Final Case List

Article 25 & 26

1. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar

of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282

2. Sri Venkataramana Devaru and Ors. v. State of Mysore and Ors., AIR 1958 SC 2553. The Durga Committee, Ajmer and Anr. V. Syed Hussain Ali and Ors., AIR 1961 SC 1402

4. Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., AIR 1977 SC 908

5. Bijoe Emmanuel and Ors. V. State of Kerala and Ors., AIR 1987 SC 748

6. Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 853

Article 15 & 16

1. Balaji

2. Ashok Kumar Thakur

3. NM Thomas

4. Nagaraj DO AGAIN

5. Pradeep Jain

Article 13

1. Keshavan Madhava Menon

Past laws are void only to the extent that they are violative of the provisions of A. 13 and not void ab initio. A. 13 has no retrospective effect whatsoever and thus pre-constitutional laws continue with regards to past acts and past offences. Article 13(1) only has the effect of nullifying or rendering all inconsistent existing laws ineffectual or nugatory and devoid of any legal force or binding effect only with respect to the exercise of fundamental rights on and after the date of the commencement of the Constitution. It has no retrospective effect and if, therefore, an act was done before the commencement of the Constitution in contravention of the provisions of any law which, after the Constitution, becomes void with respect to the exercise of any of the fundamental rights, the inconsistent law is not wiped out so far as the past act is concerned, for, to say that it is, will be to give the law retrospective effect. So far as the past acts are concerned the law exists, notwithstanding that it does not exist with respect to the future exercise of fundamental rights.

2. Bhikaji Narayan

A provision, after an amendment to the constitution, was deemed not violative of Article 19(1)(g); whereas before such amendment it stood in contravention of the constitutional provisions. The impugned Act was an existing law at the timewhen the Constitution came into force. That existing law imposed on the exercise of the rightguaranteed to the citizens of India by Article 19(1)(g) restrictions which could not be justified

as reasonable under clause (6) as it then stood and consequently under Article 13(1) thatexisting law became void "to the extent of such inconsistency". Yet, inspite of such inconsistency, such a law existed for the purpose of enforcing all transactions that had taken place before the commencement of such rights under the constitution.

The law continued in force, even after the commencement of the Constitution, with respect to persons who were not citizens and could not claim the fundamental right. The true position is that the impugned law became, as it were, eclipsed, for the time being, by the fundamental right. The effect of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 was to remove the shadow and to make the impugned Act free from all blemish or infirmity.

The coming in of the constitution had eclipsed the law until the time the amendment was brought in and the shadow over the eclipsed law was removed. Thus from the date of the amendment being brought in, the law functioned in its full capacity because it was no longer violative of the FRs.

All laws, existing or future, which are inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of our Constitution, are, by the express provision of Article 13, rendered void "to the extent of such inconsistency". Such laws were not dead for all purposes. They existed for the purposes of pre-Constitution rights and liabilities and they remained operative, even after the Constitution, as against non-citizens. It is only as against the citizens that they remained in a dormant or moribund condition.

3. Ambica Mills

Just as a pre-consti law is void only to the extent of the inconsistency with a FR, a post-consti law shall also be void only to the extent of the violation and not void-ab-initio. Therefore, a post-consti law can be valid with regards to those who don’t even enjoy the rights in the first place and be still born with respect to those who do. There is no conceivable reason why a law which takes away the fundamental right of one class of persons, or minorities or denominations should be void as against others who have no such fundamental rights as, ex hypothesi the law cannot contravene their rights. If no rights are conferred under Part III upon a person, or, if rights are conferred, but they are not taken away or abridged by the law, where is the incapacity of the legislature ?

The voidness is not in rem but to the extent only of inconsistency or contravention, as the case may be of the rights conferred under Part III. Therefore, when Article 13(2) uses the expression 'void', it can only mean, void as against persons whose fundamental rights are taken away or abridged by a law. The law might be 'still-born' so far as the persons, entities or denominations whose fundamental rights are taken away or abridged, but there is no reason why the law should be void or 'still-born' as against those who have no fundamental rights.

4. R.M.D.Chamarbaugwalla (Petitioner) vs. The Union of India (UOI), ( Respondent), AIR 1957 SC 628

The effect of severability of a legislation was in question and whether as a result of such severability, the legislation could stand, albeit without that part which contravened the FR. When a legislature whose authority is subject to limitations aforesaid enacts a law which is wholly in excess of its powers, it is entirely void and must be completely ignored. But where the legislation falls in part within the area allotted to it and in part outside it, it is undoubtedly void as to the latter; but does it on that account become necessarily void in its entirety? The answer to this question must depend on whether what is valid could be separated from what is invalid, and that is

a question which has to be decided by the court on a consideration of the provisions of the Act. There is nothing in these observations to support the contention of the petitioners that the doctrine of severability applies only when the legislation is in excess of the competence of the legislature quoad its subject-matter, and not when it infringes some constitutional prohibitions.

The doctrine of severability rests, as will presently be shown, on a presumed intention of the legislature that if a part of a statute turns out to be void, that should not affect the validity of the rest of it, and that that intention is to be ascertained from the terms of the statute. It is the true nature of the subject-matter of the legislation that is the determining factor, and while a classification made in the statute might go far to support a conclusion in favour of severability, the absence of it does not necessarily preclude it. The resulting position may thus be stated; when a statute is in part void, it will be enforced as regards the rest, if that is severable from what is invalid. It is immaterial for the purpose of this rule whether the invalidity of the statute arises by reason of its subject-matter being outside the competence of the legislature or by reason of its provisions contravening constitutional prohibitions.

Article 12

1. Rajasthan State Elec. Board

To invoke the application of ejusdem generis rule, there must be a distinct genus or category running through the bodies already named. To invoke the application of the ejusdem generis rule there must be a distinct genus or category. The specific words must apply not to different objects of a widely differing character but to something which can be called a class or kind of objects. Where this is lacking, the rule cannot apply, but the mention of a single species does not constitute a genus . In Art, 12 of the Constitution, the bodies specifically named are the Executive Governments of the Union and the States, the Legislature of the Union and the States, and local authorities. We are unable to find any common genus running through these named bodies, nor can these bodies be placed in case single on any rational basis. The doctrine of ejusdem generis could not therefore, be applied to the interpretation of the expression "other authorities" in this article. The expression "other authorities" is wide enough to include within it every authority created by a statute and functioning within the territory of India, or under the control of the Government of India; and we do not see any reason to narrow down this meaning in the context in which the words "other authorities" are used in Art. 12 of the Constitution.

The circumstance that the Board under the Electricity Supply Act is required to carry on some activities of the nature of trade or commerce does not, therefore, give any indication that the Board must be excluded from the scope of the word "State" as used in Art. 12. On the other hand, there are provisions in the Electricity Supply Act which clearly show that the powers conferred on the Board include power to give directions, the disobedience of which is punishable as a criminal offence. The Board was clearly an authority to which the provisions of Part III of the Constitution were applicable.

The Board is also invested by statute with extensive powers of control over electricity undertakings. The power to make rules and regulations and to administer the Act is in substance the sovereign power of the State delegated to the Board. The Board is, in my judgment, "other authority" within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. The expression "authority" in its

etymological sense means a body invested with power to command or give an ultimate decision, or enforce obedience, or having a legal right to command and be obeyed. A constitutional or statutory authority would be within the meaning of the expression "other authorities", if it has been invested with statutory power to issue binding directions to third parties, the disobedience of which would entail penal consequence or it has the sovereign power to make rules and regulations having the force of law.

In my judgment, authorities constitutional or statutory invested with power by law but not sharing the sovereign power do not fall within the expression "State" as defined in Art. 12. constitutional or statutory bodies which do not share that sovereign power of the State are not, in my judgment, "State" within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution.

2. Sukhdev Singh

The agency and instrumentality test laid down in this case by J. Mathews. This was the broader view with regards to the definition of state.

The Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act confers power of entry on employees of the Commission upon any land or premises for the purpose of lawfully carrying out works by the Commission. The Life Insurance Act provides that if any person lawfully withholds or fails to deliver to the Corporation any property which has been transferred to and vested in the Corporation or wilfully applies them to purposes other than those expressed or authorised by the Act, he shall, on the complaint of the Corporation be punishable with the imprisonment which may extend to one year or with fine which may extend to one thousand of rupees or with both. The Industrial Finance Corporation Act states that whoever in any bill of lading, warehouse receipt or other instrument given to the Corporation whereby security is given to the Corporation for accommodation granted by it wilfully makes any false statement or knowingly permits any false statement to be made shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees or with both.

The Corporations enjoys protection of action taken under the Act. A company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act does not enjoy these privileges. Therefore the rules and regulations created by the corporation have the force of state made laws.

In addition to this, it may be stated generally that State financial aid alone does not render the institution receiving such aid a state agency. Financial aid plus some additional factor might lead to a different conclusion. A finding of state financial support plus an unusual degree of control over the management and policies might lead one to characterize an operation as state action.

