001 and 2008 from the
8We also considered capitalization ratios and z-scores (Laeven and Valencia2010), both of which corroborate the absence of results that we report below.Results are available upon request.
Vol. 10 No. 4 Financial Stability and Central Bank Governance 39Tab
le1.
Des
crip
tive
Sta
tist
ics
and
Univ
aria
teR
esults
Univ
aria
teO
LS
onPer
centi
leM
ean
Pre
-Cri
sis
NP
L
Var
iable
Mea
n1s
t99
thN
Coeffi
cien
tSE
R2
Dep
ende
ntVar
iabl
es
Mea
nN
PL
Shar
e(2
004–
6)2.
990.
2010
.00
Mea
nN
PL
Shar
e(2
008–
9)4.
300.
4561
.20
Cou
ntry
and
Cri
sis
His
tory
Con
trol
s
Cre
dit
Rig
hts 2
001
2.15
0.00
4.00
330.
538
[0.3
68]
0.06
5C
redi
tR
ight
s 200
82.
020.
004.
0044
0.48
9[0
.382
]0.
037
Ban
king
Cri
ses 1
970
0.75
0.00
4.00
431.
105
[0.4
53]∗
∗0.
127
Ban
king
Cri
ses 1
990
0.55
0.00
2.00
431.
507
[0.6
27]∗
∗0.
124
Cur
renc
yC
rise
s 197
01.
500.
006.
0043
0.37
7[0
.246
]0.
054
Cur
renc
yC
rise
s 199
00.
550.
003.
0043
0.63
6[0
.541
]0.
033
Deb
tC
rise
s 197
00.
300.
002.
0043
0.53
7[0
.655
]0.
016
Deb
tC
rise
s 199
00.
180.
002.
0043
0.56
9[0
.837
]0.
011
Leg
alO
rigi
nU
K0.
310.
001.
0044
−2.
549
[1.2
20]∗
∗0.
094
Leg
alO
rigi
nFr
ance
0.29
0.00
1.00
44−
0.00
7[0
.892
]0.
000
Leg
alO
rigi
nSo
viet
Uni
on0.
200.
001.
0044
1.84
4[0
.968
]∗0.
080
Leg
alO
rigi
nG
erm
any
0.09
0.00
1.00
44−
0.76
2[1
.410
]0.
007
Leg
alO
rigi
nSc
andi
navi
a0.
110.
001.
0044
0.10
2[0
.891
]0.
000
Gin
iIn
dex
35.9
024
.70
59.3
043
0.07
0[0
.042
]∗0.
065
Seco
ndar
ySc
hool
Enr
ollm
ent 2
000
17.5
03.
5044
.30
37−
0.08
6[0
.040
]∗∗
0.11
5M
ean
GD
P19
96−
2005
7.38
−6.
8411
2.00
440.
003
[0.0
22]
0.00
0A
vera
geTru
stIn
dica
tor
1.67
1.30
1.94
365.
473
[3.0
74]∗
0.08
5H
irsc
hman
-Her
finda
hlIn
dex
0.18
0.03
0.53
37−
4.44
2[3
.757
]0.
038
(con
tinu
ed)
40 International Journal of Central Banking December 2014
Tab
le1.
(Con
tinued
)
Univ
aria
teO
LS
onPer
centi
leM
ean
Pre
-Cri
sis
NP
L
Var
iable
Mea
n1s
t99
thN
Coeffi
cien
tSE
R2
Cou
ntry
and
Cri
sis
His
tory
Con
trol
s
Pan
zar-
Ros
seH
-Sta
tist
ic0.
56−
0.48
1.52
371.
104
[0.8
89]
0.04
2Fo
reig
n-O
wne
dA
sset
Shar
e0.
310.
000.
9938
0.57
1[1
.350
]0.
005
CR
3R
atio
in20
000.
630.
211.
0043
−2.
062
[2.0
25]
0.02
5N
PL
Shar
ein
2000
7.23
0.50
29.3
042
0.29
6[0
.043
]∗∗∗
0.54
5O
EC
D0.
670.
001.
0044
−2.
409
[0.7
74]∗
∗∗0.
188
Cen
tral
Ban
kO
bjec
tive
s
Obje
ctiv
eM
onet
ary
Pol
icy
0.51
0.00
1.00
44−
0.40
0[0
.811
]0.
006
Obje
ctiv
eFo
reig
nE
xcha
nge
0.18
0.00
1.00
440.
625
[1.0
50]
0.00
8O
bje
ctiv
ePay
men
tSy
stem
0.07
0.00
1.00
44−
1.84
0[1
.589
]0.
031
Mon
etar
yPol
icy:
Yes
0.56
0.00
1.00
44−
1.01
0[0
.802
]0.
036
Mon
etar
yPol
icy:
No
0.13
0.00
1.00
440.
440
[1.1
83]
0.00
3
Supe
rvis
ion
and
Sepa
ration
ofPow
ers
Sole
Supe
rvis
or:C
B0.
510.
001.
0044
1.72
1[0
.769
]∗∗
0.10
7So
leSu
perv
isor
:FSA
0.13
0.00
1.00
44−
2.10
8[1
.140
]∗0.
075
Mul
tipl
eSu
perv
isor
s0.
360.
001.
0044
−0.
658
[0.7
66]
0.01
7
(con
tinu
ed)
Vol. 10 No. 4 Financial Stability and Central Bank Governance 41Tab
le1.
(Con
tinued
)
Univ
aria
teO
LS
onPer
centi
leM
ean
Pre
-Cri
sis
NP
L
Var
iable
Mea
n1s
t99
thN
Coeffi
cien
tSE
R2
Cen
tral
Ban
kG
over
nanc
e
No
Bud
get
App
rova
l0.
770.
001.
0043
−0.
575
[1.0
14]
0.00
8N
oR
estr
icti
ons
onSt
affs’
Inve
stm
ent
0.11
0.00
1.00
44−
1.77
4[1
.252
]0.
046
No
Law
onP
rofit
Allo
cati
onof
CB
0.19
0.00
1.00
411.
934
[1.0
25]∗
0.08
4C
BG
over
nor
Rem
uner
atio
n32
8,64
615
,838
1,28
2,68
533
−0.
000
[0.0
00]
0.02
4Len
gth
ofG
over
nor
Ter
m14
.00
3.00
100.
0044
0.01
0[0
.015
]0.
010
Cou
ntof
Gov
erno
rD
ism
issa
lD
ueto
:1.
840.
006.
0044
−0.
646
[0.3
92]
0.06
1A
ctin
gag
ains
tG
over
nmen
tPol
icy
0.04
0.00
1.00
44−
1.45
9[1
.940
]0.
013
Non
-Ful
fillm
ent
ofR
equi
rem
ents
0.56
0.00
1.00
44−
1.17
2[0
.797
]0.
049
Non
-Ful
fillm
ent
ofD
utie
s0.
400.
001.
0044
0.39
6[0
.833
]0.
005
wit
hout
Pre
cise
Rea
soni
ng0.
130.
001.
0044
−0.
943
[1.1
76]
0.01
5Poo
rPer
form
ance
0.07
0.00
1.00
44−
1.75
6[1
.934
]0.
019
Mis
cond
uct/
Cri
min
alO
ffens
e0.
600.
001.
0044
−0.
370
[0.8
33]
0.00
5A
pptm
nt.C
ond.
onG
ood
Con
duct
0.04
0.00
1.00
44−
2.75
1[1
.906
]0.
047
Sepa
rate
Supe
rvis
ory
Boa
rd0.
490.
001.
0044
−0.
484
[0.8
11]
0.00
8E
xter
nalSu
perv
isor
yB
oard
Mem
bers
0.80
0.00
1.00
29−
0.06
3[1
.799
]0.
000
Num
ber
ofM
eeti
ngs
per
Yea
r12
.80
4.00
52.0
019
0.01
8[0
.047
]0.
009
CB
Foun
dati
onY
ear
1908
1668
1998
440.
011
[0.0
05]∗
∗0.
106
Note
s:D
ata
are
from
the
Wor
ldB
ank’
sW
orld
Dev
elop
men
tIn
dica
tors
(WD
I)an
dG
loba
lD
evel
opm
ent
Fin
ance
(GD
F)
data
base
,da
taba
nk.w
orld
bank
.org
/ddp
/hom
e.do
.
