United Nations Vs. Regional Peace

Support Operations: A Comparative

Analysis of Four Case Studies from the

1990s

Seán Williams, BA (NUI)

13210161

Presented for the degree of Master of Arts in International Security &

Conflict Studies to the School of Law & Government, Dublin City University

Supervisor:

Professor Robert Elgie

September 2014

Declaration

I hereby certify that this material, which I now submit for assessment on the programme of

study leading to the award of MA International Security & Conflict Studies is entirely my

own work, that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original, and

does not to the best of my knowledge breach any law of copyright, and has not been taken

from the work of others save and to the extent that such work has been cited and

acknowledged within the text of my work.

Signed: _____________________________

ID No: _____________________________

Date: ___________________________

i

Acknowledgements

Firstly, I offer my sincerest gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Robert

Elgie, who has supported me throughout my research, allowing me the room to work in my

own way while also keeping my work in check. Your help was invaluable.

Secondly, I must thank all of the staff at the DCU School of Law &

Government whom I have worked with over the last year for contributing to my

understanding of the contemporary world, each in their own unique way. Each of you has

given of your time, energy, and expertise and I am richer for it.

Finally, this journey would not have been possible without the support of

my family, Niamh, Seán Snr, and Ciara, and my girlfriend Jana. Thank you for

encouraging me in all of my pursuits and inspiring me to follow my dream. I am especially

grateful to my parents, who supported me emotionally and financially. I always knew that

you believed in me and wanted the best for me. I dedicate this thesis, my first book, to you,

knowing that it is on your investment that I will now build my adult life. Quite simply, I

cannot thank you enough.

ii

Abstract

The UN response to situations of conflict around the world has, over the years since the

end of the Cold War, varied considerably and the UN Security Council, as the only legal

authority responsible for mandating peace support and humanitarian intervention missions,

has increasingly come under close scrutiny in this regard. At the centre of this issue is a

cumbersome UN structure, the lack of any uniform interpretation of the UN Charter and an

inability to circumvent the self-interest of individual member states in enforcing the human

rights ideals of its legal instruments. In contrast, regional actors, e.g. NATO, ECOWAS

and the African Union, as well as coalitions involving loosely aligned self-motivated allies,

because they have a higher stake in ensuring peace and security close to their own borders,

have been highly effective interventionists. Utilising a comparative case study approach

and a hypothetico-deductive model of investigation, this thesis examines four interventions

from the 1990s: UNOSOM in Somalia, UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia, ECOMOG

in Liberia and INTERFET in East Timor. It calls into question the use of UN versus

regional entities in the composition of intervention forces, and discusses the impact of

mandates and resources on mission outcomes. The motivation behind this thesis is, not just

to identify the root causes of success and failure but, to point to an appropriate range of

defendable benchmarks that could influence future interventions for the better. The

overwhelming evidence of my study supports the view outlined in the literature that there

is considerable merit in having regional organisations partner the UN in peacekeeping

operations or, like INTERFET in East Timor, in acting as first responders to prepare the

ground for more long-term UN nation-building missions.

iii

Abbreviations

I-MEF – First Marine Expeditionary Force (United States Marine Corps)

ABC – Australian Broadcasting Corporation

AFL – Armed Forces of Liberia

AMIS – African Union Mission in Sudan

ANZUS – Australia, New Zealand & United States Security Treaty

ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations

AU – African Union

BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation

BSA – Bosnian Serb Army

CIMIC – Civil-Military Cooperation

CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States

DFAT – Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade (Australia)

EC – European Community

ECOMOG – ECOWAS Monitoring Group

ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States

EU – European Union

FALINTIL – Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste

FRETILIN – Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor

HI – Humanitarian Intervention

HRW – Human Rights Watch

HMAS – Her Majesty’s Australian Ship (Royal Australian Navy ship prefix)

IFOR – Implementation Force (NATO Force in Bosnia)

IMF – International Monetary Fund

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INPFL – Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia

INTERFET – International Force East Timor

JNA – Yugoslav National Army

LAS – League of Arab States

LPC – Liberian Peace Council

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NCA – National Command Authorities (USA)

NPFL – National Patriotic Front of Liberia

NSA – National Somali Alliance

OAS – Organisation of American States

OAU – Organisation of African Unity (Precursor of the African Union)

OIC – Organisation of the Islamic Conference

OSCE – Organisation for Security & Co-operation in Europe

P-5 – Permanent members of the UN Security Council

R2P – Responsibility to Protect Doctrine

RAR – Royal Australian Regiment (Infantry Formation of the Australian Army)

RUF – Revolutionary United Front of Liberia

SMC – Standing Mediation Committee (ECOWAS)

SNA – Somali National Army

TNI – Indonesian National Armed Forces

UDT – Timorese Democratic Union

ULIMO – United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy

ULIMO-J – United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (Krahn Breakaway)

ULIMO-K – United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (Mandingo

Breakaway)

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UN – United Nations

UNAMID – United Nations/African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur

UNAMET – United Nations Mission in East Timor

UNAMIR – United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

UNDPKO – United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNITAF – Unified Task Force

UNOMIL – United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia

UNOSOM – United Nations Operation in Somalia (I & II)

UNPROFOR – United Nations Protection Force (Former Yugoslavia)

UNPA – United Nations Protected Areas (Safe Areas in the Former Yugoslavia)

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

UNSG – United Nations Secretary General

UNTAET – United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

US – United States of America

USCENTCOM – United States Central Command (Military)

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union)

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Table of Contents

Declaration……………………………………………………………………………….....i

Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………...ii

Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………....iii

List of Abbreviations……………………………………………………………………...iv

Table of Contents………………………………………………………………………...vii

CHAPTER 1: Introduction & Statement of Research Aims……………………………1

CHAPTER 2: Literature Review…………………………………………………………5

CHAPTER 3: Research Design & Methodology……………………………………….16

CHAPTER 4: Review of Case Study I – UNOSOM in Somalia…….………………...22

Background to the Conflict…………………………………………………………...22

The Intervention……………………………………………………………………....23

Case Analysis………………………………………………………………………....28

CHAPTER 5: Review of Case Study II – UNPROFOR in Yugoslavia……………….32

Background to the Conflict…………………………………………………………...32

The Intervention……………………………………………………………………....34

Case Analysis………………………………………………………………………....38

CHAPTER 6: Review of Case Study III – ECOMOG in Liberia……………………..42

Background to the Conflict…………………………………………………………...42

The Intervention……………………………………………………………………....44

Case Analysis………………………………………………………………………....51

CHAPTER 7: Review of Case Study IV – INTERFET in East Timor……………….54

Background to the Conflict…………………………………………………………...54

The Intervention…………………………………………………………………........58

vii

Case Analysis………………………………………………………………………....63

CHAPTER 8: Findings & Conclusions…………………………………………………66

Research Findings…………………………………………………………………….66

Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………...74

BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………..79

UN Documents, Publications & Resolutions………………………………………....79

Regional Organisation and Other Government Documents………………………….82

News Media Sources…………………………………………………………………82

NGO Publications…………………………………………………………………….83

Secondary Research Material………………………………………………………...83

viii

Chapter 1 – Introduction & Statement of Research Aims

Given the urgency that attends responses to humanitarian needs, it is

remarkable how UN debates can engender procrastination, provoke stalemate or render

ineffectual one of society’s most cherished values, the protection of human rights. In this

respect, Normand and Zaidi (2008) detail the significant complexity in legislating for

humanitarian intervention but among the many ideas they proffer, one has particular

relevance to my topic.

“Cultural practices that transgress conventional notions of human

rights may invite humanitarian intervention; states that deny the

universal validity of human rights may become international

pariahs subject to regime change. The ‘may’ is important, because

it is common knowledge that not all abuses and abusers are equal

in practice. The theory of impartiality is belied by the absence of

consistently applied legal mechanisms interpreted and enforced by

objective decision makers.” (Normand & Zaidi; 2008: 9).

This, to me, is the nub of the argument surrounding humanitarian intervention. Because

international law provides for action against human rights abuses (UN; 1945: Preamble),

even where these involve hostilities or the threat of them (Holzgrefe & Keohane; 2003:

18), one cannot presume any parity in the manner or scale of any humanitarian operation

with a comparable precedent.

There are three separate issues that feed into the debate on armed

humanitarian interventions and which determine their effectiveness. Firstly, the precarious

standing within international law of any form of intervention; secondly, the extent to which

self-interest by powerful states may be a motivating factor in the decision to intervene; and

1

finally, the incapacity of UN structures when faced with the need to respond timely and

decisively to gross violations of human rights. These three issues conspire to render

ineffectual the very institution whose mission it is to act as guardian of human rights in all

its forms.

The precarious nature of armed intervention within international law rests

on a fulcrum between two contrasting interpretations of the UN Charter. The

‘restrictionist’ point of view asserts “no justification for entertaining any interpretation

other than the exact meaning of the text” (Harhoff; 2001: 101). This doctrine is grounded

in the fear that should any deviation be permitted, it could create a precedent for states to

wage war in pursuit of their own ideals and ends (Bellamy & Williams; 2006: 146). In

essence, restrictionists believe in the absolute sovereignty of all states, as a fundamental

and inviolable principle.

“The concept of international society privileges the state as the

sole repository of sovereign authority and is based on the

assumption that international order can be best maintained if states

respect each other’s sovereignty by adhering to the norms of non-

intervention in the internal affairs of other states” (Ayoob; 2002:

81).

In contrast, the ‘counter-restrictionist’ interpretation relies on a more

flexible attitude to wording, whereby humanitarian intervention may be deemed legal, even

under Article 2(4), if it does not seek to annex any territory or threaten a state’s

independence, and if humanitarian actions are undertaken exclusively for the purpose of

protecting human rights (Arend & Beck; 1993: 134). Here, the UN Charter may be

interpreted flexibly to meet the needs and particular context of an urgent or imminent

humanitarian crisis. For instance, when a state is in violation of its own citizens’

2

fundamental human rights, it can within international law be deemed to have reneged on

the most basic obligation of sovereignty and, in so doing, have a questionable claim of

sovereignty (Kolodziej; 2000: 127).

Under current international law, the UNSC exercises exclusive authority to

sanction (or not to sanction) humanitarian intervention and it is also the sole arbiter over

disputes relating to the legitimacy and/or legality of any external intervention in the

sovereign affairs of a member state. However, there are strong reasons to support the belief

that the UNSC may not be the optimal body to exercise exclusive authority in this matter

and the record shows in a significant number of cases that it has proved inept and ill-suited

to this task. The purpose of this thesis is to present an argument for rejecting the primacy

of the UNSC in this task and to explore a rationale for allowing regional organisations

greater autonomy to intervene, especially where nearby human rights abuses require an

immediate and resolute military response.

It is from these observations that my research question emerges: In

responding to gross violations of human rights, are regional organisations and/or ad-hoc

‘coalitions of the willing’ (led by either neighbour nations or nations with regional

influence) more effective than the UN? My overarching theory is that regional and/or

individual actors are better alternatives to the UNSC when it comes to authorising and

exercising peace enforcement measures in defence of human rights, especially in situation

where states fail to protect their own citizens. 1 From this, I have developed four pertinent

hypotheses to help focus my thesis (Baglione; 2007: 66).

The record of the UNSC in enforcing human rights ideals is poor.

The UNSC’s primacy in mandating intervention missions is obsolete.

1 In these circumstances, states can be deemed to have abnegated one of the primary responsibilities of state sovereignty and this then obligates the international community to intervene under the ‘Responsibility to Protect (R2P)’ doctrine.

3

In countering gross human rights abuses, decisive and robust peace enforcement is

more effective than issuing sanctions and/or mandating a peacekeeping presence.

Regional organisations, and/or ad-hoc coalitions are more effective than UN-led

mission at halting gross violations of human rights.

Given the considerable body of existing work devoted to the debate about

humanitarian intervention and the individual case studies that argue varying points of view,

I do not expect to uncover totally new insights. Although my research follows in the

footsteps of those cited in my literature review, my particular perspective offers a new way

of looking at the problem. The arguments and conclusions presented are relevant in today’s

world and I hope they will present not just reasoned argument but solutions to a problem

which continues to haunt UN interventions to this day. Nothing that I have read to date

recommends actions that might impact on the UNSC’s primacy in making decisions about

humanitarian interventions and this aspect of my research is entirely my own and will

hopefully contribute something new to the debate.

4

Chapter 2 – Literature Review

Since World War II, the UN has been burdened with mediating a growing

number of conflicts in various parts of the globe where intervention is required for the

purposes of peacekeeping, peace enforcement, nation-building, ensuring human wellbeing

and security and delivering humanitarian aid. Increased UN activism, has demonstrated the

extent to which the organisation has over-stretched its capabilities (Morris & McCoubrey;

2000: vii) and, because of this, the involvement of other actors in undertaking and

partnering operations of this nature has become necessary.

The UN’s legal authority to decide all matters concerning foreign

intervention is established in its Charter and in international law. However, there exists a

tension between the use of force by non-UN missions and the Charter’s cornerstone

principle of the non-use of force, embodied in Article 2(4). 2 Charney states that the

prohibition in Article 2(4) was meant to be essentially all encompassing and incorporates,

within its meaning, territorial integrity and political independence (1999: 1247). Charney’s

valid assumption poses difficulties for regional actors who, in assuming the role of

peacekeeping, usurp the prima facie fundamental right of the UN as the only legally

authorised agency to intervene and mediate foreign conflict or alleviate humanitarian need.

Article 24 of the UN Charter specifically confers “on the Security Council primary

responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (UN; 1945: Article

24). Therefore, ipso facto, it is also contrary to international law (and specifically Article

24) to violate the sovereignty of another UN member state without the consent of or a

mandate from the UN Security Council (UNSC) (Charney; 1999: 1247). However, what

2 Article 2(4) of the UN Charters states that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” (UN; 1945: Article 2(4)).

5

has come increasingly into play here is the ‘restrictionist’ and ‘counter-restrictionist’

interpretations of the wording which, in debate, can be self-serving and unduly delay a

timely response to a grave situation. However, academic opinion is much more cohesive

on the subject of intervention. Bellamy & Williams assert that it is illegal to breach the

sovereignty of another country under the banner of humanitarian intervention in pursuit of

one’s own ideals and ends; such interventions are essentially wars of aggression, even

when they are accompanied by manipulative language suggesting the contrary as well as

an altruistic concern (2006: 146).

The UN Charter obligates states to resolve disputes by peaceful means (UN;

1945: Article 2(3)). Article 37 further requires states, once they have exhausted all

peaceful avenues, to refer unsettled disputes to the Security Council (Ibid: Article 37).

Cassese specifies that, even in the face of human rights abuses, failure to act through the

UNSC and/or by UNSC mandate is reprehensible, even if the Council confines its

attentions “to deploring or condemning the massacres, plus possibly terming the situation

a threat to the peace” (1999: 27). According to the Danish Institute Report (1999: 108),

“inaction on the part of the Security Council is generally accepted as an indispensable

condition for the legitimacy of [unauthorised] humanitarian intervention.” This report also

suggests that the concomitant of this condition is the requirement by states undertaking

unauthorised humanitarian intervention to “report to the Security Council on their plans of

intervention and its progress” (Ibid). In addition, Charney (1999: 1244) states that the

issue should also be formally brought before the General Assembly on an emergency basis

and, assuming the UNSC has failed to approve the necessary military intervention, and

neither the Council “nor the General Assembly adopts a resolution expressly forbidding

further action … recourse to a UN-based remedy will be deemed to be exhausted .” Cassese

6

asserts that an unauthorised intervention must have “the support or at least the non-

opposition of the majority of the Member States of the UN” (1999: 27).

From a ‘deontological’ moral perspective, 3 it is the individual, and not the

state, that lies at the centre of international law because, in a democracy, states receive

their legitimacy from the will of the people. Hence, sovereignty is not an inherent right of

states but, rather, derives from individual rights. There is also a reciprocal obligation on

states to protect its own people. Thus, when sovereignty comes into conflict with human

rights, it is the good of the people that must prevail. Fernando Tesón (1997: 173-4), a

leading proponent of the legal right to unilateral humanitarian intervention, argues as

follows:

“The human rights imperative underlies the concepts of state and

government and the precepts that are designed to protect them,

most prominently article 2(4). The rights of states recognized by

international law are meaningful only on the assumption that those

states minimally observe individual rights. The United Nations’

purpose of promoting and protecting human rights found in article

1(3), and by reference in article 2(4) as a qualifying clause to the

prohibition of war, has a necessary primacy over the respect for

state sovereignty. Force used in defence of fundamental human

rights is therefore not a use of force inconsistent with the purposes

of the United Nations.”

The underlying assumption here is that human rights take precedence over the right to

sovereignty and that natural law and all aspects of the security of citizens have primacy.