Another factor which might be considered is whether the operation is an important public function (instrumentality of the state; agency test). The combination of state aid and the furnishing of an important public service may result in a conclusion that the operation should be classified as a state agency. If a given function is of such public importance and so closely related to governmental functions as to be classified as a government agency, then even the presence or absence of state financial aid might be irrelevant in making a finding of state action. If the function does not fall within such a description, then mere addition of state money would not influence the conclusion. These corporations are instrumentalities or agencies of the state for carrying on businesses which otherwise would have been run by the state departmentally. If the state had

chosen to carry on these businesses through the medium of government departments, there would have been no question that actions of these departments would be 'state actions'.

3. RD Shetty (AAI Case)

It will thus be seen that there are several factors which may have to be considered in determining whether a corporation is an agency or instrumentality of Government. We have referred to some of these factors and they may be summarised as under :

whether there is any financial assistance given by the State, and if so, what is the magnitude of such assistance,

whether there is any other form of assistance given by the State, and if so, whether it is of the usual kind or it is extraordinary,

whether there is any control of the management and policies of the corporation by the State and what is the nature and extent of such control,

whether the corporation enjoys State conferred or State protected monopoly status and

whether the functions carried out by the corporation are public functions closely related to governmental functions.

Moreover even amongst these factors which we have described, no one single factor will yield a satisfactory answer to the question and the court will have to consider the cumulative effect of these various factors and arrive at its decision on the basis of a particularised inquiry into the facts and circumstances of each case. We would, for reasons already discussed, prefer to adopt the test of Governmental instrumentality or agency as one more test and perhaps a more satisfactory one for determining whether a statutory corporation, body or other authority falls within the definition of 'State'. If a statutory corporation, body or other authority is an instrumentality or agency of Government, it would be an 'authority' and therefore 'State' within the meaning of that expression in Article 12.

See Para 34 in the Edit for the various provisions because of which the AAI is considered a state; on how the state has its stake in the AAI.

4. Sabhajit Tewary

The CSIR had many features such as pervasive and omnipresent control of the government in the management of the council, financial assistance, appointment powers by the government and the fact that the Prime Minister of the country was the ex-officio chairman of the council. Moreover the government could dismiss any member of the council and had the appointment powers with them. Yet the courts held that the Society does not have a statutory character like the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, or the Life Insurance Corporation or Industrial Finance Corporation. It is a society incorporated in accordance with the provisions of the Societies Registration Act.

The fact that the Prime Minister is the President or that the Government appoints nominees to the Governing Body or that the Government may terminate the membership will not establish

anything more than the fact that the Government takes special care that the promotion, guidance and co-operation of scientific and industrial research, the institution and financing of specific researches, establishment or development and assistance to special institutions or department of the existing institutions for scientific study of problems affecting particular industry in a trade, the utilisation of the result of the researches conducted under the auspices of the Council towards the development of industries in the country are carried out in a responsible manner.

5. Ajay Hasia (the admission to the J&K regional engineering college was challenged)

We must therefore give such an interpretation to the expression "other authorities" as will not stultify the operation and reach of the fundamental rights by enabling the Government to its obligation in relation to the Fundamental Rights by setting up an authority to act as its instrumentality or agency for carrying out its functions. the corporation has become an effective legal contrivance in the hands of the Government for carrying out its activities, for it is found that this legal facility of corporate instrument provides considerable flexibility and elasticity and facilitates proper and efficient management with professional skills and on business principles and it is blissfully free from "departmental rigidity, slow motion procedure and hierarchy of officers".

In such cases "the true owner is the State, the real operator is the State and the effective controllorate is the State and accountability for its actions to the community and to Parliament is of the State."

We may point out that it is immaterial for this purpose whether the corporation is created by a statute or under a statute. The test is whether it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government and not as to how it is created. Whatever be its genetical origin, it would be an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12 if it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government and that would have to be decided on a proper assessment of the facts in the light of the relevant factors.

We must, therefore, hold that the Society is an instrumentality or agency of the State and the Central Governments and it is an 'authority' within the meaning of Article 12.

See para 15 of the edit for the analysis of the nature of the society

6. Som Prakash Rekhi (not discussed by her, but there in the edits)

7. Pradeep Kumar Biswas (overruled Sabhajit Tewary completely)

The questions therefore before us are - is the CSIR a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and if it is should this Court reverse a decision which has stood for over a quarter of a century? Side-stepping the majority approach in Sabhajit Tewary, the 'drastic changes' in the perception of 'State' heralded in Sukhdev Singh by Mathew, J and the tests formulated by him were affirmed and amplified in Ramana v. International Airport Authority of India . Although the International Airport Authority of India is a statutory corporation and therefore within the accepted connotation of State, the Bench of three Judges developed the concept of State, The rationale for the approach was the one adopted by Mathew J in Sukhdev Singh …From this perspective, the logical sequitur is that it really does not matter what guise the State adopts for this purpose, whether by a Corporation established by statute or incorporated under a law such as the Companies Act or formed under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Neither the

form of the Corporation, nor its ostensible autonomy would take away from its character as 'State' and its constitutional accountability under Part III vis-a-vis the individual if it were in fact acting as an instrumentality or agency of Government. The question in each case would be - whether in the light of the cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found then the body is a State within Article 12. On the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory whether under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State.

See Paras 43-57 for the analysis of CSIR being a state under Article 12; on how the government has a deep and pervasive financial, functional and administrative control over the society.Since on a re-examination of the question we have come to the conclusion that the decision was plainly erroneous, it is our duty to say so and not perpetuate our mistake.

8. Zee Telefilms

Article 14

1. Chiranjit Lal Chaudhary(1951)

A class can also consist of only one person.

A law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself;

The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws means the protection of equal laws. It forbids class legislation, but does not forbid classification which rests upon reasonable grounds of distinction. It does not prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the objects to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. 'It merely requires that all persons subjected to such legislation shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed."

A law applying to one person or one class of persons is constitutional if there is sufficient basis or reason for it. a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual, in those cases where on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself. The fact that only one person or one object or one business or one locality is affected is not proof of denial of the equal protection of the laws. For such proof it must be shown that there is no reasonable basis for the classification.

A single person classification under Article 14 is also perfectly permissible until the point that the classification is made upon reasonable grounds and is not arbitrary. Thus it may not be held to be unconstitutional prima facie. If certain circumstances affect only that particular person, a legislation to regulate that person cannot be held to be invalid just for the reason that it deals with it separately and not with others.

2. Anwar Ali Sarkar(1952)

Special courts act was challenged on the ground that it gave unreasonable powers to the government to decide as to which matters are to be governed by the special courts and which are not to be governed so. It was challenged on the grounds that it violated Article 14 and thus should be struck down according to Article 13(2).

The Supreme Court opined that the equality clause is meant for equal treatment of all persons placed in similar circumstances against legislative discrimination, and if the legislature takes care to reasonably classify persons for legislative purposes and if it deals equally with all persons belonging to a well-defined class, it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that the law does not apply to other person. It follows from the two foregoing paragraphs that one of the ways in which the impugned Act can be saved is to show that it is based on a reasonable classification of the persons to whom or the offences in respect of which the procedure laid down in it is to apply, and hence it is necessary to ascertain whether it is actually based on such a classification.

The state has power to decide, by means of reasonable classification, those who shall fall within a class of persons. This is to facilitate equal treatment for that class particularly and not for equality between two distinct classes. It postulates a rational basis and does not mean herding together of certain persons and classes arbitrarily. In order to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others and that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act.

3. Ram Krishna Dalmia(1958) GET FACTS FROM SOMEWHERE…DO AGAIN WITH FACTS!!

While good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation.

A statute may not make any classification of the persons or things for the purpose of applying its provisions but may leave it to the discretion of the Government to select and classify persons or things to whom its provisions are to apply. In determining the question of the validity or otherwise of such a statute the court will not strike down the law out of hand only because no classification appears on its face or because a discretion is given to the Government to make the selection or classification but will go on to examine and ascertain if the statute has laid down any principle or policy for the guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of the selection or classification. After such scrutiny the court will strike down the statute if it does not lay down any principle or policy for guiding the exercise of discretion by the Government.

We conceive it to be, the question arises as to the scope and ambit of the power which is conferred by it on the appropriate Government. The answer is furnished by the statute itself, for section 3 indicates that the appropriate Government can appoint a Commission of Inquiry only for the

purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and into no other matter. The attack against the notification is that the Government has not properly implemented the policy or followed the principle laid down in the Act and has consequently transgressed the bounds of the authority delegated to it.