42 International Journal of Central Banking December 2014
website of Andrei Shleifer.The variable is an index that ranges from0 to 4 in our sample, where higher values indicate better creditorrights. Univariate results in table 1 indicate that creditor rightsdo not correlate with NPL shares. We disregard the variable inmultivariate analysis.
A country’s history of crises may increase risk adversity of agentsand improve prudential monitoring procedures subsequently. But itmight also create path dependency if it takes long-lasting effortsto restore trust in financial markets. We therefore include a countvariable for three types of crisis sourced from Laeven and Valencia(2010): banking crises, currency crises, and debt crises. We spec-ify two counts. The first starts in 1970 and the second starts in1990. Only banking crises correlate significantly and positively withpre-crisis NPL shares, which indicates that bad debt is persistent.
Next, we control for the differences in legal origins across coun-tries (also obtained from the home page of Andrei Shleifer). Giventhe limited degrees of freedom due to the number of countries stud-ied here, we specify in the multivariate analyses below only onedummy that is significant in univariate analysis, namely for coun-tries with a legal UK heritage. Relative to any other legal heritage,UK-type legal systems exhibit lower levels of NPL shares in oursample.
To control for the differences in income and economic activityacross countries, we tested a number of conventional macro indi-cators provided in the World Development Indicators of the WorldBank, such as gross domestic product (GDP), GDP per capita, GDPgrowth across various time episodes, etc. We show in table 1 thedescriptive statistics for the specified measure of income dispersionacross countries, the Gini coefficient, which is weakly positively cor-related with NPL shares. Higher values indicate a larger dispersionof income within a country. We also show the share of studentsenrolled in secondary education in the total population as a measureof human capital intensity as well as mean GDP between 1996 and2005. Both variables are excluded below due to high correlation withthe Gini coefficient and limited degrees of freedom in multivariateanalysis.
Trust is another potential determinant of deciding whetherto extend a loan, as well as the risk of the latter turningnon-performing. We use a measure from the World Value Survey
Vol. 10 No. 4 Financial Stability and Central Bank Governance 43
questionnaire also used in, for instance, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zin-gales (2008). It gauges how much people generally think others canbe trusted. Higher values indicate larger skepticism. Despite univari-ate significance, we excluded the covariate from multivariate analysisbelow because of high correlation with other country controls andfairly low coverage of sampled countries.
Many studies discuss the relation between banking market struc-ture, competition, and risk (see, e.g., Keeley 1990, Koetter andPoghosyan 2009, and Martınez Miera and Repullo 2010). We there-fore test simple measures of concentration (Hirschman-Herfindahlindices and concentration ratios) and competition measures (Panzar-Rosse H-statistics), as well as the share of foreign-owned banks’assets. None of these correlates significantly with mean NPL shares.We nonetheless include one proxy in the multivariate regressionsbelow given the ample indications in previous literature that com-petition and market structure are important in explaining the risktaking of banks.
Bad credit is persistent and we expect that historically high lev-els of NPL shares are unlikely to vanish quickly. Therefore, we alsospecify the NPL share in the year 2000, which exhibits a signifi-cantly positive univariate effect on mean NPL shares in the threeyears prior to the crisis. Finally, we account for OECD member-ship in this fairly heterogeneous sample of countries by including anaccording indicator variable. OECD membership is also statisticallysignificant and correlates negatively with mean NPL shares.
2.2 Survey Data on Central Banks
In spring 2004 we formulated a list with nineteen composite ques-tions regarding the governance characteristics of a central bank. Werefer to appendix 1 for the complete list. The questions broadlyfocused on five areas: (i) the objectives and tasks of the bank, andthe exclusivity of its responsibilities; (ii) ownership structure, bud-getary freedom, and restrictions on the allocation of profits; (iii) theappointment, remuneration, tenure, and dismissal of governors; (iv)the appointment, tenure, and dismissal of supervisory board mem-bers; and (v) limitations on investments by bank staff and governors.In this paper, we use data from areas (i) and (ii).
44 International Journal of Central Banking December 2014
To the extent that central banks provided information on theabove-mentioned areas, we collected the answers to these questionsfrom the websites of forty-seven central banks between June andAugust 2004. Between June and August 2005, we checked the web-sites once more to verify if more data was available.
The starting point for our sample consisted of all thirty-onemembers and two candidate members of the OECD as of 2005 andall but one G20 members that are not OECD members (nine). Tocome closer to a sample size of about fifty countries, we added fourdeveloped or emerging Asian economies as well as an EU candidatemember.
On September 16, 2005, we followed up on the first step of thedata collection by sending out a written questionnaire to all forty-six central banks with a request for relevant information that wasnot provided on the banks’ websites.9 Surveys were individualizedin the sense that questions to which we already had answers weredeleted from the “gross” list. In case a central bank had a researchdepartment at that point in time, we sent the survey to the direc-tor of research. For the remaining central banks, we directed theform to the respective heads of the economics department or to whatappeared to be the nearest alternative. Addresses, departments, andcontact persons were taken from the Bank for International Settle-ment’s (BIS’s) International Directory of central banks, which isupdated monthly by the BIS. Each questionnaire was accompaniedby a letter (appendix 2). Central banks were asked to return theform by October 6, 2005.
By October 6, 2005, we had received replies from four of the forty-seven central banks, although by October 13, this number had risento fourteen. On November 1, 2005, we sent out a reminder letter byregular mail to the twenty-six central banks that had not yet replied.If we were able to find the e-mail address of the addressee on theInternet, we also sent a copy of the reminder by e-mail. Within thefour weeks after this reminder, we received another nine replies, mak-ing the total, including Sweden, twenty-nine. Another four centralbanks had confirmed receipt of the questionnaire, without sendinga reply, one of which replied they would not be able to answer thequestions.
9No survey was sent to the Riksbank.
Vol. 10 No. 4 Financial Stability and Central Bank Governance 45
Between December 2005 and June 2006, one more bank con-firmed receipt of the survey without replying. On June 19, 2006, wesent a second reminder by e-mail to the remaining sixteen banksand followed up with a phone call within a week. This resulted inanother eleven responses. A personal letter we sent to the governoror a deputy governor of three central banks on July 5, 2006 led toanother two replies. By September 4, 2006, we had the replies fromforty-three of the forty-seven central banks and concluded our datacollection effort.
For eight central banks, the answer to at least one sub-questionwas missing or incomplete in the reply. In those cases, we contactedthe respondent with a request for a completion and attempted oncemore to locate the information on the website of that bank. Forsome variables and central banks, omitted replies indicated that aquestion did not apply. For some others it indicated unwillingness toreply and/or an inability by us to obtain an answer—for example,because we did not get the complete answer after a reminder. In thefinal data set, for example, nine countries did not fill out an answerto the question about governor wages. In sections 2.2.1 through 2.2.3below, we briefly discuss the survey results we use in this study. Formore information, we refer to a predecessor of this paper—Frisell,Roszbach, and Spagnolo (2008)—where the full survey data set isdiscussed.
2.2.1 Central Bank Objectives
We define three groups of objectives from these responses. First, wecode an indicator variable for monetary policy objectives if author-ities replied that they pursue price stability or monetary stability.Second, we specify a dummy for foreign exchange objectives if centralbanks respond that they aim to preserve either the external valueor the stability of the purchasing power of the currency. Third, wespecify payment system stability as the objective if central banksindicate to ensure an efficient functioning of payment systems orguide sound banking operations.
As figure 1 shows, these three objectives jointly apply to 70.2percent of the sampled countries. Roughly 50 percent of the banksindicate that price or monetary stability is their main objective,just over 8 percent that they have an efficient payments system or
46 International Journal of Central Banking December 2014
Figure 1. Objectives of Central Banks
Notes: Replies from questionnaire; see appendix 1 for details. Multiple repliesper central bank are possible (N = 47).
banking system stability as their objective, and 18 percent that theyhave a forex objective. The remaining central banks indicate morecomplex objectives. The data in table 1 demonstrate that none ofthese objectives exhibits significant univariate explanatory power.We test for potential multivariate effects below. We also test whetherthe simple indicator “monetary policy is stipulated in the centralbank law as the prime objective” can explain mean NPL shares andfind this indicator is also uncorrelated.
