LessonsLearnedExerciseon

UN/UNDPPeacebuildingEffortsin

SriLanka

FinalReport

October2018

2

Acronyms

APRC AllPartyRepresentativeCommittee

ACLG CommissionerofLocalGovernment

CAIP ConsolidatedAnnualImplementationProgramme

CLG CommissionerofLocalGovernment

CEPA CentreforPovertyAnalysis

CMO-C Conflict-Mechanism-OutcomeConfiguration

CTF ConsultativeTaxForce

DS DistrictSecretariat/Secretary

DS DivisionalSecretariat/Secretary

EPC EasternProvincialCouncil

EU EuropeanUnion

GLED GovernanceforLocalEconomicDevelopment

GoSL GovernmentofSriLanka

ILO InternationalLabourOrganisation

INGO InternationalNon-GovernmentalOrganisation

IRF ImmediateResponseFacility

LLRC LessonsLearntandReconciliationCommission

LTTE LiberationTigersofTamilEelam

LOGOPRO LocalGovernanceProject

MDTU ManagementDevelopmentandTrainingUnit

MFA` MinistryofForeignAffairs

MOJ MinistryofJustice

MOWCA MinistryofWomenandChildren’sAffairs

MPCLGS MinistryofProvincialCouncils,LocalGovernmentandSports

MRRHA MinistryofResettlement,Rehabilitation,NorthernDevelopment

NGO Non-GovernmentOrganisation

NIRO NationalIntegrationandReconciliation&OfficialLanguages

NPC NorthernProvincialCouncil

OECD-DAC OrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment

OHCHR OfficeoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforHumanRights

ONUR OfficeforNationalUnityandReconciliation

PBF PeacebuildingFund

PBSO PeacebuildingSupportOffice

PC ProvincialCouncil

PCA PeacebuildingContextAssessment

PPP PeacebuildingPriorityPlan

RDS RuralDevelopmentSociety

RMS RevenueManagementSystems

RTI RighttoInformation

SCRM SecretariatforCoordinationofReconciliationMechanism

TOR TermsofReference

UNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme

UNHRC UnitedNationsHumanRightsCouncil

UNPBF UnitedNationsPeacebuildingFund

UNRCO UnitedNationsResidentCoordinator’sOffice

UNV UnitedNationsVolunteers

WRDS Women’sRuralDevelopmentSociety

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TableofContents

Acronyms.................................................................................................................................2

ListofAnnexures......................................................................................................................4

ExecutiveSummary..................................................................................................................5

1. Introduction.....................................................................................................................8

1.1ContextAnalysis.............................................................................................................8

1.2UNResolutionHR30/1.................................................................................................10

1.3ThePeacebuildingPriorityPlan....................................................................................10

1.4 ScopeoftheStudy..................................................................................................13

2. MethodologicalApproach..............................................................................................14

2.1 RealistImpactEvaluation.......................................................................................14

2.2 OECD-DACAssessment(Relevance,EffectivenessEfficiency,GenderEquality)....16

2.3 LessonsLearned:UnderstandingImpactandSustainability..................................16

2.4 DataCollectionandSampling.................................................................................17

2.5 Limitations..............................................................................................................17

3. KeyFindingsandLessonsLearned.................................................................................19

3.1 Project1:SupporttotheSriLankaPBFSecretariatandGovernmentSecretariat

forCoordinationofReconciliationMechanisms....................................................19

3.1.1 ContextRelatedFindings................................................................................19

3.1.2 MechanismRelatedFindings..........................................................................20

3.1.3 OutcomesandLessonsLearned.....................................................................22

3.2 Project2:“SupporttoSriLankatopromotenationalunityandreconciliation

effortsthroughtargetedtechnicalassistancetotheONURandtheNorthern

ProvincialAdministrationandEasternProvincialAdministration.”......................27

3.2.1 Output1:KeyMechanismsandProcesses(ElementsofaRoadmap)for

NationalUnityandReconciliationCommencedUndertheGuidanceofthe

ONUR………………………………………………………………………………..………………………………….27

3.2.1.1 ContextRelatedFindings........................................................................27

3.2.1.2 MechanismRelatedFindings..................................................................28

3.2.1.3 OutcomeRelatedFindings.....................................................................32

3.2.1.4 LessonsLearned.....................................................................................33

3.2.2Output2:NorthernProvincialadministrationandEasternProvincial

administrationenabledtoproducestrategicplansandstrengthenrevenue

generationtosupportdevelopmentactivitiesthataddresstheprioritiesofconflict

affectedpeople…...........…………………………………………………………………………………..…37

3.2.2.1 ContextRelatedFindings........................................................................37

3.2.2.2 MechanismRelatedFindings..................................................................43

3.2.2.3 OutcomeRelatedFindings.....................................................................44

3.2.2.4 LessonsLearned.....................................................................................45

4. Recommendations.........................................................................................................47

References..............................................................................................................................50

Annexures..............................................................................................................................51

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ListofAnnexures

Annex01WorkPlan

Annex02 DocumentsRequestedandReceivedforEvaluation

Annex03 ActivityPlan

Annex04ProposedFlowofActivitiesandDataCollectionInstrument

Annex05 ListofInterviewees/ParticipantsattheWorkshop

Annex06 TermsofReference

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ExecutiveSummary

TheGeneva Resolution 30/1 and the change of government in 2015, provided amore conducive

platformforUN’sbroaderengagementwiththenewlyelectedpoliticalleaderswhilethecountryitself

embarked on a wide democratization process. The Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP), that was

formulatedasaresultoftheseconsequentialdevelopmentsconstitutesallprocessesofUN’scurrent

interventions in Sri Lanka. The Immediate Response Fund (IRF) of the UN’s Peacebuilding Fund

(UNPBF), from 2015 to 2016 is an initiative taken in this backdrop. The UN and the Sri Lankan

Governmentpartners,laterworkedonthreeIRFprojects,fundedbythePBF.One,ledbyOfficeofthe

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) was in support of the accountability and

transitional justice process. The second one led by the UNDP and the United Nations Resident

Coordinator’s Office (UNRCO) is referred to herein as - Project 1: “Support to the Sri Lanka PBF

SecretariatandGovernmentSecretariatforCoordinationofReconciliationMechanisms”(SCRM).The

thirdprojectforthis‘lessons’learned’/evaluationexerciseisreferredtoasProject2:“SupporttoSri

Lankatopromotenationalunityandreconciliationeffortsthroughtargetedtechnicalassistanceto

theONURandtheNorthernProvincialadministrationandEasternProvincialAdministration.”Atthe

endofthesecondyearofitsinterventions,theUNDPcommissionedanevaluationofProjects1and

2asalessonslearnedexerciseconcerningongoingpeacebuildingeffortsundertakeninSriLanka.The

Evaluation Team carried out a ‘lessons learned’ exercise informed primarily by a realist impact

evaluation approach to derive reliable evidence in understanding the context and the underlying

mechanismofactionandoutputsfromtheproject,servicesandinterventions.

Detailedfindingshavebeendescribedinthedocument.Keylessonslearnedandrecommendations

emanatingfromthetwoprojectsareasfollows:

ThePeacebuildingPriorityPlanhasbeensuccessfullypositionedasananchoringframeworkfor

donors,developmentpartnersandtheUNcommunity.However,localpartnersexpressawishfor

amorehome-grown‘non-linear’framework.

TheUNPeaceBuildingFund(PBF)andtheSCRMhaveenjoyedagenerallypositiverelationship.

TechnicalassistanceprovidedtotheSCRMthroughtheUNPBFandthePeacebuildingPriorityPlan

(PPP)weregreatlyappreciated.

NeedtoAddressIncreasedPolarizationinSriLanka.Duringtheevaluationexercisecarriedout,

respondentssharedtheirobservationonhowSriLankaismorepolarizedthanitwasin2015.This

instability affects the positioning of mechanisms such as Secretariat for Coordinating

ReconciliationMechanisms(SCRM)andtheOfficeforNationalUnityandReconciliation(ONUR),

that are embedded within government agencies. It was also observed that much of the

peacebuildingandreconciliationworkfocusedon‘quickwin’initiativesandnotasresilientlong-

term interventions. Predisposition to economic development initiatives resulted in reduced

emphasisonmeetingrights-basedchallenges.Inthislight,itisimperativethattherebeafocused

anddecisive shift fromeconomicdevelopment toaddressing the increasedpolarization in the

country.TheUNPBFandthePPParewellpositionedtoencouragenationalactorstoaddressthese

challenges.

Alongertermstudytoassesstheeffectivenessofthetwomechanisms(SCRMandONUR)atthe

nationalandlocallevelsisalsorequiredrequired,toensurethattheyhaveapositiveimpactupon

onlong-termpeacebuildingeffortsinthecountry.

Relationship Management becomes crucial for projects working within more sensitive and

politically charged environments. Relationshipmanagement and communication between UN

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staffandstaffattheSCRMandONURrequiresfurtherimprovementinordertoensureeffective

project implementation.Better relationshipmanagementbetweenpartnerswill ensurebetter

deliveryoftheproject.Managingrelationships,buildingrapport,orientatinglocalcounterpartsto

UNwaysofworkingneedstobehandledformallyaswellasinformally.Peopletrustpeople,and

peoplearemorelikelytobesupportiveorcollaboratewithpeopletheycanrelateto.Thishuman

factorneedstobeconsidered inprojects lookingto influencepeopleand institutionalchange.

Therefore,itisrecommendedthatrelationshipbuildingapproachesandtechniquesbeutilisedto

ensureprojectresultsandthattheresponsibilityofprojecteffectivelydeliveredlieswithUNDP.

Local capacity, at the community level, as well as at higher levels of the transitional justice

process,requiresstewardshipandencouragementinordertosetasolidfoundationforthelonger

termgoalofreconciliation.

The UN Volunteers embedded in crucial governmental departments is a successful model

demonstratingpositiveimpact.Thisisrecommendedasausefulstrategytobereplicated.

Genderisacontentiousissue.ItissignificantlydiscussedintheoryintheprodocsandthePPP,

however, inpractice it seems tobedifficult toascertainwhat specificactivitiesaddressed the

genderdimension.Genderprogrammingcanbeenhancedbyensuringthatthegenderdimension

isnotreducedtoequalityofparticipationinworkshopsandprojectactivities.Thereneedstobe

clearerunderstandingaboutgender issuesandhowtheycanbepro-activelybuilt intospecific

programmes.

ProgrammingApproach/depth–WhilekeepinginmindtheboundariesthattheUNorprojects

suchasthesemustoperatewithin,itisrecommendedthatprogrammingtakesresponsibilityto

create lasting change especially where gaps are evident. Also in cases where the context

operationalinasituationposeslimitationstobringingaboutchanges,itisrecommendedthesame

degreeofproblemanalysisbecontinuedintodesigningtheexpectedresultsandhowitwouldbe

measured.Languageusedinthestatementofoutputsandintheresultsframeworkshouldnotbe

elusiveandbemoresubstantive.

LogicalDesignApproach–inretrospectivereflectionthestandardlogicalanalysisisprobablynot

themostappropriateapproachforthetypesofprojectsevaluatedhere,whereresultscannotbe

logicallypredictedowingtothesensitivepoliticalcontextunderwhichtheyoperate.Ifthetheory

ofchangeapproachisbeingused,thenitisrecommendedthatitisusedthroughoutthewhole

projectmanagementcycle,andnotonlyattheconceptual/designstage.PDIAapproachesare

alsorecommendedforstatecraftingworkdealingwithafluidcontextsuchasthisone.

ProactiveMonitoring and RiskManagement – Proactive and continuous project monitoring,

usageofmonitoringfindings,andstrategicadaptivemanagementtoensuretheprojectstayson

trackandiseffectivelydelivered,isfoundtobecriticalinadynamiccontext.

AdaptiveManagement–TheprojectactivitiesasdescribedfortheONURdeviatedsignificantly

fromtheoriginalplanandtheresultsframework.However,giventheinstablepoliticalcontext

withinwhichtheprojectoperated,itisexpectedthatthepredictedactivitypathwaymayneedto

beadjustedandadapteddependingontheavailableentrypointsandopportunities.Therefore,

evaluators feel that the project implementers should focus on the delivery of the originally

plannedresult,morethanafocusontheplannedactivities.Accordingly,insertionofcompletely

different activities, if its strategic enough, should be considered instead of simply redressing

activities.AnexampleofthisistheM&EactivityadjustmentortheWHOpsychosocialadjustment

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madebytheproject.Thesewereminorlevelsofchangetotheoriginalactivity,butnegatedthe

contributiontotheexpectedoutput.

ImplementationModality–InacontextlikeSriLankawheretheUNandNGO’sareconsidered

suspiciously,adirectlyimplementedprojectworkingonpeacebuildingmayhavehadlesstraction.

Also,giventheUN’sapproachofpeacebuildingfundsbeinga‘hinge’,andtheirworkonlybeing

facilitatory,itthenraisesthequestionaboutitsdirectimplementationmodality.

Documentation and Reporting; Inclusive Consultation/Internal Communication and

InformationSharingneedtobestrengthenedfurther.OntheUN’sside,limitedcommunication

isnotedbetweenthepoliticaldecisionmakinglevelandtheworkinglevel,duringthedesignphase

as well as the implementation phase. Improvement of the commitment to keep all parties

adequatelybriefedwherenecessaryisseenascriticalinreducingavoidablemisunderstandingand

improvingeffectivenessandefficiencyofdelivery.Thereportspellsoutrecommendationsonthe

lacunaeaddressedaboveto improveDocumentationandReporting;ReportingandKnowledge

management; ProactiveMonitoring and RiskManagement, and on Inclusive Consultation and

Communication from the UN RCO to the implementing agency and to the stake-holders.

RecommendationsaremadeonDocumentationandRecordkeepingtoo,especiallyinchallenging

programmaticareasofnon-performanceanddiversionofplans.

Introductionofgoodgovernancepracticesrelatingtocentre-peripheryrelationsmustaddress

existingdisconnectsthatdefeatgenuinepowerdevolutionencouraginglingeringdistrustatthe

periphery and their sense of marginalisation. As these grievances are often with an ethnic

undertoneintheNorthandEast,theycarrytheinherentriskofdeepeningfurther.Hence,the

urgencyand thepivotalneed tohandle these issueswitha carefully framedstrategy, (asalso

prudentlyrecognisedintheprojecttheory).Introducingmeaningfulmechanismstostrengthen

provincial and local authorities vis-a-vis the Central government’s authority remains an

imperative.Effortscouldhavebeenmadetoaddresssuchlacunastrategicallyundertherubricof

the specialisedPBF support, insteadof the general capacity developmentwork thathasbeen

carriedoutintheregionalcouncils.Suchstrategicinterventionswouldallowtheseinstitutionsto

function with a certain amount of autonomy strengthening the reconciliation process. Such

conflictsensitiveworkremainsanimperativeintheUNDP’sworkwiththetwoProvincialCouncils.

Nevertheless,thesuccessfulworkinimprovinginstitutionalfunctionsandstrengtheningcapacity

of local government bodies in the region is highly commended and remains important in the

regions recovering from thewar. The regional governments’ success storiesofownershipand

passionateachievementsoughttobesharedandreplicated.

This‘lessonslearned’documentendeavourstoencapsulatethehopesforthefuture,concernsofthe

presentandtheexperiencesofthepast,withtheviewofexpandingtheworthyreconciliationefforts

ofthePBFinterventionsonalargerscale,thatthecountryneeds.Recommendationsspeltoutindetail

in theendof this reportwouldhopefully serveascontextual informationandbecomepartof the

formalarchitectureofprojectsforsuccessfulfutureinterventions.

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1. Introduction

Attheendofasavagecivilwarfoughtforthreedecades,thepopulacesettledintoaquietwithdrawal

fromthewarpsychebut,thethengovernment,immediatelypost-war,foundtherulebydiktatmore

enticingthantherulebydemocraticconsent.Theylostanunprecedentedopportunitytoadoptan

inclusivestrategytobringaboutreconciliationamongstallcommunities,strengthenruleoflawand

affectconstitutionalreformstodevolveandsharepowerbetweenthemajorityandethnicminority

communities especially in the regions of the North and East. However, the commitment and the

intensionoftheincumbentgovernment,toachieveanall-embracingtransitionintoafullyfunctional

democratic process is evident, although painstakingly slow. It still remains a challenge for the

government to become a shining example of embedded democratic institutions that can be the

beacontootheradvanceddemocraciesintheregion.

Ontheotherhand,theUNHumanRightsCouncilresolutiononSriLankatabledatits30thsessionon

the24thofSeptember2015,maintainedthatpeace,securityandprosperitywithjustice,equalityand

freedomprevailforallcitizens.Thisresolutionandtheformationofanationalgovernmentcreateda

rare opening to set the course of the country on a transformative trajectory to address the core

grievancesofvictimsfromallcommunitiesandtackletherootcausesofconflict.Thesettingupof

institutionalmechanismsaspledgedbytheGovernmentofSriLanka,isanticipatedtoeventuallypave

thewaytoameaningfulreconciliation,restorativejusticeandreparationsforthevictims.TheUN’s

intervention in this context, with the resources from the Immediate Response Facility (IRF) and

PeacebuildingFund(PBF),forprimarilytransitionaljusticeandreconciliationrelatedworkobjectives

arewhatthetwoprojectsupforreviewsoughttoaccomplish.

This introductory section of the report provides a brief context analysis of the reconciliation and

transitionaljusticesituationinSriLanka,andintroducescertainkeypiecesandinformativesources

fortheUNPBF’sworkinSriLanka,suchasthePeacebuildingPriorityPlan(PPP)andUNResolutionHR

30/1.

1.1ContextAnalysis

Since the end of thewar in 2009, Sri Lanka has been inching forward towards reconciliation and

transformative justice, a process that involves amultiplicity of actors, voices, and a socio-political

historythatincludesnotonlytheethnicconflict,butinsurrectionsandlargescaledisasterslikethe

2004 Boxing Day Tsunami. As the National Policy on Reconciliation notes, it is a process that

necessarilyinvolvesattentiontoadiversehistoryandanongoingrealityofculturalpluralism.The

PeacebuildingPriorityPlanitselfnotesthat“peacebuildinginSriLankarequiresacomplexandmulti-

levelnationalpoliticalconsensusinordertoachievesustainablepeace”(PPP2016:6).In2018,Sri

Lankaisacountrythatisstillseekinganewidentity,lookinginmanydirectionsforthemeaningofits

existencewithoutadecadeslongwar. Ideologicaldebates,thereby,abound,andthecruxofthese

debates circle the tensions between development and reconciliation. The academic and policy

dialoguesurroundingthepost-warclimateinSriLankais,therefore,quitewide-ranging.Inarecent

talkattheInternationalCentreforEthnicStudies(ICES),Uyangoda(2017)notedtheuniquenessofSri

Lanka’sprocess,callingforahome-grownsolutionthatspeakstoapolitythatdoesnotasyethavea

singularideaofwhatreconciliationshouldmean.Thiranagama(2013)arguesthatreconciliationhas

notbeenlinkedtoethnicreconciliation,butis,instead,aresponsetointernationalpressureregarding

thelackofpoliticalreform.Kottegoda(2012),amongstothers,notesthatpervasivegenderinequity

is another aspect that troubles reconciliation. The terms ‘transitional justice’, ‘durable solutions’,

‘sustainablepeacebuilding’and‘reconciliation’havebeengainingtractionincommonpolicyparlance,

producingawealthofprogramming,government led interventions,andacademicandcivil society

discussion.

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However,asFonseka(2017)notes,theprocessinSriLankahasbeenbesetwithchallengessinceits

inception.Muchofthiscanbeattributedtothefactthattherehasbeen,forsignificantperiodsof

time, a lack of a coherent national strategy for transitional justice and reconciliation. There are a

varietyofdifferenteffortsbeingmade,buthowreconciliationandjusticeinthiscontextisdefined

andarticulatedis,asyet,difficulttoascertain.Indeed,itisthislackofcoherencethatledtheUNPBF

tosupporttheGovernment’seffortstoestablishtheSecretariatfortheCoordinationofReconciliation

Mechanisms,abodythatismeanttoactasacentralisedhubforreconciliationeffortsbetweenvarious

agencies,bothgovernmentalandnon-governmental.

TheoreticalandempiricalengagementonthesubjectofSriLanka’stransitionfromwartopost-war

suggests necessary engagementwith a host of considerations. Amongst them are, understanding

whatreconciliationmeansinagrowingpoliticsofresentment;innon-traditionalpoliticalnarratives;

in unrecognised minority voices; the complexity of identity; and the significant issue of double

alienation,wheretherearemanywho’sparticipationisunrecognisedandmadeinvisible.Colouring

allofthisisthefactthatthereisnoparticularsetofgoalsthatthecountryismovingtowardsinterms

of reconciliation. Several studies (Thaheeretal.2016,Fernando2014)note thatwhilstallparties

agreethatreconciliationisneeded,theydisagreeastoitssubstantivemeaning.Itisalsoimportant

tonoteatthisjuncturethatprogrammaticallyandpolicy-wisethereareaplethoraofformal,informal,

governmental andnon-governmental efforts that are seeking to ‘build’ reconciliation in Sri Lanka.

Therearealsomanyunresolved issueswith regards todiscrimination stemming from thepre-war

years,aswellashighlevelsofmilitarisationthatoccurredduringthewar,andintheimmediatepost-

warperiod.Forexample,anongoingCEPAstudyinJaffnaandTrincomaleeconfirmstheabovetrends

andparticularlyhighlightcastebaseddiscrimination,especiallyinaccesstoeducation,lackofsafety,

lackofemploymentopportunities forwomen-headedhouseholdsaspressing issues.At thepolicy

level,theOfficeofMissingPersons,isonlynowbeginningtooperationalise,andhasfacedaseriesof

politicalchallenges.Manyactivistsandfamiliesofthemissingandthedisappearedarestillengaging

in sit-ins and long-termprotests tonote their dissatisfactionwith the slownessof the transitional

justicemechanism.

Thereareperceptionsofpoliticalandeconomicpowerandpatronisation,assessedthroughinterviews

andnarrativesoflivedexperience,forthisevaluationandotherstudiesatCEPA,thatarealsolimiting

toreconciliation. There isalsothechallengeoftrust in institutions, leadershipandfellowcitizens,

offeringacriticalreflectionofthelevelstowhichindividualsandgroupsfeelexcludedfromorincluded

inthesocial,economicandpoliticalsystem.

Academicsandpolicyanalyststypicallybreakthepost-warperiodintotwophases.