It is true that the notification primarily or even solely affects the petitioners and their companies but it cannot be overlooked that parliament having left the selective application of the Act to the discretion of the appropriate Government, the latter must of necessity take its decision on the materials available to it and the opinion it forms thereon. The appropriate Government cannot in such matters be expected to sit down and hold a judicial inquiry into the truth of the materials brought before it, and examine the informants on oath in the presence of the parties who are or may be likely to be affected by its decision. In matters of this kind the appropriate Government has of necessity to act upon the information available to it. It is the best judge of the reliability of its source of information and if it acts in good faith on the materials brought to its notice and honestly comes to the conclusion that the act and conduct of the petitioners and the affairs of their companies constitute a definite matter of public importance calling for an inquiry

We are not unmindful of the fact that a very wide discretionary power has been conferred on the Government and, indeed, the contemplation that such wide powers in the hands of the executive may in some cases be misused or abused and turned into an engine of oppression has caused considerable anxiety in our mind. Nevertheless, the bare possibility that the powers may be misused or abused cannot per se induce the court to deny the existence of the powers. It cannot be overlooked that parliament has confided this discretion, not to any petty official but to the appropriate Government itself to take action in conformity with the policy and principle laid down in the Act. Parliament has confided the task of the selective application of the law to the appropriate Government and it is, therefore for the appropriate Government to exercise its discretion in the matter. It is to be expected - and, until the contrary is proved, it is to be presumed - that the Government, which is responsible to Parliament, will act honestly, properly and in conformity with the policy and principle laid down by Parliament. It may well be that the Central Government thought that even if one or more of the particular qualities and characteristics attributed to the petitioners and their companies may be found in another person or company, the combination of those qualities and characteristics which it thought were present in the petitioners and their companies was of a unique nature and was not present in any other person or company. The Central Government may have thought that the evil was more pronounced in the petitioners and their concerns than any other person or concern and that the need for an inquiry was more urgent and clear in the case of the petitioners and their companies than in the case of any other person or company.

Thus even if the same circumstances afflicted other companies or parties, yet the discretion was given to the appropriate government to decide as to where the problem was most pronounced and then apply the provisions of the act in question to them alone and not to others. This much discretion was given to the government.

It is sufficient for our present purpose to say that the facts disclosed on the face of the notification itself and the facts which have been brought to our notice by the affidavits afford sufficient support to the presumption of constitutionality of the notification. There being thus a presumption of validity in favour of the Act and the notification, it is for the petitioners to allege and prove

beyond doubt that other persons or companies similarly situate have been left out and the petitioners and their companies have been singled out for discriminatory and hostile treatment. The petitioners have, in our opinion, failed to discharge that onus.

4. EP Royappa(1974)

Made a departure from the two fold test of intelligible differentia and nexus test and ventured into the foray of arbitrariness saying that anything arbitrary was antithetical to article 14 and thus violative for that reason. Laid down a new test apart from the old doctrines, saying that its time to beyond doctrinal confines.

Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be "cribbed, cabined and confined" within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and Constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14, and if it affects any matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of Article 16. Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment.

They require that State action must be based on equivalent relevant principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations because that would be denial of equality.

The Chief Minister as the head of the Government is in ultimate charge of the administration and it is he who is politically answerable to the people for the achievements and failures of the Government. If, therefore, for any valid reason the Chief Secretary forfeits the confidence of the Chief Minister, the Chief Minister may legitimately, in the larger interests of administration, shift the Chief Secretary to another post, provided of-course that does not involve violation of any of his legal or Constitutional rights. There can be no question in such a case as to who is right and who is wrong. The displacement of the Chief Secretary from his post in such a case would not be arbitrary and it would not attract the inhibition of Articles 14 and 16. So long as the transfer is made on account of the exigencies of administration and is not from a higher post to a lower post with discriminatory preference of a junior for the higher post, it would be valid and not open to attack under Articles 14 and 16.

The premise on which this contention is founded is that the posts of Deputy Chairman and Officer on Special Duty were not of the same status and responsibility as the post of Chief Secretary, but we cannot say on the material on record that the validity of the premise has been established by the petitioner. So far as the post of Deputy Chairman is concerned, the petitioner himself accepted that post as being of the same status and responsibility as the post of Chief Secretary and did not raise any objection against it and we need not, therefore, say anything more about it.

The only question is as to the post of Officer on Special Duty. We think that this post has not been satisfactorily established by the petitioner to be inferior in status and responsibility to the post of Chief Secretary.

Merely giving the salary of one post to the other does not make for equivalence. We are, therefore,

not prepared to accept the thesis that the post of Officer on Special duty was equal in status and responsibility to the post of Chief Secretary as claimed by the respondents. But equally it is not possible for us to hold it established on the material on record that this post was inferior in status and responsibility to the post of Chief Secretary, though prima facie it does appear to be so. We cannot, therefore, say that the petitioner was arbitrarily or unfairly treated or that equality was denied to him when he was transferred from the post of Chief Secretary and in his place Sabanayagam, his junior, was promoted and confirmed. The challenge based on Articles 14 and 16 must therefore fail.

5. Maganlal Chaganlal(1974)

If two procedures exist, one more draconian than the other, and no guiding principle with regards to the process of selection is available to the authority vested with the task of selecting the candidates for the two procedures; then in such a scenario, the more draconian one will be deemed to be violative of Article 14 and will be struck down. This is for the reason that the implementing authority is vested with an unbridled and absolute power to decide as to which candidate it wants for the two procedures. Thus no intelligible differentia exists and moreover, the decision suffers from the vice of arbitrariness. However, in case there exists a reasonable basis for the distinction or a guiding principle in the law itself on the basis of which such distinction is to be made, the law purporting to make the discrimination will not be considered to be arbitrary and unreasonable.Therefore, as between persons similarly situated, one may be subjected to one procedure while another may be subjected to the other, without there being any rational basis for distinction and one procedure is substantially more drastic and prejudicial than the other, unjust discrimination would result, irrespective of whether the arbitrary choice of initiation of the two procedures is vested in the same authority or not.

It is, therefore, no argument on the part of the respondents to say that the special procedure set out in Chapter VA of the Municipal Act is fair ,and consequently it does not have to stand the test of article 14.

In considering whether the officers would be discriminating between one set of persons and another, one has got to take into account normal human behavior and not behavior which is abnormal. It is not every fancied possibility of discrimination but the real risk of discrimination that we must take into account. This is not one of those cases where discrimination is writ large on the face of the statute. Discrimination may be possible but is very improbable.

What we have to see is whether there is any standard indicated or policy and purpose disclosed in the impugned provisions in accordance with and in fulfilment of which the Municipal Corporation or Municipal Commissioner or Government is expected to select occupiers of Municipal or Government premises for being proceeded against under the special procedure. If the discretion conferred on the Municipal Corporation or Municipal Commissioner or Government to make selective application of the special procedure is guided and controlled discretion, the impugned provisions would be free from the vice of discrimination.

Under Section 4 of the Act 'if the Collector is of opinion that any person is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises and that he has to be evicted he shall issue a notice in writing calling upon such person to show cause why an order of eviction should not be passed'. Thus the Collector has no option at all but to issue a notice. But after considering the cause and the evidence produced by such person and after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard... he may make an order of eviction.It is also necessary to point out that the procedures laid down by the two Acts now under consideration are not so harsh or onerous as to suggest that a discrimination would result if resort is made to the provisions of these two Acts in some cases and to the ordinary Civil Court in other cases. There is provision in these Acts for giving notice to the party affected, to inform him of the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made, for the party affected to file a written statement and produce documents and be represented by lawyers. The main difference between the procedure before an ordinary Civil Court and the executive authorities under these two Acts is that in one case it will be decided by a judicial officer trained in law and it might also be that more than one appeal is available. As against that there is only one appeal available in the other but it is also open to the aggrieved party to resort to the High Court under the provisions of Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution. (See Para 47 of the edits for a more detailed perusal of the provisions of the act in determining its validity)

Considering the object with which these special procedures were enacted by the legislature we would not be prepared to hold that the difference between the two procedures is so unconscionable as to attract the vice of discrimination. After all, Article 14 does not demand a fanatical approach. We, therefore, hold that neither the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act nor the provisions of the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955 are hit by Article 14 of the Constitution.

6. Srilekha Vidyarthi (not discussed by her, but here in the edits)

7. Pradeep Jain (not discussed by her, but she sent it in a mail saying that it might be interesting)

Article 19

1. Romesh Thapar(1950)

The Government of Madras in exercise of a power under Section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949 imposed a ban upon the entry and circulation of the journal namely; “Cross Road” in the territory of Madras; for the purpose of securing the public safety and the maintenance of public order. The validity of the said Section and order was challenged under 19(1)(a).

freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of propagation of ideas, and that freedom is ensured by the freedom of circulation. "Liberty of circulation is as essential to that freedom as the liberty of publication. Indeed, without circulation the publication would be of little value.

The Constitution, in formulating the varying criteria for permissible legislation imposing restrictions on the fundamental rights enumerated in article 19(1), has placed in a distinct category those offences against public order which aim at undermining the security of the State or

overthrowing it, and made their prevention the sole justification for legislative abridgement of freedom of speech and expression, that is to say, nothing less than endangering the foundations of the State or threatening its overthrow could justify curtailment of the rights to freedom of speech and expression, while the right of peaceable assembly "sub-clause (b)" and the right of association "sub-clause (c)" may be restricted under clauses (3) and (4) of article 19 in the interests of "public order", which in those clauses includes the security of the State.