3 On this view, the moral motives of the actor are relevant and acting on principle takes precedence over the consequences of the action. According to Thomas Donaldson (1993: 137), “it is common to define deontological theory as ‘agent-centred,’ i.e., as placing emphasis on an agent’s moral motives, and as allowing principles and precepts to override the consideration of consequences.”

7

Not unrelated to this topic is the question about who should be permitted or

assume authority to undertake a necessary, if unauthorised, intervention. Most writers

agree that, if only as a guard against self-interest, the intervention must be a multilateral

action. The Danish Institute Report (1999: 108) notes that an intervention by one state into

the sovereign affairs of another may still be considered legitimate “if the humanitarian

emergency is apparent, but no other state than the neighbouring state wants to make the

effort.” Also, even when an intervention is multilateral, this does not necessarily make it

legal; although where “more than one state has participated in a decision to intervene for

humanitarian reasons … [this reduces] the chance that the doctrine will be invoked

exclusively for reasons of self-interest” (Ibid: 108). Cassese advises that humanitarian

interventions should always be undertaken by a group of states or an ally rather than “a

single hegemonic power”, regardless of capability or the strength of its “military, political

and economic authority” (1999: 27). This guidance is convincing and points to the need to

decouple a state’s relative strength and resources from any decision about the leadership of

any coalition of willing intervention actors. However, from a practical perspective, this is

not always possible and the history of UN humanitarian interventions shows that

humanitarian campaigns are usually led by powerful states with the necessary military and

economic resources.

Charney (1999: 1244), on the other hand, suggests that any unauthorised

intervention is best undertaken by a relevant regional organisation. Regional organisations

constituted under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter are prohibited from taking enforcement

action without the authorisation of the UNSC (Article 53(1)). Arguably, this prohibition,

although limiting, guards against self-interest and strengthens the case for dealing “with

such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are

8

appropriate for regional action.” 4 In such circumstances, the involvement of a regional

organisation as the principal actor in a humanitarian intervention would enhance the

legitimacy of that intervention. Practically speaking, however, “most regional actors do

not have sufficient capabilities to undertake prolonged military operations” (Danish

Institute Report; 1999: 38).

Under the terms of Article 53(1) of the UN Charter, for a regional

organisation to legally engage in peace enforcement action, it must receive authorisation

from the UNSC. However, citing the UNSC treatment of ECOWAS after its pre-emptive

intervention in Liberia in 1990, a considerable body of academic argument concludes that

approval or commendation of an enforcement action after it has taken place sufficiently

satisfies this requirement, (Abass; 2004: 53-54. Ress & Brohmer; 2002: 865-866. Rostow;

1991: 515. Simma; 1999: 4).

In their analysis of the totally inadequate response to the conflict in Darfur,

Bellamy & Williams offer important conclusions about how future reactions by the

international community might be rendered more effective. The most compelling of these

suggests strongly that states might force the issue by rejecting the primacy of the UNSC

when decisions about intervention are to be made (Bellamy & Williams; 2006: 157). Byers

concurs and furthers the argument by citing the example of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organisation’s (NATO’s) intervention in Kosovo. In this case, NATO, although initially

lacking UNSC authorisation, succeeded in acquiring a somewhat ‘ambiguous

authorisation’ post the event when the UNSC belatedly accepted that the situation

represented a grave threat to international peace and security (Byers: 2005: 40-51). The

4 Under Article 52(1) of the Charter, states may create regional bodies to deal “with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.” O’Connell (2000: 63-67) notes a number of regional organisations that have UN status under Chapter VIII. The ECOWAS peacekeeping campaign in Liberia (ECOMOG) and its subsequent intervention in Sierra Leone were both approved after the fact by the UNSC under Chapter VIII of the Charter.

9

legitimacy of NATO’s action is established by the fact that, had it not occurred, it might

have resulted in the kind of genocidal atrocities reminiscent of Rwanda in 1994 and in

Srebrenica 1995. This concurs with Tesón’s view that moral imperative to act can

retrospectively confer legitimacy (Tesón; 1997: 173-4).

Buchanan (2001) further discusses the justification for foreign intervention,

especially intervention that might be deemed illegal under international law, and he

proposes a number of guidelines for assessing the morality of such acts. Because it is a

proposition of my research to reject the primacy of the UNSC as the sole authorising agent

for all humanitarian intervention, one of Buchanan’s guidelines is of particular interest to

my study. Buchanan’s ‘substantive justice’ guideline asserts since the pursuit of the

‘human rights for all’ agenda constitutes a core substantive justice, that justification for

intervention acts could be provided on these grounds. He advises the international legal

system to consider this when determining “whether illegal action is morally justifiable”

and that this concept “cannot be dismissed as the imposition of purely personal or

subjective moral views” (Buchanan; 2001: 699). He concludes by rejecting the very idea of

illegality in the field of humanitarian intervention because, not to do so is failing to

comprehend the complexities of the issue (Ibid: 704).

In discussing issues of consent and legitimacy, Glanville (2013) offers a

different perspective on the role of regional organisations in humanitarian intervention. He

proposes less dependence on the sovereign consent of the troubled state and a greater

reliance on consent from the relevant regional organisation when making UNSC decisions

about Chapter VII interventions, particularly where human rights abuses are relevant

(Glanville; 2013: 326). 5 In examining the route to the NATO intervention in Libya,

Glanville analyses the rhetoric emanating from organisations such as the League of Arab

5 Chapter VII of the UN Charter allows the UNSC to act to restore peace and stability where it determines the existence of any threat to or breach of the peace or aggressive action to have taken place.

10

States (LAS), the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the AU, all of which

helped procure the UN resolution authorising ‘all necessary means’ in response to gross

violations of human rights by Libyan government forces. He notes that, in their

submissions to the UN, these organisations demonstrated a deep understanding of the

nature of the Libyan conflict, the need for immediate military action and the necessity in

this particular case to transcend legal issues relating to sovereign consent (Ibid: 336).

Summarising, he concludes that the UNSC “should be guided by the opinions of relevant

regional organisations.” This example is crucial to my research because it reveals an

important precedent for allowing regional organisation a role in securing authorisation for

intervention. Even when regional actors lack the necessary military capability and

resources to intervene decisively in a neighbouring conflict, Glanville has shown that they

can exercise a crucial influence on events and this can be an important resource when

deciding the nature and strength of humanitarian interventions.

Pattinson (2008) describes the problems facing regional organisations,

individual nations and ad-hoc coalitions who undertake humanitarian missions without UN

sanction. While he accepts that many Western states have both the military capacity and

logistical support capability to deploy forces on a scale that are likely to be effective, he

draws attention to how humanitarian interveners are perceived and accepted within the

zone of need (Pattinson; 2008: 408). History reveals that most Western penetrations into

the global south and Middle East are likely to be faced with a large level of local

resistance. For example, in the aftermath of the Iraq War, the US and Western democracies

generally “do not have the credibility in the eyes of the world to carry out humanitarian

intervention” (ibid). Similarly, ex-colonial powers intervening in former colonies run the

risk of being perceived as pursuing colonial self-interest. Pattinson’s point is convincing in

that a potential intervener must carefully weigh up whether or not it is likely to provoke an

11

escalation of a problem by creating more fighters than it disarms. In this respect, he sees

merit in using regional organisations but warns that, with the exception of NATO and the

EU, most others, such as the African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West

African States (ECOWAS), suffer from massive shortfalls in military funding and

equipment, rendering prolonged operations difficult (Pattinson; 2008: 409). He considers

the EU’s potential as an effective humanitarian actor but acknowledges that, currently, it

does not have agreed structures to allow it to rapidly deploy a large force off continent

(ibid). The capacity of NATO to conduct successful humanitarian operations has been

demonstrated in Bosnia, Kosovo, and most recently, in Libya. However, since NATO is

primarily a defence pact, its deployment in humanitarian activities, especially outside of its

zone of influence, is often governed by self-interest (Pattinson; 2008: 408).

While Pattinson’s writings reveal a number of issues facing likely actors in

the field of humanitarian intervention, I think he misses the advantages that regional

interventions offer in comparison to more remote actors mandated by the UNSC. Some of

these advantages are considered by MacFarlane & Weiss (1994). Firstly, regional

organisations often have a “higher stake” in preventing and/or ending conflict within their

sphere of influence (MacFarlane & Weiss; 1994: 283). Member states within these spheres

feel the effects of regional conflict more acutely, such as population displacement, a

downturn in foreign direct investment from abroad and, in general, regional instability.

MacFarlane & Weiss explain that regional organisations have a higher stake in ensuring

near-neighbour stability and are more likely to act decisively in pursuit of these ends (ibid).

More persuasively, regional rather than remote international actors tend to best understand

the nature of strife and ethnic tension in their own immediate area, making them better

mediators of local conflicts (ibid). MacFarlane and Weiss conclude that, whereas regional

12

interventions have some obvious limitations, they convey humanitarian benefits more

efficiently and more effectively than non-regional actors.

The concept of hybrid peace operations (often a coalition between a

dominant lead nation collaborating with willing neighbour states) has emerged in recent

times. The steady expansion of regional interventions such as ECOWAS in Liberia, Guinea

Bissau and Ivory Coast, the AU in Darfur and Somalia, as well as the more publicised

interventions of NATO in the former Yugoslavia and Libya prompts questions about the

role and legality of regional actors. Also, it cannot go unnoticed that many UN

peacekeeping missions have been deployed concurrently with or immediately following

regional missions and, most recently, this has come under scrutiny in scholarly journals. As

the deployment of hybrid peace operations becomes more prevalent in the international

response to security and conflict, there seems to be tacit agreement about the practice,

notwithstanding the ambiguity about how it can be accommodated under the current

unwieldy UN framework (Yamashita; 2012: 166).

Yamashita conjectures that UN hybrid missions might occur under two

dominant models - the ‘subcontracting’ model and the ‘partnering’ model, both of which

focus on incorporating both regional and UN actors (Yamashita; 2012: 168). Firstly, ‘sub-

contracting’ refers to an arrangement whereby regional organisations and coalitions

undertake an active role in peace making and peacekeeping responsibilities and, under

international law, such contracting must be authorised, monitored and directed by the

UNSC. The subcontracting model then is a form of global cooperation in which regional

peace operations are, in essence, UN operations delegated to other organisations.

(Yamashita; 2012: 169). A recent example of the ‘sub-contracting’ approach is the UN

authorised NATO intervention in Libya in 2011. Reacting to both excessive violence by

Libyan government forces on domestic opponents and under pressure from regional

13

entities in the immediate vicinity, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1973 authorising ‘all

necessary means’ to quell the bloodshed (UNSC; 2011). Almost immediately, NATO

established a no-fly zone and launched an aerial bombardment on government forces. After

seven months, Libyan opposition forces had conquered the country and ousted (and killed)

the former authoritarian ruler Muammar al-Qaddafi. At the time, western media hailed

NATO’s intervention for averting a potential bloodbath and assisting in Libya’s transition

towards democracy (Kuperman; 2013: 105). Although open to debate, NATO’s Libyan

intervention is cited as an ideal implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

principle. Whereas it undoubtedly saved civilian lives and achieved its goals within a brief

timeframe, NATO’s intervention here has to be measured against more recent opportunity

in Syria where, in similar circumstances, the R2P principle failed to engage and resulted in

a very different outcome.

The ‘partnering’ model implies a more horizontal relationship to ‘sub-

contracting’ wherein the UN and regional organisations form a network of peacekeeping

partners with interconnected capabilities (Yamashita; 2012: 170). Institutionally, the

convergence of regional and UN peacekeeping is most clearly evident in the AU/UN

hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the first peacekeeping mission that is formally both

a UN and a regional operation. Morphing from its precursor, the solely AU AMIS mission

which was eventually rendered ineffective due to a lack of available troops and a weak

mandate, the formal transition to UNAMID took place on December 21st, 2007, with the

majority of AMIS troops being ‘re-hatted’ as UN peacekeepers (Yamashita; 2012: 502-

503). The AU and the UN jointly appoint UNAMID’s top officials and agree on its

composition, and the UN provides the mission’s ‘command and control structures and

backstopping’ as well as its funding (Coleman; 2011: 537). Sub-Saharan African states

form the bulk of UNAMID troops (71% in May 2011) because the Sudanese government

14

insisted on a predominantly African presence on its land (UNDPKO; 2011: 12-15). In this

way, the UN has overcome issues of misperception, circumventing the possibility that its

mission might be perceived in terms of a Western penetration into African affairs.

However, the situation on the ground in Darfur is still bleak and no reliable evaluation of

the partnering approach has yet occurred.

Chapter 3 – Research Design & Methodology

15

Comparative research belongs to a well-established research method that

has become popular in the social sciences since the mid twentieth century. In this thesis, a

comparative case study approach will be employed to argue that regional organisations

and/or coalitions of the willing have discernible advantages over the UN in conducting

humanitarian intervention missions. Comparative research methods, a subset of qualitative

research methods, are grounded in positive epistomology and are often used in the study of

international social and political issues, and international relations in general. There is, in

particular, a long tradition of cross-case studies involving humanitarian intervention and

this approach is particularly appropriate where one has to identify, analyse and explain

similarities and differences across a range of topics that transcend time, geopolitical and

cultural boundaries. Although, in qualitative research, the most common procedures for

collecting data are by means of interviews and observations, there is some scholarly

consensus that reviewing relevant documents can also be a valuable means of garnering

valid data. (e.g. Creswell; 2009: 175-176 & 193. Locke et al; 2010: throughout. Prior;

2003: 145ff.).

What matters here is the researcher’s own perceptions and the way he/she

can bring interpretation and analysis to bear on different texts by searching for meaning

across a number of themes that have been identified as useful for his/her purposes. Because

of the impracticality of generating original statistical field data from different theatres of

operation, comparative analysis has particular value in topics like mine, not least because

of the ready availability of a body of existing, relevant and reliable research literature from

which pertinent inferences can be derived. In this way, for my particular purposes,

comparing case studies has a particular relevance and advantage over other forms of

research.

16

Lijphart (1971) defines the comparative method as the analysis of a small

number of cases, entailing at least two observations, yet too few to permit the application

of conventional statistical analysis (Collier; 1993: 106). His case study approach has the

merit of providing a framework in which a scholar with modest resources can generate

useful and observable data on a certain scenario. However, in his approach, although

opportunities to systematically test hypotheses are far more limited than with other

methods such as experimental and statistical models (ibid), Lijphart insists that case studies

do make a valid contribution to testing hypotheses and building theory (1971: 691-693).

This is all the more true, given the magnitude of case studies in the area of international

security and conflict which, in my view, underlines the importance of comparative case

studies like mine, because of their value in promoting synthesis in existing knowledge and

understanding.

Another benefit of using the comparative case study method is that it allows

for deeper analysis of a small amount of cases. Because of the nature of the subject-matter,

the greatest challenge in using this approach is in devising an appropriate research tool for

measuring the extent of success and/or failure of humanitarian intervention by international

and regional organisations. Success and/or failure may be varingly interpreted depending

on one’s perspective and allegance.

Fortunately, Prior and others make a compelling case for the use of text

analysis in research, especially for topics like mine where the use of other research forms is

neither possible nor warranted. He asserts that

“documents usually appear only in so far as they serve as

receptacles of evidence for some claim or other … Consequently,

as researchers of the inert text, it would undoubtedly be of

considerable help to us if we could appeal to a set of generally

17

accepted rules about evidence to demonstrate that our scrutiny of

document content was done ‘in the right way’ and to the highest

standards – rules that would help us establish that our ultimate

claims are valid and reliable. Unfortunately, no such body of rules

exists. That is not to say that there are no rules (See for example

Platt 1981a, 1981b, Seale 1999), only that their status is always

contested.” (2003: 147).

According to Prior, positivism supplies the rules of document research and a central tenet

of this is “ the application of what is sometimes called the hypothetico- deductive method

of scientific discovery”, which emerged during the first half of the twentieth century.

“The method has many intricate features, but included among them

are the suggestions that science proceeds not on the basis of

making a lot of unconnected observations, but rather on the basis

of advancing theoretically-informed hypotheses – hypotheses that,

ideally, incorporate law-like statements” (Ibid: 148).

This provides the theoretical basis for what Prior describes as “systematic

review methodology” and its three central issues of concern, viz.(1) the selection of

evidence, (2) the scope and robustness of the data, and (3) data extraction (Ibid: 150). In

my research, I will only select primary resource documentary evidence extracted from

reports and existing published interpretations from reliable scholars. In this way, I hope to

secure the appropriate reliability and validity of the evidence on which to build meaning.

There remains the difficulties inherent in the data extraction process itself, where a number

of different narratives may emerge from different readings of the same document and

where “different individuals can often see different things in the same data set and read

18

different messages from the same document.” (Ibid: 157) Prior recommends a number of

key points that will safeguard the process of data extraction.

Researching the inert text requires one to attend to issues of reliability and validity.

