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The Inmates Are Running the Asylum: Why Some Multi-Factor Authentication

Technology is Irresponsible

Clare Nelson, CISSPclare_nelson@clearmark.biz

@Safe_SaaS

Presentation for a Fortune 500 Financial Services Company May 7, 2015

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Clare Nelson, CISSPIndependent InfoSec Consultant specializing in Multi-Factor Authentication

• 30+ years in industry– Encrypted TCP/IP variants for NSA– Product Management at DEC (HP), EMC2

– Director Global Alliances at Dell, Novell (IAM)– VP Business Development, MetaIntelli (Mobile

Security)

• 2001 Founder, CEO ClearMark Consulting

• 2012, 2013 Austin ISSA Board• 2014 Co-founder C1ph3r_Qu33ns• B.S. Mathematics

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Scope• Focus on consumers, external customers• United States focus– EU regulations

o France: legal constraints for biometric Must be authorized by National Commission for Informatics and

Liberty (CNIL)1

– India: e-commerce Snapdeal, Reserve Bank of IndiaoMove from two-factor to single-factor authentication for

transactions less than Rs. 3,0002

1Source: http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:512852/FULLTEXT01.pdfl 2Source: http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/retail/snapdeal-for-single-factor-authentication-for-low-value-deals/articleshow/46251251.cms

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NIST Definition

Origin of definition?• NIST: might be Gene Spafford, or “ancient lore”2

– @TheRealSpaf, “Nope — that's even older than me!”3

– 1970s? NSA? Academia?

1Source: http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63-2.pdf 2Source: February 26, 2015 email response from a NIST SP 800-63-2 author3Source: February 27, 2015 response from @TheRealSpaf (Gene Spafford)

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How can you write a guide based on a definition of unknown, ancient origin?

How can you implement MFA without a current, coherent definition?

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Updated Definitions (More Risk)

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) Factors:• Knowledge • Possession

– Mobile device identification• Inherence

– Biometrics: Physical or Behavioral• Location

– Geolocation– Geofencing– Geovelocity

• Time1

1Source: http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/multifactor-authentication-MFA2Source: http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63-2.pdf

NIST:Device identification, time, and geo-location could be used to challenge an identity; but “they are not considered authentication factors”2

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Authentication in an Internet Banking Environment• No longer consider simple device identification

(cookies, IP addresses, or geo-location information) • Complex device identification, “digital fingerprinting”

use PC configuration, IP address, geo-location, other factors– Implement time of day restrictions for funds transfers– Consider keystroke dynamics, biometric-based responses1

1Source: https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2011/pr11111a.pdf

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“…time to alter how authentication is done …it doesn't meet today’s demands

….the range of technologies, such as soft tokens, hard tokens, Trusted Platform Module (TPM), biometrics, simple passwords and more have led to a ‘Tower of Babel’ for authentication.”1

– Phil Dunkelberger,CEO Nok Nok Labs

1Source: http://www.networkworld.com/article/2161675/security/pgp-corp--co-founder-s-startup-targets-cloud-authentication.html

State of the Market

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Why 200+ MFA Vendors?

Authentication has been the Holy Grail since the early days of the Web.1

The iPhone of Authentication has yet to be invented.2

1Source: http://sciencewriters.ca/2014/03/26/will-your-brain-waves-become-your-new-password/ 2Source: Clare Nelson, February 2015.

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Suboptimal Choices

Authentication Factors/Technology1. Biometrics, 2D fingerprint2. Short Message Service (SMS)

– One-Time Password (OTP)

3. Quick Response (QR) codes4. JavaScript5. Weak, arcane, account recovery6. Assumption mobile devices are secure7. Encryption (without disclaimers)

– Quantum computing may break RSA or ECC by 20301

• Update on NSA’s $80M Penetrating Hard Targets project2

– Encryption backdoors, is it NSA-free and NIST-free cryptography?– No mysterious constants or “magic numbers” of unknown provenance”3

1Source: January 18, 2015: Ralph Spencer Poore, cryptologist, Austin ISSA guest lecturer2Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-seeks-to-build-quantum-computer-that-could-crack-most-types-of-encryption/2014/01/02/8fff297e-7195-11e3-8def-a33011492df2_story.html3Source: https://www.grc.com/sqrl/sqrl.htm