Very narrow and stringent limits have been set to permissible legislative abridgment of the right of free speech and expression, and this was doubtless due to the realisation that freedom of speech and of the press lay at the foundation of all democratic organisations, for without free political discussion no public education, so essential for the proper functioning of the processes of popular government, is possible. A freedom of such amplitude might involve risk of abuse.

We are therefore of opinion that unless a law restricting freedom of speech and expression is directed solely against the undermining of the security of the State or the overthrow of it, such law cannot fall within the reservation under clause (2) of article 19, although the restrictions which it seeks to impose may have been conceived generally in the interests of public order. It follows that section 9(1-A) which authorises imposition of restrictions for the wider purpose of securing public safety or the maintenance of public order falls outside the scope of authorised restrictions under clause (2), and is therefore void and unconstitutional.

Moreover, where a law purports to authorise the imposition of restrictions on a fundamental right in language wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting such right, it is not possible to uphold it even so far as if may be applied within the constitutional limits, as it is not severable. So long as the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out, it must be held to be wholly unconstitutional and void. An enactment, which is capable of being applied to cases where no such danger could arise, cannot be held to be constitutional and valid to any extent.

2. Brij Bhushan

A Delhi weekly, the organizer was banned by the chief commissioner of Delhi on the pretext that it was publishing highly communal matter with regards to Pakistan. Thus it was required to be submitted to the authorities to be scrutinised before it would be allowed to be circulated to the public. Therefore the editor of the journal came in defense of it and claimed that such an order violated their right under Article 19(1)(a) and that the restrictions imposed were not covered under Article 19(2).

There can be little doubt that the imposition of pre-censorship on a journal is a restriction on the liberty of the press which is an essential part of the right to freedom of speech and expression declared by article 19(1)(a).

As this question turns on considerations which are essentially the same as those on which our decision in Petition No. XVI of 1950 [Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras, supra p. 594] was based, our judgment in that case concludes the present case also. Accordingly, for the reasons indicated in that judgment, we allow this petition and hereby quash the impugned order of the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, dated the 2nd March, 1950.

The minority opinion by J. Fazl Ali

It is clear that anything which affects public tranquility within the State or the Province will also affect public order and the State Legislature is therefore competent to frame laws on matters relating to public tranquility and public order.

If 'public safety' is, as we have seen, equivalent to' security of the State', what I have designated as public unsafety may be regarded as equivalent to 'insecurity of the State'. When we approach the matter in this way, we find that while 'public disorder' is wide enough to cover a small riot or an affray and other cases where peace is disturbed by, or affects, a small group of persons, 'public unsafety' (or insecurity of the State), will usually be connected with serious internal disorders and such disturbances of public tranquillity as jeopardize the security of the State. it will be necessary to note that in the Act "maintenance of public order" always occurs in juxtaposition with "public safety"

The prominence thus given to 'public safety' strongly suggests that the Act was intended to deal with serious cases of public disorder which affect public or the security of the State, or cases in which, owning to some kind of emergency or a grave situation having arisen, even public disorders of comparatively small dimensions may have far-reaching effects on the security of the State.

I think that "public order" may well be paraphrased in the context as public tranquillity and the words "public safety" and "public order" may be read as equivalent to "security of the State" and "public tranquillity." I have tried to show that public disorders and disturbance of public tranquillity do undermine the security of the State and if the Act is a law aimed at preventing such disorders it fulfils the requirement of the Constitution.

If the Act is to be viewed as have suggested, it is difficult to hold that section 7(1)(c) falls outside the ambit of article 19(2). That clause clearly states that nothing in clause (1)(a) shall affect the operation of any existing law relating to any matter which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State.

3. Sakal Newspapers(1962)

The right to circulate is inherent in the freedom of press and dissemination of views and information and thus effectively under the domain of freedom of speech and expression.

Whether the provision of an Act that regulates the number of pages according to the price charged, prescribes the number of supplements to be published, prohibits the publication and sale of newspapers, regulates the size and area of advertising matter in relation to other matters in the rest of the newspaper is violative of Article 19(1)(a)

Prior to the promulgation of the Order every newspaper was free to charge whatever price it chose, and thus had a right unhampered by State regulation to publish news and views. This liberty is obviously interfered with by the Order which provides for the maximum number of pages for the particular price charged.

The right guaranteed thus extends, subject to any law competent under Article 19(2), not merely to the matter which he is entitled to circulate, but also to the volume of circulation. In other words, the citizen is entitled to propagate his views and reach any class and number of readers as he

chooses subject of course to the limitations permissible under a law competent under Article 19(2). It cannot be gainsaid that the impugned order seeks to place a restraint on the latter aspect of the right by prescribing a price page schedule. The fixation of a minimum price for the number of pages which a newspaper is entitled to publish is obviously not for ensuring a reasonable price to the buyers of newspapers but for expressly cutting down the volume of circulation of some newspapers by making the price so unattractively high for a class of its readers as is likely to deter it from purchasing such newspapers.

After the schedule comes into force it will not be open to a newspaper proprietor to charge less than a certain minimum price if he wants to give a particular number of pages in his newspaper. Similarly he cannot publish supplements in excess of four as and when he chooses, except with the permission of Government. The Order does not indicate the circumstances which would entitle a newspaper proprietor to secure the special permission of Government. Apparently, whether to allow an additional supplement or not would be dependent on the sweet will and pleasure of the Government and this would necessarily strike at the root of the independence of the press.

it would be clear that the right to freedom of speech and expression carries with it the right to publish and circulate one's ideas, opinions and views with complete freedom and by resorting to any available means of publication, subject again to such restrictions as could be legitimately imposed under clause (2) of Article 19. Requiring newspapers to reduce their sizes would be compelling them to restrict the dissemination of news and views and thus directly affecting their right under Article 19(1)(a).

In addition to this, if the area for advertisements is curtailed the price of the newspaper will be forced up. If that happens, the circulation will inevitably go down. This would be no remote, but a direct consequence of curtailment of advertisements. When a law is intended to bring about this result there would be a direct interference with the right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a).

It is not open to the State to curtail or infringe the freedom of speech of one for promoting the general welfare of a section or a group of people unless its action could be justified under a law competent under clause (2) of Article 19. It is admitted that the impugned provisions cannot be justified on the grounds referred to in the aforesaid clause. The freedom of a newspaper to publish any number of pages or to circulate it to any number of persons is each an integral part of the freedom of speech and expression. A restraint placed upon either of them would be a direct infringement of the right of freedom of speech and expression.

Its object thus is to regulate something which, as already stated, is directly related to the circulation of a newspaper. Since circulation of a newspaper is a part of the right of freedom of speech the Act must be regarded as one directed against the freedom of speech. It has selected the fact or thing which is an essential and basic attribute of the conception of the freedom of speech viz., the right to circulate one's views to all whom one can reach or care to reach for the imposition of a restriction. The impugned law far from being one, which merely interferes with the right of freedom of speech incidentally, does so directly though it seeks to achieve the and by purporting to regulate the business aspect of a newspaper. Such a course is not permissible and the courts must be ever vigilant in guarding perhaps the most precious of all the freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution.

4. Bennett Coleman(1973)

Done from the summary in V.N. Shukla…should suffice!

5. Cricket Asso. of Bengal(1995)

The Court was required to consider whether Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution included the right to have an event telecast through a national or foreign agency of one’s choice especially when no demand is made on any of the frequencies owned, commanded or controlled by the Government or its agencies. If yes, could additional restrictions be imposed besides those permissible under Article 19(2) for creating terrestrial signals of the event and granting facilities of up linking to a satellite not owned or controlled by the Government or its agencies?

Unlike the print media, however, there is a built-in limitation on the use of electronic media because the airwaves are a public property and hence are owned or controlled by the Government or a central national authority or they are not available on account of the scarcity, costs and competition. Broadcasting is a means of communication and, therefore, a medium of speech and expression. Hence in a democratic polity, neither any private individual, institution or organisation nor any Government or Government organisation can claim exclusive right over it.

The monopoly permitted by our Constitution is only in respect of carrying on a trade, business, Industry or service under Article 19(6) to subserve the interests of the general public. However, the monopoly in broadcasting and telecasting is often claimed by the Government to utilise the public resources in the form of the limited frequencies available for the benefit of the society at large. It is justified by the Government to prevent the concentration of the frequencies in the hands of the rich few who can monopolise the dissemination of views and information to suit their interests and thus in fact to control and manipulate public opinion in effect smothering the right to freedom of speech and expression and freedom of information of others.

The claim to monopoly made on this ground may, however, loses all its raison d’être if either any section of the society is unreasonably denied an access to broadcasting or the governmental agency claims exclusive right to prepare and relay programmes. The ground is further not available when those claiming an access either do not make a demand on the limited frequencies controlled by the Government or claim the frequency which is not utilised and is available for transmission.