Issues of reliability and validity in turn require that we state at the outset of the

research project what, exactly, we are seeking to achieve, and what is to be included in

the field of study.

Selection (and exclusion) of documentary material should be in accordance with the

principles established in the preceding point.

In those instances where documentary materials have to be sampled, a thorough

justification for the sampling procedures needs to be provided.

Indexing and coding of data need to be executed in a rigorous and unbiased manner.

Whilst drawing conclusions from data, always pay special attention to data that

apparently fail to confirm one’s claims and generalizations.” (Ibid: 163)

The forgoing advice is useful and provides important guidance for my

study. Whereas it is important in all of this to maintain an objectivity and an openness,

logic dictates that much will depend on structuring the data in such a way that will allow

the appropriate information to be extracted across a series of different documents. The

systematic review methodology described by Prior requires the researcher to establish

objectives and outcomes and primarily to declare from the outset what exactly he

understands by his title. Definitions of this type are necessary in utilising the hypothetico-

deductive method if only to avoid the possibility of conflicting interpretations infecting the

research. For the purposes of this research, then, intervention (whether by UN, a regional

organisation or a coalition of the willing) will be considered successful if the humanitarian

goals of the intervention are met. That is, most cases of humanitarian intervention have

objectives that are tightly circumscribed and limited in time, for instance, the ceasing of

19

hostilities or the ending of genocide. If those goals are met, the intervention can be deemed

successful. Other indicators, for instance, the reconciliation of internal differences within a

state, although important, are beyond the scope of my research. In my analysis, the

prevention of widespread egregious human rights violations by military intervention will

be regarded as a measure of success. Although this is a somewhat narrow definition, it is

necessary in the interests of time to keep the investigation on a clear and coherent track.

My choice of these particular four case studies (Somalia, Bosnia, Liberia

and East Timor) may seem random and unorthodox given the varying circumstances of the

four conflicts involved. However, there are good grounds for choosing these particular case

studies. All four occurred during the 1990s, a decade during which the UN had to deal

with several historic conflicts in different areas of the globe. All four, however, are

sufficiently dissimilar, especially in the nature and progress of the conflicts, to allow

comparative analysis to be made to suit the particular needs of my study. Both the Liberia

and the East Timor case studies involved a significant intervention from neighbour states

while, in the latter stages of the Bosnian conflict, NATO’s belated intervention is also

pertinent to my purposes. The UN interventions in Somalia and Bosnia drew its forces and

resources from a wide variety of states and therefore make good comparison with East

Timor and Liberia.

Also, there are sufficient similarities across all four case studies to allow me

make comparable findings over a range of obvious and pertinent criteria which I have

conveniently framed as questions. This gives considerable strength and robustness to my

findings and allows me focus my conclusions more authoritatively. My findings address

the following seven questions:

a) What was the composition of the intervening force?

b) Was the mandate strong enough to ensure success?

20

c) Were the resources adequate for the task?

d) Was the mandate fulfilled?

e) Did the intervention contain the conflict and bring an end to hostilities?

f) Did the intervention bring about a reduction in human suffering?

g) Did the intervention bring about normalization and a return to democratic rule?

The first question (a) examines the extent and impact of regional entities in

the composition of all four forces. Questions (b) and (d) examine different aspects of the

UN mandates involved in each case and this has particular significance to my study

(Druckman et al; 1997: 152). The resourcing of each mission is compared in question (c).

Finally, questions (d), (e), (f) and (g) address the outcomes of each mission.

The above analytical structure allows for good comparative judgments to be

made and is consistent with the hypothetico-deductive method. It provides an appropriate

range of defendable benchmarks with which to assess why some missions have ended in

catastrophe while others have succeeded. Although the small number of cases studies

involved may appear limiting, all four missions have a high degree of comparability and

there is sufficient justification for good conclusions to be deduced.

Chapter 4 – Case Study I: UNOSOM in Somalia

21

Background to the Conflict:

On 15th October 1969, when Somalia’s president Abdirashid Ali Shermarke

was assassinated, the army led by its commander Mohamed Siad Barre seized power in a

bloodless coup d’état, after which all democratic institutions were dissolved (Daniels;

2012: 12). Despite the undemocratic nature of his regime, Barre’s leadership remained

popular for some time, not least because of his espousal of the ideal of a Greater Somalia

that would incorporate the province of Ogaden, then a province within Ethopia. Barre

believed that a weakened Ethiopia would not be able to mount a successful defence of

Ogaden and in 1977, he waged war with the intention of annexing the province

(Cassanelli; 2001: 41). However, when Ethiopia was reinforced by the USSR and Cuba,

the Somali army lost ground and was eventually defeated (Lefort; 1983: 260). 6 As a result,

many ethnic Somalis living in the Ogaden fled to Somalia and the Barre regime lost

popular support among the clans. 7

Then, when the Barre regime waged a brutally violent war against the clans,

it lost control of north Somalia to guerrilla clan groups operating there. Barre immediately

ordered retributions that “included aerial bombardment and brutal massacres of civilians,

including women and children” and, by 1991, the country had descended into civil war

(Hirsch & Oakley; 1995: 11). Because of their wider support base, rebel clans quickly

gained ground and this led to the toppling of Barre's regime, its expulsion from the Somali

capital, Mogadishu, and the disbandment of the Somali National Army (SNA). Such was

the intensity of the fighting that it destroyed much of the country’s infrastructure and its

means of food production, thus causing severe food shortage and famine.

6 Ethiopia’s allies, USSR and Cuba, sent large amounts of weapons and a contingent of 13,000 Cuban troops to engage and repel the Somalis (Lefort; 1983: 260).7 Somali society is hierarchically based and follows a strict loyalty pattern from family, to sub clan, clan and country, the strongest bond being loyalty to family and allegiance to country is the weakest. Because Somalia’s six main clans have greater significance than political parties, there exists a natural polarisation between the country’s population and democratic politics.

22

With the ousting of Barre, the ensuing power vacuum, and the absence of

any national military to enforce law and order, rebel leaders fought among themselves in a

lengthy and bloodthirsty struggle for control of the country and its resources. By the end of

1991, the resulting human suffering left over 20,000 people killed or injured. Within two

years, it is believed that somewhere between 300,000 and 500,000 people perished, either

as a result of the civil war or as a direct result of the famine, with another 3 million

affected in other ways (Ahmed & Green; 1999: 120-121). The ensuing broadcast images of

suffering Somalis shocked the Western world and pressured governments and the UN to

step up efforts to tackle the humanitarian crisis.

The Intervention:

Then, when the warring factions agreed to a ceasefire on 3 rd March I992, the

UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was established under the provisions of UNSC

Resolution 751 on 24th April 1992 to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu, to provide

security for UN personnel and supplies, and to escort humanitarian supplies to distribution

centres (UNSC; 1992b). However, UNOSOM’s humanitarian effort progressed slowly

because member states were reluctant to commit troops to the project. 8 This was because

“fighting and looting by various factions seeking to control ports and distribution routes

[had become] an important factor in the political economy of the militia” (Lewis &

Mayall; 1996: 108). With little regard for the starving population, the militias wanted the

food for themselves. UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, reported on 28 th August that

the main challenge was not the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies, but the protection

of convoys transporting these to warehouses and distribution centres.

8 It was envisaged that UNOSOM, at full strength, would have 4,000 troops contributed by Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan and Zimbabwe. However, in its early days of operation, only 54 military observers and 893 military personnel were in place. International civilian and local staff also supported UNOSOM.

23

To counteract the action of the militias, UNSC Resolution 775 immediately

authorised an additional 3,000 security troops for UNOSOM (UNSC; 1992f). Under the

terms of this new resolution, the newly consolidated 4,219-strong UNOSOM was

mandated to provide humanitarian relief, to monitor the ceasefire, to provide security, to

carry out demobilisation and disarmament, and to assist in national reconciliation (Thakur;

1994: 388-389). However, even with the additional troops, UNOSOM was ineffectual

against strong and determined militia groups who considered plunder and robbery as

necessary for survival. In these circumstances, the UNOSOM mission floundered and, with

the broadcasting of graphic images of starvation and death among Somali civilians, the

Bush administration was pressured into ordering Operation Provide Relief in August 1992.

Under this terms of this order, US military air transports and some 400 personnel were

deployed with the intention of airlifting humanitarian aid to remote parts of Somalia,

thereby reducing the reliance on trucks to ferry the relief overland and denying the militia

groups any opportunity of looting aid. During the six months of Operation Provide Relief,

more than 48,000 tons of critically needed relief supplies were airlifted into Somalia

(Allard; 1995: 3).

However, in spite of this apparent success in aid delivery, the security

situation in Somalia, and most notably in the city of Mogadishu, grew worse and it was all

too apparent that the aid delivery strategy was unsustainable and was contributing little to

the peace effort. On 29th November 1992, Boutros-Ghali outlined five options to the UN.

The first was to continue to deploy UNOSOM under the established principles of

consensual, non-forceful UN peacekeeping but, given the scale of the humanitarian crisis,

this was clearly inadequate. The second option was to abandon UNOSOM's mission and

withdraw the force, but an admission of failure of this magnitude could not be

contemplated and would be unlikely to find support. The remaining three options involved

24

the use of force. UNOSOM could assume a more aggressive stance, particularly in

Mogadishu, in the hope of convincing lawless elements to stop abusing international relief

efforts. Alternatively, although deemed to be logistically impractical, the UN might launch

a countrywide enforcement operation under its own command and control. Finally, and

more realistically, the UNSC might authorise a group of member states to carry out such an

operation (Thakur; 1994: 394-395). The latter option was preferred and, when the US

informed Boutros-Ghali that it would be prepared to take the lead in organising a UN-

sanctioned forceful mission to establish a secure environment for humanitarian operations

in Somalia, Boutros-Ghali agreed but insisted that the mission should be precisely defined

and limited in time in order to prepare the way for a return to peacekeeping and post-

conflict peace-building (Ibid).

On 3rd December 1992, the UNSC, acting under Chapter VII, authorised the

use of ‘all necessary means’ to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid to the people of

Somalia (UNSC; 1992h). This sanctioning of the use of force for the first time in Somalia

grew out of a conviction that UNOSOM’s existing mandate was inadequate for the

challenge of alleviating mass starvation in an environment of total anarchy (Ibid). UNSC

Resolution 794 required a new response and promised joint, determined, and innovative

action by the UN in alleviating the hardship of an entire nation (Bellamy & Williams;

2010: 216). The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) headed by and under the command of the

US, was established in order to “feed the starving, protect the defenceless and prepare the

way for political, economic and social reconstruction” (UN; 1993: 16). The mission was

intended to be short and was to pave the way for “the unique UN peace making military

administration” UNOSOM II, which would replace both UNITAF and UNOSOM (Lewis

& Mayall; 1996: 112).

25

Although the deployment of UNITAF significantly altered the terms and

raised the stake of American involvement in the Somalia at this time, it is difficult to form

any reliable assessment of its success or otherwise. That the effective delivery of aid was

both expedited and saved lives has to be acknowledged. However, in submitting

recommendations on 3rd March 1993 for effecting the transition from UNITAF

to UNOSOM II, the Secretary-General noted that, despite UNITAF, a secure environment

in Somalia was not yet established and it still had no effective functioning government or

local security/police force. He concluded, therefore, that, should the UNSC determine that

the time had come for the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, the latter should be

endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to establish a

secure environment throughout Somalia (UNDPKO; 1997). UNOSOM II would therefore

seek to complete the task begun by UNITAF of restoring peace and stability throughout

Somalia. The new mandate would also empower UNOSOM II to assist the Somali people

in rebuilding their economic, political and social life, through achieving national

reconciliation and democratic rule (UNSC; 1993a). UNOSOM II was established under

UNSC Resolution 814 on 26th March 1993 and it formally relieved UNITAF, which was

dissolved, on 4th May 1993.

In spite of UNOSOM II’s Chapter VII mandate and its troop strength of

20,000, “there was a widespread Somali perception that the UN-led forces would be

weaker than those of UNITAF” (Hirsch and Oakley; 1995: 115). This perception

emboldened some Somali factions in Mogadishu, in particular the National Somali

Alliance (NSA) led by General Mohammed Farrah Aidid, to test the UN’s resolve. 9 Over

the summer of 1993, tension between Aidid and the UN forces increased, culminating in a

9 Although UNITAF had left, the US still maintained 4,000 troops in the country including a Quick Reaction Force.

26

number of incidents. 10 In response, US President Bill Clinton approved the deployment of

Task Force Ranger, a special task force composed of 400 US Army Rangers and Delta

Force operators to neutralise Aidid’s forces (Brune; 1999: 31). A decisive confrontation

occurred on October 3rd 1993 when Task Force Rangers, intent on capturing some of

Aidid’s top lieutenants, launched a raid into a hostile part of Mogadishu. In the ensuing

firefight, two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down and eighteen US soldiers were

killed along with countless Somali militia and civilians. What began as a judicious raid

turned into “the biggest firefight involving American soldiers since Vietnam” (Bowden;

1999: 481). Such was the intensity of US public anger engendered by the images of

American bodies being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by a cheering crowd of

Somalis that, four days after the incident, President Clinton announced a withdrawal of all

US troops from Somalia by March 31st 1994 (Lewis & Mayall; 1996: 234).

Although the UNOSOM II mission continued after the US withdrawal, it

did so in a much weaker state and, when France, Italy, and Belgium also discontinued their

participation, the nature of its mandate was revised so that it no longer operated under

Chapter VII. After that, UN forces withdrew from the countryside and confined their

operations to Mogadishu in preparation for a full withdrawal in March 1995 (Lewis &

Mayall; 1996: 122). After UN troops finally departed Mogadishu, the entire country again

descended into violence and chaos (Ibid: 121).

Case Analysis:

Over the period of UNOSOM I’s deployment, the situation on the ground in

Somalia had not changed substantially and, by the time of its departure, the problem of

10 On 8th August 1993, Aidid's militia detonated a remote controlled bomb against a US military vehicle, killing four soldiers. Two weeks later another bomb injured seven more (Bowden; 1999: 114).

27

clan rivalries and violence had not abated. As a result, both the humanitarian crisis and the

lawless, anarchic environment that is still characteristic of Somalia continued. UNOSOM

I’s failure to sustain any degree of societal cohesiveness makes the situation in Somalia

unique, while “Somalia’s inability to preserve even a minimal fig leaf of central

administration over twelve years puts it in a class by itself amongst the world’s failed

states” (Menkhaus; 2003: 407).

Logistically, the UNITAF operation in Somalia was an impressive success,

achieving its objective despite the prevailing political circumstances and the lawless

activities of the rebel clans. UNITAF’s principal strategic actor, the US, was precise in its

assessment of local conditions and the role to be played by its forces. The American

National Command Authorities (NCAs) and military commanders identified one clear,

measurable and attainable objective, to achieve a secure environment for the delivery of

humanitarian aid to the Somali people in the areas of greatest need. It is this that gave

focus and definition to UNITAF’s mission.

In pursuit of this single goal, the US Central Command (USCENTCOM)

responsible for UNITAF, retained approval authority and screened each potential

contributor, balancing capabilities and willingness to adhere to central operational control

and rules of engagement. The First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) headquarters

assumed the task of managing this multinational operation and became the nucleus of the

UNITAF command and control structure. Not only did this headquarters integrate and

employ 23 coalition member contingents, but it also met the liaison and coordination

requirements for the 49 different humanitarian agencies involved (Freeman et al; 1993:

61). Consequently, the USCENTCOM commander, General Joseph P. Hoar, noted that

both unity of command and unity of purpose was achieved (Hoar; 1993: 62). By March

28

1993, UNITAF had established nine humanitarian relief sectors in southern Somalia

(Cordesman; 1998: 20). 11

UNITAF’s success was due in no small measure to its realisation that, to

achieve its objective, it would need to avoid land transport as much as possible and, where

this was unavoidable, to dissuade and disarm, as necessary, rebel looters. 12 However, the

mission was plagued by disagreements between the UN and the US about the precise terms

of its mandate and, in particular, the interpretation of words such as ‘all necessary means’

and ‘security’, and the forceful disarming the Somali factions. It is to the credit of

USCENTCOM that it did not deflect from its own best judgement and directed the

operation in a manner necessary to ensure success. However, despite UNITAF's success,

tensions remained between US and UN agents surrounding the conduct of the mission and,

when this was conveyed back to UN headquarters, an early handover of responsibility back

to the UN was inevitable. The UN, wary of a lengthy deployment of US forces in the

region, had always perceived UNITAF as an interim force. Nevertheless, it was only too

glad to avail of US superior capability and, in preparation for the next phase of the

response, UNITAF set about disarming the factional militia forces more systematically in

advance of effecting the transition to UN command (Smith; 1996: 97). By March 1993,

USCENTCOM deemed that the level of security was sufficient to allow transition of the

operation to the UN. The longer-term UN nation-building efforts were left to UNOSOM II

whose broader mandate included political and economic rehabilitation.