The immediate post-war period: The first time period, 2009-2014, is seen as overwhelmingly

characterisedbyadefensiveapproachtotransitionaljusticeattheinternationallevelandalackof

commitmenttotransformativejusticeatthedomesticlevel(Uyangoda2010,Goodhand2013).Asthe

UNPeacebuildingPriorityPlannotes,althoughthe2009-2014periodcontainedmeasuressuchasthe

Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) and the Presidential Commission to

InvestigateMissingPersons,manyoftheseinitiativesfellshortofmeetingtheneedsandexpectations

of the affected. Neither did these efforts adhere to international standards of peacebuilding and

conflicttransformation(PPP2016:5).Theoverwhelmingfocusoneconomicdevelopmentatthistime

didlittletoaddressstructuralgrievances,andtheimmediatepost-warperiodisseenasoneof‘missed

opportunity’ (ibid). This is not only related to the economy, but also to the national policy on

languages,secondaryandtertiaryeducation,newandre-emergentsocialconflicts,andtheeffectof

along-termlackofacohesivetransitionaljusticeprocess,casesofthemissingandthedisappeared,

andthewidespreadmilitarisationthatmanifestedintheimmediateaftermathofthewar.Ideological

debates also abound, and the crux of these debates circle the tensions between economic

developmentandreconciliation(Ranawana2017).

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Thepost-2015period: Inthepost-2015oryahapalanayaperiod,thegovernmentisseenasbeing

comparativelyprogressivewithregardtoitscommitmenttotransitionaljusticeandhumanrightsat

the international level (Samaratne2017). The adventof the Sirisena-Wickremasinghe government

suggested a ‘window of opportunity’ for peacebuilding, and since, many different efforts and

initiativeshavetakenonnewlifeinthepost-2015period.

ItiswithintheimmediateadventoftheSirisena-WickremasinghegovernmentthatthePeacebuilding

SupportOffice(PBSO)committedtoprovideflexibleandstrategicPeacebuildingFunding(PBF)that

wouldsupportthegovernment’speacebuildingpriorityplan(PPP).ThePPPismeanttoserveasthe

framework for a “coordinated Government, UN and development partners’ response to secure

durablepeaceinSriLanka”(PPP2016:10).Anothersignificantinfluenceforthedevelopmentofthe

nationalandgovernment ledmechanismshasalsobeentheresultsoftheConsultativeTaskForce

(CTF)process.AlthoughtheCTF is separate to thePPPandthePeacebuildingContextAssessment

(PCA)process,ithasalsofedinsignificantlytothe‘on-the-ground’workdonebytheSecretariatfor

CoordinationofReconciliationMechanism(SCRM)andtheOfficeofNationalUnityandReconciliation

(ONUR). TheCTFwas awide ranging consultationwith victims/civil societyon Transitional Justice

processes and mechanisms. It recommended the following four bodies be set up: The Office of

Reparations, The Office of Missing Persons, Accountability Mechanisms, and a Truth and

ReconciliationCommission.

1.2UNResolutionHR30/1

UNResolutionHR30/1wasadoptedby thehumanrightscouncil inOctober2015withaviewto

promotereconciliation,humanrightsandaccountabilityinSriLanka.Itrecognisesandpromotesthe

Sri Lankan government’s September 2015 pledge to work toward a “meaningful reconciliation,

strengthening democratic institutions, good governance, the rule of law, and confidence building

amongcommunitiesaffectedbyconflictformanyyears”(PPP2016:12).Theprocessacknowledged

thefactthatdealingwiththepastandestablishinganewhumanrightscultureisanenormoustask

and that the GoSL, together with the guidance and support of the UN would work together to

strategicallymove forwardwithanationallyownedandvictim-centricprocess that addressed the

grievances of victims, allegations of systematic violations of international human rights and

internationalhumanitarianlawallthewhileadvancingaccountabilityandreconciliation.(PPP2016:

15). Theresolutionemphasisesthe importanceofacomprehensiveapproachtodealingwiththe

past,incorporatingthefullrangeofjudicialandnon-judicialmeasures,including,interalia,individualprosecutions,reparations,truth-seekingandinstitutionalreform.Theresolutionalsonotedtheneed

forconsultativeandparticipatorymethodsthatincludetheviewsofallrelevantstakeholdersinthe

transitionaljusticeprocess.

1.3ThePeacebuildingPriorityPlan

ThePeacebuildingPriorityPlanwasdesignedinordertoguidethewiderandlonger-termsupportfor

peacebuilding, and is a framework that was developed by United Nations Sri Lanka and the

GovernmentofSriLanka.Thisplanreflectsalsothecloseconsultationthatwasconductedwithcivil

societyandlocalandinternationaldevelopmentpartners.ThePPPisinformedbythePeacebuilding

ContextAssessment(PCA)of2016andisintendedtobeacommonframework,throughwhichtheUN

andotherdevelopmentpartnerscanaligntheirsupporttowardsnationallyidentifiedpriorities,and

insodoingensureacoordinatedapproachtopeacebuildingandreconciliationinthecountry.Keyto

the larger frameworkofthePPP is thePCA’sunderstandingthatSriLankarequiresacomplexand

multi-levelnationalpoliticalconsensusinorderforpeacebuildingandreconciliationtomanifestand

besustainable.Thereisthen,anecessityforconsensusbuildingacrosstheethnicdivideaswellasat

‘elite’intra-ethnicorcross-partylevel(betweenSinhalesepoliticalparties,andbetweenTamilpolitical

11

leadership).Such‘horizontalconsensus’willneedtobebuttressedby‘verticalconsensus’,orsupport

for peacebuilding at the grassroots level, particularly the Sinhalese, without which it will ‘lack

legitimacyandriskbeingfragile’(ibid).ThePPPtherebyidentifiedaneedfortransformativereform

ofpoliticalculture.

Assuch,thePCAandthePPParecloselyattunedtogovernancereformasameansthroughwhichto

effect reconciliation. Such reform is seen to bedone throughbuilding the capacity of the various

mechanismsandorganisationsatlocalandnationallevelsofgovernment.Indeed,capacitybuilding

appears as a key element for UN assistance to the Government of Sri Lanka in affecting its

reconciliation plan. There are three strategic priorities articulated here. These are seen as vital

confidencebuildinginterventionsandalsocriticalenablersfordurablesolutions.

A) ThefirstistechnicalsupporttotheGovernmenttooperationalisethenewNationalPolicyon

DurableSolutionsforConflictAffectedDisplacement.ThepolicyarticulatestheGovernment’s

commitmenttore-buildthelivesofconflict-affectedfamiliesusingarights-basedapproach,

and provides direction for all relevant stakeholders towork collectively and coherently in

supportofresettlementprocesses.

B) Thesecondpriorityisinsupportofaccesstoland,andincludeshighlyfocusedandtargeted

supportforsurveyingthathasthepotentialtocatalysetheresolutionofuptoapproximately

40,000casesoverathree-yearperiod.Italsoincludesprovisionoflegalaidtoassistthemost

vulnerablefamilies,especiallythoseheadedbywomen,toresolveoftencomplexlegaland

documentationissues.

C) Thethirdfocusforislivelihoods.Withoutlivelihoodoptionsmanyfamiliesfindthemselvesin

a highly precarious situation in the newly released areas, or are forced to postpone their

return,andthusfurtherdelaygettingtheirlivesbackontrackandrealisingthedividendsof

peace.The focuson livelihoods linksdirectly to theproblemof indebtedness that isbeing

understoodbythePPP,aswellasactorsinthegovernmentandattheSCRMandONURasa

‘hotspot’foremergentconflict.“Nexttosecurity,socialandeconomicissuesareparamount,

inparticularaccesstolandandhousing,alackofsustainablelivelihoods,andindebtedness.”

(PPP2016:6).

Thereby, economic development, governance reform and trust restoration are understood as key

components of peacebuilding. The ‘restorative framework’ described by the PCA and the PPP

identifiesfourtargetgroupsinparticularforeconomicupliftment.Theyare:

• peopleofallcommunitieswhohavesufferedinthemaintheatreofwar;

• soldiersandfamiliesofsoldiers;

• victimsofLTTEatrocitiesoutsidethetheatreofwar;

• andthosedisplacedfromtheirhomesandforcedoutsidethetheatreofwar.

ThePPPalsonotestheneedforincludingmorewomenatdecisionmakinglevelsingovernanceand

policymaking processes. It highlights the need to, “include leveraging women’s capacities and

contributions, and developing strategies for inclusion which recognise their roles, and diverse

experiencesofconflict”as“withoutwomen’sengagementatthestagesofpeaceconsolidation,the

dangersofrelapsearegreatlyheightened”(PPP2016:16).

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Assuch,thePPPhasfouroverarchingoutcomes:

1.TransitionalJusticeimplementedtohelpreconcileandhealSriLankansociety;

2.SriLankansocietywithpeacefulco-existenceandasenseofbelonging;

3.AllSriLankanpeoplefeelsafe,andtrusttheGovernmenttoeffectively,efficiently,equitablyand

transparentlyrespondtotheirneeds;

4.Peopledisplacedbytheconflict(IDPs,IDPreturneesandrefugeereturnees)haveacoregrievance

addressedthroughaccesstolandandrebuildingoftheirlives.

Theprimaryfocusforconflicttransformation,drawingfromthePeacebuildingPriorityPlan(PPP),is

on Four Pillars: Transitional Justice, Reconciliation, Good Governance and Resettlement Durable

Solutions. Guiding this process then, are the following principles, as articulated in the

Peacebuilding Priority Plan. These principles are drawn up to be consistent and

supplementarytotheaccountability/transitionaljusticeagenda:

§ Victimcentric:reconciliationandtransitional justiceapproacheswillallaimatdealingwith

the consequences of the inter-ethnic conflict and legacies of systematic human rights

violationsandabusessoastoprovidehealingandredressforallvictims;

§ Nationalownership:thedesignandimplementationofboththereconciliationandtransitional

justice agenda is first and foremost an exercise for Sri Lankans, and has to be led by Sri

Lankans;

§ Holistic, comprehensive approach: the multidimensional nature of the transitional justice

agenda requires careful identification of linkages between interdependent and mutually

reinforcingprocesses,suchasjusticeandsecuritysectorreformsanddemocraticgovernance;

§ Coordinated: a strategic, coordinated and sequenced approach ensures that the limited

resourcesandcapacitiesareutilisedmosteffectivelyandhelpsustainlong-termmultilateral

and bilateral support to Sri Lanka’s transitional justice agenda, with the United Nations

CountryTeamplayingacentralrole;

§ CivilSociety:engagementwithcivilsocietywillbemainstreamedacrossthefourpillarsofthe

PPP, with civil society taking on an important role during the project development,

implementation and monitoring stages. The PPP will also include dedicated support for

strengtheningtheroleofcivilsocietyandvolunteerisminpeacebuilding;

§ Nationalfocus:ThePPPwilladoptanevidencebasedapproachtocoveringdifferentpartsof

thecountry,dependingontheissue;

§ Gendersensitive:throughoutallstages,itisimportanttorecognisethecriticalroleofwomen,

especiallythosefrommarginalisedcommunities,aswellasthespecificviolationstheyhave

sufferedandtheirspecificneedsofredress;

§ Periodicallyreviewed:it isessentialtoregularlyreflecttheevolvingSriLankancontextand

adoptmechanismsthatarecapableofrespondingtochangeandofproposingappropriate

adjustmentstoprioritiesandactivities;

§ ContributetoSustainableDevelopmentGoal(SDG)16onjustice,peaceandstronginstitutions

andSDG5ongenderequality:TheinitiativessupportedunderthePPPwillbeincludedina

widerframeworkofsupporttotheSDGs,andwillseektocoordinatewithother initiatives

contributingtothesamegoals.(PPP2016:15-16).

ThesupportthattheUNprovidestotheGovernmentofSriLankaisinfluencedbytheprioritiesand

overarching outcomes of the PPP and is, therefore intended to provide technical assistance and

capacitydevelopmentsupport,throughtheUNsystem,toidentifiedinstitutionsandprocessesand,

assuch,toreinforcepressurepointsthataddressobstaclestolong-termpeaceandreconciliationas

wellassustainingthecountryonthepathtosocialtransformation.

Asapartofthisoverallpeacebuildingplan,theUNPBFintervenedtooffersupporttotwoparticular

conflicttransformationandtransitionaljusticemechanisms.Theyare:

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a. TheOfficeforNationalUnityandReconciliation(ONUR),comesundertheagendafor‘non-

recurrence’, functions as a catalyst and aims towards long–term systematic change and

buildingprogrammaticagendasforpeace.TheprogrammaticaimsoftheONURincludeart

and culture, conflict transformation, interfaith dialogue, university engagement, livelihood

support, community development, public outreach, women for reconciliation and

psychosocialsupport.TheONUR’sprogrammesaremeanttobedesignedandimplemented

inacollaborativeprocessbetweenthegovernmentandaffectedcommunities.

b. The Secretariat for Coordinating Reconciliation Mechanisms (SCRM) is tasked with the

design,creationandcoordinationofmechanismstoachievetruth, justice,reparationsand

non-recurrence.TheSecretariatcomesunderthePrimeMinister'sOffice,andwasformedon

18December2015.TheSCRMisalsomeanttoliaiseandworkwithdevelopmentpartners,

UNagencies,relevantministriesandreconciliationarmssuchastheONURtoensurethatthe

fabricforTransitionalJusticemechanismspercolatethroughoutdifferenteffortsforeconomic

development and reconciliation in Sri Lanka. The Offices for the Missing Persons, the

Accountability Mechanisms and the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions fall under the

purviewofthisunit.

In2018, theUNdecided tocommissionan independent third-party lesson learnedexerciseof the

Projects’ performance, that would provide evidence of the project’s relevance, efficiency,

effectiveness,impactandsustainabilityinachievingitsobjectives.ThisalsofulfilsthePBF’smandate

of conducting periodic review of the outcomes and outputs of the UNPBF. Following a proposal

process,theCentreforPovertyAnalysis(CEPA)wonabidtoperformthisevaluationprocess. The

nextsectionsdetailthemethodology,analytical frameworkandotherparticularsoftheevaluation

thatCEPAdeployedincollatingthislessonslearneddocument.

1.4 ScopeoftheStudy

In July2018, theUNcommissionedan independent third-party lesson learnedexerciseof the two

peacebuilding projectsmentioned above that would provide evidence of the project’s relevance,

efficiency,effectiveness,impactandsustainabilityinachievingitsobjectives.ThisalsofulfilsthePBF’s

mandateofconductingperiodicreviewoftheoutcomesandoutputsoftheUNPBF.Theseprojects

wereimplementedbytheUNDPandincludedtheinstitutionalestablishmentoftheSecretariatfor

CoordinationofReconciliationMechanisms(SCRM),specialisedtechnicalassistancetotheOfficeof

National Unity and Reconciliation (ONUR), and each of the Northern and Eastern provincial

administrations. These projects were set up to support the State to ensure progress of its

peacebuildingandreformsagendainthecountry.

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2. MethodologicalApproach

Peacebuildingisacomplexandmultifacetedprocessofchange,andunderstandingtheeffectiveness

andsustainabilityofsuchworkinvolvesavarietyoftoolsofinquiry,aswellasabuilt-inframework

thatallowsforreflectivepractice.Reflectingonpeacebuildingandreconciliationactivitiesrequiresan

understandingofthecontextwithinwhichtheactivitieswereundertaken.Inspacesinwhichthere

aredeep-rootedandlong-standingconflictssuchasinSriLanka,violencecanunexpectedlyspiralout,

andtherefore,trustandpartnershipbuildingcantakesignificantamountsoftime.Whatthisrequires

oftheevaluativeprocessisthebuildingofknowledge,andalsotheunderstandingandimprovement

of practice through structured reflection and feedback. Therefore, embedded into the proposed

methodologyisathemeofongoingandcontinuedreflection,wheretheresearchtoolwillguidethe

evaluatorstoaskquestionssuchas‘howarefactorsconnectedandinterrelated?Whatarethevisible

and invisible factors, in this context?’ Such a reflective process also brings with it the additional

advantageofamethodthatisimplicitlyattunedtothevarietyofsocialfactors(ethnicity,class,caste,

religionandgender)affectingtheprocessofpeacebuilding.

To be able to evaluate the programmatic outcomes and the outputs referred to in Project 1 and

Project 2, the exercisedeployed a combinationof approaches specific for evaluating them. These

evaluationswereinformedbytheDevelopmentandCooperationDirectorateoftheOrganisationfor

EconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECDDACapproach)toevaluate“relevance,”“efficiency”

“effectiveness”oftheprojectsmentionedintheTOR.However,themainapproachbeingadopted

fortheevaluationoftheproject’soutputswas,theRealistImpactEvaluationmethodfromacritical

realiststandpoint,(abranchofthe‘TheoryofChange’approach).Thishelpedcarryoutameaningful

evaluationofthe“impact”and“sustainability”aspectsoftheidentifiedprojects,wheredeployingthe

OECDDACapproachalonewasnothelpfultoappraisetheassumptionsandtheoriesbehindthese

aspects.Thetheoryunderlyingtheinterventionswaslocatedatthecentreoftheevaluationexercise

here.However,asWesthrop(2014)elucidates,theRealistImpactEvaluation“focusesoninterventionswhicharehardertoevaluatebecauseoftheirdiversityandcomplexityorwheretraditional impactevaluationapproachesmaynotbe feasible,with thebroaderaimof identifying lessonswithwiderapplicationpotential”.Thisapproachwasalso importanttoexplainwhyprojects failorsucceed in

differentsettingsbycomparingthe‘beforeandafter’effectsofinterventionsthroughthisapproach.

Eg:Ithelpedunderstand‘whatwerethecircumstancesinwhichtheprojectinterventionsworked?

Whatwere theunderlyingmechanisms thatbuilt trust,orestablishedaccess to servicesafter the

projectintervention?’

2.1 RealistImpactEvaluation

TheRealist ImpactEvaluationstrategy, isaspecificbranchofthe ‘theoryofchange’approachand

increasesthespecificityofourunderstandingofhowaprojectaccomplisheschange.Itintensifiesthe

understanding of a project’s ‘context’ that influences programme ‘mechanism’; and expands the

precisenessofforecastingproject‘outcomes’.This‘realisticexplanatorytriad’willhelpopenthe‘black

box’(the‘space’betweentheactualprojectinputsandtheeventualresult)ofprojectmechanism.

InaRealistEvaluationwhat isrevealedareelementsofacontextthatare,exceedingly important.

Suchknowledgeneedstobeimpartedandthoseelementsoughttobeincorporatedaspartofthe

formalarchitectureorbemadetheblueprintoftheprogrammeforfutureinterventions.Thiscould

especially include those elements thatwere under-theorized andwere not realised as imperative

partsofthecontextthathelpmakeadifference.

This method is based on the assumption that regularities in social actions are brought about by

underlying mechanisms that spring from people’s reasoning, and the resources they are able to

summoninaparticularcontextforthoseactions(ortheirprojectinterventions).Hence,anevaluation

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ofsuchprogrammesandprojectsneedstoinvolvethetaskoftestingtheunderpinnedtheoriesand

especiallythosetheorieswhichweremanifestlyappliedaswellastheoveralllessonslearned.

I. Context

First,theteamtriedtounderstandtheimpactoftheprojectsbyestablishingtheprogrammecontext.

Contextualconditionsunderwhichprojectsareimplementedarecritical,criticalsuchasthechange

of Government, the Human Rights Resolution (30/1) that was brought against Sri Lanka, etc.

Sometimes,there isnoawarenessoftheusageofpre-existingresourcesforthefunctioningaswe

onlyseethetipoftheiceberg.Hence,onehastotheorisethoseresourcesinapropermannerfrom

thecontext.Itwouldthenalsobehelpfultoscaleuptheprojectinacontextwherethoseresources

exist compared to another contextwhere the project failed. Implementers and evaluatorswould

prefertoknowwhyitfailedasonedoesnothaveanyreasontoexplainwhysomethingfailed.Thisis

why,itbecomesimperativetotheorisetheimpactofcontextandunderstandwhatisunder-theorised

withregardstoresources,inthecontextthatwouldhelpexplaintheoutcomebetter.

This is a lessons learnt exercise to understand that there are explicit/implicit conditions that

contribute towards either making or breaking “context-mechanism” association. Hence, the

evaluators, armed with appropriate tools attempted to elicit knowledge of such explicit/implicit

contextsthathelpedthemechanismtoproducepositive,negativeorneutraloutcomes.Theplanning

oftheevaluationofsuchprojectsisanattempttoelicitknowledgetoidentify‘whatworks’for‘whom’

in ‘what context’ and in ‘what respects?’ Contexts also influence the ways in which intended

beneficiaries respond to government or non-government projects. Variations within target

populationscaninfluencewhichmechanismsoperate(gender,class,caster,ethno-religiousculture

etc).“Arealistevaluationtherefore,hypothesiswhichfeaturesofcontextarelikelytoaffect‘how’,

and for ‘whom’, a project is expected towork and collects data about those features of context”

(Westhorp2014:7).Asthenextstep,itsetsofftoseekfordataandanalyticstrategiestoexamine

theinteractionbetweencontextandmechanism.

II. Mechanism

Understanding projectmechanisms is critical in understanding how projectswork. Understanding

how subjects interpret and act upon the intervention stratagem is known as the programme

‘mechanism’ and it is the pivot around which realist research revolves (Pawson et al., 2004).

Mechanisms can be intended or unintended (and ought not to be confused with project

strategies/resources/activities). Amidst other levels of concepts, the realist evaluation helps

understandandinterpretthe‘main’mechanismsgeneratingthemainpatternsofoutcomes.

Forthispurpose,theOECD-DACmethodwasusedasatooltostrengthentheprocessofknowledge

collection by probing deeper to elicit project-related information with regards to: relevance,

effectiveness and efficiency where this approach has proven to be successful in many other

evaluationsinthepast.Theevaluationincludedquestionssuchasi.e.whatmechanismsareneeded

fortheprogrammetowork?Didtheprogrammeincorporateknowledgeofsuchmechanismsinits

design?

III. Outcome(CMO-Configuration)

TheCMO-Configurationimpartsacertainaspectofknowledgethatwouldhelp1buildarepositoryof

success and failures, providing policymakers with theories and typologies of successful ‘context-

mechanism-outcome’configurationsorpatternsknownasCMO,bywayofaLessonsLearntExercise

forthispurpose.Thisapproacharticulatesassumptionsthatunderpinthework;uncoversdiffering

1Thiswouldalsohelpanalyse‘ImpactandSustainability’inthelexiconoftheOCED-DACapproach.

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viewsontheoriesofchange;theprinciplefactorsinfluencingtheachievementornon-achievements

of the project outputs, and most importantly helps find answers to the question “why”? The

applicationof thisevaluationmethodwouldhelpdistinguish the flawsand strengthof the theory

(open the black box) behind the implementation. It also helps identify, articulate and explain the

transformationprocess.

Theexerciselookedintopositiveandnegative,primaryandsecondary,directlyorindirectly,intended

orunintendedlong-termeffectsproducedbytheinterventions.Thus,thetheoriesofchangeapproach

withthecriticalrealistevaluationmethodinparticularwasappliedforgainingdeeperinsightsintoits

positiveornegativeimpactandtheirintendedoutcomes,impactandsustainability.

TheFlowofActivitiesandDataCollectionInstrument(Annex04),providesthedetailsofthequestions

askedundereachoftheabovecategoryfromrelevantstakeholdersoftheproject.