On the other hand, if the Government is vested with an unbridled discretion to grant or refuse to grant the license or access to the media, the reason for creating monopoly will lose its validity. For then it is the government which will be enabled to effectively suppress the freedom of speech and expression instead of protecting it and utilising the licensing power strictly for the purposes for which it is conferred. It is for this reason that in most of the democratic countries an independent autonomous broadcasting authority is created to control all aspects of the operation of the electronic media. Such authority is representative of all sections of the society and is free from control of the political and administrative executive of the State.

We are not concerned here with the permission to establish or maintain a telegraph because in the present case the permission is sought only for operating a telegraph and that too for a limited time

and for a limited and specified purpose. The purpose again is non-commercial. It is to relay the specific number of cricket matches. It is only incidentally that the CAB will earn some revenue by selling its right to relay the matches organised by it. The CAB is obviously not a business or a commercial organisation nor can it be said that it is organising matches for earning profits as a business proposition.

The restrictions and conditions that the Central Government is authorised to place under Section 4(1) while permitting non-wireless telegraphing can, as stated earlier, only be those which are warranted by the purposes mentioned in Article 19(2) and none else. It is not and cannot be the case of the Government that by granting the permission in question, the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign State, public order, decency or morality or either of them will be in jeopardy or that the permission will lead to the contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. It will be apparent from the contentions advanced on behalf of MIB that their main thrust is that the right claimed by the BCCI/CAB is not the right of freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a), but a commercial right or the right to trade under Article 19(1)(g). The contention is based mainly on two grounds viz., there is no free speech element in the telecast of sports and secondly, the primary object of the BCCI/CAB in seeking to telecast the cricket matches is not to educate and entertain the viewer but to make money.

The right to telecast sporting event will therefore also include the right to educate and inform the present and the prospective sportsmen interested in the particular game and also to inform and entertain the lovers of the game. Hence, when a telecaster desires to telecast a sporting event, it is incorrect to say that the free speech element is absent from his right. The degree of the element will depend upon the character of the telecaster who claims the right. An organiser such as the BCCI or CAB in the present case which are indisputably devoted to the promotion of the game of cricket, cannot be placed in the same scale as the business organisations whose only intention is to make as large a profit as can be made by telecasting the game.

That while pursuing their objective of popularising the sports by electing the best available means of doing so, they incidentally earn some revenue, will not convert either them into commercial organisations or the right claimed by them to explore the said means, into a commercial right or interest. It must further be remembered that sporting organisations such as BCCI/CAB in the present case, have not been established only to organise the sports events or to broadcast or telecast them. The organisation of sporting events is only a part of their various objects, as pointed out earlier and even when they organise the events, they are primarily to educate the sportsmen, to promote and popularise the sports and also to inform and entertain the viewers. It will be taking a deliberately distorted view of the right claimed by such organisations to telecast the sporting event to call it an assertion of a commercial right.

Further it was added by the court that, there is no doubt that since the airwaves/frequencies are a public property and are also limited, they have to be used in the best interest of the society and this can be done either by a central authority by establishing its own broadcasting network or regulating the grant of licences to other agencies, including the private agencies. But to contend that on that account the restrictions to be imposed on the right under Article 19(1)(a) should be in addition to those permissible under Article 19(2) and dictated by the use of public resources in the best interests of the society at large, is to misconceive both the content of the freedom of speech and expression and the problems posed by the element of public property in, and the alleged

scarcity of, the frequencies as well as by the wider reach of the media.

The virtues of the electronic media cannot become its enemies. It may warrant a greater regulation over licensing and control and vigilance on the content of the programme telecast. However, this control can only be exercised within the framework of Article 19(2) and the dictates of public interests. To plead for other grounds is to plead for unconstitutional measures.

The only limitations on the said right is, therefore, the limitation of resources and, the need to use them for the benefit of all. When, however, there are surplus or unlimited resources and the public interests so demand or in any case do not prevent telecasting, the validity of the argument based on limitation of resources disappears.

It cannot be denied that the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) includes the right to disseminate information by the best possible method through an agency of one's choice so long as the engagement of such agency is not in contravention of Article 19(2) of the Constitution and does not amount to improper or unwarranted use of the frequencies. Hence the choice of BCCI/CAB of a foreign agency to telecast the matches, cannot be objected to. There is no suggestion in the present case that the engagement of the foreign agency by the BCCI/CAB is violative of the provisions of Article 19(2).

Article 20

1. Sevli v. State of Karnataka

Article 21

1. AK Gopalan

A petition was filed by the applicant under article 32(1) of the Constitution of India for a writ of habeas corpus against his detention in the Madras Jail. In the petition he has given various dates showing how he has been under detention since December, 1947. Under the ordinary Criminal Law he was sentenced to terms of imprisonment but those convictions were set aside. While he was thus under detention under one of the orders of the Madras State Government, on the 1st of March, 1950, he was served with an order made under section 3(1) of the Preventive Detention Act, IV of 1950. He challenges the legality of the order as it is contended that Act IV of 1950 contravenes the provisions of articles 13, 19 and 21 and the provisions of that Act are not in accordance with article 22 of the Constitution.

The view taken by the majority in A. K. Gopalan's case was that so long as a law of preventive detention satisfies the requirements of Article 22, it would be within the terms of Article 21 and it would not be required, to meet the challenge of Article 19. This view proceeded on the assumption that "certain articles in the Constitution exclusively deal with specific matters" and where the requirements of an article dealing with the particular matter in question are satisfied and there is no infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed by that article, no recourse can be had to a fundamental right conferred by another article.

See Para 16 for important contentions regarding Article 21

In contrast to the American Constitution, the Indian Constitution is a very detailed one. The Constitution itself provides in minute details the legislative powers of the Parliament and the State Legislatures. Four marked points of distinction between the clause in the American Constitution and article 21 of the Constitution of India may be noticed at this stage. The first is that in U.S.A. Constitution the word "liberty" is used simpliciter while in India it is restricted to personal liberty. (2) In U.S.A. Constitution the same protection is given to property, while in India the fundamental right in respect of property is contained in article 31. (3) The word "due" is omitted altogether and the expression "due process of law" is not used deliberately. (4) The word "established" is used and is limited to "Procedure" in our article 21.

No extrinsic aid is needed to interpret the words of article 21, which in my opinion, are not ambiguous. Normally read, and without thinking of other Constitutions, the expression "procedure established by law" must mean procedure prescribed by the law of the State. If the Indian Constitution wanted to preserve to every person the protection given by the due process clause of the American Constitution there was nothing to prevent the Assembly from adopting the phrase, or if they wanted to limit the same to procedure only, to adopt that expression with only the word "procedural" prefixed to "law". The only right is that no person shall be deprived of his life or liberty except according to procedure established by law.

To read the word "law" as meaning rules of natural justice will land one in difficulties because the rules of natural justice, as regards procedure, are nowhere defined and in my opinion the Constitution cannot be read as laying down a vague standard. This is particularly so when in omitting to adopt "due process of law" it was considered that the expression "procedure established by law" made the standard specific. It cannot be specific except by reading the expression as meaning procedure prescribed by the legislature. The word, "law" as used in this Part has different shades of meaning but in no other article it appears to bear the indefinite meaning of natural justice. If so, there appears no reason why in this article it should receive this peculiar meaning.

On 22

It is obvious that article 22(1) and (2) prescribe limitations on the right given by article 21. If the procedure mentioned in those articles is followed, the arrest and detention contemplated by article 22(1) and (2), although they infringe the personal liberty of the individual, will be legal, because that becomes the established legal procedure in respect of arrest and detention.

I am unable to accept that contention. It is obvious that in respect of arrest and detention article 22(1) and (2) provide safeguards. These safeguards are excluded in the case of preventive detention by article 22(3), but safeguards in connection with such detention are provided by clauses (4) to (7) of the same article. It is therefore clear that article 21 has to be read as supplemented by article 22. Reading in that way the proper mode of construction will be that to the extent the procedure is prescribed by article 22 the same is to be observed; otherwise article 21 will apply. On the points of procedure which expressly or by necessary implication are not dealt with by article 22, the operation of article 21 will remain unaffected.

The provisions of article 22(4) to (7) by their very wording leave unaffected the large powers of legislation on this point and emphasize particularly by article 22(7) the power of the Parliament to deprive a person of a right to have his case considered by an advisory board. Part III and article 22

in particular are the only restrictions on that power and but for those provisions the power to legislate on this subject would have been quite unrestricted. Parliament could have made a law without any safeguard or any procedure for preventive detention. Therefore, if the legislature prescribes a procedure by a validly enacted law and such procedure in the case of preventive detention does not come in conflict with the express provisions of Part III or article 22(4) to (7), the Preventive Detention Act must be held valid notwithstanding that the Court may not fully approve of the procedure prescribed under such Act.