11 Centred around major towns and feeding centres, these nine sectors were key to the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. When UNITAF handed over responsibility of these centres to UNOSOM II, France undertook responsibility for Oddur, Canada for Belet Uen, Italy for Gialalassi, Morocco for Baledogle, Australia for Baidoa, Belgium for Kismayo, and Botswana for Bardera (Cordesman; 1998: 20).12 Although not fully excluded under the terms of the mandate, General Hoar believed that disarming the rebels was neither realistically achievable nor a prerequisite for the mission. Instead, he limited the confiscation of weapons to “technical” arms (i.e. wheeled vehicles with mounted crew served weapons) and arms caches that were a clear threat to UNITAF forces (Hoar; 1993: 63).

29

Although UNITAF had done everything possible to disarm the warring

clans in preparation for the handover to UNOSOM II, UN-US disagreements conspired to

make the transition rushed and uncoordinated. Also, the UNOSOM II mission, as

mandated under UNSC Resolution 814, was a significantly smaller and less capable

peacekeeping force than previous missions to the region. Furthermore, the slow and

incremental way in which UNOSOM II was assembled aggravated and delayed matters

while, at the same time, US forces were withdrawn on schedule. 13 When the formal

change of command occurred on 4th May 1993, UNOSOM II staff was at only 30 per cent

strength (Allard; 1995: 30) leaving the mission overwhelmed from the outset and unable to

avail fully of UNITAF’s valuable infrastructure. 14 Sensing the lack of coherence and

capability within UNOSOM II, the Somali warring factions became openly hostile and

defiant (Clark & Gosende; 1996: 42). 15

UNOSOM II’s mission eventually fell into disarray due to the fractured

nature of its deployment and the lack of a clear road map for nation building. In planning,

the mission gave little attention to the fundamental issues confronting Somalia (e.g. the

nature, prospects and timing of reconciliation that would be needed to rebuild Somalia’s

institutions, how to build consensus and disarm and demobilize the militias, etc.).

UNOSOM II’s leaders had no guidance other than their own judgement about any given

situation they encountered and, in their frustration, commanders on the ground had to react

as they saw best. This reaction increasingly involved ‘mission creep’ and the adoption of a

more offensive stance. It was becoming painfully obvious to the clan warlords, and most

13 UNOSOM II was formed incrementally from the voluntary contributions of member states and contingents were deployed as they arrived without the benefit of an overall strategic master plan.14 The Civil-Military Operations Centre, a UNITAF innovation, that liaised with and organised the many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and humanitarian relief organizations involved in Somalia, was unable to function in these circumstances and was subsequently abandoned.15 Aidid perceived UNOSOM as a threat to his power because of its desire to disarm all militia factions. When his militia attacked Pakistani troops in Mogadishu, there were some 80 casualties. 18 US troops and more than 1,000 civilians and militia were killed in another attack during October 1993.

30

notably to Aidid, that UNOSOM II’s mission objectives were creeping from feeding to

fighting, and this set the peacekeepers more and more in direct confrontation with the

Somali clan warlords. With no end or solution in sight, the UNOSOM II mission withdrew

from Mogadishu on the 3rd March 1995, after suffering significant casualties. The only

valid assessment of the international intervention in Somalia between 1992 and 1995 was

that it was “a horrible failure” (Kennedy; 2006: 96).

The UN intervention in Somalia prompts a number of important questions.

Firstly, is peace enforcement a realistic and viable option in a complex civil war

environment? Secondly, does the UN have the capacity to function as an effective military

manager in peace enforcement operations? Thirdly, how can humanitarian aid be delivered

with the appropriate security and protection? The humanitarian need in Somalia was so

great and its transmission around the world so graphic, that the UN was pressured to

respond with urgency. The UN intervention in Somalia shows what can happen when the

public demands instant response to a situation that has no easy answer. Given the nature of

this civil conflict and the absence of any effective political infrastructure to counter it,

there was never any basis for or hope of peace. The delivery of humanitarian aid in these

circumstances would need a level of security that could only be achieved by enforcement.

The warring factions in Somalia had no intention of capitulating to any force and, thus,

outside intervention to bring peace carried high risk and low probabilities of success

(Curtis; 1994: 311). Peace enforcement in such circumstances was never guaranteed

success, 16 although one has to admire the short-term success of the interim UNITAF force.

16 The former US Ambassador to Somalia, T. Frank Crigler, expressed his doubts about UN peace enforcement in this environment: “perhaps the fatal flaw lies in the very concept of peace enforcement, the notion that peace enforcement can be imposed on a reluctant and notoriously proud people at gunpoint and that the social fabric of their nation can be rewoven at the direction of outsiders” (Crigler; 1993: 67).

31

Chapter 5 – Case Study II: UNPROFOR in the Former

Yugoslavia

Background to the Conflict:

The crisis that led Yugoslavia into disintegration was prompted by the death

of Joseph Broz Tito in 1980 and the rise of nationalist sentiment among the different ethnic

regions. 17 Serbia, in particular, under Slobodan Milosevic, elected President in 1991,

pursued a ruthless nationalist agenda in support of the establishment of a Greater Serbia

that he hoped would replace the former Yugoslavia and hold together the various ethnic

regions. (Doder; 1993: 14). However, “Milosevic’s demagogic appeals to Serbian

nationalism led the Croats to elect an extreme nationalist of their own in 1990 – Franjo

Tudjman, a former communist and general” (Meisler; 1995: 314). The radicalism of both

men, and the sensitive question of the ethnic Serbs living in the Krajina region of Croatia,

18 combined and ratcheted up fears of impending ethnic cleansing. 19 Milosovic, acting in

support of the Croatian Serbs, proclaimed that all Serbs had the right to control the lands in

which they lived. In June 1991, Tudjman responded by seceding from the Yugoslav

Federation and declaring independence. Slovenia, another former Yugoslav Republic,

followed suit and, because over 95% of its population were ethnic Slovenians in favour of

independence, the Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army (JNA) were powerless to

prevent it (Hudson; 2003: 89). Things would be different, however, in Croatia where the

17 The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was an amalgam of the eight federated ethnic regions including the six republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, and the two autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo.18 Krajina was the self-proclaimed Serb state within the Republic of Croatia. The Krajina Serbs, although in 1991 they formed only about 12% of the Croatian population, held a sizable majority in the Krajina region.19 The Krajina Serbs had every reason to fear the possibility of Croatian oppression. During World War II, Ustaša, part of Axis-occupied Yugoslavia, was the scene of Croatian fascist genocide perpetrated against thousands of ethnic Serbs, Jews, Muslims and Roma peoples.

32

JNA joined with the Krajina Serbs and captured a quarter of the country’s territory (Ibid).

Between 1991 and 1995, open war raged in Croatia with atrocities and ethnic cleansing

perpetrated by both sides. However, in 1992, the UN brokered a ceasefire and established

international recognition for the pre-war borders of Croatia. A UN Protection Force

(UNPROFOR) was deployed to monitor the ceasefire and to establish security in

demilitarised United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) or ‘safe-haven’ zones. 20 Hostilities

were renewed in 1993, albeit intermittently until, eventually in 1995, Croatia launched two

major, conclusive offensives ending with total victory for its forces. Gradually, over the

coming years, the UNPAs were peacefully reintegrated into Croatia.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, hereafter referred to as Bosnia, was another former

Yugoslav Republic on the brink of political chaos. 21 Fearing that the civil war in Croatia

would spill over into Bosnia, its moderate Muslim President, Alija Izetbegovic, requested

the assistance of UN peacekeepers (Meisler; 1995: 315). 22 However, in February 1992,

after a referendum in which 64% of Bosnian Muslims and Croats voted in favour of

secession, Izetbegovic declared Bosnian independence in spite of a Bosnian Serb boycott

of the plebiscite. In response, the Bosnian Serbs, led by Radovan Karadzic and supported

by Milosevic, declared the Bosnian Serb Republic’s independence (Judah; 1997: 202-203).

In April 1992, the JNA launched an offensive operation from Serbia in order to prevent the

secession of Bosnia but, following international pressure, it formally withdrew from

Bosnia leaving enough troops, material and leadership behind to support the newly created

Bosnian Serb Army (BSA).

20 UNSC Resolutions 743 (1992a), 762 (1992c) and 769 (1992d) govern the establishment and strengthening of UNPROFOR in Croatia.21 Bosnia’s population consisted of “40% Muslim, 32% Serb, and 18% Croat” and intermarriage between the different groups helped stabilise its society under communist rule (Meisler; 1995: 315). 22 The US ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1989 to 1992, Warren Zimmermann, backed the request in a cable to Washington but did not press for it as hard as he should have. When it came to it, the US did not support the request, assuming that the proper time for peacekeepers would be after the war (Meisler; 1995: 315).

33

The war in Bosnia began in earnest after the European Community (EC)

recognised Bosnia as a sovereign state on April 6th 1992 (Daniel et al; 1999: 45). The

warring factions were the Bosnian Serbs (supported by Serbia), the Bosnian Croats

(supported by Croatia) and the Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims).

The Intervention:

On 25 September 1991, UN Security Council Resolution 713 called on all

countries to apply a general and complete arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia

(UNSC; 1991). The UN involvement in the Yugoslav civil war began with the deployment

of the 14,000-troop force UNPROFOR in Croatia. Its mandate included peacekeeping and

ensuring that former combat zones in Croatia remained demilitarised (UNSC; 1992). An

advance contingent arrived in the region on 8th March 1992 to monitor the withdrawal from

Croatia of the pro-Serbian federal army and Serbian irregulars (Cohen & Moens; 1999:

87). UN troops were, then, fully deployed by July and the UNPROFOR Headquarters was

set up in the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo (Ibid). 23

In Bosnia, the UN faced a challenge of enormous proportions because,

unlike other missions, UNPROFOR was mandated to keep peace where there was no

declared peace to keep, nor was it likely that the warring factions would consent to peace

(Ibid: 88). At first, the UNSC was reluctant to expand UNPROFOR’s mandate to Bosnia,

but on the understanding that the troop contributors (Britain, France, Italy, and Canada)

would meet the additional costs, Resolution 776 was passed permitting its expansion to

over 23,000, the largest ever UN peacekeeping force. UNPROFOR’s mandate in Bosnia

was to support the work of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and to

23 UNPROFOR contributing nations as of 30 November 1994 were: Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Lithuania, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States and Venezuela. The contingent was split between civilian police, troops, and military observers.

34

establish UNPAs to this effect (UNSC; 1992g). 24 Given the intensity of the conflict where,

to safeguard civilian refugees in UNPAs, lightly armed UNPROFOR troops were expected

to deploy between the unrelenting warring factions, this proved an impossible task from

the very outset.

In August 1992, such was the scale of the ethnic atrocity that the UNSC

approved a resolution calling on UNPROFOR to take “all measures necessary” to support

the humanitarian effort in besieged Sarajevo and other areas in Bosnia (UNSC; 1992e), but

“the resolution was never implemented” and no action was taken against Serb aggressors

(Ziring et. al; 2000: 313). The situation became more desperate when Serb militia attacked

lightly armed UN forces and military observers operating in small units. UNPROFOR

personnel were easy targets for the warring factions, mainly the Serbs, who repeatedly

seized its troops and military observers declaring them to be prisoners of war (Morris &

McCoubrey; 1999: 44). 25

In autumn 1992, the UNSC prioritised the various functions of

UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR was required firstly to alleviating the human suffering caused

by the wars as far as possible, initially by operating the Sarajevo airport and by protecting

UNHCR convoys; secondly, it was mandated to contain the conflict within the territories

of the former Yugoslavia; and lastly, it was required to facilitate the efforts of the warring

parties themselves to reach a political settlement (Ziring et. al; 2000: 454). Arguably this

prioritisation gave better focus to the mission, although UNPROFOR’s inability to act

decisively and with appropriate force continued to impede its progress.

In spite of a growing international belief that the war was nearing an end,

hostilities continued unabated through 1993. Then, in June of that year, following debate

24 The six safe areas in Bosnia were Bihac, Gorazde, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Zepa.25 In May 1995, several UN heavy-weapon collection points were overrun by Bosnian Serbs and, when NATO responded with air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets, the Bosnian Serbs immediately seized 350 UN peacekeepers, tied them to potential targets, and brought them before television cameras, forcing NATO to call off the air strikes (Daniel et al; 1999: 52).

35

about why its Bosnian mission was failing, the UNSC passed Resolution 836 under

Chapter VII of the UN Charter, directing UNPROFOR to ensure the safety of UNPAs

(UNSC; 1993b). Co-sponsored by France and the UK, Resolution 836 empowered member

states “acting under the authority of the Security Council...[to take] all necessary

measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of

Bosnia and Herzegovina, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate”

(Manusama; 2006: 225). But this mandate also lacked teeth, in a situation where lightly

armed peacekeepers were dispersed in small numbers and expected to protect civilians

against a determined and heavily armed foe. Lacking in strength and resources,

UNPROFOR was unable to enforce its mandate and this failure led directly to a number of

well publicised ethnic massacres the most notable being at Srebrenica when, in July 1995,

some 8,000 Bosnian Muslims - mainly men and boys - were brutally killed by Serb armed

forces under the command of Ratko Mladić. The UN Secretary General described this

mass murder as the worst genocidal crime in Europe since the Second World War (Akashi;

1995: 314).

However, events elsewhere that would impact strongly on the work of

UNPROFOR were unfolding. Realising the UNSC stalemate that continually failed to

provide UNPROFOR with the necessary peace enforcement powers and resources to force

the war to a conclusion, the new US administration under President Clinton, with the help

of NATO allies, adopted a ‘lift and strike’ policy which entailed the partial lifting of the

arms embargo against the Bosnian government combined with airstrikes against Serb

targets throughout Bosnia (Berdal; 2004: 454). In August 1995, right after the Croatian

Army inflicted a humbling defeat over the Krajina rebel Serbs “and forced local Serbs to

flee in a massive ethnic cleansing operation,” (Nye; 2003: 152), the US, bypassing the UN,

launched a new diplomatic campaign, backed militarily by a large scale NATO air

36

campaign against Serb positions. Given the ferocity of the bombing, the Serbs agreed to a

ceasefire in October 1995. Peace talks began in early November in Dayton, Ohio, and a

peace agreement was signed by December, in Paris, by the Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian

leaders (Europe – Miscellaneous; 1995). Under the terms of the peace agreement, Bosnia-

Herzegovina would remain one country with an elected presidency, but its territory would

be divided between the Muslim-Croat Federation and a Bosnian-Serb Republic. Under

Article 53(1), of the UN Charter, the peace agreement was to be enforced by 60,000

NATO troops. 26 Although the UN had been excluded from the diplomatic process, it

would help rebuild the economy and resettle the area's hundreds of thousands of refugees,

as well as pursue those accused of war crimes and bring them before the war crimes

tribunal in The Hague (Microsoft Encarta Reference Library; 2004: 1995: United Nations).

After the agreement, the UNSC immediately lifted most economic sanctions

against Yugoslavia including the arms embargo against all six republics of the former

Yugoslavia. UN troops and observers were removed from Bosnia and Croatia in January

1996 and military authority for the region was transferred to NATO on December of that

year.

Case Analysis:

Of the factors that contributed to the ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR, the

most significant were its weak mandate and the lack of appropriate resources to ensure

success. UNPROFOR’s initial deployment in Bosnia was authorised under Chapter VI of

the UN Charter, as was the initial UNPROFOR mission in Croatia, and because of this it

26 Article 53(1) states: “The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state” (UN; 1945: Article 53(1)).

37

was limited to engaging in conventional peacekeeping methods in a situation where there

was no peace agreement to police. The particular circumstances in Bosnia were such that a

strong Chapter VII mandate would have been more appropriate to allow for robust peace

enforcement measures to be undertaken. In fact, because there was no direct military

engagement permitted between UNPROFOR and any of the warring factions, it allowed

the war to proceed without any effective UN countermeasures.

“Bound by the traditional rules of engagement (fire only in self-

defence and only after being fired upon), UN troops never fought a

single battle with any of the factions in Bosnia that routinely

disrupted relief convoys. The rules of engagement led to the

appeasement of local forces rather than to the enforcement of UN

mandates” (Weiss et al: 2001: 89).

In these circumstances, “by the end of March 1995, 149 peacekeepers had

been killed and 1,366 wounded in the former Yugoslavia”, and the atrocities and suffering

inflicted on ordinary civilians remains to this day a testimony to the complete failure of

UNPROFOR (Meisler; 1995: 313).