2.2.2 Separation of Powers
We specify three categories to test for different arrangements regard-ing the separation of power. The first dummy indicates that acountry has only one supervisor, namely the central bank. Of allcountries, 51 percent belong to this category. The second dummyequals 1 for countries with just one supervisory authority but wherean institution other than the central bank, such as a financial super-visory agency, fulfills this function. Thirteen percent are in thiscategory. A third dummy variable captures jurisdictions with mul-tiple supervisors. This regime applies to more than one out of threejurisdictions.
Vol. 10 No. 4 Financial Stability and Central Bank Governance 47
Univariate regressions indicate that centralized supervision cor-relates with NPL shares. If central banks act as the sole prudentialsupervisor, mean NPL shares prior to the crisis are higher. Soleresponsibilities resting with an independent authority different thanthe central bank correlates negatively with NPL shares.
In contrast to objectives as such, differences in mandates thusseem to bear explanatory power for NPL shares. Below, we willexplore this possible link in more detail using multivariate analysis.
2.2.3 Governance and Independence
Commonly used measures of central bank independence take intoaccount to what extent a bank can conduct monetary policy with-out a formal possibility for parliament or the government to influ-ence decision making. In our survey and in this paper, we insteadattempt to capture to what extent central banks can be consideredfinancially independent from the political sphere. In particular, whenstudying the impact of the institutional structure of financial super-vision on financial system stability, such measures better capturethe relevant governance features of a central bank and the leeway ithas to conduct stabilizing operations in financial markets. Our sur-vey therefore focused on a bank’s freedom to allocate and distributeprofits, as well as on its freedom to set its own budget. Such rightsare likely to influence the ability of a central bank to adjust thesize and composition of its balance sheet when conducting financialstability policy. Figure 2 contains data on the freedom that centralbanks have to allocate profits. In our survey 11 percent report thatthere are no laws governing the allocation of profits, while an equalshare reports that the allocation of profits is governed by law. Thevast majority reports a more complex solution—for example, withinformal arrangements or through regulations other than by law.
With regards to their budgets, central banks have more free-dom. As displayed in figure 3, three out of four report that they donot need approval from parliament or the government, the typicalprincipals of central banks.
We tested a large number of governance indicators from the sur-vey, shown in the bottom panel of table 1, on a relation with twobanking system stability measures. With the exception of two indi-cators, none correlates with observed NPL shares. We discuss here
48 International Journal of Central Banking December 2014
Figure 2. Are Any Laws Set upon Central Banks thatGovern How Profits Should Be Allocated?
Notes: Replies from questionnaire; see appendix 1 for details. (N = 47).
Figure 3. Do Central Banks Need Approval fromParliament or the Government before Setting Their
Budget?
Notes: Replies from questionnaire; see appendix 1 for details. (N = 47).
only the three measures we include in the multivariate regressionsbelow.
First, we include a dummy indicating that the government or leg-islature does not have to approve central banks’ expenditure budget.
Vol. 10 No. 4 Financial Stability and Central Bank Governance 49
Budget autonomy indicates higher central bank independence andshould thus indicate that it is better safeguarded from political influ-ence. Second, we specify an indicator equal to 1 if no law exists thatgoverns the allocation of central bank profits. This variable indicateshigher financial independence and correlates weakly, but positively,with mean NPL shares. Third, we find that a more recent founda-tion data of central banks is positively related to NPL shares prior tothe crisis. Younger central banks may correlate positively with NPLshares if a shorter history of the institution gauges also less experi-ence and skill. In contrast, younger central banks might have fewervested interests—for instance, resulting from entanglement of for-mer supervisors with the commercial banking sector—and thereforecould reduce NPL shares after controlling for other factors. Thus,the effect of central banks’ foundation years on NPL shares in amultivariate context remains a priori ambiguous.
Other measures of central bank governance—such as the levelof pay, the existence and composition of supervisory boards, themeeting cycle, terms lengths, or differently motivated dismissals ofgovernors—show no significant univariate correlation with NPL forour sample.
2.3 Auxiliary Data
In addition to the data from our questionnaire and the country con-trols described above, we used data from three other sources: a listof regulatory authorities and supervisory agencies maintained by theBIS (BIS 2005), central bank governance data collected by the IMF(Lybek and Morris 2004; Berger, Nitsch, and Lybek 2006), and theElectronic Compendium on Central Bank Governance maintainedby the BIS Central Bank Governance Forum (BIS 2004). In addi-tion, we collected the founding year of each central bank from itsrespective website.
We used the BIS list of regulatory authorities and supervisoryagencies to cross-check and supplement information provided by cen-tral banks on the importance and exclusivity of their supervisorytasks. For countries we did not have first-hand knowledge on, weverified the data on the BIS website to make sure the list was up todate. All three supervision and separation of power variables (“SoleSupervisor: CB,” “Sole Supervisor: FSA,” “Multiple Supervisors”)
50 International Journal of Central Banking December 2014
were constructed using this information. Because we only used theother BIS and IMF data in exploratory analyses, but not in any ofthe results we present in the paper, it suffices here to refer to theabove articles for a description of these data.
3. Results
As discussed in the literature review, there are arguments in favor ofand against separating financial supervision from other tasks typicalof central banks, but most theoretical analyses appear to suggestthat the benefits from separation are likely higher than the costs.Many recent policy papers and statements from central banks andthe current UK government argue instead in the opposite direction.Empirical evidence is lacking, as the study closest to ours, Hasanand Mester (2008), finds no significant effect of this feature for thepre-crisis period. Here, we test whether the consideration of the cri-sis period paired with the specification of our novel survey responsedata reported directly by central banks themselves sheds a differentlight on the issue.
3.1 Pre-Crisis Credit Risk
Table 2 shows results from OLS regressions of non-performing loan(NPL) shares averaged over the period 2004 until 2006 for eachcountry.10 Column 1 presents results for a specification includingall covariates that are significantly different from 0 in univariatetests and a number of test variables added at our discretion.11 Thefirst panel illustrates that neither more frequent crises in the past,nor banking market structure, influence mean NPL shares as such.Higher income dispersion and high historical levels of NPL explain
10We also specified annual estimations and various different time intervals.Results are qualitatively unaffected. Our preference for the period 2004–6 resultsfrom the timing of the questionnaire (mostly around 2005), a sufficiently long timelag to historical NPL levels (2000 in our case), and the aim to have a symmetriccrisis time window (2007–9; see next sub-section). All alternative specificationsare available upon request.
11We tested a battery of different combinations, using stepwise regression toexclude or include alternative covariates for each of the four “blocks” in theregressions.
Vol. 10 No. 4 Financial Stability and Central Bank Governance 51Tab
le2.
Mea
nN
on-P
erfo
rmin
gLoa
ns
and
Cen
tral
Ban
kTra
its
Pri
orto
Cri
sis
(200
4–6)
Spec
ifica
tion:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Vari
able
sFull
Model
Obje
ctiv
esO
bje
ctiv
esand
Mandate
Cou
ntr
yan
dCri
sis
His
tory
Con
trol
s
oecd
−4.
002
−1.
990
−2.
444
−2.
448
−2.
443
−2.
469
[1.0
85]∗
∗∗
[0.7
28]∗
∗∗
[0.8
49]∗
∗∗
[0.8
80]∗
∗∗
[0.8
67]∗
∗∗
[0.8
29]∗
∗∗
lego
ruk
−1.
855
−1.
262
−1.
334
−1.
338
−1.
345
−1.
380
[0.9
74]∗
[0.6
58]∗
[0.7
03]∗
[0.7
38]∗
[0.7
25]∗
[0.6
61]∗
∗
giniin
dex
0.16
50.
127
0.12
90.
129
0.13
00.
129
[0.0
54]∗
∗∗
[0.0
41]∗
∗∗
[0.0
41]∗
∗∗
[0.0
42]∗
∗∗
[0.0
41]∗
∗∗
[0.0
40]∗
∗∗
npl20
00w
b0.
319
0.26
80.
281
0.28
10.
280
0.28
1[0
.063
]∗∗
∗[0
.041
]∗∗
∗[0
.042
]∗∗
∗[0
.044
]∗∗
∗[0
.043
]∗∗
∗[0
.042
]∗∗
∗
bc
1970
lv−
0.55
7[0
.485
]cc
1970
lv−
0.15
0[0
.269
]cr
320
00−
0.30
5[1
.573
]
Cen
tral
Ban
kO
bjec
tive
s
obje
ctiv
esfx
−3.