2.2 OECD-DACAssessment(Relevance,EffectivenessEfficiency,GenderEquality)

TheevaluationtookintoconsiderationanappraisaloftheResultsFrameworkoftheProjectdeveloped

for this exercise. The logical linkwith the activities and resultswere also assessed keeping to the

requirementsofthebeneficiariesandthelocaldevelopmentneeds.TheOECDDACevaluationcriteria

wasmostlyhelpfultoevaluaterelevanceandeffectiveness,efficiency.

• Relevance:Theevaluationattemptedtounderstandtheextenttowhichtheobjectivesofthe

interventionareconsistentwithbeneficiaries’requirements,countryneeds,globalpriorities

andpartners’anddonors’policies.Whathasbeendone?Weretherightthingsdone?What

istherelevanceorsignificanceoftheinterventionregardinglocalandnationalrequirements

andpriorities?

• Effectiveness: The extent to which the intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are

expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance will be analysed

throughthiscomponent.Theendeavoredtounderstandtheextenttowhichanintervention

hasattained,orisexpectedtoattain,itsmajorrelevantobjectivesefficientlyinasustainable

manner andwith a positive institutional developmental impact.Howproportional are the

resultsoftheprojectcomparedtotheobjectivesplanned?

• Efficiency:Theexercisehelpedestablishameasureofhoweconomicallyresources/ inputs

(funds, expertise, time, etc.) converted to results. Are the objectives achieved in a cost-

efficientmannerbythedevelopmentintervention?Wasitvalueformoney?Howbigisthe

efficiencyorutilisationratiooftheutilisedresources?

• GenderEquality:Theexercisealsotriedtounderstandwhethergenderequalitywasexplicitly

promoted through specific measures such as whether it a) reduced social, economic or

political power inequalities betweenwomen andmen; or ensured thatwomen benefited

equally with men from the activity, or were compensated for past discrimination; or b)

developed or strengthened gender equality or anti-discrimination policies or institution

systems. The exercise approached this aspect by analysing gender inequalities through

interventionsundertakenandasanintegralpartofagencies’standardprocedures.

2.3 LessonsLearned:UnderstandingImpactandSustainability

Theoverarchingaimofthisexerciseistosharelessonslearnedintheevaluationprocessofthegiven

projects,withtheUNPBF.The‘lessonslearned’exerciseinvolvedthepresentationofthesystematic

discoveryofhowcircumstantial influencesstimulatetheconnectionbetweenthe interventionand

the finaloutcome.Theteamendeavouredto learn ‘how’ theproject implementationscenariohas

actually taken place with a combination of approaches: i.e. Realist Impact Evaluation and some

aspectsoftheOCED-DACapproachtosupplementknowledgerelatedtomechanismsatwork.Italso

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endeavoredtounearththecausalpathleadingtooutcomes;unearthingthecontextualdeterminants;

comparecontexts;theorisemechanism;scopeouttheoutcomesandpresentthemaslessonslearnt.

The Realist Impact Evaluation findings are also helpful to informpolicy, practice and assist in the

effectivetailoringoffutureprogrammes/projectsofcertainrealistcontexts.Theknowledgetheyhelp

elicitonwhichprogrammesworkedunderwhatcontextand‘how’,willhelpmakerecommendations

onhowtorefinepoliciesandprojectsto improvetheireffectiveness,their impacts,andalsomore

importantlyinforminterventionsonhowtoadaptprojectstonewcontextsinfutureinterventions.

(PleaseseeAnnex4forProposedFlowofActivitiesandDataCollectionInstrument)

2.4 DataCollectionandSampling

Inordertofindresponsestothecomplexsetofquestionsundereachoftheaforementionedaspects

to be evaluated (i.e. relevance, effectiveness, efficiency etc.), qualitative and limited secondary

quantitativeworkwerecarriedout.Twostrategieswereusedfordatacollectiontosolicitknowledge

about mechanisms. Firstly, data from existing project documents at the organisational level was

utilisedtounderstandwhytheprojectwasexpectedtoworkdifferentlyforthestakeholdersidentified

intheprojecttheory.Forexample,asegregatedunderstandingofwhythisprojectwasexpectedto

workfortheNorthernandEasternProvincesdifferentlyfromtherestofthecountryasitwasoriginally

designedfortheregionsunderthePBF.

Secondly,throughkeystakeholderinterviewsinColomboandtheNorthernProvinceandthrougha

workshop with stakeholders in the Eastern Province, the team was able to reason if values and

prioritieschangedasaresultoftheprojectandtheresourcesprovidedthroughthe interventions.

Thiswasanintraprogrammaticexercisewithcomparisonsonprogramme-theoryconstructs.

Thequalitativemethodformedtheheartoftheexercisegiventheteamofresearcherswithrelevant

experienceinvolvedinthisprocess,toconductkeystakeholderinterviewsinColomboandtheregions

includingaworkshopwithstakeholdersintheEasternProvince.However,asforthequantitativedata-

collection,giventhetimeconstraints,thedatawassolicitedfromsecondarysourcesforanalysisof

opinionpollsandpilotstudies,basedonpreviousnationalpeaceandreconciliationworkcarriedout

intherelevantareas.

2.5 Limitations

Somelimitationsthattheprojectexperiencedwererelatedtomeetingtherelevantindividualswho

wereinvolvedintheprojectduringitsdesignandthereafterintheimplementationphase.Fromthe

initial review of documents, the team understood that there were changes in staff both at UN

RCO/UNDP as well as with Government partners i.e. the ONUR. However, the teamwas able to

interviewmostoftherelevantindividualstounderstandthecontext,aswellasthereasoningbehind

certain keydecisions and certainmechanisms thatwere adoptedormodified. The teammadeall

efforts to interviewthesekeyofficials togainanunderstandingof thebiggerpictureaswellas to

ascertain the C-M-O aspects of lessons that could be learnt and applied in future interventions.

Relevanttothisistheveryshorttimeframeforthisassignment,whichneedstoinactualfactevaluate

thelessonsofthreeseparateminiprojects.Therefore,thetimeframeinwhichtoidentify,contact

and obtain appointments for four separate sets of interviewswas also limited, especiallywhen it

comestomeetingsintheEastaswellastheNorth.Theabsenceofdocumentstoprovidecomplete

informationonsomeofthekeyaspects/turnofeventsintheprojectswasanotherchallengethatthe

teamfaced.Theyhowever,intensifiedtheneedtoholdmorestakeholderinterviewsthananticipated.

Hence, the teamcarriedoutasmanystakeholder interviewsaspossible toobtain information to

bridge the gap. As a result, the team required additional work days for the completion of data

collectionandanalyses.Oneoftheotherlimitationsisrelatedtohowknowledgeanddecisionmaking

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hasbeeninstitutionalizedaswellashowitcanbedocumented.Commentsthatwerereceivedonthe

report,post-validationmeetinghavebeenincorporatedinthisversiontothebestoftheteam’sability.

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3. KeyFindingsandLessonsLearned

3.1 Project1:SupporttotheSriLankaPBFSecretariatandGovernmentSecretariatfor

CoordinationofReconciliationMechanisms

AlthoughtheProject1comprises2Outcomes,thescopeoftheassignmentistoconductthelessons

learntexerciseofOutcome1ofthisproject,whichis:

Outcome1–UnitedNationsPeacebuildingSupportinSriLankaisstrategicallypositionedtosupport

nationalpriorities,arrivedatthroughafullyconsultativeandinclusiveprocess,andiseffectively

deliveredinacoordinatedandharmonisedmanner

• Output 1 – Peacebuilding Priority Plan developed andmechanism established to support

coordinatedprojectdevelopmentandimplementation.

• Output2–EffectiveimplementationoftheUN’sPeacebuildinginitiatives,withattentiontocoordination,evidencebasedinterventionsandhigh-impactresults.

• Output3–SecretariatforCoordinatingtheReconciliationMechanismsestablishedwithinthe

PrimeMinister’sOfficetoensurecoordinatedandcoherentGovernmentstrategytoprogress

reconciliationanddevelopandimplementtransitionaljusticemechanisms.

3.1.1 ContextRelatedFindings

a. WideconsultationinthearchitectureofthePPP:AtthedesignstageofthePeacebuilding

PriorityPlan,therewaswideconsultation,especiallythroughengagementwithgovernment

andcivilsocietyactorsatboththenationalandprovinciallevel.

b. DynamicnatureofthePPP:Thedynamismofrefocussingandopeningupthedocumentto

newcontextualrealitiesisappreciatedbythisevaluativereport.WhenthePPPwasinitially

designedandpulledtogether,itwasorientedtowardssecuringtheIRFfundingforSriLanka,

andsuggestedabroadbasedandambitiousdesignforSriLanka’sreconciliationprocess.In

2018,thedocumentasitnowsitsshowsamaturityofprocessandconsultation,notingthe

slowness of the Transitional Justice process overall, and the challenges brought about by

political instability in thecountry. Ithasalso takenonnewdimensions.Thisdidnotentail

changingthedynamicsofthePPP itself,butrefocusingonrapid impact initiatives(suchas

implementationoftri-lingual initiatives),moreeffectiveentrypoints (suchasmappingand

archiving efforts towards transitional justice), as well as non-recurrence initiatives. These

changes were made using results from Peacebuilding Surveys and ongoing stakeholder

consultations.However,itdoesraiseaquerywithregardstowhythefocusismoreattuned

to‘quick,highimpact’ratherthanlong-termhighimpactresults.

c. Polarised 2018 context: In terms of the 2018 context,many respondents highlighted the

problemofincreasingpolarisationandpolitical instability.Respondentsnotedthatpolitical

momentumsince2015hasdecelerated,thatthereisnowa‘paralysis’astoaccountabilityand

doubtsastowhethertherewillbeanytransformativeconstitutionalchangesatall.

d. SCRMprojectdesignandimplementation:SCRMwasestablishedinordertoensurethatthe

reconciliationagendachampionedbythenewgovernmentandtheUNwouldbecoordinated

andtakenforward.AccordingtointerviewswithSCRMstaff,SCRMdrawsguidancefromthe

fourpillarsofthePPPdocument,butreliesalsoonotherongoingconsultationsanditsliaising

withotherreconciliationrelatedgovernmentactorssuchastheMinistryforResettlement,

theONUR,MinistryforNationalIntegrationandReconciliationandsoon.

e. Generally positive relationship betweenUN and the SCRM: The SCRM officials and staff

provide a generally positive review of the UNPBF and the relationship between various

entities.ThePPPandthePBFwerenotedasprovidingsignificantassistancethroughforeign

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experts.RespondentsnotedthatthePBFandrelatedUNstaffareveryhelpfulandarealways

in constant dialoguewith them.Respondents noted their appreciation for assistancewith

conducting situational risk assessments that identify ‘hot spots’ for emergent conflict,

policymakingandgeneralperceptionsurveys.Thisgoodrelationshipisalsocorroboratedby

interviews with UN officials who note that when a request is made by the SCRM, it is

consideredbykeypersonsonthePBFandactionedifandwhenpossible.UNPeacebuilding

officialsalsonotedthatthesuccessoftheSCRMwasalso inthewaysthatUnitedNations

Volunteers(UNVs)hadbeenintroducedtoandabletoascendwithinthesecretariat,staffing

theSCRMinitiativessuchastheMediaUnit.

f. Relationshipmanagement and communication:When asked about the everydayworking

relationshipbetweentheSCRMandtheUN,respondentsfromwithintheSCRMnotedthat

someUNagenciesarechallengingtoworkwith.Assuch,theSCRMhasoftenreliedonthe

officeoftheRCOtolobbyontheSCRM’sbehalfatthePBFlevel.Itwasnotedthatassistance

andwillingness towork fluctuateddependingonwhichUNagencyonewasattempting to

workwith.

g. AcknowledgedlimitationsofSCRM:UNofficialsalsonotethatanacknowledgedlimitation

oftheSCRMisthatitoperateswithinasmallwindowofpoliticalopportunity.TheSCRM’s

mandateisonlyrenewedonayearlybasisduetothefluidnatureofthepoliticalscenarioin

SriLanka.ThiscertainlyraisesconcernswithregardstotheSCRM’slong-termeffectiveness.

h. Initialteethingissues:TheSCRMofficialsalsonotedthatwhiletheUNPBFandSCRMnow

enjoyapositiverelationship,therewereafewteethingissuesintheinitialsetupuntilsuch

timeasallpartieswereclearastowhatcameundertheUN’spurview,andwhatcameunder

theGovernment’spurview.TheSCRMofficialsalsonotedthedifficultiesassociatedwiththeir

ownlimitations.Asanexample,whenthereisaconflationsuchastheeventsinDiganain

March 2018, the SCRM felt constrained as theirmandate did not allow them to create a

preventiverole.TheSCRMwasnotenvisionedtoworkonthesematters,butthereiscapacity

tointerveneandworkwithministriesifthatissodesired.

i. Technicalassistancemorehelpfulthanfinancialassistance,‘gapsofuncertainty’:TheSCRM

and UN officials also noted that it is more difficult to ascertain the SCRM’s actual role,

especiallyincomparisontothemorespecificrolethattheONURoccupies.Assuch,theSCRM

officialsnotedthatthemostusefulassistancethattheyreceivedwastechnicalassistance,as

opposedtofinancialassistance.AstheSCRM’sroleisverydiverse,financialassistanceismore

difficult for the UN to operationalise. UN officials also noted ‘gaps of uncertainty’ and a

certainamountofflexibilitythatisrequiredinthisongoingrelationship.Flexiblefundsfrom

the IRFweredeployed for theSCRMdue to thisambiguity. It shouldbenoted thatSCRM

officialsnotedthattheydidnotreceivesignificantfinancialassistancefromtheUN.

3.1.2 MechanismRelatedFindingsa. Effectiveness of thePPP at national level: Itwas noted that the PPPwas very helpful in

initiatingdialoguewiththemilitaryandbuildingapartnershipwiththem,especiallyinterms

ofworktoanimatemilitaryofficerstowardspeacebuildingwork.Thereissustaineddialogue

betweenthePPPandSCRM,throughtheUNPBF.ThePPPisarticulatedandclearlyexistsasa

spacewherethingsgetanchored.Asanexample, the ideaof ‘victimcentredness’,directly

derivedfromthePPPisseenreflectedinpolicydocumentationattheSCRMlevel,aswellas

ininterviewswithcertainSCRMofficials.Itwasdifficulttoascertainifthiswasthesamefor

theONUR.Thisevaluationwasmethodologically limited inbeingunable tospeaktoother

reconciliationrelatedministries inordertogaugetheeverydayandrollingeffectsthatthe

PPPhaswithinthegovernmentmachinery.

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b. Catalyticfunding:CatalyticfundingfromthePBFhasbeenverygoodattriggeringquick‘high

impact’projectswiththeSriLankangovernment.

c. Effectiveness of the PPP at the donor and UN community level: The PPP is also a key

documentforexternal(foreign)donorsseekingtoprovidedevelopmentaidtoSriLanka.It

hasbeenleveragedbytheRCOasaconduitthroughwhichsuchdonorscanidentifyongoing

needs, as well as formulate criteria for deploying aid. As an example, the marrying of

economicdevelopmentneedstoreconciliationgoalsisacentralthematicinfluencingcurrent

donorpractice,and isat theheartof thePPP.Mappingdoneat the levelofdevelopment

actorsevidencesthatthefourpillarsofthePPPhaveaffectedthelanguageofmanydonors

nowprovidinglivelihoodandeconomicdevelopmentsupporttoSriLanka,ascanbeseenin

ILO,UNagencyandADBprojectsthatareinvestinginthecountry.Incomparisontothepre

2015politicalscenario,itcanbesaidthatthisisakeymilestoneoftheproject.

d. TheSCRMdesignandimplementationutilisesmanysources:SCRMofficialsnotedthatthey

drawfromthefourpillarsofthePPPintheirongoingwork,specificallyinguidingthe‘style

and contours’ of the work that the SCRM engages in. However, other documentation,

consultationandknowledgeproductsarealsonamedasplayingakeypartinmobilisingthe

work that the SCRMdoes. Named specifically in our key interviewswere the transitional

justice documents drawn up by Professor Savitri Goonesekere and Dr Manori

Mutthuwetugama, as well as the results of the consultative task force and the ongoing

dialoguewithcivil society leaders.SCRMofficialsnoted thata fulldayworkshopwithcivil

society leaders, as well as on-going and ad-hoc consultations as being key to planning

initiativesattheSCRM.Asmanyrespondentsnoted,itisdifficulttoidentifywhichdocument

isthe‘keyanchor’fortheSCRM.Someofthis,however,hastodowiththefactthattheactual

role of the SCRM itself took awhile to be defined. It is a strength of the design that the

peacebuildinginitiativesallowfortheSCRMtotakeonsuchautonomy.

e. CriticismofPPPassumptions:Thereiscriticismfromlocaldevelopmentactorsofoneofthe

assumptionswithinthePPP.Thisisinrelationtotheideathatwhenlivelihoodsareattended

to, reconciliation can be achieved. This is seen as ignoring the rights based and access

challengesthatarefacedonaquotidianlevel.Therewascriticismwithregardstotheamount

of money being poured into such livelihood development projects without enough

assessment of whether CSOs and cooperatives who eventually receive such funds from

externalagentshavethecapacitytoabsorbandmanagesuchmoney.Thislevelofcritique

alsochallengedwhatwas termedas the ‘project-based’natureofpeacebuilding initiatives

thatarelinkedtoasingularframework.

f. Aneedtoattendtotransformativechange:Itwasalsonotedthatabetterleveragingofthe

fundsfromthePBFcouldhavebeentowardsmore‘transformative’attitudinalchangerather

thaneconomicdevelopmentactivities.Toclarify,thisisbecausetherearemanydevelopment

actorsandfinancial investmentsthatarebeingmadetowardseconomicdevelopment,and

that the PBF’s connection and alliance with the state machinery could have been more

effectiveiffocussedtowardsaddressingrightsbasedandhorizontalinequalitiesexperienced

on theground. This isespeciallyurgentasmany respondents raised the fact that theSri

Lankanpolityisnowmorepolarisedthaneverbefore.

g. Short–termprojectsdonotcreatethespacefortrust–building:Therewerealsoconcerns

raised as to the need for more ‘trust building’. It was noted that building trust between

governmentactors(nationalandlocal),aswellasthedifferentcommunitiesinthecountryis

essentialforpeacebuilding.However,asfundsforpeacebuildingactivitiesareoftentiedto

thedurationofaproject,ortheprioritiesofinternationalgovernance,thereisnotenough

timegivenforsuchtrustbuildingtotakeplace.Trustbuildingcannotbeputintoatimeframe

orachievedwithinthelimitedframeworkofaprojectbasedactivity.Respondentsnotedthat

thelinearassumptionsofprojectbasedworkdonotmeetthecomplexrealitiesandcircularity

oftimeofthequotidianlevel.Therewascriticismofthefactthat‘complexrealities’donot

22

fitinwiththeUNsystemicapproachtopeacebuildingsuchthatthereisa‘mismatchbetween

thetaskaheadandtheinstitutionsthataretaskedtodoit’.Toclarify,whatthisiscritiquing

is the imposition of a peacebuilding framework ‘from above’, and one which is allied to

universalisedstandards.

h. ‘Quick’decisionmaking:WhiletheSCRMandcertainkeydecisionmakersontheUNPBFenjoy

agoodrelationship,somedecisionsarenotmadebythefullboard.Muchofthisisbecause

theboardonlymeetseverythreemonthsandthereisaneedtotake‘quick’actiononcertain

items.Assuch,whenrequestsaremadeoftheUNPBF,therearethreekeypersonnelwhoare

consulted toprovideapprovalor refusal.However,boardmembers felt thatmakingquick

decisionshampersprojectchoicesthattrulyaddresstheneedswithintargetedcommunities.

i. Genderprogramming:Genderischallengingpointinthisevaluation.Accordingtointerviews

withUNofficials,theUNdidnothavemuchsaywhenitcametohowgenderprioritieswere

actionedthroughtheSCRM,buttheRCOofficeprovidedsupportforworkshopsandtrainings

toensurethattheyweregendersensitive.AccordingtoSCRMofficials,therewasnopushby

theUNto look into thegenderaspect.However,SCRMofficialsnote that, there isaclose

focusonreferring to thegenderdimension fromwithin thesecretariat,whenprojectsare

enacted. However, they say they were not provided with any specific examples. This

ambiguity also extends to project documents and log frames. According to a PBF board

member,gender issuesarenotsignificantlyhighlightedthrough theONURorSCRMinthe

overallprojectdesign,butthemembernotedthattheILOEMPOWERproject,fundedbythe

UNPBF, seems to be having strong positive results with regards to women’s economic

development.

j. Local capacity building:Therewasmuch discussion also,with boardmembers and SCRM

officials,abouttheneedtobuildlocalcapacity.Assuch,intheseconversations,therewasa

flagraisedabouttheleveloftechnicalassistancethatkeepscominginthroughtheUNPBF.

While it is appreciated and there are many lessons to be learned, ongoing reliance on

international experts was found to not build internal and local capacity for juridical and

monitoringprocesses.

3.1.3 OutcomesandLessonsLearneda. Methodological limitations: While PPP language can be seen in project and policy

documentationguides,thisevaluationwasnotabletomapactualeffectivenessofthePPP,

throughimplementationactors,tothe‘groundlevel’.Itisrecommendedthatasecondand

longerevaluationbedonetoascertainactual‘groundlevel’effectivenessofthepercolation

ofthePPPprinciplesandofthemobilisationcapacityofthePPPfromdesigntograssroots.

Understanding ‘effective implementation’ necessitates a more in-depth study of the key

ministries,developmentactorsanddonorsworkingalongsidetheUNPBFandtheSCRM.This

evaluationwasunabletodotriangulationwiththeministriesthattheSCRMworksalongside

tostudytherolloutoftheSCRMprogrammingandmobilisation.

b. Gender:Gender isakeyguidingprincipleofthePPP,andGenderscoring isprofessedasa

mainactivitywhendevelopingPPPasamainelementwasconsultationacrossfourpillarsso

there is sufficient female andmale participation. It has been difficult, however, for this

evaluationtoascertainwhatspecificprogrammesweredonefromagenderlensoutsideof

equal inclusion inworkshopsandotherevents.However, in the2018 iterationof thePPP

there seems to bemore attention paid to the specific challenges being faced by women

headedhouseholds.Genderprogramming,ifplacedasahighermarker,mustbehighlighted

notonlyassimply‘equalityofparticipation’,thereneedstobeactivemobilisationongender

23

dimensions. It is concerning that replies from both UN officials and SCRM officials were

ambiguousatbestintermsofgenderprogramming.

c. DynamismofthePPP:ThisreportappreciatesthedynamicnatureofthePPP,inthatits’2018

iterationhaspickedupontheneedtoaddressindebtedness,workingwithvulnerablewomen

headed households, and also fast-tracking durable resettlement plans. The significant

effectivenessofthePPPasastandingframeworkhasbeenthatitallowsabasefromwhich

theUNcanmobiliseandrallygovernmentpartnersandotherdevelopmentpartnersaround

theidentifiedstrategicinterventions.

d. Quickwinapproaches:There isgeneralcriticismfromallpartieswithregards toadefault

approachtotakingon‘quick-win’‘highimpact’initiatives,ratherthaninvestinginlong-term

goals.Peacebuildingwasidentifiedoverandoveragainasacomplexprocess,andnotone

thatcanbeachievedthroughaplanthatisfocusedonforoneortwoyears.Assuch,thebest

thatcanbeenvisionedthroughtheentireprocessisoneof‘sowing’initialseeds.

e. Independence of the SCRM: This evaluation highlights the fact that making the SCRM a

national,butmoreindependentmechanismmayallowformorelong-termimplementation.