Furthermore, the UN’s fortified safe area strategy had limited success, given

the lack of strength and resources that adversely impacted on UNPROFOR’s ability to

effectively protect the UNPAs. UNPROFOR was expected to safeguard the UNPAs

through its presence alone and, even then, when its commanders requested 34,000

additional troops to undertake the safe area operation, the UN only sanctioned 7,950

(Daniel et al; 1999: 56). It was common knowledge among the Bosnian warring factions

that UNPROFOR troops were permitted to use force only in self-defence and peacekeepers

were often forced to stand aside and allow Serbs inflict atrocities within the UNPAs.

Shocked by the genocide in Srebrenica, the nations who contributed troops to UNPROFOR

38

met in London and issued a strong warning that any attack on Gorazde, the only remaining

‘safe-area’, would be met with “a substantial and decisive response” (Ibid: 69). Had this

deterrent been issued earlier in the conflict, and acted upon, it might have prevented

considerable suffering and brought an end to the war much earlier.

With the failure of a European Union peace plan in late 1993, it took

another year and a half before all three warring parties met to negotiate a peace settlement

(Ginsberg; 2001: 63). Eventually, in December of 1995, after countless UNSC

Resolutions, and a ruthless bombing campaign by NATO, the Balkan War officially ended

with the Dayton Accords. It is pertinent to this study that the Dayton Accords were

negotiated and policed by NATO, not the UN, and it was a NATO-led Implementation

Force (IFOR) that relieved UNPROFOR of its military duties in the region (Europe –

Miscellaneous; 1995)

UNPROFOR’s peacekeeping mission had no real design and it was

expected that its vague mandate could be stretched to cover changing circumstances in the

region (Rikhye; 2000: 45). Also, the indecisive, hesitant and reactive nature of UNSC

responses throughout the Balkan Wars clearly added to UNPROFOR’s problems on the

ground. The membership of the UNSC reflects post World War II strategic interest in

countries like the former Yugoslavia, and UNSC decisions in the 1990s reflected this fact.

Although the US had no longer any strategic interest in the region, its NATO allies in

Europe clearly had desires to bring the Balkans into the European sphere of influence.

Because this would not have gone unnoticed by Russian (and/or Chinese) members of the

UNSC, they exercised their veto when there were demands for strengthening

UNPROFOR’s mandate. Also, the non-aligned members of the P-5 lacked the muscle to

compel American acquiescence in politics that had an exclusive European focus

(Simmons; 1995: 83).

39

Furthermore, with the presumption that the war was near the end of its

course and that peace was “just around the corner”, the UNSC believed that a stronger

mandate would only exacerbate matters and prolong the conflict. Although the US and

Germany did question the assumptions on which UNPROFOR’s mandate had been

assigned, there was no real appetite among the P-5 for enforcement action in Bosnia, and

the Americans and Germans had no desire to commit their own troops to such a mission

(Berdal; 2004: 454). In issuing directions to UNPROFOR, it was clear that the Western

members of the UNSC could not separate their national foreign policy goals from what

was best for the mission and this is clearly visible in the debate that led to UN Resolution

836 and the catastrophic consequences on the ground that emerge from this decision

(Berdal; 2004: 454).

In failing to understand the need to enforce peace prior to maintaining

peace, especially in circumstances where no effective peace exists or is possible, the UN

showed a lack of resolve which hindered rather than helped peace building in Bosnia. Late

in the conflict, when the “use of any means necessary” was authorised, it proved confusing

and ineffective for UNPROFOR troops on the ground (Berdal; 2004: 460). It was not until

NATO became involved and forced the peace, and the US in conjunction with other

nations became involved in strategic negotiations, that there was any clear progress

towards peace. The lesson to be learned from the singular failure of UNPROFOR is that, in

escalating war zones, the success of UN mandated peacekeeping missions depends largely

on the ability to act timely and with sufficient strength and decisiveness to ensure an

imposed peace exists prior to building on that peace. This clear purpose must be

underpinned by a clear mandate. Only then will there be any secure basis for delivering

humanitarian aid and rebuilding states.

40

The mission in the former Yugoslavia remains one of the most controversial

in UN history. Furthermore, when a ceasefire was finally brokered, it was NATO (not the

UN) that negotiated the peace. An ineffectual UN needed the assistance of a regional

organisation (NATO) to bring an end to the savage and bloody Balkan conflict.

Responsibility for the ineffectiveness of the mission rests with the UN’s cumbersome

organisation as a whole, but more specifically, with the stubborn positions of the UNCS’s

five permanent members and it is they who must bear the blame for UNPROFOR’s failure

in the former Yugoslavia. 27

Chapter 6 – Case Study III: ECOMOG in Liberia

Background to the Conflict:

The geographic area that encompasses the West African state of the

Republic of Liberia has been inhabited since at least the 12th century (Runn-Marcos and

27 The UNSC has 5 permanent members (P-5) and 10 rotating members. The P-5 include Russia, UK, US, France and China. Under Article 27 of the UN Charter, UNSC decisions on substantive matters require the assent of 9 members, but any member of the P-5 can exercise a veto, thus preventing the adoption of any proposal. In practice the P-5 vote divides along east-west lines, with the US, UK and France against China and Russia and vice versa, thus rendering ineffectual any major decision that acts against the self-interest of one side or the other.

41

Kolleholon; 2005: 5). Its foundation in 1820 by the American Colonisation Society was

achieved by establishing a colony of freed slaves in the area in the aftermath of the

American Civil War. Because of strong US affiliations and identity, the newly arrived

‘Americo-Liberians’ asserted their influence and this alienated the existing indigenous

populations and upset the established ethnic and cultural balances and in the region.  Moran

(2006: 2) states that whereas “Liberia was never formally colonised”, the reality was that

“its relationship with the United States has always resembled that between colonised and

coloniser” (Ngovo; 1999: 45). Wegmann (2010: 7-8) elaborates on this point, insisting that

native Liberians were banned from the “highest echelons of settler society”, which resulted

in the strong perception of a divided and aggrieved society. This was manifested

particularly when the descendants of freed slaves became the political elite and through

nepotism and corruption favouring the ‘Americo-Liberians’ left the indigenous ethnic

tribes marginalised. The political dissatisfaction was augmented by Liberia’s three

crippling economic problems during the 1970s:

i. Depressed rubber prices, Liberia’s major export (Verité; 2012: 12).

ii. Government plans to increase rice prices from $22 per hundred-pound bag to $26

(Global Security; 1985).

iii. The drastic increase in oil prices from $1.80 a barrel in 1960 to $35.69 a barrel in

1980 (US Energy Information Administration; 2001).

The seeds of unrest having been sown finally culminated on the 12 th of April

1980 when Master Sergeant Samuel Doe led a coup d’état against the ruling ‘Americo-

Liberian’ ascendency. This, however, did not lead to better outcomes for all Liberians

because other ethnic minorities, and not least the outgoing ascendancy rulers, experienced

the harsh discrimination of Doe’s tribally biased autocratic rule. Doe’s presidency merely

replaced one form of ethnic suppression for another.

42

Despite the horrendous human rights record of Doe’s regime, Liberia was

receiving more US aid than ever during the 1980s (RAD-AID; 2009). Doe’s close

relationship with the US antagonised some regional players, particularly Libya. Libya’s

Muammar Qaddafi, desiring to exercise a greater influence on regional affairs, wanted to

replace Doe’s rule with Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)

(Mgbeoji; 2003: 42). With Libyan help, the NPFL, alongside mercenaries from The

Gambia, Sierra Leone and Burkina Faso, came across the border from Cote d’Ivoire on the

24th December 1989 and attacked Butuo in Nimba County (Hoffman; 2004: 214-215). The

AFL with the support of the Mandingo tribe fought back, but ethnic tensions escalated

further when Mandingo tribesmen attacked Gio and Mano tribe members because of their

support for the NPFL invasion (HRW; 1990a). With the memory of the ethnically

motivated purging of Doe’s political opponents the conflict spiralled into a horrendous

tribal vendetta (HRW; 1993).

In spite of this and by the end of 1990, Taylor’s NPFL was in control of the

whole of Liberia bar its capital, Monrovia, but in the process, the conflict had inflicted

considerable humanitarian hardship. Amnesty International (1996) reported that 700,000 of

Liberia’s 2,150,000 citizens had fled the country. This included some 80,000 from the

minority Krahn tribe whose pre-conflict population was estimated to be just 125,000

(HRW; 1990b). 

Alerted by the huge displacement of people and the alarming escalation of

the conflict over 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

established the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group

(ECOMOG), a multilateral armed force that relied heavily on Nigerian armed forces and

resources. Its purpose was to intervene and stabilise the peace in Liberia.

43

The Intervention:

ECOMOG’s intervention was timely, given the reluctance (or inability) of

major powers strategically interested in the country to become involved in Liberia and the

danger of the conflict spilling over into neighbouring countries. Although the US had

vastly more ties to Liberia than did any African country, it maintained a strictly limited

involvement. Having assisted initial mediation efforts, Washington never seriously

considered military intervention in Liberia. 28 The Soviet Union, once a major player on the

African continent, was by then in the process of disintegration, and was unable to act

further in the region. Similarly, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) - Africa's major

continent-wide organisation - paid scant attention to Liberia's suffering. 29 Nor did the UN

show any real interest and when, in July 1990, Liberia's UN ambassador tried to have the

UNSC consider the crisis, he failed. Not until January 1991, some thirteen months into the

civil war and five months after the establishment of ECOMOG, did the UNSC publicly

comment on events in Liberia (Wippman; 1993: 165).

By contrast, Anglophone Nigeria was the leading supporter of providing a

West African force for Liberia. In April 1990, at the urging of Nigeria's President Ibrahim

Babangida, a group of five ECOWAS member states established a Standing Mediation

Committee (SMC) to help resolve Liberia's conflict peacefully. 30 For three weeks during

July an inclusive and fully representative group drawn from all Liberian protagonists

attempted and failed to obtain a peace settlement leading to elections. By August 7 th, with

no peace settlement in sight, and fearing a bloodbath in Monrovia in the event of further

28 At this time, US public and political opinion was mainly focussed on Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and by late summer 1990 military intervention in the Middle East seemed inevitable.29 The OAU has always opposed military interference in the internal affairs of another African state except by invitation. It also opposed non-African intervention in general because of past colonial experience and the fear of resource exploitation.

30 Three Anglophone states (Nigeria, Gambia, and Ghana) and two Francophone states (Mali and Togo) comprised the SMC. The three Anglophone states would become heavily involved in ECOMOG, whereas the two Francophone states did not.

44

delay, the SMC recommended setting up the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group,

ECOMOG, while at the same time continuing to press for a political resolution. The SMC

also called for the establishment on an interim basis of an agreed, broadly-based Liberian

government that would rule until internationally supervised elections could be held under

more favourable conditions.

ECOMOG received a broad mandate that encompassed both peacekeeping

and peace enforcement. 31 ECOMOG was “to conduct military operations for the purpose

of monitoring the ceasefire, restoring law and order to create the necessary conditions for

free and fair elections to be held in Liberia,” and to aid the “release of all political

prisoners and prisoners of war.” (ECOWAS; 1990, cited in Weller; 1994: 68).

ECOMOG’s intervention in the Liberian conflict falls into four different

time frames that often overlap depending on map reference location. Olonisakin (2000:

166) describes these under the headings: peacekeeping, enforcement, stagnation and

enforcement again, and it is possible to identify a set of specific actions under each

heading.  Peacekeeping, for instance, prompted various attempts to forge consensus but

ended in political impasses. The period of stagnation is categorised by failed attempts at

diplomacy and political infighting. Olonisakin describes the two periods of enforcement as

explicitly useful (2000: 116) and, for my purposes, they merit deeper consideration.

The numerical strength of the ECOMOG force in Liberia varied between

6,000 and 11,000 troops; according to other sources 14,000 troops were deployed (BBC;

1992) and these consisted of army, naval and air force components (Molnár; 2008: 58).

31 Adeleke states that when it comes to peacekeeping, “…the application of force may be deemed necessary or in fact inevitable if the situation on the ground calls for it” but he adds that “…the empowering authority may include peace enforcement in a force’s mandate” (1995: 570). Given the ethnic nature of the Liberian civil war and the murderous actions of its main protagonists, not least Charles Taylor, it is reasonable to assume that a peacekeeping mandate alone would not have been strong enough to ensure any hope of success. In this respect, the peace enforcement aspect of the mandate seems a sensible precaution.

45

Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone initially contributed to the force and

they were later joined by troops from Mali, Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda. 32

In mid-August of 1990, ECOMOG deployed to Sierra Leone, Liberia’s

western neighbour where they set up the force’s forward operating base. The three warring

factions in Liberia reacted predictably. Prince Yourmie Johnson’s INPFL eagerly offered

cooperation, as did the AFL, while Charles Taylor’s NPFL artillery quickly zeroed in on

ECOMOG’s forces. INPFL’s and AFL’s cooperation was, of course, self-serving since

both were too weak to challenge ECOMOG directly, but each could benefit from

ECOMOG’s protection and from any destruction ECOMOG could inflict upon Taylor’s

forces. INPFL’s initial cooperation gave it special privileges, the most obvious being

unhindered armed access to ECOMOG headquarters and Howe reminds us that this was

contrary to ECOMOG’s overall strategy (Howe; 1996: 154). ECOMOG’s overall strategy

was to suppress through intimidation all three warring factions and, by this means, provide

an opportunity for an interim government to resolve differences through political activity

in advance of peaceful elections.

On August 27th, the SMC convened the All Liberia Conference of seventeen

political groupings and parties. This conference endorsed the SMC’s peace plan and

elected as interim president Professor Amos Sawyer as well as an interim legislature. By

ensuring Liberian political independence and its sovereignty, ECOWAS hoped to avoid

being perceived as an army of occupation.

32 Molnár (2008: 58) details the formidable strength of the ECOMOG forces in Liberia. The Army consisted of 1 infantry company from the Gambian Armed Forces, 1 battalion from the People’s Republic of Guinea Armed Forces, 1 battalion from the Nigerian Armed Forces with a platoon of reconnaissance, an artillery battery of 105mm Howitzer, a troop of engineers and a squadron of signals, 1 battalion from the Ghanaian Armed Forces with its support weapons including a reconnaissance platoon, 1 battalion from the Republic of Sierra Leone Army. The Navy consisted of two fast attack crafts and two merchant ships from the Ghanaian Navy and two fast attack crafts, two mine countermeasure vessels, one landing ship tank, one oil tanker, one tugboat, and three merchant ships from the Nigerian Navy. The Air Forces of Ghana and later Nigeria also contributed assets when necessary.

46

ECOMOG’s overall commander, General Quainoo, 33 perceived his role as

peacekeeper rather than peace enforcer and, to this end, preferred at first to move slowly

against the NPFL (Ibid). This approach, however, merely demonstrated ECOMOG’s

inexperience and the inadvisability of fraternising with the enemy’s enemy. Following a

surprise attack, NPFL forces almost overran ECOMOG’s headquarters. Then, when on

September 9th, INPFL forces murdered seventy Doe bodyguards at ECOMOG’s

headquarters and Doe himself nearby, ECOMOG itself was suspected of complicity in the

killings. In reprisal, AFL soldiers torched sections of Monrovia (Ibid: 155). Soon

afterwards, the INPFL detained a platoon of Nigerians and forced ECOMOG to swap two

105mm howitzers in exchange for the freed Nigerians. This profoundly embarrassed the

Nigerians and demonstrated that ECOMOG’s strategy was not working. Fearing the

ultimate failure of the mission, Nigeria asserted its dominance over ECOMOG by having

Dawda Jawara, Chairman of ECOWAS’s Authority of Heads of State and Government,

replace Quainoo with the more aggressive Major-General Joshua Dogonyaro of Nigeria

(Iweze; 1993: 233).

The change in leadership prompted a shift, albeit temporarily, from

peacekeeping to peace enforcing. 3,000 additional troops, more offensive weaponry and

some offensive air capability were supplied by Nigeria and Ghana, thus enabling

ECOMOG to undertake an offensive posture and enforce compliance. By October,

Dogonyaro was using Nigeria’s 77th Airborne Battalion and the two Ghanaian battalions

to outflank the now-retreating Taylor (Howe; 1996: 155). This military pressure succeeded

in forcing Taylor to sign a ceasefire at Bamako, Mali, on November 28 th. ECOMOG’s

peace enforcement approach had succeeded and following the Bamako ceasefire, it

reverted to its previous role as peacekeeper. However, the overall position in Liberia

remained largely unchanged; ECOMOG controlled Monrovia and Taylor’s NPFL 33 Lieutenant-General Arnold Quainoo was a senior officer in the Ghanaian Army.

47

controlled what he termed ‘Greater Liberia’ practically all the remainder of the country

(Ibid).