745
−3.
675
−3.
956
−3.
961
−3.
948
−3.
979
[1.3
00]∗
∗∗
[1.0
83]∗
∗∗
[1.1
28]∗
∗∗
[1.1
70]∗
∗∗
[1.1
51]∗
∗∗
[1.1
07]∗
∗∗
obje
ctiv
esps
−2.
580
−1.
358
−1.
513
−1.
516
−1.
499
−1.
514
[1.3
94]∗
[1.0
31]
[1.0
48]
[1.0
76]
[1.0
55]
[1.0
33]
obje
ctiv
esm
p0.
620
[0.7
47]
Supe
rvis
ion
and
Sep
arat
ion
ofPow
ers
mult
iple
super
viso
r−
0.93
2−
0.01
90.
084
[1.0
71]
[0.8
92]
[0.6
68]
(con
tinu
ed)
52 International Journal of Central Banking December 2014
Tab
le2.
(Con
tinued
)
Spec
ifica
tion:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Vari
able
sFull
Model
Obje
ctiv
esO
bje
ctiv
esand
Mandate
Supe
rvis
ion
and
Sep
arat
ion
ofPow
ers
cbso
lesu
per
viso
r−
1.93
7−
0.35
9−
0.38
9[1
.210
][1
.638
][2
.189
]fs
apru
dsu
p0.
367
0.35
20.
651
0.72
0[1
.725
][1
.875
][0
.824
][0
.606
]
Cen
tral
Ban
kG
over
nan
ce
cbfo
und
year
−0.
008
[0.0
05]
budap
no
0.58
0[0
.817
]pro
fitn
olaw
−0.
995
[1.4
63]
Con
stan
t15
.441
−0.
903
−0.
704
−0.
667
−1.
088
−1.
057
[10.
651]
[1.6
34]
[2.3
07]
[2.9
16]
[1.6
73]
[1.6
29]
Obse
rvat
ions
3941
4141
4141
R-S
quar
ed0.
818
0.74
20.
753
0.75
30.
753
0.75
3N
3941
4141
4141
Note
s:T
he
dep
enden
tva
riable
isth
eav
erage
ofth
enon-p
erfo
rmin
glo
an
share
for
the
yea
rs2004–6.Vari
able
sare
defi
ned
as
follow
s:bc
1970
lv:num
ber
ofbankin
gcr
ises
since
1970
acc
ord
ing
toLaev
enand
Vale
nci
a(2
008);
cc1970
lv:num
ber
ofcu
rren
cycr
ises
since
1970
acc
ord
ing
toLaev
enand
Vale
nci
a(2
010);
cbfo
und
yea
r:se
lf-r
eport
edfo
undati
on
yea
rofth
ece
ntr
albank;le
gor
uk:in
dic
ato
rva
riable
equalto
1if
the
countr
yhas
ale
galsy
stem
wit
hU
Kori
gin
.T
he
refe
rence
gro
up
isall
oth
erle
galher
itages
as
des
crib
edin
Shle
ifer
and
Vis
hny
(1998).
gin
iin
dex
:in
com
edis
per
sion
mea
sure
;cr
32000:th
em
ark
etsh
are
of
asy
stem
’sla
rges
tth
ree
banks
inte
rms
of
gro
ssto
talass
ets
in2000
(Worl
dB
ank);
npl2000
wb:non-p
erfo
rmin
glo
an
share
inth
eyea
r2000
(Worl
dB
ank);
OEC
D:in
dic
ato
rva
riable
equalto
1if
the
countr
yis
am
ember
ofth
eO
EC
D;obje
ctiv
esm
p:in
dic
ato
req
ualto
1if
the
centr
albank
answ
ered
topurs
ue
eith
erpri
ceor
money
stability
as
pri
me
obje
ctiv
e;obje
ctiv
esfx
:in
dic
ato
req
ualto
1if
the
centr
albank
answ
ered
topurs
ue
eith
ercu
rren
cyor
purc
hasi
ng
pow
erof
curr
ency
stability
as
pri
me
obje
ctiv
e;obje
ctiv
esps:
indic
ato
req
ualto
1if
the
centr
albank
answ
ered
topurs
ue
eith
eran
effici
ent
pay
men
tsy
stem
or
stable
bankin
goper
ati
ons
as
pri
me
obje
ctiv
e;cb
sole
super
vis
or:
indic
ato
req
ualto
1if
the
centr
albank
isin
volv
edin
at
least
som
esu
per
vis
ion
and
ifth
ere
isonly
one
pru
den
tialsu
per
vis
or;
mult
iple
super
vis
or:
indic
ato
req
ualto
1if
mult
iple
super
vis
ors
;fs
apru
dsu
p:eq
ual
to1
ifth
ere
exis
tsa
financi
alsu
per
vis
ion
auth
ori
tynex
tto
the
centr
albank;cb
pru
dsu
p:in
dic
ato
req
ualto
1if
the
centr
albank
isin
volv
edin
at
least
som
esu
per
vis
ion;budapno:in
dic
ato
req
ualto
1if
no
law
inpla
cere
quir
ing
appro
valofce
ntr
albank
budget
;pro
fitn
ola
w:in
dic
ato
req
ualto
1if
no
law
inpla
cere
quir
ing
dis
trib
uti
on
ofce
ntr
albank
pro
fits
.Sta
ndard
erro
rsare
inbra
cket
s.∗
∗∗p
<0.0
1,
∗∗p
<0.0
5,
∗p
<0.1
.
Vol. 10 No. 4 Financial Stability and Central Bank Governance 53
a large part of the cross-country variation and correlate positivelywith pre-crisis NPL shares. Membership in the OECD and a legalsystem with a UK heritage reduces NPL shares.
The second panel shows that objectives do matter for credit riskas well. However, in contrast to univariate analysis, the objectiveof monetary policy exhibits no significant relation. In fact, pursu-ing external stability as a prime objective correlates most signifi-cantly, and negatively, with pre-crisis NPL shares. The third panelfurther shows that differences in the prudential supervisory architec-ture across sampled economies have no significant influence on NPLshares. Likewise, models with interactions terms between objectivesand supervisory architecture differences (not reported) yield no sig-nificant differential effect of certain combinations between the twosets of variables.
Hence, much of the ongoing debate on whether to central-ize prudential supervision, the potential role of central banks ver-sus alternative authorities, and the potential interplay betweenprice and financial stability objectives appears less relevant thanexpected.
Regarding central bank governance proxies shown in the bottompanel of table 1, we also fail to detect significant relations with NPLshares. Overall, macroeconomic differences across countries are mostrelevant to explain credit risk.
The lack of significant relations before and during the crisis isconsistent with the negative findings of Hasan and Mester (2008) forthe non-crisis period in the 1990s. However, the absence of resultsmight merely reflect the fairly low degrees of freedom in our sam-ple. Therefore, we test in columns 2–6 whether our findings arecorroborated when excluding insignificant covariates. Consider firstspecification (2), which scrutinizes the results for central bank objec-tives and drops any prudential supervision, governance, or insignifi-cant macro covariate. The negative relation between foreign stabilityobjectives and NPL shares is corroborated, but the previously weaksignificance regarding payment system stability vanishes. We inves-tigate below whether this NPL-reducing effect of foreign stabilityobjectives potentially reflects past experiences with IMF missions.IMF involvement might have caused generally higher standards ofpolicy procedures at central banks that eventually also affected NPLlevels positively.
54 International Journal of Central Banking December 2014
Let us first consider a number of permutations in columns 3–6 that augment the reduced specification with different combina-tions of prudential mandate indicators. We focus on these vari-ables because of the intense policy debate (and actions) reflectedby, for instance, the enactment of the Dodd-Frank bill in theUnited States and the inception of the European Systemic RiskBoard under the auspices of the ECB that intend to establishautonomous and centralized prudential supervisory institutions. Inshort, none of the specifications indicate any significant correlationbetween differences in prudential mandates across sample coun-tries and NPL shares. Hence, this finding confirms that the cur-rent policy debate might be misguided to the extent that alterna-tive arrangements did not affect pre-crisis NPL shares in the firstplace.