SCRMofficialsnotedthatanecessarynextstep for theSecretariatwouldbetobuild local

capacityforlongtermpeacebuildingandtransitionaljusticemechanisms.

f. Theprudenceof relyingon foreignexpertise: Respondentsacross theboardqueried the

usefulness and practicality of an international strategic expertwhen there aremany local

expertswhohavebeenimmersedintheSriLankansituationandwhohaveamoregrounded

intuition for localneeds.Nooneparticulargroupofexpertsorworkshopswereespecially

highlighted.Indeed,thisqueryisverymuchattunedtoongoingreflexivityonwhatismost

usefulandpertinenttodevelopingandutilisinglocalcapacityfortransitionaljustice,aswell

asasking,broadly,C is thisprocess too reliantonexternal assistance?’. Toquote froman

interviewwithamemberoftheUNPBFboard,“Peaceworkrequiresanintensivepresenceon

thegroundwithpeacestrategies,iftheUNDPisseriousaboutsomethingtheyneedtohave

strongpeoplewhounderstandtheculture,analyse,andunderstandthedifferentthingsthat

arehappeningthereandtogivesupportforsomethingtoevolve”.Respondentsfoundthat

reliance on foreign expertise detracted significantly from a ‘home-grown’ and community

groundedpeacebuildingprocess.Asanexample,SCRMofficialsnotedtheneedtotrainlocal

prosecutors on how to handle reparations and transitional justice cases, a need that will

manifestoncetruthcommissionsandotheraccountabilitymechanismsareoperationalised.

There was also concern with regards to the financial expenditure incurred in bringing in

expertsfromotherconflictrelatedcountriesas,inmanywaysthesearemoneysthatcould

beexpendedelsewhere,perhapsatthenecessarycommunitylevel.Therewasalsosustained

criticismofthe‘workshopculture’associatedwithbringinginforeignexpertise.

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EvaluationMatrix:

ProjectOne:“SupporttotheSriLankaPBFSecretariatandtheGovernmentSecretariatfor

CoordinationofReconciliationMechanisms”.

Output 1: Peacebuilding Priority Plan developed and mechanism established to support

coordinatedprojectdevelopmentandimplementation

Context-Mechanism-OutputConfiguration Category Remarks

Context Thetheoryatwork Relevantin2015basedonthecontextassessment.In2018therehasbeenarefocussingtowardsmoreresettlementandeconomicdevelopmentinitiatives.However,between2015and2018,thecountryhasbecomemorepolarisedandthereisaneedtorefocusonrightsbasedchallengesversusrapiddevelopmentinitiatives.

Mechanism Relevance

Theprojecthasmaintaineditsrelevanceasaprojectdocumentthroughincorporatinginformationfromsurveysandongoingcontextassessment.However,therearequeriesastowhethertheserefocusesadequatelyaddresstheeverydayneedsandwantsofcommunities.

Effectiveness

ThePPPisananchoringframeworkfortheUNcommunity,theSCRM,andthedonor/diplomaticcommunity.Itisdifficulttoaccessitseffectivenessoutsideofthesegroups.

Efficiency

ThePPPisananchoringframeworkfortheUNcommunity,theSCRM,andthedonor/diplomaticcommunity.Itisdifficulttoaccessitsefficiencyoutsideofthesegroups.

GenderDimension Genderisaguidingprincipleofthedocumentandthereisplentyoftheoreticalevidencefor

25

‘gender’relatedmarkers.However,inpractice,theseeffectsarenotveryvisible.Gendermustbeunderstood,programmatically,asmorethanratesofparticipationandattendingtoWHHs.

Outcome(ImpactandSustainability)

Positive?Negative?Neutral?

ImpactscoresapositiveasthedocumenthaspositioneditselfasakeyframeworkfortheUN,SCRMandthedonor/diplomaticcommunity.Sustainabilityscoresaneutral.ThePPPhasincorporatednewchallengessuchasindebtednessandrapidresettlementneeds,butremainwithinaparticularlinearandsystematicframeworkthatcanbequeriedintermsofitsabilitytospeaktothecomplexitiesoftheSriLankansituation.

Output2–EffectiveimplementationoftheUN’sPeacebuildinginitiatives,withattentionto

coordination,evidencedbasedinterventionsandhigh-impactresults.

Output3–SecretariatforCoordinatingtheReconciliationMechanismsestablishedwithinthe

PrimeMinister’sOfficetoensurecoordinatedandcoherentGovernmentstrategytoprogress

reconciliationanddevelopandimplementtransitionaljusticemechanisms.

Context-Mechanism-OutputConfiguration Category RemarksContext Thetheoryatwork TheSCRMcurrentlyhasa

relevantroleincoordinatingstatelevelreconciliationmechanisms.However,it’sroleistiedtothisparticularpost-2015situation.Itisdifficulttoassesswhetheritwillhavearolepost-2019.

26

Mechanism Relevance

TheSCRMoperatesandisrelevantatthelevelofthestateandtheUNcommunity.Italsodoesworkatthelocalgovernmentlevel.Wewereabletoassessrelevanceattheformerbutnotatthelatter.

Effectiveness

EffectivenessoutsidetheUNandwithlimitedstakeholderswasnotassessedin-depth.Communitylevelimpactisnotimmediatelyvisible.

Efficiency FlexiblefundingassistedtheSCRMtobuildstaffcapacities.Receivedwiderangingtechnicalassistance.TheSCRMalsohasthecapacityandautonomytoaccessspecialistassistancefromoutsidetheUNcommunity.TheSCRMhassetupdifferentunitssuchasResearchandMediathatareefficientonamediumscale.

GenderDimension Theoreticallyapparent.Practicallyambiguous.PleaseseecommentrelatedtothePPPintableabove.Equalparticipationatworkshopsisnotgenderfocussedprogramming.

Outcome Positive?Negative?Neutral?

Theresulthereisneutral.TheSCRMhasbeensuccessfulinpushingforwardcertainstatelevelactivitiesbuttherearequeriesastoitslongevitypolitically,andit’srelevanceoutsideofthestate,UNanddiplomatic/donorcommunity.

27

3.2 Project2:“SupporttoSriLankatopromotenationalunityandreconciliation

effortsthroughtargetedtechnicalassistancetotheONURandtheNorthern

ProvincialAdministrationandEasternProvincialAdministration.”

Project2istobeconsideredfortheexercisecompletely.

Outcome1-“SriLankasocietywithawell-coordinatedandcoherentsystemtoadvancenational

unityandreconciliationamongitspeople.”

• Output 1:Keymechanisms andprocesses (elements of a roadmap) for national unity and

reconciliationcommencedundertheguidanceoftheONUR• Output2:NorthernProvincialadministrationandEasternProvincialadministrationenabled

to produce strategic plans and strengthen revenue generation to support development

activitiesthataddresstheprioritiesofconflictaffectedpeople.

3.2.1 Output1:KeyMechanismsandProcesses(ElementsofaRoadmap)forNationalUnityandReconciliationCommencedUndertheGuidanceoftheONUR

3.2.1.1ContextRelatedFindingsa. ProjectDesignandStrategy -TheOfficeofNationalUnityandReconciliation (ONUR)was

establishedundertheformerPresidentKumaratunga,anditsmainroleistocoordinateand

catalyseactiontoadvancenationalunityandreconciliation.Ithasprioritisedsocialcohesion,

peaceeducation,psychosocialsupport,livelihoodsandtrilinguallanguagepolicyasareasto

take forward. During the design stage of the project, officials at the ONUR were widely

consultedandtheprojectdocumentwasdevelopedbasedontheiridentifiedneeds.Efforts

to interview former President and Head of the ONUR, Chandrika Kumaratunga for the

evaluationwere unsuccessful. However, ONUR officials spoke positively about initial level

collaborationwiththeUNRCOandabouthowtheywereprovidedwithpeacebuildingrelated

knowledgeandskillsduringthatphase.

i. However, it seems that this initial levelof collaborationdidn’t continue frommid-

2016onwards.ONURofficialsalsofeltthattheirinputsandneedswhichweretaken

onboardin2015,beforetheprojectstarted,werenotwellreflectedinthefinaldesign

thatwassubmittedforPBFfunding.UNDPofficialsreportthatoncetheprojectdesign

wasformalisedtheywerebrought intothepictureandtheprojecthandedoverto

them. The UNDP reported, in terms of effectiveness, that they believed that the

project design phase didn’t adequately brief theONUR that the projectwould be

manageddirectlybyUNDP.Thereafteroncetheprojectwasinitiated,theUNDPand

ONUR were locked in detailed negotiations about working modalities for a long

duration,especiallybecausetheONURfeltthatthefundmanagementshouldhave

cometothem.TherewasalsoalackofawarenessofUNDPworkingmodalities,rules

andregulations,aswellaswhatadirectlymanagedprojectentailedwithintheONUR.

ii. UNDPofficialsreportthatcommunicationandcollaborationbetweentheUNRCOand

UNDP during the design phase was limited, limiting effectiveness of the project.

Misunderstandingand lackofclaritybecausethe implementingagencyUNDP,was

notas involvedasmuchas it thoughtnecessaryduringthedesignstage,seemsto

28

havecritically influencedrelationsnegativelybetweenthetwoparties–UNDPand

ONUR.2

iii. TheUNDP reflects that theprojectdesign couldhave incorporatedmore strategic

supporttotheONURandbeenmorerelevant.TheyfeltthatsincetheONURwasa

newly set up body, support should have been laidmore squarely on institutional

building.This,theyfeltwouldhavehelpedsetuptheONURtoundertakeitsfunctions

moreeffectively.Thistheybelievewouldhavesupportedastrongerpartnershipwith

theUNDPandstrongabsorptionoftheprojectactivities.

b. ProjectDocument–Theprojectdocument iswellthoughtout,highlyrelevant,andclearly

describesthecontextandthewindowofopportunitythattheUNhopedtofurthercatalyse

withtimelysupportthroughtheIFRandPBFfunds.Thedesignutilisesthetheoryofchange

conceptandaresultsframeworkanalysistomeasureprojectsuccess.

i. Evaluatorsfindthatthehighlevelofexpectationsthataredescribedinthenarrative

of the project document and in the outcome and outputs, does not adequately

translate,with the same sort of intensity, into the design of the activities. For an

ambitious18monthproject,theactivitiesdescribedarenotsufficienttodeliverthe

expected result, limiting its effectiveness.While its understood that the activities

themselvesarereasonablegiventheUNDP’spositionandaccess,theoutputpromises

commencementofmechanismsandprocesses,whichismorethantheactivitiescan

deliver.

3.2.1.2MechanismRelatedFindingsa. Project Implementation -When the project came into being inmid 2016, theUNDPwas

chargedwithdirectlyimplementingit,whiletheONURbelievedtheprojectwasgoingtobe

implementedbythemselves.Thereafter,ONURofficialsfeltthattheywerenotwellinformed

abouttheproject,notclearlytoldwhattheirrolewas,whatfundsandsupportwasavailable

tothem,etc.Basedonthismisunderstanding,workingrelationsbetweenthetwopartners

werestrained,andtheeffectivenessoftheprojectreduced.

i. The UNDP project documentation shows the Letter of Agreement (LOA) signed

betweenUNDPandONUR,roughlyaccountingforabout200,000USD(dependenton

theexchangerateatthetimeoftransfer).ThesefundswereusedbytheONURfora

partofthequick-winactivitiessuchastheDialogueInitiative,thetrilinguallanguage

translationservice,andfortheinter-schoolpilotwork,withcredibleefficiency.The

incumbentofficialsattheONURclaimnottobeawareofthefullproject,butonly

aware ofwhatwas agreed and signedwith them – as per the LOA. This is not in

keepingwith the fulloutputof thisproject related todevelopingmechanismsand

processesfornationalunityandreconciliationundertheguidanceoftheONUR.

ii. Duringthisphase,evaluatorsfindthatthereweretwomainlevelsofcommunication

and working between the UNDP and ONUR. One between senior politicians and

decision makers and another between working level officials.While they worked

effectivelyateachlevel,withineachorganisationtherewasverylimitedcollaboration

2UN/UNDPOfficialsreviewingthisreport,post-validationmeeting,commentedonthisissueasfollows.(Itis

incorporated for the sake of providing more clarity on this issue): “UNDP were there at many of the

planning/designdiscussions.TherewereseveralworkshopsforexampleintheUNtodeveloptheRRFetcand

finalizethestrategy.UNDPwereverypresent…[The]issuewasmorethanUNDPandRCOwerenotmeetingthe

leadershipofONURtogether,andthisledtodifferentunderstandingsatthehigherlevel”

29

and engagement vertically, between senior decision makers and working level

officers.Thisledtoalackofcoherencebetweendecisionsthatwerebeingmadeand

whatwasbeing implemented, aswell as tomisunderstandings. TheUNDP reports

thatsomeof itsworkingleveldecisionsweresometimescountermandedbasedon

politicalrequests,andonthewhole,theeffectivenessoftheprojectwasaffected.

b. ActivityonProvisionofTechnicalAssistance-Thefirstactivityrelatedtoprovidingtechnical

assistanceistosupporttheONURonpeacebuildingissues,andcommunicationandisofhigh

relevance. There are three key actions identified within: 1) on a communication strategy

whichisalsopartoftheriskmitigationwork;2)onimprovingthemonitoringcapacitytotrack

reconciliation work; 3) provision of conflict transformation and peacebuilding technical

expertise.

i. According to UNDP officers “ONUR failed to access UN technical and financial

support”;whiletheONURinturnclaimstonothavebeenawareoftheavailabilityof

such support. The UNDP in several meetings with the ONUR brought up the

availability of funds for securing technical assistance on peacebuilding,

communicationandMonitoringandEvaluation(MandE).Whiletheactivityisjudged

toberelevantbyallparties, itraisesthequestionastowhytheONURthendidn’t

makeuseoftheopportunityandresources.

ii. OntheM&Esupport,atrainingonmonitoringwasconductedforONURofficerswhich

they found very useful for their work. The UNDP however identifies that their

attempts to help reinforce the monitoring capacity within the ONUR was not

enthusiastically received. Thereafter the UNDP had made attempts to work with

anotherpartnertoundertakethemonitoringworkonreconciliation.However,due

tochangesingovernmentthistoohasnotbeensuccessfullycompleted.Whileagain

thereasoningbehindtheactionisrelevant,itisnotclearifitwastheeffectivenessof

deliverythatcausedittobeirrelevant.

iii. Onthecommunicationaspect,theprojectdocumentclearlydescribestheneedfora

communication strategy tomanage expectations about the reconciliation process.

However,duetonon-tractionontheONURside,thiswasnotcompleted,raisingthe

earlierquestiononeffectivenessandrelevance.

iv. Peacebuildingandconflicttransformationrelatedtechnicalassistancewasnotsought

bytheONURaccordingtotheUNDP.TheONURmaintains itwasnotawareofthe

availabilityofsupport;raisingearlierquestionsoneffectivenessofdelivery limiting

relevanceoftheactivity.

c. Activity on Quick-Win Confidence Building Initiatives – The logic and relevance for

confidence building activities is clearly justified. On the whole this activity was well

implementedbytheONUR.TheUNDPreportsthattheONURhadthebasicdesignsofthe

dialogueinitiative,developedwhentheprojectwasstarted.TheONURalsoworkedoninter-

school work and inter-cultural activities and a trilingual translation service called

Bashawa.com. These activitieswere assessed separately by theUNDP, and found tohave

beensatisfactorily completed.TheONUR isnowcontinuing thedialogue initiativeand the

inter-school/inter-culturalactivities.ThelanguageworkwastakenoverbythenewMinistry

of National Languages, however its reported to have not been utilised by the Ministry

thereafter. TheWHO ledpsychosocialworkwasalsodevelopedwhen theproject started.

Accordingly,theseactivitieswereimplementedsmoothlyonceUNDPworkingmodalitieswas

understood.Somedelayswereexperiencedthoughonthepsychosocialwork,contributingto

theneedforaNoCostExtensionoftheproject.Thisisexplainedbelow:

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Theprojectdocumentrecognisestheneedforpsycho-socialsupporttocommunitiesinthe

NorthernandEasternProvinces,AnuradhapuraandGalledistricts,andaimstotargeta100

peoplepertargetdistrict.TheoriginaldesignenvisagesthatWHOwillassisttheONURTask

Force on Psychosocial Well-being. In addition, a strategic plan to build the capacity of

Provincial authorities, government agencies and civil society to establish the long term

coordinatedpsychosocial supportmechanismwasalsopartof thedesign.Thisdesign is in

keepingwiththeoriginallyenvisagedgoalofsupportingthedevelopmentofmechanismsand

processesundertheguidanceoftheONUR,andfoundtobehighlyrelevant.

i. Evaluatorsfoundthatthepsychosocialworkconductedbytheprojectwasnotknown

totheONURorusedtobuildtheONURTaskForceonPsychosocialWellbeing.From

interviewswithmultiplepartiesandinternalreports3,itbecomesclearthattherewas

adisagreementbetweentheONURandWHO.Thereportreferstothedisagreement

beingaboutWHOworkingmodalitiesthroughtheMinistryofHealth(MoH).Dueto

thelackofclarityonthis,furtherinterviewswithpreviousONURstaffrevealedthat

the WHO had already identified subcontracted parties and were insistent upon

managing the psychosocial work as per their normal Ministry of Health working

modalities.Thereafter,theUNDPandWHOhadsignedanagreementandaproject

documentwhichby-passedtheONURanditsTaskForceonPsychosocialWellbeing.

ItisnotclearastowhytheUNDPwouldchoosetocontinuewiththeWHO,without

lookingforanotherpartnertosupportthestrengtheningoftheONUR’sTaskForce.

Thischangeofhowtheactivitywasdoneisfoundtoreducetherelevanceandthe

effectivenessoftheaction,aswellascontributetothestrainedrelationshipbetween

theONURandUNDP.

ii. Project document related deliverables were modified based on WHO working

modalitiesandamended inaLOAandattachedprojectdocument.Amendedtasks

were found to have been well conducted as per an assessment of the activity.

Activitieswerelimitedtotwodistricts,KillinochchiandMullaithivu,andthestrategic

planthatwastobeputinplacewasnotfulfilled.Theprocessesandmechanismswere

notput inplace,andthetargetofaminimum100peopleperdistrictwasalsonot

met.ThealternateactivitiesconductedbytheWHOneverthelessareofvalueinitself

andseemtoadequatelysupportMoHwithitswork.

iii. While the work is considered effective against the amended expectations; when

considered against the original expected output of strengthening processes and

mechanismsundertheguidanceoftheONUR,especiallyinasituationwhereithada

body to take forward thework - the results are considered to be less relevant or

effective.Theactionisnotinkeepingwiththisgoalandunderminestheusefulnessof

theirTaskForce.

d. ActivityonNationalReconciliationPolicy –TheUNDPhad informed theONURabout the

availabilityoffundstosecuretechnicalassistancetosupportthedevelopmentofthepolicy.

However,theONURdidnotaccessthesefunds,asisreportedbytheUNDP.ONURofficials

stated that funds were available from the national budget for the activity and they also

wanted it to be a nationally driven and developed policy. The ONUR official in charge of

developingthispolicycouldnotbecontactedforthisevaluationpurpose.

i. ItisnotclearastowhytheONURdidnotseektheavailabletechnicalandfinancial

supportfortheactivity.It’sprobabletheybelievedthatusageofnationalresources

wouldmakethepolicymorelegitimate,butthenthatraisesthequestionastowhy

3AnnualReport2016

31

thisdecisionwasnotdirectlyconveyedtotheUNDP.TheUNDPwasunawarethatthe

ONURwasproceedingwith theactivityuntil thepolicywasalmost complete.This

raisesaquestionofbuy-infromtheONURtotheoverallproject,thetrustbetween

partnersandtheseeminglackofrequirement.

ii. TheUNDPreportsthattheyfindthePolicydevelopedbytheONURwasofadequate

standard. However, they judged that the policy does not seem to havemobilised

muchsupportor tractionbehind it. Therefore, theynoted that it isnoteffectively

steering the reconciliation work in the country. Different actors, civil society and

developmentpartnersinthesectorareworkingonreconciliationinapiece-meal/add

hocmannerandthereisnobroadlevelcoherencetothework.

e. ProjectMonitoring–Nodedicatedprojectmonitoringrecordsweremadeavailableforthe

evaluationbytheUNDP.Theprojectdocumentdesignclearlydescribestheplantosetuptwo

technicalcommittees,onefortheUNDP-ONURandtheotherfortheUNDP-MinistryofLocal

GovernmentandProvincialCouncils.WhiletheonewiththeProvincialAuthoritieswereset

up,theevaluatorsfindthattheUNDPdidnotsetupthistechnicalcommitteewiththeONUR

formally. The UNDP however did hold meetings with the ONUR to discuss project

implementation, as recorded in meeting minutes. However, the UNDP reported that

attendanceformeetingsaftertheinitialfew,werelimitedandonlyresponsibleofficialsfora

particular activitywould attend, basedon the agenda.Overall buy-inof thewiderproject

deliverableswaslow,withONURfocusbeingmainlyontheactionstheytookresponsibility

forintheLOA.

i. Thelackofadedicatedprojectofficertomanagethisdirectlyimplementedproject

may have affected the effectiveness and efficiency of implementation. From the

meetingminutes, it appears that the UNDP expected theONUR to lead and plan

activities for Activity 1 & 3 of the project and request support where needed.