The Bamako ceasefire certainly saved thousands of lives by preventing a

factional battle for Monrovia and allowing essential food and medical supplies to be

delivered. Although unstable at times, the ceasefire lasted for two years and provided the

necessary breathing space for negotiations. Sadly, the lull in fighting also allowed

adversaries the space and time to rebuild themselves militarily. 34

The re-emergence of a state of war allowed new factions to form and the

conflict spread beyond Liberia to Sierra Leon. 35 None of these groups took ideological

positions but voiced instead some ethnic defensiveness or personal dislike of an opposing

faction leader. They were motivated by self-enrichment and supported themselves by

looting national resources that were then sold to international middlemen. Their prevailing

belief was that war was more rewarding than peace and Human Rights Watch/Africa

reported that their human rights records ranged “from suspect to abysmal” (Fleischman &

Whitman; 1994: 9).

ECOMOG at various times provided sympathetic militia factions with arms,

ammunition, intelligence, transport, and free passage as best suited its purpose of pressing

the war against Taylor. 36 These cooperative efforts were mutually beneficial to both sides.

For ECOMOG, they lessened financial costs, allowed for its goals to be met more

34 During the Bamako ceasefire, Joshua Iroha of Nigeria was ECOWAS’s special representative trying to negotiate a lasting peace settlement with the warring factions. However, during protracted negotiations, Burkina Faso resupplied Taylor’s forces. During this time, the enterprising Taylor also built his own resource base by extorting resources from several large businesses and by selling gold, diamonds, and hardwoods to commercial middlemen.35 Taylor armed dissident Sierra Leoneans who formed the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and Liberians displaced in Sierra Leon formed themselves into the United Liberation Movement of Liberians for Democracy (ULIMO). Soon ULIMO was skirmishing with RUF and, by February 1992, had crossed into Liberia. Howe (1996: 156) tells us that, by 1994, ULIMO had split into two separate militias: the mostly Mandingo ULIMO-K and later the mostly Krahn ULIMO-J. Many AFL soldiers defected to ULIMO-J or another Krahn faction, George Boley’s Liberian Peace Council (LPC), which operated in southeast Liberia.36 For example, Howe (1996: 156) reports that in 1990 it provided ammunition to the INPFL and to the AFL.

48

effectively and, should casualties be sustained, they would not incur political repercussions

among participating countries.

The Liberian civil war dragged on until 1996 and produced many failed

attempts in negotiating peace agreements. Those held in Yamoussoukro, Cote d’Ivoire,

between July and October 1991, were typical in that they provided for a ceasefire,

disarmament, encampment, an interim government and various steps towards elections.

Although the Yamoussoukro ceasefire held throughout much of 1992, the militia groups

continued to skirmish in the countryside outside Monrovia. Then, in late April 1992, in

compliance with the Yamoussoukro accords, ECOMOG soldiers began dispersing

throughout much of Liberia in an attempt to quell the skirmishing. Yet events on the

battlefield were beginning to undermining conference agreements. Taylor refused to

disarm and there were also reports that he mistreated ECOMOG peacekeepers arriving in

his areas of operation (Weller; 1990: 217). Then, on October 5 th 1992, in open defiance of

ECOMOG and the Yamoussoukro ceasefire agreement, Taylor’s NPFL mounted

"Operation Octopus", a two-month siege of ECOMOG-held Monrovia. ECOMOG's

departing Field Commander, General Ishaya Bakut, reflected ECOMOG's, and especially

Nigeria's, disenchantment with Taylor: “I now realise that I was wrong about Taylor's

intention. It is quite clear that Taylor is not sincere about disarmament nor is he willing to

let anything stand between him and the Executive Mansion” (Howe; 1996: 158). Taylor's

aggression had again pushed ECOMOG into peace enforcement that would last for five

months until, by late December, ECOMOG's General Adetunji Olourin had pushed the

NPFL out beyond Monrovia's suburbs. By April, ECOMOG had taken the major towns of

Harbel and Kakata and then the port of Buchanan, 90 miles from Monrovia (Ibid). By mid-

1993, Taylor was retreating throughout much of Liberia and was losing his economic base.

Africa Confidential observed that Taylor “is in the difficult position of leading a guerrilla

49

force which has to hold vast swatches of territory on a sharply declining revenue base”

(Ibid: 158-159).

It was ECOMOG’s aggressive peace enforcement that once again forced

Taylor and the NPFL to the negotiation table. 37 In July 1993 a meeting in Cotonou, Benin,

agreed yet another ceasefire, a coalition interim government, and free elections within

seven months of the ceasefire. Attempting to assuage on-going worries about the narrow

make-up of the force and the likelihood of bias due to Nigerian-domination, the Cotonou

agreement, approved the expansion of ECOMOG to include participation by troops from

east African states and assented to monitoring by UN observers (UNSC; 1993). 38 To this

end, the UN dispatched 368 observers to Monrovia in early 1994. Under the title United

Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), these observers were mandated “to

monitor the ceasefire, to monitor the UN and ECOWAS arms embargo, to assist in the

disarmament and demobilization of combatants, to observe and verify the election process,

to help with coordination of the humanitarian aid effort [and] to report on human rights

violations” (UNSC; 1993c). About the same time, a battalion of Tanzanian and a battalion

of Ugandan troops, under ECOMOG command and financed by the United States also

arrived in Monrovia (Brown et al; 2001: 281).

ECOMOG’s attempts to demobilise warring factions in spite of the Cotonou

Agreement was not successful and the war rumbled on for another year in this manner with

no real prospect of any decisive outcome. In early January 1996, opposing factions fought

at Tubmanburg and ECOMOG’s attempt to quell the fighting resulted in the deaths of

some fifty of its soldiers. Then in April 1996, fighting broke out in Monrovia and resulted

37 This Liberian Civil War was characterised by quite a number of failed peace talks, the most notable being: the Banjul Agreement (October 1990), Bamako Ceasefire Agreement (November 1990), Banjul Agreement (December 1990), Lomé Agreement (February 1991), Yamoussoukro Peace Agreement (October 1991), Geneva Agreement 1992 (April 1992), Cotonou Peace Agreement (July 1993), Akosombo Peace Agreement (September 1994), Accra Agreements/Akosombo clarification agreement (December 1994), Abuja Peace Agreement (August 1995) (UPPSALA Conflict Data Program; n.d.). 38 The Cotonou agreement was the first time that the UN cooperated with a non-UN peacekeeping force.

50

in the destruction of some areas of the city and the deaths of an unknown number of

civilians. This plunged Liberia back into that hopelessness encountered over the six years

of ECOMOG’s involvement in Liberia (Howe; 1996: 159). Sporadic fighting continued

until after Charles Taylor’s election as President of Liberia on 19 th July 1997. 39 By the end

of 1998, all ECOMOG troops had withdrawn from Liberia.

Case Analysis:

The Liberian conflict was similar in experience to other conflicts during the

1990s. Its impact on civilian life was enormous, with over 10,000 civilian fatalities,

600,000 refugees, and 1.5 million (i.e. one-half of Liberia’s population) displaced persons

(Ofuatey-Kodjoe; 1994: 262). However, as with NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999,

ECOWAS’s intervention in Liberia set a number of important precedents. (i) ECOMOG

was the first regional military force deployed within a third world state; (ii) ECOMOG was

the first military mission with which the UN agreed to work as a secondary partner, albeit

as a provider of logistical and humanitarian support only (Howe; 1996: 146); and (iii) this

was the first time that the overall command and control structure of an intervention mission

was authorised and mandated by a regional authority, rather than the UNSC, and this

represented a major change in approach to international conflict resolution. Howe reports

that this was one of the first conflicts where the UN and a major regional organisation (i.e.

ECOWAS) redefined traditional notions of peacekeeping intervention into another state’s

territory by an external body. However, given the extent and complexity of the

humanitarian aspects of the intervention, UN logistical support was integral to the overall

success of the mission.

39 With an election turnout of 89%, and despite his penchant for violence, Taylor was elected with 75% of the votes (Inter-Parliamentary Union; 1997 and Independent Elections Commission; 1997). It is widely believed that his victory occurred out of a fear that if he did not win, the country would slide back into war, as he was the only candidate in a position to continue fighting (Harris; 1999: 452).

51

Although largely an economic organisation for promoting trade and self-

reliance through trade liberalisation, ECOWAS had been observing Liberia’s deteriorating

conditions with trepidation. Because it included all sixteen states in the region, ECOWAS

had a vested interest in maintaining peace within the region. Primarily, it feared the

consequences of the Liberian conflict spilling over into neighbouring states and threatening

economic activity and sovereignty throughout the region. Prior to this, it never before

deployed a united military force, although it had defence plans for mutual protection

should the need arise (Ibid: 150).

Cognisant of the UNSC practice of issuing restricting mandates, carefully

scripted to accommodate the self-serving views of East-West political adversaries,

ECOWAS issued a broad mandate to ECOMOG, 40 including peace enforcement as well as

peacekeeping components. Allowing for the possibility of deteriorating conditions, this

mandate permitted ECOMOG to engage in hostilities in pursuit of its overall objective

should that need arise. Over the first six to eight months, ECOMOG used considerable

peace enforcement measures, most notably when, during November 1990, Nigeria and

Ghana sent 3,000 additional troops to reinforce those engaged in controlling insurgency in

Monrovia. Then, with Monrovia under its control, ECOMOG used its considerable military

presence to force a ceasefire on the warring factions (Ero; 1995). Significantly, Charles

Taylor, who had been unwilling to sign previous ceasefire agreements, was essentially

coerced militarily into signing the agreement in November.

Notwithstanding these successes, the ECOMOG mission was always under-

resourced and underfunded. Also resentful of Nigeria’s insistence on exercising control

40 The most conspicuous example of a limiting UNSC mandate was UNSC Resolution 872 (1993) which provided the legal framework for the operations of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). This mandate was so weakly framed that even the commanders of the peacekeeping force were unsure about the legal basis of any decision to use force in defence of civilians. Then, when on 6 th April 1994 a plane carrying the Hutu President of Burundi was shot down over Kigali, and suspicion fell on extremist Tutsi army officers, UN peacekeepers were forced to stand idly by for 100 days while the ruling Hutus hacked to death with machetes between 800,000 and 1,000,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutus.

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over the mission, some of its contributing countries provoked organisational difficulties

that compromised its command structure. Given the plethora of warring factions and the

fact that so many peace agreements failed, ECOMOG’s inability to manage the Liberian

civil war’s many layers of complexity is, to some extent, exposed.

However, regardless of these failings, ECOMOG’s mission in Liberia

achieved considerable success in the way it was able to protect civilian populations. Unlike

the Rwandan civil war, there was no ethnic cleansing or genocide in Liberia. While the

ECOWAS/ECOMOG intervention in Liberia is not without its problems, its achievement

can be gauged chiefly from a humanitarian perspective.

Chapter 7 – Case Study IV: INTERFET in East Timor

Background to the Conflict:

The island of Timor is situated in Southeast Asia about 650km northwest of

Australia. The Portuguese first colonised the eastern part of the island around 1520 and a

Dutch settlement was established in the western part in the early 1600s. Territorial disputes

between Portuguese and Dutch settlers were commonplace until the mid-nineteenth

century when the Portuguese made territorial concessions in the western half of the island,

thus formalising the current border that now exists between present day Indonesian West

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Timor and independent East Timor. Following Indonesia’s independence in 1949, West

Timor became part of the Indonesian province of Nusatenggara. 41 East Timor remained a

Portuguese dependency until 1974 when, following a coup in Lisbon, independence was

granted to all Portugal’s overseas colonies, including East Timor (Ooi; 2004: 1130).

In 1975, two new political parties in East Timor, the conservative Timorese

Democratic Union (UDT) and the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor

(FRETILIN), a leftist party with Communist connections, formed an unstable ruling

coalition. In July 1975, however, the UDT, fearing the impact of Communist ideology,

launched a coup against FRETILIN and, in the process, perpetrated a civil war. Concurrent

with these events the Indonesian military, fearful of the influence of Communism in the

region, launched a covert operation designed to generate unrest in East Timor. Then, with

the outbreak of civil war in East Timor, the Indonesians invaded with the support of

Indonesian migrants and those East Timorese who were reliant on Indonesia for

employment and education (Breen; 2001: 1). FALINTIL, 42 FRETILIN’s paramilitary

wing, put up unexpectedly-effective opposition to the invasion, causing pro-Indonesian

forces to extract considerable retribution on East Timorese civilians and, altogether, this

conflict cost the lives of some 200,000 East Timorese, (about 30% of the population) and

about 10,000 Indonesian soldiers. Eventually, the East Timorese succumbed and, on 17 th

July 1976, East Timor was formally annexed by Indonesia and was governed as a police

state under military occupation (Crawford & Harper; 2001: 11-20).

Throughout the period of the Cold War because of his strong opposition to

Communist influences, Indonesian President Suharto’s power grip strengthened both

domestically and internationally with the tacit support of non-communist states. However,

41 Indonesia was formed from the colony previously known as Dutch East Indies. West Timor, also a Dutch colony, had greater economic and cultural affinities with the new Indonesia than with the Portuguese colony of East Timor.42 FALINTIL was formed after the Portuguese withdrawal in 1975 and drew its manpower from the demobilized Portuguese garrison on the island.

54

renewed criticism of Indonesia’s oppressive annexation of East Timor emerged in

February 1997. At this time, Kofi Annan, the newly elected UN Secretary General,

appointed Ambassador Ramsheed Marker as his personal representative for East Timor

(Durch; 2006: 394). Marker was mandated to revive the negotiations between Portugal and

Indonesia over East Timorese independence. However an Indonesian economic downturn

resulting from the wider Asian financial crisis of 1997 intervened and was the principal

cause of the fall of the Suharto regime. Suharto’s replacement, however, B.J. Habibie,

offered a “special status” for the territory, which would entail autonomy in most areas of

government except defence, foreign affairs and monetary policy (White; 2008: 71) but this

led to renewed violence by pro-integration militia with the support of elements of the

Indonesian military.

On December 1st 1998. Australia’s Prime Minister John Howard and

Foreign Minister Alexander Downer sent a letter to Habibie urging him to include in his

‘special status’ proposal “a future act of self-determination” (Howard; 2010: 341).

However, Habibie’s reaction to this letter was distinctly negative as is obvious from an

interview recorded some years later:

“Howard suggested that I have to solve East Timor as other friends

have solved their colonies [said with emphasis], prepare them for

10 years or whatever and then after that give them their

independence. So as I read that I was upset. It is John Howard

[said with emphasis], who makes me make a quick decision!”

(ABC; 2008: 6:30 mins).

Habibie’s indignation, however, was ameliorated by the exigency of doing

something to lessen international pressures in the face of ongoing violence in East Timor.

Finally, in October 1999, he agreed to a temporary administration by the UN Transitional

55

Administration of East Timor (UNTAET) and announced that there would be a UN-

monitored referendum in six months offering the Timorese the choice between autonomy

within Indonesia or complete independence (Durch; 2006: 395). 43 However, such was the

intensity of the conflict, it was clear that neither side wished to compromise. FALINTIL

continued waging a pro-independence insurgency against Indonesia and the Indonesian

Army (TNI) had sponsored the growth of a number of anti-independence militia groups.

With these events, the stage was set for intervention, as the only way of resolving the

situation and restoring normality.

By April 1999, Australian concerns were increasing about the extreme

levels of violence and prospect of having another impoverished and conflict ridden country

on its doorstep (White; 2008: 75). Then, on April 6th 1999, when anti-independence

militias attacked a church compound in Liquica, killing at least thirty of the estimated

2,000 local people, Prime Minister Howard arranged a meeting with Habibie to

recommend deploying an international peacekeeping force to East Timor prior to the

ballot. Habibie, however, forcefully rejected Howard’s suggestion (Durch; 2006: 399),

stating that his position would become domestically “untenable” if he accepted an

intervention, as it would humiliate Indonesia and particularly the Indonesian military.

Indonesia, he felt, was well capable of taking care of the situation. However, in clandestine

cooperation with the UN, Australia secretly planned Operation Spitfire - an evacuation

operation of all Australian, UN and other international personnel from East Timor – in the

event of a collapse in security during or after the ballot (White; 2008: 80).

UNAMET, the UN mission to administer the East Timor ballot, deployed on

June 11th 1999 (UNSC; 1999a). In compliance with Habibie’s wishes, this was a totally

civilian mission, consisting of UN staff and a small police force of approximately 270

43 White (2008: 73) reports that, to this date, it remains unclear to what extent Habibie’s decision to hold a referendum was caused by Howard’s letter and there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that a re-reading of Howard’s letter in late January provided the final spur.

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officers. The East Timor ballot was held on August 30 th 1999. 44 Overall, this UN

supervised plebiscite in East Timor resulted in an overwhelming vote for independence

with an overall turnout of some 98.6 percent of the electorate. (Nevins; 2005: 97). Five

days later, on September 4th 1999, the results were announced; 78.5 percent voted for self-

determination. Almost immediately after the announcement, the anti-independence militias

unleashed a systematic campaign of terror and intimidation, forcing thousands of East

Timorese to flee into the hills. Such was the destruction that, in a matter of a few days,

most of the buildings, utilities, and agricultural infrastructure throughout the territory were

destroyed; almost the entire population was displaced, with over 250,000 transported by

the TNI or anti-independence militias to West Timor, the part of Timor that was still under

Indonesian control (Durch; 2006: 407). Australia responded immediately by activating

Operation Spitfire and, as well as its own citizens, it also evacuated UNAMET staff,

foreign media personnel and some 1,900 East Timorese (Ibid) amid what was full scale

and widespread civil unrest.