3.2 Crisis Credit Risk
A possible explanation for the absence of any such effect mightbe that NPL shares in “normal” times just prior to the crisiswere monitored equally (in)effectively by either prudential architec-ture. Therefore, table 3 shows identical specifications as table 2—using, however, the mean share of NPL during the crisis, specificallybetween 2007 and 2009.
The ability of the previously chosen covariates to explain NPLshares vanishes almost entirely. Only the number of currency crisessince 1970, higher banking market concentration, and more recentfoundation of the central bank exhibit statistically weak evidence infavor of lower NPL ratios. This result vividly illustrates that duringthe crisis the institutional arrangements are of even lesser impor-tance. Presumably, the statement of objectives of central banksmight have meant little in times of crisis when authorities around theglobe took unusual measures to support crippled financial systems(see, e.g., Stolz and Wedow 2010 for a survey of “unconventional”measures during the crisis). Likewise, the existence of single or multi-ple supervisors is likely to mean little in times of international ad hoccollaboration among representatives from all authorities, includingtop-level government representatives, to stabilize financial systemsin concerted efforts.
Vol. 10 No. 4 Financial Stability and Central Bank Governance 55Tab
le3.
Mea
nN
on-P
erfo
rmin
gLoa
ns
and
Cen
tral
Ban
kTra
its
duri
ng
the
Cri
sis
(200
7–9)
Spec
ifica
tion:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Var
iable
sFull
Model
Obje
ctiv
esO
bje
ctiv
esan
dM
andat
e
Cou
ntry
and
Cri
sis
His
tory
Con
trol
s
oecd
−0.
119
−0.
893
−1.
980
−1.
628
−1.
634
−2.
144
[6.6
86]
[4.8
48]
[5.8
16]
[6.0
27]
[5.9
26]
[5.6
77]
lego
ruk
2.81
2−
4.00
1−
3.95
2−
3.58
8−
3.57
9−
4.25
0[6
.133
][4
.400
][4
.776
][5
.007
][4
.917
][4
.491
]gi
niin
dex
−0.
117
0.15
30.
158
0.16
80.
167
0.16
1[0
.333
][0
.271
][0
.279
][0
.286
][0
.279
][0
.275
]np
l20
00w
b−
0.19
1−
0.07
2−
0.03
6−
0.04
9−
0.04
8−
0.03
3[0
.391
][0
.272
][0
.294
][0
.301
][0
.296
][0
.289
]bc
1970
lv−
1.40
0[2
.985
]cc
1970
lv4.
586
[1.6
72]∗
∗
cr3
2000
16.9
31[9
.695
]∗
Cen
tral
Ban
kO
bjec
tive
s
obje
ctiv
esfx
−6.
680
−4.
886
−5.
521
−5.
052
−5.
067
−5.
675
[8.0
04]
[7.2
11]
[7.6
69]
[7.9
50]
[7.8
07]
[7.5
19]
obje
ctiv
esps
1.07
6−
1.72
9−
2.07
9−
1.77
8−
1.79
9−
2.08
5[8
.647
][6
.873
][7
.114
][7
.295
][7
.148
][7
.006
]ob
ject
ives
mp
2.87
6[4
.601
]
Supe
rvis
ion
and
Sepa
ration
ofPow
ers
cbso
lesu
per
viso
r1.
603
−2.
328
0.47
2[7
.535
][1
1.11
6][1
4.83
7]
(con
tinu
ed)
56 International Journal of Central Banking December 2014
Tab
le3.
(Con
tinued
)
Spec
ifica
tion:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Var
iable
sFull
Model
Obje
ctiv
esO
bje
ctiv
esan
dM
andat
e
Supe
rvis
ion
and
Sepa
ration
ofPow
ers
mul
tipl
esu
per
viso
r3.
580
1.75
71.
632
[6.5
93]
[6.0
45]
[4.5
23]
fsa
prud
sup
−0.
399
0.91
10.
549
1.89
3[1
1.78
7][1
2.78
7][5
.744
][4
.315
]
Cen
tral
Ban
kG
over
nanc
e
cbfo
und
year
0.05
4[0
.030
]∗
buda
pno
−1.
095
[5.1
57]
profi
tnol
aw7.
080
[9.0
09]
Con
stan
t−
112.
002
2.09
93.
862
0.44
50.
956
1.57
5[6
6.19
0][1
0.91
0][1
5.70
2][1
9.80
6][1
1.39
4][1
1.11
0]
Obs
erva
tion
s38
4040
4040
40R
-Squ
ared
0.45
10.
036
0.04
40.
046
0.04
60.
042
N38
4040
4040
40
Note
s:T
he
dep
enden
tva
riable
isth
eav
erage
ofth
enon-p
erfo
rmin
glo
an
share
for
the
yea
rs2007–9.Vari
able
sare
defi
ned
as
follow
s:bc
1970
lv:num
ber
ofbankin
gcr
ises
since
1970
acc
ord
ing
toLaev
enand
Vale
nci
a(2
010);
cc1970
lv:num
ber
ofcu
rren
cycr
ises
since
1970
acc
ord
ing
toLaev
enand
Vale
nci
a(2
008);
cbfo
und
yea
r:se
lf-r
eport
edfo
undati
on
yea
rofth
ece
ntr
albank;le
gor
uk:in
dic
ato
rva
riable
equalto
1if
the
countr
yhas
ale
galsy
stem
wit
hU
Kori
gin
.T
he
refe
rence
gro
up
isall
oth
erle
galher
itages
as
des
crib
edin
Shle
ifer
and
Vis
hny
(1998).
gin
iin
dex
:in
com
edis
per
sion
mea
sure
;cr
32000:th
em
ark
etsh
are
of
asy
stem
’sla
rges
tth
ree
banks
inte
rms
of
gro
ssto
talass
ets
in2000
(Worl
dB
ank);
npl2000
wb:non-p
erfo
rmin
glo
an
share
inth
eyea
r2000
(Worl
dB
ank);
oec
d:in
dic
ato
rva
riable
equalto
1if
the
countr
yis
am
ember
ofth
eO
EC
D;obje
ctiv
esm
p:in
dic
ato
req
ualto
1if
the
centr
albank
answ
ered
topurs
ue
eith
erpri
ceor
money
stability
as
pri
me
obje
ctiv
e;obje
ctiv
esfx
:in
dic
ato
req
ualto
1if
the
centr
albank
answ
ered
topurs
ue
eith
ercu
rren
cyor
purc
hasi
ng
pow
erof
curr
ency
stability
as
pri
me
obje
ctiv
e;obje
ctiv
esps:
indic
ato
req
ualto
1if
the
centr
albank
answ
ered
topurs
ue
eith
eran
effici
ent
pay
men
tsy
stem
or
stable
bankin
goper
ati
ons
as
pri
me
obje
ctiv
e;cb
sole
super
vis
or:
indic
ato
req
ualto
1if
the
centr
albank
isin
volv
edin
at
least
som
esu
per
vis
ion
and
ifth
ere
isonly
one
pru
den
tialsu
per
vis
or;
mult
iple
super
vis
or:
indic
ato
req
ualto
1if
mult
iple
super
vis
ors
;fs
apru
dsu
p:eq
ual
to1
ifth
ere
exis
tsa
financi
alsu
per
vis
ion
auth
ori
tynex
tto
the
centr
albank;cb
pru
dsu
p:in
dic
ato
req
ualto
1if
the
centr
albank
isin
volv
edin
at
least
som
esu
per
vis
ion;budapno:in
dic
ato
req
ualto
1if
no
law
inpla
cere
quir
ing
appro
valofce
ntr
albank
budget
;pro
fitn
ola
w:in
dic
ato
req
ualto
1if
no
law
inpla
cere
quir
ing
dis
trib
uti
on
ofce
ntr
albank
pro
fits
.Sta
ndard
erro
rsare
inbra
cket
s.∗
∗∗p
<0.0
1,
∗∗p
<0.0
5,
∗p
<0.1
.
Vol. 10 No. 4 Financial Stability and Central Bank Governance 57
3.3 Why Currency Stability Objectives?
The result that pre-crisis NPL shares are basically only correlatedwith the existence of explicit objectives of central banks to maintaina stable currency warrants some further discussion.