However,theONURsawitsresponsibilityaslimitedtothequick-winsdelineatedin

theLOA.

ii. It is noted that the ONUR took responsibility for the quick-win activities. These

activitieswere thereafterdelivered, and its individual assessments show that they

wereimplementedwithsatisfactorylevelsofefficiency.

iii. ThoughtheUNDPwasdirectly implementingtheproject,theactivitiestheyhadto

implementweredependentonONUR.Thisappearstonotbeaneffectivemeansof

implementation.

iv. GiventhattheUNDPwasawareofthestrainedrelationshipwiththeONUR,itisnot

clear what proactive instruments the UNDP used to ensure that project delivery

stayedontrack,apartfromthemeetingsthatweresetupwiththeONUR.Thelackof

aformalprojectmanagementcommittee,wasalsooneofthekeymechanismsthat

contributedtothelowdeliveryandeffectivenessofexpectedprojectresults.Thus,

evaluators determine therewas limited effectiveness and efficiency in delivery of

projectresults.

f. Project Reporting – The UNDP reports that its’ ability to reportwas limited by the PBSO

template.Inaprojectwherealotofadaptivemanagement,riskmitigation,andothercontext

relatedissuesareprevalent,thereportingtemplatewasnotabletocapturethenuancesof

why certain actions were undertaken or not. This was found to be a limitation in

understandinghowtheprojectwasmanagedbetter.

i. Recordscapturingchangesincontext,issuesfaced,decisionsmade,activitychanges

andadaptivemanagementmeasurestaken,werenotavailable.TheUNDPdoesnot

seemtohavemaintainedanyinternalreportsapartfromthedonortemplates.

32

ii. Onbothsides,theUNDPaswellastheONUR,therehasbeensomestaffturnover.

OntheUNDPside,thoughofficersreportedthattherewasasmoothhandoverof

functions from one to another, they were not aware of the reasoning behind

decisions,pastactionorpreviousgovernmentofficialsincharge.TheUNDPofficers

also identified that they considered this project “inherited from theUNRCO”and

thereforewerenotawareofthereasoningbehindsomeofthedesignaspects.The

approach fromUNDPofficerswas that theywerenotwilling to takeownershipor

responsibilityforthedesign,decisions,changes,adaptationsmadeduringthecourse

oftheproject.

iii. Senior staff changes in the case of the Government of Sri Lanka occur regularly.

Therefore,knowledgemanagement,maintainingprojectdocumentation,monitoring

andreportingfunctionstoensurethatnewstaffareadequatelybriefedisacritical

functionoftheresponsibleparty,theUNDP,inthiscase.

ThemaindocumentationrelatedtomonitoringseemedtobethroughtheuseofAnnualwork

plans and biannual donor reports. Limited monitoring, especially nuanced monitoring to

ensurethattheprojectwasontracktodelivertheexpectedoutput,furtherlimitingactivity

effectiveness,wasnoted.

3.2.1.3OutcomeRelatedFindingsa. OutcomeandOutputAchievement – The overall outcome ismeasured by two indicators

capturingperceptionsoflocalcommunitiesinprojectreports.Bothindicatorbaselinesquote

2014perceptions as thebaseline,whichwouldbeduring theprevious administrationand

before the project context materialised. The indicator progress is quoted from the 2016

(September)perceptionsurvey,whichisameasurementduringthebeginningphaseofthe

project.Thesefiguresarenotameasurementofthisproject’sprogress,andshouldnotbe

used.Inaddition,evaluatorsfeelthatgiventhereachofactivitiesconductedbythisproject,

it’sunlikelythat2017perceptionsurveyresultscouldhavebeeninfluencedbytheproject.

Under the output, the original results framework has five indicators clearlymeasuring all

aspect of the project design. However, in subsequent project biannual reports, only two

indicatorsarereported,relatedtotwoquickwinactivities,asubsetofActivity2oftheproject.

It’snotclearwhytheotherindicatorshavenotbeenreportedagainstinanyreports.

b. RiskMitigation - A riskmitigation strategy in a project like this is critical. The context is

dynamicandthereareinherentrisksintheproblemtheprojectistryingtoaddress.Thusthe

risks identified are not comprehensive, nor fully developed, nor themitigation strategies

adequatelyaddressedinthedesign.Risksrelatedtochangesinkeypeople,settingupofnew

institutions, political and contextual instability are not adequately thought through.

Thereafter, in thebiannual reporting, themitigation strategiesdonot seem tohavebeen

implementedthoughsomeoftherisksmaterialised.

UNDPofficersreportthatfundswerereprogrammeddependingonavailableopportunities,

andadmitthatinsomecasesitwasnotstrategic.GivenUNDPperceptionabouttheneedfor

better institutionalbuildingwork,or thecommunicationaroundtheusageof thepolicy, it

mayhavebeen amore strategic adaptation.On theother hand, the strained relationship

betweenthetwopartners,maynothaveprovidedthewindowsofopportunityfortheUNDP

totakeadvantageof.

c. UNDPImplementationModality–Thereisalackofclarityregardingthereasoningbehind

whythethreeactivitiesweredirectlyimplementedbytheUNDP.Giventhesuccessfulmanner

inwhichtheONURactuallydeliveredthefundsprovidedtoit,itmayhavebeenmorestrategic

33

and sustainable to allow this project to be nationally implemented, contributing to its

institutionalcapacitybuildingaswell.

d. Gender Equality Focused Programming– The project has noted that gender equality is a

significantobjective(gendermarker2),requiringthat15%ofthebudgetbededicatedforthis

function.However, the evaluators did not notice any active programming to build gender

equalityexceptinthepsychosocialwork.Here,70femaleheadedhouseholdersweretargeted

andprovidedTrainingofTrainerstrainingonpsychosocialaspects.Itmustbenotedthatthis,

however, is a very targeted support, allowing these women to become key players in

supporting their own and their community’smanagement of psychosocial issues. Inother

componentsoftheproject,genderequalityrelatedprogrammingisrestrictedtoencouraging

participation,averypassivemethodofprogramming.Thefactthatofficersbelieveincreased

participationisadequate,indicatesalackofawarenessofgenderrelatedissuesandareasof

concern.

e. UNDPofficialsusedthemetaphorofa‘hinge’inrelationtothepeacebuildingfund.Thehinge

allows/facilitatesthewindows/doorsofopportunitytobeopenedbutdoesnotopenitby

itself.Theyexplainedthatit’snottheUN’splacetotellSriLankawhattodo,buttosupport,

facilitate,adviceandguideSriLankawhenrequestedandwhereopportunityexists.TheSri

Lankanpeacebuildingprocessneedstobeanationallydriven,nationallydesignedprocess.

AndtheUNhasdonewhatisinitspowertosupportsuchaprocess,andconsciouslyplanned

itssupportfromthatperspective.

i. TheUNisawareofthesuspicionwithwhichitandotherwesternideasareviewed,

andunderstandsthatanysortofovertmannerofengagingwithSriLankawillonly

undermine the effectiveness of government interventions and how its perceived.

Therefore,theyfocusonbeingasdiscreetaspossible,andlimitingtheirengagement

tofacilitatorysupportivefunctions.

3.2.1.4LessonsLearneda. LogicalDesignApproach-Lookingbackwardsfromtheendoftheproject,attheverydynamic

context that the projectwas immersed in, the type ofwindows of opportunities that the

projectwas trying tocatalyse, the risks inherent in this typeofwork,and the institutional

buildingworkattheheartofthisproject–standardlogicalanalysisisprobablynotthemost

appropriate approach. Its best used in a stable context, where results can be logically

predicted.Inadynamiccontext,withinherentrisksattachedtopoliticsandpowerplaysits

difficult for results to be predicted. In a sense, the results frameworkmay even limit the

activitiesoftheprojectbindingitmechanicallytoitstargetsandindicators.Toallowaproject

likethistheflexibilityandadaptabilitytomaneuverinthiscontext,theapproachisnotagood

match.TheTheoryofChangeapproachthoughusedinthedesign,doesn’tseemtohavebeen

usedeffectivelythereafter.Ifappliedintheprojectmanagementcycleitshouldhelptoadapt

to contextual issues. The Problem Driven Iterative Adaption (PDIA)4 approach is another

relevantandeffectivefit,especiallyforinstitutionalbuildinginunstablecontexts.

4PDIAdiffers fromotherdevelopmentapproaches in that itmoves fromcritiquetoresponse. It isprimarily

concernedwithbuildinggovernancecapabilitytodeliveroncomplexandpotentiallycontestedreformsinareas

likegovernanceandjustice.PDIAdifferentiatesfromothermethodsconcernedwithreformsimplementation,

alsoinitshigherfocusontheenablingbackgroundconditionsthatmakeitpossibleforsystemstobefunctional.

Theideaofadaptationwhichputsunderquestionthenotionofdoingreformsbyadoptingexternalrules–best

practices–isalsouniquetotheapproach.Formoredetailsrefer:MattAndrews,LantPritchett,SalimahSamji

and Michael Woolcock 2015. Building Capability by Delivering Results: Putting Problem-Driven Iterative

34

b. RelationshipManagement-Theabilitytoinfluencechangerestsmuchmoreonthehuman

aspectsofprogramming,thanonthetechnical,especiallyforprojectsworkingwithinmore

sensitiveandpoliticallychargedenvironments.Therefore,managingrelationships,building

rapport,orientatinglocalcounterpartstoUNwaysofworking,needstobehandledformally

aswell as informally, if the UN is committed to ensuring the effectiveness of theirwork.

Review of meeting minutes especially showcase the very formal and distant relationship

betweenthedonorandtherecipient.TheUNDPapproachtoengagingcounterpartsneedto

bebroughtontoamoreequalplatformofpartnershipandcollaboration.Incaseswherethe

UNDP isdirectly implementingaproject, theonus toensure that theproject iseffectively

delivered lies with the UNDP. In complicated roles where delivery is dependent on the

partner,it’simperativethattheUNDPundertakemorehandsonrelationshipmanagementas

well.Withouttakingthisaspectintotheprojectmanagementactivities,it’sunlikelythatthe

UNDPwillbeabletoensureeffectivelydelivery.Giventhehighoverheadsof14%thatthe

UNDPchargesforprojectimplementation,itwouldbemoreefficientandeffectivetohavea

dedicatedpersonberesponsibleforanationallycritical,time-sensitivepeacebuildingproject.

c. Proactive Monitoring and Risk Management – It’s noted by evaluators that with more

proactivemonitoring,measurestomitigatethepoorrelationshipbetweenitsmainpartner

couldhavebeenimplementedeffectivelyandefficiently.Monitoringfromthepointofview

ofwhether the projectwas achieving its expected result, should have also prompted the

projecttore-programmeintomorestrategicactions.Rigorousprojectmonitoring,usageof

monitoringfindings,andstrategicadaptivemanagementtoensuretheprojectstaysontrack

andiseffectivelydelivered,isfoundtobecriticalinadynamiccontext.

d. AdaptiveManagement-Theprojectactivitiesasdescribedabovedeviatedsignificantlyfrom

the original plan and the results framework. However, given the instable political context

withinwhichtheprojectoperated,it’sexpectedthatthepredictedactivitypathwaymayneed

to be adjusted and adapted depending on the available entry points and opportunities.

Therefore,evaluatorsfeelthattheprojectimplementersshouldfocusonthedeliveryofthe

originallyplannedresult,morethanafocusontheplannedactivities.Accordingly,insertion

of completely different activities, if its strategic enough, should be considered instead of

simply redressingactivities.Agoodexampleof this, is theM&Eactivityadjustmentor the

WHOpsychosocialadjustmentmadebytheproject.Theseareminorlevelsofchangetothe

originalactivity,butnegatedacontributiontotheexpectedoutput.

e. DocumentationandReporting–Theprojectshiftedhandsbetweenagencies,andthereafter

betweenstaffbothwithintheUNDPandONUR.Therefore,theneedforveryclearprocess

leveldocumentation,meetinganddecisionmakingrecordsiscriticalforeffectiveandefficient

delivery.Thelackofdocumentationandclearexplanationsforchangesandamendmentsto

project actions, also disempowers incoming new staff who are then reluctant to take

responsibilityforaspectsthattheyareunawareof,whichwasevidentwithbothparties.While

thedonor/PBSOtemplatemaybelimiting,itwouldbewelladvisedfortheUNDPtomaintain

itsownmonitoringrecordsclearlydocumentingreasoningfordeviationsandamendments.

f. InclusiveConsultation/Collaboration–It’sclearthatoneofthekeycontributingfactorsto

thepoorrelationshipbetweentheUNDPandONUR,wasduetotheONURnotbeingbriefed

clearly about how the project would be implemented. Therefore, the ensuing

misunderstandingcausedtheONURtoadoptalessthancollaborativeapproachtotheaspects

oftheproject itwasnotdirectlyresponsiblefor.Thismisunderstandingandresultingpoor

Adaptation (PDIA) Principles into Practice. A Governance Practitioner’s Notebook: Alternative Ideas andApproaches©OECD2015.

35

relationship could have been averted to an extent if the working modalities and other

implementation related matters were clearly conveyed to the partner. This in a sense

compromisedtheeffectivelydeliveryoftheproject.

g. Internal Communication and Information Sharing – Its observed that there was poor

communication and information sharing vertically, between different levels of both

organisations.OntheUNside,thisisnotedbetweenthepoliticaldecisionmakingleveland

theworkinglevel,duringthedesignphaseaswellastheimplementationphase.Improvement

ofthecommitmenttokeepallpartiesadequatelybriefedwherenecessary,isseenascritical

in reducing avoidable misunderstanding and improving effectiveness and efficiency of

delivery.

h. Implementation Modality – In a context like Sri Lanka, where the UN and NGO’s are

considered with suspicion, a directly implemented project working on peacebuildingmay

havehadlesstraction.AlsogiventheUNapproachofpeacebuildingfundsbeinga‘hinge’,and

theirworkonlybeingfacilitatory,itthenraisesthequestionaboutitsdirectimplementation

modality.However,ifthePBSOmodalityrequiresdirectimplementation,thenactivitiesneed

tobedesignedandimplementedfromthatunderstanding.Withintheproject,it’snotedthat

the component that the ONUR took responsibility for, was implemented effectively, as

demonstratedbythevariousassessmentreports.

i. Programming Depth – In a relative sense, it’s easier to understand the overall context

operationalinasituation,thanitistotrytochangeit.Inthissituation,it’simportantthatthe

samedegreeofanalysis in theproblemanalysisbecontinued intodesigning theexpected

results,andhowitwouldbemeasured.Dedicationandcommitmenttoensuringchangeson

thegroundshouldbeseenconcretelyinthedesignoftheexpectedresults.Languageusedin

thestatementofoutputsand intheresults frameworkshouldnotbeelusiveandbemore

substantive.

Aneg.isActivity3:InitiationoftheformulationofaNationalReconciliationPolicy.ThereinitappearsthattheUNwilltakeresponsibilityonlyfortheinitiationofthepolicyformulation

work,andnotthereafter.Wouldsimplytheinitiationofthepolicyworkhelpaddressthedire

contextualsituationandtakeadvantageofthewindowofopportunityinthecountry?This

callsintoquestionthecommitmentinreality,asopposedtowhatthein-depthdetaileddesign

narrativeshowcasedasareasofconcern.WhilekeepinginmindthattheUNalsocanonlybe

responsible for facilitating a process, it still needs to be able to take responsibility for

facilitatingaction inamorededicatedway.Are-writtenexampleoftheaboveactivitycan

possiblybe–Activity3–FacilitationofthedevelopmentandimplementationofaNationalReconciliationPolicy.

j. Gender Related Programming – When project programming does need to address how

womeninparticularareaffected,theresulttendstobethecontinuationofthestatusquo.

This means that their marginalisation and disempowerment continues to be further

institutionalised. In a peacebuilding context, it alsomeans that opportunities to empower

womenandsupportthechangeinstatusquoisnottakenadvantageof.It’simperativethat

the UN proactively utilises these opportunities available through its projects to promote

equality of women, and acknowledge that passive participation related approaches see

limitedeffectivenessandimpact.

36

EvaluationMatrix:

Project Two: “Support to Sri Lanka to promote national unity and reconciliation efforts

through targeted technical assistance to the ONUR and the Northern Provincial

AdministrationandEasternProvincialAdministration.”

Output1:Keymechanismsandprocesses(elementsofaroadmap)fornationalunityand

reconciliationcommencedundertheguidanceofONUR

CMOCONFIGURATION Category RemarksContext Relevance Highlyrelevantandstrategic

interventiontosupporttheONURtoputinplacelongtermprocessesandmechanisms

Mechanism RelevanceEffectivenessEfficiencyGenderDimension

Relevantmechanicsofachievingtheoutputwasdesigned.However,theimplementationmodalitymayneedtobereconsidered.Only1of3keyactivities,thequick-winswereimplemented.Projectcyclemonitoringandriskmanagementwaslimited.Fundswerereprogrammedbutwithoutmuchcontributiontowardstheoveralloutput.Duetolimitedimplementationofactivities,theefficiencyintheuseofprojectfundswaslimited.Focuswasmainlylimitedtothepsychosocialworkwithinactivity2,whileotheractivitiesonlysupportedequalparticipationofwomen.Proactivegenderfocusedprogrammingwaslimited.

Outcome ImpactandSustainability Itisunlikelythattheimplementedquickwinactivitieshadmuchdepthinimpact,orthatitwouldbesustainable.SettingupprocessesandmechanismsundertheguidanceoftheONURtopromoteunityandreconciliationwasnotachieved.

37

3.2.2 Output2:NorthernProvincialadministrationandEasternProvincialadministrationenabledtoproducestrategicplansandstrengthenrevenuegenerationtosupportdevelopmentactivitiesthataddresstheprioritiesofconflictaffectedpeople.

3.2.2.1ContextRelatedFindingsActivity 1: Fielding of technical experts to support the Northern Provincial Administration and

EasternProvincialAdministrationtodevelopmulti-sectordevelopmentplansandmechanismsto

strengthenrevenueraisingcapacities.

The PBF support and its proposed interventions weremade in the post-war context to facilitate

inclusivedialoguesonissuesofnationalunityandreconciliation.Itwasalsobuiltonthehypothesis

that “if the society can witness peacebuilding results on the ground then there will be greater

confidence,trustandrealisationinprospectsforasustainablepeace.”TheNorthernProvincewasthe

worstaffectedduringthelastthreedecadescomparedtotheotherprovinces.TheEasternProvince

isthenextwar-affectedregionrequiringfocusedassistance.

Thereseemstobeanunderstandingatthetheorisingleveloftheprojectthattheneeds,priorities,

peculiarities and their insecurities when reconstructing their lives after a devastating war is very

differentfromtheprioritiesoftherestofthecountry.However,theirreconciliation-relatedneedsare

somehowlostwhentranslatingtheimplementationoftheorytoproject-levelactivitiesontheground.

ThatthepeopleoftheNorthernprovince,continuetoholdthattheirrights-basedgrievancesareyet

tobeaddressedbythecentralstate, isanoverpoweringallegationthatsubsumestheir interest in

meredevelopmentprojects5.Thisisalongstanding,well-knownpleafromtheregion.Thattheywish

toaddress their rightsbased issuesalong-sidedevelopmentgoals, asa region recovering froman

ethnicconflictandacivilwariswidelyknown,inthepost-warcontext(FernandoandMoonesinghe,

(2012);Thaheer,Peirisetal.(2013);Frase(2017).Attheprojectimplementationlevel,itoughttohave

been informedbythisstronglyarticulatedgrievancethatprovides thecontextualbackdroptoany

interventionintheNorthincluding,thereferencestothis intheTOCnarrativesoftheUNsproject

documents.SomeactivitiesintheNorthernProvincialCouncil(NPC),analysedbelowseemtoreiterate

theneedforreflectiononthisaspect.ActivitieswiththeNorthernandEasternProvincialCouncilfor

improvinginstitutionalcapacities,werecarriedoutduringNovember2016toMay2018.

TheNorthernProvinceDevelopmentPlan–Thisactivityhasnot takenplace. Instead, fundshave

beendivertedtocarryouttheDistrictPlansofJaffna,MullaitivuandKilinochchi(tobecarriedoutin

concurrencetotheDistrictPlansofVavuniyaandMannarthathavebeenformulatedearlierwiththe

assistanceoftheUNDPandotherdonors).Hence,thethreeaforementionedDistrictSecretariatshave

been approached to develop their respective District Plans instead of the development of the

NorthernProvincialPlan,asplannedandenvisaged intheprojectdocument.Plans/decisiontoby-

pass this area ofworkwith theNorthern Provincial Council and to directly develop theNorthern

DevelopmentPlanwiththreeDistrictSecretariatshavenotbeendocumentedbytheUNDP.However,

theminutesofaProgressReviewMeetingoftheNorthernProvincialSecretariatofOctober16,2017

(almostayearafterthelaunchoftheproject),thatwassharedbytheUNDPprojectstaffnotesthus:

“[sic]Unavoidablecircumstances,theProvincialDevelopmentPlancouldnotbeprepared.TheChief

Secretaryinformedthatthisamountmaybetransferredtotheotherdepartmentsforfulfilltheurgent

5Informationbasedoninterviewswithsomestakeholdersandliteratureonreconciliationrelatedissuesin

theNorth.

38

needs.”6

Project Implementation– Theassumption is that the funds allocated for thedevelopmentof the

NorthernProvincialPlanwouldbetransferredfortheDistrictPlans.Theseplansaretobeconsolidated

tocarryoutaProvincialPlannextyear.7TheDeputyChiefSecretary,Planningalsovalidatedthatthe

activitiesfortheimprovementofservicedeliveriesandstrengtheningofinstitutionalcapacitieswith

theassistanceofUNDPwillhelpdevelopprovincialdevelopmentplannextyear.8

TheDistrictSecretaryofJaffna,N.VethanayahaninaninterviewwiththeCEPAteamvalidatedthe

developmentoftheJaffnaDistrictPlanwhichisalreadyavailableinthepublicdomain.Hestatedthat

differentdistrictshavedifferentpotentialsandsoaretheirpatternsandpriorities.Withthehelpof

thedistrictplans theProvincialCouncilplans todevelop themasterplan for theProvince. “Itwas

discussedinthemeetingwiththeChiefSecretaryandthestaff.Itwasagreeduponatthemeeting,

wewillprepareaprovincialplan,butwill firstworkon thedistrictplansbeforeproceeding todo

that.”9TheDevelopmentPlansofKilinochchiandMullaitivuDistrictsarecurrentlyunderpreparation.

TheChiefMinisteroftheNorthernProvincialCouncilJusticeC.V.Wigneswaran,commentingonthe

PeacebuildingFundrelatedwork intheNorthexpressedhisdispleasureof itbeinganon-inclusive

process. His appeal to the UN Resident Coordinator (UNRC) requesting for the participation of a

member of the elected body of the council, in the Peacebuilding Boardmeetings (instead or) in

addition to theChief Secretaryof theNPC, a Stateofficial, (who, theybelieve cannotmakea fair

representationofthepeople’swar-relatedgrievances)hasyettobemet.10InhisletterstotheUNRCO

and during hismeetingwith the thenUNRC,UnaMcCauley, ChiefMinisterWigneswaran says he

appealedforthe inclusionofamemberoftheelectedbodyofthe“affectedpeopleforwhomthe

Peacebuildingmatrixwaspurportedlyprepared.”11Inhisletter,hestates,“Itisnottoolatetoallow

representativesofthepoliticalleadershipoftheNorthernProvincetohereafterparticipate...Notto

allow the representatives of the victims, the affected and the identified beneficiarieswould be a

travesty of justice”.12 He states in a letter to be delivered at the Peacebuilding Board meeting,

addressedtoMinisterofForeignAffairs,MangalaSamaraweeraandtheUNRC,UnaMcCauley,“on

ourparticipation...Hon.Ms.UnasaiditwasnotpossiblefortheNorthernProvincialCounciltobecome

amemberandparticipate…”13Inhisopinion,itisnotenoughtoinvitetheChiefSecretarywhoisa

publicservantundertheCentralGovernmenttoparticipateatthesePeacebuildingBoardmeetings.