The Intervention:

Such was the scale of the violence and because the UN was not yet ready to

deploy a full-scale peacekeeping force, it was decided to send a short-term interim force

(White; 2008: 82). Australia was the logical candidate to lead an ad hoc peace enforcement

operation but, given the extent of the unrest and Indonesian atrocities in East Timor, the

Howard government feared the military and political consequences of an intervention of

this kind (Coleman; 2007: 244-245). Intervening in East Timor would effectively mean

going to war with the most powerful country in South-East Asia, Indonesia and Australia’s

44 Overall, the East Timor referendum was a remarkable event. At 5.30 a.m., an hour before the polls were schedule to open, would-be voters, dressed in their best attire and were already waiting in long lines at the polling stations. By 2.30 p.m., most of the polling stations were empty; most people already had cast their votes. Those Timorese who had fled their villages and towns bravely returned to the places where they were registered to vote, then quickly returned to their places of refuge.

57

defence forces were not prepared for such an undertaking 45 (White; 2008: 82). Canberra

then turned to the US for help, but the Clinton government was ambivalent about the

prospect of becoming embroiled in the conflict. Howard was manifestly taken aback by

this. “Whenever the Americans had been involved in a major operation, they had always

turned to Australia seeking a contribution. We had been willing to make it,” Prime

Minister Howard argued (Howard; 2010: 346). “This was a violation of the ANZUS

alliance. Australia was being dumped” (Kelly; 2009: 508). 46 Portugal also exerted

diplomatic and political pressure on the US in support of Howard’s view. 47 Ultimately,

Howard’s view prevailed and Clinton relented and agreed to make a “tangible

contribution” (Kelly; 2009: 509). 48 The US would provide strategic airlift, intelligence

support and logistics and, most importantly, it would throw all its diplomatic clout behind

Australia in support of what would become the International Force for East Timor

(INTERFET) or, as Prime Minister Howard later recalled “an all-out diplomatic effort in

support of what Australia wanted” (Howard; 2010: 347). This diplomatic effort was vital

to Australia’s need to obtain Indonesia’s acquiescence to the deployment of a multinational

force to East Timor (Howard; 2010: 347) since, on several occasions, Indonesia had made

it clear that any international military operation would be considered an invasion (DFAT;

2001: 84). 49 However, when the consequences of opposing were outlined, the US

diplomatic leadership managed to persuade Indonesia to accept INTERFET (Robinson;

45 Indonesia had an army of over 200,000 soldiers, 25, 000 of which were stationed in East Timor. 46 ANZUS, is an acronym and refers to the Australian, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty, signed in 1951. It originally pledged co-operation on defense matters in the Pacific. However, today the treaty covers conflicts in any part of the world. 47 The Portuguese Prime Minister, Antonio Guterres, telephoned Clinton and threatened to pull Portuguese troops out of Kosovo if he refused to help the Australian peacekeeping force in East Timor. To make his point crystal clear, Guterres prevented sixteen US military flights from departing the Portuguese airbase in the Azores and this helped concentrate US minds on the East Timor need (Greenlees & Garran; 2002: 246).48 One senior US official famously described the Clinton’s U-turn on East Timor with the following words: “We don’t have a dog running in the East Timor race, but we have a very big dog running down there called Australia and we have to support it” (Fernandes; 2008: 94).49 An Indonesian government statement read: “If the Security Council deployed troops against Indonesia’s wishes, they would be going as peace enforcers and would be met by the Indonesian armed forces.”

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2010: 196 and White; 2008: 83 and Fernandes; 2008: 94). 50 The diplomatic and economic

pressure on Indonesia eventually produced results. On September 13, 1999, Habibie

informed Annan that he was willing to invite a peacekeeping force of ‘friendly nations’ to

East Timor (Edwards & Goldsworthy; 2001: 249).

Australia began a speedy search for coalition partners for INTERFET.

Canberra’s preference for recruiting member states from the Association of Southeast

Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well as countries that had Muslim populations was clearly to

assuage Indonesian feelings about the intervention. In addition, countries with previous

peacekeeping experiences and adequately trained militaries were preferred over

inexperienced countries. Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs was asked to work

through its embassy network and supply a list of potential contributing countries (Connery;

2010: 37). In this way, the final complement of 11,000 troops from 22 different countries

contributing to INTERFET was decided (Horner; 2001: 9). 51

On the 15th September the UNSC unanimously agreed Resolution 1264

under Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorising the establishment of a multinational force

under a unified command structure to restore peace and security in East Timor, protect and

support UNAMET, and facilitate humanitarian assistance operations (UNSC; 1999b).

50 The World Bank was instructed to freeze US$ 300 million that had been scheduled for disbursement the following week to aid Indonesia economic recovery. The IMF was told to postpone a mission to Indonesia for discussions on its economic recovery programme. That meant in essence that the IMF would not disburse some US$ 6 million as planned in mid-Sept 1999 (Robinson; 2010: 196).51 Australia, as the lead nation, provided the commander, 5,500 troops, hardware and equipment; New Zealand sent the next largest contingent of 1,100 troops. Altogether some 22 nations contributed to INTERFET. Its complement of including Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, United Kingdom and United States of America. In 1999, Irish officers were sent to East Timor as part of the UNAMET observer group (Timorese Independence Referendum). Later in the year, a platoon of Rangers (1 IRCON) were sent as part of the INTERFET peacekeeping force. The Army Ranger Wing (the Army's Special Forces unit) was deployed in East Timor alongside the Australian Special Air Service Regiment for a four-month tour. This marked the second time that the Irish Army's elite forces were officially deployed operationally outside of the Irish state, the first being to Somalia in 1993. INTERFET handed over to UNTAET during 2 IRCON's tour in 2000.

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Once INTERFET deployed, Indonesia withdrew its troops from East Timor

leaving it without any civil administration or justice systems and this left INTERFET and

its accompanying humanitarian agencies to function in what was effectively a collapsed

state. In this environment, INTERFET assumed responsibility for civil order, although it

was not resourced for this task. Also, despite careful screening, a considerable number of

INTERFET troops arrived in Australia pre-deployed with “pretty much . . . nothing”

(Ryan; 2000: 107). This posed a significant threat to the mission because, unless the

indigenous East Timorese population who fled the violence in the aftermath of the

plebiscite on independence was secure and had access to humanitarian aid, public

confidence in INTERFET would erode and intransigent factions might seize the initiative

and deny the possibility of a return to normal life (Mack; 1999: 23).

On 19th September, INTERFET’s overall commander, Major General Peter

Cosgrove, flew to Dili for discussions with Major General Kiki Syahnakri, the senior

Indonesian officer in East Timor, to facilitate the transfer of power. Then, at dawn the

following day, Dili’s Comoro airport was secured by troops from Australia, New Zealand

and Britain, after which INTERFET forces began arriving by C-130 Hercules. The Second

Battalion Royal Australian Regiment (2RAR) was first to arrive and it immediately

deployed around Dili. Then on 21st September, the Third Battalion Royal Australian

Regiment (3RAR) arrived at Dili port on board the fast catamaran HMAS Jervis Bay, and

22 light armoured vehicles from C Squadron 2nd Cavalry Regiment were landed from

HMAS Tobruk. The same day, twelve Black Hawk helicopters self-deployed from Darwin

to Dili Heliport to provide air mobility.

With Dili secured, Australian, New Zealand and British (Ghurka) forces

began rounding up and disarming Indonesian militia groups. On 27th September, an

airmobile operation was conducted in Liquica, a town 30 km west of Dili. 52 Then, in early 52 Liquica was the scene of some of the worst militia violence both before and after the referendum.

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October, the main towns near the border with West Timor were secured in airmobile

operations supported by amphibious landings of armoured vehicles and other equipment.

This was the key phase in the operation because, once the border was secure, militia

entering East Timor could be intercepted and denied the freedom to operate at will from

sanctuaries within West Timor. However, INTERFET operations in and around Suai on the

south coast met with significant resistance. In one incident, when a militia truck convoy

attempted to break through a roadblock, Australian troops opened fire wounding six

militia. Then, later the same day, a patrol escorting detainees from this incident was

ambushed, and two militiamen were killed in the ensuing firefight. On 22nd October a

further airmobile operation was undertaken to secure the coastal enclave of Oecussi which

is isolated from the rest of East Timor. Because of its location surrounded on three sides by

Indonesian West Timor, militia violence here had been particularly acute and continued

right up to the arrival of INTERFET. Almost the entire population of 50,000 had been

displaced as a result of the violence. INTERFET’s fast and professional deployment in

operations of this nature and throughout East Timor generally, and its effectiveness in

disarming the Indonesian militia groups and restoring law and order, enabled up to 500,000

refugees to return to the relative safety of their looted homes from the hills where they

were in danger of dying from lack of food and clean water.

INTERFET’s easy progress in disarming and disbanding the rogue militia

groups around the country was impressive and won the immediate admiration of the

international community. However, the situation around Dili, where the militia were more

organised and stubborn, required a more persistent approach. In Dili, the soldiers from the

2nd Battalion Royal Ghurka Regiment, eschewing mundane and static tasks, justifiably

attracted considerable positive media attention for the manner in which they dominated

their area of operation by means of a high visibility patrol programme. Less attention was

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given to the Filipino battalion in the eastern town of Baucau who were active in

undertaking necessary humanitarian tasks (Mack; 1999: 23-24).

The INTERFET operation formally concluded on 23rd February 2000, when

authority was transferred to the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)

although, initially, it was units of the INTERFET mission who constituted the new

UNTAET peacekeeping force (UNSC; 1999c).

Case Analysis:

In its brief existence, INTERFET demonstrated that, in the initial

stabilisation period, it had succeeded in bringing about a significant measure of order,

direction and specialist assistance to a traumatised and failed society (Ibid: 25). Two weeks

into the operation, East Timor had pulled back from the brink of widespread renewed

violence and chaos. On arrival, INTERFET showed an ability to adapt to the needs of the

moment and fill a number of essential civil, security and humanitarian roles successfully.

INTERFET is an enduring example of a successful peacekeeping mission with a strong

peace enforcement mandate. Its success gave sufficient time for UNTAET to deploy

successfully with the full authority of the UNSC. Because of INTERFET’s success,

UNTAET’s mandate for peace building and nation building was made significantly more

manageable. 53

The success of INTERFET can be gauged by its fulfilment of the UNSC

mandate to provide a basic level of security that would allow the safe transition to

UNTAET. In this respect it was an ‘outstanding success’ (Smith & Dee; 2006: 421).

However, pivotal in INTERFET’s success was the choice of Australia as the lead state for

53 UNTAET was given overall responsibility for the interim administration of East Timor and was empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice (United Nations Security Council; 1999c).

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the mission. Australia had a significant interest in ensuring security and peace in its nearest

neighbour and it understood more than most the sensitivities involved as well as the need

to bring high-ranking diplomacy to bear in conjunction with armed intervention. Also,

Australia’s careful scrutiny and selection process for the various armed contingents that

comprised INTERFET was crucial to the success of the enterprise. There was also a

heightened degree of cooperation between troop contributing countries, especially between

Australia, several ASEAN states, South Korea, Fiji and Britain who contributed most of

the forces. INTERFET also had a unified and fully briefed command and control structure

with a strong sense of mission.

Notwithstanding its resolute and purposeful resolve, INTERFET had to

overcome significant challenges in East Timor, e.g. with over 40 percent of the population

displaced, a considerable amount of its time was spent persuading fearful refugees to return

home and providing the necessary security for this to happen. Also INTERFET had to

achieve this in a situation where there was practically no transport or communication

infrastructure outside the country’s capital, Dili (Smith & Dee; 2003: 53). By 2002, nearly

a quarter of a million displaced Timorese had returned to their homes and, in May of that

year, sufficient normality had returned to East Timor to allow independence to be

formalised. Under Xanana Gusmão as its first president, East Timor was formally admitted

as a full member of the UN on 27th September 2002.

Smith and Dee (2006: 421-2) argue that INTERFET holds four important

lessons about peacekeeping. Firstly, peace support operations must have a capable

lead/pivotal state and comprise adequate forces with good war-fighting skills. With

Australian troops making up the largest individual contingent of INTERFET, the mission

had sufficient expertise in all ranks to fulfil its mandate. Secondly, successful

peacekeeping depends on appropriate host-state support. In the case of INTERFET, it was

63

the cooperative effort between neighbouring Australia and the high-powered diplomatic

skills of the US that persuaded Habibe to acquiesce to its deployment. Thirdly, peace

support operations are large and expensive and require adequate funding. Adequate

funding was readily available to INTERFET and contributing nations never left the

mission under resourced. Finally, peacekeepers must be able to assume civilian functions

until such time as civilian agencies themselves have the necessary capacity. Civilian

capacity takes longer to deploy than military capacity and, in peacekeeping, good civilian

capacity is at least as important as good military capacity. The East Timor mission was

never wanting in good civilian support.

Restoring security to East Timor would not have been possible without the

threat or use of force from INTERFET troops. Although the mission was predominantly

peacekeeping in nature, it regularly encountered situations that necessitated a

demonstration of INTERFET’s capability of responding forcefully to violence.

The INTERFET mission in East Timor was, in many ways, an object lesson

in how UN interventions should be conducted. Its disarming of the unknown number of

Indonesian aligned militias responsible for murdering hundreds, if not thousands, of East

Timorese was essential to the overall success of its mission. Although, the militias had

little resolve to fight in the face of overwhelming opposition, INTERFET won the respect

of the international community by the professionalism, speed and alacrity with which it

went about the business of disarmament. The militia quickly succumbed to INTERFET’s

greater professionalism and resolve.

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Chapter 8 – Research Findings & Conclusions

Research Findings:

Given the complex circumstances in which they take place, any assessment

of the success or failure of a humanitarian intervention is difficult, but the task becomes

considerably more tenuous where, as in this study, one is trying to make comparative

assessments across a number of different interventions. I have identified the following

pertinent questions that will provide a framework for my findings and allow me make

comparative judgements across all four very different case studies.

a) What was the composition of the intervening force?

b) Was the mandate strong enough to ensure success?

c) Were the resources adequate for the task?

d) Was the mandate fulfilled?

e) Did the intervention contain the conflict and bring an end to hostilities?

f) Did the intervention bring about a reduction in human suffering?

g) Did the intervention bring about normalization and a return to democratic rule?

a) What was the composition of the intervening force?

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This question has particular relevance to my study. The consensus and

logical view is that the wider the international participation in intervention missions, the

greater the safeguard against self-interest. However, one would expect neighbouring

countries to have a greater interest in supporting humanitarian efforts close to their own

borders and preventing civil strife from spilling over into their own countries. Also,

intervention by neighbour countries is more acceptable and has a greater prospect of

success because of their better understanding of the social, religious and cultural

sensitivities of the effected nation. For these reasons, the UN urges “states in proximity to

emergencies […] to participate closely with the affected countries in international efforts,

with a view to facilitating, to the extent possible, the transit of humanitarian assistance”

(UNGA; 1991). The Table below shows the extent to which this guideline applied in my

case studies.

Table showing the number of troop contributing countries by continent:

Europe Asia Africa America Oceania

UNOSOM I 5 4 3 1 3

Somalia 54 UNITAF 10 7 5 2 2

UNOSOM II 13 12 6 2 3

Bosnia UNPROFO 22 8 6 4 2

Liberia ECOMOG 0 0 8 0 0

East Timor INTERFET 7 8 1 3 2

54 Although UNITAF’s personnel were drawn from five continents about 25,000 of its 37,000 personnel and most of its logistics and resources were contributed by the US. UNOSOM II included troops and logistic and civilian staff drawn from 36 different countries. To protect UNOSOM II, the US contributed a quick reaction force on board US ships off the coast of Somalia.

66

Although both UNOSOM missions involved participation by a wide number

of nations, the dominance of countries from the west might reflect their relative affluence

and a greater logistical ability to subscribe to the missions. The overwhelming strength of

the US in the short UNITAF mission merely indicates its greater capability to react quickly

with strength and numbers under an experienced and unified command. However, the

failure to allow UNITAF follow up on the gains it made, ultimately led to the overall

failure of UNISOM II.

The numerical strength of European states in UNPROFOR, the dominant

influence of Australia and New Zealand in INTERFET, and the exclusive presence of West

African states under Nigerian leadership in ECOMOG is noteworthy and demonstrates the

greater likelihood of success when regional forces with a greater stake in ensuring peace on

their borders assume lead roles in humanitarian interventions.

b) Was the mandate strong enough to ensure success?