The important clause to be considered is article 22(7). Sub-clause (a) is important for this case. In the case of an Act of preventive detention passed by the Parliament this clause contained in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights, thus permits detention beyond a period of three months and excludes the necessity of consulting an advisory board, if the opening words of the sub-clause are complied with. Sub-clause (b) is permissive. It is not obligatory on the Parliament to prescribe any maximum period.

It was argued that this gives the Parliament a right to allow a person to be detained indefinitely. If that construction is correct, it springs out of the words of sub-clause (7) itself and the Court cannot help in the matter. I am unable to accept the contention that article 22(4)(a) is the rule and article 22(7) the exception. I read them as two alternatives, provided by the Constitution for making laws on preventive detention.

Before a person can be held liable for an offence it is obvious that he should be in a position to know what he may do or not do, and an omission to do or not to do will result in the State considering him guilty according to the penal enactment. When it comes however to preventive detention, the very purpose is to prevent the individual not merely from acting in a particular way but, as the sub-heads summarized above show, from achieving a particular object. It will not be humanly possible to tabulate exhaustively all actions which may lead to a particular object. It has therefore been considered that a punitive detention Act which sufficiently prescribes the objects which the legislature considers have not to be worked up to is a sufficient standard to prevent the legislation being vague.

The Constituent Assembly had before them the provisions of clause (1) of the same article. The Assembly having dealt with the requirements of receiving grounds and giving an opportunity to make a representation has deliberately refrained from providing a right to be heard orally. If so, I do not read the clause as guaranteeing such right under article 22(5).

It was contended that the right to make a representation in article 22(5) must carry with it a right to be heard by an independent tribunal; otherwise the making of a representation has no substance because it is not an effective remedy. I am unable to read clause (5) of article 22 as giving a fundamental right to be heard by an independent tribunal. The Constitution deliberately stops at giving the right of representation. This is natural because under article 22(7), in terms, the Constitution permits the making of a law by Parliament in which a reference to an advisory board may be omitted. To consider the right to make a representation as necessarily including a right to be heard by an independent judicial, administrative or advisory tribunal will thus be directly in conflict with the express words of article 22(7).

Section 14 was strongly attacked on the ground that it violated all principles of natural justice and even infringed the right given by article 22(5) of the Constitution. …

42. By that section the Court is prevented (except for the purpose of punishment for such disclosure) from being informed, either by a statement or by leading evidence, of the substance of the grounds conveyed to the detained person under section 7 on which the order was made, or of any representation made by him against such order. It also prevents the Court from calling upon any public officer to disclose the substance of those grounds or from the production of the proceedings or report of the advisory board which may be declared confidential. It is clear that if this provision is permitted to stand the Court can have no material before it to determine whether the detention is proper or not.

Section 14 of the impugned Act appears to be a drastic provision which requires considerable support to sustain it in a preventive detention Act. The learned Attorney-General urged that the whole object of the section was to prevent ventilation in public of the grounds and the representations, and that it was a rule of evidence only which the Parliament could prescribe.

I do not agree. This argument is clearly not sustainable on the words of article 22 clauses (5) and (6). The Government has the right under article 22(6) not to disclose facts which it considers undesirable to disclose in the public interest. It does not permit the Government to refrain from disclosing grounds which fall under clause (5). Therefore, it cannot successfully be contended that the disclosure of grounds may be withheld from the Court in public interest, as a rule of evidence. Moreover, the position is made clear by the words of article 22(5). It provides that the detaining authority shall communicate to such detained person the grounds on which the order has been made. It is therefore essential that the grounds must be connected with the order of preventive detention. If they are not so connected the requirements of article 22(5) are not complied with and the detention order will be invalid. Therefore, it is open to a detained person to contend before a Court that the grounds on which the order has been made have no connection at all with the order, or have no connection with the circumstances or class or classes of cases under which a preventive detention order could be supported under section 12.

The impugned Act minus this section can remain unaffected. The omission of this section will not change the nature or the structure or the object of the legislation. Therefore the decision that section 14 is ultra virus does not affect the validity of the rest of the Act. In my opinion therefore Act IV of 1950, except section 14, is not ultra vires. It does not infringe any provisions of Part III of the Constitution and the contention of the applicant against the validity of that Act, except to the extent of section 14, fails. The petition therefore fails and is dismissed.

2. Maneka Gandhi(1978)

So far as the right to personal liberty is concerned, it is ensured by providing that no one shall be deprived of personal liberty except according to procedure prescribed by law. It was in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors. MANU/SC/0085/1962 that the question as to the proper scope and meaning of the expression 'personal liberty' came up pointedly for consideration for the first time before this Court. The majority of the Judges took the view "that 'personal liberty' is used in the article as a compendious term, to include within itself all the varieties of rights which go' to make up the 'personal liberties' of man other than those- dealt with in the several clauses of Article 19(1). In other words, while Article 19(1) deals with particular species or attributes, of that freedom, 'personal liberty' in Article 21 takes in and comprises the residue".

In our view, this is not a correct approach. Both are independent fundamental rights, though there is overlapping. There is no question of one being carved out of another. The fundamental, right of life and personal liberty bas many attributes and some of them are found in Article 19. If a person's fundamental right under Article 21 is infringed, the State can rely upon a law to sustain the action, but that cannot be a complete answer unless the said law satisfies the test laid down in Article 19(2) so far as the attributes covered by Article 19(1) are concerned".

"In our judgment, the assumption in A. K. Gopalan's case that certain articles in the Constitution exclusively deal with specific matters cannot be accepted as correct". It was held in R. C. Cooper's case and that is clear from the judgment of Shah, J., because Shah, J., in so many terms disapproved of the contrary states merit of law contained in the opinions of Kama, C.J., Patanjali Sastri, J., Mahajan, J., Mukherjee, J., and S. R. Das, J., in A. K. Gopalan's case that even where a person is detained in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, as mandated by Article 21, the protection conferred by the various clauses of Article 19(1) does not cease to be available to him and the law authorising such detention has to satisfy the test of the applicable freedom under Article 19, Clause (1). This would clearly show that Articles 19(1) and 21 are not mutually exclusive, for, if they were, there would be no question of a law depriving a person of personal liberty within the meaning of Article 21 having to meet the challenge of a fundamental right under Article 19(1).

The attempt of the court should be to expand the reach and ambit of the fundamental rights rather than attenuate their meaning and content by a process of judicial construction. The wave length for comprehending the scope and ambit of the fundamental rights has been set by this Court in R. C. Cooper's case and our approach in the interpretation of the fundamental rights must now be in tune with this wave length. The expression 'personal liberty' in Article 21 is of the widest amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of man and some of them have been raised to the status of distinct fundamental rights and given additional protection under Article 19.

There was some discussion in A. K. Gopalan's case in regard to the nature of the procedure required to be prescribed under Article 21 and at least three of the learned Judges out of five expressed themselves strongly in favour of the view that the procedure cannot be any arbitrary, fantastic or oppressive procedure. Fazal Ali, J., who was in a minority, went to the farthest limit in saying that the procedure must include the four essentials set out in Prof. Willi's book on Constitutional Law, namely, notice, opportunity to be heard, impartial tribunal and ordinary course of procedure. Apart from all of this, we find that even on principle the concept of reasonableness must be projected in the procedure contemplated by Article 21, having regard to the impact of Article 14 on Article 21.

14, 19 and 21

The law, must, therefore, now be taken to be well settled that Article 21 does not exclude Article 19 and that even if there is a law prescribing a procedure for depriving a person of 'personal liberty' and there is consequently no infringement of the fundamental right conferred by Article 21, such law, in so far as it abridges or takes away any fundamental right under Article 19 would have to meet the challenge of that article. Now, if a law depriving a person of ''personal liberty' and prescribing a procedure for that purpose within the meaning of Article 21 has to stand the test of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred under Article 19 which may be applicable in a given, situation, ex hypothesi it must also' be liable to be tested with reference to Article 14. It was held in both these cases that the procedure established by the special law must not be violative of the equality clause. That procedure must answer the requirement of Article 14.

Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the best of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be "right and just and fair" and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied.

Natural Justice as Part of Procedure Established by Law

it is true that there is no express provision in the Passports Act, 1967 which requires that the audi alteram partem rule should be followed before impounding a passport, but that is not conclusive of the question. The principle of audi alteram partem, which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard, is part of the rules of natural justice. In fact, there are two main principles in which the rules of natural justice are manifested, namely, Nemo Judex in Sua Causa and audi alteram partem. We are not concerned here with the former, since there is no case of bias urged here. The question is only in regard to the right of hearing which involves the audi alteram partem rule.