SuchmisunderstandingsseemtohavecausedtheabsenceoftheNorthernProvincialDevelopment

Plan.

The funds that were meant to strengthen the Provincial Council with the formulation of a

6MinutesoftheProgressReviewMeetingonStrengtheningInstitutionalCapacityofSelectedDepartmentsand

Officeof theDeputyChief Secretary - Planning in theNorthernProvinceby Improving ServiceDelivery and

FacilitateDistrictDevelopmentPlan,October16,2017.7 Interview with the Chief Secretary, Northern Provincial Council, Mr. A. Pathinathan on August 29, 2018.

Although, thedecision to carryout theNorthernProvincial Planas a sequel to the fiveDistrict Plans is not

documentedanywhere,hesaidhewasdeterminedtoworkonitnextyear,byconsolidatingthefiveDistrict

Plans.8InterviewwiththeDirector,Planning,ProvincialCouncil,Mr.UmakanthanonAugust29,2018.9InterviewwiththeDistrictSecretaryofJaffna,N.Vethanayahanon29August,2018attheDistrictSecretariat,

Jaffna.10InterviewwithHon.JusticeC.V.Wigneswaran,ChiefMinister,NorthernProvincialCouncilon30August,2018,

Jaffna.11LetterwrittenonApril6,2017,addressedtoHon.MangalaSaamaraweera,MinisterofForeignAffairsand

Hon.Ms.UnaMcCauley,UNResidentCoordinatoretal.12Ibid.

13Ibid

39

development plan of the Northern Province being diverted to the District Secretaries (who are

perceived as the agents of the Central Government; that are non-autonomous bodies, with a

constrictedmandate toserve the region,compared to thepeople’selectedbodyof theProvincial

Council),beliestheproject’swell-definedpurpose,describedinitsjustificationforassistancesought

throughaPBFsource.ItalsomakestherationalefortheUNPBF’sinterventionchallengingtofathom

fromanevaluator’spointofview.TherepeatedcontentionsfromtheNorthernProvincethattheUN’s

interventions are also circumspect if not are unremittingly turning a blind eye to meaningfully

strengtheningprovincialadministrationinthepost-warphase,whichwerehithertoundermined,may

not be entirely valid. Nevertheless, it is an imputation worth reflecting upon, in strategic

implementationofreconciliationprojects,withthe‘conflictsensitivity’itdeserves.

ProjectDocumentationandRecordKeeping–There isnodocumentedrecordtoexplainwhythis

Activityhadnotbeencarriedout.MeetingswiththeUNDPteamtoelicitinformationonthisproved

tobefutile,astherewasnoformalprojectdocument(i.e.projectmeetingminutes)availableonthe

UNDP’s decision/reasons to shift from this key Activity envisaged in the logframe of the project.

Project staff, however, did allude to the non-cooperation of the Chief Minister of the Northern

ProvinceasthereasonfornotdevelopingtheNorthernProvincialPlan.Interviewswithofficialsofthe

UNRCofficealsoverballyvalidatedthesame.Intheabsenceofanywrittendocumentonthismatter

ontheUNDP’spart,theCEPAteamisunabletomakeanyconclusiveobservationonthis,exceptfor

usingthisspacetoconveysentimentsofthedirectstakeholders/beneficiaries(asconveyedabove)on

thisactivity.

Theprojectdocumentunderscorestheneedfora“broad-basedconsultativeprocessanddrawingon

acomprehensivedevelopmentneedsassessmentbytheGovernment,UNandotherhumanitarian

partners…IntheNorth,themulti-sectordevelopmentplanwillbedevelopedincloseconsultationwith

theBoardofMinisters...whileworkingwiththeProvincialMinisters…”(UNPBSCOProjectDocument

2016). However, the team finds this main objective of the Project being circumvented. A formal

explanationbywayofprojectleveldocumentationorPeacebuildingBoard(PBB)minuteswouldhave

helpedtheevaluationteamtounderstandthereason/sbehindthedivergenceofthisactivity,from

theprojectdocument,whichisseeminglyaquintessentialpartofthePBF’ssupport14fortheregion.

StrengtheningRevenueRaisingCapacities– In theNorthernProvince, theactivities tostrengtheninstitutionalcapacityofselecteddepartmentsandtheOfficeoftheDeputyChiefSecretaryPlanning

by improvingservicedeliverieshavebeencarriedoutwell.Themainobjectiveofthisactivity isto

enhance skillsandknowledge to improve theHRcapacityofOfficesof theCommissionerof Local

Government (CLG) and the Assistant Commissioners for Local Government (ACLG) and local

authorities to ensure better service deliveries and resource utilisation. Activities have also been

carried out to improve institutional capacities and capability of the planning secretariat of the

Provincial Council to ensure better planning and implementation; systematise legal constitutional

provisionstomaximiseresourceusage.

SomeinterventionshavebeenmadeinkeyNorthernProvincialDepartments,andinclude:supportto

theDepartmentofCommissionerofLocalGovernmentandallACLGoffices;supporttodevelopthe

14Rationale forPBFSupport:“theprojectwillworkwith theNorthernProvincialadministrationandEastern

Provincial administration to enable them to produce strategic plans and strengthen revenue generation to

supportdevelopmentactivitiesthataddresstheprioritiesofconflictaffectedpeople”Projecttitle:Supportto

SriLankatopromotenationalunityandreconciliationeffortsthroughtargetedtechnicalassistancetotheONUR

and the Northern Provincial Administration and Eastern Provincial Administration. United National

Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSCO)/Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), IRF Project Document. Project Start Date

February1,2016.p.10.

40

institutional capabilities of the Provincial Management Development and Training Unit (MDTU);

systematiserevenuegenerationservicesoftheDepartmentofMotorTrafficandtheDepartmentof

Provincial Revenue; support to establish a “one-stop service bureau” to improve industrial

developmentandalsotopromoteinvestmentwithintheProvince.

MonitoringandImplementation–InterviewswiththeHeadsofsomeoftheseDepartmentsrevealed

thesuccessfulcompletionoftheactivitiesthathaveenabledindividualsandinstitutionstoengagein

sustainablelocaleconomicdevelopment/revenuegenerationactivities.Officialsvouchforincreased

levelsofeffectivenessingovernanceinstitutionsforefficientservicedelivery.Thereisalsoincreased

levels of knowledge among policy makers and development partners on good practices of

transparency,localeconomyandlocalgovernance.Communitymemberstoofeelempoweredwith

skillsandabilitytoparticipateinlocalgovernanceactivities.

AttheMotorTrafficDepartmentforinstance,theynowpossessthesoftwarecomponentthatlinksall

theDSofficestooneplace,incomparisonwiththepast,whentheyhaddifficultiesgettingaccessto

computeraccessories,intheirdepartment.TheCommissionerforMotorTrafficclaimsthattheyhave

purchased41computersundertheProjectandprovidedthemtoeveryDSdivisionintheProvince.

“The technicalpackagesarealreadypreparedby the ICTAandare linkedwithall computers. The

softwareiseasytoaccessbythepublicinnotime.Therewasatimetheyhadtowaitlonghoursto

getamotorlicense.Thishaschangedthingsradicallyforthebetter.”15

TheDepartmentofLocalGovernmentalsocommendedtheobservablechangesthathavetakenplace

asaresultoftheUNDP’sProjectintervention.Speakingofacaseinpoint,itwaspointedoutthatthe

valuationexerciseinKarachiandKararaipatrudivisionsinKilinochchiwerequitesuccessfulbecause

thesetwolocalauthoritiesinthepast,lackedsystemstovaluatetheirsourcesforrevenues.Theywill

now be able to earn around Rs. 15million per annum from taxations. The introduction of these

revenuegenerationserviceshasenabledtheDepartmentofProvincialRevenuetovaluateproperties

andearntheduetaxes–aphenomenonthatwasnotavailableinpre-2016.Thereisinformationthat

taxeswerecollectedinthe1960s.ThisUNDPinterventionisbeingshowcasedasasuccessfulpioneer

project,oncegazetted.Thetaxcollectionprocesswillstartin2018or2019.AroundRs.2millionhas

beenspentonthevaluationexerciseofjustaboutsevenareas.Thereisagreatlackofresourcesto

evaluateallconflict-affectedareasintheProvince.Onlyfewlocalauthoritiescancarrythisworkout

withtheirownfunds,therestneedfinancialsupport.16

TheDepartment ofManagementDevelopment and TrainingUnit (MDTU), has conducted TOTs in

aboutfivemajoractivitiesofMDTU.About195frontlineofficersweretrainedincluding,89whowere

female officers.Gender participation is at least 50%, but thereweremorewomenparticipants in

general,inthesetrainings.ThecapacitybuildingtrainingincludedinformationonSDGgoals,howto

work with the grass root levels, how to incorporate SDG planning in the sessions, capacity

managementetc.17

TheCitizens’Charter introduced in somedepartments in theProvince too,hasbeena resounding

achievementintermsofempoweringthegeneralmasses.Thereisasharpdeclineincomplaintsafter

the public display of the charter. Such public awareness raising mechanisms helps mainstream

transparency,accountabilityandgoodgovernance.Thissentimentisintenseinareasrecoveringfrom

beingformerlyundertheLTTE’scontrol.Thevalueformoneyintermsofthecapacitydevelopment

15BasedoninterviewwithCommissioner,DepartmentofMotorTraffic,Ms.S.SujeevaonAugust29,2018.

16InformationbasedoninterviewwithCommissionerforLocalGovernment,Mr.PatrickDiranjan.

17 Information based on interview with Deputy Chief Secretary, Personnel and Training (MDTU), Mr. A

Sivabanasundaran.

41

andskillsenhancementworkintheNorth,hasbeenfullyachieved.However,assistanceforfurther

workremainsadireneedinmanypartsoftheregion.

The Eastern Province Development Plan – The second medium term development plan was

developedbasedontheneedsofthedevolvedsubjectsoftheEastfrom2017to2020,(basedonthe

first plan thatwas developed in 2012 to 2016). Themedium term development plan includes all

subjectsdevolved to theprovince i.e. irrigation, agriculture, educationetc.UNDP fundswerealso

allocatedtodeveloptheTrincomaleeDistrictPlanwhichwasnotcoveredbyformerinterventions.

TheDistrictDevelopmentPlan2017hasbeenprepared andwill bepublished shortly.All sectoral

needshavebeenidentified.

In theProvincialCouncils in theNorthandEast, theoverallobjectiveof theGovernance for Local

EconomicDevelopmentprojectsunder theUNDP,PBFassistancewere carriedout todevelop the

institutional capacity for better service delivery and improvement of systems to establish good

governancepracticesinselectedinstitutionsoftheNPCandtheEPC.

ThestaffmembersoftheEPCfeltthattheyhaveexperiencedalargercapacitydevelopmentcourse

(justasmuchasthestaffoftheNorthernProvince),owingtotheirworkengagementondeveloping

theEasternProvincialPlanwiththeUNDP’ssupport.Thisdocumentisavailableinthepublicdomain.

MechanismstoStrengthenRevenueRaisingCapacities–Theseactivitieshavebeencommendably

implemented. IntheEast,theexperiencehasalsohelpedthemtopreparesectoralplans,financial

plansfortheMinistryofFinanceetc.basedonthisknowledge-enhancingexperience.Theynolonger

requireconsultantsforplanning.Thiswasasentimentendorsedcollectivelybyallseniorstaffwhom

theCEPAteammetwith,i.e.theDeputyChiefSecretary,PersonnelandTraining;AdditionalDirector,

Planning;ProvincialDirector,Dept.ofRuralDevelopment,CommissionersforMotorTrafficandLocal

Government. Similar gains and claims of the capacity development and knowledge gains were

endorsedbytheircounterpartsintheNorthernProvincialCouncili.e.byDepartmentofMotorTraffic,

CommissionerforLocalGovernmentandtheDeputyChiefSecretary,PersonnelandTraining(MDTU).

Theytoofeltthattheycaninfuture,runthesystemsandcarryouttheirowncapacitydevelopment

work,withtheknowledgegained.

Thiswasalsoalearningexperienceinmanyways.Officialsconductedaseriesofdiscussionspaving

thespaceforopeninteractionsandsystematiseddocumenting.Thisprocessincludescontributions

fromthecivilsocietyandpoliticalrepresentatives.

Avaluableoutcomeintheexposuretosystemsdevelopment/improvementintheEasternProvincial

Council istheirrealisationandtheirinsistenceontheneedtostreamlineaprovincialdevelopment

processforprovincialplanningandcoordination,engineeringservicesmanagementandfinancialand

procurementmanagement.Thetimingandbalancingofactivities intheworkonthesesectorsare

crucialforcoordinateddevelopmentwork.18

TheEasternProvincialCouncil’sConsolidatedAnnualImplementationProgramme,(CAIP)anditsweb-

baseddatabasesystem,asasingleofficialinformationsystemisapositiveoutcomeofthisventure.

Some of the noteworthy activities undertaken by the Provincial Planning Secretariats (PPS) are asfollows:18InformationbasedoninterviewwithformerDeputyChiefSecretaryPlanningoftheEPCN.Mahendrarajaand

fromtheslidepresentationofBalancedRegionalDevelopmentandSDG,ProvincialPlanningSecretariat,Eastern

ProvincialCouncil,Trincomalee.

42

Fundsallocatedforthedevelopmentforumhadbeendivertedfordevelopingcapacityofseniorstaff

oftheEPCinstitutionsandstrengtheningtheinstitutionalcapacitiesforbetterservicedeliveryofthe

OfficeoftheChiefSecretaryandProvincialPlanningSecretariat.

ImprovementoftheexistingDivisionalResourceProfilehasalsotakenplacewiththeinstallationof

thesoftwareattheDistrictandDivisionalSecretariatswiththeimprovementofDigitizedDivisional

Resource Profile. Capacity development trainings to senior staff have ranged fromWorkshops on

LeadershipandChangeManagement;preparationofReportsonStreamliningProvincialDevelopment

ProcessandPracticesandProcurementManagementandalsoonStrengtheningPlanningCapacityof

EPC Officials. Some programmes have been carried out on Architectural and Drawings for Civil

StructuresandRegulationsandPracticesforConstructionofBuildings.

OneofthehighlycommendedactivitieswastheimprovementoftheCAIPweb-basedDatabasewith

additionalfeaturesandfacilitieswithmodificationsintroducedbyFinanceCommission.

StaffTrainingandSoftwareDevelopment–AwebbasedRevenueManagementSystem(RMS)has

been developed and installed at Provincial Departments of Revenue in theNorthern and Eastern

provincial councils. Staff have been trained to operate the software with the procurement of IT

equipment for the efficient running of the RMS. As for the training activities of theMDTU, staff

expressedhighsatisfaction for theTrainingofTrainers (TOT)Programmesconducted inTamiland

Sinhala.AsfortheProvincialTreasurysoftwareformanagingassetsbelongingtoinstitutionsunder

the Eastern Provincial Council (AssetManagement Software), it has been developed and relevant

Chief Accountants, Accountants and Development Officers have been trained on its usage. The

Department of Rural Development has benefitted with an IT based system known as “Rural

DevelopmentSocieties’ InformationManagementSystem”(RDSIMS).Thishelpsthemmonitorand

manage information on Community BasedOrganisation (CBOs) at provincial level, systemise their

registrationandupdatethesystemonaregularbasis.Aplethoraofactivitiesincapacitydevelopment

of skill and knowledge and also on Peacebuilding and Reconciliation related Training to Rural

DevelopmentSocieties(RDS)sandWomen’sRuralDevelopmentSocieties(WRDS)shavebeencarried

out.Womenhavebeenactiveparticipantsattheseworkshopsandborewitnessatourmeetingonto

howtheyhavedirectlybenefittedthroughthesetrainingsforbetterperformancesintermsofsystems

andfinancemanagementintheirvillages.Anotherinstitutionthatbenefittedthroughthisprojectis

theDepartmentof Rural Industries.A rangeof activities have takenplaceunder thisDepartment

including the Vocational training for youth; Support to establish a sales unit for selectedwomen

groupsi.e.modificationoftheSalesCentreinBatticaloatownwithnecessarycomputers,furniture,

fittingsandotherfacilities.

CAIPdatabaserelatedworkcontinuestobeupdatedbythevoluntarycontributionsoftheEPCstaff.

Acentraliseddatabasemanagementsystemhasbeenbeneficialinmanyways.i.e.tomaintainacadre

management system; identify the areas of strengths; the gaps etc. It has also increased their

partnershipandenabledthestafftoresolvepubliccomplaintsbywayofacollectiveeffort.TheCAIP

web based data base is attracting the attention of other Provincial Councils for its best systems

managementpractices.Theyfeel,theyneednoexternalconsultanttobehiredfortrainingpurposes.

Aroundthetimeoftheevaluation,atrainingindevelopingaCAIPdatabasewasbeingofferedtothe

staffoftheSabaragamuwaProvincialCouncilofficetostrengthentheirtechnicalcapacities.

AsfortheRevenueManagementsystem,ithashelpedsystematisetheavailabilityofdata/information

onpropertiesandownership;identifiedgapsandincreaserevenuesandreduceddelaysinpayment.

43

3.2.2.2MechanismRelatedFindingsDedicatedofficersofbothProvincialCouncilsintheNorthandtheEastwereanevidentreasonfor

thesuccessofmostofthecapacitydevelopmentworkinservicedeliverywork.Conscientioussenior

andmid-rangeofficialsincludingtheCommissioners,DirectorsandtheirDeputiesintheDepartments

ofPlanning,LocalGovernment,MDTU,MotorTraffic,RuralDevelopmentetc.inthesetwoprovinces

were the ‘live-wires’ of resources that these projects have empowered. The evaluators identified

thesemotivatedindividualstobethecontributoryfactorsforsuccessamongallprojectstakeholders.

Without the innerwill and dedication of these Heads of Departments, therewould be very little

motivationfortherespectivedepartmentstoproduceremarkablework.

Beside other benefits that have accrued to the general public through the introduction of the

Governance for Local Economic Development (GLED) activities, the staff of these departments

believe,thattheprojectshavehelpeddeveloptheirownpoolofresourcepeoplewhocouldcarryout

furtherworkontheirown.Owingtothesystemsupdatethathasbeeninitiated,thereisnoneedin

futureforacostingforresourcepersonsandthedevelopmentofbasicinformationfortheregions,as

itisnowonlyamatterofupdatingexistingrecordswhenpublicisingnewinformationonrequest.

There isanoverall senseofsatisfaction intheadvancementofsystemsandprocessesset inplace

through theGLED project in the Eastern Provincial Council. The benefits range from a balance in

distributionoffunds;availabilityoftrainedstafftoactiveparticipationofRuralDevelopmentSociety

(RDS)andWomen’sRuralDevelopmentSociety(WRDS)andareductioninpaperwork.

Theofficialsacknowledgethedirectpositiveimpactontheenhancementofskillsandknowledgeof

thestaffinmorethanoneway,i.e.whenobtainingITknowledge,staffbydefaultalsoenhancetheir

knowledgeinEnglish,goodgovernance,accountabilityandtransparency.

TheleadershipprovidedbytheChiefSecretaryandDeputyChiefSecretaryPlanning;communication

andcoordinationbetweenagencies;cooperationoftheimplementingagenciesinfunallocationsetc.

andmostimportantlycommitmentofstaffwithapositiveapproachhavecontributedtothesuccess

storyoftheGLED2activities.

Challenges in implementation – Officials felt that the coordination with District and Divisional

Secretarieswouldbeneededinfutureimplementation.Thelackofsupportandcooperationfromthe

District and Divisional Secretariats for data entry was noted by the Provincial Council staff as an

obstacle.Theyalsosawpoliticalinterferenceasachallengetotheirworkaspertheirplans.Theytend

to disrupt the process by introducing resources to already benefitted areas of their constituency

causing imbalance in development and duplication in fund allocations, viz. Tamil areas remain

underdevelopedowingtolackofattentionofbothTamilandMuslimpoliticians.TheEPCisableto

rectifythistoagreatextentowingtotheavailabilityofthedatabaseandtheinformationobtained

throughit.

Theonlyareaofslowprogressaccordingtothem(inbothprovinces)wasthedevelopmentof the

Statute inturningthemintoa legallybindingprovisions.Multiple levelsofobstaclesseemtohave

sloweddownthisprocess.Althoughthiswasamajorrequirement,theywereunabletocompleteit

owingtothedepartureofaconsultantwhowashiredforthisactivity.Hence,thefundswerediverted

forotherareasofneeds.Thistoowaspossibleasstaffwereabletoforecastnon-productiveareasand

possessedtheagencyandknowledgetodivertfunds.

44

Activity2:PublicConsultationwithCSOsandCommunityGroupstoestablishaCitizen’sCharterto

monitorservicedelivery

ImplementationoftheCitizen’sCharter–ThisismostwelcomeinboththeNorthernandtheEastern

Provinces.Thepublicwhootherwisedidnotknowwhatdocumentstheyhavetosubmit,bringthe

applicationandcomplainorgetswindledbythetoutswhomisleadtheminpublicplaces.Thishas

beenaperennialprobleminalmostallpartsoftheprovinceespeciallyintheNorth,i.e.inJaffnaand

KilinochchiPradeshiyaSabhasandtheMunicipalCouncil.Thepublicisinconveniencedandwereoften

turnedbacktobringtherequireddocuments.But,withtheintroductionoftheCitizen’sCharterin

whichinformationregardingrequireddocumentationfortheregistrationofbusinessesandlandetc.

ispubliclyavailable,peoplearenolongerharassed.Thisisevidentintheremarkablereductionofthe

comparative number of complaints that were received before and after the introduction of the

CitizensCharter.Publicawarenessondocumentationhasalsoarisenfollowingtheintroductionofthe

Citizens’ Charter and there is a remarkable reduction of corruption issues and the upholding of

professional ethics of transparency and accountability in achieving good governance related goals

throughthisactivityaswell.AhighlevelofcontentmentwaswitnessedintheNorthernandEastern

ProvincesduringtheinterviewsandtheworkshopintheprovinceontheCitizens’Charter.

Consideringthegenderaspectofthetraining,theofficialsofthetwoprovincesarewellawareofthe

minimum25%women’sparticipationthatisrequired.Hence,priorityisgiventowomen,intraining

programmes.Ataproject implementation levelandat the levelof thebeneficiariesof theWRDS,

womenexpressedhowtheirlevelsofconfidencehavearisenafterthetrainingstheyhavereceived.

Theyarealsoable toextendtheirknowledgetoefficientlymanagetheWRDSdatabaseand fund

transactionswithahighleveloftransparencytobenefitallwomenintheircommunities.