A first potential reason could be that governments in countriesthat pursue fixed exchange rate regimes are more prone, and pow-erful, to prick (perceived) bubbles as they emerge. Such differencesin intrusive policy propensity and ability might partly be capturedby indices of economic freedom. Table 4 shows according regres-sions where we specify each of the five individual freedom indexcomponents as well as a summary index collected since 1970 by theFraser Institute for a comprehensive sample of countries (Gwart-ney, Lawson, and Gartzke 2005).12 Each pair of columns refers toNPL prior to the financial crisis (2004–6) and during the financialcrisis (2007–9) as dependent variable, respectively. The result thatpre-crisis credit risk is negatively associated with a foreign exchangeobjective of the central bank remains intact. Likewise, NPL levelsduring the crisis continue to remain not significantly affected bystated objectives of central bankers. Hence, foreign exchange objec-tives are unlikely to merely gauge potentially omitted differences ingovernment’s hesitance to regulate banks.
Another potential reason why the objective to maintain a stablecurrency coincides with lower levels of NPL shares could result froma larger exposure to external disciplining devices. One such devicecould, in our view, be the involvement of the IMF once it extendsa loan to a country. IMF lending is usually conditioned on com-plying with procedures to select and monitor investment projectsfunded with IMF support. We also assume that IMF missions atcentral banks of countries having received support occur more oftenin order to ensure a proper management of IMF funds indepen-dent of political interests, e.g., by the ministry of finance. IMF staffpresence might either directly or indirectly improve governance andprocesses at central banks—for instance, through training and skilltransfers or simply by setting an example on acting prudently and
12The sub-components of the index are listed in table 6. Data pertain to thesurvey year 2005 to match the survey year of central banks. Data have beenobtained from http://www.freetheworld.com/.
58 International Journal of Central Banking December 2014Tab
le4.
NP
LP
rior
toan
dD
uri
ng
the
Cri
sis
and
Eco
nom
icFre
edom
Indic
ator
s
Specifi
cati
on:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
Baseline
Siz
eofG
overnm
ent
LegalSyste
mSound
Money
Freedom
toTrade
Regula
tion
Sum
mary
Index
Varia
ble
spre
durin
gpre
durin
gpre
durin
gpre
durin
gpre
durin
gpre
durin
gpre
durin
g
Cou
ntr
yan
dCri
sis
His
tory
Con
trol
s
oecd
−4
.121
1.5
84
−3
.936
−1
.344
−4
.160
1.2
09
−3
.972
13
.530
−4
.199
9.8
91
−4
.376
−5
.758
−4
.053
4.7
96
[1.1
45]∗
∗∗
[7.8
88]
[1.2
28]∗
∗∗
[8.2
92]
[1.1
98]∗
∗∗
[8.2
71]
[1.3
93]∗
∗∗
[8.3
92]
[1.2
44]∗
∗∗
[6.8
72]
[1.3
23]∗
∗∗
[8.6
09]
[1.5
20]∗
∗[1
0.4
59]
legor
uk
−1
.448
0.9
65
−1
.290
−1
.328
−1
.506
0.3
58
−1
.368
7.4
68
−1
.570
14
.289
−1
.725
−7
.366
−1
.381
4.2
01
[0.9
31]
[6.5
08]
[1.0
04]
[6.8
06]
[1.0
28]
[7.3
01]
[1.0
33]
[6.3
19]
[1.1
61]
[6.5
35]∗
∗[1
.166]
[7.8
02]
[1.3
52]
[9.4
62]
gin
iin
dex
0.1
34
0.3
67
0.1
38
0.3
12
0.1
36
0.3
82
0.1
31
0.1
05
0.1
36
0.1
92
0.1
41
0.5
41
0.1
33
0.3
19
[0.0
46]∗
∗∗
[0.3
14]
[0.0
47]∗
∗∗
[0.3
17]
[0.0
48]∗
∗∗
[0.3
29]
[0.0
49]∗
∗[0
.298]
[0.0
47]∗
∗∗
[0.2
62]
[0.0
49]∗
∗∗
[0.3
16]
[0.0
49]∗
∗[0
.335]
cr3
2000
0.0
28
16
.348
0.1
24
14
.883
−0
.084
15
.266
0.1
89
29
.266
−0
.102
30
.209
−0
.237
8.6
23
0.1
12
20
.289
[1.5
69]
[10
.805]
[1.6
07]
[10
.838]
[1.7
68]
[12
.277]
[1.7
97]
[10
.836]∗
∗[1
.750]
[9.6
78]∗
∗∗
[1.7
24]
[11
.218]
[1.9
94]
[13
.733]
npl2000
wb
0.2
79
−0
.209
0.2
75
−0
.126
0.2
84
−0
.165
0.2
76
−0
.424
0.2
83
−0
.607
0.2
81
−0
.175
0.2
77
−0
.315
[0.0
55]∗
∗∗
[0.3
81]
[0.0
56]∗
∗∗
[0.3
87]
[0.0
65]∗
∗∗
[0.4
48]
[0.0
57]∗
∗∗
[0.3
50]
[0.0
60]∗
∗∗
[0.3
32]∗
[0.0
56]∗
∗∗
[0.3
65]
[0.0
65]∗
∗∗
[0.4
47]
Cen
tral
Ban
kO
bjec
tive
s
obje
cti
ves
fx−
3.6
98
−2
.448
−3
.583
−4
.290
−3
.684
−2
.313
−3
.634
2.6
17
−3
.802
8.5
91
−3
.740
−3
.631
−3
.667
−1
.019
[1.2
79]∗
∗∗
[8.8
06]
[1.3
23]∗
∗[8
.925]
[1.3
09]∗
∗∗
[9.0
21]
[1.3
44]∗
∗[8
.097]
[1.4
23]∗
∗[7
.858]
[1.3
06]∗
∗∗
[8.4
50]
[1.3
76]∗
∗[9
.442]
obje
cti
ves
ps
−2
.835
5.4
19
−2
.776
4.7
52
−2
.835
5.3
49
−2
.749
12
.453
−2
.878
10
.396
−2
.990
0.4
95
−2
.804
6.9
61
[1.3
92]∗
[9.6
84]
[1.4
21]∗
[9.6
59]
[1.4
22]∗
[9.8
99]
[1.4
87]∗
[9.0
54]
[1.4
41]∗
[8.0
48]
[1.4
67]∗
[9.6
71]
[1.4
90]∗
[10
.364]
obje
cti
ves
mp
0.9
12
4.4
31
0.7
76
6.5
89
0.9
24
4.5
41
0.9
38
6.4
78
0.8
30
13
.196
0.9
59
5.7
63
0.9
09
4.2
79
[0.7
58]
[5.2
17]
[0.8
22]
[5.5
52]
[0.7
78]
[5.3
58]
[0.7
84]
[4.7
23]
[0.8
94]
[4.9
43]∗
∗[0
.780]
[5.0
47]
[0.7
75]
[5.3
16]
Supe
rvis
ion
and
Sep
arat
ion
ofPow
ers
cb
sole
superv
isor
−0
.202
2.6
67
−0
.301
4.2
19
−0
.285
1.8
85
−0
.225
0.8
68
−0
.127
−5
.334
−0
.133
4.6
91
−0
.211
2.2
76
[2.2
65]
[15
.599]
[2.3
12]
[15
.593]
[2.3
78]
[16
.403]
[2.3
15]
[13
.944]
[2.3
48]
[12
.963]
[2.3
12]
[14
.965]
[2.3
17]
[15
.888]
mult
iple
superv
isor
−0
.499
7.1
42
−0
.441
6.3
06
−0
.568
6.4
63
−0
.477
8.8
64
−0
.514
8.9
26
−0
.517
6.4
79
−0
.474
8.3
09
[1.0
36]
[7.1
45]
[1.0
60]
[7.1
53]
[1.1
55]
[8.0
42]
[1.0
63]
[6.4
13]
[1.0
61]
[5.8
67]
[1.0
55]
[6.8
45]
[1.1
13]
[7.6
66]
fsa
pru
dsu
p1
.363
−1
.113
1.1
56
2.4
23
1.3
14
−1
.641
1.3
25
−4
.034
1.4
83
−13
.469
1.4
46
0.8
46
1.3
30
−2
.570
[1.9
79]
[13
.683]
[2.0
58]
[13
.996]
[2.0
47]
[14
.221]
[2.0
29]
[12
.267]
[2.1
23]
[11
.732]
[2.0
24]
[13
.135]
[2.0
73]
[14
.247]
Cen
tral
Ban
kG
over
nan
ce
cb
found
year
−0
.007
0.0
58
−0
.006
0.0
46
−0
.007
0.0
57
−0
.007
0.0
77
−0
.007
0.0
79
−0
.007
0.0
45
−0
.007
0.0
66
[0.0
05]
[0.0
33]∗
[0.0
05]
[0.0
34]
[0.0
05]
[0.0
34]
[0.0
05]
[0.0
30]∗
∗[0
.005]
[0.0
28]∗
∗∗
[0.0
05]
[0.0
32]
[0.0
05]
[0.0
37]∗
Budapno
0.7
80
−0
.552
0.6
81
0.7
63
0.7
71
−0
.581
0.7
29
−4
.795
0.8
11
−4
.224
0.8
86
2.9
51
0.7
57
−1
.724
[0.8
16]
[5.7
73]
[0.8
55]
[5.8
70]
[0.8
36]
[5.8
99]
[0.8
72]
[5.4
03]
[0.8
49]
[4.8
37]
[0.8
70]
[5.8
66]
[0.8
97]
[6.3
62]
Pro
fitn
ola
w−
0.6
64
−3
.490
−0
.575
−4
.959
−0
.716
−3
.970
−0
.544
6.1
28
−0
.762
6.8
43
−0
.887
−9
.808
−0
.605
−0
.714
[1.3
42]
[9.2
41]
[1.3
77]
[9.2
96]
[1.4
13]
[9.7
38]
[1.4
99]
[9.0
32]
[1.4
70]
[8.1
11]
[1.4
71]
[9.5
32]
[1.6
09]
[11
.044]
(con
tinu
ed)
Vol. 10 No. 4 Financial Stability and Central Bank Governance 59Tab
le4.