Here, the power conferred on the Passport Authority is to impound a passport and the consequence of impounding a passport would be to impair the constitutional right of the holder of the passport to go abroad during the time that the passport is impounded. It is clear on a consideration of these circumstances that the test laid down in the decisions of this Court for distinguishing between a quasi-judicial power and an administrative power is satisfied and the power conferred on the Passport Authority to impound a passport is quasi-judicial power. The rules of natural justice would, in the circumstances, be applicable in the exercise of the power of impounding a passport even on the orthodox view which prevailed prior to A. K. Kraipak's case. The same result must follow in view of the decision in A. K. Kraipak's case, even if the power to impound a passport were regarded as administrative in character, because it seriously interferes with the

constitutional right of the holder of the passport to go abroad and entails adverse civil consequences.

It would not, therefore, be right to conclude that the audi alteram partem rule is excluded merely because the power to impound a passport might be frustrated, if prior notice and hearing were to be given to the person concerned before impounding his passport.

A fair opportunity of being heard following immediately upon the order impounding the passport would satisfy the mandate of natural justice and a provision requiring giving of such opportunity to the person concerned can and should be read by implication in the Passports Act, 1967. If such a provision were held to be incorporated in the Passports- Act, 1967 by necessary implication, as we hold it must be, the procedure prescribed by the Act for impounding a passport would be right, fair and just and it would not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness or unreasonableness. We must, therefore, hold that the procedure 'established' by the Passports Act, 1967 for impounding a passport is in conformity with the requirement of Article 21 and does not fall foul of that article.

We have already pointed out that the Central Government was wholly unjustified in- withholding the reasons for impounding the passport from the petitioner and this was not only in breach of the statutory provision, but it also amounted to denial of opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The order impounding the passport of the petitioner was, therefore, clearly in violation of the rule of natural justice embodied in the maxim audi alteram partem and it was not in conformity with the procedure prescribed by the Passports Act, 1967. Realising that this was a fatal defect which would void the order impounding the passport

‘In the interest of general public’ being vague and unguided?

We are clearly of the view that sufficient guidelines are provided by the words "in the interests of the general public" and the power conferred on the Passport Authority to impound a passport cannot be said to be unguided or unfettered. Moreover, it must be remembered that the exercise of this power is not made dependent on the subjective opinion of the Passport Authority as regards the necessity of exercising it on one or more of the grounds stated in the section, but the Passport Authority is required to record in writing a brief statement of reasons for impounding the passport and, save in certain exceptional circumstances, to supply a copy of such statement to the person affected, so that the person concerned can challenge the decision of the Passport Authority in appeal and the appellate authority can examine whether the reasons given by the Passport Authority are correct, and if so, whether" they justify the making of the order impounding the passport.

Right to go abroad

Now, it may be pointed out at the outset that it is not our view that a right which is not specifically mentioned by name can never be a fundamental right within the meaning of

Article 19(1). It is possible that a right does not find express mention in any clause of Article 19(1) and yet it may be covered by some clause of that Article.

Every activity which facilitates the exercise of a named fundamental right is not necessarily comprehended in that fundamental right nor can it be regarded as such merely because it may not be possible otherwise to effectively exercise that fundamental right.

What is necessary to be seen is, and that is the test which must be applied,

whether the right claimed by the petitioner is an integral part of a named fundamental right or partakes of the same basic nature and character as the named fundamental right so that the exercise of such right is in reality and substance nothing but an instance of the exercise of the named fundamental right. V.V.V. Imp!!!!!!!

This basic freedom of the human being is expressed at various levels and is reflected in various basic rights. Freedom to go abroad is one of such rights, for the nature of man is a free agent necessarily involves free movement on his part. There can be no doubt that if the purpose and the sense of. the State is to protect personality and its development, as indeed it should be of any liberal democratic State, freedom to go abroad must be given its due place amongst the basic rights. This right is an important basic human right for it nourishes independent and self-determining creative character of the individual, not only by extending his freedoms of action, but also by extending the scope of his experience.

Moreover, this freedom would be highly valuable right where man finds himself obliged to flee (a) because he is unable to serve his God as he wished at the previous place of residence, (b) because his personal freedom is threatened for reasons which do not constitute a crime in the usual meaning of the word and many were such cases during the emergency, or (c) because his life is threatened either for religious or political reasons or through the threat to the maintenance of minimum standard of living compatible with human dignity. These reasons suggest that freedom to go abroad incorporates the important function of an ultimum refunium libertatis when other basic freedoms are refused.

However, freedom of movement at home and abroad is a part of our heritage and, as already pointed out, it is a highly cherished right essential to the growth and development of the human personality and its importance cannot be over emphasised. But it cannot be said to be part of the right of free speech and expression. It is not of the same basic nature and character as freedom of speech and expression. When a person goes, abroad, he may do so for a variety of reasons and it may not necessarily and always be for exercise of freedom of speech and expression. Every travel abroad is not an exercise of right of free speech and expression and it would not be correct to say that whenever there is a restriction on the right to go abroad, ex necessitae it involves violation of freedom of speech and expression. It is no doubt, true that going abroad may be necessary in a given case for exercise of freedom of speech and expression, but that does not make it an

integral part of the right of free speech and expression.

We cannot, therefore, accept the theory that a peripheral or concomitant right which facilitates the exercise of a named fundamental right or gives it meaning and substance or makes its exercise effective, is itself a guaranteed right included within the named fundamental right. The right to go abroad cannot, therefore, be regarded as included in freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) on the theory of peripheral or concomitant right.

Finally

We have already examined this ground while discussing the constitutional validity of Section 10(3)(c) with reference to Article 21 and shown how the statement made by the learned Attorney General on behalf of the Government of India has cured the impugned Order of the vice of non-compliance with the audi alteram partem rule.

It is true, and we must straightaway concede it, that merely because a statutory provision empowering an authority take action in specified circumstances is constitutionally valid as not being in conflict with any fundamental rights, it does not give a carte blanche to the authority to make any order it likes so long as it is within the parameters laid down by the statutory provision. Every order made under a statutory provision must not only be within the authority conferred by the statutory provision, but must also stand the test of fundamental rights. Parliament cannot be presumed to have intended to confer power on an authority to act in contravention of fundamental rights. It is a basic constitutional assumption underlying every statutory grant of power that the authority on which the power is conferred should act constitutionally and not in violation of any fundamental rights.

It would thus be clear that though the impugned Order may be within the terms of Section 10(3)(c), it must nevertheless not contravene any fundamental rights and if it does, it would be void. Now, even if an order impounding a passport is made in the interests of public order, decency or morality, the restriction imposed by it may be so wide, excessive or disproportionate to the mischief or evil sought -to be averted that it may be considered unreasonable and in that event, if the direct and inevitable consequence of the Order is to abridge or take away freedom of speech and expression, it would be violative of Article 19(1)(a) and would not be protected by Article 19(2) and the same would be the position where the order is in the interests of the general public but it impinges directly and inevitably on the freedom to carry on a. profession in which case it would contravene Article 19(1)(g) without being saved by the provision enacted in Article 19(6).

But we do not think that the impugned Order in the present case violates either Article 19(1)(a) or Article 19(1)(g). What the impugned Order does is to impound the passport of the petitioner and thereby prevent her from going abroad and at the date when the impugned order was made there is nothing to show that the petitioner was intending to go abroad for the purpose of exercising her freedom of speech and expression or her right to carry on her profession as a journalist. The direct and inevitable consequence of the

impugned order was to impede the exercise of her right to go abroad and not to interfere with her freedom of speech and expression or her right to carry on her profession.

But we must hasten to point out that if at any time in the future the petitioner wants to go abroad for the purpose of" exercising her freedom of speech and expression or for carrying on her profession as a journalist and she applies to the Central Government to release the passport, the question would definitely arise whether the-refusal to release or in other words, continuance of the impounding of the passport is in the interests of public order, decency or morality in the first case, and in the interests of the general public in the second, and the restriction thus imposed is reasonable so as to come within the protection of Article 19(2) or Article 19(6). That is, however, not the question before us at present.

We may observe that if the impugned Order impounding the passport of the petitioner were violative of her right to freedom of speech and expression or her right to carry on her profession as a journalist, it would not be saved by Article 19(2) or Article 19(6), because the impounding of the passport for an indefinite length of time would clearly constitute an unreasonable restriction. Now, it is true that the passport of the petitioner was impounded on the ground that her presence was likely to be required in connection with the proceeding before the Commission of Inquiry and the initial time limit fixed for the Commission of Inquiry to submit its report was 31st December, 1977, but the time limit could always be extended by the Government and the experience of several Commissions of Inquiry set up in this country over the last twenty-five years shows that hardly any Commission of Inquiry has been able to complete its report within the originally appointed time. Whatever might have been the expectation in regard to the duration of the Commission of Inquiry headed by Mr. Justice Shah at the time when the impugned Order was made, it is now clear that it has not been possible for it to complete its labours by 31st December, 1977 which was the time limit originally fixed and in fact its term has been extended upto 31st May, 1978. The period for which the passport is impounded cannot, in the circumstances, be said to be definite and certain and it may extend to an indefinite point of time. This would clearly make the impugned order unreasonable and the learned Attorney General appearing on behalf of the Central Government, therefore, made a statement that in case the decision to impound the passport of the petitioner is confirmed by the Central Government after hearing the petitioner, "the duration of the impounding will not exceed a period of six months from the date of the decision that may be taken on the petitioner's representation". It must be said in fairness to the Central Government that this was a very reasonable stand to adopt, because in a democratic society governed by the rule of law, it is expected of the Government that it should act not only constitutional and legally but also fairly and justly towards the citizen.