IntheEasternProvince,theCitizen’sCharterDevelopmentProjectthroughtheMDTUstaffhasfirst

andforemostenhancedtheskillsofthestaffbeforeservingthepublic.Citizen’sChartershavealso

beenpreparedbytheDept.ofLocalGovernmentfor02localauthorities,ProvincialDirectorHealth

SectorOffice,Dept.ofAnimalProductionandHealthandDept.ofAgriculture.Theyarealsoondisplay

ina)AgricultureOffice,Amparab)MCAkkaraipattuc)MOHOfficeAmpara,d)UCAmpara,e)District

OfficeofAnimalProductionandHealth,Ampara.Aveterinarysurgeonattheworkshopvalidatedthe

assistanceoftheequipmentfordisplayingCitizenChartersthathavebeeninstalledintheseplaces.

Assistancetoprocuremoresuchequipmentwasexpressed.

3.2.2.3OutcomeRelatedFindingsContextual factors in the Northern and Eastern Provinces have been well informed and well

considered in theconceptualisingof theprojectsand thedeliveryof someaspectsofOutput2of

Project2.The social, cultural, economicandpolitical contextual imperativesare recognisedunder

Activities1and2, i.e.theneedforstrengthening institutionalcapacityofselecteddepartmentsby

improvingservicedeliveryandharnessingsuccessful interventions thatwouldproducesustainable

andlongtermimpact.Theprojectgoalsforthispurposearealignedwiththecommunity’sneedsand

aspirations that have a bearing on the success of the interventions. The improving of service

components have occurred in a linear fashion and have been carried out systematically. The

implementationofcertainaspectsoftheOutputwereextremelysuccessfulcomparedtoothersowing

to some champions who believed in the need of their importance and armed with a sense of

commitmentversusindividualswhodidnotbelieveintheimportanceofdevelopment.Theyblamed

itonthedevelopmentofanon-inclusivepeacebuildingmatrixthatearmarkedtheregionforPBF’s

specialinterventions.

45

TheUNDP’sassistancetostrengtheninginstitutionalcapacityofselecteddepartmentsbyimproving

servicedeliverieswiththeNPCandtheEPChaveinmostcaseshelpedthemintrinsicallystreamline

activitiesinmostoftheDepartmentsintheNorthernandtheEasternProvincialCouncilswhilstothers

followclosely.

Challengesinimplementation–StaffexpressedtheneedforthedirectinvolvementofsectorHeads

duringthepreparationstageoftheCitizen’sCharter.Theyalsoneedassistanceinselectingsuitable

consultantsespecially,fortranslatingintotheSinhalaandTamillanguages.Thereisgenerallyadearth

oftranslatorsinallsectorsespeciallyforthecreationofatrilingualwebsitefortheEPCcompletewith

alltheinformation.Lackofinterest/encouragementofthetopofficialsinimplementingthefindings

oftheconsultantsreportsinsomesectorswasnoted.

More fundingwas required for developingmore user-friendly digital display in all areas. Officials

noticedaproceduraldelayinthereleaseoffundsfortheEasternProvincialCouncilfromtheUNDP

sidetokeepuptheflowofactivities.

UNDPsupportisappealedforassistanceinpromotingtheCitizens’Charterinallpartsoftheregions

asitservesavitalpurposeintransformingwar-affectedpeoples’livestonormalcyespeciallyinareas

thatwerepreviouslyundertheLTTEwhichseveredtheirconnectionswiththeStatemechanismsand

institutions.

Withtherapidlychangingcontext,extensiveconsultationsatplanning,designingandimplementation

stages have taken place intermittently between the UNDP and the Provincial Offices in terms of

strategisingandreformulatingactivitiesrelatedtostrengtheningcapacity.Thiswasacommendable

featurewhichwasnotsoevident inotheractivities, i.e.workwiththeNPCforProvincialPlanand

aspectsoftheONUR’swork

3.2.2.4 LessonsLearnedReconciliation-related good governance – There is public demand for reconciliation by way of

meaningfuldevolutionthroughademocraticprocessofdecentralisationofpowerstotheprovincial

andlocalauthorities.TherearemanyareasofgovernancerelatedcontentionintheProvincevis-a-vis

theCentre,i.e.acaseinpointistheBusinessTurnoverTaxthatwascollectedbytheProvincialCouncil

which is now takenover by theCentre/lineministry. This deprives theprovince froma sourceof

incomefordevelopmentandcausesmuchdispleasure,aggravatingthecentre-peripherydifferences

in these regions. This also aggravates the negative perceptions of the Centre’s repressive tactics

amongthepeopleoftheregion.Effortscouldhavebeenmadetoaddresslacunaeinpeacebuilding

and Transitional Justice aspects of good governance by the strategic usage of PBF resources for

reconciliationingovernancerelateddimensionsoftheProvincialbodiesratherthanonthegeneral

governance-related activities already carried out. Such activitieswould allow these institutions to

functionwith a certain amount of autonomy, strengthening the reconciliation process, instead of

placingtotaldependencyontheCentre.TheCentre-peripherychasmremains.Givenanethnichue,

theycouldonlydeepenfurther.

Contextsensitivework–TheEasternProvincialCouncil(justasmuchastheNPC)hasbeenclamouring

in the past for Inclusive development and democratic decentralisation within the National Policy

FrameworkandtheneedforanintegrateddevelopmentplanfortheEasternProvince.Bythis,they

meanameaningfulcoordinationofnationalpoliciesandprioritiestogetherwiththeSDGtargets,to

worktowardsdevelopmentofthesocio-economicpotentialoftheregion.19TheNorthernProvincial

Councilhasalsovoicedtheirneedforinclusivedevelopment.Therefore,itisincumbentuponproject

19FromtheEPCslidepresentationofBalancedRegionalDevelopmentandSDG.

46

implementers to be informed by local socio-economic and political contextual conditions of each

region,whenconsideringhowthefuturePBFfundrelatedactivitiescanbeadaptedtodiscernmere

governancerelatedworkversusPBF-supportedgoodgovernancethroughthelensofreconciliation.

It has missed an “…opportunity to build on this positive momentum and support the Northern

ProvinceandtheEasternProvincetosetoutitsdevelopmentvisionandstrategytoaddressitssevere

capacityconstraints…toadvancedevelopmentpriorities,”asspeltoutintheprojectdocument.

ItwasoverallappreciatedthattheUNDP’sGLED1and2projectsthatcameinasasequeltotheLocal

Governance Project (LOGOPRO) work of the UNDP, since 2008, addressedmost of the gaps and

requestsoftheEasternProvincialCouncilwhenidentifyingareasofinterventionsasdesiredbythe

ProvincialCouncil.Theyaregratifiedattheagencytheypossessedandtheknowledgetheyhadgained

throughthisproject,inbeingabletodirectthefundstowardtheiractualneed.

EvaluationMatrix:

Project Two: “Support to Sri Lanka to promote national unity and reconciliation efforts

through targeted technical assistance to the ONUR and the Northern Provincial

AdministrationandEasternProvincialAdministration.”

Output2:NorthernProvincialadministrationandEasternProvincialadministrationenabled

to produce strategic plans and strengthen revenue generation to support development

activitiesthataddresstheprioritiesofconflictaffectedpeople.

CMOConfiguration Category RemarksContext Relevanceofthetheory

atworkAnenablingbackdropandspaceforreconciliationthroughtechnicalassistanceremainsvalid.

Mechanism Relevance

Prioritiesofconflictaffectedpeopleneedfocus.Projectremainsrelevantandimportant.

Effectiveness

Overallplanning/implementationofachievingoverallpurposeofproject’sobjectivesofdevelopingmulti-sectordevelopmentplanstoaddresstheprioritiesofconflict-affectedpeopleisincomplete.However,theaspectwithregardstostrengtheninginstitutionswassuccessful.

Efficiency

Servicesandsupporttotheregionhavebeencost-effectiveandefficientlymanagedbyrespectivesectorsinthetwoProvinces.

GenderDimension Gender-parityandgender-sensitiveprojectinterventionsaremainstreamedininstitutionalpracticesinthetwoProvincialCouncils/UNDP’soverallactivities.

47

OutcomeImpactandSustainability

Positive?Negative?Neutral?

-PositiveimpactandsustainabilityevidentintheregionontheoutputonstrengtheninginstitutionalcapacityandservicedeliveryworkrelatedtobothProvincialCouncils.-Negativeimpactintermsof‘enablingtheNorthernProvincialCounciltoproducestrategicplanstoaddressthepriorityofconflictaffectedpeople’.

4. Recommendations

ThisLessonsLearnedexercisehasbrought to light thesubstantiveundertakingofactivitiesby the

UNDPunderthePBFassistedprojectsandtheirpositiveandnegativeimpacts.Whilecommending

the overall interventionsmade by the UNDP in its sincere attempts to initiate reconciliation and

TransitionalJusticemechanisms,thefollowingsetofrecommendationsareofferedforconsideration,

hoping theywouldprovide contextual information for any future interventions, as overall lessons

learned.

1. TheoryofChangeApproach–Ifthisapproachisbeingused,thenitisrecommendedthatitis

usedthroughoutthewholeprojectmanagementcycle,andnotonlyatthedesignstage.The

theoriesbehindstrategicactionsshouldbeunderstood,monitoredandthecontextchanges,

beadaptedaccordingly.Itshouldnotbeusedasastaticapproach,similartothelogicalor

results framework approach. This would curb the usefulness of the approach for fluid

contexts.

2. ProblemDrivenIterativeAdaption(PDIA)Approach–Forprojectsworkingonpeacebuilding

orworkinginfluiddynamiccontexts,theuseofstaticprogrammingtoolssuchastheResults

BasedFrameworkisnotrecommended.Itslimitationshavebeendiscussedearlier.Instead,

theusageofaPDIAapproachisproposed.Thisthinkinghasgainedalotoftractionamongthe

development community and comes recommended for state crafting work dealing with

sensitivefluidcontexts.“Manyreforminitiativesfailtoachievesustainedimprovements in

performancebecauseorganisationsusemimicrytocamouflagetheabsenceofrealchange.

Thatis,theypretendtoreformbychangingwhatpoliciesandorganisationalstructureslook

likeratherthanwhattheyactuallydo”(Andrews,Pritchettetal:2012).PDIAisanchoredontransformation of institutionswith a focus on “what is actually done” to ensure sustainedperformanceimprovement,ratherthanfocusingonpolicychangeorhoworganisationslooklike(structure).

3. RelationshipManagement–Peopletrustpeople,andpeoplearemorelikelytobesupportive

orcollaboratewithpeopletheycanrelateto.Thishumanfactorneedstobeconsideredin

projectslookingtoinfluencepeopleandinstitutionalchange.Therefore,itisrecommended

that relationshipbuildingapproachesand techniquesbeutilised toensureproject results.

Specifically, in peacebuilding contexts its recommended that the UN prioritize the

developmentofstrongworkingrelationshipsbuiltontrust,understandingandpartnership,

movingawayfromdonor-beneficiaryapproaches.

4. ProgrammingApproach–WhilekeepinginmindtheinvisibleborderthattheUNorprojects

suchasthesemustoperatewithin,itisrecommendedthatprogramminginamorecommitted

48

fashion,takesresponsibilitytocreatelastingchangeespeciallywheregapsareevident.Itis

aninherentimperativethatneedstobeaddressedasdescribedearlier.

a. ReportingandKnowledgeManagement–Projects,especiallythoseoperatinginfluid

and unstable contexts must undertake substantive documentation, reporting and

knowledgemanagement. Thepresenceofwhichwill empower stakeholders to take

holisticresponsibilityandownership.

b. ProactiveMonitoringandRiskManagement–Asstatedabove,activemonitoring,

usageoffindings,riskmanagementandstrategicadaptivemanagementneedstoform

theenginethatdrivesthesetypesofprojects.Itenablesprojectstorespondtochanging

situations,people,issues,whilestillaimingatachievingtheexpectedresults.

c. ProactiveGenderrelatedProgramming–Opportunitiesaboundindynamiccontexts

tochangethestatusquoofespeciallywomen,andtheseneedtobecapitalisedupon.

Clearerunderstandingaboutgenderissuesneedstobeactivelybuiltintoprogrammes,

anddedicatedactivitiesimplemented.

d. InclusiveConsultationandCommunication–WhiletheUNRCOundertakesstrategic

guidancetothepeacebuildingandreconciliationprocess,wheretheimplementationis

beinghandedovertoaspecificagency, itsimperativethatthatagencyis includedin

the design phase. It is understood though, that it may not be possible for the

implementingagencytotakepartinallhighlevelconsultationsandmeetings,orwhen

necessary. When persistent demands for inclusive dialogues and requests for a

participatoryexercisearemadebydirectstake-holders (whocouldalsobepotential

spoilers) and representatives from the war-affected zones, through formal lines of

communicationgiventhepeculiarityofthecircumstances,thecontextandthepurpose

of the Peacebuilding Fund’s rationale for intervention, an accommodative approach

would be desirable. This would save acute criticism undermining the PBF’s good

intentions. Inclusivity in the Peacebuilding Board set up with a particular purpose,

(unlikeforthepurposeofanyotherdevelopmentproject),isrecommended,insteadof

rigid exclusivity. This could have ensured success of programmatic interventions as

planned.Thepreponderantaccusationof ‘absenceof consultation’whenconceiving

especiallyapeacebuildingmatrixfortheaffectedpeople(whichisasimportantasany

othermeredevelopmentproject)couldhavebeenavoided. Ontheotherhand, it is

also necessary that means of internal communication and information sharing is

rigorouslypracticedsothatprojectsmaybeconsistentlyandeffectivelyimplemented.

e. Documentationandrecordkeeping–Programmestaffmustbeconsistentinkeeping

up the good practices of keeping/maintaining documentation evidence on

programmatic activities, especially in challenging programmatic areas of non-

performance-diversionofplansandpointsofdeparturefromtheactivitiesoriginally

envisaged in the log frames, to justify the new course of actions. i.e. minutes of

oversightcommitteemeeting,projectteammeetings,lettersofagreements.

f. Improvingservicedelivery–TheNorthernandEasternProvincialCouncils’,Planning

OfficersandHeadsofDepartmentswereintotalcommandoftheconcept.Allactivities

have been carried outwith personal commitment by all of them,with no poignant

condition that deserves attention, except for the appeal for the UNDP’s sustained

engagementinstrengtheningtheplanningunitsinthelocalgovernmentministriesand

departments–acurrentregionalrequirement.Providingassistanceforimprovement

ofservicedeliveryinotherpartsofthesetworegionstoowouldbeverybeneficial.The

success is attributed to the local adoption of the broader activity of “multi sector

49

development” speltoutby theUNDPoffice (underProject2,Output2), to suit the

regionalimperativesontheground.TheflexibilityaccordedtotheProvincialCouncils

todoso,washighlycommended.Thisledtothecommunity’sownershipofthework

and bottom-up-approaches of people’s participation. Areas with multicultural

communities such as in Trincomalee, also had high participation in such peace-

dividends-relateddevelopmentactivities.

50

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AnnexuresAnnex01WorkPlan

Activity 08/1 08/2

08/3

08/4

09/1

09/2

09/3

09/4

10/1

10/2

SubmissionofInceptioneport 6th

UNinternalreviewofInceptionReport

Secondarydocumentationandpolicyreview*

FieldworkinColombo(KPIsonly)

FieldworkinNorthandEast(KPIsonlyWorkshops)

WritingandAnalysisofDraftLessonsLearntReport

SubmissionofDraftFinalReport 14th

UNInternalReviewofdraftFinalReport

UNSubmissionofFeedbackondraftFinalReport 26th

Validationmeetingandpresentationofresults 28th

SubmissionFinalreport 15th

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Annex02DocumentsRequestedandReceivedforEvaluation

DocumentsRequested Received Missing

ProjectDocumentsof1&2 30thJuly Allmid-termevaluationreportsofProject1and2

Notconducted

LogframeAnalysisintheproposal 30thJuly P1&2Annualworkplanandfinancialbudgets

1stAug(partialAWPprovided)

SCRM–AWP/BudgetsforDec2016-Apr2017ONUR–allAWP/BudgetsafterAug2016

P1&2Annualreportsanddonorreports

1stAug

P1&2SteeringCommitteemeetingminutesandassociatedreports

1stAug-PBFBoard1st&3rdmeetingminutes

AllTechnicalWorkingGrouporProjectSteeringCommitteeminutesforP1&P2

UNDP’sCountryProgrammeDocument

1stAug

MOUswithImplementingPartnerInstitutions

1AugReportsonLOAs

LOA/MOU

PeacebuildingPriorityPlan 1stAug StrategicPlansDevelopedbytheNorthernProvincialadministrationandEasternProvincialadministration(Project2Output1)&DistrictPlansofJaffna,Mullaitivu,Kilinochchi(North)andTrincomalee(East)

NorthernProvinceStrategicPlan:NotsubmittedEasterProvinceStrategicPlan:Submitted.DistrictPlans:OnlyJaffna-Submitted

AnydocumentationProofforProducingandstrengtheningrevenuegenerationtosupportdevelopmentactivities(Project2Output2)

Notsubmitted

ComprehensiveDistrictDevelopmentPlan(ONUR)

N/A

PowerPointpresentedtotheUNonthePPFfront.(SCRM)

Notsubmitted

CommunicationMaterial NotsubmittedNationalPBPerceptionSurvey 1stAug

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Annex03ActivityPlan

TheActivityPlanincludedsecondarydocumentreview;qualitativeandquantitativedatacollectionandtheanalysisbasedontheproposedframeworksofRealistImpactEvaluationandDACmethod.The findings from thevarious tools and the literature reviewwereused to triangulate theoverallconclusions, lessons learned, recommendations for moving forward and possibly guidelines forreplication.

i. SecondaryDocumentReview–This includedananalysisof theprojectdocuments,projectreports,steeringcommitteeminutes,monitoringandevaluationreports,consultationreportsetc.Dueconsideration to the time limitationswasgiven.TheTeamalsodrewuponCEPA’sinstitutionalknowledge,informationandunderstandingoftheresettlementandreconciliationworkintheNorthandtheEastundertakenonbehalfoftheUN,UNDPandUNICEFtofurthercontextualizeandbuildupontheanalysis.

ii. DataCollection – Thebasic project document reviewand thedata collection actionswereconducted simultaneously. Interviews with partners, stakeholder organisations and othercounterpartsusingtheagreedmethodology,toolsandquestionsintheinceptionphasewereconducted. These involved: Key partner interviewswith stakeholders and key project stafffromUNDP,SCRMandONUR.OneworkshopwasconductedintheEasternProvince(insteadoftwo,initiallyenvisagedtobecarriedoutinboththeNorthandtheEast)withtherelevantProvincialSecretariatstaff,Chief/DeputyChiefSecretaryPlanning,Secretary,FinancePlanning,relevant provincial councilors, District Secretariat staff i.e. Divisional Secretaries, DirectorPlanningandifrequiredwiththerelevantDistrictSecretariataswellascommunitymembersandbeneficiaries.Carewastakentosolicit theexperiencesof femalecommunitymembersandcouncilors.ItwasdecidednottoholdaworkshopintheNorthastheProvincialPlanandtwoDistrictPlanswerenotpreparedcontrarytotheinformationintheprojectdocuments.Hence,onlyKPIswerecarriedoutintheNorthwiththestakeholders.

iii. AnalysisandEvaluation–Thestudy teamcollated the information, secondaryquantitativedata,casestoriesandothermaterialcollected,toanalyzethefindingsofthestudyusingtheagreedmethodologicalframeworks.

iv. DraftReport –Thestudy teamdrafted the report for thispurpose, keeping inmindstatedexpectationsandmethodological frameworks.TheDraftReportwassubmittedfor informalpeerreviewatCEPAbeforethedraftwasfinalizedforsubmissiontoUNDP.

v. Validation–Followingfeedback,thestudyteampresentedthedocumentanditsfindingsatavalidationmeeting,hostedbytheUNDP’sJointteam.Themainfindingsandrecommendationswere presented in an elaborative interactive manner conducive for constructive lessonslearning.

vi. FinalLessonsLearntReport–ThedocumentwasfinalizedusingthefinalroundofcommentsreceivedfromthevalidationandsubmittedbacktoUNDP/ResidentCoordinator’sOfficeasperagreedstipulations.

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Annex04FlowofActivitiesandDataCollectionInstrument

DataCollectionInstrument:DraftSemi-StructuredQuestionsforInterviewwithProjectPartners/

Stakeholders

ForSCRM

ContextRelatedQuestions

• As youunderstand it, howdid SCRMcome intobeing? (Probe:Whatwas the contextbehindtheintervention?Whatwerethecontextualassumptionsmade?)

• Why did such a project architecture make sense?What other ideas were discarded?(Probe:Otherconflicttransformationtheoriesandthinking?Whatreallywenton?)

• Had the context for peacebuilding and reconciliationbeendifferent, (similar to2009),would these assumptions have been valid? (Probe: How would the mechanism havelookeddifferent?Whatwoulditlooklikein2020?)

• WasthePPPalignedwiththeSriLankangovernment’speacebuildingandreconciliationpriorities?

Ontology

Socialactionshaveanunderlyingmechanismthatspringfrompeoplesreasoningtomobilizeresourcesinaparticularcontextforthoseactions

Analysisofcontext-mechanismassociationhelps

• bringelementsintotheprogrammeblueprint/programmetheoryoffutureprojects

• Innovate/transformfutureinterventions

Epistemology

Testingthetheorybehindtheregularityofacourseofsocialaction

Activities

• SecondaryDocumentandPolicyReview

• KeyPersonInterviews• StakeholderWorkshop

Method

RealistImpactEvaluationFramework

+theOECD-DACApproach.

(Anevaluationofprogrammingtheoryto

understandthe“context-mechanism*-outcome”aspectsofProjects1and2.)

*

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• InthedesignoftheSecretariat,wasthesocio-politicalsituationofallprovincestakenintoaccount?(Probe:Howso?Canyoutellmeanyparticularities?Whatwasdiscarded?)

• What could have been the features (i.e. Individuals/Institutions) of the context thathelpedtheprojecttoachieveitsoutcome?

• Accordingtoyou,whatwerethreekeythingsthatworkedinthisgivencontext?

• Similarly,whatwas onemain thing that did notwork,when considering the context?(Probe:Perhapsmorethanonething?)

• InthedesignoftheSecretariat,inwhatparticularwaysweretheissuesofwomentakenintoaccount?Wasiteffective?

OutcomeRelatedQuestions

• Is there any generalizable knowledge that you wish to share based on this projectimplementationprocess?

ForONUR

ContextRelatedQuestions

• HowdidONURfirstinitiateitspartnershipwiththeUNPBF?(Probe:Whatwasthecontextbehindtheintervention?Whatwerethecontextualassumptionsmade?)

• WhatwasthevalueadditionthattheUNPBFbroughttoONUR?(Examples)

• Whydidsuchapartnershipmakesense?HowdiditaffectONUR’sapproachtoconflicttransformation?