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Juniper Research:• By 2019, 770 million apps that use biometric authentication will be

downloaded annually- Up from 6 million in 2015

• Fingerprint authentication will account for an overwhelming majority- Driven by increase of fingerprint scanners in smartphones1

Irrational Exuberance of Biometric Authentication Adoption

1Source: http://www.nfcworld.com/2015/01/22/333665/juniper-forecasts-biometric-authentication-market/

Samsung Pay

Slide 121Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q3ymzRYXezI

Apple Touch ID: Cat Demo

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• Cannot be revoked or re-issued- Easy to reset your password, not easy to reset your fingerprints

• 2D Fingerprints- Proven especially vulnerable to targeted attacks

• Your biometrics are in public domain, and elsewhere, easily accessed• Biometric identification systems may undermine privacy by making

identity theft more likely1

• Biometrics will likely persist in government and private databases, accreting information whether we like it or not2

• False positives, false negatives• High cost • Need to account for disabilities, injuries, other issues• User acceptance, preference for biometric factors varies by demographic

Issues with Biometrics

1Source: http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:512852/FULLTEXT01.pdfl 2Source: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/tech/biometrics-and-the-future-of-identification/

“Fingerprints scare me” - Anonymous (2015)

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1Source: http://www.dw.de/image/0,,18154223_303,00.jpg

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2D Fingerprint Hacks

• Starbug, aka Jan Krissler• 2014: Cloned fingerprint of German Defense

Minister, Ursula Von der Leyen– From photographs1,2

• 2013: Hacked Apple’s Touch ID on iPhone 5S ~24 hours after release in Germany– Won IsTouchIDHackedYet.com competition3

• 2006: Published research on hacking fingerprint recognition systems4

1Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vVivA0eoNGM 2Source: http://www.forbes.com/sites/paulmonckton/2014/12/30/hacker-clones-fingerprint-from-photograph/ 3Source: http://istouchidhackedyet.com4Source: http://berlin.ccc.de/~starbug/talks/0611-pacsec-hacking_fingerprint_recognition_systems.pdf

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2013: Starbug Faking Touch ID

1Source: http://istouchidhackedyet.com

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Riccio versus Krissler

“Fingerprints are one of the best passwords in the world.”1

– Dan RiccioSenior vice president, Apple

“Don't use fingerprint recognition systems for security relevant applications!”2

– Jan Krissler (Starbug)

1Source: http://www.imore.com/how-touch-id-works2Source: http://berlin.ccc.de/~starbug/talks/0611-pacsec-hacking_fingerprint_recognition_systems.pdf

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Biometrics Systems: Types of Attacks1

1Source: http://berlin.ccc.de/~starbug/talks/0611-pacsec-hacking_fingerprint_recognition_systems.pdf

Starbug’s Threat Model

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3D Fingerprint1

1Source: http://sonavation.com/technology/

No matter how advanced the biometric is, the basic threat model persists.

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Behavioral Biometrics: BehavioSec

1Source: http://www.behaviosec.com

Laptop: requires JavaScript, won’t work with Aviator browser, or if you disable JavaScript

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Behavioral Biometrics: BioCatch

• Detect threats based on user interaction with online, and mobile applications

• Analyzes 400+ bio-behavioral, cognitive and physiological parameters– How you find missing cursor1

1Source: http://www.biocatch.com

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Fingerprinting Web Users Through Font Metrics1

• Browser variations– Version– What fonts are installed– Other settings

• Font metric–based fingerprinting– Measure onscreen size of font

glyphs

• Effective against Tor Browser

2Source: http://fc15.ifca.ai/preproceedings/paper_83.pdf

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Biometrics: In Use, Proposed• Fingerprints 2D, 3D via ultrasonic waves• Palms, its prints and/or the whole hand (feet?)• Signature• Keystroke, art of typing, mouse, touch pad• Voice• Iris, retina, features of eye movements• Face, head – its shape, specific movements• Other elements of head, such as ears, lip prints• Gait• Odor• DNA• ECG (Beta: Bionym’s Nymi wristband, smartphone, laptop, car, home security)• EEG1