UNOSOM I’s mandate allowed for (i) monitoring the ceasefire in

Mogadishu, (ii) providing protection and security for UN personnel, equipment and

supplies, and (iii) escorting deliveries of humanitarian supplies to distribution centres in

the Mogadishu and its immediate environs (UNSC; 1992b). In limiting involvement

exclusively to these tasks, its mandate failed to address the true situation in Somalia in

early 1992 where armed factions looted the aid after the departure of escorting troops.

UNSOM I’s mandate was deficient in this respect and should have authorised its troops to

disarm and suppress militia units and, where necessary, to prevent looting and the secure

distribution of the aid to those for whom it was intended.

The only real success in Somalia occurred during the five months of

UNITAF’s operation and this was facilitated largely by its ‘all necessary means’ mandate

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which permitted troops to use force to secure the safe delivery of humanitarian aid. With

UNITAF, the UN operation finally began to make an impact. However, fearing the

strength of US control and influence over the mission, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN

Secretary-General, hampered the operation diplomatically and eroded US military resolve

to continue. UNOSOM II’s mandate also contained an ‘all necessary means’ provision for

its first year (UNSC; 1993a). However, when this was withdrawn in February 1994, it

signalled a UN weakness and lack of resolve (UNSC; 1994). Left devoid of any effective

punch, UNOSOM II was rendered as inept as UNOSOM I had been.

The UNPROFOR mandate was a first generation peacekeeping

mandate, more suited to post-conflict zones where a ceasefire was already in place. Its

provisions included (i) delivering humanitarian assistance throughout Bosnia, and (ii)

establishing UNPAs for refugees around the region (UNSC; 1992e & 1992g). Authorised

under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, it permitted no peace enforcement measures.

Essentially, the UNPROFOR mandate only facilitated peacekeeping in circumstances

where there was no agreed peace to keep. For this reason, it was inadequate and offered no

prospect of stabilising Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On the other hand, ECOMOG’s broad mandate encompassed both

peacekeeping and peace enforcement and allowed ECOMOG to engage, as necessary, in

hostilities to defend humanitarian efforts in Liberia. Its strong military presence, especially

during its first six to eight months, allowed ECOMOG to enforce peace and, by November

1990, it had taken control of Monrovia and established a ceasefire (Ero; 1996). Over its

seven years in Liberia, ECOMOG’s overwhelming military presence helped re-establish

order and avoid the awful prospect of humanitarian disaster.

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INTERFET’s UNSC mandate to provide a basic level of security and allow

the transition to UNTAET was also clear and unambiguous, and allowed the use force in

pursuit of its goals (UNSC; 1999b). Because of this, it achieved complete success.

c) Were the resources adequate for the task?

Resources in this context include human resources as well as equipment and

logistics. UNOSOM I was initially designed to consist of 4,000 troops. However, because

member states were slow to commit, the initial force involved 54 military observers and

893 troops as well as international civilian and local staff. When the humanitarian effort

stalled, UNSC Resolution 775 authorised the immediate deployment of an additional 3,000

security troops (UNSC; 1992f). From the outset, UNOSOM I did not possess the human

resources to successfully fulfil its functions of providing humanitarian relief, monitoring

the ceasefire, providing security, carrying out demobilisation and disarmament, and

assisting in national reconciliation (Thakur; 1994: 388-389). Within months of its

deployment, it was obvious that it would not succeed.

Although UNITAF’s strength of 37,000 fully equipped and resourced troops

made it highly successful for the limited period of its deployment, its successor, UNOSOM

II possessed only 22,000 troops and 8,000 logistic and civilian staff drawn from 36

different countries. Also, UNOSOM’s lack of a strong central command and control

rendered it incapable of carrying out its mandate efficiently or effectively, and this led to

its eventual withdrawal.

UNPROFOR had a complement of 39,000 troops. However, it was its weak

mandate rather than any deficiency in its strength or resources that most contributed to its

failure.

69

Considering the area of Liberia, ECOMOG’s deployment of 14,000 troops

was adequate for its task. At no point was the ECOMOG force found wanting in terms of

presence. Nigeria, acting as the backbone of the force, supplied most of the troops, the

military materials and command structure. ECOMOG established a strong presence

throughout the country and succeeded in maintaining a constant pressure on the

belligerents.

INTERFET was authorised only when Australia agreed to act as the lead

nation. Australia provided some 5,500 troops, military hardware and equipment and a

command structure for the mission. New Zealand contributed some 1,100 troops, the

second largest contingent with other nations contributing significantly less to the mission.

d) Was the mandate fulfilled?

UNOSOM I failed to fulfil all aspects of its limited mandate. As a result, the

ceasefire crumbled and the humanitarian crisis increased; convoys carrying aid supplies

were routinely attacked and looted by militia groups and less aid was reaching those who

needed it most. UNITAF’s mandate was fulfilled but its premature withdrawal before it

could consolidate its success will always remain controversial. With the departure of US

marines, emboldened militia groups quickly resumed their looting and warring activities.

UNOSOM II’s mandate, although strong, was not achieved due to lack of resources and a

weak central command.

In prohibiting the use of coercion, UNPROFOR’s mandate lacked the teeth

to compel compliance among warring factions. As a result UN peacekeepers could not

command respect nor enforce the protection of the UNPAs. UNPROFOR troops, rendered

helpless in deterring hostilities and atrocities, failed in their mandate.

70

Despite obstacles, ECOMOG fulfilled its mandate and completed its

mission in Liberia. It imposed a lasting ceasefire, disarmed warring parties, protected and

evacuated civilians as necessary, and created an environment conducive to free and fair

elections. What was most impressive about the ECOMOG mission was its commitment to

its goals, probably because its troops were drawn from regional countries.

INTERFET, no doubt, helped by the clarity of its UNSC mandate, was

quickly able to restore stability to East Timor. Its rapid deployment and effective action

against the hostile militia enabled, within six months, conditions conducive to the transfer

of authority to UNTAET. In all facets of its mandate, INTERFET was a resounding

success.

e) Did the intervention contain the conflict and bring an end to hostilities?

UNOSOM I failed to contain or reduce violence in Somalia for reasons

stated earlier. Its successor UNITAF created a brief lull in violence and more stable

conditions that aided the safe delivery of humanitarian aid. However, its premature

withdrawal and the transfer of its authority to UNOSOM II ended all hopes of a permanent

end to violence.

At no point did UNPROFOR contain the conflict in Bosnia. Only when

NATO, a regional organisation, became involved and bombed Serb paramilitaries were

there any gains made in safeguarding vulnerable communities and ending hostilities in

Bosnia.

In the beginning of its deployment in Liberia, ECOMOG seemed to have

had an effect on containing the violence and was especially successful in preventing a

factional battle for the capital city, Monrovia. Its tenacity in maintaining pressure on the

belligerents over seven long years eventually succeeded in ending the violence, albeit until

71

the beginning of the Second Liberian Civil War two years later, after which ECOMOG

mediators eventually succeed in negotiating a peaceful settlement.

INTERFET’s intervention was, by all accounts, hugely successful in

containing conflict and ending hostilities in East Timor. Its timely and robust deployment

and its considerable diplomatic support brought peace and stability to the region.

f) Did the intervention bring about a reduction in human suffering?

In Somalia, both UNOSOM deployments were too weak and ineffective to

bring about any reduction in human suffering. UNITAF’s success in preventing

humanitarian disaster and delivering aid did, for a time, end human suffering, but its

premature replacement by UNOSOM II returned the country to the hopeless state it was in

prior to intervention.

The massacre at Srebrenica in 1995 is only one example of UNPROFOR’s

inability to guard civilians and bring about an end to human suffering. Its lack of authority

and its weakness in the face of warring factions left its safe havens vulnerable to attack and

human rights abuses.

In Liberia, ECOMOG did have some impact on reducing human suffering

by containing the civil war and enforcing peace. However, when thousands of displaced

civilians formed themselves into militias, ECOMOG failed to address the widespread use

of child soldiers. Whereas ECOMOG did not directly focus on the suffering of civilians, its

robust actions brought about an earlier peace than would otherwise have happened. In that

sense only, ECOMOG lessened human suffering.

72

Within a short period after initial deployment, INTERFET managed to

establish the safe conditions that allowed many displaced refugees return home. In addition

to establishing and maintaining order, INTERFET provided logistical assistance to civilian

agencies, rebuilt roads and public utilities, protected air warehouses and supported aid

convoys. These activities enabled humanitarian agencies to provide much needed food,

water, shelter and medical supplies and care (Seybolt; 2007: 90). By the end of 1999, there

were some 40 humanitarian organizations working in East Timor. In these ways,

INTERFET’s deployment did reduce human suffering.

g) Did the intervention bring about normalization and a return to democratic rule?

Somalia, in spite of the efforts of UNOSOM I, UNITAF and UNISOM II,

did not returned to democratic rule and it remains to this day one of the world’s most

unstable zones. Recent interventions offer some hope of a return to stable government.

UNPROFOR failed to return Bosnia to democracy. However, with the

intervention of NATO and its brokering of the Dayton Accords, Bosnia and Herzegovina

agreed to adopt a federal system of rule with two separate entities based largely on the

territories held by each side at the end of the conflict. Only since then has democracy in

Bosnia stabilized.

ECOMOG’s intervention in Liberia did bring peace in 1995 and returned

some semblance of democratic rule with the election of Charles Taylor as President in

1997. However, it did not succeed in establishing permanent democratic institutions.

Taylor’s election perpetrated a second civil war two years later and it was not until his

resignation in 2003 and the intervention of the UN Mission in Liberia that the country

began to return to democratic rule.

73

INTERFET placed a high priority on assisting civilians. In the absence of an

indigenous judicial system, it established a military ‘quasi-judicial’ regime to temporarily

detain suspected criminals, though it lacked the authority to try criminal suspects (Bull:

2008: 191). In establishing and maintaining order, INTERFET created a secure

environment for handing over authority to UNTAET and for the early return of democratic

and civilian rule.

Conclusions:

The above findings confirm my initial theory. It is apparent, from my

analysis of the four case studies that, during the 1990s, the UN’s record of successfully

enforcing human rights ideals was poor. Both cases in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia

presented the international community with widespread human rights abuses in complex

situations of conflict. Yet, as an organisation, the UN proved to be ambivalent in

understanding the nature of these conflicts and ensuring that appropriate tools and

resources matched their situational needs. This is particularly true in the cases of

UNPROFOR and UNOSOM whose interventions failed with disastrous consequences. It

was only with the entry of NATO in Bosnia and the US-led UNITAF in Somalia

respectively that the humanitarian relief efforts in both theatres of operation achieved any

degree of momentum although, in the case of Somalia, this momentum was not sustained.

Under the guidance of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Bosnia and Somalia were

not isolated failures as is evident from other failed UN interventions, e.g. Rwanda, Darfur

and Sudan. 55 The inference is that the UN is not the best institution to enforce human

55 The UN was heavily criticized for not pre-empting the Rwandan genocide (1994), in spite of the overwhelming evidence to that effect and for failing to strengthen the force and the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) once the genocide had begun. Although the humanitarian crisis in Darfur and Sudan (2003 onwards) is technically outside of the time-span of my study and occurred under Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s watch, the UNSC has been reproached for failing to act decisively and timely in spite of warnings by Annan that these regions were at risk of another genocide.

74

rights ideals because it places too much importance on the restrictive legal discourse

surrounding intervention and sovereignty. Buchanan’s ‘substantive justice’ guideline about

there being no higher moral justification for intervention than human rights and Tesón’s

‘deontological’ moral perspective that the good of the people takes precedence over the

sovereignty of the state have particular significance here and reinforce my overall

conclusion on this topic (Buchanan; 2001: 699-704 and Tesón (1997: 173-4).

A second consideration arises out of the UN’s primacy as the only

legitimate agency for issuing legal intervention mandates in circumstances where the self-

interest of permanent UNSC members can often unduly influence the terms and strength of

each mission. While it was recognised that both Somalia and the former Yugoslavia

necessitated a strong intervention, neither mission was afforded a mandate that was robust

enough to ensure effectiveness on the ground. The mandates of UNOSOM and

UNPROFOR were more suited to situations where a ceasefire was already declared but,

instead, they were obliged to keep the peace in situations where there was no effective

peace to keep. This explains in large measure why both missions failed.

In contrast, UNITAF’s short but robust mandate in Somalia (December

1992-May 1993) and NATO’s unilateral incursion into Kosovo (1998-1999) offer some

insight into what can be achieved with appropriate resolve and support. 56 Both these

examples highlight the need for decisive and robust peace enforcement measures when

warranted. Similarly, the mandates for ECOMOG in Liberia (1990-1998) and INTERFET

in East Timor (September 1999 - February 2000), provided for the lawful use of peace

enforcement measures and their troops were able to confront belligerent actors decisively

in defence of human rights. In both these situations the interventions were successful

56 US strength of purpose and commitment of resources was hugely influential in bringing about UNITAF’s success. NATO’s action in Kosovo was also highly successful. Although it acted without UN mandate and was technically illegal, NATO’s action was retrospectively deemed to be legitimate under the R2P doctrine (Independent International Commission on Kosovo; 2000: 289).

75

because, as outlined in my literature review, the rights of civilians took precedence over

sovereignty issues.

My analysis of the case studies also shows the wisdom of involving troops

from regional states in lead roles in areas of conflict. The literature shows that even when

regional actors lack the strength and resources necessary to play leading roles, their

influence on the ground can be crucial to the overall success of the mission (Glanville;

2013). Both ECOMOG and INTERFET interventions convey what can be achieved when

neighbouring states are utilised in this way. Both these cases show that neighbouring states

can be highly effective when conducting large scale humanitarian intervention missions, if

for no other reason than they have a higher stake in ensuring peace in their own region and,

with their comparative better understanding of the nature of the conflict, are more likely to

ensure the necessary military personnel and resources are available for the success of the

mission. The writings of MacFarlane & Weiss concur with these conclusions (MacFarlane

& Weiss; 1994: 283).

Another issue which impacts on my hypothesis, as shown by the UN

missions in both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, is that in spite of early warnings of

impending genocide, neither the UNSC nor the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping

Operations (DPKO) are capable of responding timely and with appropriate force. On the

other hand, regional organisations like the AU, NATO, ECOWAS, ASEAN, etc. could

deploy more readily and with greater understanding within their own geographical areas.

Both ECOMOG and INTERFET interventions are cases in point.

This assertion, however, comes with a number of caveats. Because the UN

has considerably greater experience in mounting complex peacekeeping and humanitarian

missions, albeit with little success, this expertise cannot be ignored. Also, some regional

organisations may not have the political will or the necessary resources with which to

76

deploy effectively. Whereas NATO can command significant military resources, other

regional organisations (e.g. the EU) have no military capability because they are essentially

economic and political entities. Others (e.g. ASEAN) may be ambivalent about human

rights issues. 57 My hypothesis, therefore, cannot be universally applied but should be

applied selectively as best suits each particular case. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo,

deemed retrospectively to have been ‘illegal but legitimate’ (Independent International

Commission on Kosovo; 2000: 289), is often cited in defence of controversial and self-

serving incursions into neighbouring countries, e.g. the recent Russian ‘reclaiming’ of

Crimea in support of its Russian-speaking population. However, the substantive argument

against the Russian annexation of the Crimea is that the Russian-speaking population there

was never in any danger, nor was it under any discernible threat of danger whereas, in

Kosovo, NATO’s intervention was undertaken where human rights abuses were real and

blatant. The justification for a ‘restrictionist’ interpretation of the UN Charter cited in my

introduction also feeds into this debate (Bellamy & Williams; 2006: 146 and Ayoob; 2002:

81).

Notwithstanding these caveats, regional actors offer real advantages that

others could not be expected to possess and my study shows that, when they are involved

either in lead roles or in coalition with international partners, humanitarian interventions

have a better prospect of success. UNITAF’s impressive intervention in Somalia, which

was overwhelmingly drawn from the US military, is an obvious exception to my overall

thesis although, even here, the mission included small contingents from five different

African nations. Pattinson points out what can happen when western powers get involved

in humanitarian missions in the Middle East and in Africa, even though they possess more

57 ASEAN has been criticised recently for its soft approach to promoting human rights in Burma and its failure to act in the face of corruption and large-scale abuses of human rights in Cambodia.

77

capability to fund and resource these than non-western nations (Pattinson; 2008). Hybrid

missions involving regional actors are more advisable in today’s post-colonial world.

The overwhelming evidence of my study supports the view outlined in the

literature that there is considerable merit in having regional organisations partner the UN in

peacekeeping operations (Yamashita; 2012) or, like INTERFET in East Timor, in acting as

first responders to prepare the ground for more long-term UN nation-building missions.

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