• What could have been the features (i.e. Individuals/Institutions) of the context thathelpedtheprojecttoachieveitsoutcome?

• InthedesignoftheONUR-PBF,wasthesocio-politicalsituationofallprovincestakenintoaccount?

• InthedesignofONURwhatparticularwayswastheissuesofwomentakenintoaccount?Wasiteffective?

• Accordingtoyou,whatwerethreekeythingsthatworkedinthisgivencontext?

• Similarly,whatwas onemain thing that did notwork,when considering the context?(Probe:Perhapsmorethanonething?)

OutcomeRelatedQuestions

• Is there any generalizable knowledge that you wish to share based on this projectimplementationprocess?

• WouldONURbeabletocarryoutitsworkinadifferentcontext?

ForProvincialCouncils/DistrictSecretariats

ContextRelatedQuestions

• Whatwasthecontextin2015thatenabledPBFtoworkwiththeProvincialCouncils,thatwasnotconducivein2009?

• WhatwasthevalueadditionthattheUNPBFbroughttoProvincialCouncils?(Examples)

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• Whywas a development plan necessary in this context? How is it different fromUthuruVasantheya and Nagenahira Udanaya? Does the current development plan incorporateelementsfromoldernationalplans(i.e.formergovernmentinitiativesfortheprovinces)?

• Whatcouldhavebeenthefeatures(i.e. Individuals/Institutions)ofthecontextthathelpedtheprojecttoachieveitsoutcomesintheNorthandEast?

• In the design of the partnership between the Provincial Councils and the PBF, how wascontextualinformationgathered?

• Howwasthesituationofwomenfactoredin?

• Whatare theuniquechallenges thatwomen face in thisdistrict/province that theprojectattendsto?Areyousatisfiedwiththeinterventions?Doyoufeelitwaseffective?

• Accordingtoyou,whatwerethreekeythingsthatworkedinthisgivencontext?

• Similarly,whatwasonemainthingthatdidnotwork,whenconsideringthecontext?(Probe:Perhapsmorethanonething?)

OutcomeRelatedQuestions

• Is there any generalizable knowledge that you wish to share based on this projectimplementationprocess?

• Doyoufeelthatthecompetenciesofthestaffemployedwasadequatetocarryoutthiswork?

• Whatresourceswouldyouneedtocarryoutthisworkinotherprovinces?How?

ForProgrammaticStaffatONUR/SCRM

MechanismRelatedQuestions

• HavetheONUR,SCRMandMinistryofLocalGovernmentandProvincialCouncilsandotherpartnerinstitutionsachievedtheirintendedresultsofPROJCT1and2?

• Probebasedonresultsframeworkonimpactandsustainability(positive,negative,neutral)

• Inyouropinion,hasthePPPbeensuccessful?Didyoufeeladequatelyconsultedwithregardstoitsdevelopment?Didyoufeelitincorporatednationalinterestssufficiently?

• YoureceivedtechnicalandfinancialassistanceforavarietyofactivitiesthroughtheUNDP.(Probe:Illustratewaysinwhichitassistedyourprogrammingtobesuccessful?)

• Wasthisassistancehelpful?Relevant?Pleaseexplainhow

• What was the gender focused activities that were undertaken? Are you satisfied withconsultation/participationinactivities?Whatcouldhavebeendonebetter?

• Andhowitimpacteduponthecommunitiesyousupported?(positive/negative/neutral)

• Howwouldyoudothingsdifferentlynexttimearound?

• Did technical assistance adapt to the fluctuating conditions in the context? Please explainhow?

• Basedon thecontextwediscussed,doyou feel that the technicaland financialassistancereceivedwasadequatetocounterthecontextualbarriersanddeficiencies?

• TowhatextentdidUNDP’sinterventionstargetedpeacebuildinginthewar-affectedregionsandtherestofregionsofthecountryinachievingOutput1,2and3ofPROJECT1?

• Wereyousatisfiedwiththecostsandbenefitsoftheinterventions?

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• Was it in reasonable proportion to the expected outputs? (probe – use figures from resultsframework+financialreports,especiallyrelatedtogender)

• Wereyousatisfiedwiththeproportionalfinancialbreakdownbetweenvariousactivities;betweeninputcategories?(egcontractualservicesvsgrants)

• Weretechnicalassistanceandfinancesprovidedinatimelyandcosteffectivemanner?

• Did itallow/facilitatesequentialbuildingof interventions?Did itallowforsynergies?(probe–Howitworked)

ForUNDPStaff

ContextRelatedQuestions

• HavetheONUR,SCRMandMinistryofLocalGovernmentandProvincialCouncilsandotherpartnerinstitutionsachievedtheirintendedresultsofProject1and2?

• TheUNDPprovidedtechnicalassistanceforresearch,analysis,andawidevarietyofactivitiestoSCRM/ONUR/PCs.Howwerethesedelivered?Didyoufeeltheyweresuccessfullydone?Whatcouldhavebeenimproved?(Probe:Forexample,howwasthestrategicanalysisandtrackingofPBinitiativesmappingundertaken?)

• Howwellwouldyouevaluatetheflowofcommunicationbetweenthedifferentparties(ThePBFSecretariat,thePBFboard,ExecutiveBoardandIRF/PBFTechnicalCommittees)?

• Doyoufeeltheactivitiesdesignedwereadequatetomeettheexpectedoutputs?

• CouldyouexplainthecoordinationfunctionsandthecapacitydevelopmentthatIRFandPBFprovidedtoimplementingagencies?

• Could you explain theways inwhich the RCO communication unit disseminated the bestpracticesoftheIRFandPPPtothePBFpartners,especiallySCRM?

• Weunderstandthatanationalsurveyonpeacebuildingwasconducted. Howwelldidthisfeedintonationalpolicymakingand,inparticular,thedevelopmentandactivitiesofSCRM?

• What was the mechanism that you used to deliver the programme strategies (inputs/resources?)

• Howdidyouleverageprogrammemechanismagainstbarriersinthecontext?

• Wereresourcesprovidedadequatetotheexpecteddeliverablesoftheproject?

• TowhatextentdidUNDP’sinterventionstargetedpeacebuildinginthewar-affectedregionsandtherestofregionsofthecountryinachievingOutput1,2and3ofProject1?

• Towhatextentwerethecostsandbenefitsoftheinterventionsinreasonableproportiontothe expected outputs? (probe – use figures from results framework + financial reports,especiallyrelatedtogender)

• Were you satisfiedwith the proportional breakdown between various activities; betweeninputcategories?(egcontractualservicesvsgrants)

• Canyoudescribehowthegenderallocationwasutilized?Wasiteffective?

• Wereservicesprovidedinatimelyandcosteffectivemanner?

• Diditallow/facilitatesequentialbuildingofinterventions?

• Is there any generalizable knowledge that you wish to share based on this projectimplementationprocess?

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General

MechanismRelatedQuestions

• Whatwasthemechanisminyouropinion,thatinfluencedtheconfidenceofthecommunitiesthatyouworkedwith?

• Howdidthishappen?(Probe–onthings-people/places-outsidetheresources&strategies)

• Whatmechanismhasbeenusedtomeasuretheimpactoftheactivitiesonpeople?whatwerethefindings?

• Doyoufeelthetechnicalandfinancialassistanceprovidedforthetaskswereadequate?

• Weretheyqualifiedpersonneltocarryouttheinterventions?

• Howwouldyouevaluatetheimpactmadeongenderspecificissues?

• Whatweretheparticularprogrammingelementsthatfocusedonthesituationonwomenandgirls?(probe–howitworked)

OutcomeRelatedQuestions

• Doyoufeeltheproject(s)adaptedtothefluctuatingconditionsinthecontext?Pleaseexplainhow?

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ProvincialWorkshopFormat

Agenda:September6,2018(9am–1pmtobeconductedinTamilorEnglish)

• WelcomeandIntroductiontotheLessonsLearnedExercise(30minutes)

• FocusGroupDiscussionandGroupWork(3andahalfhours)

-FocusGroupDiscussion:(9:30:10:30a.m.)

-GroupExercise:(10:45a.m.to1:00p.m.)

• VoteofthanksandEndofSessionwithLunch

DetailsoftheAgendaoftheWorkshop

1. WelcomeandIntroductiontotheLessonsLearnedExercise(30minutes)

2. FocusGroupDiscussion

(ContextRelatedQuestions)

Ø TellusaboutthecontextinwhichyoustartedtoworkwiththeUNDP.

Ø Briefly explain work carried out for UNDP from your respective Depts? (How did yourrespectiveDepts.benefitfromtheseactivities?)Giveusexamples

Ø Howdiditfulfillyourcommunity’sneeds?Telluswhatchangeyouwitnessnowcomparedtobeforetheinterventions,withtheintroductionofTechnicalAssistance,Training?EnhancedITfacilities.Cross-regionalvisitsandlearnings?

(MechanismRelatedQuestions)

Ø HowhastheassistancereceivedfromtheUNDPhelpedtheProvincialAdministrationtoimprovecapacityforservicedelivery?

Ø Howdoyouthinkthisbenefitedthepeople?Giveusexamples.Ø Weretheseactivitiescosteffective?(Probe:Perhapsmorethanonething?)Ø Were the strategies helpful? Were theresources for the activities adequate?Were there

qualifiedstafftocarryontheinterventions?Ø Werethereadequatewomen’sparticipation?Howdidyouassesstheirinvolvement?

(Beneficiariescanbeencouragedtospeakmoreonthis)

Tea/CoffeeBreak

3. GroupWork

(OutcomeRelatedQuestions)

FOLLOWINGQUESTIONSAREBASEDONTHEFACILITIESEXTENDEDBYTHEUNDPTOTHEPROVINCIALCOUNCILSANDDISTRICTSECRETARIATS)

(Postitactivity–whereeachgroupmemberwritesoutthe3thingsthatworked(1color)and1thingthatdidn’twork(color2).Thenasagrouptheyprioritizethelesson;anddiscusswhythesearethepriorities.)

1. Accordingtoyou,whatwerethreekeythingsthatyouareawareofthatworkedwell(whenconsideringtheregionalcontext:funds;qualifiedstafforgenderparity)withtheUNDP’s interventionswithregardstoDevelopmentPlans,Strengthening InstitutionalCapacityenhancementsforgoodgovernance?

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2. Whatarethe3thingsthatdidnotwork,(whenconsideringtheregionalcontext:funds;qualified staff or gender parity) with the UNDP’s interventions with regards toDevelopmentPlans,StrengtheningInstitutionalCapacityenhancementsetc.?

3. Arethereanyotherlessonthatyouwishtosharewithusforfuturework?

EndofSessionwithLunch

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Annex05ListofIntervieweesandParticipantsattheWorkshop

UN/UNDP

1. ProgrammeCoordinationSpecialist,Ms.DushanthiFernando2. ProjectManager,Mr.MohamedMuzain3. TechnicalSpecialist,Ms.KrishaVelupillai4. AdvisorPeacebuildingandDevelopment,Ms.GeetaSabarwal5. ProgrammeAnalyst-Governance(former),Ms.AmanthiWickremasinghe6. UNPBSODeskOfficer,MrPatriceChiwota7. PeacebuildingSpecialist(former),MsZoeKeeler8. PsychosocialAnalyst(WHO),Ms.SandhaniRajapakse

SCRM

1. DirectorGeneral–Mr.ManoTittawela2. DirectorPBB-Mr.TharakaHettiarachchi

ONUR

1. DirectorGeneral-Mr.Jayasinghe2. FormerDG–Mr.Maliyadda3. Director–Mr.Amb.DaneshCasieChetty4. DeputyDirectorPeacebuilding-Ms.SanduniAriyawansa

MinistryofLocalGovernmentandProvincialCouncil

1. AdditionalSecretary–Mr.BoralessaNorthernProvincialCouncilandJaffnaDistrictSecretariat

1. ChiefMinister,NorthernProvincialCouncilHon.JusticeC.V.Wigneswaran,2. ChiefSecretary,NorthernProvincialCouncil,Mr.A.Pathinathan.3. Director,Planning,ProvincialCouncil,Mr.Umakanthan.4. Commissioner,DepartmentofMotorTraffic,Ms.S.Sujeeva.5. DeputyChiefSecretary,PersonnelandTraining(MDTU),Mr.A.Sivabanasundaran.6. CommissionerforLocalGovernment,Mr.PatrickDiranjan.7. DistrictSecretary,JaffnaDistrictSecretariat,Mr.N.Vethanayahan.

OtherStakeholderKPIs(CivilSocietymembers)

1. Independent Consultant, Member of the Board of Office on Missing Persons, Mr. MirakRaheem.

2. FormerDeputyChiefSecretaryPlanning,EasternProvincialCouncilMr.N.Mahendraraja.3. HeadofZOAinternational,INGORepresentative,UNPBFBoardMr.RagaAlphonsus.

ParticipantsattheWorkshopintheEasternProvincialCouncilonSeptember6,2018

1. AdditionalDirector,Planning,Mr.M.Munazir2. CommissionerLocalGovernment,Mr.M.YSaleem3. ProvincialDirector,Dept.ofRuralDevelopment,Ms.U.Kavitha4. DeputyChiefSecretary,ProvincialTreasury,Mr.I.MHuzain

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5. DeputyChiefSecretary–PersonnelandTraining,Ms.J.J.Muralitharan6. Commissioner,MotorTraffic,Mr.M.I.M.Mahir7. DeputyDistrictPlanningOfficer,DistrictSecretariat,Trincomalee-Ms.Vijayathasan8. FormerProjectCoordinatorUNDP-GLED,MsB.Sivapiragasam9. Director(MDTU),Ms.M.MHalida10. Govt.VeterinarySurgeon,Dept.ofAnimalProductionandHealth,Dr.Ms.N.S.M.Nawsath11. ChiefAccountant,ProvincialTreasury,Mr.B.Konesh12. FarmManager,DDA(Ext)office,Trincomalee,Mr.J.JeizelJazaad13. DirectorPlanning,PPS,Mr.P.Gunaretnam14. AssistantDirectorPlanning,PPS,Ms.V.I.G.Johnpillai15. Beneficiaries16. Women’sRuralDevelopmentSociety(WRDS),Kaluwanchikudy,Ms.S.Srimathy17. WRDS,Kaluwanchikudy,Ms.M.Sunitha18. WRDS,Kaluwanchikudy,Ms.S.Nivaharan19. WRDS,Thampalakamam,Ms.T.Vijayaluxmi

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Annex06TermsofReference

INDEPENDENT LESSONS LEARNED EXERCISE ON PEACEBUILDING EFFORTS IN SRI LANKA BY

ASSESSINGTWOPROJECTS;

Project1:“SupporttoSriLankatopromotenationalunityandreconciliationeffortsthroughtargetedtechnical assistance to ONUR and the Northern Provincial administration and Eastern Provincialadministration”

Project2:SupporttotheSriLankaPBFSecretariatandGovernmentSecretariatforCoordinationofReconciliationMechanisms.

Reportsto:TechnicalSpecialist–TransitionalJustice–UNDP�ProgrammeCoordinationSpecialist–Peacebuilding–UNRCO

DutyStation:Colombo,SriLanka.Suggestedtraveltotheprojectsitesnecessarytoimplementthelessonslearnedtobespecifiedintheproposal

TypeofContract:ContractforGoodsandServices

Languagerequired:English

DurationofAssignment:02Months

ContractStartDate:July/September2018

ApplicationDeadline:�6July/September2018

1.BACKGROUNDANDINTRODUCTION:

InJune2015,SriLankabeganaccessingtheImmediateResponseFacility(IRF)ofthePeacebuildingFund through a joint project developed and submitted by UNHCR and UNICEF to support theresettlementofIDPstolandreleasedbythenewGovernmentfromformerHighSecurityZones.Later,inlinewithanIRFconceptnotewhichisagreedbetweentheGovernmentandtheUNinApril2015,workbeganonthreemoreIRFprojects.Outofthesethreeprojects,onetobeledbyOHCHRinsupportoftheaccountabilityandtransitionaljusticeprocess,andasecondoneledbyUNDPandtheRCOin“support to the Sri Lanka PBF Secretariat and the Government Secretariat for Coordination of

ReconciliationMechanisms”(hereinreferredtoastheProject1),tosupportthejointpreparationofthePeacebuildingPriorityPlan.Thethirdprojecttitled“SupporttoSriLankatopromotenational

unityandreconciliationeffortsthroughtargetedtechnicalassistancetoONURandtheNorthern

ProvincialadministrationandEasternProvincialadministration”(hereinreferredtoastheProject2)was implementedbyUNDPand included specialized technical assistance to theOfficeofNationalUnityandReconciliation(ONUR),andeachoftheNorthernandEasternprovincialadministrations.Inthisassignment,theUNDPrequirestoconductacompleteindependentlessonlearntforsomeparts

65

ofProject1andtheentireProject2.

Followingaseriesofeventsthattookplaceinthecountry’spoliticaltransition,theProjectsweresetuptosupporttheStatetoprogressitspeacebuildingandreformsagendainthecountry-apledgethat formed the basis of both the President’s electionmanifesto aswell as the campaigning thatpreceded the electionof theNationalUnityGovernment. This pledge also transpired into the co-sponsoringofUNHRCResolution30/1,“Promotingreconciliation,accountabilityandhumanrightsinSri Lanka.” Thus, through these projects, the UN aimed at supporting the State, across multipleinstitutionsthatweresetuporstrengthenedtopromotepeacebuildingandreconciliationinSriLanka.

2.SCOPEANDOBJECTIVES

THEPROJECTS:

The scope and objectives of the afore mentioned projects have been described in the “ProjectDocuments”asfollows;

Project1:

AlthoughtheProject1iscomprisedwith2Outcomes,thescopetoconducttheindependentlessonslearntexerciseinthisprojectislimitedonlytoOutcome1.

Outcome1–UnitedNationsPeacebuildingSupportinSriLankaisstrategicallypositionedtosupportnationalpriorities,arrivedatthroughafullyconsultativeandinclusiveprocess,andiseffectively

deliveredinacoordinatedandharmonizedmanner

The relevant Outputs to be considered are as follows:�Output 1 – Peacebuilding Priority Plandeveloped and mechanism established to support coordinated project development andimplementation�Output 2 – Effective implementation of the UN’s Peacebuilding initiatives, withattention to coordination, evidenced based interventions and high-impact results�Output 3 –SecretariatforCoordinatingtheReconciliationMechanismsestablishedwithinthePrimeMinister’sOffice to ensure coordinated and coherent Government strategy to progress reconciliation anddevelopandimplementtransitionaljusticemechanisms

Project2:

Project2hasonlyoneOutcomewhich shouldbe considered completely.�Outcome1 -“Sri Lankasocietywithawell-coordinatedandcoherentsystemtoadvancenationalunityandreconciliation

amongitspeople.”

The related Outputs are as follows:�Output 1: Key mechanisms and processes (elements of aroadmap)fornationalunityandreconciliationcommencedundertheguidanceofONUR

Output 2: Northern Provincial administration and Eastern Provincial administration enabled toproducestrategicplansandstrengthenrevenuegenerationtosupportdevelopmentactivitiesthataddresstheprioritiesofconflictaffectedpeople.

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THEASSIGNMENT:

Againstthebackground,theUNislookingtocommissionanindependentthird-partylessonlearnedexercise of the Projects’ performance, that would provide evidence of the project’s relevance,efficiency,effectiveness,impactandsustainabilityinachievingitsobjectives.

1.Relevance:Theexercisewillassess thedegreetowhichtheproject takes intoaccount the localcontext anddevelopmentproblems. Theexercisewill also review theextent towhich theprojectdesignwaslogicalandcoherent,anditwillassessthelinkbetweenactivitiesandexpectedresults,andbetweenresultsandobjectivestobeachieved.2. Effectiveness: The exercise will assess the extent to which the Project's objectives have beenachieved,comparedtotheoverallprojectpurpose.Inevaluatingeffectiveness,itisusefultoconsider:I) if theplanningactivitieswereconsistentwith theoverallobjectivesandprojectpurpose;2) theanalysisofprincipalfactorsinfluencingtheachievementornon-achievementoftheobjectives.��3.Efficiency:Usinga rangeof costanalysisapproaches, fromtheelaboratecost-effectivenessandcost-benefitanalysis,tocost-efficiencyanalysis,toaquickcostcomparison,theexercisewillassesshowwelldidtheprojectproducetheproductsandservicesitcommitteditselftodeliver;howdocostsaffectthesustainabilityoftheresults;4.Impact:TheexercisewillassessanycredibleevidenceandthemainimpacteffectivelyachievedbytheProjectinthecontextofreference.5.Sustainability:Theexercisewillassesstheprojectcapacitytoproduceandtoreproducebenefitsovertime.Inevaluatingtheprojectsustainability,itisusefultoconsidertowhatextentinterventionbenefitswill continueevenafter theproject is concludedand theprincipal factors influencing theachievementornon-achievementoftheprojectsustainability.Additionally, and outside of the core projects results frameworks, the exercise will also aim atassessing the design logic of the projects.�Particular emphasis should be set to includerecommendations thatwouldhelp informboththedesignof future interventionsaswellasguideongoingprogrammingundertheframeworkofthePPP.Specifically,inregardtointerventionsfundedbythePeacebuildingFund(PBF),whichhavebeendesignedtotakeforwardsomeoftheinitiativesandlogicbehindtheprojectunderreview.(Pleasereferthescopeofwork,enclosed)

3.RESPONSIBILITIES–EXPECTEDOUTPUTSANDDELIVERABLES

EXPECTEDOUTPUTS:

1.Aninceptionreportisproducedoutliningtheworkplan,methodologyandagreedon.Theconsultingcompany/firmshoulddevelopaverycomprehensiveinceptionreportwhichshouldincludetheworkplan,methodology,keyquestionsplannedtobeaskedtothestakeholdersandthejustificationfortheproposedapproach.Thereportshouldnotbemorethana10pagerwithfontsize11.2.AcompletefinallessonlearntreportisproducedandpresentedtotheUNjointteam.AdraftreportshouldbedevelopedandpresentedtotheUNDP/UNRCOfor initialcommentsandfeedbacks.Thereafter,avalidationsessiononthefindingsandrecommendations,usinganinteractivepresentationshouldbeconductedtotheUNJointteam.Thefinalreportshouldhaveincorporatedallthefeedbacksandcommentsandsubmitted.

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DESCRIPTIONOFASSIGNMENT/DELIVERABLES:

Tasks EndProduct/ Approximate

deliverables Timeframe

InceptionReport:Workplanandmethodology/approachforthelessonslearnedexercisewithsufficientjustificationtobeincludedwithmethodsofdatacollection,keyquestionsandtimelines.

Inceptionreport

10August2018

DraftLessonsLearnedReportsharedforcomments/feedback. Draftreport14September

2018

ValidationsessionwithUNJointteam:Apresentationofmainfindingsandrecommendations,usinginteractivemethodology. Presentation

28September2018

Finallessonslearntreport–incorporatedfeedbacksfromValidation

FinalReport12October2018(made on 15October,2018)