• Smartphone/behavioral: AirSig authenticates based on g-sensor and gyroscope, how you write your signature in the air2

1Source: http://www.optel.pl/article/future%20of%20biometrics.pdf 2Source: http://www.airsig.com

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“Thought Auth”1

EEG Biosensor• MindWave™

headset2

• Measures brainwave signals

• EEG monitor• International

Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security

1Source: Clare Nelson, March 20152Source: http://neurosky.com/biosensors/eeg-sensor/biosensors/

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“… biometrics cannot, and absolutely must not, be used to authenticate an identity”1

– Dustin Kirkland, Ubuntu Cloud Solutions Product Manager and Strategist at Canonical

1Source: http://blog.dustinkirkland.com/2013/10/fingerprints-are-user-names-not.html

“Fingerprints are Usernames, Not Passwords”

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• 2014 Paper from Northeastern University and Technische Universität Berlin - “SMS OTP systems cannot be considered secure

anymore”• SMS OTP threat model

- Physical access to phone- SIM swap attack- Wireless interception- Mobile phone trojans1

1Source: https://www.eecs.tu-berlin.de/fileadmin/f4/TechReports/2014/tr_2014-02.pdf

SMS OTP Attacks

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• Operation Emmental• Defeated two-factor authentication (2FA)

- 2014, discovered by Trend Micro1

- Targeted Swiss, Austrian, German, Swedish other European; plus Japanese banks

- Typical scenario: customer goes to online bank1. Customer enters username and password2. Session token sent to mobile device (SMS OTP)3. Customer enters session token (OTP)

- Attackers scraped SMS one-time passwords off customers’ Android phones2, 3

1Source: http://blog.trendmicro.com/finding-holes-operation-emmental/ 2Source: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf 3Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gchKFumYHWc

SMS OTP Attack: Banking Example

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QR Code Risks1

• Example: VASCO two-factor authentication– User captures QR code with mobile device– User enters PIN code to log on, or validate

transaction2

• QR code redirects user to URL, even if the URL is displayed, not everyone reads– Could link to a malicious website

1Source: http://www.csoonline.com/article/2133890/mobile-security/the-dangers-of-qr-codes-for-security.html2Source: https://www.vasco.com/products/client_products/software_digipass/digipass_for_mobile.aspx

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1Source: http://www.zdnet.com/article/google-unveils-5-year-roadmap-for-strong-authentication/

Account recovery is the Achilles heel of 2FA

– Eric SachsProduct Management Director, Identityat Google

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Account Recovery1

1Source: https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/1187538?hl=en

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Account Recovery1

Apple Two-Step Authentication• What if I lose my Recovery Key?• Go to My Apple ID, create a new Recovery Key using

your Apple ID password and one of your trusted devices.1

1Source: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204152

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1Source: http://guardtime.com/blog/biggest-enterprise-risk-mobile-devices

“Mobile is the New Adversarial Ingress Point.”1

– Lee Cocking, VP Product Strategy at GuardTime

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What’s Wrong with the Mobile Device Becoming the Authentication Device?

Source: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Mobile_Security_Project#tab=Top_10_Mobile_Risks Source: http://metaintelli.com/blog/2015/01/06/industry-first-metaintelli-research-discovers-large-number-of-mobile-apps-affected-by-owasp-mobile-top-10-risks/

MetaIntelli research: sample of 38,000 mobile apps, 67% had M32

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MFA Double Standard

Big Company (2015)• Consumers may

use facial and voice recognition for mobile login2

• Employees use Symantec Validation and ID Protection (VIP)3

1Source: http://cdn.themetapicture.com/media/funny-puppy-poop-double-standards.jpg 2Source: http://www.americanbanker.com/news/bank-technology/biometric-tipping-point-usaa-deploys-face-voice-recognition-1072509-1.html 3Source: http://www.slideshare.net/ExperianBIS/70-006identityauthenticationandcredentialinginpractice