3. A.K. Roy

The case dealt with the question of whether an Ordinance passed by the President in exercise of his executive powers was a law under Article 21 and whether it can be used to

deprive a person of his personal life and liberty and thus in violation of Articles 14, 19 and 21. Also, whether a preventive detention law violates Articles 14, 19, 21 and 22. In addition, whether a preventive detention law take away the right to be represented by a legal counsel as envisaged under Article 22 an can therefore, specifically, be considered constitutional and broadly because in doing away with due process, the principle of natural Justice is violated

It was held that an ordinance is a law, albeit the only distinction being that it is for a limited duration unless ratified by the legislature. It is exercise of the legislative power of the president. It was said that a legislation, may it be parliamentary or presidential, cannot under any circumstances take away or abridge the fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution.

The only obligation on the Government is to lay the ordinance before both Houses of Parliament and the only distinction which the Constitution makes between a law made by the Parliament and an ordinance issued by the President is that whereas the life of a law made by the Parliament would depend upon the terms of that law, an ordinance, by reason of Sub-clause (a) of Clause (2), ceases to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of Parliament, unless resolutions disapproving it are passed by both Houses before the expiration of that period.

Clause,(3) of Article 13 provides that in Article 13, "law" includes, inter alia, an ordinance, unless the context otherwise requires. In view of the fact that the context does not otherwise so require, it must follow from the combined operation of Clauses (2) and (3) of Article 13 that an ordinance issued by the President under Article 123, which is equated by Clause (2) of that article with an Act of Parliament, is subject to the same constraints and limitations as the latter.

An ordinance which satisfies these pre-conditions has the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament. Article356 empowers the President to issue a proclamation in case of failure of constitutional machinery in the States. By Article 357(1)(a), if by a proclamation issued under Article 356(1) it has been declared that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament, it is competent for the Parliament to confer on the President the power of the Legislature of the State to make laws.

An ordinance issued by the President or the Governor is as much law as an Act passed by the Parliament and is, fortunately and unquestionably, subject to the same inhibitions.

The marginal note to Article 357 speaks of the "Exercise of Legislative powers" under the proclamation issued under Article 356. There cannot be the slightest doubt that not only the power exercised by the President under Article 357(1)(a) but even the power exercised by his delegate under that clause is legislative in character.

The contention that the word 'law' in Article 21 must be construed to mean a law made by the legistature only and cannot include an ordinance, contradicts directly the express provisions of

Articles 123(2) and 367(2) of the Constitution. Besides, if an ordinance is not law within the meaning of Article 21, it will stand released from the wholesome and salutary restraint imposed upon the legislative power by Article 13(2) of the Constitution. The word 'established' is used in Article 21 in order to denote and ensure that the procedure prescribed by the law must be defined with certainty in order that those who are deprived of their fundamental right to life or liberty must know the precise extent of such deprivation.

Another answer to Shri Garg's contention is that what Article 21 emphasise is that the deprivation of the right to life or liberty must be brought about by a State-made law and not by the rules of natural law. We must therefore reject the contention that Ordinance is not 'law' within the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution.

The Constitution does not impose by its terms any inhibition on the ordinance-making power that it shall not be used to deal with a subject matter which is already covered by a law made by the Legislature. There is no justification for imposing any such restriction on the ordinance-making power, especially when an ordinance, like any law made by the Legislature, has to comply with the mandate of Artice 13(2) of the Constitution. As regards Articles 14, 19 and 21 being reduced to a dead letter, we are unable to appreciate how an ordinance which is subject to the same constraints as a law made by the Legislature can, in its practical operation, result in the obliteration of these articles. The answer to this contention is again to be found in the provisions contained in Article 13(2).

Preventive Detention

The practical need and reality of the laws of preventive detention find concrete recognition in the provisions of Article 22 of the Constitution. It is evident that the power of preventive detention was conferred by the Constitution in order to ensure that the security and safety of the country and the welfare of its people are not put in peril. So long as a law of preventive detention operates within the general scope of the affirmative words used in the respective entries of the union and concurrent lists which give that power and so long as it does not violate any condition or restriction placed upon that power by the Constitution, the Court cannot invalidate that law on the specious ground that it is calculated to interfere with the liberties of the people.

the question whether a law of preventive detention is unconstitutional for the reason that it violates the freedoms conferred by Articles 14, 19, 21 and 22 of the Constitution is also concluded by the decision in Haradhan Saha. ……..Accordingly, we find it impossible to accept the argument that the 'National Security Act, which is in part materia with the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, is unconstitutional on the ground that, by its very nature, it is generally violative of Articles 14, 19, 21 and 22.

Laws of preventive detention cannot, by the back-door, introduce procedural measures of a punitive kind. Detention without trial is an evil to be suffered, but to no greater extent and in no greater measure than is minimally necessary in the interest of the country and the community. It

is neither fair nor just that a detenu should have to suffer detention in "such place" as the Government may specify. The normal rule has to be that the detenu will be kept in detention in a place which is within the environs of his or her ordinary place of residence.

Besides, keeping a person in detention in a place other than the one where he habitually resides makes it impossible for his friends and relatives to meet him or for the detenu to claim the advantage of facilities like having his own food. The requirements of administrative convenience, safety and security may justify in a given case the transfer of a detenu to a place other than that where he ordinarily resides, but that can only be by way of an exception and not as a matter of general rule. Even when a detenu is required to be kept in or transferred to a place which is other than his usual place of residence, he ought not to be sent to any far off place which, by the very reason of its distance, is likely to deprive him of the facilities to which he is entitled. Whatever smacks of punishment must be scrupulously avoided in matters of preventive detention.

(i) the right of legal representation; (ii) the right of cross examination and (iii) the right to present his evidence in rebuttal. These rights undoubtedly constitute the core of just process because without them, it would be difficult for any person to disprove the allegations made against him and to establish the truth.

But there are two considerations of primary importance which must be borne in mind in this regard. There is no prescribed standard of reasonableness and therefore, what kind of procedural rights should be made available to a person in any proceeding depends upon the nature of the proceeding in relation to which the rights are claimed. The kind of issues involved in the proceeding determine the kind of rights available to the persons who are parties to that proceeding. Secondly, the question as to the availability of rights has to be decided not generally but on the basis of the statutory provisions which govern the proceeding, provided of course that those provisions are valid.

It has been stated that on being arrested, a person does not surrender all his rights and privileges and still has to be treated with human dignity and civilized norms of behaviour.

On a combined reading of Clauses (1) and (3) (b) of Article 22, it is clear that the right to consult and to be defended by a legal practitioner of one's choice, which is conferred by Clause (1), is denied by Clause 3(b) to a person who is detained under any law providing for preventive detention. Thus, according to the express intendment of the Constitution itself, no person who is detained under any law, which provides for preventive detention, can claim the right to consult a legal practitioner of his choice or to be defended by him.

In view of this, it seems to us difficult to hold, by the application of abstract, general principles or on a priori considerations that the detenu has the right of being represented by a legal practitioner in the proceedings before the Advisory Board, Since the Constitution, as originally enacted, itself contemplates that such a right should not be made available to a detenu, it cannot be said that the denial of the said right is unfair, unjust or unreasonable.

If Article 22 were silent on the question of the right of legal representation, it would have been possible, indeed right and proper, to hold that the detenu cannot be denied the right of legal representation in the proceedings before the Advisory Boards. It is unfortunate that courts have been deprived of that choice by the express language of Article 22(3)(b) read with Article 22(1).

To read the right of legal representation in Article 22(5) is straining the language of that article. Clause (5) confers upon the detenu the right to be informed of the grounds of detention and the right to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. That right has undoubtedly to be effective, but it does not carry with it the right to be represented by a legal practitioner before the Advisory Board merely because, by Section 10 of the National Security Act, the representation made by the detenu is required to be forwarded to the Advisory Board for its consideration.

The reason behind the provisions contained in Artice 22(4)(b) of the Constitution clearly is that a legal practitioner should not be permitted to appear before the Advisory Board for any party. Permitting the detaining authority or the Government to appear before the Advisory Board with the aid of a legal practitioner or a legal adviser would be in breach of Article 14, if a similar facility is denied to the detenu. We must therefore make it clear that if the detaining authority or the Government takes the aid of a legal practitioner or a legal adviser before the Advisory Board, the detenu must be allowed the facility of appearing before the Board through a legal practitioner

4. Francis Mullin (not discussed by her. Sent by her in a mail as MP Singh had mentioned in his class)

Article 29 & 30

1. TMA Pai

DPSP and FR relationship

1. Minerva Mills