(Con
tinued
)
Specifi
cati
on:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
Baseline
Siz
eofG
overnm
ent
LegalSyste
mSound
Money
Freedom
toTrade
Regula
tion
Sum
mary
Index
Varia
ble
spre
durin
gpre
durin
gpre
durin
gpre
durin
gpre
durin
gpre
durin
gpre
durin
g
Eco
nom
icFre
edom
Indi
cato
rs
Siz
eofG
overn
ment
−0
.140
2.2
29
[0.2
96]
[2.0
28]
LegalSyst
em
0.0
59
0.5
65
[0.3
97]
[2.8
10]
Sound
Money
−0
.090
−7
.235
[0.4
58]
[2.7
64]∗
∗
Fre
edom
toTra
de
0.0
97
−10
.341
[0.5
30]
[2.9
41]∗
∗∗
Regula
tion
0.1
93
5.5
46
[0.4
74]
[3.1
31]∗
Sum
mary
Index
−0
.059
−2
.789
[0.8
44]
[5.8
27]
Const
ant
11
.854
−133.9
88
11
.098
−124.1
10
11
.698
−134.9
54
12
.144
−111.8
03
11
.487
−98.2
11
11
.229
−148.1
38
11
.942
−130.4
15
[10
.185]
[70
.949]∗
[10
.475]
[71
.198]∗
[10
.451]
[72
.635]∗
[10
.499]
[63
.910]∗
[10
.586]
[58
.928]
[10
.479]
[68
.334]∗
∗[1
0.4
79]
[72
.553]∗
Obse
rvati
ons
39
38
39
38
39
38
39
38
39
38
39
38
39
38
R-S
quare
d0
.804
0.2
62
0.8
06
0.3
00
0.8
04
0.2
63
0.8
05
0.4
37
0.8
05
0.5
27
0.8
06
0.3
54
0.8
04
0.2
69
Note
s:
The
dependent
vari
able
isth
eavera
ge
of
the
non-p
erf
orm
ing
loan
share
for
the
years
2004–7
(pre
)and
2007–9
(duri
ng).
Vari
able
sare
defined
as
follows:
bc
1970
lv:num
ber
ofbankin
gcri
ses
since
1970
accord
ing
toLaeven
and
Vale
ncia
(2010);
cc
1970
lv:num
ber
ofcurr
ency
cri
ses
since
1970
accord
ing
toLaeven
and
Vale
ncia
(2008);
cb
found
year:
self-r
eport
ed
foundati
on
year
ofth
ecentr
albank;le
gor
uk:in
dic
ato
rvari
able
equalto
1if
the
countr
yhas
ale
galsy
stem
wit
hU
Kori
gin
.T
he
refe
rence
gro
up
isall
oth
er
legalheri
tages
as
desc
ribed
inShle
ifer
and
Vis
hny
(1998).
gin
iin
dex:in
com
edis
pers
ion
measu
re;cr3
2000:th
em
ark
et
share
ofa
syst
em
’sla
rgest
thre
ebanks
inte
rms
ofgro
ssto
talass
ets
in2000
(Worl
dBank);
npl2000
wb:non-p
erf
orm
ing
loan
share
inth
eyear
2000
(Worl
dBank);
oecd:
indic
ato
rvari
able
equal
to1
ifth
ecountr
yis
am
em
ber
of
the
OEC
D;
obje
cti
ves
mp:
indic
ato
requal
to1
ifth
ecentr
al
bank
answ
ere
dto
purs
ue
eit
her
pri
ce
or
money
stability
as
pri
me
obje
cti
ve;obje
cti
ves
fx:in
dic
ato
requalto
1if
the
centr
albank
answ
ere
dto
purs
ue
eit
her
curr
ency
or
purc
hasi
ng
power
ofcurr
ency
stability
as
pri
me
obje
cti
ve;
obje
cti
ves
ps:
indic
ato
requal
to1
ifth
ecentr
al
bank
answ
ere
dto
purs
ue
eit
her
an
effic
ient
paym
ent
syst
em
or
stable
bankin
gopera
tions
as
pri
me
obje
cti
ve;cb
sole
superv
isor:
indic
ato
requalto
1if
the
centr
albank
isin
volv
ed
inat
least
som
esu
perv
isio
nand
ifth
ere
isonly
one
pru
denti
alsu
perv
isor;
mult
iple
superv
isor:
indic
ato
requal
to1
ifm
ult
iple
superv
isors
;fs
apru
dsu
p:
equal
to1
ifth
ere
exis
tsa
financia
lsu
perv
isio
nauth
ori
tynext
toth
ecentr
al
bank;
cb
pru
dsu
p:in
dic
ato
requalto
1if
the
centr
albank
isin
volv
ed
inat
least
som
esu
perv
isio
n;budapno:in
dic
ato
requalto
1if
no
law
inpla
ce
requir
ing
appro
valof
centr
albank
budget;
pro
fitn
ola
w:in
dic
ato
requalto
1if
no
law
inpla
ce
requir
ing
dis
trib
uti
on
ofcentr
albank
pro
fits
.Econom
icfr
eedom
data
isfu
rther
desc
ribed
inta
ble
6.Sta
ndard
err
ors
are
inbra
ckets
.∗
∗∗p
<0.0
1,
∗∗p
<0.0
5,
∗p
<0.1
.
60 International Journal of Central Banking December 2014
Table 5. Correspondence of Currency Objectives andPast IMF Exposure 1963–2005
FX Objective
IMF NO YES Total
NO 28 1 29YES 6 5 11Total 34 6 40
Notes: The table shows tabulation of IMF and FX-objective indicators. IMF is equalto 1 if the share of years with IMF support measures for a country is larger thanthe 75th percentile of the distribution of the share of years with support of all yearssince 1964. This share percentile is equal to 28 percent. FX objective is equal to 1 ifthe central bank answered to pursue stability of the currency or purchasing power ofthe currency. The area under the receiver operating characteristics curve is 0.71. Thestandard error is 0.081. Thus, this area is different from either 0.5 (non-determinacy)or 1 (perfectly deterministic).
independently. The result may be positive spillovers to local author-ities, which eventually helps them in supervising their own financialsystems according to mimicked standards and procedures.
Obviously, a full-fledged statistical test of this narrative is beyondthe scope of this paper. It would require detailed information onactual IMF missions as well as more direct data proxying for poten-tial skill transfers and, ultimately, adoption of better procedures,governance, and policymaking with domestic authorities.