1

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Perfect Storm

• Fractured, crowded market, 200+ MFA vendors chasing ~$1.8B market1

• Apple, VISA, Samsung, others: fingerprint-based authentication is cool, secure

• FIDO Alliance • 2014, year of the breach• Increased legislation

1Source: http://www.slideshare.net/FrostandSullivan/analysis-of-the-strong-authentication-and-one-time-password-otp-market

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FIDO Alliance

• Fast ID Online (FIDO) Alliance• Proponent of interoperability– Universal 2nd Factor (U2F)– Universal Authentication Framework (UAF)

• Triumph of marketing over technology• Network-resident versus device-resident

biometrics– FIDO advocates device-resident

• Problems, especially with voice1

1Source: January 2015, “Networks vs Device Resident Biometrics,” ValidSoft

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“Legacy thinking subverts the security of a well-constructed system”1

– David Birch, Digital Money and Identity Consultant,

Author of Identity is the New Money2

1Source: https://www.ted.com/talks/david_birch_identity_without_a_name?language=en#t-1123822Source: http://www.amazon.com/Identity-Is-New-Money-Perspectives/dp/1907994122

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Consider Context-Based Authentication(aka Risk-Based Authentication, Adaptive Authentication)

• Device registration and fingerprinting • Source IP reputation data • Identity store lookup • Geo-location • Geo-fencing • Geo-velocity • Behavioral analysis

1Source: http://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/authentication/moving-beyond-2-factor-authentication-with-context/a/d-id/1317911

Layer multiple contextual factors. Build a risk profile.

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What You Can Do (1 of 2)

• Request threat models from MFA vendors • Beware– 2D fingerprints– Already-hacked biometrics– QR codes– SMS OTP– JavaScript requirements– Weak account recovery– Lack of mobile device risk analysis– Encryption with backdoors

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What You Can Do (2 of 2)

• Do not be swayed by latest InfoSec fashion trends– Apple TouchID• Integration with VISA• Samsung Pay

– FIDO Alliance• Rethink the definition of MFA– Beware of new interpretations

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Questions?Clare Nelson, CISSP

clare_nelson@clearmark.biz@Safe_SaaS

Feature article for April 2015, Information Systems Security Association (ISSA) Journal,

Multi-Factor Authentication: What to Look Forhttp://www.bluetoad.com/publication/?i=252353

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Backup Slides

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Additional References

1. 2014 December, Starbug (Jan Krissler) video, Iche sehe, also bin ich … Du, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vVivA0eoNGM&feature=youtu.be

2. OWASP Mobile Top 10 Risks, Insufficient Transport Layer Protection, https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Mobile_Top_10_2014-M3

3. OWASP Guide to Authentication, https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Guide_to_Authentication#What_is_two_factor_authentication.2C_really.3F

4. SANS, Two-Factor Authentication: Can You Choose the Right One? http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/authentication/two-factor-authentication-choose-one-33093

5. Gluu blog, (January 15, 2014), Achilles Heel of Two-Factor Authentication, http://www.gluu.org/blog/2fa_achilles_heel/

6. Gartner, December 1, 2014, Magic Quadrant for User Authentication.7. Forrester, December 30, 2013; Market Overview: Employee and Customer

Authentication Solutions in 2013: Part 1 of 28. M2SYS Technology (July 24, 2014), The Impact of Biometrics in Banking,

http://blog.m2sys.com/financial-services/impact-biometrics-banking/ 9. Google Unveils 5-Year Roadmap for Strong Authentication,

http://www.zdnet.com/article/google-unveils-5-year-roadmap-for-strong-authentication/

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• Biometrics, when employed as a single factor of authentication, do not constitute acceptable secrets for e-authentication

• Biometrics may be used in the registration process for higher levels of assurance to• Later help prevent a subscriber who is registered from

repudiating the registration• Help identify those who commit registration fraud• Unlock tokens1

1Source: http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63-2.pdf

NIST on Biometrics

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NIST: Threat Resistance by Threat Level1

1Source: http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63-2.pdf

29 Long term authentication secrets shall be protected at this level. Short term secrets may or may not be protected.30 Although there are techniques used to resist flood attacks, no protocol has comprehensive resistance to stop flooding.