But as an exploration of this potential reason why foreign sta-bility objectives correlate significantly with lower shares of NPL, wemanually collected from IMF annual reports the outstanding vol-umes of support funding to any of our sampled countries between1964 and 2005, i.e., just up to the first period included in the pre-crisis mean NPL share. On average, countries in our sample had in19 percent of the years since 1964 an exposure to the IMF. Inter-estingly, despite the large share of OECD countries in our sample,only seven out of forty-four countries never had an exposure to theIMF. We define intensive IMF exposure countries as those that havean exposure above the 75th percentile of the frequency distribution,i.e., in more than 28 percent of the years between 1964 and 2005.
Table 5 shows the tabulation between high (low) IMF exposurecountries and the existence (absence) of foreign stability objectives
Vol. 10 No. 4 Financial Stability and Central Bank Governance 61Tab
le6.
Eco
nom
icFre
edom
Index
Cat
egor
ies
1.Siz
eof
2.Leg
alSyst
eman
d4.Fre
edom
toTra
de
Gov
ernm
ent
Pro
per
tyR
ights
3.Sound
Money
Inte
rnat
ional
ly5.R
egula
tion
1AG
over
nmen
tco
nsum
ptio
n2A
Judi
cial
inde
pen
denc
e3A
Mon
eygr
owth
4ATar
iffs
5AC
redi
tm
arke
tre
gula
tion
s1B
Tra
nsfe
rsan
dsu
bsid
ies
2BIm
part
ialco
urts
3BSt
anda
rdde
viat
ion
ofin
flation
4AiR
even
uefr
omtr
ade
taxe
s(%
oftr
ade
sect
or)
5AiO
wne
rshi
pof
bank
s
1CG
over
nmen
ten
terp
rise
san
din
vest
men
t
2CP
rote
ctio
nof
prop
erty
righ
ts3C
Infla
tion
:M
ost
rece
ntye
ar4A
iiM
ean
tari
ffra
te5A
iiP
riva
tese
ctor
cred
it
1DTop
mar
gina
lta
xra
te2D
Mili
tary
inte
rfer
ence
inru
leof
law
and
pol
itic
s
3DFr
eedo
mto
own
fore
ign-
curr
ency
acco
unts
4Aiii
Stan
dard
devi
atio
nof
tari
ffra
tes
5Aiii
Inte
rest
rate
cont
rols
1DiTop
mar
gina
lin
com
eta
xra
te
2EIn
tegr
ity
ofth
ele
galsy
stem
4BR
egul
ator
ytr
ade
barr
iers
5BLab
orm
arke
tre
gula
tion
s
1Dii
Top
mar
gina
lin
com
ean
dpa
yrol
lta
xra
te
2FLeg
alen
forc
emen
tof
cont
ract
s4B
iN
on-t
ariff
trad
eba
rrie
rs5B
iH
irin
gre
gu-
lation
san
dm
inim
umw
age
2GR
egul
ator
yre
stri
ctio
nson
the
sale
ofre
alpr
oper
ty
4Bii
Com
plia
nce
cost
sof
impor
ting
and
expor
ting
5Bii
Hir
ing
and
firin
gre
gula
tion
s
2HR
elia
bilit
yof
pol
ice
4CB
lack
mar
ket
exch
ange
rate
s5B
iiiC
entr
aliz
edco
llect
ive
barg
aini
ng2I
Bus
ines
sco
sts
ofcr
ime
4DC
ontr
ols
ofth
em
ovem
ent
ofca
pita
lan
dpeo
ple
5Biv
Hou
rsre
gula
tion
s
4DiFo
reig
now
ners
hip/
inve
stm
ent
rest
rict
ions
5Bv
Man
date
dco
stof
wor
ker
dism
issa
l
(con
tinu
ed)
62 International Journal of Central Banking December 2014
Tab
le6.
(Con
tinued
)
1.Siz
eof
2.Leg
alSyst
eman
d4.Fre
edom
toTra
de
Gov
ernm
ent
Pro
per
tyR
ights
3.Sound
Money
Inte
rnat
ional
ly5.R
egula
tion
4Dii
Cap
ital
cont
rols
5Bvi
Con
scri
ptio
n4D
iiiFr
eedo
mof
fore
igne
rsto
visi
t
5CB
usin
ess
regu
la-
tion
s
5CiA
dmin
istr
ativ
ere
quir
emen
ts5C
iiB
urea
ucra
cyco
sts
5Ciii
Star
ting
abu
sine
ss5C
ivE
xtra
pay-
men
ts/
brib
es/
favo
ritism
5Cv
Lic
ensi
ngre
stri
ctio
ns5C
viTax
com
plia
nce
Note
s:T
he
econ
omic
free
dom
index
isob
tain
edfr
omG
war
tney
,Law
son,an
dG
artz
ke(2
005)
.D
ownlo
aded
dat
aco
rres
pon
dto
the
2005
surv
eyre
sult
san
dar
ebas
edon
the
late
stve
rsio
nof
the
Eco
nom
icFre
edom
ofth
eW
orld
Annu
alR
epor
t,av
aila
ble
atht
tp:/
/ww
w.fre
ethew
orld
.com
/.H
igher
scor
esin
dic
ate
mor
efr
eedom
.
Vol. 10 No. 4 Financial Stability and Central Bank Governance 63
for the countries included in specifications (2) through (6) in pre-ceding multivariate analyses. Around half of the countries with themost substantial IMF exposure also indicated the pursuit of for-eign exchange stability as an objective. In turn, 83 percent of allcountries indicated foreign exchange stability objectives were alsoexposed most frequently to the IMF. The area under the ROC curveis 0.71—according to Hosmer and Lemeshow (2005), an indication ofa good discriminatory power of these two measures. The five coun-tries in the lower right cell of the tabulation are Argentina, Brazil,Bulgaria, Chile, and Mexico. Many of these countries actually expe-rienced currency crises in the past, on average two since 1990 andaround four since 1970 according to the crisis definitions of Laevenand Levine (2010).
Consequently, past experiences of crisis that brought in someexternal disciplining device in the form of IMF missions might have amore relevant long-run effect on improving prudential attitudes com-pared with the currently debated issues on whether or not to central-ize supervision and, if so, with whom the prudential mandate shouldrest, central banks or financial stability authorities. Note, however,that we are not able to detect a significant relationship of an IMFexposure indicator variable on the NPL share prior to, or during thecrisis for this fairly confined, cross-sectional sample. Therefore, fur-ther research into the effects of skill transfer and externally imposeddiscipline might constitute an important, but so far neglected, routefor further research on the relation between prudential supervisionand financial stability.
4. Conclusion
The crisis in the sub-prime mortgage market and the subsequentfinancial crisis ignited a debate about the past and future role of cen-tral banks and financial supervisory agencies. In several countries,new laws have been or are being adopted that alter the objectivesof central banks, change the allocation of prudential supervisoryauthority, or change the governance structure of central banks.
In this paper, we use newly collected survey data on the gover-nance structure of central banks in forty-seven developed and emerg-ing jurisdictions, to shed more light on whether the formal objective,
64 International Journal of Central Banking December 2014
the mandate, and a large number of governance features of a cen-tral bank can help explain a country’s banking system fragility, bothprior to and during the 2007–9 financial crisis. We focus in partic-ular on empirical evidence of whether micro-prudential supervisionshould be with the central banks or with a separate independentagency, as the issue is at the core of the current policy debate.
We find that neither having formal responsibility for bankingsupervision or banking system stability nor other central bank gov-ernance features explain cross-country variation in financial fragility,both prior to and during the crisis. Instead we find a country’slegal origin, income dispersion, historical levels of credit risk, andOECD membership explain most of the variation in pre-crisis finan-cial fragility. During the crisis period, however, these links breakdown.
The only governance characteristic that exhibits a significantrelation with non-performing loan levels is whether central bankspursue a currency stability objective. This effect is amplified forcountries with more frequent exposures to IMF missions in the past.
These results suggest that the current focus of policy discussionson whether prudential supervision should be shared or concentratedat the central bank may be somewhat misguided. Our results do notlend support in favor of institutional reforms in this direction.
Instead, one way to interpret our results is that countries thatare experiencing a big crisis and are exposed to IMF crisis packagestighten up their financial supervision and reduce financial fragility,irrespective of their central bank’s governance structure. Unfortu-nately, our data lack time-series variation and do not allow us to fur-ther investigate this matter. Additional work on the subject, startingfrom the data-collection stage, is needed to support policymakersand guide the design of any institutional reforms.
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